Abstract
Across 3 experiments, the authors examined the effects of temporal distance on negotiation behavior. They found that greater temporal distance from negotiation decreased preference for piecemeal, single-issue consideration over integrative, multi-issue consideration (Experiment 1). They also found that greater temporal distance from an event being negotiated increased interest in conceding on the lowest priority issue and decreased interest in conceding on the highest priority issue (Experiment 2). Lastly, they found increased temporal distance from an event being negotiated produced a greater proportion of multi-issue offers, a greater likelihood of conceding on the lowest priority issue in exchange for a concession on the highest priority issue, and greater individual and joint outcomes (Experiment 3). Implications for conflict resolution and construal level theory are discussed.
Keywords: construal, time, psychological distance, negotiation, integrative
A large amount of negotiation research has been dedicated to identifying the factors that either facilitate or hinder the resolution of interpersonal conflict (see Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003, for reviews). A general conclusion of much of this research is that integrative behaviors are a key means by which optimal negotiation outcomes are achieved—behaviors that include, for example, making trade-offs across low- and high-priority issues (Kelley & Schenitzki, 1972). Integrative outcomes are said to be optimal for the resolution of interpersonal conflict because they maximize utility, foster positive relationships between negotiators, and increase the chances that the parties will follow through on any agreement reached (Pruitt, 1981). Negotiation researchers have therefore recognized the importance of identifying the factors that facilitate integrative behavior. The current study examines the proposition that temporal distance from the realization of negotiated agreements promotes integrative behavior during the negotiation process.
Integrative Behavior
Several lines of research have demonstrated that making offers in a piecemeal (one issue at a time) rather than a multi-issue fashion interferes with integrative agreements (Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kelley, 1966; Yukl, Malone, Hayslip, & Pamin, 1976). This classic work on issue consideration has shown that negotiators who are able to deal with multiple issues in a more simultaneous fashion are more willing to concede on low-priority issues in exchange for concessions on high-priority issues (logrolling) and, as a result, achieve higher joint outcomes. Considering issues in a more localized, discrete manner interferes with negotiators’ ability to distinguish between low-priority and high-priority issues when making concessions. As a result, negotiators who deal with issues separately are less likely to make appropriate trade-offs on low-priority issues in exchange for concessions from the other party on high-priority issues (Froman, & Cohen, 1970; Pruitt, 1981).
More recent research has continued to demonstrate the negative consequences of piecemeal issue consideration during negotiation, with special emphasis often placed on the interplay between issue consideration and other important negotiation variables (Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993). Notably, Weingart et al. (1993) examined the benefits of simultaneously rather than sequentially considering issues when individuals had different types of motivational orientation. A simultaneous approach to the issues led to better joint outcomes when individuals had an individualistic orientation; when negotiators had a cooperative orientation, negotiators were still able to achieve high joint outcomes even when issues were considered one at a time. This suggests that factors that promote a more integrative approach toward negotiation will mainly produce benefits for those with an individualistic orientation, as negotiators with a cooperative orientation seem ready and able to obtain mutually beneficial agreements.
Temporal Distance in Negotiation
Time has long been regarded as an important factor in negotiation (Carnevale, O’Connor, & McCusker, 1993; Druckman, 1994). However, there is a relatively small amount of research on the impact of temporal distance on negotiation. Most studies of time have examined the issue of time pressure, defined as the amount of time available to negotiate or the costs of continued negotiation (e.g., De Dreu, 2003; Lytle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999; Moore, 2004; Olekalns & Smith, 2003). A set of studies conducted by Okhuysen, Galinsky, and Uptigrove (2003) examined the effects of temporal distance from the realization of negotiated agreements on the quality of outcomes reached in negotiation. Okhuysen et al. found that dyads that negotiated over an agreement that was set to take effect in the distant future (1 year) reached better joint outcomes than dyads that negotiated over an agreement that was set to take effect in the near future (2 weeks). These researchers argued that as temporal distance increases, negotiators’ incentive to achieve an agreement that maximizes their positive outcomes or minimizes their negative outcomes should decrease, making it easier for them to concede on issues and reach integrative agreements. Okhuysen et al.’s findings are important because they demonstrate that increased temporal distance from the realization of negotiated outcomes make it easier for individuals to reach better joint outcomes. These findings also raise new questions regarding the specific aspects of the negotiation process that are affected by temporal distance and the role these aspects play as mediators of the effect of temporal distance on joint outcomes. Are dyads more likely or less likely to rely on single-issue or multi-issue offers when negotiating distant future outcomes than near future outcomes? How does temporal distance affect the kind of concessions negotiators are willing to make? Is the willingness to make concessions on low-priority versus high-priority issues similarly or differently affected by temporal distance? The present research addresses these questions within the framework of construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003).
Temporal Construal
According to construal level theory (CLT; N. Liberman et al., in press; Trope & Liberman, 2003), people construe objects and events differently depending on their distance from them. From a distant perspective, people form high-level, more abstract construals of objects and events. Construing an object or event at a higher level involves extracting the perceived essence, gist, or summary of the given information about the object or event (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Schul, 1983). Because higher level processing entails extracting the core aspects of an object or event, it involves emphasizing primary, critical features over secondary, incidental features. To distinguish between the primary and secondary features of an object or event, higher level processing first involves a global consideration of the available information about the object or event (“seeing the forest rather than the trees”) and then a focus on the relations among the information (Hayes-Roth, 1977; Reder & Anderson, 1980; Schul, 1983). Therefore, high-level construals may be regarded as a by-product of integrating separate features of an object or event within a structured representation that emphasizes more primary than secondary information. From a proximal perspective, in contrast, people form more concrete, low-level construals of objects and events. These construals are less structured and fail to integrate separate aspects of objects and events. Therefore, low-level construals allow for a greater relative emphasis on secondary information about objects and events than high-level construals. For example, an aspect such as “air conditioning in the employee lounge” might identify a secondary, low-level feature of an object (“work contract”). Conceptualizing the same object at a higher level construal (“job satisfaction”) renders such a feature less relevant and makes other aspects more prominent, such as “the amount of paid sick days.”
Consistent with this analysis, research has shown that greater temporal distance from objects and events promotes a more global consideration of information and more emphasis on essential rather than peripheral features of objects and events (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; also see Smith & Trope, 2006). For example, Förster et al. (Studies 2 and 3) found that participants who envisioned their lives and imagined themselves engaging in a visual task in the distant future (a year later) as opposed to the near future (next day) subsequently exhibited increased perceptual integration and recognition of images out of a fragmented visual stimulus. In a similar vein, N. Liberman, Sagristano, and Trope (2002) found that a temporally distant perspective from an event fostered more inclusive processing of information related to the event. For example, N. Liberman et al. (Study 1) found that participants who imagined engaging in several activities (e.g., having a yard sale, going on a camping trip) in the distant future (next year) as opposed to the near future (upcoming weekend) used broader categories to classify objects related to the activities. Presumably, individuals with a temporally distant perspective exhibited a greater breadth of categorization because they disregarded the incidental features of each object, which typically isolate them from one another, and focused instead on the fewer essential or defining features of the objects, which unite them together.
Several lines of research have also shown that increased temporal distance from events and objects activates higher levels of construal when making evaluations and judgments about those events and objects. For example, N. Liberman and Trope (1998, Study 1) found that when individuals thought about engaging in activities (e.g., making a list, washing clothes) in the distant future (sometime next year) as opposed to the near future (tomorrow), they preferred to identify activities in terms of the superordinate end-states that could be achieved from the activities (getting organized, removing odors from clothes) rather than the subordinate means that could be used to carry out the activities (writing things down, putting clothes into the machine). In another set of studies, Trope and Liberman (2000) had individuals decide for the near or distant future between tasks that differed in the valence associated with the primary features and secondary features of the tasks. Results showed that individuals that decided for the distant future gave more weight to the primary features over secondary features when reporting their evaluations and preferences between the tasks (Trope & Liberman, 2000).
Temporal Construal and Negotiation
Overall, research in support of CLT suggests that decision makers with a temporally distant perspective are more likely to focus on the big picture as opposed to the incidental details when making a decision, resulting in more weight being given to primary and essential information when making a decision. It is important to note, however, that these consequences of a temporally distant perspective have only been studied within the context of individual decision making. Nevertheless, CLT is meant to be a general theory that applies to all types of real-life decisions in which the available options entail a trade-off between one’s primary and secondary interests, including decisions by dyads and groups (Trope & Liberman, 2000).
In the current research, we relied on CLT to offer some insights into how temporal distance might affect negotiation behavior. The present research is not a test of construal level theory per se, but rather we focus on whether the theory can provide some insights into negotiation behavior. Specifically, we investigated how temporal distance from the realization of a negotiated agreement promotes a more structured approach toward the issues during negotiation. It is important to note that temporal distance from the realization of a negotiated agreement can be activated in several ways. In particular, temporal distance is often manifest in the nearness of a negotiation session in time (e.g., a meeting today versus next month) or the closeness in time between a negotiation session and the point in time when the negotiated agreement is to be implemented. To illustrate this distinction, we offer the now classic negotiation example of a couple that is planning a vacation (Pruitt, 1981). A couple might have opposing preferences for the vacation and they might set a date in the near or distant future to sit down and try to resolve their differences for the vacation. Moreover, a couple might try settling their differences for a vacation that is set to occur in the near or distant future. In both cases, when temporal distance is increased, the realization of whatever agreement that is reached is also pushed farther into the future. As a result, a temporally distant perspective, regardless of how it is induced, should promote a more structured consideration of the issues. As negotiators’ construal of information about the agreement becomes more structured, they should be better able to integrate separate aspects or features of the agreement and emphasize more primary rather than secondary issues within the agreement. Therefore, we hypothesized that a temporally distant perspective from the realization of a negotiated agreement would promote less single-issue offers (separate consideration of issues) and more appropriate, systematic concessions that indicate concessions on low-priority issues in exchange for concessions on high-priority issues (cf. Kelley, 1966; Kelley & Schenitzki, 1972).
