A cultural–ecological perspective on agency and offending behaviour

Abstract

This article aims to outline briefly the important role of culture in the development of the human mind and behaviour, and therefore argues that cultural information is a key part of forensic explanation. We suggest that differing cultural experiences, such as marginalisation, contribute to the differential representation of individuals and groups in criminal justice systems. This occurs through several means, but we focus specifically on individual operation of agency in particular cultural contexts. Building on previous theoretical work, we present a preliminary model, the cultural–ecological predictive agency model. Through an exemplar, we show how this model might assist in understanding better the role of dynamic risk factors in individual behaviour, by locating and incorporating cultural–historical contexts and information.

Introduction

The concept of culture is central to understanding human nature, and as such has implications for forensic psychology and the explanation of criminal behaviour. Particularly in countries with colonial histories and systems, we see significant disparities in the representation of different cultural groups in our criminal justice systems. The question is raised, does culture itself have something to do with offending? We argue yes, but only insofar as culture is something that affects the behaviour of every person, regardless of their ethnic background or status as an ‘offender’. This paper suggests that a more nuanced understanding of culture will assist in producing more comprehensive explanations of human behaviour, including norm-violating practices such as crime. This has important implications in guiding treatment with individuals who have offended.

Defining culture is difficult, given that there are multiple academic and colloquial uses of the term, which vary significantly in their meaning (Fernando, 1991; Jahoda, 2012; Jenkins, 2015). The frequent conflation of culture, ethnicity and race is an ongoing issue in research (Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018a; Fernando, 1991; Kagawa-Singer, Dressler, & George, 2016; Quintana et al., 2006). While race and ethnicity are culturally relevant, they are subsumed by the broader construct of culture itself. Race refers to the social system of categorising groups based on phenotypical features, such as skin colour, whereas ethnicity refers to a more specific sense of identity and belonging, based on a shared group culture (Causadias, Vitriol, & Atkin, 2018b). While definitions of race and ethnicity seem relatively stable, culture has been variously defined and operationalised, often with reference to external social contexts such as shared lifestyles, values and beliefs, or networks of knowledge (Jahoda, 2012). We see culture as a holistic feature that exists at both individual and group levels, specifically ‘… an orientation to being-in-the-world that is dynamically created and re-created in the process of social interaction and historical context’ (Jenkins, 2015, p. 9). This orientation can exist within groups, through shared values, norms and behaviours, and also within individuals, as humans are multi-faceted creatures who undergo unique experiences and operate from a subjective individual perspective. In other words, culture is not a fixed aspect of a person or group, but rather a dynamic process between an individual, various groups and their environment, which cannot be separated from their behaviour.

This article first outlines the current role of culture in forensic psychology and correctional interventions, with a particular focus on the New Zealand context. We then outline a number of problems with the current preoccupation with criminogenic factors and propose a need for a shift in focus to incorporate cultural and ecological factors as well. Next, we review several theoretical developments that inform a cultural perspective on offending and propensity to engage in crime, and introduce a preliminary model that integrates current conceptions of culture, behaviour and offending. After presenting the model we apply it to an exemplar of physical violence and suggest ways in which culture might impact upon this behaviour. We conclude with some comments about the potential contribution of this model to the forensic field and suggestions for future avenues of research that may enhance our understanding of the role of culture in offending behaviour.

Culture, psychology and offending

The innate complexity of culture and its role in human behaviour impacts upon psychological research. There is a strong tendency in Western scientific research to view culture as something that only ‘other’ or minority groups possess (Causadias, 2013; Causadias et al., 2018a). Causadias et al. (2018a, 2018b) term this phenomenon the ‘cultural (mis)attribution bias’, wherein minority-group members’ behaviour is attributed to and explained by ‘culture’ considerably more often than majority-group members’ behaviour, for whom psychological concepts and processes are more likely to be utilised in explanation. This bias is a significant concern to the study of human behaviour because, as Causadias et al. (2018a, 2018b) note, all humans are shaped by culture. The importance of psychological processes and mechanisms to human behaviour is of course a ubiquitous feature of humanity.

The cultural (mis)attribution bias is associated with several other problems regarding culture’s role in the explanation of behaviour (Causadias, 2013; Causadias et al., 2018a). Statistical differences derived from culturally diverse samples are often attributed to ‘culture’, with no explication of the processes through which this might occur (Kagawa-Singer et al., 2016). This assumes a homogeneity of group members and their behaviour, while viewing culture as a variable independent from other bio-psycho-social factors. Secondly, the ‘othering’ of culture has contributed to the ‘invisibility’ of how culture affects the behaviour of majority-group members (Causadias, 2013). The reality is that all humans are embedded in a socio-cultural context, with constant interaction between the individual and the context. Culture is not only relevant for the behaviour of individuals belonging to ethnic minorities.

New Zealand corrections and culture

In Aotearoa–New Zealand, a bicultural approach to law and policy has been implemented, with differing levels of success (Tauri, 1999). There is recognition of the indigenous Māori culture, as well as the dominant Pākehā (European) culture. Māori enacted kaitiakitanga (guardianship) in Aotearoa–New Zealand for more than 1000 years, but in the late eighteenth century, European (mainly British) immigration and settlement began, followed by a formal treaty document – te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty of Waitangi) – signed in 1840. Following this document, designed to form the basis of a social and political partnership between Māori and Pākehā, the process of colonisation by the British government began. This resulted in the mass loss of Māori land to the government, generally through illegitimate means. Legislation, such as the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 (NZ), made illegal many of the practices making up daily life for Māori (e.g. traditional healing methods), which further contributed to disenfranchisement, misappropriation and marginalisation (Katene & Mulholland, 2013; Nakhid & Shorter, 2014). Significantly, during colonisation, justice processes shifted from a restorative model towards a more retributive, punishment-based orientation (Brittain & Tuffin, 2017; Workman, 2016), and then followed the rest of the world in adopting the use of psychological rehabilitation in order to reduce incidences of reoffending (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). In other words, Western legal categories and justice processes were introduced and enforced via colonisation, and these reflected the values and norms of the dominant Pākehā culture.

