The traditional model of infectious disease causation is the epidemiologic triangle. It has three components: an external agent, a susceptible host and environmental factors that bring the host and the agent together to produce an infection.1
Occupational infections are defined by two of these components. Particular infectious agents or organisms may be associated with a workplace or occupational setting and specific work activities may predispose the worker to exposure, resulting in an occupational infection.
THE IMPORTANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL INFECTIONS
Although difficult to quantify, occupational infections are probably uncommon when compared to those that result from non-occupational activities or environments.
Infections can only be confidently attributed to occupational exposure as a result of careful epidemiologic investigation. Case reports, surveillance data and cross-sectional surveys may lead to a hypothesis that a particular infection is diagnosed more commonly in one or other group of workers. However, in order to accurately estimate an odds ratio or relative risk, a carefully designed, adequately powered, case-control or cohort study will be required. Assuming that bias and confounding factors can be adequately controlled, it may then be possible to satisfy the Bradford Hill criteria for causation. Few infections have been subject to this rigorous approach.
In the individual case where an occupational infection is suspected, it is important to take an adequate occupational history. A workplace visit to assess the system of work can help confirm the likelihood of the infection being acquired through workplace factors.2 A high index of suspicion will ensure that occupational infections are not missed. If an occupational source is not recognized, there will be a continuing risk to other workers in the same work area, and the affected individual may be at risk of re-infection on return to work, especially if full immunity following the initial infection does not occur.
A number of occupational infections that are of historical interest in developed countries are still found in less developed parts of the world, and staff who are traveling to work in those areas may acquire these infections. As the working environment becomes ever more complex, there is the potential for new occupational infections to emerge.
Infections acquired occupationally may spread to other workers or the workers’ families or social contacts. As with any infection, occupational infections are controlled by controlling the source of infection, its route of transmission and by protecting susceptible persons. Most occupational infections can be prevented if appropriate measures are implemented. Some occupational infections, especially those for which vaccines are available (e.g. hepatitis B), are more amenable to prevention than others (e.g. hepatitis C). Health education and preventive programs in the workplace provide a good system for minimizing the risk of occupational infections. The largest employer in the United Kingdom – i.e. the National Health Service – has a requirement for every health-care facility to have access to an occupational health service. This has helped in reducing the burden of occupationally acquired infections in the health-care community.3 The system is not as well developed in other industries where there is a recognized risk of occupational infections (e.g. in farming).
This chapter is written from a United Kingdom perspective and describes the arrangements and structures for public health and occupational health practice that will be found in the UK. Similar arrangements can be expected in most industrialized countries. For example, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have published guidelines for preventing the transmission of infectious diseases in the health-care workplace. These are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/worker.html.
The US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which is part of CDC, has published research and recommendations on most aspects of work-related injury and illness including infections (see http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/diseases.html).
The Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC) provides policy advice on all aspects of occupational health and safety to allow local legislators to enact and enforce laws. A recent ASCC report focuses on the more common and important infections associated with occupations in Australia.4
CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONAL INFECTIONS
Mode of transmission, occupations and examples of infections are outlined in Table 67.1 .
Table 67.1.
Occupational infections
Mode of transmission | Occupations | Examples of infections |
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Contact with animals and animal products (zoonoses) |
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Exposure to vectors |
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Care of patients |
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Environmental sources, exposure to soil |
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Occupational skin infections |
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SURVEILLANCE OF OCCUPATIONAL INFECTIONS
Surveillance of occupationally acquired infection is problematic. A range of data sources are available. The examples described here are from the United Kingdom but similar systems may be found in other countries.
It is a legal requirement for clinicians to notify certain specified infectious diseases to local health authorities. The current list of notifiable infections for the UK covers common infections (including viral hepatitis and tuberculosis) that may be occupationally acquired, as well as rarities such as leptospirosis, rabies and anthrax. Microbiology laboratories also report micro-organisms of public health significance to local health authorities. Outputs from these surveillance schemes can be viewed at http://www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics_az/noids/menu.htm.
In neither of these systems is the occupation of the case requested or recorded. Local and national health authorities may enhance the data that are collected as part of case investigation and management, and this may include occupation and other relevant risk factors. However, such additional data are not consistently collated, analyzed or disseminated and, when available, are susceptible to ascertainment and reporting bias.