Three experiments were designed to test these hypotheses. In Experiment 1, we tested whether greater temporal distance from a negotiation decreases preference for single-issue consideration relative to preference for multi-issue consideration during the negotiation. In Experiment 2, we tested whether increased temporal distance from an event being hypothetically negotiated increases willingness to make a concession on the lowest priority issue and decreases willingness to make a concession on the highest priority issue. In Experiment 3, we tested whether increased temporal distance from an event being negotiated through non-face-to-face discussion produces less single-issue offers (relative to multi-issue offers) and more complete concessions on the lowest priority issue in exchange for complete concessions from the other party on the highest priority issue.
Experiment 1: Does Temporal Distance Affect Preference for Issue Consideration?
Negotiators with a temporally near rather than distant perspective are likely to process information related to an agreement in a more localized, fragmented, and unstructured manner. Consequently, negotiators with a near rather than distant perspective are likely to find it more difficult to craft multi-issue offers instead of single-issue offers. In light of this, we hypothesized that as negotiators’ temporal perspective was decreased, they would find an approach that did not revolve around integrating issues (piecemeal issue consideration) more appealing than an approach that did revolve around integrating issues (simultaneous issue consideration). The current experiment tested this hypothesis.
Method
Participants
Participants were 43 students (12 men, 31 women) enrolled in a psychology course at New York University, who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. We included the gender of the participant as a factor for all of the analyses and controlled for gender in all analyses, and the pattern of results was unchanged in both cases. Thus, the gender of participants is not discussed further.
Design
Type of issue consideration (piecemeal vs. simultaneous) was the within-participant variable. Temporal perspective (near vs. distant) and order of the presentation for the dependent measure (piecemeal first vs. simultaneous first) were the between-participants variables. No order differences emerged for any of the analyses reported. There were 23 participants in the temporally near perspective cell and 20 participants in the temporally distant perspective cell.
Negotiation Task
For this task, the role-playing exercise Towers Market was used. This task was developed for multi-issue group decision making. Previous researchers who have used this task (e.g., Weingart et al., 1993) have asked participants to assume the roles of representatives of four stores that are interested in opening a joint market in which each store is separate, but common areas are shared. The stores include a grocery, liquor store, florist, and bakery. Each merchant’s decision to join the market is contingent on how the market would be managed. There are five issues that remain to be agreed on at a meeting before any decision is made to form the joint business. Typically, each participant is assigned to a different role with pre-specified interests and priorities designated by the assignment of numerical values to each alternative for each issue. Participants are then required to negotiate over the issues described in the exercise. To control for exposure to different information in the exercise, we held constant the role assignment by having each participant adopt the same role (florist); participants were led to believe that only they had been assigned to their particular role.
Procedure
Participants were invited into the lab to participate in a study on “interpersonal decision-making.” We ran participants in groups of 3 to 4 people.1 Participants assigned to the temporally near perspective condition were led to believe that they would engage in the live negotiation in the current session. Participants assigned to the temporally distant perspective condition were led to believe that they would engage in the live negotiation 1 month later. Participants were told that such role-playing exercises were useful for studying how individuals make decisions together. Participants were told that before they could participate in the live negotiation exercise, they had to make a decision about what the format would be during the negotiation. Specifically, participants were told that they would have to indicate their preference between requiring all negotiating parties to consider and make offers in a piecemeal fashion or requiring all negotiating parties to consider and make offers in a simultaneous fashion.
Measures
After reviewing the information about the role-playing exercise, participants were asked to make a choice between two format options for the negotiation exercise—piecemeal issue consideration or simultaneous issue consideration. Specifically, we borrowed the descriptions that were used by Weingart et al. (1993) to manipulate the type of issue consideration during the negotiation. However, unlike in the Weingart et al. experiments, in which the type of issue consideration was treated as an independent variable, we presented all participants in this experiment with descriptions of both types of issue consideration. The piecemeal issue format was labeled “vote on individual issues” and required all negotiators to discuss only one issue at a time. If negotiators adopted this format option, negotiators would not be allowed to discuss a new issue until the prior issue was decided by a formal vote. The simultaneous issue format was labeled “vote on a proposal incorporating all the issues” and required negotiators to discuss all of the issues together. If negotiators adopted this format option, negotiators would have to vote for or against proposals that included all of the issues (see Weingart et al., 1993, p. 508, for a complete description of each format option).
After reading the description of each format option, participants were asked to indicate their preference for using that particular format during the negotiation by means of the following 9-point rating scale: “Please indicate how much you would prefer this negotiation format (when you come back in a month)?” The answer scale ranged from 1 (definitely do not prefer) to 9 (definitely do prefer). In addition, we gave participants a forced choice by having them indicate which type of issue consideration they would prefer during the negotiation task. Responses to the preference items and responses to the forced choice item served as our dependent measures. Finally, we verified that our experimental groups did not differ in mood by means of the following 9-point rating scale: “How do you feel right now, at this very moment?” The answer scaled ranged from 1 (very bad) to 9 (very good).
Results
Preference for Issue Consideration
Participants’ preference ratings toward piecemeal and simultaneous issue consideration were analyzed using a 2 (temporal perspective: near vs. distant) × 2 (type of issue consideration: piecemeal vs. simultaneous) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the first factor as a between-participants variable and the last factor as a within-participant variable. Neither the main effect of temporal perspective (F < 1) nor the main effect of type of issue consideration, F(1, 41) = 1.40, p = .24, were significant. Analyses did reveal a significant Temporal Perspective × Type of Issue Consideration interaction effect, F(1, 41) = 7.59, p < .01 (see Figure 1). Specific comparisons revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally near perspective condition evidenced a greater preference for engaging in piecemeal issue consideration than participants in the temporally distant perspective condition (M = 6.26, SD = 2.00 vs. M = 4.95, SD = 2.06), t(41) = 2.11, p < .05, d = 0.64. Specific comparisons also revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition evidenced a greater preference in engaging in simultaneous issue consideration than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 5.80, SD = 2.21 vs. M = 4.13, SD = 1.91), t(41) = 2.65, p < .05, d = 0.83.
Figure 1.
Mean preference ratings as a function of temporal perspective (near vs. distant) and type of issue consideration (piecemeal vs. simultaneous; Experiment 1).
We also analyzed the within time comparisons for the preference for issue consideration. Specific comparisons revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally near perspective condition evidenced a greater preference in engaging in piecemeal issue consideration than simultaneous issue consideration, t(41) = 2.11, p < .05, d = 0.64. In contrast, participants in the temporally distant perspective condition preferred to engage in simultaneous issue consideration to the same extent as piecemeal issue consideration (t < 1).
Choice of Issue Consideration
We analyzed the proportion of participants who chose to engage in piecemeal versus simultaneous issue consideration. We found that 12 of the 20 participants (60%) in the temporally distant perspective group chose to engage in simultaneous issue consideration, whereas only 5 of 23 (22%) in the temporally near perspective group chose to engage in simultaneous issue consideration. This pattern of results produced a significant difference, χ2(1, N = 43) = 6.55, p = .01, between the groups.
Mood
Participants’ mood rating was entered into a one-way ANOVA, with temporal perspective condition (near vs. distant) as the between-participants variable. No significant difference emerged between the temporally near perspective group (M = 5.30, SD = 1.55) and temporally distant perspective group (M = 5.10, SD = 1.65; F < 1). Moreover, adjusting for this variable as a covariate did not change the pattern of the results reported in the previous paragraphs, suggesting that mood does not mediate the effect of temporal distance on preference for issue consideration.
Discussion
According to CLT, when individuals experience greater temporal distance from a negotiated agreement, two consequences should emerge. First, information related to any agreement that might be reached in the distant future should be considered in a more global manner. Second, information related to the primary aspects or features of any agreement should receive more weight than information related to the secondary aspects or features of the agreement. Accordingly, strategies that center on considering issues in a more packaged format should seem less attractive to negotiators with a temporally near rather than distant perspective, because individuals with a near perspective are likely to have a more fragmented and unstructured representation of the issues compared with those with a distant perspective. Given that negotiators with a temporally near perspective find it more difficult to consider issues simultaneously rather than separately, we expected they would find the prospect of being required to construct multi-issue offers throughout a negotiation less appealing than negotiators with a temporally distant perspective. Results confirmed our expectation, with participants in the temporally near perspective group exhibiting a greater preference for considering issues in piecemeal rather than simultaneous fashion.
