Abstract
The program to immunize 210 million Americans against swine flu failed. It set back the Federal government's relations with state health agencies, private physicians, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the insurance industry. It increased mistrust of immunization programs and of government health programs in general.
The well-intentioned plan had far-reaching consequences because its scope and the speed with which it was implemented were overreactions to the threat. Its size magnified every one of its faults, legal, medical and political. Organizational and scientific capacity were less than expected. Local health agencies could not administer the program with the inadequate funds from HEW and pharmaceutical companies could not produce a safe, effective children's vaccine.
Because of the urgency given the program, Congress neglected the opposition of consumer advocates and state health officials, and did not spend time trying to include immunization against childhood disease in the swine flu program.
The failure illustrates the dangers of hasty decisions, of considering only direct medical costs and benefits and not social and political effects on health policy, of launching a public health program whose scientific basis is weak and whose administrative requirements are untested.
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Selected References
These references are in PubMed. This may not be the complete list of references from this article.
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