Skip to main content
NCBI home page
NIHPA Author Manuscripts logoLink to NIHPA Author Manuscripts
. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2014 Apr 1.
Published in final edited form as: Cognit Ther Res. 2012 Apr 29;37(2):412–418. doi: 10.1007/s10608-012-9459-2

Egocentric Perceptions of the Environment in Primary, but not Secondary, Psychopathy

Konrad Bresin 1, Ryan L Boyd 2, Scott Ode 2, Michael D Robinson 2
PMCID: PMC3653328  NIHMSID: NIHMS369214  PMID: 23687398

Abstract

Several theories of psychopathy link it to an egocentric mode of perceiving the world. This explanatory perspective is quite plausible given that psychopaths are viewed as callous, uncaring, and narcissistic. This explanatory perspective, though, has been an insufficient focus of research, particularly in basic cognitive tasks. Building on the work of Wapner and Werner (1957), an implicit measure of cognitive egocentrism was developed. Continuous variations in primary and secondary psychopathy were assessed in a sample of college undergraduates (N = 80). Individuals high in primary psychopathy exhibited cognitive egocentrism, whereas individuals low in primary psychopathy did not. On the other hand, variations in secondary psychopathy were non-predictive of performance in the task. Results are discussed in terms of theories of psychopathy, distinctions between its primary and secondary components, and the utility of modeling egocentrism in basic cognitive terms.

Keywords: Primary Psychopathy, Secondary Psychopathy, Egocentrism, Priming, Cognition

Karpman (1941) first suggested that there are at least two forms of antisocial personality. One form, often termed primary psychopathy, can be viewed in terms of an apparent deficit in appreciating the needs or wishes of others (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005). The second form, often termed secondary psychopathy, is defined in more behavioral terms. Such individuals are impulsive and get into trouble more frequently, but often because of their emotional reactivity and lack of planning (Millon, Simonsen, Birket-Smith, & Davis, 1998). There is now good support for this distinction in the psychopathy assessment (Benning, Patrick, Hicks, Blonigen, & Krueger, 2003; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and outcome prediction (Edens & McDermott, 2010; Lee & Salekin, 2010) literatures. We assessed primary and secondary psychopathy in dimensional terms, as increasingly advocated (e.g., Benning, Patrick, Blonigen, Hicks, & Iacono, 2005; Lee & Salekin, 2010). Of more importance, we sought to contribute to this literature by showing that primary, but not secondary, psychopathy is marked by higher levels of a basic form of egocentrism.

Primary Psychopathy as Cognitive Egocentrism

An egocentrism perspective of primary psychopathy has much to recommend it. Cleckley (1976) maintained that the primary psychopath is a person whose self is the center of the psyche. Gough (1948) proposed that the primary psychopath is a person who has deficiencies in understanding the perspectives of others. In addition, an egocentricity perspective can potentially explain many of the traits ascribed to primary psychopaths such as narcissism, callousness, and self-serving dominance (Benning et al., 2005; Miller, Gaughan, & Pryor, 2008). In all such cases, and others that we could cite, cognitive egocentrism may be a key mechanism.

Thus far, probes of cognitive egocentrism have primarily involved complicated scenarios in which individuals sometimes fail to recognize that another has a very different perspective (Lempers, Flavell, & Flavell, 1977; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). To be sure, individual differences in responding to such “theory of mind” scenarios are sometimes robust (Dehlgren, Sandberg, & Hjelmquist, 2003) and display sensitivity to clinical conditions such as schizophrenia (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Nonetheless, we deemed it useful to assess cognitive egocentrism in even more basic terms, as is possible on the basis of the excellent but largely forgotten work of Werner and Wapner in the 1940s and 1950s.