To overcome these shortcomings, active surveillance of selected occupationally acquired infections is carried out by the Surveillance of Infectious Diseases at Work (SIDAW) Project at the University of Manchester. Data are contributed by local public health staff each month. Most reports relate to diarrheal disease and scabies in health-care workers but legionellosis, tuberculosis and cutaneous anthrax have been reported.
Other occupational surveillance schemes also occasionally report occupational infections. Outputs from these surveillance schemes can be viewed at http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/indexoftables.htm.
Acute illnesses due to biologic agents encountered during a specified work activity – for example Lyme disease, Q fever, rabies, Streptococcus suis, tetanus, tuberculosis, anthrax, brucellosis, avian chlamydiosis, ovine chlamydiosis, hepatitis, legionellosis and leptospirosis – are reportable to the Health and Safety Executive under Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR 95).5 This legal requirement to notify is intended to provide information on trends and to facilitate prevention. More information and links to outputs can be viewed at http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/sources.htm. Reports on infections are infrequent.
The Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit (IIDB) Scheme provides benefits to employees if they develop a prescribed occupational disease. Diseases are prescribed when there is a recognized risk to workers in an occupation and where the risk is uncommon or absent in the general population. For some occupational diseases there is a strong association with occupation and the disease may rarely occur outside work (e.g. mesothelioma, coal miner's pneumoconiosis). However, most infections are common in the general population and it is difficult to establish a causal link with the occupation. In lay terms an infection will be attributed to an occupation if it is more likely than not to be caused by that occupation. In epidemiologic terms this means an attributable fraction (the proportion of the additional risk that can be attributed to the exposure in the exposed population) of 50% or more which equates to a relative risk of 2 (a doubling of the background risk caused by exposure).
Prescribed infections include:
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anthrax where work involves contact with animals infected with anthrax, or the handling of animal products or residues;
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glanders where work involves contact with equine animals or their carcasses;
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leptospirosis where work involves places liable to be infested by rodents or other small mammals, handling dogs, or contact with pigs or bovine animals or meat products;
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hepatitis A virus infection where work involves contact with raw sewage; and
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hepatitis B or C virus infection where work involves contact with human blood products or other sources.
Ancylostomiasis where work involves work in or about a mine is included in the list of UK prescribed diseases, although there is scant evidence that mining carries an increased risk of hookworm infestation. Earlier observations indicated a risk of anemia in Cornish tin miners, attributed to a lack of toilet facilities in the mines leading to spread of hookworm infestation.6 Interestingly, this risk was not seen in coal mines. It has also not been reported as a risk in tin mines in other countries (e.g. Malaysia), even though hookworm infestation in the tropics is prevalent. The methods used for tin mining in different countries can, however, be different.7 Most of the coal mines and tin mines in the UK are now closed, although ancylostomiasis remains on the prescribed diseases list. A complete list of prescribed infections can be viewed at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/db1/appendix/appendix1.asp.
The UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a national survey of 52 000 households on self-reported work-related illness. THOR-GP is a UK-wide surveillance scheme in which 270 participating general practitioners report cases of work-related ill health. Participants make a judgment as to whether a new case should be attributed to work on the balance of probabilities. Additional information and links to outputs can be viewed at http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/sources.htm. Again, reports on infections are infrequent.
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF OCCUPATIONAL INFECTIONS
The control of any occupational infection requires a detailed knowledge of its epidemiology, clinical features, reservoir, mode of transmission, incubation period and communicable period. To prevent and control infection, measures are necessary to eliminate the source of infection and the route of transmission. Susceptible workers can be offered protection with antibiotics or immunization.
The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health (COSHH) Regulations 2002 require employers to assess the risks from exposure to all hazardous substances (including biologic agents) and to implement measures to protect workers and others from those risks as far as is reasonably practicable.8 Following a workplace risk assessment, exposure to potential infection should be eliminated by changing working practices and removing hazardous products or waste. Residual risk is controlled by promoting good occupational hygiene and environmental hygiene, and by focusing on design and engineering controls. Staff training and provision and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) are key measures (Table 67.2 ).
Table 67.2.
