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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2013 May 7.
Published in final edited form as: J Theor Biol. 2012 Jan 28;300:161–172. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.01.032

Economic Analysis of the Use of Facemasks During Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Samantha M Tracht a,b,*, Sara Y Del Valle a, Brian K Edwards a
PMCID: PMC3307882  NIHMSID: NIHMS353398  PMID: 22300798

Abstract

A large-scale pandemic could cause severe health, social, and economic impacts. The recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic confirmed the need for mitigation strategies that are cost-effective and easy to implement. Typically, in the early stages of a pandemic, as seen with pandemic (H1N1) 2009, vaccines and antivirals may be limited or non-existent, resulting in the need for non-pharmaceutical strategies to reduce the spread of disease and the economic impact. We construct and analyze a mathematical model for a population comprised of three different age groups and assume that some individuals wear facemasks. We then quantify the impact facemasks could have had on the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and examine their cost effectiveness. Our analyses show that an unmitigated pandemic could result in losses of nearly $832 billion in the United States during the length of the pandemic. Based on present value of future earnings, hospital costs, and lost income estimates due to illness, this study estimates that the use of facemasks by 10%, 25%, and 50% of the population could reduce economic losses by $478 billion, $570 billion, and $573 billion, respectively. The results show that facemasks can significantly reduce the number of influenza cases as well as the economic losses due to a pandemic.

Keywords: Influenza, Mathematical Models, Epidemic Models, Facemask, Mitigation Strategies

1. Introduction

On June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the outbreak of novel influenza A (H1N1) (referred to as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 per WHO nomenclature) a pandemic. The emergence of an unexpected or novel strain of influenza poses problems in combating the spread of infection. Vaccines are typically the first line of defense against influenza viruses (Germann et al., 2006), however, in the case of novel viruses vaccines may not be readily available. In addition to vaccines, public health campaigns encouraging good hygiene have been used to reduce the spread of influenza.

During the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak several non-pharmaceutical mitigation strategies were used including school closures, social distancing, and facemasks (Condon and Sinha, 2009). Influenza spreads through person-to-person contact via airborne particles as well as by direct and indirect (e.g., via fomites) contacts. Several studies have shown that facemasks can be an effective mitigation strategy. A recent study on facemasks and hand hygiene showed a 10 – 50% transmission reduction for influenza-like illnesses (Aiello et al., 2010). Other studies have also shown that facemasks can not only act as a barrier (Del Valle et al., 2010) but they can redirect and decelerate exhaled air flows to prevent them from entering the breathing zones of others (Tang and Settles, 2009). Several laboratory studies on mask effectiveness have shown that N95 respirators are 21.5% effective in protecting against the inhalation of nanoparticles, while surgical masks were only 2.4% effective (an Lee et al., 2008). However, a study by Loeb et al. (Loeb et al., 2009) found that surgical masks and N95 respirators offered about the same percentage of protection for nurses in hospitals. Although several studies have shown that both surgical masks and N95 provide similar protection against influenza, a recent editorial by Killingley (Killingley, 2011) discusses two studies and argues that the results are still inconclusive and that more research is needed. For our model we will focus on N95 respirators since we are interested in analyzing optimal interventions, however, our analyses may be applicable to surgical masks based on Loeb et al. (Loeb et al., 2009) results.

Using a mathematical model, Tracht et al. (Tracht et al., 2010) analyzed the effectiveness of facemasks in reducing the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. They compared the impact that surgical and N95 masks could have on reducing the spread of influenza. Their results showed that facemasks can be an effective intervention strategy for mitigating an airborne disease. We expand upon that model by dividing the population into three age groups and quantifying the impact of facemasks (also referred to as N95 respirators) have on the spread of the disease as well as their cost effectiveness.

2. Methods

Following the approaches developed in (Del Valle et al., 2005) and (Tracht et al., 2010), the population is divided into two subgroups: a mask-wearing group (subscript M) and a non-mask wearing group. People alternate between mask and non-mask groups based on the number of individuals infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009. We also separate the population into three different age group classifications: children between ages 0–17 (superscript 1), adults between ages 18–64 (superscript 2), and seniors older than 65 (superscript 3). Individuals are characterized by their epidemiological status: susceptible, Sk and SMk, exposed, Ek and EMk (i.e., people who are infected but not yet fully contagious), and infectious individuals, Ik and IMk, where k = 1 (ages 0–17), 2 (ages 18–64) and 3 (ages 65+). Definitions of the epidemiological classes are summarized in Table 1 and the transfers are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. Because we are evaluating the potential economic impact of masks during the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 outbreak, we use a closed system with no migration in or out; births and natural deaths are not included in the model.

Table 1.

State variables and definitions for the model.

Variable Definition
Sk Number of susceptible individuals not wearing a mask in age group k
SMk
Number of susceptible individuals wearing a mask in age group k
Ek Number of exposed individuals not wearing a mask in age group k
EMk
Number of exposed individuals wearing a mask in age group k
Ik Number of infected individuals not wearing a mask in age group k
IMk
Number of infected individuals wearing a mask in age group k
Hk Number of hospitalized individuals in age group k
Rk Number of recovered individuals in age group k
Dk Number of dead individuals in age group k

Figure 1. Schematic relationship between mask wearing and non-mask wearing individuals for pandemic (H1N1) 2009.

Figure 1

Note there are three different diagrams represented: k = 1 (ages 0–17), 2 (ages 18–64), and 3 (ages 65+). The arrows connecting the boxed groups represent the movement of individuals from one group to an adjacent one. Susceptible individuals (Sk or SMk) can either become exposed (Ek or EMk) or move between the non-mask wearing (Sk) or mask wearing ( SMk) susceptible groups. Exposed individuals (Ek or EMk) can either become infectious (Ik or IMk) or move between the non-mask wearing (Ek) and mask wearing ( EMk) exposed groups. Infectious individuals (Ik or IMk) can recover (Rk), die (Dk), be hospitalized (Hk), or move between non-mask wearing (Ik) and mask wearing ( IMk) infectious groups. Hospitalized individuals can either recover (Rk) or die (Dk).