Werner and Wapner (1949), like others in the “New Look” movement (e.g., Bruner, 1951), advanced a theory of perception countering the idea that perceptions tend to be veridical. In several studies, they showed that asymmetric (left versus right) stimulations often biased subsequent visual perceptions, whether due to head tilt, body tilt, or auditory stimulation (e.g., Wapner, Werner, & Chandler, 1951; Werner, Wapner, & Bruell, 1953). Their most cogent statement was made in a 1957 monograph (Wapner & Werner, 1957). Greater susceptibility to such influences, they suggested, reveals a basic form of cognitive egocentrism – i.e., one in which external reality is implicitly assumed to correspond to a primed self-state. They showed that such biases were reliable and decreased with age, as they should from developmental perspectives of cognitive egocentrism (Piaget, 1932). We selected and improved one of their basic cognitive tasks for use in the present investigation. In addition to hypotheses involving primary versus secondary psychopathy, we examined other hypotheses as well.

Hypotheses

In our paradigm, individuals were to determine the point of a line immediately above a small dot presented toward the bottom of the computer screen. There is a general tendency – termed “pseudoneglect” – for individuals to bisect lines to the left of center (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). We hypothesized a similar bias in the present paradigm, which would result in average perceptions leftward of the actual horizontal position of the presented dots.

Of more importance, we presented asymmetric auditory input prior to each visual perception trial. Wapner and Werner (1957) showed that asymmetric auditory inputs generally bias subsequent visual perceptions in an assimilation-related manner – that is, visual perceptions are biased leftward following auditory stimulation to the left ear and rightward following auditory stimulation to the right ear. Effects of this type constitute a form of cognitive egocentrism and we hypothesized normative effects of this type – i.e., there should be a main effect of auditory prime side consistent with such assimilation effects.

Of more importance, we hypothesized that such egocentric inputs to perception would be evident among individuals high, but not low, in primary psychopathy, which would result in a primary psychopathy by auditory prime side interaction. On the other hand, we hypothesized no such biases as a function of individual differences in secondary psychopathy (i.e., there should be no secondary psychopathy by auditory prime side interaction), as secondary psychopathy is likely to reflect factors other than cognitive egocentrism (Poythress et al., 2010). Such a dissociation between the two forms of psychopathy would further the idea that primary and secondary psychopathy need to be distinguished from a mechanism-related standpoint.

For orthogonal reasons, we varied the valence of auditory primes. Some of them were unpleasant in nature and some were not. As a question of interest, we deemed it possible that visual perceptions would be biased in a direction opposite unpleasant (relative to neutral or pleasant) primes, much as aversive events often trigger avoidance-related tendencies (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Effects involving auditory valence are not central to key hypotheses, though we do discuss effects involving this variable.

Method

Participants and General Procedures

Eighty undergraduates from North Dakota State University (47 female; M age = 20.22; 91% Caucasian in race; all right-handed) received course credit for their psychology classes. Participants arrived in groups of six or less and were generally informed that the study concerned personality and perception, but only vaguely so. They were then assigned to individual personal computers with dividers. Participants first completed the perception task described below (programmed with E-Prime software). Only thereafter did we assess variations in primary and secondary psychopathy (programmed with MediaLab software).

Perception Task

Instructions

Participants were told to don headphones such that the left (right) ear of the headphones was over the left (right) ear and experimenters confirmed such placements. Subsequently, the computer program informed participants that we were interested in their abilities to alternate between two very different (and presumably independent) tasks – attending to sounds and making visual judgments. Instructions further stated that questions concerning the sounds would be presented at a later point in time, though they were not.

Task

The visual perception task was as follows. A small white dot was presented three-fourths (y-axis = 75%) from the top of the computer screen. Its horizontal position was subtly varied across trials, at random, to prelude inattention. A line was then presented one-fourth (y-axis = 25%) from the top of the computer screen. Participants were to indicate the horizontal position along the line exactly above the presented dot. They did so by making a mouse click.

Lateralized Sound Primes

Prior to each visual judgment, we presented auditory primes. The auditory primes were presented only to one ear, auditory side selected at random. Given the randomized nature of such primes, one should not be influenced by them and influences of this type would be consistent with cognitive egocentrism (Wapner & Werner, 1957).

