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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2011 Aug 8.
Published in final edited form as: Evolution. 2010 Aug 19;64(10):2840–2854. doi: 10.1111/j.1558-5646.2010.01033.x

Figure 4.

Figure 4

Individuals compete in a density-regulated neighborhood wherein the total number of individuals is kept at a constant value, K. In this case, each regulation group is composed of two social groups. The fitness effects in the figure are b = 0.8 and c = 0.2, and altruists are designated in light gray. After selection, K individuals are chosen at random to form the next generation such that each neighborhood contributes the same proportion of individuals. After density regulation, groups retain their same post-selection relative sizes within each neighborhood, but their absolute size is constrained by K. Altruism evolution is impeded by the inability of altruist-rich regulation groups to contribute more than altruist-poor neighborhoods to the next generation, although this constraint is weakened by larger spatial scales of regulation. For comparison, final frequency of altruists in the figure would be p = 0.31 under strict local density regulation.