In this experiment, we examined the effects of temporal distance from the realization of a negotiated agreement on interest in single-issue and multi-issue consideration by varying when negotiators expected to meet to try to reach an agreement. As noted earlier, temporal distance from the realization of a negotiated agreement can also vary as a function of when negotiators expect to implement or carry out any agreement that is reached. Generally, we assume that when individuals negotiate over issues pertaining to an event that is not expected to occur until the distant future (e.g., opening of a new market, start of a new work contract), any agreement that is reached on the issues will not be implemented or experienced until the event itself occurs (e.g., until the market opens, until the work contract begins). Just as greater temporal distance from when a negotiation is set to occur should activate a higher level construal of the issues (e.g., more global consideration of issues, more weight on primary issues), so should greater temporal distance from when the event surrounding the negotiation is set to occur.
In the next experiment, we examine the effects of temporal distance on concession behavior in a negotiation setting by exploring the consequences of greater temporal distance from when the event being negotiated over is set to occur. Specifically, in the next experiment we examined the weight that individuals with a temporally distant versus near perspective place on high-priority versus low-priority issues when making concessions during negotiation.
Experiment 2: Does Temporal Distance Affect Preference for Appropriate Concessions?
Whereas Experiment 1 demonstrated the increased inclination to approach a negotiation in a more integrative fashion as temporal perspective increased from a negotiated agreement, it did not address whether this approach emphasized more primary than secondary concerns. That is, we showed that individuals who had a temporally near rather than distant perspective were less likely to consider the issues in relation to each other (i.e., they preferred to consider issues separately). However, we did not examine whether such individuals would be less focused on their higher priority concerns. Because negotiators with a temporally distant perspective from the negotiated agreement are expected to construe the issues at a higher level, they should put more weight on their primary concerns than negotiators with a temporally near perspective. As a result, negotiators with a temporally distant rather than near perspective should exhibit less interest in reaching an agreement that requires a concession on a high-priority issue. Because negotiators with a temporally near perspective from the negotiated agreement are expected to construe the issues at a lower level, they should put more weight on their secondary concerns than negotiators with a temporally distant perspective. As a result, individuals with a temporally near rather than distant perspective from a negotiated agreement should exhibit less interest in reaching an agreement that requires a concession on a low-priority issue. The current experiment tested these hypotheses.
Method
Participants
Participants were 62 students (13 men, 49 women) at New York University, who participated for $5 or in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. We included the gender of the participant as a factor for all of the analyses and controlled for gender in all analyses, and the pattern of results was unchanged in both cases. Thus, the gender of participants is not discussed further.
Design
Temporal perspective (near vs. distant) and type of concession (low-priority issue vs. high-priority issue) were the between-participants variables. There were 15 or 16 participants in each of the cells. We borrowed a manipulation of motivational orientation used in previous negotiation research (O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1993)2 and instructed all participants to adopt an individualistic orientation.3
Negotiation Task
As in Experiment 1, the task for this experiment was the Towers Market role-playing exercise. Again, participants were told to take the perspective of one of the characters in the exercise and the role assignment was held constant in this experiment by assigning each participant to the same role (florist). The usage of the Towers Market exercise was ideal for our interest in this experiment because it has certain issues built into the description of the exercise that are of primary concern for each role in the exercise. All participants in the current experiment read statements throughout the description of the Towers Market exercise that conveyed that the highest priority issue for their role (florist) was how the clerks for the market would be trained. These statements included, “Your business is built on the expertise of your personnel,” and “It is essential to hire and train your own clerks.” As such, the issue of clerks had the highest potential point value assigned to it to convey its primary status (100). Participants did not read any statements that conveyed any special priority status to the issue of how the advertisement would be done for the market, and thus, the issue of advertisement had the lowest potential point value assigned to it to convey its secondary status (40). The issue of temperature, maintenance, and position fell in between the issue of clerks and advertisement in terms of their priority status, and thus, the appropriate potential point values (60, 60, 80) were assigned to convey their intermediate status. The maximum outcome score possible was 340 (see Appendix A).
Appendix A.
Point Value Assigned to Options for Each Issue (Experiment 2)
| Option | Point Value |
|---|---|
| Temperature | |
| A. 77° | 60 |
| B. 74° | 30 |
| C. 71° | 10 |
| D. 68° | 0 |
| E. 65° | 0 |
|
| |
| Advertising | |
| A. combined campaign, advertising for market as a whole, costs to be divided equally among the market merchants | 0 |
| B. combined campaign, advertising for market as a whole, to be paid according to percentage of the market’s gross profits contributed by the merchant | 40 |
| C. combined campaign, advertising the stores as individual units but on the same flyers, with each member given (and paying for) 1/4th of ad | 30 |
| D. separate campaign for each member, 6% of expected gross profits to be spent on advertising | 10 |
| E. separate campaign for each member, amount spent up to individual merchants | 20 |
|
| |
| Clerks | |
| A. hire by group, train by group, distribute equally, paid for by group | 0 |
| B. hire by group, train by group, distribute according to floor space, paid for by group | 0 |
| C. hire by group, train individually, distribute according to demand for service, paid for by group | 20 |
| D. hire individually, train individually, distribute according to demand for service, each merchant to pay from individual profits | 60 |
| E. hire individually, train individually, each merchant to decide how many clerks, each merchant to pay from individual profits | 100 |
|
| |
| Maintenance | |
| A. shared, each responsible for 1/4th of total costs | 0 |
| B. shared, each responsible for percentage according to floor space occupied | 60 |
| C. shared, each responsible for percentage according to floor space occupied, but with bakery paying double its percentage because of the nature of its carry-out business | 20 |
| D. separate, each responsible for own floor space, plus common area maintenance cost as a function of floor space occupied | 30 |
| E. separate, each responsible for own floor space plus equal contributions for common area maintenance | 10 |
|
| |
| Position | |
| A. spontaneous purchases near entrance | 80 |
| B. smaller departments near entrance | 60 |
| C. common area near entrance | 0 |
| D. convenient location for dept. with highest volume of sales | 0 |
| E. merchants stocking heavier products should be located near entrance/exits | 0 |
Procedure
As in Experiment 1, participants were invited to participate in a study on “interpersonal decision-making.” Participants were told that they would read a hypothetical negotiation exercise. The instructions explained that the experimenter was interested in individuals’ reactions to potential outcomes from a negotiation. Unlike Experiment 1, participants were not led to believe that they would engage in a live negotiation. Instead, participants read the exercise and were told that they would be presented with a possible proposal that they might have received had they actually engaged in a live negotiation.
Participants were randomly assigned to condition. As in Experiment 1, we varied the temporal perspective in the negotiation task. However, unlike in Experiment 1, we used a manipulation of temporal perspective within the description of the negotiation exercise itself, by varying when the event (“the opening of the market”) that the negotiation revolved around was set to occur. All participants read about a group of four business owners in negotiation about opening a joint store together. As described in the procedure section of Experiment 1, participants learned that five issues needed to be negotiated before any decision could be made about whether to open the joint business.
Participants assigned to the temporally near perspective condition read repeated statements throughout the description of the exercise that the opening of store would occur in 2 days. Participants assigned to the temporally distant perspective condition read repeated statements throughout the description of the exercise that the opening of the store would occur in 2 years. For example, some statements included in the description of the exercise were “The Market will have an open plan, with a common décor and will open in 2 days (2 years),” “You and the other merchants have agreed to meet to try to resolve these issues so that everyone can prepare to open the Market in 2 days (2 years),” and “P’s grocery, a successful East Side establishment, plans to open Towers Market in 2 days (2 years).”
Afterwards, participants were told to imagine that they received an offer that contained an option for each of the five issues on the table. The proposal contained participants’ most preferred option for four out of the five issues. For participants assigned to the low-priority issue concession condition, the fifth remaining issue (advertising) contained one of the participants’ nonpreferred options, amounting to a loss of 40 points from the total outcome score (see Appendix A). Specifically, participants assigned to the low-priority issue concession condition were asked the following:
Imagine you received the following proposal for the Market that will open in 2 days (2 years):
Temperature Option a Advertising Option a Clerks Option e Maintenance Option b Position Option a
For participants in the high-priority issue concession condition, the fifth remaining issue (clerks) contained one of the participants’ nonpreferred options, amounting to a loss of 80 points from the total outcome score (see Appendix A). Participants assigned to this high-priority issue concession condition were asked the following:
Imagine you received the following proposal for the Market that will open in 2 days (2 years):
Temperature Option a Advertising Option b Clerks Option c Maintenance Option b Position Option a
Measures
We measured participants’ interest in accepting the presented proposal by means of the following 6-point rating scales: “How unsatisfied/satisfied would you be with this proposal?” The answer scale ranged from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 6 (very satisfied). “How unlikely/likely would you be to reject this proposal?” (reverse scored). The answer scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 6 (very likely). “If you accepted this proposal, how much would you regret it later?” The answer scale ranged from 1 (completely regret it) to 6 (completely not regret it). “If you accepted this proposal, how much would you feel that the other parties took advantage of you?” (reverse scored). The answer scale ranged from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). We created an index of interest in accepting the offer by averaging each participant’s responses to the four items (α = .87). This served as our dependent measure.