To examine the generality of such effects, three blocks were administered. In all three blocks, the sound terminated immediately prior to the visual perception portion of the trial. The first block presented a non-aversive Windows XP ring tone for 1 second. The second block presented an aversive (Fetterman, Robinson, Gordon, & Elliot, 2011) white noise blast, again for 1 second. Given that the procedures were identical in these first two blocks, aside from sound content, we analyzed results from the first two blocks (60 trials in all) in a common analysis.

In the third block, six-second sound clips from the International Affective Digitized Sounds (IADS) database (Bradley & Lang, 1999) were presented as asymmetric auditory primes. There were 10 pleasant sounds (e.g., a baby laughing) and 10 unpleasant sounds (e.g., an argument). Auditory primes differed systematically in valence, F > 1500 (3.22 versus 7.49), but not arousal, F (1, 18) = 1.29, p > .25 (M = 6.11), according to the norms of Bradley and Lang (1999). There were 60 trials in this block in which both auditory side and sound valence were randomized, in a trial-specific manner, by the computer program.

Dependent Measure

The program recorded the actual x-position of the dot presented for each trial. In addition, it recorded the x-position perceived to be directly above the dot presented. From these two sources of information, a bias difference score was created by subtracting actual position from perceived position. A negative (positive) score thus indicates that the apparent position of the dot was to the left (right) of its actual position along the x-axis.

Psychopathy Assessment

The psychopathy literature has increasingly advocated dimensional assessments of it (e.g., Edens & McDermott, 2010; Lee & Salekin, 2010). Accordingly, we assessed primary and secondary psychopathy using the well-validated (e.g., Brinkley, Schmitt, Smith, & Newman, 2001) dimensional scales of Levenson, Kiehl, and Fitzpatrick (1995). Its primary psychopathy scale assesses classic features of it such as manipulative tendencies and cynicism (e.g., “In today’s world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to succeed.”). By contrast, secondary psychopathy includes items assessing emotional reactivity and impulsivity (e.g., “I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time and time again”), all such items rated along a 4-point continuum (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = strongly agree). Both scales were reliable (alphas > .80) and there was a moderate correlation between the scales, r = .40, p < .01, as is typical.

Results

Pseudoneglect

There is a consistent tendency, among right-handers, to favor the left region of space in visual perception tasks (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). Evidence in favor of the validity of our task would therefore be obtained to the extent that bias scores, irrespective of (and thus collapsing across) lateralized auditory primes, were leftward of veridical dot positions. This was true for the first factorial design, which collapsed across blocks 1 and 2, t (79) = −7.07, p < .01, d = −.79, and for results from the third block as well, t (79) = −7.23, p < .01, d = −.81.

Results Involving One-Second Lateralized Auditory Primes (Blocks 1 and 2)

A lack of self-environment differentiation – or, in other words, an egocentric frame of reference – is revealed to the extent that irrelevant inputs to the self are treated as information concerning the environment (Werner & Wapner, 1949). In the present context, this lack of differentiation would be evident to the extent that visual perceptions are biased toward the side of auditory stimulation. We hypothesized such an effect but one that would be particularly evident at high relative to low levels of primary psychopathy.

In a first General Linear Model (GLM) analysis, we included two within-subject predictors of visual bias scores. The first within-subject predictor was sound type (ding versus white noise) and the second was side of auditory stimulation (left versus right). In addition, z-scored variations in primary psychopathy were entered. The beauty and flexibility of the GLM procedure is that it can simultaneously model discrete within-subject predictors in combination with continuous between-subjects factors, thereby facilitating cognitive approaches to personality assessment (Robinson, 2007).

