The future of human nature Jürgen Habermas Cambridge (UK): Polity Press; 2003 127 pp $28.50 ISBN 0745629865
This little book is a translation from the German of three pieces based on lectures given by the philosopher Jürgen Habermas in 2000 and 2001. It demands a great deal of the reader unfamiliar with philosophy, as it draws on the work of many major thinkers in Western philosophy and, in particular, examines the changes in philosophical thinking that have occurred since Kierkegaard.
The first section poses a question about a question: “Are there postmetaphysical answers to the the question: What is the ‘good life’?” In other words, in the absence of a common belief in an absolute external authority, how can one arrive at ethical and moral decisions? Habermas' examination of this question lays the groundwork for his main theme, which is our self- understanding as an ethical species.
Habermas begins his foundational section on “the good life” with a discussion of how morality, ethics and justice are related to one another. If I understand him well, he draws a connection from personal morality, to a social consensus on what is ethical, to justice, which includes the instantiation in law of that consensus. He then addresses the question of how one decides what the good life is, in an era when absolutes are no longer credible. If it is no longer possible to prescribe the good life, how is one to know what to do? As a prerequisite, such decisions require that one is capable of entertaining such questions responsibly. However, people also depend on society to help them develop and maintain this capacity. Habermas contends that in a democracy this dependency of individuals on society to enable them to become fully human implies the need for “ethically conscious conduct” rather than “narrow-minded self-empowerment.” “Right” ethical self-understanding, therefore, does not reside in an absolute, but “can only be won in a common endeavour.”
Habermas points out that contemporary philosophers of ethics tend to concern themselves with methodologic rather than practical matters: that is, they examine the processes we might use to arrive at a solution to the question of how to live a good life, but avoid prescribing specifics. But this distance from practice is impossible to maintain when “ethical self-understanding ... is at stake in its entirety” (author's italics). Habermas holds that this is the current situation in human genetic science: what has been “‘given’ now shifts to the realm of [technologically enabled] artefacts and their production.” He concludes this section with the comment that “Philosophers no longer have any good reason for leaving [disputes about the ‘good life’ arising from new technologies] to biologists and engineers intoxicated by science fiction.”
Under the heading “Moralizing human nature,” Habermas draws on the perspective developed in the previous section to examine the question of genetic manipulation, particularly the currently available technologies of preimplantation genetic diagnosis and human embryonic experimentation. He asks whether we may consider
the genetic self-transformation and self-optimization of the species as a way of increasing the autonomy of the individual? Or will it undermine our normative self-understanding as persons leading our own lives and showing one another equal respect?
He argues that a person whose genome has been altered in embryo will be impaired in his or her capacity to be an equal and autonomous member of society.
In subsequent sections, Habermas explores with subtlety and rigour the lines of thought suggested by section headings such as “The moral limits of eugenics.” He subjects his intuitions — that there is something disgusting about tinkering with embryos and something worrisome about manipulating our genome — to the crucible of critical examination, distinguishing and developing the implications of various aspects of reproductive technology. One of his more readily understood ideas is to introduce the question of implied consent: Would the embryo, had it been able to develop to the point of deciding, have consented to the procedure to which it was subjected? He emphasizes the significance of the distinction and tension between the use of human beings and the dignity implicit in regarding human beings as ends in themselves. Perhaps most of all, Habermas is interested in promoting and joining in the discussion he sees as the essential process in arriving at ethical and just social decisions in this area.
One emerges from this discussion with the conviction that these are not decisions to be left by default to industry and governments, which are liable to be driven by concern with economic success at the expense of human values.
In its consideration of ethical issues surrounding science and technology in relation to the human genome, The Future of Human Nature always returns to concrete current applications, specifically preimplantation genetic diagnosis and embryonic research. It does not consider the issues of abortion or nonhuman genetic manipulation, nor does it indulge in speculations about the vague threats posed by future possibilities (although Habermas warns us against being oblivious to them). It makes a clear distinction between medical interventions for which the question of consent has been carefully attended to, and interventions for which such consent is not even contemplated. Working in this focused area strengthens the force of Habermas' arguments, driving them to the conclusion that, whatever decisions we make about experimentation with and use of human embryos now, these decisions are not to be taken lightly and have far-reaching implications for what it will mean in the future to be human.
This book is also a rich introduction to current ethical thinking in Europe and to the relevance of philosophy to society. It is replete with references to relevant current and past literature in this area, although these are primarily restricted to the Western philosophical tradition and current European work.
In a postscript written in January 2002, Habermas notes the difference between European discussions of whether to proceed with human genetic experimentation, and North America debates, which in his reading jump over the step that links ethics and justice in order to discuss how to proceed. He also acknowledges that the ideas in the present book are far from the whole story: “My impression is that we still have not reflected deeply enough.”
John Elliott Psychiatrist Calgary, Alta.
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Photo by: Fred Sebastian
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