Results
Participants’ interest in accepting the offer was analyzed using a 2 (temporal perspective: near vs. distant) × 2 (type of concession: low-priority issue vs. high-priority issue) ANOVA. None of the main effects were significant (Fs < 1). Analyses did reveal, however, a significant Temporal Perspective × Type of Concession interaction effect, F(1, 58) = 11.39, p = .001. Specific comparisons revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition evidenced more interest in accepting the offer that required a concession on the lowest priority issue than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 5.30, SD = 0.65 vs. M = 4.61, SD = 1.01), t(30) = 2.29, p = .03, d = 0.84. Specific comparisons also revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition evidenced less interest in accepting the offer that required a concession on the highest priority issue than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 4.57, SD = 0.75 vs. M = 5.17, SD = 0.47), t(28) = −2.62, p = .01, d = 0.99.
We also analyzed the within time comparisons for the different types of concessions. Specific comparisons revealed, as expected, that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition indicated less interest in accepting the offer that required a concession on the highest priority issue rather than a concession on the lowest priority issue (M = 4.57 vs. M = 5.30), t(29) = −2.90, p = .007, d = 1.08. In contrast, specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally near perspective condition indicated less interest in accepting the offer that required a concession on the lowest priority issue rather than a concession on the highest priority issue (M = 4.61 vs. M = 5.17), t(29) = −1.94, p = .06, d = 0.72.
Discussion
Overall, the findings from the current experiment are consistent with our hypotheses. On the basis of the tenets of CLT, we reasoned that individuals with a temporally distant perspective from a negotiated agreement would adopt a high-level construal of the issues, resulting in more weight being given to primary concerns. The pattern of results confirmed our expectations. Individuals who had a temporally distant perspective expressed less interest in accepting an agreement that involved a concession on a high-priority issue than individuals who had a temporally near perspective. We also reasoned that individuals with a temporally near perspective from a negotiated agreement would adopt a low-level construal of the issues, resulting in more weight being given to secondary concerns. Again, the pattern of results confirmed our expectations. Individuals who had a temporally near perspective expressed less interest in accepting the agreement that involved a concession on a secondary issue than individuals who had a temporally distant perspective. In fact, individuals with a temporally near perspective exhibited a greater interest in making the more costly concession (concession on the high-priority issue rather than concession on the low-priority issue). Such a preference reversal is consistent with the notion that negotiators with a temporally near perspective are likely to think about the issues surrounding their negotiation in such a fragmented manner that they find it difficult to maintain the relative priorities attached to the respective issues. In contrast, negotiators with a temporally distant perspective are likely to think about the issues surrounding the negotiation in such a structured manner that they clearly distinguish between their central, primary concerns and their incidental, secondary concerns (see Druckman & Rozelle, 1975, for a related discussion).
The results from the current experiment provide preliminary evidence that the type of temporal perspective that negotiators adopt within a negotiation impacts the extent to which they are willing to make appropriate concessions. Our findings suggest that individuals who have a temporally distant perspective within a negotiation are more willing to accept concessions on low-priority issues as long as concessions on higher priority issues are not called for.
The results from this experiment complement the findings from the first experiment, as several studies have found that considering issues in a localized, piecemeal fashion rather than in a more integrative, packaged fashion leads to inappropriate concessions and poorer joint outcomes (e.g., Erickson, Holmes, Frey, Walker, & Thibaut, 1974; Froman & Cohen, 1970; Kelley, 1966; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1993). Negotiators who resolve issues sequentially tend to make compromise concessions irrespective of whether an issue is of low or high value, reflecting a more fragmented approach toward the negotiation. In contrast, negotiators who resolve issues through global trade-offs make concessions on issues of low importance in return for similar concessions from the other party, reflecting a more structured understanding of the negotiation (Pruitt, 1981). In a sense, considering issues one at a time makes people lose sight of the big picture, leading to poorer outcomes. Indeed, Weingart et al. (1993) found that participants who engaged in sequential consideration of issues argued more about specific positions on each issue while focusing less on the task of discovering joint outcomes. Taken together, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that a temporally distant perspective during a negotiation may be beneficial for reaching satisfactory agreements. When the issues being negotiated have integrative potential, our results suggest that a temporally distant perspective may facilitate more logrolling or concession making on low-priority issues in exchange for favorable outcomes on high-priority issues, resulting in more beneficial outcomes for both negotiators. Our third experiment uses live negotiation to investigate temporal perspective, the preference for piecemeal versus multi-issue consideration by negotiators, and the consequences for the types of concessions made and outcomes reached.
Experiment 3: Does the Impact of Temporal Distance on Issue Consideration and Concession Behavior Affect Outcomes?
Whereas the previous set of experiments provide converging evidence that negotiators who have a temporally distant perspective within a negotiation are more likely to adopt an integrative, structured approach toward their negotiation (i.e., less single-issue consideration and less concern with secondary issues), we have yet to demonstrate that this approach manifests itself in live negotiation. At this point, we can only conclude from Experiment 1 that a temporally distant perspective within negotiation decreases individuals’ preference for considering issues one at a time when given the choice. And although this finding is certainly meaningful because it adds to our understanding of what factors influence negotiators’ attraction to certain strategies when several alternatives are available (Tinsley, 2001; Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996), it does not directly speak to whether a distant perspective spontaneously inhibits the consideration of issues in a fragmented, piecemeal manner during negotiation. Furthermore, although Experiment 2’s findings clearly suggest that individuals who have a temporally distant perspective reach more integrative agreements than individuals who have a temporally near perspective, Experiment 2’s findings derive from responses to an imaginary scenario, which limits inferences to actual negotiation behavior.
Therefore, to address these limitations, Experiment 3 tested hypotheses in the context of live negotiation. On the basis of the tenets of CLT, we hypothesized that individuals who have a temporally distant rather than near perspective during live negotiation should exhibit a greater relative degree of multi-issue offers, more logrolling (concession on lowest priority issue while holding firm on highest priority issue), and better outcomes from the negotiation.
Method
Participants
Participants were 50 students enrolled in a psychology course at New York University, who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement as in Experiments 1 and 2. Twenty-five dyads took part in the experiment (13 female–female dyads, 4 male–male dyads, 8 female–male dyads). Data from 4 other dyads were collected but not included in the analyses because at least one of the individuals in the dyad had previously participated in a similar study. We included the gender composition of the dyad (same gender vs. mixed gender) as a factor for all of the analyses and controlled for gender composition in all analyses, and the pattern of results was unchanged in both cases. Thus, the gender composition of dyads is not discussed further.
Design
Participants were randomly assigned to either the temporally near or distant perspective condition. There were 12 dyads in the temporally near perspective cell and 13 dyads in the temporally distant perspective cell. As in Experiment 2, we instructed all participants to adopt an individualistic orientation (see Footnote 2). As used in previous negotiation research (e.g., O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Thompson, 1991), all participants were told that 10 cash prizes worth $10 each would be awarded to individuals at the end of the semester. Specifically, participants were told that they had the opportunity to win a minimum of 1 and a maximum of all 10 cash prizes on the basis of their negotiation performance. The probability of winning these prizes was thus related to the number of points the negotiators earned.4
Negotiation Task
For this experiment, we created a role-playing exercise that had the basic elements of a simulated bilateral negotiation as developed by Pruitt and Lewis (1975). This task asked pairs of participants to assume the roles of two students who are interested in doing an extra credit class presentation together. The two students are enrolled in a class in which the instructor has agreed to set aside time in the class schedule to allow pairs of students to give presentations to the class for extra credit. Each student’s decision to go through with the presentation is contingent on how several issues surrounding the presentation are resolved.
There are four issues that remain to be agreed on before any decision is made about whether to do the presentation. To rule out the possibility that any effects from our previous experiments were due to the content associated with the specific issues described in the exercises, in the current experiment we left unspecified the content of the issues and the content of each option for each issue. Although we provided examples of the types of issues that might be negotiated for a class presentation (who will say what, what the color of the background will be, the order of the things presented, whether each of them should receive the same amount of extra credit, what to wear during the presentation), the instructions stressed that the issues did not refer to these examples. Participants were told that the content of the issues was not relevant to do the negotiation task. That is, they were told that they did not need to know what the issues were in order to do the negotiation. Participants were simply told to assume that the four issues represented things that would be relevant for doing an extra credit presentation.
Participants were told they and the other person would be making offers and counteroffers back and forth between each other during the negotiation about which options should be adopted for the issues. Participants were told that they should try to come to an agreement about which options should be adopted for the extra credit presentation. That is, participants were told that they should try to come to a mutual agreement on the issues for the presentation. Specifically, participants were told to assume that if they did not reach an agreement on all of the issues, they would not be able to do the presentation.
For this negotiation exercise, we constructed a point-scoring scheme to illustrate participants’ position on these issues. Participants were told that the use of points might seem a bit artificial but that it would allow them to compare the value of possible agreements with that of other alternative agreements. Specifically, participants were told that the points indicated how desirable each option was for them for each issue. The two point schedules that were presented to each dyadic member are presented in Appendix B. Associated with each issue were five possible options, with an associated payoff.
Appendix B.