Māori today are disproportionately represented in areas of social, economic and political marginalisation (Cunneen & Tauri, 2019; McIntosh, 2011; Tauri & Webb, 2012). One of the most concerning areas of overrepresentation is in criminal justice statistics. Recent numbers indicate Māori, who make up 15% of the general population, currently make up approximately 51% of the prison population (Department of Corrections, 2018). Observed rates of reoffending following release from prison are also higher for Māori than they are for Pākehā (Department of Corrections, 2013). These figures are in line with those observed in other colonised nations such as Australia and Canada (Cunneen & Tauri, 2019; Tamatea, 2017). Two dominant explanations for the overrepresentation of Māori in the criminal justice system posit that there is an overwhelming bias within the justice system that sees Māori treated more harshly at every stage of the judicial process (Webb, 2011) and/or that Māori are disproportionately exposed to the adverse factors that predict offending (e.g. unemployment, drug and alcohol use; Morrison, 2009). However, the conclusion of some indigenous scholars that colonisation itself is criminogenic as it ‘… actively produces dispossession, marginalisation, and cultural dislocation’ (Cunneen & Tauri, 2019, p. 364) subsumes these two avenues, as each is itself the product of colonisation.

Culture and rehabilitation

Culture is often recognised as relevant for forensic practice, particularly in Aotearoa–New Zealand (Thakker, 2014). However, despite the acknowledgement of historical trauma and systemic biases, explanation and treatment of offending largely follow international trends and the kinds of interventions that have demonstrated the most success in reducing recidivism (Bonta & Andrews, 2017) – for example, using cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) techniques to change individual attitudes or thinking patterns that support offending, and equipping individuals with strategies for effective and prosocial self-regulation (e.g. coping strategies, problem solving, communication). Thus, the assumption tends to be that problems exist within the individual rather than the social structures and systems they exist within (Webb, 2018). However, in addition to international models and techniques, rehabilitation programmes in Aotearoa–New Zealand contain some reo Māori (Māori language) and models of health and wellbeing, such as te Whare Tapa Whā (Durie, 1985). Such ‘hybrid’ programmes are routinely delivered to individuals from a range of cultural backgrounds, with specific ‘culture-based’ programmes being available to participants who identify as Māori. These programmes typically target the same factors as hybrid programmes (e.g. attitudes, drug and alcohol use), but they also incorporate a focus on Maori reo (language) and cultural identity. As such they tend to have comparable levels of success (Johnston, 2018).

Unfortunately, alongside the problem of locating the causes of offending solely within individuals who have offended, culture continues to be seen as simply a responsivity factor in correctional treatment (Bonta, LaPrairie, & Wallace-Capretta, 1997; Department of Corrections, 2009b; Webb, 2018). Culture is largely seen as something that affects an individual’s ability to engage in treatment rather than being a part of the person that is intertwined with the targets of change. In other words, culture is not viewed as shaping and maintaining an individual’s attitudes, beliefs and self-regulation strategies – the targets of treatment. Instead it is viewed as something that affects their ability to engage in treatment in order to change these things, like other responsivity concerns such as motivation, literacy or language abilities. This is not to say that rehabilitation programmes should not be culturally responsive to individuals’ various world views, life experiences and backgrounds. However, there is a danger of making homogeneous assumptions about a group of people when ‘culture’ (or more often ethnicity) is simply seen as something that affects engagement in programmes, rather than a unique individual and group orientation. The suggestion that culture only acts as a responsivity factor assumes that it is independent of the bio-psycho-social causes underpinning an individual’s offending.

In Aotearoa–New Zealand, the degree to which Māori concepts and models have been integrated into correctional practice has been questioned, implying a level of tokenism about efforts to provide ‘cultural interventions’ (Leaming & Willis, 2016; Tauri & Webb, 2012) – for example, the limited integration of Maori models alongside largely incompatible Western risk-reduction models (Leaming & Willis, 2016). In recent times, correctional organisations and researchers alike have adopted the stance that culture itself is not an intervention for offending, and that attempts to rebuild a ‘fractured cultural identity’ are an inappropriate way to reduce recidivism (Marie, 2010; Mihaere, 2015). The notion of ‘cultural identity’ in this context also serves to make individuals from minority cultural backgrounds ‘other’ from those who identify as Pākehā and are therefore not assumed to have a fractured cultural identity, and perpetuates the idea that the causes of offending are all located within the individual (Causadias, 2013; Webb, 2018). It is these presumed causes, or individual propensities, that are the targets of current interventions aimed at reducing recidivism.

Problems with intervention targets

In addition to the problems with the current conceptualisation of culture that are briefly mentioned above, there are problems with the focus of correctional interventions more generally – specifically, the reliance upon aggregate correlates of recidivism or dynamic risk factors (DRFs) and the neglect of individual agency and cultural influences. Examples of DRFs include: offence supportive attitudes, antisocial associates, drug and alcohol use, relationship issues, impulsivity and poor problem-solving skills (Heffernan & Ward, 2017). These have also been referred to as ‘criminogenic needs’ (Bonta & Andrew, 2017), due to their hypothesised causal relationship with criminal behaviour and the assumption that treatment addressing these needs will reduce recidivism. However, recently researchers have identified and outlined a number of conceptual problems with DRF (e.g. Ward & Fortune, 2016). These criticisms generally stem from the transportation of these statistical predictors of risk into the domain of treatment; in brief, they are merely descriptions of problems that cannot provide explanations for offending.

