Skip to main content
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences logoLink to Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
. 2004 Feb 7;271(Suppl 3):S25–S26. doi: 10.1098/rsbl.2003.0083

The Prisoner's Dilemma and polymorphism in yeast SUC genes.

Duncan Greig 1, Michael Travisano 1
PMCID: PMC1810003  PMID: 15101409

Abstract

The SUC multigene family of the single-celled yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae is polymorphic, with genes varying both in number and activity. All of the genes encode invertase, an enzyme that is secreted to digest sucrose outside of the cell. This communal endeavour creates the potential for individual cells to defect (cheat) by stealing the sugar digested by their neighbours without contributing the enzyme themselves. We measured the fitness of a defector, with a deleted suc2 gene, relative to an otherwise isogenic cooperator, with a functional SUC2 gene. We manipulated the level of social interaction within the community by varying the population density and found that the defector is less fit than the cooperator at low levels of sociality but more fit in dense communities. We propose that selection for antisocial cheating causes SUC polymorphism in nature. The infamous Prisoner's Dilemma game shows that social behaviour is generally unstable, and the success of both cooperation and defection can vary continuously in time and space. The variation in SUC genes reflects constant adaptation to an ever-changing biotic environment that is a consequence of the instability of cooperation. It is interesting that social interactions can have a direct effect on molecular evolution, even in an organism as simple as yeast.

Full Text

The Full Text of this article is available as a PDF (74.8 KB).

Selected References

These references are in PubMed. This may not be the complete list of references from this article.

  1. Carlson M., Botstein D. Organization of the SUC gene family in Saccharomyces. Mol Cell Biol. 1983 Mar;3(3):351–359. doi: 10.1128/mcb.3.3.351. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  2. Denayrolles M., de Villechenon E. P., Lonvaud-Funel A., Aigle M. Incidence of SUC-RTM telomeric repeated genes in brewing and wild wine strains of Saccharomyces. Curr Genet. 1997 Jun;31(6):457–461. doi: 10.1007/s002940050230. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  3. Killingback T., Doebeli M. 'Raise the stakes' evolves into a defector. Nature. 1999 Aug 5;400(6744):518–518. doi: 10.1038/22913. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  4. Louis E. J. The chromosome ends of Saccharomyces cerevisiae. Yeast. 1995 Dec;11(16):1553–1573. doi: 10.1002/yea.320111604. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  5. Moxon E. R., Rainey P. B., Nowak M. A., Lenski R. E. Adaptive evolution of highly mutable loci in pathogenic bacteria. Curr Biol. 1994 Jan 1;4(1):24–33. doi: 10.1016/s0960-9822(00)00005-1. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  6. Naumov G. I., Naumova E. S., Sancho E. D., Korhola M. P. Polymeric SUC genes in natural populations of Saccharomyces cerevisiae. FEMS Microbiol Lett. 1996 Jan 1;135(1):31–35. doi: 10.1111/j.1574-6968.1996.tb07962.x. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  7. Nowak M., Sigmund K. Chaos and the evolution of cooperation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1993 Jun 1;90(11):5091–5094. doi: 10.1073/pnas.90.11.5091. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  8. Nowak M., Sigmund K. Oscillations in the evolution of reciprocity. J Theor Biol. 1989 Mar 7;137(1):21–26. doi: 10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80146-8. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  9. Pryde F. E., Louis E. J. Saccharomyces cerevisiae telomeres. A review. Biochemistry (Mosc) 1997 Nov;62(11):1232–1241. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  10. Roberts G., Sherratt T. N. Development of cooperative relationships through increasing investment. Nature. 1998 Jul 9;394(6689):175–179. doi: 10.1038/28160. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

Articles from Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences are provided here courtesy of The Royal Society

RESOURCES