As seen in Figure 1, the transfer rates from the exposed classes, Ek and EMk, to the infectious classes, Ik and IMk, are ωEk and ωEMk, respectively. Infectious individuals can move to group Dk at rate μkIk and μkIMk when they die from infection to group Rk, at rate δIk and δIMk upon recovery, or to group Hk at rate of χkHk and χkHMk if they are hospitalized. Those individuals who are hospitalized either recover at a rate of νkHk or die at a rate of μkHk. The mean times in the infectious classes, Ik and IMk, are 1/(μk+δ+χk). Hence, the infectious fraction δ/(μk+δ+χk) recovers and the infectious fraction μk/(μk+δ+χk) dies as a consequence of the disease.

We assume homogenous mixing within each age group and heterogeneous mixing between groups; the mixing matrix containing the average number of daily contacts an individual from group k has with group j is shown in Table 2. We also assume that contact levels remain normal throughout the epidemic, except that the average number of daily contacts for hospitalized individuals is reduced by 1/3. We define t0 as the beginning of the epidemic. Movement of individuals between mask and non-mask groups depends upon the number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases in the population, that is, a specified percentage of the population starts wearing masks as the number of infected people increases.

Table 2. Mixing matrix.

The average number of daily contacts age group k has with age group j (Del Valle et al., 2007).

Age Children (0–17) Adults (18–64) Seniors (65+)
Children (0–17) 23.3824 31.7305 1.9396
Adults (18–64) 7.9593 37.1030 3.4924
Seniors (65+) 3.1534 21.8981 7.6981

We define ϕSMSk, ϕEMEk, and ϕIMIk to be the transfer rates from the Sk, Ek, and Ik classes to the SMk,EMk, and IMk classes, respectively; similarly ϕSSMk,ϕEEMk, and ϕIIMk are the transfer rates from the SMk,EMk, and IMk to the Sk, Ek, and Ik, respectively.

The rate coefficients are modeled by step-functions of the number of infectious individuals in the population:

ϕr={ar,0k=1n(Ik+IMk)τbr,τ<k=1n(Ik+IMk) (1)

for r=Sk,Ek,Ik,SMk,EMk, and IMk and k = 1 (ages 0–17), 2 (ages 18–64) and 3 (ages 65+), where the parameters a and b are positive constants that determine the rate of movement and τ is the number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases that determines when masks are implemented.

Using the transfer diagram shown in Figure 1, we obtain the following system of differential equations:

dSMkdt=(ϕS+λMk)SMk+ϕSMSkdEMkdt=(ϕE+ω)EMk+λMkSMk+ϕEMEkdIMkdt=(ϕI+μk+δ+χk)IMk+ωEMk+ϕIMIkdSkdt=(ϕSM+λk)Sk+ϕSSMkdEkdt=(ϕEM+ω)Ek+λkSk+ϕEEMkdIkdt=(ϕIM+μk+δ+χk)Ik+ωEk+ϕIIMkdHkdt=(μk+νk)Hk+(IMk+Ik)χkdRkdt=(IMk+Ik)δ+νkHkdDkdt=(IMk+Ik)μk+μkHk (2)

where k = 1, 2, and 3. Note that there is a system of nine equations for each of the three age groups, resulting in a system of 27 differential equations.

Here λk (non-mask groups) and λMk (mask groups) are the forces of infection and λkSk and λMkSMk are the transfer rates from the susceptible classes, Sk and SMk, to the exposed classes, Ek and EMk. There are six different infection rates, λk and λMk for each of the three age groups, which incorporate the probability of transmission per contact from an individual in age group k to an individual in age group j (βkj); the reduced infectiousness due to incubation (α), and 1 − ηt (t = i or s), which accounts for the effectiveness of the mask in reducing either susceptibility (ηs) or infectivity (ηi). The transmissibility, βkj, is defined as the susceptibility of the population, multiplied by the infectivity of the disease, multiplied by the average number of contacts an individual has per day. The definitions of the parameters are summarized in Table 3. The forces of infection for the non-mask group and mask group are given by:

λlk(t)=j=1nλlkj(t)l={NoMask,ηs=0Mask,ηs0 (3)

Table 3.

Parameter values and descriptions

Parameter Description Units Baseline Range Reference
N1 Population of age group 1 (0–17) People 73,000,000 1–100 million 36
N2 Population of age group 2 (18–64) People 191,000,000 1–250 million 36
N3 Population of age group 3 (65+) People 38,000,000 1–50 million 36
Runc1
Effective reproduction number (uncontrolled) for age group 1 (0–17) 1 1.3 & 1.35 & 1.4 0–2 35; 32; 40; 29
Runc2
effective reproduction number (uncontrolled) for age group 2 (18–64) 1 1.25 & 1.3 & 1.35 0–2 35; 32; 40; 29
Runc3
effective reproduction number (uncontrolled) for age group 3 (65+) 1 1.2 & 1.25 & 1.3 0–2 35; 32; 40; 29
Runcavg
Average effective reproduction number (uncontrolled) 1 1.25 & 1.3 & 1.35 0–2 35; 32; 40; 29
βkj Transmission rate from age group k to age group j 1 See Text 0–1 See Text
κkj Average number of contacts age group k has with age group j
PeopleDay
See Text 0–40 16
ξk Infectivity of age group k 1 See Text 0–1 See Text
ιj Susceptibility of age group j 1 1 0–1 8; 39
ω Incubation relative rate Day−1 0.25 0–1 35; 10
δ Non-hospitalized recovery relative rate Day−1 0.20 0–1 10
ν1 Hospitalized recovery rate relative for age group 1 (0–17) Day−1
15
0–1 27
ν2 Hospitalized recovery rate relative for age group 2 (18–64) Day−1
18
0–1 27
ν3 Hospitalized recovery rate relative for age group 3 (65+) Day−1
110
0–1 27
μ1 Death relative rate for age group 1 (0–17) Day−1 0.0000192 0–1 11; 32
μ2 Death relative rate for age group 2 (18–64) Day−1 0.0008224 0–1 11; 32
μ3 Death relative rate for age group 3 (65+) Day−1 0.00008102 0–1 11; 32
χ1 Hospitalization relative rate for age group 1 (0–17) Day−1 0.00435 0–1 11
χ2 Hospitalization relative rate for age group 2 (18–64) Day−1 0.00457 0–1 11
χ3 Hospitalization relative rate for age group 3 (65+) Day−1 0.0045 0–1 11
θ Reduced contacts due to hospitalization 1
13
0–1 See Text
α Reduced infectiousness due to incubation 1 0.5 0–1 See Text
ηi Decrease in infectivity because of mask 1 0.20 0–1 24; 1
ηs Decrease in susceptibility because of mask 1 0.50 0–1 24; 1
τ Number of infectious individuals at which masks are implemented People 30,200 30,200 See Text
ar Positive constant that determines the rate of movement between mask and non-mask classes 1 0 0–1 See Text
br Positive constant that determines the rate of movement between mask and non-mask classes 1 0.1 0–1 See Text
ϕr Movement rate between mask and non-mask classes, r = S, SM, E, EM, I, IM 1 See Text 0–1 See Text, 13
I1/N1 Initially infected fraction of population of age group 1 1
1,80073,000,000
0–1 15
I2/N2 Initially infected fraction of population of age group 2 1
2,000191,000,000
0–1 15
I3/N3 Initially infected fraction of population of age group 3 1
10038,000,000
0–1 15

