THE IMPACT OF HISPANIC POPULATION GROWTH ON THE OUTLOOK OF AFRICAN AMERICANS

Abstract

We know too little about the effects of immigration on black Americans. If prior research yields mixed evidence about immigration’s consequences for the objective well-being of African Americans, it is silent about effects of immigration on blacks’ subjective well-being. To fill that void, this paper assesses the impact of the expanding Hispanic population on black Americans from a social psychological perspective. We ask whether blacks’ self-reported distress, social distrust, or attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants are affected by the size of the local Hispanic population or by the percentage growth in local Hispanic residents. Answers come from responses of non-Hispanic black participants in the 1998–2002 General Social Surveys, linked to 1990 and 2000 census data. Contrary to pessimistic claims, most social psychological outcomes, including measures of economic distress, manifest no impact of local Hispanic numbers. The four exceptions, significant effects of local Hispanic population share or percentage growth evenly split in valence, underscore the complexity of recent immigration’s effects on African Americans.

William Julius Wilson’s influential analysis of black inner city life includes this claim: “in the 1980s a large number of immigrants with little formal education arrived in the United States from developing countries, and affected the wages of poorly educated native workers, especially those who had dropped out of high school” (1996:34). Wilson is not alone in taking this position, but there have also been contrary voices. Indeed, the impact of America’s expanding immigrant population on the well-being of African Americans has been a focus of widespread analysis and debate. Researchers have searche for signs that immigration creates hardship for blacks in economic outcomes such as wages, employment, and small business development--and in residential segregation, education and crime. Social psychological outcomes, however, have been overlooked. While there are anecdotal reports of economic conflict between African Americans and immigrants, whether blacks living in high-immigration areas feel financially pinched or blame their plight on immigrants has yet to be ascertained.

Because Hispanics constitute such a large share of recent immigrants (Larsen 2004), the consequences of immigration for African Americans are in large measure consequences of the growing Hispanic presence in the U.S. This research uses data from the 1998–2002 General Social Surveys and 1990 and 2000 censuses to assess the impact of local Hispanic population share and recent growth on black Americans’ self-reported economic distress, personal distress, and distrust. We also examine blacks’ attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants for signs of perceived competition and threat.

BACKGROUND

The Migration Context: Rising Hispanic Populations in the U.S.

The rapid expansion of the Hispanic population in the U.S. has changed the societal context for all Americans. In 1980, Hispanics represented 6.4% of the U.S. population; in 1990 the figure was 9.0%; and by 2000, the percentage of Hispanics was 12.5%.

Most of this growth has taken place in areas already heavily populated by Hispanics. Demographers speak of migration streams because new migrants typically follow the paths paved by kinship and social networks, settling near their predecessors. This process of chain migration, together with the legacy of U.S. acquisition of Southwestern lands from Mexico, has created longstanding concentrations of Hispanics in the West and Southwest, along with Chicago, New York, and southern Florida.

But dramatic growth of Hispanic populations in traditional target areas is not the only noteworthy development of the past twenty years. The rising Hispanic population in new locations represents another striking change. Aided by the amnesty provision of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, domestic Hispanic migrants have been moving from the Northeast and West to the Midwest and South, particularly Georgia and North Carolina. Newly-arrived Hispanic immigrants often replace domestic migrants in traditional gateway states like California and New York (Frey 2002, 2005; Schachter 2003), but alternately may choose initial U.S. destinations in “new gateway” cities like Atlanta, Georgia, along with Charlotte-Gastonia and Greensboro-Winston-Salem in North Carolina (Singer 2004). As a block, the Southern states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia saw 1990–2000 increases of over 190% in their Hispanic populations (Schmid 2003:145). North Carolina’s Hispanic population grew by almost 400 percent from 1990 to 2000 (Mohl 2003:38). Given that Hispanics are probably undercounted in the official census numbers, the true population growth may be much higher (Mohl 2003:39–41).

Importantly, this increase of Hispanic population in non-traditional locations is not confined to urban areas. Searching for economic opportunities created by economic expansion, and recruited directly by poultry plants and agricultural corporations on a quest for cheap labor (Bailey 2005; Fennelly 2005; Frey 2002, 2003, 2005; Mohl 2003), Hispanic immigrants have increasingly made their homes in suburban and rural areas that lacked any substantial numbers of Hispanics in 1980 (Alba, Logan, Stults, Marzan, and Zhang 1999; Bump, Lowell, and Pettersen 2005; Lichter and Johnson 2006, 2009; McConnell 2008).

This growth has not been free of problems. Given the circumscribed labor market prospects of many new immigrants, it is unsurprising that Hispanic poverty rates rose six percentage points in the South during the 1990s. Hispanics have often relied on public services for health care and strained the educational and legal systems that struggle to adapt to changing demands (Bailey 2005; Bump et al. 2005; Kochhar et al. 2005; Schoenholtz 2005; Solorzano 2005). But have the growing Hispanic numbers also amplified hardships faced by the most vulnerable longstanding residents of high-immigration areas, especially African Americans?

The Impact of Hispanic/Immigrant Population¹ Growth on African American Well-Being

“Hard” outcomes

Policy debates and academic research have given much attention to the impact of America’s expanding immigrant population on the material well-being of African Americans.

As noted earlier, William Julius Wilson (1996) insists that economic competition from immigrants is one important cause of the shift from more livable “institutional ghettos” of the past to the jobless ghettos in which so many black Americans are mired today. However, the assumption that immigrant competition harms black Americans has not escaped challenge. As Bean and Stevens (2003) note, the situation is complex. Although blacks and foreign-born populations are often concentrated in the same metropolitan areas—at least outside the South— sharing a location does not necessarily engender competition. For one thing, large immigrant populations can expand certain employment opportunities. For another, enclave economies can insulate immigrants and African Americans against competition from the other group.

