Abstract
Uwe E. Reinhardt received his Ph.D. in economics from Yale University. He has been on the faculty of Princeton University since 1968, and is currently James Madison Professor of Political Economy. His research interests have centered on health economics. In 1978, he was elected to membership in the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine. He has served on several governmental task forces on health policy and on several editorial boards including Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Health Affairs, and Journal of Health Economics.
Impact on beneficiaries
Ask a normal human being “How are you?” and you are likely to receive the reply “Fine!” Ask an economist the same question, and the reply is bound to be, “Relative to what?” This is so with perfunctory salutations, and certainly with questions on the impact of the Medicare and Medicaid programs on their beneficiaries. In connection with such questions, one is immediately led to wonder, “Relative to what?”
Those who fought so tenaciously for the two programs during the mid-1960's probably thought of them as logical first steps toward full-blown national health insurance (NHI). Ironically, in retrospect, the two programs may well have deflected American health policy from a path towards national health insurance. With the wisdom of hindsight, the supporters of NHI might now judge these programs as seriously flawed incrementalism, an incrementalism that was just enough to temper the brewing crisis in American health care and divert the Nation's energy from its march towards NHI, but, not enough to free all Americans from anxiety over the financial consequences of illness and grant all Americans access to needed health care on dignified terms.
An argument could thus be made that, relative to a full-fledged NHI program, the Medicare and Medicaid programs actually made millions of the Nation's poor and near poor relatively worse off. This surely must be true of the large number of poor and near-poor Americans who do not now have any health insurance coverage at all, some of whom reportedly are being denied access to health care for want of ability to pay. In its Special Report on this problem, for example, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (1983) reported that more than one million families found themselves in that position in 1982. Even the Wall Street Journal (1985), a paper not known for Liberal hysteria, has recently documented cases of gravely ill Americans who have been denied care for lack of insurance coverage and ability to pay. To argue that such families are nevertheless better off than they would be under a national health insurance scheme of, say, the Canadian variety would be to carry ideology to absurd heights.
One can reasonably wonder, however, whether a full-fledged national health insurance program ever has been a realistic option in this country. Quite aside from the Nation's geographic and cultural heterogeneity, its governmental structure—particularly the role interest groups play therein—may well preclude the introduction of so sweeping a social policy as national health insurance. A more realistic baseline from which to judge the Medicare and Medicaid programs may therefore be the situation prevailing prior to 1965. From that baseline, and strictly from the beneficiaries' perspective, one might give the Medicare program the grade of A- and the Medicaid program a plain C, perhaps even a C +.
Whatever shortcomings one may identify in the Medicare program, one would surely not wish to deny that it, along with the entire social security program of which it is a part, has brought about a dramatic improvement in the quality of life of our Nation's senior citizens during the last two decades. As Fuchs (1984) has shown, the average after-tax income per household member of the aged is now about equal to that of the 45-64 years of age group, a fact noted also in the Council of Economic Advisors' Annual Report (1985). Before the introduction of Medicare, only one-half of the aged had health insurance, and many of them were quickly driven into indigency when illness struck. Since the onset of Medicare, there has been a substantial increase in the utilization of health services by the aged, most noticeably by the poor aged. If the primary purpose of Medicare has been to bring our aged into the mainstream of American health care, that goal has been reasonably well achieved.
Whether all of the increase in utilization was medically justified can be debated, as can be the precise causal relationship between this increase and the health status of the aged. It is beyond dispute, however, that the increase in utilization has been accompanied by a significant improvement in the health status of the aged, whether one measures it by life expectancy, reductions in age-adjusted death rates, or by age-specific disability days (Fuchs, 1984; and Rogers and Aiken 1984). These improvements in health status are unlikely to have been sheer coincidence.