Perhaps the key reason that they cannot be considered explanatory is that in their prototypical form (as described above) they do not refer to any specific thing that could be causal. DRFs are conceptualised at different levels of abstraction, ranging from general categories, such as ‘antisocial personality pattern’, to more specific domains such as ‘impulsivity’ and ‘aggression’ (categories that, again, can be broken down further into more concrete features). They are composite constructs; each risk factor is an umbrella term, which includes a number of possible (often unspecified) causal features, contextual features and mental state variables (Ward & Fortune, 2016). They are unable to pinpoint a specific causal mechanism, and multiple causal possibilities may be referred to with the use of one term (i.e. they lack specificity; Ward, 2016). For example, ‘antisocial associates’ refers to peers who: approve of offending, assist in offending, disapprove of prosocial behaviour or any combination thereof. More accurately, it refers to a person’s choice and opportunities to associate with others (i.e. availability and perceived attractiveness of prosocial and antisocial peers), their impact on cognition and ability to influence the individual (i.e. signalling reward) and the extent to which they facilitate learning offence-related skills (i.e. role modelling, seeking out offending opportunities within the environment). Thus the DRF ‘antisocial associates’ incorporates environmental, interpersonal and cognitive influences upon behaviour. Aspects of these DRFs may play a causal role in behaviour, but others may simply be a manifestation of underlying processes (e.g. proxies of DRFs). The ways in which DRFs such as ‘antisocial associates’ may be linked with behaviour vary between individuals, and this variation is shaped by cultural processes.

The problem with DRFs that we mention next is perhaps most relevant to the argument that culture is an indispensable source of explanation. Ward and Heffernan (2017) suggest that DRFs are partly normative constructs (i.e. require value judgments) rather than scientific or ‘real’ categories. They point to trends (i.e. deviation from norms) within group behaviour, rather than being the genuine causes of individuals’ behaviour (also see Ward, 2016). Categories of crime and related factors reflect normative (cultural) judgements about human behaviour. For example, the terms ‘relationship issues’ and ‘poor self-regulation’ have little meaning without reference to healthy or acceptable relationships and behaviours, which vary across cultures. The law is based on the assertion that certain behaviours cause harm, and as such should be sanctioned and outlawed; these decisions are made by societies composed of various cultural groups. DRFs are the problems that are associated with or predict behaviours that society has deemed harmful, and thus violate social norms of ‘good’ behaviour. Given that crime is a normative and culturally created construct itself, the constructs designed to predict it are not equipped to ‘map onto valid patterns of psychological problems’ (Ward & Fortune, 2016, p. 82). These predictors provide evidence of features that often co-exist with persistent offending; as such our understanding of them will be enhanced by reference to cultural explanations that include influences such as values, norms and expectations.

DRFs have demonstrated a useful function in their ability to predict behaviour that violates social and legal norms, but the problems associated with them means they are not useful explanatory constructs; they are correlates that may point to causal constructs among other factors, such as psychological states and contextual features (Heffernan, Ward, Vandevelde, & Van Damme, 2018; Ward & Fortune, 2016). Furthermore, the use of DRF locates the causes of offending in the ‘faulty psychological functioning’ of the individual and discounts contextual, historical and cultural information, which provides critical explanatory value, particularly for members of marginalised cultural groups (Webb, 2018). To continue using DRFs to explain behaviour in this individualistic way is to maintain the overrepresentation of marginalised minorities in the criminal justice system. In part, this is because the overarching socio-political causes of social problems such as crime resulting from historical processes such as colonisation on both groups and individuals are not accounted for. Given that explanation and understanding (i.e. through case formulation) is the first step in modifying harmful behaviours, the reliance on DRFs means that many individuals’ behaviours are inadequately explained, and subsequent rehabilitation is ill equipped to make substantive change. While the addressing of unequal wider social structures that serve to place certain cultural groups at a subordinate position requires change across multiple levels of society, forensic practice can make its contribution through explanation of individuals’ behaviour that references the unique historical and contemporary socio-cultural factors.

Theoretical developments

There are a number of recent theoretical advances that can assist in the development of a more culturally informed theory of human behaviour, which can then help to understand norm violations and offending. The first is a unique view of cultural evolution and learning, which informs our understanding of culture’s influence upon the emergence of psychological mechanisms. The second is a multi-level nested view of human beings, and the third is intersectionality. The fourth is the development of a subjective first-person perspective, in shaping the unique lens through which individuals engage with their environments. Finally, the fifth development is a view of human beings as goal-directed agents, and behaviours as goal-directed practices. We briefly review each of these now, before we put them to work in our preliminary model.

Cultural learning and shaping mechanisms

While there are many different conceptualisations of cultural evolution, Heyes (2018) provides a revolutionary way to view the evolved impact of culture on human behaviour. She argues that psychological mechanisms such as language, theory of mind and causal understanding are as much the products of cultural evolution as are attitudes, emotions, behaviour or artefacts. Previously, researchers largely maintained that these mechanisms were the result of genetically inherited psychological attributes (Heyes, 2018). In contrast, Heyes argues that instead of inheriting ‘fully formed’ psychological mechanisms, we only inherit genetically ‘tweaked’ basic psychological attributes. These basic attributes are common across all animals and are the basis of the development of human mechanisms, known as ‘cognitive gadgets’, from birth onwards (Heyes, 2018).

Culture and biology are deeply intertwined. It has been suggested the core mechanism behind the evolution of humans’ extraordinary abilities is the coevolution of culture and genetics (Causadias, 2013; Laland, 2008b). There is burgeoning evidence that demonstrates culturally genetically evolved differences in neuroplasticity, various neurological activation patterns, temperament and psychopathology, amongst others (Causadias, 2013; Gelfand, Chiu, & Hong, 2013; Han, 2017, Heyes, 2018). An interesting example of the interplay between culture and biology is the field of epigenetics, wherein information is transmitted between cells that is additional to the inheritance of DNA (Feinberg & Fallin, 2015). There is some evidence to suggest that genetic markers are inherited across generations, which may affect individual development and contribute to continued socio-economic disadvantage over time (Combs-Orme, 2018). Although the contribution of culture–biology interactions is not our current explanatory target, it is an important area that may influence behaviour of individuals who belong to different cultural groups.