Control of occupational infection
Controlling the source of infection | In the case of zoonoses, best practice should be observed with respect to animal husbandry, biosecurity of animal houses, feed and water, hygiene of animal houses and equipment, inspection, testing and certification and quarantine. Codes of practice are available and some of these are backed by legal measures In the case of human sources, prompt action is needed to isolate the case while infectious and to treat if possible to render the case noninfectious. |
Controlling the route of transmission | Guidelines are available which detail the measures that should be implemented to prevent transmission, including handwashing and use of appropriate personal protective equipment. In the health-care workplace, standard precautions are widely promoted in addition to enhanced measures for specific infections |
Protecting susceptible workers | Antibiotic or antiviral chemoprophylaxis may be required. All staff should be up to date with their routine immunizations (tetanus; diphtheria; polio; measles, mumps and rubella). Immunization is cost-effective for some groups of workers, particularly health-care workers and laboratory workers. Health warning cards may be issued to at-risk workers |
Immunization
All workers should be fully immunized according to the routine immunization schedule.9 In UK this comprises diphtheria; tetanus; pertussis; polio; measles, mumps and rubella (MMR); Haemophilus influenzae b (Hib); meningitis C (MenC) and pneumococcal vaccines. See: http://www.immunisation.nhs.uk/Immunisation_Schedule for further details.
In addition, selective immunization may be recommended for groups of workers at increased risk10 (Table 67.3 ).
Table 67.3.
Immunization for groups of workers at increased risk
Immunization | Occupational groups |
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Anthrax | Those handling imported infected animal products or working with infected animals |
Cholera | Relief or disaster aid workers |
Diphtheria, polio, tetanus | Laboratory and health-care workers who may be exposed in the course of their work in laboratories and clinical infectious disease units |
Hepatitis A | Laboratory workers who work with hepatitis A virus, staff of large residential institutions for those with learning difficulties, sewage workers, people who work with primatesConsider for food packagers and handlers, staff in day-care facilities and some other categories of health-care workers based on risk assessment |
Hepatitis B | Health-care workers in the UK and overseas, including students and trainees who have direct contact with patients’ blood or tissues, laboratory staff who handle material that may contain the virus, staff of residential accommodation for those with learning difficulties, morticians and embalmers, prison service staff in contact with prisonersConsider for other staff groups such as the police and fire and rescue services based on risk of exposure |
Influenza | Health and social care staff directly involved in patient care |
Japanese encephalitis | Laboratory staff who may be exposed to the virus |
Measles, mumps, rubella (MMR) | Health-care staff should be immune to measles, mumps and rubella for their own benefit and also to prevent them from spreading infection to patients |
Rabies | Pre-exposure immunization should be offered to laboratory workers handling the virus, those who may handle imported animals, people who regularly handle bats in the UK, those working abroad whose work may bring them into contact with rabid animals and health-care workers who may be exposed to body fluids from a patient with rabies |
Smallpox | Workers in laboratories where pox viruses (such as monkeypox or genetically modified vaccinia) are handled. Not recommended for people exhuming bodies in crypts |
Tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) | In endemic areas recommended for those engaged in forestry, woodcutting, farming and the military. Recommended for laboratory workers who may be exposed to TBE |
Tuberculosis | Bacille Calmette–Guérin (BCG) recommended for unvaccinated, tuberculin-negative persons aged under 35 with increased risk of exposure to persons with tuberculosis, including health-care workers, laboratory staff, veterinary and abattoir workers (who may handle infected animal species), prison staff, staff of care homes, staff of hostels for homeless people and refugees |
Immunization for laboratory and pathology staff
Laboratory and pathology staff handle pathogens or potentially infected specimens, and mortuary staff are potentially exposed to infected cadavers.11 Other laboratory personnel include cleaners, porters and administrative staff. Guidelines for morticians and embalmers can be viewed at http://www.hpa.org.uk/webw/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1200660060264?p=1200660029736.
All staff should have had all routinely recommended immunizations, which in the UK include tetanus, diphtheria, polio, MMR and MenC. Staff handling fecal specimens who may be exposed to polio viruses should have a reinforcing polio immunization every 10 years. Staff who may be exposed to diphtheria should have antibody levels tested 3 months after immunization. The recommended level is 0.01 IU/ml for those involved in routine diagnostic testing and 0.1 IU/ml for those exposed to toxigenic strains. A reinforcing dose is recommended every 10 years. Additional recommendations for laboratory and pathology staff are summarized in Table 67.4 .
Table 67.4.