Indeed, the research evidence is mixed. Studies of African Americans’ labor market outcomes have variably concluded that positive inter-city correlations of socioeconomic indicators for blacks and Latinos demonstrate an absence of socioeconomic competition (McClain and Tauber 1998), or that growth in the immigrant population has brought at least modest decline in labor market outcomes of African Americans, particularly the lowest-skilled groups (Hamermesh and Bean 1998).

In terms of other outcomes, immigration was found to have no negative implications for the likelihood of self-employment among African Americans (Fairlie and Meyer 1998), or for residential segregation, where if anything the impact is positive (Zax 1998). But the swelling immigrant population may hurt the chances of African Americans to complete high school (Betts 1998) and to gain entrance to certain types of higher education programs (Hoxby 1998).

There is little quantitative evidence that Hispanics have competed with African Americans for jobs in new immigrant destinations in the South. In most Southern counties, the robust 1990s economy provided ample opportunities for natives and newcomers alike (Kochhar et al. 2005:23–26). Still, Hispanics have replaced blacks in selected local industries, and some analysts have reported perceptions among blacks that Hispanics threaten their economic livelihoods (Mohl 2003:46–49; Schmid 2003:152).

Social psychological distress and distrust

Portrayals of African American disadvantage often chart tangible outcomes, like education, employment, income, and longevity (for example, see Farley 1996; Stoll 2005), but the literature on racial disparities also reminds us that such less tangible dimensions as dissatisfaction, unhappiness, poor health, and social distrust constitute other crucial aspects of inequality.

Financial discontent, job insecurity, and perceived decline in conditions for blacks as a group are obvious places to look for signs that growth in Hispanic numbers makes blacks feel squeezed, whether out of actual or perceived economic competition.

General unhappiness and poor health could be other indications, if growing Hispanic numbers were in fact having negative repercussions for blacks’ well-being. We know that blacks fare worse than whites on these social psychological dimensions, for reasons partly linked to socioeconomic status (Cockerham 1990; Mirowsky and Ross 1980; Ross and Van Willigen 1997), partly independent of it (Thomas and Hughes 1986; Hughes and Thomas 1998). Community poverty and experience of discrimination have also been linked to psychological distress and life dissatisfaction among blacks (Broman 1997; Schulz et al. 2000). Taken together, these findings suggest that health and happiness among African Americans are potential multi-faceted barometers of the impact of swelling Hispanic numbers on black Americans.

Distrust—both interpersonal distrust and distrust of government—is another important dimension of social psychological outlook. Distrust is more common among those who have experienced trauma or chronic hardship including discrimination, among the educationally and economically unsuccessful, and among those living in communities marked by racial diversity and economic disparity, so say Alesina and La Ferrara (2002). Congruent patterns are reported in Smith’s (1997) analysis of General Social Survey “misanthropy” items. Thus levels of distrust among African Americans would be plausible indicators of whether Hispanic immigrants represent a negative disruption in their lives.

In sum, existing literature indicates that glum economic perspectives, unhappiness, poor health, and distrust are common responses to hardship and stress. It is important to learn whether the growing presence of Hispanics evokes such responses in African Americans.

Attitudes about Hispanics and immigrants

Insofar as growth in the local Hispanic population blights the life chances of African Americans, social psychological evidence might appear not only in blacks’ outlook on their own lives and society, but also in their sense of threat and feelings of hostility toward Hispanics and immigrants. Cultural and linguistic differences may aggravate clashes (Mohl 2003; Schoenholtz 2005); and low-skilled Hispanics’ reliance on public services could foster resentment among blacks.

The proposition that sizeable out-group populations evoke a sense of competition or threat and consequent negative reaction is a staple of the intergroup relations literature (Allport 1954, Williams 1947). “Realistic group conflict” (Levine and Campbell 1972) is emphasized in some constructions; in others it is threat to group position (Blumer 1958: Bobo 1999). Such threat or competition may be economic, political, or both (Blalock 1967). Most often, the focus has been reactions of the dominant group to minority populations, but some prominent research considers threat posed to minority groups by other minorities (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Change in the size of out-group populations has not often been explicitly measured, but temporal patterns in reactions to out-groups are often interpreted in terms of such change (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006).

A sense of threat and rivalry was certainly suggested in the move by black legislators in the high-Hispanic-growth state of Georgia to prevent the inclusion of Hispanics among the state’s protected minorities (Schmid 2003). Similar accounts come from the traditional gateway areas of Los Angeles and Miami, where black-to-brown residential transition has brought economic and political shifts and strains (Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn 1997; Vaca 2004). But aside from these local stories, is there systematic evidence of a widespread tendency for local Hispanic presence or influx to produce anti-Hispanic or anti-immigrant sentiment among blacks, perhaps mediated by perceived competition and threat?

The literature provides some clues but no clear answers. County-level Hispanic population share was reportedly unrelated to African Americans’ attitudes toward Hispanics (Cummings and Lambert 1997), and opinion on immigration policy was found to be unresponsive to perceived growth in the local Hispanic population (Wilson 2001). Voting patterns for California’s anti-immigrant Proposition 187 were examined in vain for signs that sizeable local Hispanic populations fueled resentment among African Americans (Morris 2002). However, Oliver and Ha (2006) claimed that attitudes about immigration are most negative in metropolitan areas where minority out-group populations are large.

Evidence is similarly mixed regarding the linkage of perceived competition and threat with anti-Hispanic and anti-immigrant sentiment. Among black respondents to the American National Election Studies, neither perceived economic conflict (Thornton and Mizuno 1999) nor economic pessimism (Cummings and Lambert 1997) seemed to play a role in shaping attitudes about Hispanics. However, nonwhite General Social Survey respondents’ opinions on immigration policy were linked to the sense of threat and competition from immigrants (Wilson 2001).