Yet, unlike the aged in other industrialized societies, our aged still pay for a substantial proportion of their health care out of their own resources. In 1981, for example, Medicare itself covered only about 45 percent of total health care expenditures by the aged. Another 14 percent was picked up by Medicaid, mainly for nursing home care of indigent aged. Fully 36 percent was financed by the aged themselves, either in the form of health insurance premiums or in out-of-pocket expenditures at point of service. For those aged who did use health services, out-of-pocket expenditures averaged between $500 and $600 that year, an amount that was constant over income classes. As a percent of total per capita health expenditures for the aged, these out-of-pocket expenditures ranged from 20 percent for the poor and near poor to 26 percent for those with high incomes.
It can be argued that there is nothing inherently wicked in requiring such contributions from a group whose average per capita income is close to that of the working population and whose financial responsibilities no longer include the rearing and educating of children. The problem is that the averages mask considerable variance. If one man sits on dry ice and the other on a hot stove they can be said to be, on average, comfortable. Similarly, the fact that, on average, the aged may well be able to absorb 20 or 30 percent of the cost of their health care masks the extraordinary regressivity of this cost sharing. For the poor and near-poor aged, out-of-pocket expenses alone represent an average of 14 percent of their already low incomes. To these outlays must be added the health insurance premiums paid by the aged. Health policy analysts and policymakers, who are young and typically find themselves in the upper 10 percent of the Nation's income distribution,1 are at a serious disadvantage in imagining just what hardship such out-of-pocket expenditures might wreak among poor aged. That is probably one reason why this problem has persisted to the present.
The considerable financial burden the Medicare program still imposes on some of the poor and sick must be counted as one of its major failures from the beneficiaries' point of view—hence the minus on the grade A. It is also a shortcoming from the viewpoint of every American citizen, for a Nation that allows its aged to be utterly pauperized over illness has an image problem in the rest of the world.
A second major shortcoming is the program's benefit structure. That structure places heavy emphasis upon medical episodes requiring short- to medium-term hospitalization, but it leaves unresolved the problem of protecting the aged against the sustained financial drain of long-term chronic illness. In the short run, a solution to this problem will require additional transfers from the working population to the aged. In the long run, the problem must be solved by goading this Nation to a higher savings ratio, that is, by encouraging or even forcing the current working population to set aside now the resources for their own future long-term care.
In thinking about the challenges faced by Medicare beneficiaries in the future, a distinction obviously must be made between individuals who are now aged or near aged and those who will be aged three to four decades hence.
Those now aged or near aged have few options left to rearrange the financial base for their retirement. To the extent that their assets are inadequate to support their years in retirement, they must seek transfers from younger generations. It seems easy enough to provide a moral foundation for such transfers. After all, generations who experienced the Great Depression, who carried this Nation's flag during World War II, who reconstructed their own country and much of the world they liberated with their sweat and ingenuity, and who, in addition, found it in their heart to bestow upon their children the most generous educational benefits any generation has ever bestowed upon another, can without shame expect that those whom they so endowed now return the favor without rancor. Properly viewed, much of what is now deplored by the working young as the insufferable burden of social security is but a repayment for human capital (education) and physical capital (e.g., the infrastructure) that were financed during the working years by those who are now aged.
The challenge faced by those now aged and near aged is to remind the younger generations of these I.O.U.'s in a manner that does not offend the latter's sense of fairness. It is apparent that, at this time, American voters, both young and old, prefer to shrink or at least to constrain the percentage of the gross national product (GNP) diverted to the public sector. Under these constraints, expenditures for the aged do come, in part, at the expense of the younger poor. Already there is evidence that children represent the most rapidly growing segment of this Nation's poor. Among them are the ever-growing numbers of children born to unwed teenage mothers. To neglect the health care and education of these children would be to mortgage the entire Nation. Trade-offs that divert support from these poor to well-to-do aged are apt to violate the sense of fairness of younger adults, even of those who have traditionally been champions of the aged. To quote economist Victor Fuchs (1984), one of the sagest and most humane health economists in our midst: “Twenty years ago the plight of the elderly was palpable. Today the most pressing social needs may lie elsewhere. The 'good society' needs to balance its efforts, to make hard choices among many worthwhile objectives.”