Immunization of laboratory and pathology staff against specific occupational infections
Bacille Calmette–Guérin (BCG) | Recommended for microbiology and pathology staff, mortuary staff and others at high risk |
Hepatitis B | Recommended for laboratory staff who have direct contact with patients’ blood or tissues. Antibody levels should be checked after immunization |
Hepatitis A, Japanese encephalitis, cholera, meningococcal serogroups A, C, Y, W135, smallpox, tick-borne encephalitis, typhoid, yellow fever, influenza, varicella, anthrax, rabies | Recommended for staff handling or carrying out research on specific organisms and those working in reference laboratories or infectious disease hospitals |
CONCLUSIONS
There are many infections that can be acquired through work activities or from workplaces (Table 67.5 ). The recognition of occupational factors as an important component in the transmission of these infections will aid in the management of affected cases, and in prevention. Continuing vigilance for new occupational infections, advances in preventive measures and an experienced occupational health team working with infection control specialists are key to the successful prevention of these infections.
Table 67.5.
Selected infections with occupational significance
Infection | Description of infection in humans and public health importance | Risk factors, source and route of transmission | Surveillance/occurrence | Prevention and control |
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Brucellosis | Zoonosis. Acute febrile illness, fever or unknown origin or chronic bone or joint infection |
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Varicella |
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Direct and respiratory spread from human cases |
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Human seasonal influenza |
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Spread by respiratory secretions from human cases by large droplet or direct spread. Spread by airborne aerosol may also occur |
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Avian influenza |
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Pandemic influenza | Global pandemics of influenzax A occurred in 1918, 1957 and 1968 with high attack rates and significant morbidity and mortality, with effects on health services and other national infrastructure |
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In the UK, planning assumptions are for a 50% clinical attack rate, with an initial wave lasting about 15 weeks with the peak in weeks 6 and 7, when 22% of cases will occur each week |
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Hepatitis B and C viruses12 |
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Human immunodeficiency virus14 | A chronic viral infection which leads to depletion of CD4 lymphocytes and immunosuppression resulting in AIDS |
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Tuberculosis (TB) |
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Leptospirosis | Zoonosis with wide clinical spectrum caused by one of many serovars of Leptospira |
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Anthrax | Infection in humans affects skin, respiratory and gastrointestinal tract |
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Rare. Nineteen cases reported in the UK in 1975–96 in workers handling imported infected animal products or working with infected animals |
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Ovine and avian chlamydiosis (psittacosis) | Zoonosis. Potentially serious respiratory and systemic infection caused by Chlamydophila psittaci |
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Avian and ovine chlamydiosis | Zoonosis. Respiratory infection and may lead to miscarriage in pregnancy, caused by Chlamydophila abortus | Spread by inhalation of aerosols from infected and aborting sheep. Cattle and goats may also be affected |
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Diarrheal disease | There are many causes of infectious intestinal disease. Some are zoonoses, others have only human reservoirs | Transmission is by the direct or indirect fecal–oral route. |
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Infection control procedures should be followed, including handwashing and use of PPE Guidelines are available |
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) | A spectrum of infection from minor skin infection to life-threatening bacteremia caused by methicillin-resistant S. aureus |
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Hepatitis A |
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Transmitted by the fecal–oral route through person-to-person spread or contaminated food or drink |
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Orf18., 19. |
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Associated with lambs, sheep and goats | Groups affected include farmers, children visiting farms, meat industry workers |
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Q fever20,21 |
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Nipah22and Hendra virus |
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In an outbreak, PPE advised for workers dealing with infected animals, and as a precautionary measure for health-care staff dealing with infected patients |
Lyme disease | Infection with spirochaete Borrelia burgdorferi causing rash which may progress to polyarthritis and nervous system involvement |
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Japanese encephalitis (JE) |
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There have been reports of laboratory-acquired JE virus infection | Immunization is recommended for laboratory staff who may be exposed to the virus |
Rabies | Acute viral encephalomyelitis caused by Lyssavirus (classic rabies virus) or bat-related Lyssavirus |
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Pre-exposure immunization with rabies vaccine should be offered to laboratory workers handling the virus, those who may handle imported animals, people who regularly handle bats in the UK, those working abroad whose work may bring them into contact with rabid animals and health-care workers who may be exposed to body fluids from a patient with rabies |
Tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) | Flavivirus infection of central nervous system ranging from mild febrile illnesses to meningoencephalitis |
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Meningococcal infection23 |
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BCG, bacille Calmette–Guérin; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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