We define λlkj in (3) as the product of the transmissibility of a disease, βkj, and the fraction of contacts that are infected. βkj is the product of the average number of contacts per unit time that each individual in age group k has with age group j, κkj; the susceptibility of the population, which is set to 1 for children and adults and 0.85 for seniors (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b; Xing and Cardona, 2009), ιj; and the infectivity of the disease for age group k, ξk. That is:

λlkj=(NumberofContactsperUnitTime)X(SusceptibilityofthePopulation)X(InfectivityoftheDisease)X(FractionofContactsthatareInfected)λlkj(t)=(κkj)x(ιj)x(ξk)x[(1ηs)(Ij+αEj+(1θ)HjN)+(1ηs)(1ηi)(IMj+αEMjN)] (4)

where N is the total population.

3. Effective Reproduction Number, ℜeff

The effective reproduction number, ℜeff, is the average number of secondary cases produced by a typical infectious individual during the infectious period (Hethcote, 2000; van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002). The success of mitigation strategies is measured by their ability to reduce the spread of disease. In an epidemic model the magnitude of the effective reproduction number, ℜeff, determines whether an epidemic occurs and its severity (Del Valle et al., 2005). When ℜeff > 1, the disease will spread and an epidemic will occur, however, when ℜeff < 1, the disease will die out (Del Valle et al., 2005; Tracht et al., 2010).

Each individual age group has a unique initial effective reproduction number denoted Reffk, however, when we average these three values, we obtain an average effective reproduction number, Reffavg, for the entire model. Without any intervention strategies in place, the model has an initial average effective reproduction number (uncontrolled), Runcavg.

The ‘next generation operator’ approach (van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002) can be used to find an expression for the effective reproduction number (controlled), ℜcon, to determine the effectiveness of masks as an intervention strategy. This is done by linearizing the system of equations (3) around the disease-free equilibrium (DFE). The DFE has Ek, EMk, Ik, IMk, and Hk equal to zero with S0k, SM0k, and R0k positive, where k = 1, 2, and 3. The resulting 15-dimensional linearized system is of the form dXdt=(FV)X, where

X=[E1EM1I1IM1H1E2EM2I2IM2H2E3EM3I3IM3H3]T

The F matrix is a 15 × 15 matrix that can be described in blocks of 5 × 5 with the first two rows having nonzero entries in every column and the third, fourth, and fifth rows containing all zeros. The first two rows are of the form:

1σ[βkjS0kαβkjS0kαmiβkjS0kβkjS0kmiβkjS0k(1θ)βkjSM0kαmsβkjSM0kαmsmiβkjSM0kmsβkjSM0kmsmiβkjSM0kms(1θ)]

where k and j represent the three age group classifications, k = 1, 2, and 3 and j = 1, 2, and 3, ms = 1 − ηs, mi = 1 − ηi, and σ=S01+SM01+S02+SM02+S03+SM03. The V matrix is block diagonal with 5 × 5 blocks of the form:

B=[ϕEM+ωϕE000ϕEMϕE+ω000ω0ϕIM+μk+δϕI00ωϕIMϕI+μk+δ000χkχkμk+νk]

which has an inverse of the form:

B1=[ϕE+ωγ1ωϕEγ1ω000ϕEMγ1ωϕEM+ωγ1ω000ϕE+ωγ1γ2+ϕIγ2γ3ϕEγ1γ2+ϕIγ2γ3ϕI+μk+δγ2γ3ϕIγ2γ30ϕEMγ1γ2+ϕIMγ2γ3ϕEM+ωγ1γ3+ϕIMγ2γ3ϕIMγ2γ3ϕIM+μk+δγ2γ30χkγ3γ4χkγ3γ4χkγ3γ4χkγ3γ41γ4]

where γ1 = ϕE+ϕEM+ω, γ2 = ϕIM+ϕI+μk+δ, γ3 = μk+δ, and γ4 = νk+μk.