Therefore, in seeking to redress the current regressivity of the financial burden Medicare imposes on the aged, those who represent the aged in the political arena should not dismiss, out of hand, a redistribution of economic privilege among the aged themselves. That redistribution could be effected in a number of obvious ways. Unfortunately, a discussion of these options (Davis and Rowland, 1984; and Meyer 1984) goes beyond the space limitation of this commentary.
For those who will be Medicare beneficiaries three to four decades hence, that program and social security in its entirety probably represent a social contract that has outlived its usefulness. That contract needs to be renegotiated, and now would be a good time to start the process.
In contrast to the Medicare program, from the viewpoint of its intended beneficiaries, Medicaid deserves, at best, a mixed review. The ostensible goal of the program was to remove the financial barriers to mainstream American health care for the poor. For some of the poor, that goal has been achieved. Unfortunately, many poor who should, in principle, benefit from the program have been eclipsed by it altogether—hence the relatively low grade C or C +.
During the past two decades, there has been a noticeable increase in the utilization of health services by low-income groups. There has also been a dramatic improvement in the health status of the poor. Surely, the Medicaid program can claim partial credit for this achievement. Furthermore, the average cost of health care per Medicaid recipient is about the same as that of roughly comparable age groups not in the program (Rogers, Blendon, and Moloney, 1982). The program does not appear to be less efficient than the private system, occasional incidents of fraud and abuse notwithstanding.
These groups in particular have benefitted substantially from Medicaid coverage: the elderly poor, mentally retarded, physically disabled and blind, and children in low-income, single-parent families. Unfortunately, as Joe, Meltzer, and Yu (1985) so vividly illustrate in their recent paper on Medicaid, eligibility for the program varies considerably and seemingly capriciously from State to State, and there are arbitrary, illogical exclusions even within States.
Overall, in 1985, the Medicaid program covered less than one-half of the families defined as poor and near poor (near poor is defined as an income of $12,722 or less for a family of four). Although some of these families may be covered by employer-paid health insurance, between 25 and 35 million people in this country are without any health insurance coverage. This lack of insurance coverage is not confined strictly to the poor, but it is concentrated within the lower-income strata.
During the 1970's, uninsured poor individuals requiring acute care could usually obtain it, because the cost of that care could be shifted to paying patients. As the Nation moves from passive, retrospective, full-cost reimbursement of hospitals to cost-conscious, price-competitive purchasing of care, these hidden cross-subsidies will be squeezed out of the system like water out of a sponge. The major challenge facing the actual and originally intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid program will be to weather that transition until, at long last, the Nation sees fit to put into place a more coherent, comprehensive program covering all of the Nation's low-income families.
Impact on health care providers
In their original design, the Medicare and Medicaid programs were conceived of essentially as adaptations to a larger, private health care market. That was one of the key decisions shaping the development of these programs. A second key decision was acceptance of the principle that patients covered by the programs must have free choice among providers. That principle made it virtually impossible for the Government to act as a “prudent purchaser,” that is, to seek low prices by playing off one provider against the other. From the perspective of providers, these two decisions fashioned a supplier's dream world.
Practically, the first decision meant that institutions were to be reimbursed on a retrospective, full-cost basis, with only minor constraints on the definition of costs, and that for-profit institutions were to be granted a guaranteed rate of return on the proportion of their equity allocable to Medicare patients. Under the Medicare programs, physicians were to be paid their “customary” fees, if the latter were judged “reasonable” within the pattern of fees “prevailing” in the physicians' market area. Because the specific design of the Medicaid program was left to the States, the Medicare reimbursement formulas could not be imposed upon that program, although many States adopted these methods for their Medicaid programs as well.
It is tempting, in retrospect, to criticize the architects of the two programs for these crucial design parameters, but that would be unfair. First, within the politics of the mid-1960's, these parameters were the price for acceptance of the programs by health care providers. Second, it may not have been foreseen at the time just how dominant the two programs would become in the financing of American health care.
