The Song Remains the Same: A Review of Harris’ Free Will

A recent series of studies asked the question, “What if free will does not actually exist?” The authors acknowledge that the notion is frightening, but not new, as Wegner and Wheatley (1999) argued that the experience of making a choice is something the brain creates after the choice has been made. Essentially, our experience of free will is nothing more than post hoc causal inference that our thoughts caused some behavior. The feeling (of choice) itself plays no causal role in producing that behavior.

The position has remained relevant and empirically-supported up until the present day. Cognitive scientists have proposed that free will is the result of “background noise” (Bengson, Kelley, Zhang, Wang, & Mangun, 2014) in the brain before a choice is made, and that free will is a trick the brain plays on itself (Bear & Bloom, 2016). They describe the experience of making a choice as something the brain creates after a choice has been made. In computer-based, forced-choice, experimental preparations, they find a pattern of responding that suggests the participants’ “minds” swapped the order of events in conscious awareness so that the sensation of choice precedes the behavior of choosing. Researchers proceed to offer what they consider to be a radical solution to a series of related findings in these studies. Perhaps in the very moments that we experience a choice, our “minds are rewriting history, fooling us into thinking that this choice - that was actually completed after its consequences were perceived - was a choice that we had made all along” (Bengson et al., 2014).

Although not cited by these researchers, B. F. Skinner argued the same points four decades earlier (Skinner, 1971). In addition to the provocatively titled Beyond Freedom and Dignity, Time magazine featured Skinner on the cover (9/20/71) with the byline “B. F. Skinner Says We Can’t Afford Freedom.” Skinner argued that feelings (in this case, of freedom) are mistaken for causes of behavior because they occur at the same time, yet they serve no causal role (Skinner, 1974). He argued that behavior is a product of past history and current contingencies and therefore behavior cannot be “free” in the common-sense use of the term. For Skinner, the feeling of being free was useful, but not causal in any way.

Preceding the recent resurgence of interest in free will was a book by Sam Harris titled, simply, Free Will (Harris, 2012). It is is gratifying that a popular culture philosopher/neuroscientist in the mold of Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Stephen Jay Gould would address free will in a manner that is wholly compatible with Skinner’s work. Harris produced a brief text describing recent work in neuroscience supporting the idea that free will is, in fact, a useful illusion. Whether or not Harris is familiar with Skinner’s earlier position is unclear, but it is fair to assume he is.

Free Will by Sam Harris argues that free will is an illusion and that that fact should not undermine morality, or diminish the importance of social and political freedom. Harris incorporates findings from neuroscience and psychology to argue persuasively that free will is an illusion but that abandoning that illusion will not make life less worthwhile or fulfilling. Harris acknowledges early on that if the scientific community were to declare free will an illusion, it would “precipitate a culture war far more belligerent than the one waged on the subject of evolution in the 20^th century (p. 1).” Of course, Skinner proved that postulate by instigating his own culture war in the 1970s by advocating the same thing. That is, that free will is a useful illusion.

For Harris, free will is defined as “being aware of all factors that determine our thoughts and actions.” Both Harris and Skinner subscribe to a form of environmental determinism with the difference being that the former leans more heavily on the biological environment while the latter relied more on the environment more generally (including the biological). Harris concludes that we cannot be aware of all the factors that determine our actions, while Skinner concluded we did not need to be aware of the factors in order to behave. The difference is minimal and Harris talks about free will in ways strikingly similar to Skinner.

Harris believes that most of us feel that we freely author our own thoughts and actions. This feeling arises from moment-to-moment ignorance of the prior causes of our thoughts and actions. Like Skinner, Harris says that free will is a necessary illusion. Not only are we not as free as we think we are, we do not feel as free as we think we do. Interestingly, Harris believes that our sense of freedom results from not paying close attention to the variables that influence our actions, a position consistent with that of Skinner (1953).

One clear difference between Harris and Skinner is that Harris is more energetically dualistic than was Skinner. He believes that all of our decisions, intentions, goals, etc. are causal states of the brain that lead to behavior. Most problematically, Harris believes that the thoughts and intentions that arise in the mind can be observed through introspection. Introspection was summarily rejected as a valid methodology by Skinner (1974, p. 16)

Harris states that we are not in control of our minds. You, as a conscious agent, are only a part of your mind living at the mercy of other parts. He asserts that you are a biochemical puppet, but that you can “grab the strings” by behaving differently. For example, if you are in a bad mood because you are hungry, you can eat something and feel better. This approach echoes that of Skinner’s views on self-management (Skinner, 1983). Skinner, by all accounts, was “a remarkably productive, creative, and happy individual, in large part because of his expertise in self-management” (Epstein, 1997).