In this first GLM analysis, the main effect for Primary Psychopathy was not significant, F < 1. Thus, primary psychopathy did not predict pseudoneglect. All effects involving Sound Type were not significant, Fs < 1. Thus, for example, it was not the case that visual perceptions were biased in a direction opposite to the aversive auditory primes of block 2 relative to the more neutral auditory primes of block 1. On the other hand, there was a main effect for Auditory Side, F (1, 77) = 12.98, p < .01. That is, despite the irrelevant nature of the auditory primes, such lateralized inputs affected subsequent visual perceptions and did so in an assimilation-related manner: Leftward auditory primes biased visual perceptions leftward (M = −44.04), whereas rightward auditory primes biased visual perceptions rightward (M = 23.95). These results offer striking support for the ideas of Werner and Wapner (1949).

Of most importance, the GLM analysis revealed a significant Primary Psychopathy by Auditory Side interaction, F (1, 77) = 5.24, p < .05, that was not modified by Participant Sex, F < 1. To understand the pattern of this interaction, we estimated means for it at low (−1 SD) versus high (+1 SD) levels of primary psychopathy (Aiken & West, 1991). These estimated means are displayed in Figure 1 and they suggest that irrelevant auditory primes influenced subsequent visual perceptions only at high levels of primary psychopathy.

Figure 1.

Figure 1

Open in a new tab

The Effects of One-Second Lateralized Auditory Primes on Visual Perception Biases at Low versus High Levels of Primary Psychopathy

To better document the nature of the interaction, we created a difference score to reflect the effect of extraneous auditory stimulation (right stimulated perceptual biases minus left-stimulated perceptual biases). We then performed two simple regressions, with the predictor either altered to reflect a low (−1 SD) or high (+1 SD) level of primary psychopathy. The intercept – reflecting the effect of irrelevant lateral auditory input – was significant at the high level of primary psychopathy, t = 4.16, p < .01, but not the low level, t = 0.92, p > .35. Thus, primary psychopathy was an excellent predictor of this form of cognitive egocentrism.

Egocentric perceptual biases were hypothesized vary by primary, but not secondary, psychopathy. We accordingly performed a second GLM analysis in which primary psychopathy scores were replaced by secondary psychopathy scores. There were no effects for secondary psychopathy in this analysis, all Fs < 1. Further, a multiple regression indicated that primary, β = .34, t = 2.89, p < .01, but not secondary, β = −.09, t = −0.72, p > .45, psychopathy predicted cognitive egocentrism with both predictors simultaneously controlled.

Results Involving Six-Second Lateralized Auditory Primes (Block 3)

The auditory primes of block 3 were longer and more meaningful. Nonetheless, conceptual replication was expected. A first GLM included the within-subject predictors of sound valence (unpleasant versus pleasant) and side of auditory stimulation (left versus right) as well as z-scored variations in primary psychopathy.

In this GLM, the main effect for Primary Psychopathy was marginally significant, F (1, 77) = 2.80, p < .10, such that pseudoneglect in this block was more evident at a high (estimated M = −14.64) relative to low (estimated M = −9.39) level of primary psychopathy. The main effect of Sound Valence was not significant, F (1, 77) = 2.74, p > .10, but there was a marginally significant Primary Psychopathy by Sound Valence interaction, F (1, 77) = 3.46, p < .10. Leftward visual biases as a function of primary psychopathy were particularly evident following unpleasant (estimated Ms = −.9.14 & −18.67 at low & high levels of primary psychopathy) relative to pleasant (estimated Ms = −9.64 & −10.61) auditory primes. The interaction is orthogonal to our hypotheses, but it is of interest and it is discussed below.

Of perhaps more importance, we again found a significant main effect for Auditory Side, F (1, 77) = 7.37, p < .01, that was qualified by a significant Primary Psychopathy by Auditory Side interaction, F (1, 77) = 5.33, p < .05, which in turn was not modified by Participant Sex, F (1, 76) = 1.46, p > .20. Remaining interactions were not significant, Fs < 1. Estimated means for the interaction are reported in Figure 2. Follow-up testing established that the effect of lateral auditory primes on perception (i.e., cognitive egocentrism) was evident at high (+1 SD), t = 3.55, p < .01, but not low (−1 SD), t = 0.28, p > .75, levels of primary psychopathy.