Unfortunately, the “market” to which the two programs sought to adapt themselves was one dominated by a private insurance industry that was itself too splintered to confront the providers of health care with effective countervailing market power, short of violating the antitrust laws. By adapting themselves to this context, the Medicare and Medicaid programs became, for the most part, just one more structurally impotent payer in the health care market.
The principle of “divide and conquer” operating in the market for health services during the past two decades has bestowed truly generous cash flows upon the providers of health care. If the American health care sector today is truly the world's best, as is so often claimed, the credit goes not only to the Nation's well-trained physicians, but also to the taxpayers and patients who have financed for these professionals abundant physical resources with which to ply their trade. Furthermore, our Nation has shown its gratitude by granting the owners of these resources high monetary rewards per unit of resource (e.g., per physician hour, per band-aid, per pill).
It is widely appreciated that lavishing material comforts on children, while failing to discipline them, can lead to turbulent adjustment problems during adolescence. Unfortunately, what is true of children is also true of entire economic sectors, where munificent rewards and a lack of market discipline can foster much untoward behavior. There is now general agreement that our health care sector has suffered this fate. As the health care market shifts from past reimbursement practices toward cost-conscious, price-competitive, “prudent” purchasing, that sector exhibits all of the symptoms of a spoiled adolescent. There is posturing all around over threats to the “quality of care". There is lamenting over declining incomes. There is pouting aplenty, for example, the threat that the Medicare fee-freeze will lead to “two-tier” health care for the aged, or the practice of 'dumping' patients in response to prospective payments (a practice that gained momentum during 1984, as the hospital industry celebrated its highest profit margins in years!)
The point of the preceding analogy is not to offend. On the contrary, it is intended to remind us that, just as one cannot fairly blame spoiled adolescents for their tantrums, so we should refrain from casting aspersions on the character of our health care providers. By granting them, without so much as an argument, a license to take from our collective insurance treasuries virtually as they pleased, we have educated them to a way of life, and to expectations, from which they can be weaned only gradually, and from which they should be weaned gently and with patience.
Indeed, something more can be said on behalf of our providers. For all we know, certain ethical constraints induced the providers from taking less than they might have. To gain perspective on the issue, one need merely imagine what other actors in our economy would have taken under similar circumstances. Clues can be had by beholding the comportment of our defense industry, and one wonders what investment bankers or the legal profession might have done with such a license.
Now facing the providers of health care is the challenge to adapt to the newly emerging market environment without compromising the ethical standards that lie at the heart of a good health care system. As the choreographers of the system, physicians have a central role to play in this adjustment. The next decade or so will show how faithfully the medical profession will uphold its code of ethics under fiscal siege.
Among the adjustments providers must make in the years ahead is acceptance of the laws of supply and demand. Throughout the past two decades, our providers fought Government regulation with appeals to the putative virtues of a free market. That posture was cheap and easy as long as supply was relatively taut. It is severely tested when there is excess supply. There is now agreement that the Nation has an abundance—if not an outright surplus—of physicians and a glut of acute-care hospital beds. A challenge facing providers is to accommodate to the notion that the purchasers of health care will seek to exploit this surplus to their own economic advantage and that, within a market economy, that form of exploitation is entirely legitimate. Concretely, this will mean that providers must ready themselves to bargain hard with the Government over compensation levels. Alternatively, providers must learn to accept whatever compensation the market permits the Government to impose upon them. Third-party payers, be they private or public, would be derelict in their fiduciary roles if they failed to exploit their new-found market power. It is too late to decry such efforts as “unfair.”
Impact on the government
In 1965, Americans spent 6.1 percent of their gross national product on health, of which 26 percent was paid with government funds. By 1983, the Nation spent 10.8 percent of its GNP on health, and 42 percent of that total was paid with government funds. In 1965, State and local governments devoted about 8 percent of their budgets to health care; by 1983, that percentage had risen to about 14. The corresponding figures for the Federal Government are 4.5 and 12.5 percent, respectively. The government sector is now the predominant purchaser of health services in this country, and health care represents one of that sector's major outlays. Because every dollar of health care expenditure represents a dollar of health care income for some providers, we may also say that government today is one of the major suppliers of health care incomes in the Nation.