Point Value Assigned to Options for Each Issue (Experiment 3)
| Negotiator and option | Issue
|
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | |
| 1 | ||||
| A | 60 | 40 | 80 | 120 |
| B | 30 | 30 | 60 | 80 |
| C | 10 | 20 | 40 | 60 |
| D | 5 | 10 | 30 | 40 |
| E | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| 2 | ||||
| A | 0 | 10 | 10 | 0 |
| B | 5 | 40 | 30 | 10 |
| C | 10 | 60 | 40 | 20 |
| D | 30 | 80 | 60 | 30 |
| E | 60 | 120 | 80 | 40 |
In this negotiation exercise, each participant was assigned to a different role with prespecified interests and different priorities designated by the assignment of numerical values to each option for each issue. On one of the negotiator’s schedules, Issue 2 had the highest potential for payoff (120) and Issue 4 had the lowest potential (40); these priorities were reversed for the other negotiator. Thus, the task had integrative (logrolling) potential for negotiators (some issues were of differing importance to negotiators), and therefore, high joint outcomes could be achieved if the negotiators completely exchanged concessions on their high- and low-priority issues. Issues 1 and 3 were distributive issues (of equal priority to negotiators). A compromise agreement (the midpoint on each issue) yielded a joint outcome score of 260 points (130 points for each negotiator). The maximum joint outcome score possible was 390 (190 points for one negotiator and 200 points for the other negotiator). Participants were not given any information about opponent payoffs. Note that we did not tell participants that they should not mention the payoff schedules during negotiation, nor did we tell participants that they should mention the payoff schedule during negotiation. Rather, we simply let participants decide for themselves how they should go about discussing the issues and reaching an agreement. As Yukl et al. (1976) pointed out, in such situations, neither person can know for sure whether the other side is telling the truth when information is communicated about payoffs or priorities, as it would be possible to give false information to mislead the opponent if a negotiator desired to do so (e.g., see O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997).5
Procedure
As in our earlier experiments, participants were invited into the lab to participate in a study on non-face-to-face “interpersonal decision-making.” Each participant arrived separately and was assigned to a private room during the negotiation. Each participant was told that they would be engaged in a role-playing negotiation task over America Online (AOL) Instant Messenger with another participant. Participants received a screen name during the negotiation that was either “leftbooth” or “rightbooth.” We had participants engage in the negotiation over AOL for several reasons. First, we wanted to control for any variation in negotiation behavior due to visual cues of the other negotiator (e.g., gender, perceived physical attractiveness). Second, we wanted to ensure that all communication during the negotiation was coded properly, which is facilitated by having a computer transcript.
Participants were randomly assigned to condition. Each participant was given a folder that contained a brief description of the extra credit presentation and a payoff schedule. They were told the experiment was a laboratory simulation of a negotiation that might occur in the real world. They were told that the negotiation would involve several issues that were related to an extra credit class presentation, but the content of the issues was left unspecified, and their main task was to try to reach an agreement and to get as many points as possible from their agreement, in non-face-to-face discussion, on those issues.
As in Experiment 2, we varied the temporal perspective in the negotiation task by varying when the event that the negotiation supposedly revolved around (“the extra credit class presentation”) was set to occur. Similar to the manipulation that was used in Experiment 2, participants assigned to the temporally near perspective condition read repeated statements throughout the description of the exercise that the extra credit class presentation would occur the next day. Participants assigned to the temporally distant perspective condition read repeated statements throughout the description of the exercise that the extra credit class presentation would occur in 5 months. For example, some statements included in the description of the exercise were, “During this exercise, you will learn about your role, and read about an extra credit class presentation that you and another student are considering doing tomorrow (5 months from now),” and “The instructor for your class has agreed to set aside time in the class schedule tomorrow (5 months from now) to allow pairs of students to give presentations to the class for extra credit.” All other information in the exercise was the same for both conditions.
Following the instructions, the experimenter, who was blind to condition, reiterated to participants that the content of the issues was unimportant and that their main objective for the task was to maximize their outcome (number of points) from any agreement that was reached during the negotiation. Afterwards, participants immediately responded to a two-item questionnaire that asked them to verify that their concern during the negotiation was only with their own outcome and to indicate on a time line when the hypothetical extra credit presentation was set to take place. This was done to reinforce the individualistic motivational orientation and temporal perspective manipulation during the negotiation.
Participants were told they would have 20 min to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. If dyads were able to reach an agreement, then their names were entered into a lottery at the end of the semester. If a dyad was unable to reach an agreement, then neither participant was entered into the lottery. Following the negotiation, participants answered questions about the negotiation. After the negotiation, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Measures
The primary dependent measures were derived from the negotiation process and outcome. We obtained objective as well as subjective measures of the negotiation process and objective measures of the negotiation outcome.
Objective process measures
The online interaction of the dyad was coded from a digital transcript of the negotiation. Our main interest was with the relative frequency of single-issue and multi-issue offers. We counted the number of offers that were made that involved a single issue (e.g., “How about we go with Option E for Issue 2?”) and the number of offers that were made that involved multiple issues (e.g., “How about we do E for Issue 4 and go with A for Issue 1?”). On the basis of this count, we created an index of multi-issue offers by taking the number of multi-issue offers that occurred within a dyad and dividing them by the total number of offers that occurred within that dyad. We also counted the maximum number of issues that were involved in any offers that were made. This allowed us to index the extent to which dyads processed the issues in a global manner.
Each transcript was coded twice for the number of single-issue and multi-issue offers made, and an index of multi-issue offers was created from each set of codes. Both coders were blind to the experimental conditions. Agreement between the two raters was high (r = .92). Disagreements were resolved by the expert coder, yielding one set of codes for each transcript.
Subjective process measures
For the subjective measures of the negotiation process, participants responded to several items regarding their negotiation. First, we measured participants’ self-reported degree of single-issue consideration and multi-issue consideration by means of the following 7-point rating scales: “During your negotiation, how often did you make single-issue offers (i.e., offers that included an option for only one issue)?” “During your negotiation, how often did you make multi-issue offers (i.e., offers that included an option for more than one issue)?” Second, we measured participants’ self-reported degree of concession behavior on low- and high-priority issues by means of the following 7-point rating scales: “During your negotiation, how often did you make offers that involved you giving in or making a compromise on an issue that was worth a large amount of points to you?” “During your negotiation, how often did you make offers that involved you giving in or making a compromise on an issue that was worth a small amount of points to you?” The answer scales for all of the items ranged from 1 (not very often) to 7 (very often).
Outcome measures
Each dyad had three outcome measures. First, we created an index of whether dyads reached a fully logrolling agreement by counting the number of dyads in which both negotiators completely conceded on their lowest priority issue in exchange for a complete concession on their highest priority issue. This served as an indicator of whether dyads took advantage of the integrative potential of the negotiation. Second, we examined the number of points that each participant earned in his or her agreement (individual gain). Finally, we examined the number of points that each dyad earned in their agreement (joint gain).
Results
Length of Negotiation
The length of negotiation for dyads with a temporally near perspective (M = 11.70 min, SD = 5.61) versus temporally distant perspective (M = 14.10 min, SD = 4.66) was not significantly different, t(23) = −1.17, p = .26. All of the following analyses were rerun controlling for the length of negotiation, and the pattern of results were unchanged.
Objective Process Measures
First, the relative frequency of multi-issue offers made during negotiation was examined. Results showed, as expected, that dyads with a temporally distant perspective made a greater proportion of multi-issue offers (M = .56, SD = .25) than dyads with a temporally near perspective (M = .28, SD = .25), t(23) = 2.81, p = .01, d = 1.17. Second, we analyzed the number of single-issue and multi-issue offers that were made during negotiation using a 2 (temporal perspective: near vs. distant) ×2 (type of issue consideration: single-issue vs. multi-issue) repeated measures ANOVA, with the first factor as a between-participants variable and the last factor as a within-participant variable. The main effect of temporal perspective was not significant, F(1, 23) = 1.17, p = .29. However, the main effect of type of issue consideration was significant, F(1, 23) = 7.57, p = .01, with dyads making a greater number of single-issue offers (M = 6.84, SD = 4.50) than multi-issue offers (M = 4.24, SD = 3.67). Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a significant Temporal Perspective × Type of Issue Consideration interaction effect, F(1, 23) = 8.46, p = .008.
Specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally near perspective condition made a greater number of single-issue offers (M = 9.00, SD = 3.91) than participants in the temporally distant perspective condition (M = 4.85, SD = 4.18), t(23) = 2.56, p = .02, d = 1.07. Specific comparisons also revealed that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition made a greater number of multi-issue offers (M = 5.00, SD = 3.63) than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 3.42, SD = 3.68), although this latter difference failed to reach statistical significance, t(23) = 1.08, p = .29, d = 0.45. We also analyzed the within time comparisons for the number of different types of offers made. Specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally near perspective condition made a greater number of single-issue offers than multi-issue offers, t(11) = 3.28, p = .007, d = 1.98; no significant difference emerged for participants in the temporally distant perspective condition (t < 1).
The maximum number of issues that were involved in at least one offer during the negotiation was analyzed next (see Figure 2). On average, the maximum number of issues that were involved in an at least one offer was greater when dyads had a temporally distant perspective (M = 3.46, SD = 0.88) rather than a temporally near perspective (M = 2.17, SD = 1.03), t(23) = 3.39, p = .002, d = 1.41. When we analyzed the number of dyads that dealt with a maximum of one issue, two issues, three issues, or four issues at least once during negotiation, the following pattern emerged: Out of the 13 dyads that had a temporally distant perspective, 3 made an offer that dealt with two issues, 1 made an offer that dealt with three issues, and 9 made an offer that dealt with all four issues. Out of the 12 dyads that had a temporally near perspective, 3 never made an offer that dealt with more than one issue, 6 made an offer that dealt with two issues, 1 made an offer that dealt with three issues, and 2 made an offer that dealt with all four issues. Overall, this difference between conditions was significant, χ2(3, N = 25) = 8.43, p = .04.