Figure 2.

Figure 2

Open in a new tab

The Effects of Six-Second Lateralized Auditory Primes on Visual Perception Biases at Low versus High Levels of Primary Psychopathy

A second GLM analysis for this third block replaced primary psychopathy scores with secondary psychopathy scores. The main effect for Secondary Psychopathy was significant, F (1, 77) = 5.75, p < .05, but was qualified by a Secondary Psychopathy by Sound Valence interaction, F (1, 77) = 3.99, p < .05. Estimated means for the latter interaction were comparable following pleasant primes (estimated Ms = −8.72 & −11.53 at low & high levels of secondary psychopathy), but quite discrepant following unpleasant primes (estimated Ms = −7.92 & −19.89). Thus, there was a general pattern in which unpleasant primes, at least of the stronger and more meaningful block 3 type, biased attention leftward at high levels of psychopathy.

In this second GLM analysis, there was again a main effect for Auditory Side, F (1, 77) = 6.92, p < .05, but it did not interact with levels of secondary psychopathy, F < 1. Other interactions were not significant, Fs < 1. Thus, a dissociation involving the moderating effects of primary and secondary psychopathy was again obtained. This conclusion was reinforced in a multiple regression. When controlling for the overlapping variance of primary and secondary psychopathy, assimilation-related priming effects were predicted by primary psychopathy, β=.28, t = 2.30, p < .05, but not secondary psychopathy, β = −.06, t = −0.49, p > .60.

Discussion

We hypothesized that individuals high in primary, but not secondary, psychopathy would exhibit biased perceptions of an egocentric type. The results were supportive of such hypotheses. Individuals high in primary psychopathy were influenced by irrelevant auditory inputs – i.e., they saw the subsequent perceptual world in a manner consistent with the self’s activated lateralized state. On the other hand, individuals low in primary psychopathy did not exhibit such biases and secondary psychopathy did not moderate the magnitude of such effects. In the Discussion, we focus on task-related considerations, additional findings and non-findings, and future directions.

Task-Related Considerations

Wapner and Werner (1957) developed a variety of tasks to assess cognitive egocentrism in perceptual terms. Most such paradigms, though, produced complicated results that required some post-hoc assumptions. For example, individuals asked to tilt their heads in one direction typically adjusted a vertical rod in an opposite direction, results inferred to reflect unmeasured homeostatic processes (Wapner & Werner, 1952). In our opinion, such paradigms should be disfavored relative to those that typically result in assimilation-related effects.

Wapner and Werner (1957) presented several tasks producing assimilation-related effects, but some of them were potentially flawed. For example, one paradigm manipulated the starting position of a rod (which was initially tilted to the left versus right) and asked individuals to move the rod such that it was vertical. These adjustments were rarely sufficient, but could reflect the easiest course of action (i.e., insufficient adjustment) rather than cognitive egocentrism. The bottom line is that our task was carefully designed and we recommend it in future studies seeking to assess cognitive egocentrism in basic terms.

On the other hand, there would seem to be further opportunities to conceptually replicate the present findings. Perspective-taking, according to Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, and Gruenfeld (2006), can be examined in a simple task. Individuals are asked to draw an “E” on their foreheads. Some individuals do so by drawing it such that the E is consistent with the self’s perspective, whereas others do so by drawing it such that the E is consistent with the perspective of another person viewing the self. On the basis of the present findings, those high in primary psychopathy should draw this letter in a manner favoring the self’s egocentric perspective. Further, tasks used in the “theory of mind” literature (Frith, 2007) may be used in the psychopathy literature as well. If we are correct, higher levels of primary, but not secondary, psychopathy should predict deficient perspective-taking in such theory of mind tasks.