For the most part, the increased role played by the Government in health care reflects the Nation's decision, in the mid 1960's, to have the Government take on responsibility for the health care of the aged and the poor. To the extent that voters participate in such decisions at all, it was their choice. As was noted earlier, however, a part of the increase can be attributed also to the design parameters of the Medicare and Medicaid programs. These parameters literally entrusted providers with keys to the public treasury.
Private payers and the providers of health care have lamented for years that the Government has not picked up its fair share of the national health care bill, by refusing to pay for bad debts, charity care, and other exclusions from allowable costs, Government has effectively shifted costs to the private sector. One could, however, construct an alternative scenario. Over the 2-year period 1980-82, for example, real (inflation-adjusted) total national health expenditures grew by 12.7 percent. Total real outlays under the Medicare program, on the other hand, grew by 27.9 percent. Medicare outlays on physician services grew even faster, by 30.9 percent (Freeland and Schendler, 1984). It would be difficult to argue that these figures resulted from a growth in the number of the aged or changes in their morbidity. Therefore, the thought occurs that providers found it relatively easier in those 2 years to cull added health care incomes from the public sector than from the private sector—that we were witnessing cost-shifting in reverse.
The apparent ability of providers to effect such shifts raises the question of how Government, hard pressed by voters to control its budgets, might control its outlays on health care. One approach, taken virtually everywhere else in the industrialized world, would be to control overall national health care expenditures along with the Government's share of that total. That approach is taken by other societies to discourage the emergence of two-tier health care systems. Unfortunately, nonarbitrary criteria do not exist for setting the overall percentage of the Nation's GNP that should go to health care. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible to enforce whatever limit is chosen in the absence of a full-fledged national health insurance system.
For reasons already indicated, Government control over the entire health care sector is out of the question in the United States. On the other hand, the Government can no longer afford the pretense that Medicare and Medicaid programs are mere appendages of the American health care market. In many areas these programs dominate that market. It was therefore inevitable that the two programs would eventually go their own way. Prospective compensation of hospitals by diagnosis-related groups is the first step in that direction. Fee schedules of some sort for physicians is apt to be the second step. As already mentioned, unless health care providers quickly learn to negotiate such compensation levels with the Government, a further logical step will be competitively bid compensation levels, effected either through health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations. Although a march in this direction will surely elicit from providers cries of “two-tier” health care, it is hard to think of an alternative approach to budgetary control at this time. In a real sense, it is the approach providers asked for during the health policy debates of the 1970's.
A case can be made that control over public health budgets is far from compelling in the first place, because the United States has one of the smallest public sectors in the industrialized world (Japan being the sole exception). Most other industrialized nations spend between 40 and 50 percent of their GNP on the public sector, but the comparable American figure lies between only 33 and 35 percent. Such an argument, however, carries little political weight at this time. For better or for worse, American voters, both young and old, rich and poor, now wish to see their public sector severely constrained. And, as already noted, there are other priorities with legitimate claims on public funds.
There is one challenge American voters might put to health care providers before voting additional allocations for health care. Neighboring Canada currently spends a little more than 8 percent of its GNP on health care. With that allocation, it has freed every Canadian citizen from anxiety over the financial cost of illness and granted every citizen access to a common health care system. By contrast, the United States is already spending close to 11 percent of its GNP on health care without, however, guaranteeing every American citizen freedom from worry over health care bills and financial access to health care. An allocation of 11 percent of the GNP is not skimpy; it represents a generous supply of health care incomes. The challenge faced by American health care providers is to convince American voters that, relative to the quality of Canadian health care, the quality of American health care is sufficiently superior to warrant an extra 3 percentage points or so of the GNP (and even more) along with the financial distress still suffered by many American patients. It is an interesting challenge, worthy of careful research.
