Abstract
Local space-time scrambling of optical data leads to violent jerks and dislocations. On masking these, visual awareness of the scene becomes cohesive, with dislocations discounted as amodally occluding foreground. Such cohesive space-time of awareness is technically illusory because ground truth is jumbled whereas awareness is coherent. Apparently the visual field is a construction rather than a (veridical) perception.
Keywords: visual awareness, space-time, local sign, causality, amodal occlusion, specious moment
Is the space-time of awareness a pre-established container, waiting to be filled with visual experiences? Or is it created along with such experiences, as a structural aspect of them? This reminds one of the famous Leibniz-Newton controversy in physics (Clarke 1717). The issue was whether space is an empty “container” (Newton's absolute space-time: “Absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable” (Newton 1687), or whether “space” is nothing beyond a relation between objects (Leibniz in Clarke 1717: “… all we need in order to have an idea of place (and consequently of space) is to consider these relations amongst things and the rules of their changes; we do not need to imagine any absolute reality beyond the things whose location we are considering.”). In the latter case it would make no sense to speak of “empty space”. Geometry would be about relations between actual objects. The outcome (after various surprising changes of perspective) is still debated.
We consider an analogous problem in awareness. Visual space-time is commonly understood as (close to) veridical (Helmholtz 1867) representation of Newtonean space-time, requiring little explanation. This is perhaps the reason why Lotze's (1852) concept of “local sign” or Michotte's (1962) concept of apparent causality have been largely disregarded. Lotze required a physiological explanation for visual location; he considered a mere reference to the container concept unsatisfactory. Michotte showed that causality may be perceived where none exists in the physical scene. He thus showed that causality is a construction of the mind on the basis of spatio-temporally structured optical patterns. Thus the notion that perceptual space-time is a mere representation of physical space-time is perhaps suspect.
Our empirical approach to the question is to scramble physical space-time. Then “veridical perception” is a scrambled mess. We show that the space-time of visual awareness is often coherent in such cases. Thus, mental space-time is not a veridical representation of physical space-time at all, but a Leibnizian, relational structure of strands of awareness.
In Figure 1 the strips have been sloppily assembled, yet the reassembled image looks reasonably cohesive (try screening off the upper and lower ragged boundaries). This has struck many authors of books on visual arts or photography (eg, Clifton 1973). In terms of experimental phenomenology (Metzger 1930) the presentation is cohesive, whereas scrutiny reveals dislocations of edges. In the laboratory one forces “immediate visual awareness” through limiting viewing time, eccentric presentation, diverting reflective thought, and so forth (Ihde 1986).
We extend such observations to local disarray in space, time, and space-time. Purely spatial cases are illustrated with figures, whereas spatio-temporal cases require movie clips.
Consider local spatial disarray. Use a rectangular array of apertures as windows on randomly displaced independent copies of the image. Lacking data is filled with white. The displacements are about a quarter of aperture size. Local dislocations are “hidden” at the edges through cracks between the apertures (Figure 2). Even large dislocations (up to half the tile size) are “visually acceptable”.
Disarray is apparent under scrutiny (in Figure 2 notice the dislocation of the nose); it disappears under mild eccentric fixation. Even serious disarray is not salient in immediate awareness.
All instances of disarray are different, noticeable when you present them in quick succession. “Temporal cracks”, short flashes of a uniform gray image between two presentations, kill the apparent motion (Rensink et al 1997). Then vision relies on purely spatial structure (Movie 1).
Without flashes, one sees a turmoil of smooth random movements, like a flood bed seen through the rippling water surface of a shallow stream. With flashes, one enjoys a steady presentation. Scrutiny reveals occasional dislocations, but rather large disarray easily goes unnoticed. The effect is quite striking.
Benussi's demonstrations in acoustics (Albertazzi 1999) suggest similar effects for the temporal domain. We illustrate this with Sound Clip 1. In the first presentation you hear a sequence of a low tone, a high tone, and a noise burst (“dah-di-bzz”). After a period of silence you are presented with the low tone, the noise burst and the high tone in that sequence (“day-bzz-di”). However, what you hear is “dah-di-bzz”. The sequence is reordered in your acoustic awareness, “dah-di” being a sensible Gestalt.