For Harris, the brain is a more active determiner of our actions than Skinner would assert. Therefore, brains, and their background influences, are the causes of our behavior. For example, a disorder of the brain (e.g., alcoholism) can trump the best intentions of the “mind.” Deviating further from Skinner, Harris believes that laziness, like diligence, is a neurological condition. Given the above, Harris admits that there is the temptation in a deterministic approach such as his towards fatalism. “Why should I do anything if it’s out of my hands?” But to sit back and do nothing is still doing something.

As an example, Harris confesses that even without a belief in free will he does not feel fatalistic. If anything, the situation has increased his feelings of freedom. After all, there is no telling how he might change in the future. If our behavior is amenable to influences both internal, external, and historical, then we can have some control over our futures. Skinner’s emphasis on self-management was, above all, also an attempt to influence his own behavior in a positive and productive manner.

Harris, like Skinner, adopts the more optimistic/humanistic view of human nature in that “effort matters and people can change.” We do not change ourselves but we continually influence, and are influenced by, the world around us and within us. This reciprocal interactionism is compatible with Skinner’s (as well as J. R. Kantor’s) approach to human behavior.

For Harris, knowledge of ourselves and our worlds allow us to steer a more intelligent course while knowing we are ultimately being steered. In a chapter on Cause and Effect, Harris references quantum mechanics and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to bolster his position on free will. Heisenberg felt that “certain processes in the brain occur at random and cannot therefore be determined by environmental stimuli.” This is obviously a break from Skinner’s position but one that Harris endorses. For example, if decisions are the result of random neurotransmitter release, then “chance occurrences are by definition ones I can claim no responsibility for.”

This is the same kind of biological determinism that is threaded throughout the book. This is a reasonable take on determinism, although Skinner tended to minimize the biological determinism while emphasizing a determinism that included biological determinants.

In an interesting chapter on Choice, Harris asserts that certain states of consciousness “seem to arise automatically.” The choice occurs when he chooses what to pay attention to. Even so, this feeling of freedom arises from moment-to-moment ignorance of the prior causes of our thoughts and action. More radically, Harris believes that what we do is “fully determined by a prior state of the universe and the laws of nature” (including chance), before concluding that you will do whatever it is you do and it is meaningless to assert that you could have done otherwise.

A chapter on Morality gives Harris the opportunity to illustrate the practical implications for morality that result from his view of free will. Because Harris believes that brains (and their background influences) are the cause, a brain tumor would seem to divest a killer of responsibility for a crime. Likewise, anyone born with the soul of a psychopath has been profoundly unlucky. Although Harris briefly uses the idea of a soul, he quickly reverts back to environmental determinism. He acknowledges that no human being is responsible for their genes or upbringing. This much is in agreement with Skinner’s description of the causes of behavior. Genetic makeup and developmental history definitely contribute to our behavior in a radical behavioral formulation. For Harris, it is profoundly unfair not to recognize just how much luck is involved in morality itself. Since developmental history and genetics are largely the result of chance or luck, morality must be as well.

Evidence of dualistic thinking is clearly articulated throughout the book. In this case, there is a brain and there is a mind. Skinner did not resort to these kinds of metaphysical devices. An example of the author’s view is that he believes that disorders of the brain can trump the best intentions of the mind.

Harris is a well-known political progressive and a chapter on Politics serves to illustrate again the practical implications of his views. That he spends a little too much time pounding conservatives is unsurprising, but it detracts somewhat from his discussion. Harris believes that the difference between liberals and conservatives is that the former understands that a person can be lucky or unlucky, while the latter make a religious fetish of individualism. As a result, conservatives emphasize personal responsibility as a consequence of their faith in free will, while liberals are more likely to acknowledge “luck” and personal history as a consequence of their agnosticism.

In sum, Harris presents a clear and compelling argument against the popular, common-sense conception of free will. He includes many examples from everyday life to illustrate and strengthen his central thesis, which is an analysis of free will that is largely the same as that of Skinner, decades earlier. That is, that there is no free will, but that feeling like we are “free” and the authors of our own stories is a useful illusion.

Harris is more mentalistic and dualistic than Skinner and biologism runs through most of his larger assertions regarding the ultimate explanations for human behavior. Yet it is a difference in degree, not in kind. As Skinner championed environmental determinism (while acknowledging biology), Harris favors a biological determinism (while acknowledging the environment). Although he never cites Skinner’s work, Harris is likely aware of Skinner’s contributions to the discussion of free will, given the amount of attention Skinner received at the time. Without the benefit of relying on Skinner’s detailed analysis of free will, Harris presents a case for essentially the same argument as Skinner’s four decades earlier in an easily readable short book.