Implications for the future
Throughout the industrialized world, nations are wrestling with the economic implications of an aging population. Many of the European nations already have attained today the top-heavy population pyramid the United States will attain in the early part of the next century. Japan's population pyramid, too, is now rapidly shifting towards the European pattern. These demographic shifts will create intergenerational tension everywhere. The United States by no means stands alone in this struggle.
Every nation, too, has its group of economically disenfranchised citizens who cannot afford to pay fully for what are considered to be the basic necessities of life. How a nation copes with the economic problem presented by its aged and its poor depends only weakly on its overall economic strength. Much more decisive is the amorphous something called a “shared social ethic.” Nations differ quite substantially in terms of their dominant social ethic and, also, in the degree to which that dominant ethic is actually shared.
To illustrate, consider the following concise statement by the Government of Canada (1983) on the social ethic governing the distribution of health care in that country:
“The Government of Canada believes that a civilized and wealthy nation, such as [Canada], should not make the sick bear the financial burden of health care. Everyone benefits from the security and peace of mind that comes with having prepaid insurance. The misfortune of illness, which at some time touches each of us, is burden enough: the cost of care should be borne by society as a whole.”
Whatever reaction to this statement one's own ideology may trigger, the statement is a crisp definition of a social ethic, and one that seems widely shared by Canadians of all political stripes. Consistent with that definition, Canada maintains a universal health insurance system financed not through actuarially sound insurance premiums, but through a tax system based on ability to pay.
Most of the European systems have adopted a similar approach. To be sure, all of these nations agonize over the enormous expense of their systems, which absorb anywhere from 6 to 10 percent of their gross national product. But the public debate over health policy in these countries does not take place through special conferences on “financing health care for the aged,” or “financing indigent care.” These problems have been completely folded into the problem of one health insurance and health care system imposed on virtually all economic strata of society.2
The imposition of one highly regulated health care system upon all members of society inevitably carries with it certain hidden costs, among them loss of the innovative drive of looser systems such as ours, not to mention the frustration that providers suffer over their loss of certain freedoms. Be that as it may, this symposium is not the proper forum to criticize foreign systems nor to advocate them. The reason for describing them briefly here is simply to make an important point, namely, that in terms of strategy and tactics the lessons from health systems in other countries are rather meager, because their approaches are based upon a social ethic that we do not seem to share.
As argued elsewhere (Reinhardt, 1985), it would be difficult for an American to describe to foreigners the social ethic driving American health care, even if an entire page were set aside for that purpose. To be sure, many Americans hold crisp and fully coherent views of their own on this matter. The problem is that these views vary widely among individuals; there does not seem to be a lasting set of ethical precepts that are widely shared. We lack an accepted blueprint on ethics against which to assess alternative strategies for the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Without such a consensus, it is nearly impossible for a policy analyst to render expert advice on the issue without incorporating his or her own ideological predisposition.3 Rather than proffering such advice, it may therefore be more productive to raise the following fundamental questions:
Is health care to be viewed primarily as a basic, private consumption good (such as food, clothes, and shelter), or should one view it as primarily a public good, a community service (such as elementary and secondary education)?
Is access to at least a basic set of health services the right (that is, a basic entitlement) of every American citizen, or is there merely the presumption of a moral obligation on the part of providers to facilitate access to basic health services?
Even if access to basic health care was deemed a right, should the definition of that right, and responsibility for enforcing it, be the prerogative of State and local governments, or is that the proper responsibility of the Federal Government—that is, should there be nationally defined and nationally enforced standards?
Anyone who has followed our debate on national health policy during the past 20 years must conclude that no clear answers to these questions have emerged. And yet, these fundamental questions lie at the heart of the broader question on what direction the Nation should take with regard to the Medicare and Medicaid programs.
Consider, for example, the first question. To hold that health care is essentially a basic, private consumption good implies that the financing of health care is primarily the responsibility of the individual recipient of that care, although society may well see fit to assist poor individuals financially to gain access to at least a basic set of health services. Our society adopts that view in connection with certain essential commodities, such as food, shelter, and clothing. In the literature, that view is sometimes referred to as the “basic-needs” approach.