If the mind itself is at least partly created by cultural factors, explanations that do not include culture as a significant shaper of behaviour are therefore incomplete. Culture is fundamental to all human activities; this includes forensically relevant activities such as norm violations (e.g. crime) and the prevention of such violations (e.g. through rehabilitation). For instance, we might recognise that individuals possess an inherited capacity to form goals. How this capacity forms, develops and manifests depends upon the socio-cultural context of that individual, and, ultimately, this interaction determines the kinds of goals that are endorsed by the individual, as well as practical means to pursue these goals (which may be prosocial or otherwise depending on environmental constraints, learning, etc.). The conceptualisation of the mind as being partly culturally created suggests that culture has a subsequent impact on other explanatory levels, including the biological, the phenomenological and the social.

Nested systems

The ‘mind’ is a tool developed via evolution to enhance human survival and reproduction by providing us with the means to navigate and control our interactions with the environment (Aunger & Curtis, 2015; Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2016). Within the psychological scientific community, there is a movement away from viewing the ‘mind’ as something contained within the brain, to a set of structures and processes that are distributed across the brain, body and environment (Fuchs, 2009). In other words, behaviour is not the result of independent mechanisms operating in either the physical or mental space, but rather the culmination of interactions between an organism’s brain, body and environment. We can only hope to understand the neurocognitive system within its bodily and external context, all of which can be influenced and shaped by our cultural contexts (Hutchins, 2008). As Heyes (2018) suggests, the existence of the human mind is dependent on this embeddedness; without the cultural information upon which the characteristically human psychological mechanisms are built, there would be no conscious ‘mind’. Humans are capable of sophisticated thought and action, unmatched by that of any other animal. The reason for this is, in part, the cultural systems that we have created, and which have created our ‘cognitive gadgets’.

From this perspective, actions are themselves embodied; they are not triggered by a mind that is located solely in the brain; rather they are a product of the mind, which is located across various levels (brain, body, environment; Fuchs, 2009). This means that explanations of behaviour require reference to multiple explanatory levels (Thagard, 2019). These levels are irreducible; behaviour cannot be comprehensively explained by referring to only one level (e.g. an offence like violent assault cannot be explained completely by discussing only psychological factors, nor contextual factors). Although by no means exhaustive, these explanatory levels are often broken down into biological (including sub-levels such as genetic, molecular, cellular, physiological and neurological), psychological (including cognitive and phenomenological) and social (family context, community context, broad socio-economic context, political context). Although previously seen as a social variable, culture plays a key role in shaping and influencing each of these levels and therefore demands recognition in comprehensive explanations.

We propose that an embodied perspective of the mind, and subsequently behaviour, is essential to understanding why there are ethnic differences in rates of offending, and even the types and severity of offences committed (ethnicity being a proxy for culture – but not the only factor that makes a culture). Abuses of marginalised cultural groups are well documented: enslavement, institutionalisation, outlawing of cultural customs and traditions, confiscation of land, and the list goes on. This historical trauma has paved the way for the current situation, wherein members of marginalised cultural groups are significantly more likely to have a lower life expectancy and higher rates of suicide, poverty and criminal activity/exposure to criminal justice systems (Deane, Bracken, & Morrissette, 2007). If the mind is an embodied engine that serves to navigate our physical and social environments, then individuals who grow up in these marginalised socio-cultural contexts are likely to form significantly different perceptions of the world and mental representations of themselves and others that reflect these experiences. The way such individuals behave when faced with particular circumstances – which are culturally shaped themselves – is likely to differ from those who have not developed in a marginalised socio-cultural context.

Intersectionality

Understanding culture’s impact on offending behaviour requires an intersectional perspective of people and behaviour. Glynn (2016) defines intersectionality as ‘ . . . an understanding of human beings as being shaped by the interaction of different social locations. These interactions occur within a context of connected systems and structure of power’ (p. 24). For example, an individual’s cultural orientation may be simultaneously influenced by family of origin, peer group, engagement in leisure activities and groups, ethnicity, age, gender, sexuality, and so on. At the individual level, culture is the intersection of these influences. These variables interact differently for individuals, and the subjective experience this creates plays a key role in influencing individual behaviour. These interactions can serve to create or maintain social positions of power and privilege, or marginality, and are highly relevant to forensic explanation. Those individuals who are made most vulnerable by such social interactions are all too often those for whom negative outcomes, like contact with the criminal justice system, occur (Glynn, 2016).

Forensic explanation therefore needs to be cognizant of the multiple factors that intersect to shape individual subjective experience, and that no one factor makes up an individual identity (Delgado & Stefancic, 2007). Previous attempts to explain crime-related phenomena often neglect the social and structural forces that serve to oppress groups and individuals in different ways, and subsequent explanations therefore do not paint a complete picture of why various behaviours occur (Santos & Toomey, 2018; Webb, 2018). Members of marginalised groups who commit offences face not only the criminal justice system and its innate biases, but the wider reality of discrimination in their socio-cultural context (Glynn, 2016). Consequently, the process of continuing or desisting from crime may be experienced in a variety of ways and accompanied by various challenges and opportunities, significantly dependent on the navigation of this socio-cultural context.

Subjectivity and the first-person perspective

The cultural impacts on the social and contextual levels of explanation are well established, as ‘culture’ is often conceptualised as a person’s external, social environment. The current paper is concerned primarily with culture’s impact on the person, so as to inform correctional practice with individuals. We therefore prioritise the phenomenological level of explanation. This level refers to how humans subjectively understand and psychologically represent themselves, others and the world (Neisser, 2015). It is important as it significantly informs behaviour through shaping the first-person perspective from which an individual operates. Baker (2015) suggests that when people are born, we have a rudimentary first-person perspective on a par with that of other animals. In other words, there is a capacity for intentionality that drives behaviour, but only insofar as to enable survival by orienting persons towards rewards (e.g. knowing that one needs food). However, human development occurs in the context of constant cultural learning, which (as a result of our ‘tweaked’ genetically inherited psychological attributes) produces the sophisticated ‘cognitive gadgets’ that underpin distinct human activities and behaviours (Heyes, 2018). We develop a subjective consciousness of ourselves as ourselves, known as the robust first-person perspective (Baker, 2015). In other words, Sally knows that ‘Sally’s pen’ is her pen, not just ‘the pen’. This perspective allows us to form and maintain a subjective level of consciousness, wherein we hold dreams, wishes, hopes, beliefs, desires, attitudes, and so on. This adaptation, a product of genetic and cultural evolution, allows us to engage in characteristically human activities such as making plans, anticipating their outcomes, and evaluating their relative success.