Figure 2.
Percentage of dyads that dealt with a maximum of one, two, three, or four issues together at least once while making an offer during negotiation as a function of temporal perspective (near vs. distant; Experiment 3).
Subjective Process Measures
Next, we examined the subjective measures of the negotiation process. Participants’ self-reported degree of single-issue and multi-issue consideration was analyzed using a 2 (temporal perspective: near vs. distant) × 2 (type of issue consideration: single-issue vs. multi-issue) repeated measures ANOVA, with the first factor as a between-participants variable and the last factor as a within-participants variable. The main effect of temporal perspective was not significant, F(1, 23) = 2.28, p = .15. However, the main effect of type of issue consideration, F(1, 23) = 8.71, p = .007, was significant, with dyads reporting a greater degree of multi-issue consideration (M = 4.86, SD = 1.34) than single-issue consideration (M = 3.50, SD = 1.51). Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a significant Temporal Perspective × Type of Issue Consideration interaction effect, F(1, 23) = 7.13, p = .01.
Specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally near perspective condition reported a greater degree of single-issue consideration (M = 4.33, SD = 1.56) than participants in the temporally distant perspective condition (M = 2.73, SD = 1.01), t(23) = 3.08, p = .005, d = 1.28. Specific comparisons also revealed that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition reported a greater degree of multi-issue consideration (M = 5.23, SD = 1.27) than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 4.46, SD = 1.36), although this latter difference failed to reach significance, t(23) = 1.47, p = .16, d = 0.61. We also analyzed the within time comparisons for the self-reported degree of single-issue and multi-issue consideration. Although specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition reported a greater degree of multi-issue consideration than single-issue consideration, t(12) = 5.40, p< .001, d = 3.12, no significant difference emerged for participants in the temporally near perspective condition (t < 1).
Participants’ self-reported degree of concession behavior on low- and high-priority issues was analyzed using a 2 (temporal perspective: near vs. distant) × 2 (type of concession: low-priority vs. high-priority) repeated measures ANOVA, with the first factor as a between-participants variable and the last factor as a within-participant variable. Neither the main effect of temporal perspective, F(1, 23) = 1.40, p = .25, nor the main effect of type of concession (F < 1) were significant. However, as expected, there was a significant Temporal Perspective × Type of Concession Interaction effect, F(1, 23) = 4.32, p = .05. Although participants in the temporally distant perspective condition reported more offers that involved a concession on an issue that was worth a small amount of points (M = 4.85, SD = 0.63) than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 4.38, SD = 1.46), the difference was not significant, t(23) = 1.06, p = .30, d = 0.44. However, as expected, participants in the temporally distant perspective condition reported a fewer offers that involved a concession on an issue that was worth a large number of points (M = 3.96, SD = 1.13) than participants in the temporally near perspective condition (M = 5.08, SD = 1.36), t(23) = −2.25, p = .03, d = 0.94. We also analyzed the within time comparisons for the self-reported degree of concession behavior. Specific comparisons revealed that participants in the temporally distant perspective condition reported fewer offers that involved a concession on an issue that was worth a large amount of points than a concession on an issue that was worth a small amount of points, t(12) = −2.07, p = .06, d = 1.96; no significant difference emerged for participants in the temporally near perspective condition, t(11) = 1.09, p = .30, d = 0.66.
Outcome Measures
Twenty-three out of 25 of the dyads reached an agreement. The 2 dyads in the temporally distant perspective condition that did not reach an agreement indicated it was because of time constraints rather than because of impasse.6 For the 23 dyads that did reach an agreement, we first analyzed the number of cases in which the dyad reached a fully logrolling agreement (both negotiators completely conceded on their lowest priority issue in exchange for a complete concession on their highest priority issue). Although 10 out of the 11 dyads (90.9%) with a temporally distant perspective reached a fully logrolling agreement, only 6 of the 12 dyads (50%) with a temporally near perspective reached a fully logrolling agreement. This pattern of results produced a significant difference, χ2(1, N = 23) = 4.54, p = .03, between the groups.
Second, we analyzed the individual outcome of negotiators. Results revealed that negotiators with a temporally distant perspective earned a greater number of points (M = 182.50, SD = 19.93) than negotiators with a temporally near perspective (M = 162.29, SD = 34.23), t(44) = 2.42, p = .02, d = 0.73. Lastly, we analyzed the joint outcome of negotiators. Results revealed that dyads with a temporally distant perspective earned a greater number of points (M = 365.00, SD = 33.47) than dyads with a temporally near perspective (M = 324.58, SD = 56.91), t(21) = 2.05, p = .05, d = 0.89.7
Tests of Mediation
To test whether the proportion of multi-issue offers mediated the effects of temporal perspective on joint outcome, we performed a multiple regression analysis following Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998). First, temporal perspective significantly predicted joint outcome, β = .41, t(21) = 2.05, p = .05, and the proportion of multi-issue offers, β = .50, t(21) = 2.67, p = .01. Second, the proportion of multi-issue offers significantly predicted joint outcome, β = .74, t(20) = 4.43, p < .001, with temporal perspective held constant. Finally, temporal perspective no longer significantly predicted joint outcome (β = .03, t < 1). These results indicate that the proportion of multi-issue offers mediated the effects of temporal perspective on joint outcome. A Sobel test of mediation (Sobel, 1982) confirmed that the proportion of multi-issue offers significantly mediated the relationship between experimental condition and subsequent joint outcome (Sobel test = 2.37, p < .02). The full mediational model is displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 3.
Path diagram of hypothesized model, with standardized beta weights (Experiment 3). Temporal perspective conditions were dummy coded, such that 0 = temporally near perspective and 1 = temporally distant perspective. Direct effects (i.e., values without parentheses) represent the standardized regression coefficient (β). The value inside the parentheses represents the standard corrected regression coefficient. *p = .05. **p = .01. ***p < .001.
Discussion
The results from the current experiment conceptually replicate and extend the results from our first two experiments, in the context of live negotiation. Results based on the actual dialogue between negotiators as well as negotiators’ self-report of the negotiation process indicated that those who had a temporally distant perspective from the event being negotiated exhibited a greater relative degree of multi-issue offers than dyads that had a temporally near perspective. That is, the results showed that the overwhelming preference for single-issue consideration over multi-issue consideration often found in negotiation was virtually eliminated when negotiators had a temporally distant rather than near perspective. Moreover, the results further showed that dyads that had a temporally distant perspective reported more effort toward making offers that involved a concession on low- rather high-priority issues. Such appropriate concession behavior exhibited by dyads with a temporally distant perspective culminated in better outcomes for the respective parties.
Both the objective as well as subjective measures used in the current experiment indicated that dyads that had a temporally distant rather than near perspective were less likely to engage in single-issue, piecemeal consideration. It is interesting to point out, nevertheless, that the results across the two measures suggest somewhat of a discrepancy between negotiators’ behavior and their perceptions of their behavior. The objective measures were based on the dialogue between negotiators, whereas the subjective measures were based on negotiators’ self-report of their behavior during the negotiation. Results based on the objective measures showed that dyads with a temporally distant perspective made an equal number of single-issue and multi-issue offers, whereas dyads with a temporally near perspective made more single-issue offers. Results based on the subjective measures, however, showed that dyads with a temporally near perspective perceived the same degree of single-issue and multi-issue consideration, whereas dyads with a temporally distant perspective perceived a greater degree of multi-issue consideration. What might explain this difference?
One possibility might be that dyads that had a temporally distant perspective merely dealt with a greater number of issues when making multi-issue offers than dyads that had a temporally near perspective. Such an interpretation would be consistent with our results that showed that dyads with a temporally distant perspective dealt with more issues at least once while making an offer. If this explanation is correct, then dyads’ self-report of multi-issue consideration may have reflected the extent to which they considered all of the issues together when they made their multi-issue offers, rather than how many multi-issue offers they made per se. Indeed, when we first weighted each multi-issue offer that was made by a dyad by the number of issues contained in each offer and then analyzed the number of multi-issue offers that were made during the negotiation, results did in fact reveal that dyads in the temporally distant perspective group (M = 13.15, SD = 7.82) exhibited a greater amount of multi-issue consideration than dyads in the temporally near perspective group (M = 7.25, SD = 7.71), t(23) = 1.90, p = .07. Therefore, the pattern of results from both the objective and subjective measures is consistent with our theoretical framework, as both measures showed that negotiators who had a temporally distant rather than near perspective approached the negotiation in a more integrative manner.
It is also interesting to point out that although negotiators with a temporally distant perspective achieved better outcomes than negotiators with a near perspective, those with a near perspective still performed quite well relative to a simple compromise on each issue. That is, had negotiators simply accepted the middle ground on each issue, the outcome would have been 130 for each negotiator and the joint outcome would have been 260. Indeed, dyads with a temporally near perspective achieved a significantly better outcome (M = 324.58) as compared with the simple compromise outcome, t(11) = 3.93, p = .002, d = 2.34, suggesting that the difference in outcomes between negotiators with a temporally near and distant perspective is more a function of the positive impact of a distant perspective rather than the negative impact of a near perspective.
