Abstract
Students of philosophy have struggled with the question, “Why should I be moral?” Many diverse theorists have constructed elaborate logical arguments that explain why people in general should behave morally, but have had difficulty explaining why any given individual, safe from detection or retribution, should behave in a moral fashion. To avoid this problem, the notion of a supernatural deity (one who is always watching and thus removes the notion of nondetection and nonretribution) has been introduced by numerous thinkers. Philosophical systems that pride themselves on being based only on natural phenomena, however, can make no such recourse (leading to the charge, particularly from the religious, that without a god concept there can be no morality). Naturalistic humanists and behavior analysts are two groups who have found themselves unable to invoke a deity and thus face the question “Why should I behave morally?” Parallel attempts from both camps will be described and analyzed, with the conclusion being drawn that although such naturalists may not be better off than their more religious friends, they are certainly no worse off.
Keywords: morality, selection, behavior analysis
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