In sum, the studies cited above have drawn mixed conclusions about the link between growth in the Hispanic population and black intergroup attitudes, and about the role of perceived threat and competition in shaping blacks’ attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants. Little guidance is provided by related research on the impact that Hispanic population numbers may have on white Anglo attitudes: The tendency of large black populations to aggravate anti-black prejudice among whites is not echoed in effects of Hispanic population share on anti-Hispanic attitudes held by white Anglos (Taylor 1998; Taylor and Aurand 2004); effects of Hispanic population growth on white Anglo attitudes have yet to be estimated. Clearly, evidence about the impact Hispanic numbers have on black attitudes is badly needed.

The Dimensions of Hispanic Numbers

There is a long tradition of theoretical and research attention to the social psychological impact of population proportions (Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995, 1996; Taylor 1998). The emphasis in the earlier literature is on negative effects of out-group population share—putative reactions to competition and threat. However, the Hispanic case could be very different. Localities with longstanding sizeable Hispanic communities may have seen valued cultural infusions as well as economic accommodation, reflected in certain positive attitudes of local blacks as well as white Anglos. This possibility of mixed reactions makes the assessment of African Americans’ outlook in relation to the proportion of Hispanics in the locality particularly interesting.

Also, as we note above, the rapid growth of Hispanic populations in selected localities—some with little history of Hispanic presence—is an important element in recent migration patterns. In general, although localities with substantial existing Hispanic population have seen the greatest growth in absolute numbers of Hispanics, it is communities where Hispanics have been rare that show the greatest percentage growth of Hispanic residents. In popular portrayals, such rapid transformation of the local ethnic landscape is often experienced as unfortunate disruption—even though many of these areas would have lost population in the absence of Hispanic migration (Donato, Tolbert, Nucci, and Kawano 2007). Testing the assumption that percentage growth of the Hispanic population has especially pronounced social psychological effects on the indigenous black population is a central goal of this paper.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This project aims to address the following questions:

1. Is there evidence that African Americans’ views of their own lives and the society around them are negatively affected: by living where the Hispanic population share is large; or by seeing dramatic percentage growth in the local Hispanic population between 1990 and 2000?

2. Are there signs that blacks are prompted to develop adverse attitudes or negative feelings toward Hispanics and immigrants when their localities: contain a substantial Hispanic population share; or see acute percentage growth in the local Hispanic population?

METHODOLOGY

General Social Surveys (GSS) of 1998, 2000, and 2002 provide the social psychological data for this project. Response rates – completed cases as a proportion of the net sample – were .756, .700, and .701, respectively. In recent years the GSS has not over-sampled black respondents; thus any one of the recent biennial surveys includes only about 400 blacks. Pooling three of the surveys yields a non-Hispanic black sample large enough for serious analysis.² Over the 1998–2002 period, GSS respondents were drawn from one hundred metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan counties. These primary sampling units for the GSS serve as our localities.

There are good reasons to believe that metropolitan areas are appropriate units of contextual analysis. First, metropolitan areas are likely to constitute meaningful labor markets. They are a key geographical dimension in Bureau of Labor Statistics data, and studies of wage inequalities commonly use them as contexts (see, e.g., Cohen and Huffman 2003; McCall 2001). Second, metropolitan areas typically share common newspapers that provide regionally relevant news (Lacy 1984:640–41); and studies of newspaper markets have taken metropolitan area as a unit of analysis (see, e.g., Lacy 1984; Maier 2005). Finally, the GSS primary sampling units have been used as contextual units in previous studies that have found statistically significant and substantively important effects of metropolitan-area characteristics on various attitudes (Baumer, Messner, and Rosenfeld 2003; Taylor 1998).

U.S. Census data appended to the GSS files provide 1990 and 2000 population counts and socioeconomic descriptions broken down by race and ethnicity for these localities. It is reasonable to assume that any causal effects of Hispanic numbers on the perspectives of black respondents are approximately synchronous. Because census numbers shift gradually, measures taken in the 2000 decennial census will differ only incrementally from demographic realities in 1998 and 2002. Thus the 2000 census data represent a reasonably appropriate pairing with the 1998–2002 survey responses.

Dependent Variables I: Self-Reported Distress and Social Distrust

Scale construction of dependent measures was guided by conceptual considerations, inter-item correlations, and the coincidence of questions in the same survey year.

Some sixteen GSS items were used individually or within scales to yield five measures of self-reported distress and social distrust. All have been coded so that high values represent negative outcomes. Among them, these measures assess three dimensions of African Americans’ outlook on their own lives: economic distress, personal distress, and distrust.

The first of two economic distress measures, Individual economic distress, is a six-item scale representing: perception of inferior financial status relative to others; perceived recent negative change in financial status; job and financial dissatisfaction; and respondents’ perceived likelihood of losing their current jobs, and of failing to find new jobs if they do. Collective economic decline represents opinion that in the last few years conditions for black people have gotten worse, not better.

A three-item scale, Personal distress represents self-reported unhappiness, the feeling that life is dull rather than exciting, and poor health.

Two measures of distrust are measured with three-item scales. Interpersonal distrust represents negative views about whether or not people are fair, trustworthy, and helpful. Distrust of federal government registers low confidence ratings of Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the executive branch of the federal government.

Dependent Variables II: Attitudes toward Hispanics and Immigration

Another fourteen items were used to build four measures assessing three dimensions of respondent negativity toward Hispanics and immigrants—stereotyping, views about immigration, and social distance and affect. As before, high values represent negative attitudes.

The measure of Stereotyping is a three-item scale representing respondents’ ratings of Hispanics on dimensions of intelligence, industriousness, and propensity to violence.

A six-item scale taps Views on immigrants and Hispanic immigration flow. Measures represent beliefs about whether immigrants to the U.S. take jobs, increase crime, undermine national unity, help the economy, and introduce new ideas, as well as opinion on decreasing the Hispanic immigration flow.