Culture plays a crucial role in the formation and subsequent operation of this robust first-person perspective, or subjectivity. When humans developed language – a key vehicle for the transmission of cultural information – our ability to mentally represent ourselves, other people, the world and the future was vastly extended. This ability substantially enhances our prospective capabilities (i.e. our ability to draw on previous experiences to form expectations of the future) and shapes our expectations for the outcomes of the behaviours we engage in. In other words, we have a capacity to exercise agency through a heightened control over our actions and their predicted consequences (Ward, 2016). The subjective first-person perspective provides the psychological foundation from which we engage with the world. Without reference to this perspective, it is difficult to understand the intention and meaning behind a person’s actions. Therefore, it follows that an explanatory perspective that accounts for the phenomenological level of understanding is also equipped to view a person in their multiple cultural contexts. This is crucial if we are to modify behaviour, as is the goal of correctional rehabilitation.

Agency and practices

Agentic approaches to forensic explanation have recently been put forward as a means of addressing the conceptual problems with DRF outlined earlier (Durrant & Ward, 2015; Heffernan & Ward, 2015, 2017; Serin, Chadwick, & Lloyd, 2016; Thornton, 2016; Ward, 2016). Agency is the capacity to ‘effectively manage multiple and sometimes competing goals in ways that enable him or her to sustain functioning, repair any damage, avoid harm or threats, and to implement plans that are cohesive and responsive to any relevant contexts – social, physical, and cultural’ (Durrant & Ward, 2015, p. 192). Humans prioritise particular values or ‘human needs’ (Ward, 2016) and develop goals and strategies to achieve them based upon their psychological capacities and external resources or opportunities. Agents are constantly situated in and interacting with a physical and socio-cultural context, which is culturally shaped by the agent, but which also shapes their experiences. According to this perspective, DRF refer to psychological and social processes that impair prosocial agency (e.g. the formation and achievement of goals, as outlined above), or make it more likely that needs will be met via norm-violating or harmful actions. A cultural perspective that takes a holistic and contextualised view of human behaviour is likely to contribute to better explanations of norm-violating behaviours. One model that outlines this process is the predictive agency model (Heffernan & Ward, 2017); this will be incorporated within our preliminary model in the following section.

A preliminary model

The fundamental tenet of the agentic perspective described above is that an action requires both an agent and an external context in which the action is possible (Durrant & Ward, 2015). Culture operates at both individual and group levels and is therefore internal and external to human beings. Its significant influence on the development of the capacities and mechanisms that enable agency is demonstrable firstly through its impact on the development of subjectivity and subsequent experiences. Culture shapes how an individual interprets events, and it also shapes the events themselves (e.g. the interpretation and subjective experience of racism, as well as the occurrence of racism itself). Internal and external experiences of culture intersect and vary significantly across individuals; explanations of behaviour must be cognizant of this individuality.

Predictive agency model

The predictive agency model (PAM) was developed by Heffernan and Ward (2017), based on earlier models of agency (Durrant & Ward, 2015; Ward, 2016). The PAM is based on four theoretical commitments, which align with current scientific theories of psychological and social processes and structures, and which we suggest are equipped to view humans as culturally created beings. We mentioned subjectivity and a nested systems view of human beings above, and we focus here only on the additional theoretical assumptions. A further key commitment of our model is to the role of affective systems in the exercising of agency. This commitment recognises that our emotions provide meaning to our actions and allow us to evaluate our actions (and outcomes) and assign value to outcomes we prioritise. A final additional commitment is to a view of the human mind as a predictive engine, which is equipped with a unique set of capacities that allow us to use internal and external cues to predict outcomes, thus enabling our survival (Figure 1).

Figure 1.

Predictive agency model (Heffernan & Ward, 2017).

According to the PAM, individuals develop their subjective perspective over time through interactions with the environment, shaping their general models of themselves, others and the world – for example, models that form representations of the self, other types of people, specific people, physical environments and opportunities to meet needs. The individual’s emotional systems are developed in the same cultural contexts and assist in evaluating internal and external situations and experiences, and guiding behaviour toward valued outcomes. At particular points in time, the individual uses general models to develop local models specific to their current situation (i.e. persons present, sources of risk or rewards in the immediate environment), which when paired with a motivating state (i.e. a relevant need or an emotional state) inform subsequent actions. Thus implicit or explicit planning is based on these specific models, which shape the individual’s expectations of their environment and others (i.e. norms), the outcome of the behaviour (i.e. is it rewarding?) and whether this behaviour is likely to meet relevant needs (i.e. its likelihood of success). The action is enacted, and subsequent feedback from the environment (i.e. punishment or reward) and subjective feedback and evaluation of this action result in the strengthening or weakening of the general models that informed this behaviour. For example, if the outcome violates expectations then general models may need to be revised or strategies altered in order for future behaviour to meet the relevant needs.

The cultural–ecological predictive agency model (CEPAM)

The preliminary model that we present here incorporates the PAM, but adds an explicit focus on cultural influences underpinning the agency process. Figure 2 depicts an agent nested within two ‘layers’ of cultural processes that form the context/s in which a person develops and operates: historical context and processes, and cultural systems. This model draws somewhat on Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1979). However, Bronfenbrenner positioned culture as the outermost circle in which a person is situated – implying only a distal contribution to human development or behaviour (Causadias, 2013). In our model, we shift our focus to understanding how ecological systems, such as family and community contexts, are culturally shaped and influenced, and relabel them cultural systems. We additionally focus on the historical processes through which the current contexts came to be, and the subjective level of experience that is continually evolving during an individual’s lifetime – based on the events of their life. The assumption is that culture influences, and is the product of, historical contexts and processes that led to the contemporary context.

Figure 2.

Cultural–ecological predictive agency model.