The basic-needs approach clearly countenances a two- or multiple-tier health care system, just as we countenance it for food, shelter, and clothing, and even for higher education and jurisprudence, if not de jure, then at least de facto. On that perception of health care, the Medicare program must be judged ill-conceived from the start, for it offers too much to the upper income strata and perhaps not enough to the poorest among the aged. For example, adherents to the basic-needs approach would not deem it essential to offer Medicare beneficiaries complete freedom of choice among providers. Furthermore, it would be deemed quite acceptable to permit well-to-do aged complete freedom of choice (financed, of course, with their own resources), a privilege not made available to their poorer peers.
Under the basic needs approach, it would make sense eventually to fold the Medicare program into governmentally encouraged (or even mandated) life-cycle planning on the part of individuals. Individuals could be encouraged through the tax code (or mandated) to contribute during their worklife stipulated minimum annual payments into individually owned accounts established specifically to finance health and long-term care during retirement. The accounts could be held in the private sector, albeit under public supervision/The Medicare program itself would then convert to essentially a means-tested welfare program, making transfers to individuals only if the funds accumulated during their worklife proved inadequate. Clearly, such an approach would represent a sharp departure from the social ethics originally packaged into the Medicare program, but it would be fully consistent with a basic-needs approach to health care.
Readers may be surprised to see the second question raised at all. It may be thought that this issue had been settled long ago when this Nation subscribed to the much-mouthed political slogan that “health care is a basic right.” The mouthing of slogans, however, do not make a “right.” Legislating it might. If one surveys the practice of health care in our realm, and even the literature on the subject (Blumstein, 1984), one must conclude that the second question is still a relevant issue.
Consider, finally, the third question that can be rephrased as follows: Should residents in State X be at all concerned over the economic and physical welfare of fellow Americans in State Y, or is that none of their business?
If the answer is, “Yes, residents of State X should be concerned with the welfare of fellow Americans in State Y, and not only when the latter are trapped somewhere abroad,” then it would follow that there should be national standards for basic health care; the definition of a basic right to health care and the responsibility for enforcing that right cannot be left fully to the devices of individual States. If that be the dominant social ethic on this point, then the Medicaid program must be judged as ill-conceived and poorly executed.
On the other hand, if the dominant social ethic dictates the answer, “No, the health care experience of residents in State Y is not the business of residents in State X,” then the Medicaid program in its present guise makes perfect sense, but the Medicare program becomes suspect. After all, it would reflect a contorted social ethic to state that we should practice nationhood in health care only with respect to people 65 years of age and over, but not with respect to children or middle-aged fellow Americans.
To speculate on the future course of Medicare and Medicaid is to speculate on the dominant answers to the three fundamental questions raised above. If bets had to be made on these answers at this time, it would seem reasonable to place one's marbles as follows:
Health care is essentially a basic, private consumption good, and we shall countenance two- or multi-tier health care.
Access to basic health care is not an entitlement, but merely a moral obligation imposed on providers and financed, indirectly, by various formal or informal cross-subsidies.
The provision of access to health care is a State and local, not a Federal, matter.
Whether the Medicare program can ultimately be made consistent with these tenets—they imply, at the least, the conversion of Medicare into a means-tested program—remains to be seen. Indeed, in the end these tenets may not win out after all. Occasionally, even economists have been wrong in their predictions.
Footnotes
1Only about 10 percent of American families had incomes above $50,000 in 1983.
2In every one of these nations, there is a small private sector that serves as an escape valve for patients to pay for speedier treatments or treatments as private patients. Usually, much less than 10 percent of the population is privately insured, even in the United Kingdom.
3As an immigrant from, first, West Germany and then Canada, and as an erstwhile pauper, I am favorably disposed towards national health insurance systems that offer middle- to low-income families a dignified and anxiety-free health care experience. As a long-time student of the American health care sector, however, I have come to doubt that national health insurance is compatible with the American ethos and, especially, with the political process in this country. For the poor in this country, the most humane, politically feasible system would probably be a multi-track system with a bottom tier served primarily by health maintenance organizations.
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