The two final measures represent social distance and affect. Disapproval of intermarriage measures respondents’ opposition to the hypothetical marriage of a family member with an Hispanic. Cool feelings toward Hispanics consists of ratings on a nine-point coolness continuum.

Scales are unweighted means of scores standardized within the black sample. The Interpersonal distrust, Distrust of federal government, and View on immigrants scales represent the more common “effect indicator models” in the terminology of Bollen and Lennox (1991): the intercorrelated constituent measures are envisioned as outcroppings of an underlying construct. The Individual economic distress, Personal distress and Stereotyping scales represent “causal indicator models;” these measures are seen as composites of elements having no necessary relationship with each other.

Descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables can be seen in Table 1, while exact question wording and alpha coefficients for the “effect indicator model” scales are shown in Appendix A. Most values of alpha are in the expected range, generally being higher for scales containing more items.

Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics

A. Dependent Variables	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Individual Economic Distress	0.01	0.64	− 1.66	1.77	917
Collective Economic Decline	1.60	0.65	1.00	3.00	614
Personal Distress	− 0.01	0.74	− 1.37	2.01	774
Interpersonal Distrust	− 0.01	0.76	− 1.76	0.77	579
Distrust of Federal Government	− 0.01	0.78	− 1.71	1.46	589
Stereotyping	− 0.01	0.59	− 1.88	1.52	154
Views on Immigrants and Hispanic Immigration Flow	− 0.02	0.62	− 1.35	1.49	173
Opposition to Intermarriage	2.55	1.13	1.00	5.00	165
Cool Feelings Toward Hispanics	3.46	2.38	1.00	9.00	364
B. Independent Variables	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	N
Age	43.34	15.54	18.00	89.00	917
Gender (Male = 1)	0.38	0.48	0.00	1.00	917
Education	12.40	2.74	0.00	20.00	917
Occupational Prestige	39.89	13.34	17.00	86.00	917
Work Status (Full-time = 1)	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	917
East	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	917
Midwest	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00	917
South	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	917
West	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00	917
Locality Population Size (ln)	14.15	1.92	9.68	16.79	917
Metropolitan Status (MSA = 1)	0.83	0.38	0.00	1.00	917
2000 Black Population Share (ln)	− 1.75	0.73	− 5.90	− 0.56	917
2000 Proportion of Blacks with a High School Diploma	0.72	0.08	0.51	0.96	917
2000 Hispanic Population Share (ln)	− 2.89	1.12	− 5.00	− 0.56	917
2000/1990 Hispanic Population Growth (ln)	0.66	0.55	0.06	2.26	917

Note: Statistics for dependent variables are limited to cases for which valid data exists on all independent variables. Statistics for independent variables are limited to those cases for which valid data exists on all other independent variables and on the dependent variable with the largest N (Individual Economic Distress). Computing descriptive statistics for locality characteristics at the individual level produces summaries weighted by locality subsample size.

Focal Predictors: Hispanic Population in the Locality

One primary indicator of Hispanic numbers in our analyses is the 2000 Hispanic population share. We address the positive skew in this variable’s distribution by using the natural log of the proportion.

As emphasized in the preceding discussion, recent growth in local Hispanic population is a central interest, and the second focal indicator captures this dynamic. Qualitative descriptions of recent Hispanic population growth suggest that the ratio of 2000 to 1990 Hispanic population share indexes the kind of local change that may have had a pronounced impact. Importantly, this ratio is not redundant with the 2000 population share estimate: the bivariate correlation of the logged 2000 Hispanic population share and the logged ratio of 2000 to 1990 Hispanic population share is −.36; the partial correlation, net of control variables used in our analyses, is −.04 and nonsignificant. Thus our second focal predictor, the ratio 2000/1990 Hispanic population growth (logged to address skew), allows us to ask about growth in the local Hispanic population as an independent question.³

Locality-Level Controls

The contextual controls employed in our analyses were not chosen casually: each control showed one or more relationships with the focal Hispanic numbers predictors and the social psychological outcomes; thus omitting them could have biased the estimates of the Hispanic numbers effects and invited spurious interpretations.

The four regions of the country are represented with dummy variables Midwest, South, and West, the Northeast serving as the reference category. Locality population size, the natural log of the 2000 population count, is included along with Metropolitan status of the locality—a dichotomous variable coded 1 for metropolitan areas and 0 for nonmetropolitan counties. The 2000 Black population share, the natural log of the proportion black in 2000, also serves as a control. Finally, in light of evidence that attitudes can be affected by the community’s average socioeconomic status net of individual characteristics (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000)—more specifically by community-level education (Taylor and Mateyka 2007)—we use the 2000 proportion of Blacks with a high school diploma as a locality-level control for black socioeconomic status.

Individual-Level Controls

To control for potentially relevant compositional differences in the 100 localities represented in this research, five characteristics of the individual respondents are included in the analyses reported here: Age, Gender, Education (years of schooling), Occupational prestige, and Work status (full time or not). Correlations of these individual-level variables with the focal Hispanic numbers predictors are not large, but some are significant, and we know from previous research that these individual characteristics also relate to certain of our social psychological outcomes.

A complicating consideration is that two of these “control” variables—Occupational prestige and Work status—could plausibly be influenced by Hispanic population presence or growth, in which case their inclusion could bias (presumably downward) the estimates of Hispanic numbers effects on social psychological outcomes. To check against this possibility, we performed replications of all central analyses without these two controls.

Analyses of economic and personal distress and of social distrust, all represented on more than one GSS, also included two dummy variables to represent year of the survey.