An understanding of the interaction between persons and contexts is limited if there is no consideration of the historical processes through which these came to be. An individual’s opportunities to behave in certain ways may be constrained (or not) by aspects of their socio-cultural environment, which are the current manifestations of historical processes (i.e. changes in the environment and social processes over time). For example, colonisation has led to a cycle of entrenched marginality for indigenous cultures around the world, resulting in a contemporary context in which members of these groups are significantly less likely to achieve educational goals, which decreases the likelihood of prosocial employment and attainment of positions of power and increases the likelihood of negative outcomes including offending (McKinley & Hoskins, 2011). In addition, what constitutes a crime is a historically informed construction based on cultural values; a group’s values evolve and change over time, and consequently so do norms and laws. What is acceptable behaviour in one time and place may not be in another (Heffernan & Ward, 2018; Tamatea, 2017).

Culture is as dynamic and ever-changing as humans are, and this process of change has important implications for contemporary society. The development of shared values is borne out of the need for survival, as a shared value base allows a group to maintain social cohesion and collectively enhance their ability to navigate and thrive in their physical environment (Kearns, & Forrest, 2000). Over time, social groups form a shared orientation to being in the world, their ‘group culture’. In other words, a historical context maps the path by which a contemporary socio-cultural context came into being. Norms concerning the types of practices that are legal or ‘acceptable’ are enacted through multiple layers of cultural systems (Ward & Heffernan, 2017). These cultural systems can be as broad as a nation’s overarching governing, social, political and economic systems and institutions, or as specific as an individual’s immediate community and family contexts. In addition, the co-existence of multiple cultural systems and their influence on individuals (i.e. intersectionality) mean that the norms of various systems can clash (e.g. gang rules versus family values, or the law), causing behaviours that may be encouraged or accepted in one context but are seen as harmful and punished in another.

The cultural systems in which a person is embedded are important in two ways. First, they make up the context in which a person currently operates. This context may provide opportunities and means to behave in pro- or antisocial ways, and as previously mentioned defines when a behaviour is norm-violating or not. Second, humans develop their first-person perspective in a cultural environment/s. Therefore, how they understand their life experiences shapes how they see themselves, others and the world in general, which influences their behaviour. Someone raised in a context where friends and family often commit crime – and where this is expected (or even seen as inevitable) behaviour for this group – may hold a general model that is congruent with offending behaviour as normal and expected, and therefore that prison is similarly inevitable. Once in a certain environment (the nature of which is influenced by the socio-cultural context) the local models this person constructs and the implicit or explicit planning engaged in may lead to a norm-violating action. We now outline an example of a typical violent offence, and then use the model to illustrate how culture has influenced offending.

Applying the CEPAM to an example

Scott is a 23-year-old male of Pākehā and Māori descent. His parents, who both identify as Māori and Pākehā, divorced when he was four, and he and his younger sister were raised by their mother. His mother’s new partner was occasionally violent towards Scott, his sister and his mother during his childhood. Scott found reading difficult from an early age and quickly grew to dislike school. He gradually fell behind his classmates, eventually leaving school at age 15 to work for his uncle’s construction business. This uncle, the main male influence in Scott’s life after his parents’ divorce, is peripherally involved in a local gang. Scott began to spend more time with his uncle’s friends, eventually joining the gang as a result. In this context, Scott began to think that violence was a powerful way of showing his dominance and getting what he wants. At a party one night, a rival gang member was present, and Scott, under the influence of alcohol, assaulted him. Some months later, Scott was convicted of aggravated assault and was given an 18-month prison sentence.

Exemplar: correlates of violence

In this example, two important DRFs are the attitudes Scott holds concerning violence, and the antisocial associates (and enemies) he has gained through joining the gang. Evidence indicates that these two risk factors are amongst the strongest predictors of offending behaviour, and they are often measured and evaluated together (Banse, Koppehele-Gossel, Kistemaker, Werner, & Schmidt, 2013; Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Bonta and Andrews (2017) suggest that pro-criminal associates provide antisocial learning opportunities, in both the development of pro-criminal attitudes and the practical aspects of how to commit crime – for example, providing opportunities or sharing ‘expertise’. As outlined earlier, DRFs are multi-faceted descriptions of offence-related characteristics, aspects of individuals and their environments that predict recidivism. Antisocial attitudes are ‘ . . . thoughts, feelings, and beliefs that are supportive of criminal conduct’ (Bonta & Andrews, 2017, p. 123). As such, these can be many different things, and they can occur at different times. Pro-criminal cognition can occur prior, during and/or after an offence, and could be in the form of justifications, rationalisations, neutralisations, excuses and devaluations, but also other attitudes that might be approving of or favourable towards crime (Banse et al., 2013; Bonta & Andrews, 2017; Mills, Kroner, & Forth, 2002). Offence-supportive attitudes are essentially any type of cognition that makes it more likely that the individual will engage in offending.

Exemplar: historical context and processes

We can start by examining the historical context of Scott’s current and developmental contexts. Aotearoa–New Zealand is a colonised country that has seen severe deprivation and disadvantage for Māori through disenfranchisement, misappropriation and marginalisation. Māori, as a historically marginalised group, have become exposed to cycles of inequality that perpetuate overrepresentation in criminal justice statistics across time (McIntosh, 2011). The various forms of social disadvantage that have resulted from colonisation, such as poverty and poor education, are intertwined to contribute to increased exposure to various risk factors. Prison in particular has had a clear intergenerational effect on Māori; prison affects not only the individual incarcerated but their wider social contexts, particularly their families. The correctional system places individuals in prison, which evidence repeatedly demonstrates is a traumatising and criminogenic setting in and of itself (Bales & Piquero, 2012; Cid, 2009), and then returns them to the same socio-cultural environment after their sentence, with the added pressure of having to reacclimatise to society and the stigma of a criminal record.