Additional Findings and non-Findings

On the basis of some theories of motivation (e.g., Lewin, 1932), we thought it possible that visual perceptions would be biased in a direction opposite to aversive sources of stimulation. We did not observe effects of this type, likely for two reasons. Irrespective of the valence of auditory inputs, robust assimilation-related effects were obtained and they may have overwhelmed any potential influences of auditory valence. In addition, Lang et al. (1997) make the point that human beings, relative to lower animals, are much less susceptible to approach-avoidance perceptions or behaviors, particularly in tasks of a cognitive type. Accordingly, what we emphasize is that our results were robust across manipulations of auditory valence.

The right hemisphere is dominant in spatial perception tasks, resulting in robust tendencies toward pseudoneglect (Jewell & McCourt, 2000). Although our task was novel to this literature, we found that tendencies toward pseudoneglect were generally pronounced. However, we found that rightward auditory primes eliminated and in fact reversed such tendencies toward pseudoneglect. Accordingly, our findings contribute to an attention-related perspective of this phenomenon (e.g., Bultitude & David, 2006).

The unpleasant primes of block 3 biased visual perceptions leftward at high levels psychopathy. In understanding such effects, we draw upon Heller’s (e.g., Heller, Nitschke, Etienne, & Miller, 1997) influential framework. To the extent that individuals are emotionally aroused by stimuli, there should be a leftward bias in visual perception (Robinson & Compton, 2006). Our findings therefore suggest that long-duration unpleasant (relative to pleasant) primes may be differentially arousing at high levels of psychopathy. Such effects need to be replicated, but they are consistent with the idea that psychopaths view unpleasant events as unexpected and unwarranted (Blair et al., 2005; Millon et al., 1998; Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

Further Directions of Research in the Psychopathy Realm

Our results may possess value in understanding some of the traits ascribed to those high in primary psychopathy such as narcissism, callousness, and a lack of empathy for others. It is also intuitive that individual differences in cognitive egocentrism, as we assessed it, may in part explain some of the other correlates of primary psychopathy such as higher levels of approach motivation (Corr, 2010), deficient fear responses (Patrick, Bradley, & Lang, 1993), and difficulties regulating dominant responses once activated (Newman & Lorenz, 2003). In all such cases, the phenomena may be exacerbated by cognitive egocentrism. Future research is necessary to gain a more nuanced perspective of the correlates of cognitive egocentrism, however.

We adopted a dimensional perspective of psychopathy in the present investigation, but our results might prove to be of value to clinical researchers and clinicians. First and foremost, cognitive egocentrism was unique to primary relative to secondary psychopathy. For this reason, implicit assessments of the present type may prove useful in case conceptualization as different treatments have been advocated for these two forms of psychopathy (e.g., Millon et al., 1998). Second, implicit probes of the present type may track therapeutic progress among psychopaths, much as implicit probes of anxiety and depression have proven their worth in tracking therapeutic progress among mood-disordered patients (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Third, it is possible that high levels of cognitive egocentrism can be retrained to therapeutic benefit, as cognitive retraining manipulations in other psychopathology realms have exhibited a great deal of promise (MacLeod, Koster, & Fox, 2009). We have recently developed procedures for retraining cognitive egocentrism and hope to document the benefits of doing so in future reports.

Acknowledgments

This publication was made possible by COBRE Grant P20 RR020151 from the National Center for Research Resources (NCRR), a component of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Its contents are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of NCRR or NIH.