Analyses

GSS data for 1998–2002 come from large samples of respondents nested within 100 primary sampling units or localities. Our focal dependent measures are responses from individuals, while the focal predictors are characteristics of the short list of localities in which they live. Such “multilevel” data must be analyzed with specialized statistical techniques. More specifically, ordinary least squares regression assumes that all cases are independent, whereas individuals in any one of the 100 localities are probably more similar to each other than to residents of other areas. Ignoring this autocorrelation in the error terms can downwardly bias estimates of standard errors, potentially yielding inaccurate statistical inferences. Thus for central analyses we employ the multilevel modeling program HLM 6.0. Specifically, we use random-intercepts models that allow the average level of the dependent variable to vary across primary sampling units by adding a locality-level component to the error term. This parameter absorbs variation in the dependent variable among primary sampling units, rendering the individual-level error terms independent and providing more accurate significance tests. A full explanation of the method is available in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). For our analyses, all individual-level control variables are constrained to have identical effects across localities.

To enable more consistent comparisons across our various dependent variables, we use linear models to analyze them all. For ordinal variables with few categories, we performed supplementary analyses to ensure that the linear specification does not present a misleading picture. Results of these analyses will be noted, where appropriate.

RESULTS

Hispanic Numbers Vis-a-Vis Black Americans' Self-Reported Distress and Social Distrust

Are self-reported distress and distrust among African Americans affected by the local Hispanic population share in 2000 or the 2000/1990 Hispanic growth ratio? Table 2 presents slope coefficients and standard errors from HLM analyses of three social psychological measures– Individual economic distress, Collective economic decline, and Personal distress–employing the full set of individual-level and locality-level controls. Table 3 presents results for distrust – Interpersonal distrust and Distrust of federal government.⁴

Table 2.

Results of HLM Analyses of Self-Reported Distress

	Individual Economic Distress		Collective Economic Decline		Personal Distress
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Intercept	− 0.014	0.033	1.564***	0.038	− 0.008	0.039
Individual-Level Controls
Age	− 0.003*	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.004*	0.002
Gender (Male = 1)	− 0.066	0.042	0.006	0.053	− 0.123*	0.051
Education	− 0.037***	0.009	0.015	0.012	− 0.032**	0.011
Occupational Prestige	− 0.004	0.002	0.003	0.002	− 0.006**	0.002
Work Status (Full-time = 1)	− 0.214***	0.044	0.029	0.057	− 0.219***	0.055
Year of Survey (Ref. = 1998)
2000	− 0.034	0.044	− 0.090	0.058	− 0.042	0.054
2002	− 0.024	0.056	− 0.174*	0.072	− 0.092	0.076
Locality-Level Controls
Region (Ref. = Northeast)
Midwest	− 0.020	0.077	− 0.011	0.087	0.038	0.087
South	− 0.076	0.085	− 0.211*	0.103	− 0.062	0.099
West	0.051	0.104	− 0.288*	0.128	0.054	0.119
Locality Population Size (ln)	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.035	− 0.012	0.034
Metropolitan Status (MSA = 1)	− 0.130	0.109	− 0.202	0.138	0.273*	0.128
2000 Black Population Share (ln)	0.013	0.049	0.012	0.060	− 0.033	0.058
2000 Proportion of Blacks with a High School Diploma	− 0.274	0.481	0.163	0.616	− 1.455*	0.560
Local Hispanic Numbers
2000 Hispanic Population Share (ln)	− 0.037	0.029	0.005	0.035	− 0.019	0.034
2000/1990 Hispanic Population Growth (ln)	− 0.053	0.048	− 0.019	0.058	0.008	0.055
Proportion of Variance Explained
Individual Level	0.0828		0.0425		0.1108
Locality Level	0.8277		0.9916		0.9938
Sample Size
Individuals	917		614		774
Localities	83		73		81

Note: Entries are unstandardized HLM coefficients with standard errors. All variables have been centered around their grand means.

^*p < .05;

^**p <.01;

^***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Table 3.

Results of HLM Analyses of Distrust

	Interpersonal Distrust		Distrust of Federal Government
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Intercept	− 0.058	0.044	0.048	0.046
Individual-Level Controls
Age	− 0.006**	0.002	0.002	0.002
Gender (Male = 1)	0.107†	0.064	0.070	0.066
Education	− 0.020	0.013	− 0.001	0.014
Occupational Prestige	− 0.007**	0.003	0.000	0.003
Work Status (Full-time = 1)	0.001	0.068	0.006	0.071
Year of Survey (Ref. = 1998)
2000	0.055	0.068	− 0.145*	0.071
2002	0.077	0.085	− 0.066	0.088
Locality-Level Controls
Region (Ref. = Northeast)
Midwest	0.174	0.107	0.083	0.110
South	0.189	0.121	− 0.122	0.123
West	0.121	0.150	0.112	0.155
Locality Population Size (ln)	0.061	0.042	− 0.042	0.043
Metropolitan Status (MSA = 1)	− 0.318†	0.160	0.331†	0.167
2000 Black Population Share (ln)	0.009	0.067	− 0.072	0.071
2000 Proportion of Blacks with a High School Diploma	− 0.355	0.716	− 1.406†	0.743
Local Hispanic Numbers
2000 Hispanic Population Share (ln)	− 0.003	0.041	0.019	0.042
2000/1990 Hispanic Population Growth (ln)	− 0.163*	0.068	0.157*	0.071
Proportion of Variance Explained
Individual Level	0.0708		0.0213
Locality Level	0.6667		0.9842
Sample Size
Individuals	579		589
Localities	77		75

Note: Entries are unstandardized HLM coefficients with standard errors. All variables have been centered around their grand means.

^†p < .10;

^*p < .05;

^**p < .01 (two-tailed tests).