General Discussion
Across the current set of experiments, the data indicate that a temporally distant perspective from the realization of a negotiated agreement promotes a more structured approach toward the issues. First, we demonstrated that individuals who had a temporally distant perspective from a negotiation were equally inclined to require that proposals be made in a multi-issue or single-issue fashion, whereas individuals with a temporally near perspective were overwhelming in favor of proposals being made in a single-issue fashion (Experiment 1). Second, we demonstrated that individuals who had a temporally distant rather than near perspective from an event being negotiated were more interested in conceding on a low-priority issue and less interested in conceding on a high priority (Experiment 2). Finally, we demonstrated that dyads who had a temporally distant rather than near perspective from an event being negotiated during live negotiation made a greater proportion of multi-issue offers, dealt with more issues simultaneously, exhibited a greater likelihood of completely conceding on the lowest priority issue in exchange for a complete concession on the highest priority issue, and achieved greater individual and joint outcomes (Experiment 3).
According to CLT, as individuals experience greater temporal distance from an event, they should be more likely to form a high-level construal of the event. High-level construals are global and structured representations that clearly distinguish between the primary, central features and the secondary, peripheral features of the event. In the current set of experiments, the event we focused on was the realization of a negotiated agreement. As expected, our results showed that individuals who had a temporally distant rather than near perspective from the realization of a negotiated agreement were less likely to consider the issues surrounding the agreement in a localized, piecemeal manner and more likely to weigh their preferences for primary issues over their preferences for secondary issues when making a concession.
At this point, one may be left wondering why negotiation behavior and outcomes were affected by manipulating temporal perspective in the current set of experiments when all other information provided in our near and distant conditions was the same. CLT (Trope & Liberman, 2003) assumes that temporal construal is a generalized heuristic that evolves as a result of differences in what people typically know and do about near and distant future experiences. Usually, when people think about novel events that are expected to occur in the distant future, information about the secondary aspects of those events, including the context in which they will occur and alternative courses of action that might be taken in regard to them, only become reliable as people get closer in time to experiencing them. Thus, essential information about events typically receives the most attention when people are far from experiencing them, and most issues that revolve around primary goals are generally resolved long before people experience events. As a result, people are typically left devoting most of their attention to the many incidental details about events as they get closer to experiencing them, and most issues that revolve around secondary goals are not resolved until people get closer to experiencing events. For example, when people are planning a vacation, they typically resolve issues regarding their destination and mode of travel (primary concerns) long before the vacation is set to occur, whereas issues regarding meals and clothing (secondary concerns) are not resolved until they are actually on the vacation.
CLT assumes that an association forms between temporal distance and level of construal and that this association is then overgeneralized, causing people to continue to form high-level construals for distant future events and low-level construals for near future events, even when information about the secondary aspects is reliable. So, even in situations in which information about the secondary and primary aspects of an event (e.g., an agreement) is known to be reliable, individuals with a temporally distant perspective will still construe information about the event in a more abstract or integrative fashion, focusing more on the primary or essential aspects of the event.
Temporal Distance in Negotiation
Although temporal distance is often alluded to in negotiation research, it is rarely tackled empirically or theoretically. Indeed, many of the effects that emerge in short studies that restrict the temporal perspective of participants might not bear up well or at least be moderated by the impact of increased temporal perspective. Notably, the current work does extend in several ways prior research by Okhuysen and his colleagues (2003) on the effects of time discounting in negotiation. First, it is important to stress that we view the effect of temporal construal as independent of the effects of time discounting. However, we recognize, as did Okhuysen and his colleagues, that the effects of construal and discounting are likely to converge on producing beneficial negotiation outcomes. In fact, despite the fact that we did not observe evidence of discounting in our experiments, we see the results from the current set of experiments as complementing those of Okhuysen and his colleagues.
We suggest that when time discounting occurs in negotiation, the value attached to secondary, low-priority issues will be discounted at a steeper rate than the value attached to primary, high-priority issues. Moreover, because the effects of temporal construal are independent of the effect of time discounting, our findings provides a useful framework for understanding why the value attached to primary, high-priority issues might be augmented when the temporal horizon to the realization of the negotiated agreement increases. This latter point highlights the danger of universally recommending that individuals negotiate with a temporally distant perspective, as concessions on primary issues are likely to be more difficult to obtain. The findings from the current research also extend prior work on temporal distance in negotiation because we identify specific behaviors (issue consideration and logrolling) that are affected by greater temporal distance, which promote more integrative solutions in negotiation.
Possible Alternative Explanations
In this section, we address possible alternative explanations of our findings (i.e., explanations that are outside of CLT’s framework).
Time Pressure
Perhaps the results in the current set of experiments were due to participants with a temporally near perspective feeling greater time pressure. Several features of the experiments suggest that such an explanation is unlikely. First, in Experiments 1 and 2, nothing was said to the participants about a time limit or amount of time they had to report their judgments and decisions. Second, in Experiment 3, in which a time limit was mentioned, temporal perspective was operationalized using distance from a hypothetical event, and thus, there was no need or reason to come to an agreement more quickly. Third, in Experiment 3, the time limit was held constant across both conditions. Fourth, in Experiment 3, negotiators with a temporally near perspective actually made more offers overall than negotiators with a distant perspective, suggesting that they did not feel a greater need to come to a quick decision. Lastly, even if participants with a temporally near perspective did feel more time pressure during negotiation, one could easily make the case that they might be more inclined to engage in multi-issue offers to deal with all of the issues as quickly as possible. There is evidence that time pressure can be beneficial or harmful for negotiation, depending on the circumstances (Carnevale et al., 1993). Therefore, time pressure as an alternative explanation for the current findings seems untenable.
Cognitive Effort
Perhaps the results in the present research were due to differences in effortful processing between the experimental groups. For example, is it possible that participants in the current studies who had a distant perspective felt the negotiation to be less self-relevant and therefore engaged in less effortful processing than participants who had a near perspective? More important, could such a difference in effortful processing (if it even occurred) explain the results obtained? We suspect the answer to this question is no. First, it is not clear why less effortful processing would lead to a lower preference for piecemeal issue consideration relative to multi-issue consideration, as demonstrated by the group with a distant perspective (Experiments 1 and 3). Second, it is not clear why it would lead to more interest in high-priority issues relative to low-priority issues, as also demonstrated by the group with a distant perspective (Experiments 2 and 3). Third, such an interpretation is not consistent with the lack of differences in the amount of time it took to reach agreement in negotiation in Experiment 3. Presumably more effortful negotiation would take a longer time. Overall, it seems that any differences in effortful processing between individuals with a temporally near versus distant perspective are unlikely to account for any differences in issue consideration or concession behavior (see Smith & Trope, 2006, for a related discussion)
Implications for Negotiation
The findings from the current set of studies have several interesting implications for negotiation behavior. At a more theoretical level, our results provide some insights into the process that underlies the impact of temporal distance on negotiation outcomes by identifying the key role of issue consideration. Moreover, our results offer some additional insights into why people prefer to consider issues in a more piecemeal versus multi-issue fashion by demonstrating the role of temporal distance and level of construal. At a more applied level, the findings from Experiment 1 have some implications for negotiating parties preparing ahead of time before they reach the bargaining table. The majority of our participants in Experiment 1 preferred to consider issues as packages when they thought about their negotiation from a distant perspective. These results suggest that having individuals prepare for their negotiations far in advance may be at least one possible procedure, in addition to explicit instruction (Weingart et al., 1996), for increasing negotiators’ likelihood of adopting a multi-issue approach during negotiation. Of course, given that negotiators’ preference for single-issue consideration is likely to increase as their negotiation gets closer in time, any decision that is made when the negotiation is farther away about how the issues will be dealt with should be binding in order to observe the benefits of the distant perspective.
It is interesting that recent findings by Förster et al. (2004) suggest that even engaging in mental imagery exercises immediately prior to negotiation might decrease negotiators’ preference for single-issue consideration. Förster and his colleagues found that having participants simply imagine themselves engaging in a task at a distant point in time prior to having them actually engage in the task, led participants to process information about the task in a more global, integrative manner. Similar consequences might emerge for negotiation behavior, and future work should address such a possibility.
The findings from the current set of studies also have implications for how individuals handle different types of conflicts, including conflicts over minor versus major issues (Druckman & Rozelle, 1975) and conflicts over specific interests versus broad values and ideological differences (Druckman & Broome, 1991; Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1988; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Specifically, our results suggest that the resolution of conflict over things (minor issues, interests) that tend to be relatively more concrete and accompanied by local consequences should be hindered when issues are construed at a lower level. Therefore, when conflicts do in fact revolve around differences on such issues, solutions to such conflicts are likely to be facilitated by having a temporally distant perspective during negotiation. Conversely, the resolution of conflict over things (major issues, values, and ideological differences) that tend to be relatively more abstract and accompanied by global consequences should be hindered when issues are construed at a higher level. Therefore, solutions to such conflicts are likely to be facilitated by having a temporally near perspective during negotiation. Indeed, future research should examine these possibilities.
Future Directions
Negotiation Context
Our examination of the consequences of temporal perspective in negotiation was restricted to interpersonal, dyadic negotiation. It is important to note that the consequences of a temporally distant rather than near perspective might in fact be different in the context of intergroup negotiation. Indeed, in the context of intergroup negotiation, other factors that impact the process and outcome of a negotiation, including social identity concerns (Eggins, Haslam, & Reynolds, 2002; Smyth, 2002) and concerns about saving face (Hoobler, 2003; Mosterd & Rutte, 2000), might temper some of the conclusions drawn here about the consequences of a temporally distant perspective in negotiation. Therefore, future research should investigate the impact of temporal perspective in both the interpersonal and intergroup domain.