References

  1. Aiken LS, West SG. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications; 1991. [Google Scholar]
  2. Baron-Cohen S, Leslie AM, Frith U. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition. 1985;21:37–46. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  3. Benning SD, Patrick CJ, Blonigen DM, Hicks BM, Iacono WG. Estimating facets of psychopathy from normal personality traits: A step toward community epidemiological investigations. Assessment. 2005;12:3–18. doi: 10.1177/1073191104271223. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  4. Benning SD, Patrick CJ, Hicks BM, Blonigen DM, Krueger RF. Factor structure of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory: Validity and implications for clinical assessment. Psychological Assessment. 2003;15:340–350. doi: 10.1037/1040-3590.15.3.340. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  5. Blair RJR, Mitchell D, Blair K. The psychopath: Emotion and the brain. Malden, MA: Blackwell; 2005. [Google Scholar]
  6. Bradley MM, Lang PJ. International affective digitized sounds (IADS): Stimuli, instruction manual and affective ratings (Tech. Rep. No. B-2) Gainesville, FL: The Center for Research in Psychophysiology, University of Florida; 1999. [Google Scholar]
  7. Brinkley CA, Schmitt WA, Smith SS, Newman JP. Construct validation of a self-report psychopathy scale: Does Levenson’s self-report psychopathy scale measure the same constructs as Hare’s psychopathy checklist-revised. Personality and Individual Differences. 2001;31:1021–1038. [Google Scholar]
  8. Bruner JS. Personality dynamics and the process of perceiving. In: Blake RR, Ramsey GV, editors. Perception: An approach to personality. New York: Ronald Press Company; 1951. pp. 121–147. [Google Scholar]
  9. Bultitude JH, Davis AMA. Putting attention on the line: Investigating the activation-orientation hypothesis of pseudoneglect. Neuropsychologia. 2006;44:1849–1858. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.03.001. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  10. Cleckley H. The mask of sanity. 5th Ed. St. Louis, MO: Mosby; 1976. [Google Scholar]
  11. Corr PJ. The psychoticism-psychopathy continuum: A neuropsychological model of core deficits. Personality and Individual Differences. 2010;48:695–703. [Google Scholar]
  12. Dehlgren S, Sandberg AD, Hjelmquist E. The non-specificity of theory of mind deficits: Evidence from children with communicative disabilities. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 2003;15:129–155. [Google Scholar]
  13. Edens JF, McDermott BE. Examining the construct validity of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory-Revised: Preferential correlates of fearless dominance and self-centered impulsivity. Psychological Assessment. 2010;22:32–42. doi: 10.1037/a0018220. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  14. Fetterman AK, Robinson MD, Gordon RD, Elliot AJ. Anger as seeing red: Perceptual sources of evidence. Social and Psychological Personality Science. 2011;2:312–317. doi: 10.1177/1948550610390051. [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  15. Frith C. Making up the mind: How the brain creates out mental world. Malden, MA: Blackwell; 2007. [Google Scholar]
  16. Galinsky AD, Magee JC, Inesi ME, Gruenfeld DH. Power and perspectives not taken. Psychological Science. 2006;17:1068–1074. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01824.x. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  17. Gough HG. A sociological theory of psychopathy. American Journal of Sociology. 1948;53:359–366. doi: 10.1086/220203. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  18. Heller W, Nitschke JB, Etienne MA, Miller GA. Patterns of regional brain activity differentiate types of anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1997;106:376–385. doi: 10.1037//0021-843x.106.3.376. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  19. Jewell G, McCourt ME. Pseudoneglect: A review and meta-analysis of performance factors in line bisection task. Neuropsychologia. 2000;38:93–110. doi: 10.1016/s0028-3932(99)00045-7. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  20. Karpman B. On the need for separating psychopathy into two distinct clinical types: Symptomatic and idiopathic. Journal of Criminology and Psychopathology. 1941;3:112–137. [Google Scholar]
  21. Lang PJ, Bradley BB, Cuthbert BN. Motivated attention: Affect, activation, and action. In: Lang PJ, Simons RF, Balaban MT, editors. Attention and orienting: Sensory and motivational processes. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum; 1997. pp. 97–135. [Google Scholar]
  22. Lee Z, Salekin RT. Psychopathy in a noninstitutional sample: Differences in primary and secondary subtypes. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment. 2010;1:152–169. doi: 10.1037/a0019269. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  23. Lempers JD, Flavell ER, Flavell JH. The development in very young children of tacit knowledge concerning visual perception. Genetic Psychology Monographs. 1977;95:3–53. [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  24. Levenson MR, Kiehl KA, Fitzpatrick CM. Assessing psychopathic attributes in a noninstitutionalized population. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1995;68:151–158. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.68.1.151. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  25. Lewin K. Principles of topological psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1936. [Google Scholar]
  26. Lilienfeld SO, Andrews BP. Development and preliminary validation of a self-report measure of psychopathic personality traits in noncriminal populations. Journal of Personality Assessment. 1996;66:488–524. doi: 10.1207/s15327752jpa6603_3. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  27. MacLeod C, Koster EHW, Fox E. Whither cognitive bias modification research? Commentary on the special section articles. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 2009;118:89–99. doi: 10.1037/a0014878. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  28. Mathews A, MacLeod C. Cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology. 2005;1:167–195. doi: 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.1.102803.143916. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  29. Miller JD, Gaughan ET, Pryor LR. The Levenson self-report psychopathy scale: An examination of the personality traits and disorders associated with the LSRP factors. Assessment. 2008;15:450–463. doi: 10.1177/1073191108316888. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  30. Millon T, Simonsen E, Birket-Smith M, Davis RD. Psychopathy: Antisocial, criminal and violent behavior. New York: Guilford Press; 1998. [Google Scholar]
  31. Newman JP, Lorenz AR. Response modulation and emotion processing: Implications for psychopathy and other dysregulatory psychopathology. In: Davidson RJ, Scherer KR, Goldsmith HH, editors. Handbook of affective sciences. New York: Oxford University Press; 2003. pp. 904–929. [Google Scholar]
  32. Patrick CJ, Bradley MM, Lang PJ. Emotion in the criminal psychopath: Startle modulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1993;102:82–92. doi: 10.1037//0021-843x.102.1.82. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  33. Paulhus DL, Williams KM. The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality. 2002;36:556–563. [Google Scholar]
  34. Piaget J. The moral judgment of the child. Oxford: Harcourt; 1932. [Google Scholar]
  35. Poythress NG, Lilienfeld SO, Skeem JL, Douglas KS, Edens JF, Epstein M, et al. Using the PCL-R to help estimate the validity of two self-report measures of psychopathy with offenders. Assessment. 2010;17:206–219. doi: 10.1177/1073191109351715. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  36. Robinson MD. Lives lived in milliseconds: Using cognitive methods in personality research. In: Robins RW, Fraley RC, Krueger R, editors. Handbook of research methods in personality psychology. New York: Guilford Press; 2007. pp. 345–359. [Google Scholar]
  37. Robinson MD, Compton RJ. The automaticity of affective reactions: Stimulus valence, arousal, and lateral spatial attention. Social Cognition. 2006;24:469–495. [Google Scholar]
  38. Wapner S, Werner H. Experiments on sensory-tonic field theory of perception: V. Effect of body status on the kinesthetic perception of verticality. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1952;44:126–131. doi: 10.1037/h0058472. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  39. Wapner S, Werner H. Perceptual development. Worcester, MA: Clark University Press; 1957. [Google Scholar]
  40. Wapner S, Werner H, Chandler KA. Experiments on sensory-tonic field theory of perception: I. Effect of extraneous stimulation on the visual perception of verticality. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1951;42:341–345. doi: 10.1037/h0053846. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  41. Werner H, Wapner S. Sensory-tonic field theory of perception. Journal of Personality. 1949;18:88–107. [Google Scholar]
  42. Werner H, Wapner S, Bruell JH. Experiments on sensory-tonic field theory of perception: IV. Effect of position of head, eyes, and of object position of the apparent median place. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 1953;46:293–299. doi: 10.1037/h0055733. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  43. Wimmer H, Perner J. Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition. 1983;13:103–128. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

RESOURCES