The analyses reported in Table 2 yielded no significant effect of either Hispanic numbers predictor. All effects are far from significance and some are virtually zero.⁵ Furthermore, if a pattern exists in the non-zero effects, it is for negative signs to preponderate, substantial local Hispanic presence and recent growth being associated with a less negative perspective. There is no evidence here that local Hispanic presence or influx raises the self-reported distress of African Americans.⁶

In Table 3 results for the measures of distrust, there are significant effects of Hispanic numbers.⁷ Interpersonal distrust is lower in localities where there has been high percentage growth in the Hispanic population (p = .019). And in such communities there is more distrust of the federal government (p = .030).

How large is the direct effect of 2000/1990 Hispanic growth on interpersonal distrust, controlling for all other factors? For a locality at the 95^th percentile of Hispanic population growth, the 2000/1990 growth ratio is 6.086, with a natural log of 1.806. For a locality at the 5^th percentile of Hispanic population growth, the 2000/1990 growth ratio is 1.133, the logged value being .125. Using that difference of (1.806 – .125 =) 1.681 in logged growth, Table 3 tells us that on average African Americans in a 95^th percentile Hispanic growth locality have (− 0.163 * 1.681 =) 0.274 less interpersonal distrust than those in a 5^th percentile locality. This is somewhat more than one third of a standard deviation decline in the interpersonal distrust measure.

What about the effect of 2000/1990 Hispanic growth on distrust of the federal government? Again comparing localities at the 95^th and 5^th percentiles in 2000/1990 Hispanic growth, blacks in high-growth localities are about (0.157 * 1.681) or 0.264 units more distrustful of the federal government than blacks in low-growth areas. This effect of Hispanic growth on distrust of the federal government is again more than one third of a standard deviation in the governmental distrust index.

All analyses reported in Tables 2 and 3 were replicated without controls for full-time work status or occupational prestige. Conclusions reported above are unchanged; both the null findings and the significant effects hold. Full results are available from the authors,

Interpretation of findings

We had not predicted that rapid percentage growth of the local Hispanic population would be linked to lower interpersonal distrust among blacks. Might this relationship be spurious, the product of a tendency for economic boom times both to attract Hispanic migrants and to drive down rates of interpersonal distrust? While we cannot rule out this interpretation definitively, we find it implausible. If Hispanic population growth were merely a proxy for positive economic conditions, we would expect a negative relationship between Hispanic growth and individual economic distress. As noted above, such a pattern was not observed.

So, then, why should rapid percentage growth of the local Hispanic population lessen blacks’ interpersonal distrust? There are at least two plausible explanations. As discussed in other research, the high levels of interpersonal distrust observed among African Americans may be a response to problems in blacks’ own communities, or to experiences with discrimination (Taylor 2005). If blacks’ interpersonal distrust reflects their experience as victims of discrimination, we might expect distrust to dissipate when there is a rapid influx of Hispanics to serve as a buffer. The new Hispanic residents, insofar as they bring new problems and arouse new prejudices among white Anglos, may take the heat off blacks in one sense or another—either because white mistreatment of African Americans actually decreases, or because the local focus on Hispanics partially eclipses black residents’ attention to existing anti-black prejudice. while reasonable, this explanation received no support in supplementary analysis of a scale measuring belief that structural factors--discrimination and poor schools--are responsible for black poverty. With a model containing the same controls as our central analyses, the Hispanic numbers predictors did not have an effect even approaching significance: Black respondents in areas where Hispanics have increased most do not downplay the importance of structural disadvantages faced by blacks.

Insofar as interpersonal distrust among blacks reflects experiences in their own communities, we find a second potential explanation for the Hispanic population growth effect on interpersonal distrust. Whatever disappointments African Americans may have faced in past interactions with other members of the black community, the sudden and thus salient arrival of Hispanics, a new out-group, may serve to solidify blacks’ sense of group identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986), and thus to lower interpersonal distrust. Yet this explanation received no support from supplementary analyses either. Black respondents’ perception of industriousness and propensity for violence among their own group were not affected by local Hispanic population growth, showing no signs that black in-group solidarity had risen in consequence.

In short, there are several plausible explanations for the impact of growth in local Hispanic population on interpersonal distrust, but none receive support from relevant data. Additional hypotheses have yet to be developed and tested.

What about the tendency for a dramatic local influx of Hispanics to increase blacks’ distrust of the federal government? National political discussion of the federal government’s failure to control the Mexican border may be received with more sympathy by longstanding residents of localities experiencing dramatic percentage growth in Hispanic population. Also, the inability of local governments to successfully address any strains placed on schools and public services by new Hispanic immigrants may be projected onto the federal government. A full test of these explanations is beyond the scope of this paper; we look forward to future research that considers them.

Hispanic Numbers Vis-a-Vis Black Americans’ Attitudes toward Hispanics and Immigrants

Table 4 summarizes answers to questions about the impact of local Hispanic population share and 2000/1990 Hispanic population growth on black respondents’ stereotypes of Hispanics and views about immigrants and Hispanic immigration flow.⁸ In brief, the data offer no suggestion that stereotyping or attitudes about immigrants and Hispanic immigration flow are influenced by levels of local Hispanic presence or influx.⁹

Table 4.

Results of HLM Analyses of Stereotyping and Views about Immigrants and Hispanic Immigration Flow

	Stereotyping		Views on Immigrants and Hispanic Immigration Flow
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Intercept	− 0.074	0.054	− 0.085	0.053
Individual-Level Controls
Age	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.003
Gender (Male = 1)	− 0.223*	0.091	− 0.072	0.089
Education	− 0.037†	0.021	− 0.073***	0.020
Occupational Prestige	0.001	0.004	0.006	0.004
Work Status (Full-time = 1)	− 0.095	0.095	− 0.005	0.093
Locality-Level Controls
Region (Ref. = Northeast)
Midwest	0.042	0.151	− 0.058	0.154
South	− 0.074	0.175	− 0.075	0.167
West	0.393†	0.217	0.642**	0.220
Locality Population Size (ln)	0.077	0.063	− 0.025	0.060
Metropolitan Status (MSA = 1)	− 0.480†	0.240	0.017	0.225
2000 Black Population Share (ln)	0.209*	0.104	0.320**	0.100
2000 Proportion of Blacks with a High School Diploma	1.640†	0.935	0.837	0.895
Local Hispanic Numbers
2000 Hispanic Population Share (ln)	− 0.051	0.061	0.009	0.058
2000/1990 Hispanic Population Growth (ln)	− 0.049	0.108	− 0.040	0.094
Proportion of Variance Explained
Individual Level	0.1530		0.1581
Locality Level	0.8974		0.9872
Sample Size
Individuals	154		173
Localities	53		53

Note: Entries are unstandardized HLM coefficients with standard errors. All variables have been centered around their grand means.