In the visual domain, consider a video sequence free of “scene cuts”, and shift “apertures” of image frames randomly towards future or past. Such a movie looks jerky, due to the sudden dislocations. Use temporal cracks to hide these, and the movie appears smooth. The movie progresses steadily; jerks are gone (Movie 2). Immediate visual awareness deals gracefully with disarray in physical space and time alike.
Next consider disarray in space and time. Take a video sequence and tile all frames in the same way. Also “tile” in the temporal domain. (As before, this involves grouping sets of consecutive frames.) Apply both spatial and temporal disarray to each tile separately. The spatio-temporally disarrayed movie looks horrible, with violent local dislocations and strong jerks. Cracks and flashes (“space-time cracks”; Movie 2) yield an acceptable movie without obvious dislocations or jerks. Scrutiny slowly reveals many and major inconsistencies.
The cracks spoil the pleasure in viewing the movie. One sees a grid occluding the movie and a series of flashes added to it, much like lightning in a landscape. Visual awareness “does not blame” the movie for these pesky elements: it blames them on some unknown external cause. The movie appears as an integral entity seen behind, or through, the perturbations. The effect is stunning.
Neither does this experience stand alone; it works as well in the acoustic (time) domain (Sound Clip 2) and is similar to Bregman's (1994) well known “occluded BB…'s” (Movie 3). Spatio-temporal cohesion is a construction of microgenesis (Brown 2002), just as the content of awareness is. Cohesion in spite of jumbled optical structure implies that it is “illusory”, in the sense of mis-representing the physical (optical) data. Reality is a construction such that awareness makes better sense than the ground truth!
Microgenesis imposes coherent space-time and causality, rather than “represents” physical space-time and reality. The space-time of awareness is evidently Leibnizian, rather than Newtonian. It is nothing beyond the meaningful relations between threads of awareness. It is not a “representation” of space-time as immediately given by the (meaningless) optical structure.
Visual awareness is experience of one's optical user interface (Hoffman 2009; Koenderink 2010), rather than of some physical scene. This fits in seamlessly with current notions from biology (ethology, eg, Koenderink 2010; Lorenz 1973; Tinbergen 1951): evolution optimizes fitness rather than veridicality.
Acknowledgments
Jan Koenderink was supported by the Methusalem program by the Flemish Government (METH/08/02), awarded to Johan Wagemans (KUL). We gratefully acknowledge the administrative support of Stephanie Poot.
Biography
Jan Koenderink (1943) studied physics, mathematics, and astronomy at Utrecht University, where he graduated in 1972. From the late 1970's he held a chair “The Physics of Man” at Utrecht University till his retirement in 2008. He presently is Research Fellow at Delft University of Technology and guest professor at the University of Leuven. He is a member of the Dutch Royal Society of Arts and Sciences and received a honorific doctorate in medicine from Leuven University. Current interests include the mathematics and psychophysics of space and form in vision, including applications in art and design.
Whitman Richards is professor at CSAIL (MIT). His main research focus has been visual perception: mechanisms and models. Beginning first with studies of early visual processing, current work is now at a very high cognitive level, with emphasis on perception as a complex system of semi-autonomous modules—roughly akin to Minsky's “Society of Mind.” In the mid-seventies, his research activity was redirected after meeting David Marr. Rather than concentrating on mechanisms of vision, the emphasis changed to understanding the minimal conditions that should be satisfied for a vision system “to work.” Computational studies that met Marr's criteria turned out to be major advances in vision understanding. His contributions appear in a book called “Natural Computation”, which covers work in vision, hearing, and motor control.
Andrea van Doorn (1948) studied physics, mathematics, and chemistry at Utrecht University, where she did her master's in 1971. She did her PhD (at Utrecht) in 1984. She is presently at Delft University of Technology, department of Industrial Design. Current research interests are various topics in vision, communication by gestures, and soundscapes.
Contributor Information
Jan Koenderink, University of Leuven (K.U. Leuven), Laboratory of Experimental Psychology, Tiensestraat 102-box 3711, BE-3000 Leuven, Belgium; and Delft University of Technology, EEMCS, MMI, Mekelweg 4, NL-2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands; e-mail: jan.koenderink@telfort.nl.
Whitman Richards, MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, The Stata Center, Building 32, 32 Vassar Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA; e-mail: wrichards@mit.edu.
Andrea J van Doorn, Delft University of Technology, Industrial Design, Landbergstraat 15, NL-2628 CE Delft, The Netherlands; e-mail: a.j.vandoorn@tudelft.nl.
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