Social Motives
The effects of social motives have been widely studied in the context of negotiation (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt, 1981). Our treatment of social motives was limited in the current set of experiments, as we focused on the benefits of a distant perspective for negotiators with an individualistic orientation. Given the impact social motives have on negotiators’ behavior and outcomes, it would be worthwhile to fully explore how temporal distance within a negotiation interacts, if at all, with social motives. It is interesting that because social values typically serve as abstract psychological guides for behavior (Rokeach, 1968; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), one might expect, for example, that negotiators’ social motives would have more impact when making decisions about events that are set to occur in the distant future. Specifically, one might predict that a temporally distant perspective would act as a kind of magnifying glass for negotiators’ motivational orientation, with those with an individualistic orientation exhibiting even more concern for themselves and those with a cooperative orientation exhibiting even more concerns for others (cf. De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003). Indeed, results reported by Eyal, Sagristano, Liberman, and Trope (2006) are consistent with this prediction.
Relationship Between Time and Construal
The present research examined the impact of temporal distance in negotiation by treating time as a categorical variable (near vs. distant). Despite the fact that most research conducted within the framework of construal level theory has manipulated temporal distance at two levels or time points (see Pennington & Roese, 2003, for an exception), it remains an open question as to how exactly temporal distance relates to level of construal. Several studies have demonstrated that events that are purportedly temporally near versus distant elicit different levels of construal (see Trope & Liberman, 2003, for a review). Nevertheless, these studies did not identify the form of the time function.
Is there a linear relationship in which construals continue to become more abstract with increasing time to a future event? Is there a positively accelerated relationship in which changes in construals are small at the beginning as temporal distance is initially increased but then large as temporal distance is further increased? Is there a negatively accelerated relationship in which changes in construals are large at the beginning as temporal distance is initially increased but then small as temporal distance is further increased, such as how pay impacts employee reactions (Worley, Bowen, & Lawler, 1992)? Or is the relationship one in which time impacts construal in a categorical fashion, such as how light impacts color perceptions (Bornstein & Korda, 1984) and sounds impact speech perceptions (A. M. Liberman, Harris, Hoff-man, & Griffith, 1957). That is, maybe there is a special temporal cutoff point that varies by individual, at which events that occur prior to that point are construed at the same level of concreteness and events that are occur after that point are construed at the same level of abstractness. Such questions highlight how the continuous nature of time offers new possibilities for studying the impact of temporal distance on construal in many judgment and decision-making domains, including negotiation. Indeed, the final word on this issue will have serious consequences for negotiation, as the extent to which a temporally distant rather than near perspective facilitates integrative agreements will depend on the extent to which the relevant point in time triggers a higher level construal in the first place.
Type of Temporal Distancing
The primary focus of this article is on the consequences of a temporally distant perspective from a negotiated agreement on the way issues were dealt with and on the quality of agreements that were reached during negotiation. It is important to note that the temporal perspective of the participants in our first experiment was in fact linked to an actual event that they believed would occur in the future. Nevertheless, the present research was limited in that the remaining experiments examined the consequences of temporal perspective in negotiation by manipulating temporal distance from a hypothetical event. It would be worthwhile for future research to develop methods for studying temporal distancing from actual events, rather than events that are imagined to be near or distant, as imagined temporal distancing might produce weaker effects than actual temporal distancing (see Carnevale & De Dreu, 2006, for a review of methods for the study of time in negotiation). Notably, there are methodological challenges to implementing actual temporal distancing and possible confounds that are not present with hypothetical temporal distancing. Therefore, future research should be sensitive to the complexity surrounding this issue.
Psychological Distance
In general, we are interested in what impact psychological distance has on the resolution of conflict between individuals. According to CLT (see N. Liberman, et al., in press; Trope & Liberman, 2003), the same general principles that apply to temporal distance should also hold for other distance dimensions. Most relevant to the negotiation setting, the amount of spatial distance that individuals experience during negotiation is also likely to promote a more structured approach toward the issues. Recent work has found, for example, that participants who experienced greater spatial distance from events used more abstract language to describe events and identified more overarching, superordinate goals for events (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006). In addition, recent work has found that participants who experienced greater spatial distance from events relied more on abstract, global information when making predictions about the likelihood that events would occur (Henderson, Fujita, Trope, & Liberman, in press).
Just as the amount of temporal distance within a negotiation can be a multifaceted component in a negotiation setting, so can the amount of spatial distance. Indeed, negotiators may come to an agreement in one setting (e.g., United Nations Headquarters in New York) and expect to implement or realize the agreement in another setting that is geographically close (United States) or far away (Africa). Moreover, with the ever-increasing online activity in our society, more negotiations are beginning to take place across great physical distances (Carnevale & Probst, 1997). In both cases, such distances may affect the way individuals consider issues during negotiation, the relative focus they place on primary concerns, and the general integrative approach they take toward reaching an agreement.
Conclusion
Across three experiments, we have demonstrated that as individuals’ temporal perspective is increased during negotiation, there is less constraint on type of negotiation process that can be applied. Specifically, we have provided the first evidence that increased temporal distance from a negotiated agreement facilitates less single-issue consideration and more appropriate concessions, resulting in more mutually beneficial outcomes during negotiation. Although interpersonal conflict is ubiquitous, the current research suggests that those who choose to resolve conflict through open discussion may benefit from having a temporally distant perspective during their discussion, as such a perspective promotes allocating more resources to resolving central, primary concerns rather than less important, incidental concerns. Future research should continue to explore what consequences psychological distance and level of construal have in a negotiation setting for the resolution of interpersonal conflict.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Student Fellowship to Marlone D. Henderson, National Institute of Mental Health Grant 59030-06A1 to Yaacov Trope, and National Science Foundation Grant SES-0453301 to Peter J. Carnevale. We wish to thank Beryl J. Filton and Ryan D. Coganow for their assistance with data collection, Niall Bolger for his assistance with data analyses, and Susan M. Andersen and Robert B. Lount, Jr., for comments on an earlier draft of this article. Special thanks also go to Kentaro Fujita, Ido Liviatan, and Cheryl J. Wakslak for extensive discussion of ideas.
Footnotes
The instructions informed participants that the negotiation exercise was designed for 4 people. Occasionally, only 3 participants arrived for a session because of the failure of participants to show up for their scheduled experimental appointment. Anticipating this possibility, the instructions informed participants that any participants that were not present at the beginning of the session would arrive later in the session. Follow-up checks revealed that this was indeed effective at bolstering the cover story.
We held the motivational orientation constant in this experiment and in Experiment 3 because prior research (Weingart et al., 1993) has demonstrated that having negotiators adopt an integrative approach during negotiation mainly serves to alleviate the negative consequences of having an individualistic orientation. Given that this prior work suggests that factors that promote a more integrative approach during negotiation are likely to benefit mainly those with an individualistic orientation and that many people approach a negotiation with such an orientation (Bazerman & Neale, 1992; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), we decided to limit our examination of the effects of temporal perspective on concession behavior and outcomes to negotiators with an individualistic orientation.
After reading over the description of the negotiation exercise, participants read the following: “Some advice for you: Any agreement that is reached about the Market before it is announced in 2 days (2 years) will have a major impact on your store’s profitability. The points on the previous page are indicators of profitability for just you. When making your decisions, don’t worry about how well the other parties are doing. Your primary objective is to maximize your own outcome.”
Participants read the following: “It is EXTREMELY important to remember that your job is to get the most points out of this negotiation. Do not be at all concerned with the needs and welfare of the other person. The needs and welfare of the other negotiator are unimportant to you. In other words, your task is to maximize your own point winnings, disregarding how many points the other negotiator gets from any agreement that is reached for the presentation that is tomorrow (5 months from now). As an incentive for maximizing your points, individuals will be entered into a lottery for 10 cash prizes worth $10 each. The more points you receive, the more lottery tickets you will receive. Therefore, your probability of winning one of the cash prizes is related to the number of points you earn as a negotiator.”
Results revealed no differences in the likelihood of mentioning the payoff schedules between dyads in the temporally near (4 of 12) and distant (3 of 13) groups, χ2(1, N = 25) = .33, p = .56. After adjusting for this as a covariate, all of the reported results remained significant. Moreover, we reran the analyses after excluding those dyads that did mention the payoff schedules, and the results remained unchanged. Overall, this suggests that it does not mediate the effect of temporal distance on the negotiation process and outcome.
Included in this postnegotiation questionnaire was an item that was directed at dyads that were not able to reach an agreement. We included an item that asked those participants that were not able to reach an agreement if it was because they ran out of time or if it was because they reached a point during the negotiation in which neither party wanted to give in or change their mind (i.e., impasse). Only 2 dyads failed to reach agreement, and both indicated it was because of time constraints.
We also calculated the difference in outcomes between the high- and low-scoring dyadic members. Although the discrepancy in outcomes was smaller when dyads had a temporally distant perspective (M = 15.91) instead of a temporally near perspective (M = 26.25), the difference failed to reach significance, t(21) = 1.01, p = .33, d = 0.44.
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