^†p < .10;

^*p < .05;

^**p < .01;

^***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

Analyses of reactions to the hypothetical marriage of an Hispanic with a close relative and of feelings toward Hispanics yielded the results presented in Table 5. Reactions to intergroup marriage are not well predicted by any of the individual-level or locality-level factors included in our analysis.¹⁰

Table 5.

Results of HLM Analyses of Opposition to Intermarriage and Cool Feelings Toward Hispanics

	Opposition to Intermarriage		Cool Feelings Toward Hispanics
	b	S.E.	b	S.E.
Intercept	2.525***	0.102	3.303***	0.159
Individual-Level Controls
Age	0.004	0.006	0.002	0.008
Gender (Male = 1)	0.045	0.171	− 0.339	0.252
Education	− 0.070†	0.038	− 0.001	0.049
Occupational Prestige	0.010	0.007	− 0.008	0.010
Work Status (Full-time = 1)	− 0.035	0.179	0.031	0.273
Locality-Level Controls
Region (Ref. = Northeast)
Midwest	− 0.285	0.287	0.047	0.428
South	0.032	0.328	0.014	0.505
West	− 0.231	0.418	0.486	0.579
Locality Population Size (ln)	− 0.010	0.118	0.013	0.175
Metropolitan Status (MSA = 1)	0.156	0.455	1.136†	0.627
2000 Black Population Share (ln)	0.054	0.195	0.327	0.308
2000 Proportion of Blacks with a High School Diploma	− 1.204	1.747	− 1.983	2.909
Local Hispanic Numbers
2000 Hispanic Population Share (ln)	− 0.114	0.116	− 0.344*	0.170
2000/1990 Hispanic Population Growth (ln)	0.204	0.193	0.650*	0.271
Proportion of Variance Explained
Individual Level	0.0891		0.0139
Locality Level	0.9931		0.9888
Sample Size
Individuals	165		364
Localities	54		61

Note: Entries are unstandardized HLM coefficients with standard errors. All variables have been centered around their grand means.

^†p < .10;

^*p < .05;

^**p < .01;

^***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).

The story is different for feelings toward Hispanics.¹¹ Feelings toward Hispanics seem to be influenced by both Hispanic numbers predictors, but in opposite directions: African Americans living in areas with a substantial Hispanic presence feel warmer toward Hispanics than blacks in localities where Hispanics are scarce (p = .048). But experiencing high percentage growth in the local Hispanic population brings cooler feelings toward Hispanics (p = .020).

The size of the Hispanic numbers effects can be portrayed with the comparison used earlier between blacks in localities at the 95^th percentile and those in localities at the 5^th percentile. The difference in the logged Hispanic population share for these two ends of the distribution is [(−1.239 ) – (−4.747)] or 3.508. Multiplying 3.508 by the slope coefficient of − 0.344 reported in Table 5, we learn that on average blacks in localities with especially high Hispanic population share report feelings toward Hispanics that are 1.207 units warmer than those of blacks in localities with especially low Hispanic population share. This difference constitutes more than half a standard deviation in the Hispanic feeling scale.

What about the effect of 2000/1990 Hispanic population growth on feelings toward Hispanics? The difference in the logged growth ratios for localities at the 95^th percentile level of growth and those at the 5^th percentile is 1.659, as noted earlier. Multiplying this value by the coefficient of 0.650 from Table 5 implies that average black residents of localities with the highest Hispanic growth have feelings toward Hispanics that are 1.078 points cooler than those in the lowest growth localities—nearly half a standard deviation on the Hispanic feelings scale.¹²

Interpretation of findings

This pattern of findings is not hard to understand. Localities claiming sizeable proportions of Hispanic population in 2000 have in general been home to large numbers of Hispanics for some years.¹³ In many instances, cultural infusion is evident even to the casual observer—in restaurants and grocery stores, entertainment, holiday celebrations; and Hispanics are also likely to have been integrated into the local economy. The Hispanic contributions may often be valued by all racial/ethnic groups, in fact viewed as a source of community identity. Hence we see blacks in such localities reporting relatively warm feelings toward Hispanics. On the other hand, it is unsurprising that blacks’ feelings toward Hispanics are cooler where there has been dramatic percentage growth of this group over the recent years. Typically these are localities which have not had established Hispanic populations of any size, nor the attendant history of social, political, cultural and economic accommodation. In such localities, a sense of disruption may dominate longstanding residents’ experience of what it means to have Hispanic neighbors.

Interactions involving the Hispanic numbers indices

Are there important interaction effects not yet reported? Readers might wonder whether percentage growth has negative impacts on subjective well-being and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants that emerge only where the Hispanic population share is large. Supplementary analyses yielded no evidence of this pattern. Across the ten outcome measures, the interaction of the two focal Hispanic numbers predictors never achieved significance, and the signs of the nonsignificant interaction effects were split, some positive and some negative.

