Abstract
This article contains firm-level data on 1) aggregated corporate governance score, and 2) financial data for the period 2010–2017. The study includes 626 companies from 6 Asian countries: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand. Aggregated corporate governance score is calculated using 13 firm-level attributes: board size, board independence, CEO duality, board meeting attendance, independence of audit committee, auditor ratification, independence of compensation committee, independence of nomination committee, shareholder-approved poison pill, dual class unequal voting rights of common shares, staged board, diversity of board and board duration. Finally, six firm-level financial data are included.
Specifications Table
| Subject area | Finance |
| More specific subject area | Corporate finance, Corporate governance |
| Type of data | Excel file |
| How data was acquired | Bloomberg database |
| Thomson Reuters database | |
| Prowess-CMIE database | |
| Data format | Filtered, Processed |
| Experimental factors | The firm sample is based on the listing in the stock exchange-index of six Asian countries. |
| Experimental features | Cross-sectional data of two measures – Corporate Governance attributes and Financial data for the period 2010–2017. |
| Data source location | China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea and Thailand |
| Data accessibility | Data is within this article |
| Related research article | A relevant research article to the collected data is[1]. |
Value of the data
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The dataset incorporates firms’ aggregated corporate governance score with the financial data.
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The data can be useful to study the evolution of corporate governance in the Asian context, both at the firm level as well as country level. The research could benefit to empirically assess and compare the impact of various regulatory measures in different countries.
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The raw data can be useful for researchers to investigate different corporate governance attributes and firms’ performance.
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The dataset provides aggregated corporate governance score that has broad financial applications and can be appended with other critical financial indicators.
1. Data
The cross-sectional data consist of 5008 year-observations of 626 firms recorded in Bloomberg database during 2010–2017. Further, we retrieved data from Thomson Reuters database and CMIE-prowess database to consolidate the available information across databases. Data on country-wise firm count is shown in Table 1. Each observation recorded aggregated corporate governance score and six Financial indicators.
Table 1.
Data descriptive.
| No. | Country | Exchange – index | Firm count |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | China | Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE 180) | 180 |
| 2 | India | Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE 100) | 101 |
| 3 | Indonesia | Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX – LQ45) | 45 |
| 4 | Japan | Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE 100) | 100 |
| 5 | South Korea | The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI 100) | 100 |
| 6 | Thailand | The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SIT) | 100 |
2. Experimental design, materials, and methods
We obtained the 13 corporate governance attributes for each firm individually. The attributes were converted into binary measures based on the conversion logic (Table 3), and the aggregated corporate governance score is calculated as in Gompers et al. [1]. Similarly, the financial measures for each firm was calculated. Finally, these two were merged to create the consolidated datasheet.
Table 3.
Corporate governance attributes.
| Variable name | Data type | Description | Conversion formula |
|---|---|---|---|
| Board size | Count | Number of directors on the board | Value greater than or equal to 5 is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Board independence | Percentage | A board which has a majority of independent directors who are not affiliated with the firm | Value greater than or equal to 50% is 1; 0 otherwise |
| CEO duality | Binary (Yes/No) | A situation where the CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board | No is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Board meeting attendance | Percentage | Attendance by the directors of the board for the board meeting | Value greater than or equal to 66.67% (2/3) is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Independence of audit committee | Percentage | A committee with a majority of non-executive directors that connects board of directors and external auditors (Percentage of independent directors on audit committee). | Value greater than or equal to 50% is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Auditor ratification | Binary (Yes/No) | A firm appoints an auditor with annual ratification by the shareholders during the annual general meeting | Yes is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Independence of compensation committee | Count | A committee with a majority of non-executive directors to oversee the executive compensation | Value greater than or equal to 3 is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Independence of nomination committee | Percentage | A committee which examines board of directors of the firm and evaluates skills needed for directors | Value greater than or equal to 50% is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Shareholder approved poison pill | Binary (Yes/No) | In the event of a hostile takeover, shareholders are provided with exclusive rights to cancel the deal | Yes is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Dual class unequal voting rights of common shares | Binary (Yes/No) | This provision limits voting rights of some equity holders while expanding those of others | No is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Staggered board | Binary (Yes/No) | A board in which replacement of directors is delayed due to overlapping terms and classes | No is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Diversity of board | Percentage | Women representation in the board of directors | Value greater than or equal to 1 is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Board duration | Count | Duration of director׳s continuation in the board | Value less than 9 is 1; 0 otherwise |
| Corporate governance score | Continuous | Sum (aggregated) of the binarised corporate governance attribute value | Value ranges from 0 to 13 |
The firm-level descriptive data recorded are explained in Table 2. Description of corporate governance attributes and financial indicators are shared in Table 3, Table 4 respectively.
Table 2.
Firm descriptive.
| Variable name | Description |
|---|---|
| Ticker_Id | Unique identity for the publicly traded company |
| Indx_Members | Members of stock index of respective countries |
| Country | Country in which the company is listed |
| Year | Considered year |
Table 4.
Descriptive of financial indicators.
| Variable name | Data type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| LogAsset | Real-valued numeric | Natural logarithm of an asset is approximately equal to the rate of return of an asset |
| CAPEXByAsset | Real-valued ratio | The ratio of CAPEX to Assets |
| CashByAsset | Real-valued ratio | The ratio of Cash to Assets |
| DebtByAsset | Real-valued ratio | The ratio of Debt to assets is an indicator of financial leverage. |
| PPNEByAssets | Real-valued ratio | The ratio of PPNE to Assets |
| RNDBYAssets | Real-valued ratio | The ratio of Research and Development expenditure to Assets |
The statutory requirements in each country vary, as a result, the firms need not disclose all the attributes of corporate governance. Hence, the data for certain attributes is not available.
The dataset has been processed and compiled using Microsoft Excel.
Acknowledgements
We are thankful to XLRI Jamshedpur for providing access to databases. This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Footnotes
Transparency document associated with this article can be found in the online version at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2018.07.048.
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2018.07.048.
Contributor Information
Raja R.R. Singareddy, Email: fb14004@astra.xlri.ac.in.
Shabana Chandrasekaran, Email: shabana.c@astra.xlri.ac.in.
Balamurugan Annamalai, Email: bala@astra.xlri.ac.in.
Pratyush Ranjan, Email: pratyush.ranjan@astra.xlri.ac.in.
Transparency document. Supplementary material
Transparency document
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary material
Reference
- 1.Gompers P., Ishii J., Metrick A. Corporate governance and equity prices. Q. J. Econ. 2003;118(1):107–156. [Google Scholar]
Associated Data
This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.
Supplementary Materials
Transparency document
Supplementary material