Exemplar: cultural systems

The contemporary socio-cultural context and the various cultural systems that make it up are a product of the historical context. The values and subsequent norms enacted through governmental policy, and the agencies and institutions that implement these, outline what behaviours are acceptable and not acceptable. However, multiple marginalisation and inequalities established over many years contribute to a context that limits opportunities for prosocial behaviour and increases the likelihood of antisocial behaviour. It is in this context that Scott has developed and currently operates. He was raised in a family environment where Māori heritage was recognised, but like many families, disconnected from wider whānau, hapū and iwi contexts. As a single-parent and therefore single-income family, this placed significant stress on the family, and limited educational and leisure opportunities. Scott attended a low-decile school (which had significantly fewer resources to support student learning than higher decile schools) and due to his reading difficulties, came to see himself as ‘stupid’ and school as a source of continued negative evaluation. At home and school, Scott learnt that his identification as Māori placed him in a stereotypical category where normalisation of negative outcomes was rife, particularly in relation to violence, other crime and prison. This stereotype was never challenged across these settings, as a result of his family’s disconnection and the educational system’s prioritisation of Pākehā cultural values.

Exemplar: first-person perspective and predictive agency model

Scott’s first-person perspective contains a number of general models, including: prison is a normal eventuality for people like him, the world is place in which you have to defend yourself before others can hurt you, and he believes that he is already seen as a criminal by most of society anyway. To Scott, violence is a normal and viable way of achieving goals and a source of positive reinforcement, such as feeling respected and/or safe. Subsequently, the general models that influenced Scott’s decision to assault the rival gang (outlined above) were a product of the various subjective experiences that occurred in Scott’s life thus far. He saw himself as fitting in to a negative stereotype that was often linked to his ethno-cultural background in his experiences across various settings. These negative outcomes were positioned as ‘normal’ experiences. He had in the past learned that the actions that violence against rival gang members was positively reinforced in his environment, and therefore was useful to achieve goals (i.e. feeling powerful, belonging). Indeed, it could be argued that this behaviour was adaptive in his environment (Ward & Carter, 2019), as actively choosing not to engage in this action could result in, at best, social disapproval and isolation and at worst being victimised himself.

Scott has a somewhat negative affective lens through which he sees the world, in that he is overly sensitive to perceived threats or aggressive cues, and always expects the worst. This has developed via repeated experiences of disappointment and exposure to violence, and the perceived need to be vigilant to threat, and has generalised to sources of unease or uncertainty (e.g. around unknown people). At the party where Scott’s offence occurred, many of the people present had been drinking alcohol, and Scott himself was also intoxicated. It was loud, and there were a lot of people he didn’t recognise. Scott was on high alert, leading to anxiety and hypersensitivity to changes in his environment (e.g. noticing when people enter the room, excessive eye contact, signals of disrespect). Scott perceived the arrival of a rival gang member (who made prolonged eye contact) as a sign of disrespect and threat to his social standing, as well as a potential threat to his physical safety and a transgression of his and his peers’ social power (it being ‘their’ party). Implicitly, local models about how to behave in this specific situation guided Scott’s behaviour. For example, if he lets him get away with it he will be ridiculed or it will happen again, and he has seen others assault rival gang members in similar situations, creating a kind of script for this particular situation and similar ones.

His implicit plan includes the expectations that violent behaviour will be socially acceptable in his current context, and that this behaviour will be successful and rewarded, as it has been in the past. Generally speaking, this planning may or may not be an explicit process; Scott may respond to his rival in a seemingly automatic manner, but it is important to note that Scott may have considered other avenues of behaviour, such as removing himself from the party and thereby removing the threat. However, previous experience may have taught him that behaving like this will be punished (disapproval from his peers and undermining of his strength and social power), and he therefore disregarded this option. He puts his plan into action and violently assaults the other person, causing significant physical harm and trauma to the rival gang member, which in turn causes his victim’s peers to respond in an angry and upset manner and his peers to approve.

The feedback and reflection process mostly confirms Scott’s general and local models. Scott’s peers reward his behaviour by voicing their approval of his actions, and he is further reinforced by the removal of the perceived threat. However, in the longer term, Scott’s actions cause deep distress to his family, who are exposed to negative media attention and a subsequent public backlash. Scott is convicted of aggravated assault and is sentenced to an 18-month prison term. Delayed by several months after Scott’s offence, his conviction does little to punish his actions and reduce their future occurrence, and his prison term serves to fulfil his expectation that he would eventually go to prison and reinforce the normalcy of crime. While in prison, Scott forms connections with other antisocial peers. He receives very few opportunities to complete rehabilitation programmes due to his short prison sentence, long waiting list times and unavailability of resources. When Scott leaves prison, he becomes unemployed as his uncle has hired someone in his place, and his criminal record means other employers are reluctant to take him on. He now spends all his time with his previous social group and also reconnects with some of his peers from prison. As a result, the ‘punishment’ of prison has maintained Scott’s perception of the world as a place where criminality and prison are normal for people like him, and the inevitability of his following this trajectory. It provided him with further antisocial connections and removed potential prosocial opportunities and factors that may have supported desistance from crime.

In Scott’s case, the presence of the DRF of antisocial associates and attitudes that might predict his offending are highly influenced by cultural and historical processes. First, the predictive-agency perspective holds that DRFs are ‘ . . . broad categories that contain (proxies for) weakness or strength in the capacities underlying predictive-agency that cause behaviour that is more or less harmful and/or illegal in particular contexts’ (Heffernan & Ward, 2017 p. 138). For Scott, the presence of peers who supported antisocial attitudes and behaviour has led him to develop similar attitudes (after positively evaluating his peers and these attitudes). In this case, believing violence is a viable way of achieving goals such as social approval, is one of the attitudes that Scott positively evaluated, as it is reinforced in this context and is associated with emotions such as pride and belonging. When Scott finds himself in situations where a need (e.g. safety, mastery) is unmet or threatened, his culturally informed models facilitate behaviours which have been used to achieve these needs in the past.

Summary

As a member of a marginalised cultural group, Scott is situated within a context that itself directly acts as a causal factor in his behaviour (Webb, 2018). For indigenous cultures that have been forcibly shifted into a Western context, DRFs are as much the collateral harms and consequences of colonisation as they are ‘predictors’ of risk (O’Malley, 2000). For Scott, the expectation that he not reoffends after prison requires him to not only shift how he perceives his experiences and make stark changes to his lifestyle (effectively asking him to remove his social network as it is ‘antisocial’), it also requires him to do this in the face of a society that works to maintain the social subordination of his culture. Rehabilitation must therefore also support Scott to understand how to navigate this context, not only to reduce his risk of reoffending, but to support his ability to behave in a prosocial manner and live a meaningful, fulfilling life.