FV1 will have zeros in rows 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, and 15, so the eigenvectors must also have zeros in these rows. Thus, the 15 × 15 matrix consists of the rows 5(f − 1) + 1, 2 and columns 5(g − 1) + 1, 2. This matrix E = FV1 will have fg blocks of 5 × 5, with entries given by:

[ρ1(αωψ1+ψ1γ2+ψ2+ε)ρ1(αωψ1M+ψ1Mγ2+ψ2+ε)ρ1(ψ3+ε)ρ1(ψ3M+ε)ρ1ερ2(αωψ1+ψ1γ2+ψ2+ε)ρ2(αωψ1M+ψ1Mγ2+ψ2+ε)ρ2(ψ3+ε)ρ2(ψ3M+ε)ρ2ε000000000000000]

where ρ1=βkjS0kσ,ρ2=βkjSM0k(1ηs)σ,ψ1=ϕE+ω+ϕEM(1ηi)γ1,ψ1M=ϕE+(1ηi)(ϕEM+ω)γ1,ψ2=ϕI+ϕIM(1ηi)γ2γ3,ϕ3=ϕI+μk+δ+ϕIM(1ηi)γ2γ3,ϕ3M=ϕI+(ϕIM+μk+δ)(1ηi)γ3γ3, and ε=(1θ)χkγ3γ4.

The effective reproduction number ℜcon is the largest eigenvalue of the matrix E = FV1 (van den Driessche and Watmough, 2002). We cannot obtain an explicit form of the ℜcon for our model, thus we estimated ℜcon numerically for a specific set of parameter values and initial population size for the three different age groups. The resulting ℜcon is an average of the three different age groups ℜcon, thus we refer to it as Rconavg.

4. Estimation of Parameter Values

While the use of facemasks and our model can be applicable to other viral respiratory infections, we use pandemic (H1N1) 2009 parameter values. The epidemiology of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has been estimated by several researchers since the outbreak in May 2009 (Tuite et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2009; Pourbohloul et al., 2009; Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2010; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010; Xing and Cardona, 2009; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b). The parameter values shown in Table 3 were selected based on the most recent and best available data. The incubation period for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 has been reported to be one to four days with a mean of four days (Tuite et al., 2010; Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2010). The mean time in the exposed classes, Ek and EMk, corresponding to the incubation period has been assumed to be 4 days, making the transfer rate to the infectious classes, Ik and IMk, constant at ω=1/4.

The infectious period is believed to be between one and seven days, with an average of five days (Tuite et al., 2010; Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, 2010). Thus making the baseline value for the recovery rate constant at δ=1/5. The fatality rate of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 varies depending on age and is thought to be in the range of 0.001%–0.3% for all age groups, with a mean of 0.0064% for ages 0–17, 0.02734% for ages 18–64, and 0.027% for ages 65+ (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010; Tuite et al., 2010; Writing Committee of the WHO Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, 2010; Tang et al., 2010). The case fatality rate for our model is μk/(μk+δ), setting this equal to 0.0064%, 0.02734%, and 0.027% results in μ1=0.0000192, μ2=0.0008224, and μ3=0.00008102, respectively.

The estimates for the transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 indicate that one infected person typically infected one to two people (Tuite et al., 2010; Tang et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2009; Pourbohloul et al., 2009). The transmissibility, βkj, is the product of the susceptibility of the population, the infectivity of the disease, and the average number of daily contacts (Stroud et al., 2006; Chowell et al., 2006). The susceptibility of the population is set to one for children (0–17) and adults (18–64), as pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was a novel virus, and at 0.835 for seniors (65+), since it is believed about 33% of the senior population has existing immunity that correlates to a 50% reduction in susceptibility to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (Xing and Cardona, 2009; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b). The number of contacts an individual from age group k has with age group j can be found in Table 2, (Del Valle et al., 2007). The infectivity of the disease is estimated numerically.

Consistent with the U.S. Census Bureau, the baseline population size, N, for the model is set at 302 million people, all of whom are initially in the susceptible class, Sk, depending on age group classification. The model uses a baseline population of 73 million for children (ages 0–17), N1; 191 million for adults (ages 18–64), N2; and 38 million for seniors (ages 65+), N3. The initially infected fractions I1/N1, I2/N2, and I3/N3 are set at 1,800/73,000,000, 2,000/191,000,000, and 100/38,000,000 respectively. We assume that individuals start wearing masks after there are 30,200 (or 0.001% of the population) cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 present in the population. We analyze the impact of mask implementation when 10%, 25%, and 50% of the population wear masks. We use a baseline value of ηs=0.2 and ηi=0.5 for the effectiveness of N95 respirators (Tracht et al., 2010). Individuals in the exposed classes, Ek and EMk, are thought to be less infectious due to incubation than those individuals who are in the infectious classes, Ik and IMk, so we set a=0.5 (Hayden et al., 1998; Atkinson and Wein, 2008).

5. Results

We use this model to analyze three different scenarios, using different values for Runcavg:1.25,1.3,and1.35. We also analyze three variations in mask effectiveness and evaluate each case with 10%, 25%, and 50% of susceptible and exposed individuals wearing facemasks. When 10%, 25%, and 50% of susceptible and exposed individuals are wearing masks, the fraction of infectious individuals wearing masks is 30%, 40%, and 50%, respectively. All simulations assume that there are 1,800 infectious children, 2,000 infectious adults, and 100 infectious seniors in a total population of 302 million at the beginning of the epidemic, and all other individuals are susceptible. Note that in Tracht et al. (Tracht et al., 2010) we analyzed the impact of varying the number of index cases and showed that the number of initially infected individuals can have a major impact on the epidemic size. Masks are implemented after after 30,200 cases of pandemic (H1N1) are reported. For sensitivity analysis on the impact of delays in the implementation of masks, see Tracht et al. (Tracht et al., 2010). Figure 2 shows the epidemic curve for each of the three initial uncontrolled effective reproduction numbers when there are no intervention strategies in use.

Figure 2. Epidemic curves by age group and combined total for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 when there are no masks worn.

Figure 2

Results shown for three scenarios: the average uncontrolled effective reproduction number, Runcavg=1.25,Runcavg=1.3,andRuncavg=1.35.

Table 4 shows the numerical results for the number of cumulative cases, deaths, and hospitalizations for each scenario when there are no interventions (no masks worn). The results when the N95 respirator is 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and 20% effective in reducing infectivity are shown in Table 5.

Table 4. Baseline results.

Cumulative number of cases, deaths, and hospitalizations in the absence of masks for three initial values of Runcavg=1.25,1.3,and1.35.

Category Age Group
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Cases 0–17 23,513,725 28,084,081 31,912,371
18–64 71,116,839 81,223,927 88,372,676
65+ 6,793,820 8,365,016 9,758,304
Total 101,424,384 117,673,024 130,043,351

Deaths 0–17 2,257 2,695 3,063
18–64 281,319 321,299 349,578
65+ 2,660 3,276 3,821
Total 286,236 327,270 356,462

Hospitalizations 0–17 500,489 597,769 679,255
18–64 2,482,884 2,835,751 3,085,333
65+ 292,243 359,830 419,764
Total 3,275,616 3,793,350 4,184,352

Table 5. Cumulative number of cases, deaths, and hospitalizations for 10%, 25%, and 50% of the population wearing N95 respirators when they are 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity.

The results from three different initial average effective reproduction numbers uncontrolled are shown: Runcavg=1.25,1.3,and1.35.

N95 Respirator: ηi=0.2 and ηs=0.2
Category Age Group 10% 25% 50%
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Cases 0–17 2,105,026 4,715,016 7,431,064 197,243 317,591 731,988 138,594 170,448 227785
18–64 6,579,014 13,987,270 20,886,048 614,440 942,665 2,061,786 430,555 504,214 639348
65+ 559,176 1,275,281 2,042,594 51,674 84,198 196,065 36,175 44,965 60605
Total 9,243,216 19,977,567 30,359,706 863,357 1,344,454 2,989,839 605,324 719,627 927738

Deaths 0–17 202 452 713 18 30 70 13 16 21
18–64 26,024 55,329 82,619 2,430 3,728 8,155 1,703 1,994 2529
65+ 219 499 799 20 32 76 14 17 23
Total 26,445 56,280 84,131 2,468 3,790 8,301 1,730 2,027 2573

Hospitalizations 0–17 44,805 100,357 158,170 4,198 6,759 15,580 2,949 3,627 4848
18–64 229,689 488,319 729,189 21,451 32,911 71,982 15,031 17,603 22321
65+ 24,053 54,855 87,864 2,222 3,621 8,433 1,556 1,934 2607
Total 298,547 643,531 975,223 27,871 43,291 95,995 19,536 23,164 29776

Table 4 shows that when Runcavg=1.25,1.3,and1.35, the percentage of the total population infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is 33.5%, 38.9%, and 43%, respectively. When 10% of the population wears masks that are 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity, the results show a reduction in the number of total cumulative cases: 9,243,217 (9.1% of the population is infected), 19,977,568 (16.9%), and 30,359,707 (23.3%) for each of the three values of Runcavg, respectively. Figure 3 represents graphically the cumulative number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases when Runcavg=1.25 and the mask is 20% effective in reducing both infectivity and susceptibility.

Figure 3. Cumulative number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases when Runcavg=1.25 and the N95 respirator is 20% effective in reducing both infectivity and susceptibility.

Figure 3

Three cases are shown when 10%, 25% and 50% of the total population wears masks.

An intervention strategy is measured by its ability to lower the effective reproduction number below 1. In some scenarios in which facemasks are worn the reproduction number is reduced to less than 1. For the mid-level severity scenario, ℜunc=1.3, the effective reproduction number is reduced to 0.9462, when masks are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and 50% effective in reducing infectivity with 25% of the population wearing masks. An effective reproduction number that is very close to one implies that the epidemic may continue to spread. Therefore, other intervention strategies in addition to facemasks should be implemented in order to halt the spread of the epidemic.

We also analyzed a scenario in which the mask intervention is temporarily halted and then restarted. It is possible that once the perceived risk decreases, the population stops using facemasks. We implemented masks when there were 30,200 cases of reported pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the population, however, once the number of infections decreases below this number, individuals stop wearing masks. This results in an epidemic that never dies out, but remains oscillating, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Epidemic curves for each age group and combined total for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 with an initial average uncontrolled effective reproduction number, Runcavg=1.3, in which N95 respirators are worn by 10% of the population and are 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and 50% effective in reducing infectivity.

Figure 4

In this case, waves are produced because the intervention strategy is temporarily halted and restarted, e.g., if the number of infectious individuals drops below 30,200 reported cases, people stop wearing masks. Once the number of infectious individuals reaches 30,200 cases people start to wear masks again. Note that in this scenario the epidemic never dies out and the number of infectious individuals continues to oscillate between 29,400 and 32,500.

6. Sensitivity Analysis

The results presented above used assumptions based on the best available information, however, in order to better understand the model and its sensitivity to certain parameters, we analyzed different parameter values and scenarios. This sensitivity analysis examines the effects of age-specific compliance rates, which age groups wear masks, limiting the number of available masks, and limiting the amount of money spent on masks.

Age-specific compliance

Higher compliance rates from the adult group can reduce the cumulative number of cases. Here we analyzed three scenarios for compliance: 1) 10% of children, 25% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks; 2) 10% of children, 50% of adults, and 25% of seniors wear masks; 3) 25% of children, 50% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks. We used a Runcavg=1.3 and ηi=0.2 and ηs=0.2. The results are shown graphically in Figure 5, Part a.

Figure 5. The number of cumulative cases for Runcavg=1.3 when N95 respirators are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity.

Figure 5

Part a shows the results for age specific compliance. Three different scenarios are shown: 1) 10% of children, 25% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks (blue bar), 2) 10% of children, 50% of adults, and 25% of seniors wear masks (green bar), 3) 25% of children, 50% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks (red bar). Note that the compliance rates of the children and seniors do not appear to decrease the disease spread, but the compliance rates of adults greatly reduces the number of cases. If only 25% of adults comply compared to 50% the number of cases nearly doubles. Part b shows the results when one group is not wearing masks and 25% of the other two remaining groups wearing masks. Note that if children or seniors do not wear masks the results are very similar, however, there is a large increase in the number of cases if adults do not wear masks. Part c shows the results when there is a limited number of masks available. The blue bar shows the number of cases if there are 75,500,000 masks available and the red bar shows if there are 100,000,000 masks available. Note that the goal in distributing the masks is to reduce the total number of deaths. Part d shows the results when the objective is to reduce the number of deaths below 24,000. The blue bars represent when 19% of adults wear N95 respirators and 0% of children and seniors wear them. The red bars represent when 15% of all age groups wear masks. Note that the number of cumulative cases is lower when 15% of the entire population; while it is important for the adult age group to wear masks, better results are seen when all age groups comply.

Which age group wears masks

The simulation results are most sensitive to the adult group. The results show that if the adult population wears masks, the epidemic can be mitigated. We analyzed three cases: 1) children do not wear masks, 2) adults do not wear masks, and 3) seniors do not wear masks; in each case we assumed the remaining two age groups have a 25% compliance rate. Figure 5, Part b shows the results for these three scenarios for Runcavg=1.3 and ηi=0.2 and ηs=0.2.

Limit on the number of available masks

During a pandemic there may be a limited number of masks available. If this situation arises, we need to know how to effectively distribute the masks in order to minimize the number of deaths. We analyzed two scenarios: 1) there are 75,500,000 masks available (e.g., enough for about 25% of the population); and 2) there are 100,000,000 masks available (e.g., enough for about 1/3 of the population). We assumed Runcavg=1.3 and masks to be 20% effective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity. We performed an optimization analysis to determine how best to distribute the limited number of masks to reduce the number of deaths. If only 75.5 million masks are available, 14.5% of them should go to children (ages 0–17), 83.5% to adults (ages 18–64), and 2% to seniors (ages 65+). In other words, 15% of children, 33% of adults, and 4% of seniors should wear masks. This combination results in the lowest number of deaths (3,004). If there are 100 million masks available, 9.5% should go to children, 86% to adults, and 4.5% to seniors, or in other words, 13% of children, 45% of adults, and 12% of seniors should wear masks. This combination results in the lowest number of deaths (2,352). These results are shown in Figure 5, Part c.

Reduce deaths below 24,000

Seasonal influenza typically results in 24,000 deaths per year (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). In an influenza pandemic, the number of deaths could dramatically increase. We examined the level of intervention necessary to reduce the number of deaths during pandemic (H1N1) 2009 to less than that of typical seasonal influenza. To reduce the number of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 deaths to below 24,000, we considered two scenarios: 1) what percentage of adults need to wear masks and 2) what percentage of the entire population would need to wear masks. If Runcavg=1.3 and masks are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity, 19% of adults would need to wear masks to reduce the number of deaths to less than 24,000; the total number of deaths in this scenario is 22,820. If Runcavg=1.3 and masks are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity, 15% of all age groups would need to wear masks to reduce the number of deaths below 24,000; in this scenario deaths are reduced to 22,192. Even if 100% of children and seniors wear masks, but adults to do not wear masks, the number of deaths is still greater than 24,000. It is important that the adult age group wears masks. Figure 5, Part d shows the number of cumulative cases that result from both scenarios.

7. Economic Analysis

An influenza pandemic has the potential to have a tremendous impact on the economy; several loss estimates have been predicted (Ewers and Dauelsberg, 2007). The Congressional Budget O3ce estimated a 4.25% reduction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the result of a severe pandemic similar to the 1918 Spanish Influenza pandemic, and a 1% drop in GDP for a more mild pandemic (Arnold et al., 2006). While there are many mitigation strategies that can be used to reduce the impact of a pandemic, such as vaccines, school closures, and social distancing, these options can be very costly and are not necessarily economically efficient. The potential cost of school closures for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 was estimated at $10 billion to $47 billion (Lempel et al., 2009). The U.S. spent an estimated $6.4 billion dollars on an immunization program (Morgan, 2009).

To estimate one measure of the benefits of facemasks, we use the results from our model to estimate the net savings that could be gained by a percentage of the population wearing facemasks, a potentially cheaper alternative to other mitigation strategies such as vaccines and school closures. We do not, however, compare estimated savings from facemasks to the benefits obtained from other options. We define three sources of savings from the use of face-masks: 1) avoided hospitalization costs, 2) reductions in lost future income due to fatalities, and 3) reductions in lost earnings due to illness. Finally, we subtract the estimated costs of the masks from this equation to arrive at the net savings estimate. These three measures are presented in Equation 5 with the parameter values and their decriptions given in Table 6.

Table 6. Parameter values and descriptions used to calculate the net savings from using masks.

Monetary values are expressed in year 2010 U.S. dollars. k represents the different age groups.

Economic Analysis Parameters and Descriptions Used to Calculate Net Savings
Parameter Description Units Baseline Range Reference
HPk Number of hospitalizations prevented in age group k People See Text See Text See Text
DPk Number of deaths prevented in age group k People See Text See Text See Text
CPk Number of cases prevented in age group k People See Text See Text See Text
WMk Number of individuals wearing masks in age group k People See Text 050% See Text
LFk Percentage of population in the labor force 1 64.7% 6070% 6
AHD1 Average hospital duration for children Days 5 110 7
AHD2 Average hospital duration for adults Days 8 110 7
AHD3 Average hospital duration for seniors Days 10 110 7
AHC1 Average hospital cost for children
U.S.$Day
4,235.31* 1,00010,000 27
AHC2 Average hospital cost for adults
U.S.$Day
8,678.35* 1,00010,000 27
AHC3 Average hospital cost for seniors
U.S.$Day
9,890.09* 1,00010,000 27
AI Average income
U.S.$Day
165.36 100500 5
PV1 Present value earnings lost for children
U.S.$Person
1,465,771* 3–10 million 27
PV2 Present value earnings lost for adults
U.S.$Person
1,496,890* 310 million 27
PV3 Present value earnings lost for seniors
U.S.$Person
94,972* 310 million 27
AA Average absenteeism due to influenza-like illness Days 1.3 05 2
CM Cost of N95 respirator (5 Pack)
U.S.$5Masks
$9.00 1535 14
*

Adjusted to U.S. 2010 dollars.

NetSavingsk=HPkAHDk(AHCk+LFAI)+DPkPVk+CPkAALFAIWMCM (5)

where k = 1, 2, and 3 (corresponding to children, adults, and seniors, respectively). We assume that seniors do not work, thus, their average income (AI) is set to zero. We also assume that at least one parent of sick children take o3 from work to care for them.

A baseline estimate of the hospitalization costs, losses in future income due to fatalities, and lost earnings, due to an unmitigated pandemic could cost nearly $832 billion in the U.S. It is against this baseline estimate of unmitigated losses due to pandemic influenza that we look at the potential savings from facemasks, and we do so in four ways. The first estimates savings that depend on the effective reproduction number, the percentage of each age group that wears facemasks, and the effectiveness of the masks (in term of susceptibility and infectivity). The second considers the effects of age specific compliance rates on net savings. The third examines the impacts of one group no wearing masks. The fourth addresses net savings when the number of masks available is limited and the objective is to reduce fatalities.

For the first analysis, if facemasks are worn by 10% of the population and they are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity and Runcavg=1.3, the net savings would amount to approximately $478 billion. Under comparable assumptions, if 50% of the population wears masks, the net savings increases to $573 billion. As one might expect, net savings increases with higher rates of mask use and effectiveness for each value of Runcavg. In all cases, the greatest net savings result when the adult age group (18–64) wears masks, while the lowest net savings occur when children wear masks. Table 7 summarizes the net savings from all scenarios and Figure 6 shows the total net savings and the net savings for each age group for 10% of the population wearing masks when masks are 20% effective.

Table 7.

Net savings gained by a percentage of the population wearing N95 Respirators.

Net Savings: N95 Respirator (2010 U.S. Dollars in Billions)
Category Age Group 10% 25% 50%
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Runcavg=1.25
Runcavg=1.3
Runcavg=1.35
Net Savings
ηi = 0.2, ηs = 0.2
0–17 14.81 16.16 16.93 16.13 19.21 21.57 16.17 19.31 21.92
18–64 414.55 431.89 433.49 452.82 515.63 554.37 453.91 518.37 563.42
65+ 26.67 30.33 33.00 28.83 35.41 40.89 28.88 35.56 41.46
Total 456.03 478.38 483.43 497.77 570.25 616.83 498.96 573.24 626.80

Net Savings
ηi = 0.5, ηs = 0.2
0–17 16.15 19.30 21.91 16.20 19.36 22.01 16.21 19.37 22.02
18–64 453.51 518.12 563.29 454.87 519.89 565.83 455.05 520.10 566.08
65+ 28.87 35.57 41.47 28.94 34.71 41.62 28.94 35.67 41.62
Total 498.54 572.99 626.67 500.01 573.97 629.46 500.20 575.14 629.73

Net Savings
ηi = 0.5, ηs = 0.5
0–17 16.18 19.34 21.99 16.21 19.37 22.02 16.21 19.38 22.03
18–64 454.50 519.32 565.30 455.15 520.23 566.21 455.24 520.33 566.33
65+ 28.93 35.64 41.59 28.96 35.69 41.64 28.95 35.68 41.64
Total 499.61 574.30 628.88 500.31 575.29 629.88 500.40 575.38 630.00

Figure 6. Net savings when 10% of the population is wearing N95 respirators and they are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity.

Figure 6

Three different pandemic severity scenarios are shown. The greatest net savings for the length of the pandemic are seen when the adult (18–64) age group wears masks.

For the second analysis, we considered the effect of age-specific compliance rates on net savings. We examined the net savings under three different scenarios in which all age groups have different compliance rates: 1) 10% of children, 25% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks, 2) 10% of children, 50% of adults, and 25% of seniors wear masks, and 3) 25% of children, 50% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks. All three scenarios result in nearly the same net savings: $568.8 biliion, $573 billion, and $573.2 billion, respectively. The results are shown numerically in Table 8 and graphically in Figure 7, Part a.

Table 8.

Net savings for age specific compliance rates for Runcavg=1.3, ηs =0.2, and ηi=0.2.

Compliance Rates
Children – 10%
Adults - 25%
Seniors - 10%
Compliance Rates
Children - 10%
Adults - 50%
Seniors - 25%
Compliance Rates
Children - 25%
Adults - 50%
Seniors - 10%

Net Savings (In billions) 0–17 19.14 19.28 19.28
18–64 514.39 518.17 518.36
65+ 35.31 35.55 35.56
Total 568.85 573.01 573.21

Note that the only significant difference is when the adult population has a lower compliance rate; varying the percentage of children and seniors wearing masks does not effect net savings much.

Figure 7. Net savings when the population wears N95 respirators that are 20% effective in reducing both infectivity and susceptibility, with an Runcavg=1.3.

Figure 7

Part a shows the net savings for the age specific compliance scenario. There are three scenarios shown: 1) 10% of children, 25% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks (blue bar), 2) 10% of children, 50% of adults, and 25% of seniors wear masks (green bar), and 3) 25% of children, 50% of adults, and 10% of seniors wear masks (red bar). Part b shows the net savings when one group is not wearing masks and 25% of the other two remaining groups wearing masks. If adults do not wear facemasks, net savings are reduced. Part c shows net savings when there are a limited number of masks available. Similar net savings are seen in both cases; the goal is to distribute masks effectively to reduce the total number of deaths. Part d shows the net savings when the objective is to reduce the number of deaths below 24,000. Note that similar net savings are seen in both cases; the goal is to distribute masks effectively to reduce the total number of deaths to less than 24,000.

These results also suggest that net savings will increase with higher adult compliance rates, but at a decreasing rate. For example, doubling the adult compliance rate (from 25% to 50%), increasing children’s compliance rate (from 10% to 25%) and holding the senior compliance rate constant (at 10%) increases net savings to adults by about $4.4 billion, a far smaller increase in net savings than occurs when the compliance rate of adults is increased from 0% to 25%.

For the third analysis, we examined the effect of one age group not wearing masks, while the other two age groups maintained a 25% compliance rate. When children or seniors do not wear masks, the net savings are not significantly different. However, if the adult age group does not wear masks the net savings is significantly reduced. The net savings when children, adults, and seniors do not wear masks is $563.7 billion, $47.5 billion, and $569.6 billion, respectively. The results are shown graphically in Figure 7, Part b and numerically in Table 9.

Table 9.

Net savings for for when one age group does not wear masks and 25% of the other two age groups does wear masks, Runcavg=1.3, ηs=0.2, and ηi=0.2.

Compliance Rates
Children - 0%
Adults - 25%
Seniors - 25%
Compliance Rates
Children - 25%
Adults - 0%
Seniors - 25%
Compliance Rates
Children - 25%
Adults - 25%
Seniors - 0%

Net Savings (In billions) 0–17 18.91 3.92 19.17
18–64 509.74 36.53 515.13
65+ 35.06 7.09 35.34
Total 563.72 47.55 569.64

Note that when the adult population does not wear masks the net savings is significantly lower, however net savings does not change if either children or seniors do not wear masks.

Comparing the results across adult compliance rates for children and seniors reveals the importance of adult compliance rates. For example, when the adult compliance rate is 25%, increasing compliance rates of children (from 0% to 25%) or reducing the compliance rate of seniors (from 25% to 0%) has little effect on estimated net savings for either group. In contrast, reducing the adult compliance rate (from 25% to 0%) while increasing the compliance rate of children (from 0% to 25%) actually reduces the net savings for children from $18.9 billion to $3.9 billion.

For the final analysis, we calculated the optimal distribution of masks if there is a limited supply; Figure 7, part c shows the net savings for two scenarios in which the number of masks is limited. During a pandemic, one of the most important goals is to reduce the number of deaths, thus we also considered an objective of minimizing deaths. Figure 7, part c shows the net savings gained from two different scenarios that reduce the number of deaths to less than 24,000 (e.g., below typical seasonal influenza mortality rates (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010)).

8. Discussion

The standard pharmaceutical mitigation strategies used during an influenza outbreak are vaccines and antivirals. In the case of a novel virus these strategies may not be readily available and can be very costly, thus, there is a need for non-pharmaceutical interventions to reduce disease spread. In the absence of vaccines, non-pharmaceutical interventions, such as hand washing and facemasks, become the first line of defense. We used a mathematical model with three different age groups to examine the effect facemasks could have had on disease spread during the pandemic (H1N1) 2009. We then used these results to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the use of facemasks.

The numerical simulations results indicate that without any intervention strategies in place, a large percentage of the population could be infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009; approximately 33%–43% of the population could become infected. If 10% of the population wears masks with an effectiveness of 20% in reducing susceptibility and infectivity, there is a large reduction in the cumulative number of cases.

We used present value of future earnings, hospital costs, and lost income estimates due to illness to estimate the economic losses resulting from pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Our model estimates that without any intervention strategies economic losses could be in the range of $662 billion to $832 billion (2010 dollars). The model suggests that wearing masks could result in significant savings.

If 10% of the population wears facemasks and they are 20% effective in reducing both susceptibility and infectivity, there is the potential for net savings in the range of $456 billion to $483 billion (2010 dollars), depending on the value of the initial effective reproduction number. Net savings increases greatly if N95 respirators are 50% effective in reducing susceptibility and infectivity. If 10%, 25%, and 50% of the total population wears masks, there is a $500.4 billion, $575.3 billion, and $630 billion (2010 dollars) net savings, respectively.

The highest net savings result when the adult age group wears masks, partially due to this age group having the largest population and to the fact that they contribute most to the economy. It is most important for the adult population to wear masks during a pandemic in order to reduce economic losses and the total number of deaths. Facemasks can provide economic savings not only from diverted losses caused by death and illness, but other measures such as social distancing and school closures can pose a large economic burden.

Evidence shows that people would be willing to wear masks during an epidemic (Condon and Sinha, 2009; kum Tang and yan Wong, 2004). During pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Mexico City officials required the use of facemasks for bus and taxi drivers and suggested their use for passengers. Condon and Sinha found a compliance rate for bus and taxi drivers to be 20–90% and for passengers 8–55% during the beginning of the pandemic (Condon and Sinha, 2009). However, for facemasks to be effective in reducing the spread of disease they need to be: (1) available, (2) affordable, (3) worn properly, (4) replaced or sanitized daily, and (5) fit-tested (if using N95 respirators) (Tracht et al., 2010).

Only 25% of the adult population would have to wear masks in order to achieve significant net savings. One of the policy implications of our results is that people should consider wearing masks, as it is typically done in some Asian countries, to prevent the spread of airborne viruses. Facemasks are not only inexpensive, but are easy to implement and less costly than most other mitigation strategies. N95 respirators come in varying sizes, ranging from extra small to large, thus is would be feasible for people to buy them based on their face size. Although we used N95 respirators as the basis for out analyses, recent studies (Loeb et al., 2009) have shown that surgical masks and N95 respirators can provide similar protection. We can conclude from our model that facemasks are an effective intervention strategy in reducing the spread of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and are an extremely cost-effective tool to reduce economic losses due to illness.

Highlights.

  • We model an influenza epidemic where three age groups wear facemasks.

  • We analyze the cost effectiveness of the use of facemasks during an epidemic.

  • Facemasks can reduce the number of influenza cases as well as economic losses.

  • Our analyses show facemasks could reduce economic losses by $570 billion.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Lori R. Daeulsberg her helpful comments and suggestions.

This research has been supported at Los Alamos National Laboratory under the Department of Energy contract DE-AC52-06NA25396 and a grant from NIH/NIGMS in the Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study (MIDAS) program (U01-GM097658-01).

Footnotes

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