Might the impact of the 2000 Hispanic population share or the 2000/1999 growth ratio differ for those in different regions? In large and small localities, metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas? In localities where blacks are heavily or sparsely represented among the residents? In places where blacks have more or less education? We ran models including terms for the interaction of each Hispanic numbers variable with Southern region, locality size, metropolitan status, black population share, and level of black education. No interaction effects were detected.

Does the impact of 2000 Hispanic population share or 2000/1990 Hispanic growth depend on the characteristics of the Hispanic population in question, or on patterns of residential segregation? We checked and found that effects of the Hispanic numbers variables were not moderated beyond chance levels by the proportion of Hispanics in the locality with at least a high school education.¹⁴ Nor did residential segregation (as measured by dissimilarity and exposure indices calculated from block group-level data) systematically condition the effect of Hispanic population dynamics. By and large, the effects reported here hold whether Hispanics and African Americans tend to live in the same block groups¹⁵ or reside in different areas.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research addresses important questions arising from the ongoing ethnic transformation of the U.S. population. Recent immigration to this country has increased the total number of Hispanic residents, expanding the Hispanic population share in many localities that have been longstanding magnets for Hispanic immigrants, and creating dramatic percentage growth in rural and suburban as well as urban areas where Hispanic residents had been rare.

Concern has been voiced in many quarters about the implications of these changes for the pre-existing populations. Of particular interest has been the impact of Hispanic presence and growth on the material well-being of African Americans. This study broadens the issue to encompass social psychological outcomes.

Our specific questions are whether local Hispanic population share or rapid percentage growth takes a social psychological toll on African American residents—promoting a bleak view of economic circumstances, generating personal distress, increasing distrust, or aggravating negative opinions and attitudes toward Hispanics and immigrants. Whether or not such effects were accompanied by disadvantageous material outcomes, they would represent real costs of Hispanic immigration for black citizens.

Contrary to speculation in the academic and popular press, our findings provide scant evidence that local Hispanic presence or population growth is deleterious to the social psychological outlook of African Americans. Neither local Hispanic population share nor 2000/1990 Hispanic population growth predicts personal economic dissatisfaction, job insecurity, perceived decline in collective conditions for blacks, unhappiness, or poor health. With respect to blacks’ attitudes about Hispanics and immigrants, similar null effects of Hispanic numbers are seen on stereotyping, beliefs that immigrants harm or benefit the U.S., opinion about the desirable rate of immigration flow, and anti-intermarriage sentiment. Not only do most Hispanic numbers effects fall short of statistical significance; also, their direction is as likely to be contrary to the deleterious-impact hypothesis as consistent with it.

There are four exceptions to this overall pattern of independence between local Hispanic numbers and social psychological outcomes among African Americans. A dramatic local influx of Hispanics between 1990 and 2000 seems to have strained black residents’ trust in the federal government and dampened positive feelings toward Hispanics as a group. Importantly, the two observed negative effects were accompanied by two positive effects of Hispanic numbers: in high-growth areas, blacks report higher interpersonal trust; and in localities where the 2000 Hispanic population share is large, black respondents have warmer feelings toward Hispanics. These effects are probably not due to random error. For the twenty focal effects examined here, we would expect only one “false positive,” i.e., one effect significant at the .05 level just by chance. In that context, the four significant effects warrant the attention and interpretations offered above.

The main story, however, is the rarity of Hispanic numbers effects--the absence of signs that Hispanic numbers had any impact on blacks’ sense of economic well-being, health and happiness, several dimensions of intergroup attitudes, or opinions about immigrants and immigration.

As with most research, the data used here are not perfect. A larger sample of African American respondents, more localities, a richer array of survey questions—all would provide firmer ground for conclusions. These resources may be available to future researchers.

Given the demonstrated vulnerability of many African American communities, it is important that analysts continue to monitor the impact of growing numbers of Hispanics on the lives of black Americans. In the meantime, the research presented here suggests that at this point, on the social psychological side, the picture looks more complex and less alarming than some voices in the immigration debates would have us believe.

APPENDIX

Table A-1.

Measures of Self-Reported Distress and Distrust

Self-Reported Distress

Individual Economic Distress Scale

We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?

How satisfied are you in your job?

During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, worse, or has it stayed the same?

Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average?

Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off—very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?

About how easy would it be for you to find a job with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe benefits you now have? Would you say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?

Collective Economic Decline

In the past few years, do you think conditions for black people have improved, gotten worse, or stayed about the same?

Personal Distress Scale

Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?

In general, do you find life exciting, pretty routine, or dull?

Would you say your own health, in general, is excellent, good, fair, or poor?

Distrust

Interpersonal Distrust Scale(α = .602)

Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?

Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair?

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in life?

Distrust of Federal Government Scale (α = .695)

I am going to name some institutions in this country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

Executive branch of the federal government?

U.S. Supreme Court?

Congress?

Table A-2.

Measures of Attitudes Toward Hispanics and Immigration

Stereotyping

Stereotyping Scale

Where would you rate Hispanic Americans [on this 7-point scale that runs from Hard-Working to Lazy]?

Where would you rate Hispanic Americans [on this 7-point scale that runs from Intelligent to Unintelligent]?

Where would you rate Hispanic Americans [on this 7-point scale that runs from Violence-Prone to Not Violence-Prone]?

Views on Immigrants and Hispanic Immigration Flow Scale (α = .649)

What do you think will happen as a result of more immigrants coming to this country? Is each of these possible results very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not likely at all?

Higher crime rates?

People born in the U.S. losing their jobs?

Making it harder to keep the country united?

Higher economic growth?

Making the country more open to new ideas and cultures?

What about the number of immigrants from Latin America (that is, Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas) —should it be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

Social Distance and Affect

Disapproval of Intermarriage

What about having a close relative marry an Hispanic American person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?

Cool Feelings Toward Hispanics

In general, how warm or cool do you feel towards Hispanics [on this nine-point scale running from “Very Warm” to “Very Cool”]?