Conclusions

The original PAM was developed to address the inherent problems with DRFs by locating them within an agentic perspective of behaviour, and providing a means of identifying weaknesses to be targeted in intervention. Rather than relying on lists of risk factors for different types of crimes, offending is understood to be goal directed, just like any other behaviour. In other words, offences are attempts to achieve goals in legally unacceptable ways (such as coping with negative emotionality through substance use or violence). The CEPAM is further equipped to ensure that an individual’s motivation and the agentic processes that lead to behaviour are positioned within a historically derived cultural context, which influences every level of explanation. By doing so, we respect an individual’s autonomy and agency with regard to their behaviour, but remain cognizant of the contribution of the broader, intersecting causal components, outside of an individual’s psychological functioning. An agentic perspective further allows us to understand the function of behaviour, and when behaviour might be considered maladaptive or adaptive in certain contexts (Ward & Carter, 2019). The CEPAM seeks to locate the internal and external impacts of culture on offending, but with a focus on explaining individual behaviour so as to avoid a homogeneous conceptualisation of ‘culture’. Shared cultural heritage does not equate to shared subjective experience, which is influenced by gender, age, sexuality, and so on, as well as ethnicity. It is hoped that the CEPAM will encourage a multi-level, intersectional view of individuals who have offended, and their behaviours, and, further, a deeper incorporation of specific cultural knowledge into forensic research and practice.

In Aotearoa–New Zealand, the last few centuries have seen the establishment of a society that socially, politically and economically disadvantages Māori beyond other cultural groups. One of the many outcomes is the disproportionate representation in our criminal justice system. It is incomprehensive to attempt to explain why this overrepresentation occurs without reference to multiple intersecting factors including significant cultural marginality and individual factors that vary across each person and interact to significantly inform the agentic process of behaviour. In this paper we have largely drawn on this example of cultural marginality and disadvantage, but we emphasise that the CEPAM could be applied to any person from any background, to clearly identify the cultural impacts on behaviour. Furthermore, due to their privileged status in current forensic practice we have only examined DRFs, but the same perspective could be applied to those variables that occupy the position of protective factors (or strengths and desistance factors) that would support a significantly more positive approach.

We do not argue that the use of DRFs and the ‘psychological approach’ should be abandoned, but rather revisited and revised in light of recent developments in understanding culture and its impact on the individual. As predictors of reoffending, DRF go some way to assisting in keeping our communities as safe as possible via risk assessment and management (i.e. responding to imminent risk). Furthermore, the presence of psychological processes and mechanisms is ubiquitous across cultural groups, and therefore they are an important part of forensic explanation. It is the manifestation and individual functioning of these that vary and are shaped via cultural learning, and therefore are a valuable source of information. The global impact of psychological explanation is reflected in the finding that current rehabilitation programmes, generally guided by purely psychological explanations using DRF, appear to have a similar impact on individuals regardless of ethnic or cultural heritage (Johnston, 2018; Usher & Stewart, 2014). However, general effect sizes for these programmes remain insubstantial (Klepfisz, Daffern, & Day, 2014; Polaschek & Collie, 2004; Schmucker & Losel, 2015), pointing to the need to develop more comprehensive, multi-level explanations to guide subsequent treatment programmes with all individuals.

DRFs represent culturally influenced distortions or obstacles that impinge on a person’s internal and external capabilities, resources and opportunities to act in a prosocial manner (Ward & Marshall, 2007). Although fundamental, societal change is required in order to address differential cultural representation in criminal justice systems; rehabilitation can play a role in supporting individuals to reconstruct their narratives and representations of themselves and the world. There is evidential support for the relationship between individual identity and offending (Rocque, Posick, & Paternoster, 2016), and such narratives can represent the ‘ . . . juncture between individual and society . . . ’ (Fleetwood, 2016, p. 175). Similarly, the intersectionality and critical race literature has promulgated the use of ‘counter-stories’ in research and rehabilitation, which we suggest may be a useful area to examine in conjunction with the CEPAM (Glynn, 2016; Sharma, 2010). The very factors that intersect to contribute to the presence of offending behaviour are those that act as barriers to individuals who wish to desist from crime. Culturally marginalised offenders must construct counter-narratives of their own lives and realities, which combat the ‘inherent criminality’ that a purely psychological explanation of their behaviour confers upon them. In order to be effectively rehabilitated, individuals must be able to meaningfully understand and make sense of their world, in order to reconfigure how they navigate their context without reoffending. Such narratives then ‘ . . . form a bridge between individual experience and systemic social pattern . . . ’ (Glynn, 2016, p. 28). A similar trend in academia will enable the production of theoretical and empirical research that appropriately accounts for the complexity that accompanies the examination of humans as inherently cultural creatures who constantly operate in a historically derived socio-cultural context. Importantly, research by and for those cultural groups who are disproportionately represented in criminal justice systems is essential, to prioritise and privilege their voice and experience.

There is little, if any, fundamental difference between those individuals who commit crime and those who do not. Behaviour is always the outcome of multiple factors that have influence across a person’s lifespan. The CEPAM is one way to begin to conceptualise how an outcome such as violent assault might be not only the product of ‘the presence of DRFs’ but particularly the subjective experience of operating in a context that contains multiple cultural systems, which have emerged from a historical context. DRFs are situated within this context, but to understand the nature and impact of these, we require contextual and cultural information. Human nature and our characteristically human practices require culture, and we must frame our explanations of behaviour accordingly.

Ethical standards

Declaration of conflicts of interest

Annalisa Strauss-Hughes has declared no conflicts of interest

Roxanne Heffernan has declared no conflicts of interest

Tony Ward has declared no conflicts of interest

Ethical approval

This article does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors.