Airport Emergency Planning, Part II

Abstract

Airport Emergency Planning, Part II provides an overview of the core functions within airport emergency management, which include command, control, and communications (C3) and law enforcement, firefighting, public notification, emergency medical response, and resource management. Many airport emergencies require public notifications and, in some cases, Protective Actions, such as evacuation and shelter-in-place. Police, fire, and other Emergency Medical Services (EMS) comprise the core first responders to nearly any emergency, and these personnel have numerous responsibilities throughout the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP). The National Incident Management System, created after 9/11, is the standard method of managing disasters, incidents, and other events in the United States. It is based on three principles: Incident Command System (ICS), Multi-Agency Coordination, and Public Information. The five functions of ICS are command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. For some incidents, an intelligence/investigative function is added.

Airport communications control center Aspen-Pitkin County Regional Airport, CO.

Image by Shahn Sederberg, courtesy Colorado Division of Aeronautics, 2013.

Loading fire retardant on a Conair fire tanker at the U.S. Forest Service tanker base located at Rocky Mountain Metropolitan Airport, CO.

Image by Shahn Sederberg, courtesy Colorado Division of Aeronautics, 2012.

Airport Operations security team.

Courtesy Denver International Airport, CO [date unknown].

In revising Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-31C, Airport Emergency Plan, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) separated functional areas from the hazard-specific sections (FAA, 2010). This separation has created some confusion and more than a few redundancies in the AC. The Functional Section of the Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) is best understood by applying the term function literally, rather than connecting the function to a specific agency. The Functional Section addresses the functions that must be addressed in virtually any emergency, regardless of which individual or agency performs the function. According to the FAA (2010, pp. 37–38) the core functions of an aviation emergency are:

• 1.Command and control;
• 2.Communications;
• 3.Alert Notification and Warning;
• 4.Emergency Public Information;
• 5.Protective Actions;
• 6.Law enforcement/security;
• 7.Firefighting and rescue;
• 8.Health and medical;
• 9.Resource management; and
• 10.Airport Operations and maintenance.

Although not addressed in the AEP, other functions include: damage assessment, Search and Rescue, incident mitigation and recovery, mass care, and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) protection (FAA, 2010, p. 37). Airport operators may wish to address security-related functions more thoroughly in the Airport Security Program (ASP) to protect the sensitive nature of that information.

As in all areas of Airport Operations and emergency management, the resources and staff on hand determine whether on- or off-airport responders, or some mix thereof, will handle these functions. Large, commercial service airports often have enough on-airport personnel, with the expertise and equipment to handle most or all of the core functions, at least for the initial response phase. Small, commercial service airports may have to rely heavily on off-airport personnel, through the use of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs), and with their own personnel assuming multiple duties. Many Airport Operations and maintenance personnel at small airports are trained in Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting (ARFF), and some in Basic Medical Care or as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs).

Essential Functions for Emergency Operations

The AC on airport emergency planning provides instructions to an airport operator on what should be included in the AEP. Each of the functional areas follows a format of: Purpose, Situation and Assumptions, Operations; Organization and Assignment of Responsibilities; Administration and Logistics; Plan Development and Maintenance; and Reference and Authorities. In this way, it is similar to the Basic Plan. In all the functional areas, sections relating to the Plan Development and Maintenance and Reference and Authorities generally note that the section should identify the responsible parties for keeping this section of the AEP up-to-date and that any references used in building the Functional Section should be noted in the AEP.

While each element of the Functional Sections includes Situations and Assumptions, there are several core situations and assumptions that are related to most every incident. First, it must be recognized that not all emergency situations can be anticipated. Joseph Pfeifer, Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness, Fire Department of New York (FDNY), notes that by its very nature, a crisis is often random, unexpected, and novel, requiring leaders to be prepared for a wide variety of urgent circumstances that demand quick decisions (Pfeifer, 2013, p. 2).

Decisions by leaders in an extreme event can also be challenged by the nature of the event, whether it is a routine emergency, or an extreme emergency, falling outside the parameters of what a police officer, firefighter, or Airport Operations officer is accustomed to seeing. Pfeifer classifies three types of extreme events: routine, crisis, and catastrophe. Routine emergencies use a single Incident Commander (IC) and have hierarchical command and control. One person is in charge and gives orders. In a crisis, which requires a multiagency response, the hierarchal structure divides into several leaders, each overseeing their own network, reporting to a central IC. If the incident becomes catastrophic, a formation of random networks haphazardly connected with no one central leader controlling the entire incident may form (Pfeifer, 2013, p. 9). It is important for both first responders and policy makers to understand that there will be an element of randomness and that not every situation can be controlled at all times.

Airport emergency management operates on a standard set of assumptions: first, hazards and incidents occur at airports, and for large-scale events outside assistance will likely be needed. Some incidents will have a long duration, several days or even weeks; unforeseen events will occur and the airport must still generate a response. Also, all personnel with responsibilities under the AEP should be knowledgeable and trained in their expected actions to be performed during an actual emergency and ensure that the materials and equipment necessary for the performance of those duties are available and in working order.

Although not typically noted in many AEPs, a realistic assumption should be that not all personnel will be available to respond to an emergency when it occurs, because of variations in staffing levels that occur throughout the day, week, and year. A well-written AEP should account for these variations and have other contingencies and alternate courses of action available. For long-duration incidents, personnel will have to rotate in and out of the command structure and will require relief, refreshment, and rest.

Command and Control

Command and control is the largest of the Functional Sections, as it addresses many elements of managing an emergency incident and how the National Incident Management System (NIMS) integrates into the airport domain. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, directed the creation of the NIMS, which provides a template for federal, state, tribal, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, and private sector organizations to work together to prevent, prepare, respond to, and recover from emergency incidents (FEMA, 2008b).

The FAA argues that Command and Control is the most critical element of the emergency management function (FAA, 2010). The purpose of Command and Control is to provide the overall command structure, including a line of succession, and to establish the relationship between the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which is focused on overall centralized command and control, and the Incident Command Post (ICP) 1 , which is focused on on-scene command and control. Relationships to outside agencies, such as state, regional, or local emergency management agencies or government structures, may also be part of the overall command structure and should be addressed in the AEP.

While the NIMS is supposed to be integrated into airport emergency management functions, aviation is rather unique compared to its transportation counterparts. In many incidents outside the aviation domain, such as in the local community, a standard, on-scene, single IC system is used, supported by emergency dispatchers and without the involvement of the local or regional EOC. The EOC is only activated for large-scale events when the on-scene assets are overwhelmed or when larger portions of the community are involved.

Many airports, however, have EOCs and communications and dispatch centers onsite. The EOCs get activated for most airport emergencies, and even some nonemergencies, such as snow removal, or for special events. Since an airport EOC is at the airport where most of the airport incidents occur, it is physically closer to the actual incident, and it is not unusual for the IC to be located in the EOC, using CCTV (closed circuit television) cameras or eyes on the incident (literally looking out the window of the EOC to the incident on the airfield) to direct and control operations. This model challenges a longstanding principle that the IC is always literally on-scene and thus in the best position to make decisions about how to manage the incident. While many airport operators easily make the distinction, off-airport personnel, mutual aid agencies, and those newly assigned to the airport that have come from other, more traditional command structures may have some adjustments to make. Frequent exercises and training with off-airport personnel can help them better acclimate to the aviation structure, as airports bounce back and forth between IC on-scene and IC in the EOC structures. Airports have been known to use a blended structure, with the IC on-scene, and an EOC commander in the EOC. To avoid confusion, the EOC commander should be designated as a Deputy IC.

For a large-scale incident, the IC is almost always, initially, on-scene. Incident Command is established by the first responder on-scene until relieved by either a superior officer from the first responder’s own organization or the first responding entity that has responsibility over the incident according to the line of succession. For example, Airport Operations officers are commonly first on-scene for an aircraft incident as they are typically in the airfield conducting their continuous self-inspections and other airfield related duties. Upon arrival at the incident scene, the Airport Operations officer will assume Incident Command and broadcast such over the airport’s communication system. Regardless of the experience level of the first arriving officer or individual in the line of succession, that individual is in command until properly relieved. If the line of succession said that the first in command is airport fire, followed by airport police, then either the firefighting agency or the police department will take over Incident Command from the Airport Operations officer upon their arrival.

It is important to note that “in command” does not necessarily mean in an operating capacity to alleviate the problem. No one expects an Airport Operations officer, without the proper equipment and training, to run into the burning fuselage of an airplane. If an Airport Operations officer does not have firefighting responsibilities, training, or equipment, then their command function is to establish themselves as the IC (for now), set up an Incident Command Post, and ensure responding agencies are notified to the location of the incident and advised on accessible routes, if possible. The IC then ensures overall scene safety and security to the extent possible. Additionally, in some instances, such as an active shooter, any unarmed individual, including Airport Operations personnel, are usually advised to avoid the area entirely, to run away, or seek shelter, if necessary, until the shooter is neutralized. As additional units arrive, the Airport Operations person may retain IC duties, or IC duties may switch to then-appropriate personnel, based on the incident type, such as having ARFF personnel as Incident Command for an airplane crash, whereas airport police would serve as initial Incident Command for a sabotage, hijack, or bomb threat incident.

All those having command responsibilities under the AEP are listed in the Command and Control2 section, along with key supporting agencies. The core responsibilities of each organization are:

• 1. Chief Executive/Airport Manager: Activates the EOC and provides overall direction of response and recovery operations, designating an IC as appropriate.
• 2. ARFF: Responds to the scene, establishes an ICP, and performs Incident Command duties as necessary. Conducts firefighting operations, handles hazardous materials, scene safety, and evacuation.
• 3. Law Enforcement: Responds to incidents and provides law enforcement services, including scene security, traffic control, and assists with evacuation. For security-related incidents, acts as the Incident Command, establishing an ICP and assigning personnel, as appropriate.
• 4. Public Works: Responds to incidents, as appropriate, directs public work operations, including debris collection and removal, provides damage assessments, as related to damage to public utilities, and provides emergency power generators with fuel, emergency lighting, and sanitation to emergency responders.
• 5. Public Information Officer: In addition to reporting to the EOC if necessary, handles all media functions.
• 6. Health and Medical Coordinator: Sends a representative to the EOC, if required, coordinates health and medical assistance, and provides critical stress-management counseling.
• 7. Communications Coordinator: Supports communication operations of the EOC.
• 8. Animal Care and Control Agency: May be required to send a representative to the EOC and is responsible for the rescuing and capture of animals that have escaped from confinement on the aircraft, providing care for injured, sick, and stray animals, and disposal of deceased animals.

The local coroner’s office, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the American Red Cross are also often included in the command and control section. Command and control and the NIMS are addressed later in the Command and Control and NIMS sections.

Communications

Communication is a critical element in the ability to command resources and manage an incident. In addition to the day-to-day communications necessary to operate the airport, including police, fire, and emergency medical service (EMS) dispatch, maintenance and Airport Operations personnel, and air traffic control (ATC), any large-scale emergency operation will require communications beyond the normal capacities and equipment of a typical airport (FAA, 2010, p. 50). During an incident, Airport Operations personnel should assume that noise levels will be higher than normal, both on the airfield and in the terminal building; there may be areas on the airport where radios or cell phone coverage is sporadic or nonexistent; and during the emergency, communications equipment will be used for longer than the usual number of hours, resulting in the need for additional backup equipment and a ready supply of batteries. Reliability and interoperability are critical to the communications function. Reliability is the ability of the communications network or equipment to function when needed. Interoperability allows emergency management personnel to communicate across agencies through phone, text, email, video, or other means.

The Airport Manager must ensure that adequate communications systems are in place for normal and emergency operations. In extraordinary circumstances, such as a wide-scale community disaster, some organizations such as the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) and the Radio Emergency Associate Communications Team (REACT) may be available to support emergency communications.

The Communications Center Coordinator ensures all necessary communications systems are available with proper redundancy, interoperability, and backups, where necessary. The coordinator also must support media communications and ensure the communications station in the EOC is properly staffed and able to function at full capacity.

An effective communications system should include recording devices with time/date capability, a sufficient number of landlines with both listed and unlisted numbers, and extra cell phones and batteries. Runners should also be assigned to the EOC and the Mobile Command Unit to augment other modes of communication (NFPA, 2013). During a power outage and resulting communications failure, runners are invaluable, as they are often the only means to communicate essential information.

Communications center personnel are also tasked with maintaining a chronological log of events and keeping the IC and other personnel apprised of events and activities related to the incident. AEPs often identify specific communications systems and frequencies to be used and by which agencies, including special radio codes such as discrete codes to notify all those on a frequency of an airplane crash, hijacking, bomb threat, or other incident that should not be broadcast in the clear on unsecure frequencies. All other agencies with emergency management responsibilities under the AEP must keep their communications equipment up-to-date and in working order, and the agencies must report to airport management any changes in procedures or personnel.

A core operating principle in the communications function is the ability for response agencies to be notified when there is an aircraft or other airport emergency. The emergency communications system explains how personnel are notified of an airplane or airport emergency, along with daily testing requirements of alarm equipment. Most notifications of an airplane emergency come first to the air traffic control tower (ATCT), which then activates a crash phone or similar alert system, to notify airport fire and operations personnel (Figure 11.1 ). However, the ATCT is not always aware an Aircraft Accident has occurred, and other situations necessitate a callout of fire, police, and other response personnel, so the notification system must address when an agency other than the ATCT becomes aware of an incident and how each agency will activate the crash alarm or emergency response process. Usually this is a call to Airport Operations, which can then activate the crash phone or alert system. According to the NFPA (2013), the following agencies should be immediately notified by alarm of an aircraft emergency: airport ARFF, airport police, medical service providers, and the airport operator. Additional agencies should be notified via telephone, or automated notification system, as needed.

Figure 11.1.

Sample incident notification chart.

Source: NFPA, 2013.

Airport Operations personnel, in consultation with the Fire Chief, ATC, and sometimes the pilot, often determine the level of alert status. These functions cross over into the next functional area, Alert Notification and Warning.

Alert Notification and Warning

During an emergency, airport management must have a system in place to alert the public and to advise them on the actions to take, and also to alert first responders that an incident to which they should respond has occurred. Usually it is the job of the Communications Section to notify response agencies, tenants, and the public of any incidents or threats to the airport and to notify the public agencies, usually through the Public Information Officer (PIO), of what actions to take.

Airport operators must identify in their AEP methods and procedures to notify emergency response personnel and the airport population, including passengers, visitors, vendors, contractors, and tenants. Notifications to personnel on the airfield, particularly of inclement weather, such as tornadoes and lightning, are important and can be challenging because of the high noise levels on the airfield. Tornado sirens may not be heard over the noise of aircraft engines as planes start up, taxi, takeoff, and land. Some airports initiate a ringdown to their major tenants, who can then use their agency radios, or personnel, to communicate to those working in the Air Operations Area (AOA) of a hazard and of the appropriate actions to take.

Inside the terminal, announcements compete for the public’s attention; visitors to the airport are bombarded by gate announcements, paging announcements, and the endless warnings not to leave a bag unattended and to report suspicious persons to airport police. Airport management personnel must be aware that many passengers ignore announcements, requiring messages to be repeated, often several times, before the message begins to “sink in” (FAA, 2010, p. 54). Also, some passengers may have functional needs or may be unable to hear or understand the language. Airports can use a warning tone, similar to the FEMA Emergency Broadcast System tones used on local TVs, to capture the public’s attention, along with Visual Paging systems. Airports with Ambassador programs have the ability to notify their Ambassadors, who can spread the word.

Airport paging systems should also have the ability to override any other public address systems in case of emergency. Elderly passengers, as well as some with functional needs, must be advised of evacuation routes or routes to shelter that are accessible by individuals with difficulty accessing stairs or escalators.

Emergency response personnel must also be notified during an airport incident or natural disaster. If the crash occurred at an airport with a control tower or an ARFF station, a ringdown line is used to notify the first responders. At the crudest level, notifications of emergency response personnel can be done through a notification list and a telephone. It is essential that the telephone list is always kept up-to-date, listing the primary point of contact, alternate point of contact, accurate phone numbers and emails, and whether the point of contact’s phone can receive text messages. Most large- and medium-size airports have adopted automated notification and messaging systems, which can provide situational information to personnel via their phone or tablet. Similar to text alerts that individuals receive on their cell phones from The Weather Channel and other apps about the status and location of severe weather, automated notification systems provide a variety of services to an airport operator (Everbridge, 2015), including:

• 1.Automatic messaging during severe weather;
• 2.The ability to send messages in multiple formats and to multiple platforms (phone, tablet, text, etc.);
• 3.Immediate mass population notification allowing all response personnel to receive the information simultaneously, rather than when they are reached on the callout or phone-tree list;
• 4.Geographic information system (GIS) mapping noting the precise location of the incident or weather event;
• 5.Secure communications;
• 6.Verification of receipt of message.

Critical communications software reduces human error by ensuring the message that goes out is the same message to all parties and that the message has not been interpreted or paraphrased (Everbridge, 2015). Not only is uniformity of messaging important for incident response, but it also helps to defend legal claims after the fact.

The Airport Manager must also draft contingency plans to provide an alert and warning if the established communications systems fail to work, which can occur during natural disasters with the power grid offline and cell towers out of service. Backup plans usually include direct communication to Airport Operations, police, and maintenance personnel, who spread the word verbally. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Transportation Security Officer personnel can also be extremely helpful in this capacity as all passenger traffic filters through the checkpoints and exit lanes.

Although the AEP AC does not specify a role for the Communications Center Coordinator under the Alert Notification and Warning section, it is usually communications center personnel who are directly responsible for carrying out the alert and notification functions. The Communications Center Coordinator should ensure that call lists and/or critical communications software are up-to-date and that all personnel know the conditions for activating various warnings and alerts.

Any other agencies with AEP responsibilities notify volunteers and other employees who may be part of a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT)3 team or other internal response team to report to their duty stations and, if appropriate, send home nonessential personnel (or order to shelter-in-place) or recall essential personnel and determine whether to suspend normal business operations.

Airport grid maps should also be developed and used by all response personnel (Figure 11.2 ). Grid maps are helpful for on-airport responders who may have a difficult time deciphering airport-related signs and markings during an emergency, but are essential for off-airport responders. To provide an example, during an emergency, most off-airport (and some on-airport) responders would not know where the intersection of Charlie Four and Runway Three-Five Right is, but they can all look at a grid map and figure out where “B-4” is.

Figure 11.2.

Sample airport grid map.

Source: FAA, 2010, p. 278.

Emergency Public Notification

The Emergency Public Information section within the AEP AC has crossover with the Alert Notification and Warning and the Communications Sections, but more specifically addresses notifications to the community outside of the airport. The AEP must describe the methods used by the airport to notify the community at-large of an issue, emergency, or situation occurring at the airport that could affect the community or the operation of the airport. For most emergencies, the Emergency Public Information (EPI) organization (within the airport, it is usually the communications center) will initially focus on the dissemination of information to the public who are at-risk on the airport property (FAA, 2010), then to those outside its borders.

Prior to the advent of social media, the only means of addressing the public was through the mass communications abilities of the media. Social media now allows the airport to directly communicate with the populace, but social media also allows everyone else a community, or even worldwide, audience. This can cause confusion as passengers and others involved in or witnessing an event at the airport tweet, text, email, and post YouTube clips (often without context) of what they are seeing. During the November 1st active shooter event at LAX (Los Angeles International Airport), TSA personnel evacuating Terminal 3, where the shootings were occurring, texted coworkers in Terminals 1 and 2, causing both terminals to self-evacuate (when TSA shut down the checkpoint and ran, everyone followed). Many personnel evacuated to the ramp area where aircraft operations were taking place.

The airport operator must establish the lines of communication to be used in an emergency, listing the pathways, the organizations to be contacted, and specific means of contacting, along with contact information, hours of operation for radio/TV/cable stations, circulation (morning/evening, daily/weekly) of newspapers, and languages covered. Alternative methods should also be addressed if the primary pathways are unavailable (vehicle-mounted public address, door-to-door, etc.). The media generally cooperates with the airport’s public notification process, and the media will be interested because of the nature of the story; however, the media can be fickle and may not transmit the information in the same way it was received from the airport and may not transmit it for long. Plus, during a natural disaster, dozens of response agencies and communities will attempt to use the media to push out information, and airport operators may find themselves competing for attention. Notifying landside operations personnel, others picking up and dropping off passengers, and those in the parking garage or outlying parking lots must also be addressed.

Many emergency public notifications relate to the status of the airport, particularly during inclement weather, such as snow and severe thunderstorms, and are fairly routine. Individuals want to know about flight delays, whether the airport is open or closed, and for how long. In the event of a plane crash, family members and friends of passengers want to know where to go for more information and assistance, while others want to know the status of the airport and whether their flight is affected.

For a mass weather event, such as a pending hurricane, along with associated flooding, tornadoes, and high winds, airports should have scripted messages noting the specific hazard; the estimated area and time of incident; priority protection measures (sandbagging, relocating aircraft, securing equipment); recommended content of disaster supply kits; evacuation instructions (coordinate with local emergency management); other “do’s and don’ts”; and telephone or social media identifying information for specific kinds of inquiry. Other scripts can be prepared and given to airport paging or communications center personnel to be used depending on the emergency, such as what to do after an accident or natural disaster, whom to connect with for more information, and support for individuals that have loved ones who may have been involved in a plane crash. Part of the Emergency Public Notification process should be the simulation and practice of setting up the Joint Information Center, media center, and family assistance centers.

EPI should also be coordinated between the local government and the airport or other agencies, which rely on the same media sources. State laws often apply to how local and state agencies handle EPI, and there may be situations in which the federal government also becomes involved.

The Airport Director approves the release of information to the public, oftentimes working with the PIO, who consequently works with PIOs from other agencies, air carriers, tenants, and off-airport agencies. PIOs schedule news conferences, issue press releases, supervise the media center, and do their best to handle “rumor control.” If available, voluntary organizations can staff phone lines and disseminate information to the public. Both during and after the incident, PIO staff will collect press clips and stories about the airport, assess the public’s reaction, chase down false reports, and provide summaries to the Command Staff.

Protective Actions

Protective Actions are generally focused on protecting the health and safety of passengers and airport employees. The Airport Director must ensure that there is a policy on evacuation, along with policies on how to handle individuals who do not comply with evacuation or shelter-in-place orders. Primary methods of notification within an airport terminal typically include the fire alarm system and the public address or public announcement system. Airport police, fire, operations, and maintenance personnel are the primary individuals who facilitate evacuations or shelter-in-place actions.

Protective action plans typically focus on one of two options, shelter-in-place or evacuation. Evacuation plans and maps should be developed, along with routes and signs put into place throughout the airport. Airport and airline offices should also have evacuation plans with designated rally points outside of the structure. In some evacuations, personnel are simply looking to get away from the airport, such as for incoming natural disasters. However, for bomb threats, active shooter, or an actual detonation of an improvised explosive device, a designated rally point for personnel from each office or floor of an office building or personnel working in the terminal building, along with an appointed floor security manager who has a roster of personnel who are in the office that day, can help identify if individuals in the building are still in need of assistance.

For short-term incidents, such as severe thunderstorms or tornadoes, the shelter-in-place is typically the better option. In some cases, like tornadoes, evacuation may actually be more dangerous than staying inside the terminal building. Many airports, even small facilities, tend to be equipped with tunnels to accommodate baggage systems, in-line security baggage systems, or maintenance and utilities, making them relatively safe places of shelter during a tornado or high winds. However, in some cases these tunnel areas are in a Secured Area of the airport, so typically the airport will be closed for the duration of the storm and will stay closed until all passengers and unauthorized personnel are relocated back to the public areas and the Secured Areas have been searched.

Airport fire personnel should track the status of incoming severe weather and natural disasters, and they should prepare to render aid and assist the airport operator in taking Protective Actions. To protect personnel working on the ramp, airports experiencing severe thunderstorms accompanied by lightning routinely shut down ramp operations (which also shuts down flight operations), when there is lightning within a specified range4 of the airport. In this case, the “evacuation” is not individuals from the terminal building to another location, but from the ramp areas to inside the terminal building and concourses.

In some situations, personnel who are warned of a threat may not take any action. One of several illogical reactions that people can have during an emergency is the failure to move out of harm’s way. In her book, The Unthinkable: Who Survives Disaster and Why, Amanda Ripley posits that people respond better to warnings when they are told: (a) what specifically to do; (b) why they must do what is requested; and (c) the potential threats that could impact them (Ripley, 2009).

During the 9/11 evacuation of the World Trade Center towers, people waited an average of 6 minutes before heading down the stairs, with some waiting as long as 45 minutes. Failure to act in the face of a threat is a classic fight-or-flight response. Some individuals enter a temporary state of denial, saying to themselves, in effect, “this is not happening, it is not happening now, nor is it happening to me” (Ripley, 2009, p. 9). In 1960, an earthquake in Chile triggered a tsunami that headed for the Hawaiian Islands. Despite the warning sirens, which worked as advertised, most of the people who heard the siren did not evacuate, because they were not sure what the warning meant (Ripley, 2009, p. xiii).

If Ripley’s research was applied to a tornado warning message sent to occupants of an airport terminal building, the message could say: “Attention all personnel in the airport terminal, a Tornado Warning is in effect, please proceed immediately to a tornado shelter. Look for signs labeled Tornado Shelter to prevent injury from shattering glass and flying debris. The airport is temporarily closed, and all flights are being held until the warning is canceled.”

Any evacuation or shelter-in-place procedure must take into account individuals with functional needs. According to Dory Clark, Assistant Executive Director for The Arc, in Houston, Texas, it is illegal for a public-use airport to direct individuals with functional needs to use alternative evacuation points that do not provide the same level of protection and the same speed of egress as routes for those without functional needs (Clark, personal communication, 2015). It is also illegal for a public use airport to tell individuals with functional needs that they will have to wait until able-bodied individuals have evacuated before they can be evacuated (Clark, personal communication, 2015).

Individuals with functional needs or special needs include those with a hearing impairment, a visual impairment, physical disabilities, mental or emotional disabilities, unaccompanied children, elderly individuals, and even individuals with learning disabilities like dyslexia or the inability to read. It is also important to understand that passengers who do not have a clinical diagnosis for a particular condition may experience severe cases of anxiety in crowded or stressful situations or have other stress-induced health issues. Many passengers require access to medicines, and in some cases, medicines that require refrigeration. Some passengers may carry enough medicine to handle short-term shelter-in-place situations, but for extended situations, such as during a blizzard, that may shut down the airport for days and force thousands of passengers to stay in the terminal building, accommodations for refrigeration for medicines, and the need to evacuate some personnel because of medical needs, must be considered.

Not all personnel in the airport speak English, particularly at international airports, so public address announcements should also be scripted in other languages that are used in the region or that match up to the international carrier routes. For example, if Lufthansa flies out of the airport, prerecording a public address announcement in German would be logical. If Mexico is a primary service destination for airlines at the airport, it makes sense to have prerecorded announcements in Spanish. Also, apps are available that can help customer service personnel in translating various languages, and some services are also available by phone that allow an airport or airline customer service agent to call an interpreter, who can relay messages to passengers. Airport Ambassadors, or airport customer service personnel, should have these apps or phone numbers available.

For extended shelter-in-place situations, airports often keep extra supplies of blankets, pillows, and cots and have worked out contingency contracts with airline caterers to provide food. Many airport vendors and restaurants rely on daily deliveries of food and beverages to the airport, particularly refrigerated food, and cannot sustain operations for more than a day without resupply. Military meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) and a massive quantity of stored bottled water may be an option for some airport operators who desire to have sustenance options, particularly airports located in areas prone to hurricanes, where operations and community services may be shut down for days or weeks.

Another important component of Protective Actions is the protection of employees who are responsible for implementing the Protective Actions portion of the AEP. When hundreds or thousands of individuals are forced to shelter-in-place, disruptions, arguments, and fights can occur between passengers, placing Airport Operations personnel in harm’s way. Therefore, adequate police coverage and proper deployment of law enforcement personnel to areas of concern should be addressed in the planning process.

For some large-scale disasters, such as hurricanes, or severe weather leading to numerous tornadoes, such as occurred in the storms of 2011 throughout the Midwest, Airport Operations are often forced to shut down completely. Airport employees who are responsible for implementing actions under the AEP also have families and homes they are worried about. Airport management must take these natural desires—to take care of one’s family and home—into consideration in the AEP. Personnel who are more worried about what’s going on at home, and who have not been home for days or even heard if their family is okay, will not be effective at their job. The AEP should take into account reduced levels of operation because of personnel not showing up for work because of the inability to access the airport (damaged or washed-out roads, or community destruction that prevents them from getting to work) and allow the airport management to rotate essential personnel home to take care of personal needs.

When an entire community is affected by a power outage or natural disaster, a get-home-kit may be useful for getting employees home if they need to walk home or to another place of shelter (Anders, 2015, pp. 71–72). The kit should be a backpack, not a laptop or shoulder bag, as the individual may have to walk many miles. At a minimum, the kit should contain an adequate supply of bottled water, a lighter, a first aid kit, some high-calorie ration bars or protein bars, and a flashlight. If possible, a small knife, or a Swiss Army Knife or Leatherman, is useful, but may be prohibited in some workplaces. Some comfort items like a roll of toilet paper, an extra set of clothes, and a couple of pairs of socks and spare underwear are also advised, along with possibly a pair of sneakers or old comfortable boots, which can be tied to the outside of the bag to save space. A Mylar space blanket and hand-crank radio can also come in handy (Anders, 2015). Spare medicines when possible, along with any other essential item, such as batteries, a cell phone battery charger or backup battery, and a hat, gloves, and rain slicker, can also fit into a standard-sized backpack. While many personnel may not keep a kit at their desk all the time, they can be encouraged to create one if a hurricane or other foreseeable natural disaster is pending.

While the Protective Action section of the AEP AC says that this section of the emergency plan should address human-made and natural disasters, the AC was written in 2010, 3 years before the second active shooter incident since 9/11, at Los Angeles International Airport. Therefore, most of the AC focuses on natural, not human-made, disasters. An active shooter incident is significantly different from a pending natural disaster. Most natural disasters, such as a hurricane, tornado, severe thunderstorm, or blizzard, come with some advance warning. Some natural disasters, such as earthquakes, can occur with little to no warning, but airports located in areas known for the frequency of earthquakes typically have (or should have) contingency plans for such events, and the local populace often knows how to respond to an earthquake. However, active shooter situations are different.

An active shooter incident is not so much an evacuation as it is an escape. It is not so much a shelter-in-place as it is a “run-hide-fight.” While some of the Protective Actions relevant to natural disasters can be used during an active shooter event, separate contingency plans should exist. Evacuations are usually somewhat orderly, following established evacuation routes with the assistance of airport personnel. Recovery from an evacuation is also rather orderly, compared to recovery from an active shooter escape. During an active shooter incident, there is no evacuation plan per se, as the primary goal is to escape from the line-of-fire as quickly and effectively as possible. During the Los Angeles International Airport active shooter event on November 1, 2013, thousands of passengers and airport employees streamed onto the ramp through fire alarm access doors as fast as possible. Recovery from such an escape will usually take much longer than recovery from a standard evacuation because of a pending storm as individuals do not follow established evacuation routes and are literally running for their lives. It is unreasonable to think people will follow standard evacuation protocols with someone shooting at them, so airport management should be less concerned with the methods of escape and focus on shutting down aircraft operations, notifying individuals who may be in harm’s way that they need to run for cover or safety, and locating and neutralizing the shooter. Protective Actions, particularly during an active shooter event, reinforce the need for the airport operator to install panic alarms and have publicly posted phone numbers to call in the event of an emergency.

Law Enforcement and Security

Title 14 CFR Part 139 does not have specific law enforcement requirements; however, many of the emergency plan’s actions require police or some sort of security component. Additionally, commercial service airports that are regulated under Title 14 CFR Part 1542 require that the airport operator provide law enforcement to a level that is adequate to respond to the screening checkpoints, to support the ASP, including contingencies and incidents, and to respond to incidents of unlawful interference with civil aviation. The primary function of police on the airport is the enforcement of law, to support the ASP, and to support the contingencies and incident management plans within the AEP and the ASP.

Certain incidents such as bomb threats, active shooter, actual detonations of explosives, and hijackings will require immediate police response, and some situations may require additional support such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and K-9 teams or the FBI. During a natural disaster or airplane crash, law enforcement primarily is responsible for scene security and access control to the scene, Staging Areas, family assistance rooms, or in other areas where protection is needed (Figure 11.3 ).

Figure 11.3.

Some airport police departments have mobile x-ray equipment and “Raider” vehicles, like this one pictured at left (Port Authority of New York and New Jersey). The Raider allows the rapid response and stable deployment of air-stairs to the access door of an airliner.

Off-airport police or other law enforcement personnel may need to respond, depending on the situation. It is up to the police agency at the airport to ensure that off-airport responders know how to access the airport in a safe and proper manner. During some airport emergencies, local police and sheriff personnel have been known to access an airport by either driving through a gate or fence (knocking it down) and proceeding across aircraft movement areas without clearance, to respond to wherever they see smoke or perceive the incident to be (see Figure 11.4 ). These situations can cause runway incursions and potential collisions with aircraft. Offsite responders should be provided grid maps and simple instructions on where to respond at the airport and the importance of waiting for an escort to the incident site. Training with offsite responders is a way to reduce these safety incidents but still retain the benefit of police presence during an emergency.

Figure 11.4.

An ARFF truck responds during an emergency exercise at Centennial Airport, CO.

Law enforcement personnel take the lead for any security incident at the airport and should be adequately trained and equipped to respond to any security issue, Aircraft Accident, structural fire, or other hazard in the AEP. During a hijacking or bomb threat, FBI hostage-response teams or special weapons response teams may take hours to get into position. Airport police are the first line of response and should know the procedures for securing the area in the event of a bomb threat, how to handle a bomb threat on an aircraft, and the procedures for handling a potentially hijacked aircraft that is on the airport or inbound to the airport. An important note: the TSA’s Federal Security Director (FSD) has the authority to assume Incident Command for any security incident at an airport, but the FSD typically does not have any available armed response forces. TSA Transportation Security Officers and Transportation Security Inspectors are unarmed and are not trained in law enforcement response procedures.

Although air marshals are TSA personnel and are armed and trained law enforcement officers, under Part 1542 it is still the airport operator’s responsibility to respond to the threat using its own police force. Depending on the relationship between the air marshals based at the airport (if the airport is a Federal Air Marshal [FAM] base), local police may call on air marshals for assistance. If available, an Assistant Federal Security Director for Law Enforcement (AFSD-LEO) (a TSA law enforcement officer) may help facilitate federal agency response until the FBI is on-scene. However, AFSD-LEOs are very few and far between, so it’s a good assumption for airport police to believe that they are on their own, at least for the first 30 to 60 minutes of an event. In some cases, airports are located on or near military bases and may have military special operations teams that can respond to an act of unlawful interference with aviation. This response option should be addressed in the ASP and familiarization training conducted with these off-airport response teams.

Airport law enforcement personnel should also work with local jurisdictions to provide additional support via air, land, and water, if appropriate, to respond to airport incidents. The airport law enforcement coordinator must ensure that a representative responds to the EOC or Incident Command center during an emergency and must ensure that all equipment, radios, and other materials are in proper and working order and ready to support the AEP and ASP.

Some airports use unarmed security officers to provide staffing for airfield vehicle gates, and general patrol of the airfield and terminal areas, to respond to security alarms, and watch for and respond to potential violations of the Airport Security regulations. While other security personnel cannot meet the TSA regulatory requirements for law enforcement personnel at an airport, they can be used as a force multiplier by enforcing the ASP and responding to alarms, freeing up police officers for other duties.

Firefighting and Rescue

Firefighting and rescue personnel provide emergency services to the airport that may affect life, property, and safety. While Part 139 requires a certain level of ARFF response to Aircraft Accidents and incidents, the AEP extends those responsibilities to structural fires and hazards, hazardous material (HAZMAT) incidents, and emergency medical response. The AEP must describe the level of firefighting capability, along with the number of personnel, the location and number of vehicles and support equipment, and outside agency support (FAA, 2010, p. 75). Although dedicated to ARFF response, some airport fire crews often provide response to the terminal building to provide emergency medical care, and at large airports, the fire department may have additional specific terminal (structural) and landside-response fire-rescue equipment (Figure 11.4).

Some airports maintain structural firefighting capabilities and on-scene paramedics or emergency medical personnel. At airports without such capabilities, the AEP must address how offsite responders will provide the services, including how they will be notified and how they will access the airport. As previously mentioned, some airports rely on military fire and rescue services, so the airport operator should ensure that military ARFF equipment and personnel meet the Part 139 requirements.

The ARFF chief must ensure compliance with all ACs related to ARFF training standards and regulations and HAZMAT standards and ensure the readiness of all necessary equipment. ARFF personnel are required to participate in one live-burn exercise annually and to participate in the triennial emergency exercise.

At most airports, the Fire Chief or senior firefighter officer on duty will assume Incident Command for an airplane crash or other related incident. Fire and rescue personnel are responsible for the Priorities of Work (saving lives, scene stability, protect property, protect the environment), but once the incident is stabilized and recovery operations are underway, Incident Command typically shifts to Airport Operations or airport police. A representative from the fire department is expected to respond to the EOC, for most airport emergencies.

Fire and rescue personnel must also support HAZMAT issues, including fuel spills. Typically, only large airports have significant HAZMAT response capability. At smaller airports, HAZMAT response is often the responsibility of an off-airport unit. Fire personnel and equipment also support security incidents by providing lifesaving services, putting out fires, and managing any fire alarms that may have been activated during a security incident.

ARFF personnel that drive on the airfield must be trained and authorized to be in the AOA, and an airport grid map should be available in every fire and rescue vehicle. Specific duties for ARFF personnel and other fire and rescue personnel are addressed in the hazard-specific section of the AEP.

Health and Medical

Airports often experience high levels of demand for health care services. Some passengers experience higher levels of anxiety during air travel, some passengers’ preexisting medical conditions may be exacerbated by thinner air as a result of a pressurized airline cabin or as the result of traveling to a higher altitude, and some passengers may be sick or may become injured during travel. The airport operator should have available EMSs to treat conditions such as cardiac arrest, abdominal pains, burns, cuts, abrasions, and communicable diseases, as well as other medical problems (NFPA, 2013, pp. 424–28).

Today, it is normal for airport firefighters to also be trained as EMTs, or at least in Basic Medical Care, and many Airport Operations personnel are trained in first aid, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and critical trauma care. Some airports have first-aid treatment facilities with limited resources, but enough to treat most of the common injuries and ailments experienced by passengers (slip and falls, airsickness, headaches, etc.). Automatic external defibrillators (AEDs) are effective in certain cardiac events and should be positioned throughout the airport (NFPA, 2013, pp. 424–28).

The AEP must address how the airport operator will mobilize assets and respond to health and medical issues and the specific agency that is responsible for providing health and medical services. Any Part 139 certificated airport is required to have at least one individual on-duty, usually a firefighter, who is trained in Basic Medical Care. However, this training requirement is not equal to the level of Paramedic or EMT, and at any large commercial service airport, one medic will not be enough to handle the health and medical demands of the airport population.

Most airports cannot sustain health and medical capabilities beyond initial first aid and trauma care during a mass casualty incident and require assistance from outside entities. The AEP must describe the airport’s ability to provide medical care, treatment, and transportation of victims during an aircraft crash or airport incident, describing also any public and private medical facilities and mortuary services available at the airport or in the community. Such entities should understand their role and requirements under the AEP, and the AEP should include the name, location, contact information, and emergency capability of each hospital and other medical facility that agrees to provide medical assistance or transportation (FAA, 2010).

The AEP should identify hangars or other buildings to be used for the staging of personnel, uninjured, injured, and deceased. The senior medical coordinator should ensure that a health and medical representative responds to the EOC (and the Incident Command Post), and that provisions are made for transportation of the wounded to proper medical facilities. All ambulances or other emergency medical vehicles should be equipped with a grid map of the airport and provided either with an escort to the accident site or a clearly marked pathway (using cones, barricades, and airport personnel) to ensure safe access to the site, particularly when the airport continues to be operational. The senior medical coordinator should also know the process for requesting support of the various Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), which are part of the resource typing categories in NIMS, and the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORTs).

Medical personnel are responsible for triage of the injured, transportation of critically injured to medical facilities as quickly as possible, ideally within 60 minutes, and identifying and arranging for the transport of the deceased.5 During a HAZMAT incident, medical personnel are responsible for isolating, decontaminating, and treating victims as needed; however, airport fire personnel typically take on the role of initial decontamination of victims. Environmental health officers should also be appointed to monitor and evaluate health risks, inspect damaged buildings for health hazards or contamination, and ensure sanitary facilities in emergency shelters are available. Other key medical functions include coordinating with the American Red Cross and Salvation Army to provide food for both responders and patients, assist the air carrier in family member notifications, assist those with functional needs, and assist orphaned children and children separated from their parents, along with coordinating with veterinarians and animal hospitals to provide care as needed to those involved in the incident.

Communicable Diseases

As much as aviation allows us to travel the world in a matter of hours, it can spread a communicable disease from one side of the planet to the other just as quickly. Air travel reduces the time available for countries and airports to prepare interventions and stockpile antidotes. The primary goal of the airport operator is to protect the health of passengers, staff, and the general public. In 2009, Airports Council International (ACI) issued a communiqué on the responsibilities of airports to mitigate the effects of communicable diseases, health screening practices, and how to handle an inbound aircraft carrying a passenger with a suspected case of a communicable disease, which can pose a serious health risk (ACI, 2009).

Approximately 1.7 million passengers arrive daily in the United States on commercial passenger flights, with each large aircraft carrying more than 300 passengers and crew (ACI, 2009). This number does not take into account passengers and crews arriving on general aviation aircraft into the United States. The threat of pandemic flu, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Ebola, and other viruses spreading through the air transportation system has caused airport operators to consider options for handling individuals who may be infected and require quarantine, or even quarantine of an aircraft or the entire airport population.

Many airports have installed hand cleaner dispensers in the rest rooms and throughout the terminal building, and signs encouraging passengers and employees to wash their hands to prevent the spread of infectious or communicable diseases.6 To further reduce the risk of spreading communicable diseases, ACI encourages airports to develop an Airport Preparedness Plan that addresses how the airport will communicate with the public about the potential for a communicable disease outbreak or issue, the implementation of screening processes for communicable diseases, methods to transport passengers to health facilities, and having on hand the necessary equipment to conduct the screening along with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to reduce the risk of airport staff contracting a disease. Furthermore, airports should coordinate response plans with local, state, and federal public health authorities prior to an outbreak.

Communication is critical to preventing an outbreak or spread of communicable disease. Airports should leverage their notification processes that are already in place and outlined in their AEP to ensure that quick methods are available to get in touch with air carriers, tenants, vendors, contractors, and others working at the airport, along with passengers and the media. Information can be given to passengers prior to arrival at the airport through airport and airline websites, a dedicated telephone line that passengers can call to receive the latest information, and through normal mainstream media pathways (ACI, 2009).

The World Health Organization (WHO) says that screening for communicable diseases can reduce the opportunity for transmission or delay an international spread (ACI, 2009). A variety of screening methods are available, including visual inspection to look for obvious signs of illness or symptoms of particular diseases, and the use of thermal scanners or other suitable methods to take the temperature of inbound passengers from international destinations. Passenger interviews and questionnaires, along with identifying flights that have been routed through countries with known infectious disease outbreaks, are other methods of attempting to identify individuals with communicable diseases (ACI, 2009).

Health screening usually takes place at the Federal Inspection Areas of the airport. Airport operators should ensure at least one individual from the airport is appointed to keep up with the latest information coming out of the WHO and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on the latest epidemiological and virological findings, along with the geographical distribution of infected persons and suggested screening measures (ACI, 2009). In some circumstances, screening is conducted at the airport of departure, but that cannot always be counted upon. It’s important that passengers are screened as soon as possible upon entering the airport and definitely before being allowed out of the Federal Inspection Service (FIS) area. A simulation model conducted as part of a study on U.S. airport entry screening in response to pandemic influenza (CDC, 2009) found that foreign shore exit screening significantly reduces the number of infected passengers while U.S. screening identifies 50% of the infected individuals.

In 2014, approximately 80,000 passengers departed by air from the three countries most affected by Ebola: Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; approximately 12,000 of these passengers were en route to the United States. Procedures were implemented to deny boarding to ill persons and persons reporting a high risk of exposure to Ebola; however, no passengers who were denied boarding for fever or other symptoms or reported exposures were subsequently diagnosed with Ebola. Of those permitted to travel, none are known to have had Ebola symptoms during travel and none have been subsequently diagnosed with Ebola, but two passengers to the United States, who were not symptomatic during exit screening and travel, became ill with Ebola after arrival. CDC enhanced its procedures for detecting ill passengers entering the United States at airports by providing additional guidance and training to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel, airlines, airport authorities, and EMS units at airports; the training covers recognizing possible signs of Ebola in travelers and reporting suspected cases to CDC (CDC, 2014).

If during the screening process a passenger is determined to be a health risk of having a communicable disease, they should immediately undergo a more extensive evaluation by a medical professional. Quarantine facilities should be previously designated, and protocols for handling potentially infected individuals should be in place.

If an inbound aircraft is carrying an individual that may have a communicable disease or an infectious disease, or an ill person7 with an unknown cause, the pilot in command should be notified as soon as possible and advised of where to park the aircraft. The aircraft may even be diverted to another airport. Ideally, the aircraft should be parked away from the concourse or terminal building, on a remote stand or area of the airfield, and either with a separate passenger boarding bridge or air stairs (ACI, 2009). Passengers should be taken off the aircraft as soon as possible and provided with information about what is happening and what to do if they experience symptoms later on. The WHO publishes a Passenger Locator Card that can be used to track passengers who were on the affected flight (Figure 11.5 ). All passengers should be required to fill out the card. Methods should also be in place to handle screening of those arriving by general aviation aircraft into both commercial service and general aviation airports. Sick passengers should be taken to an isolation or quarantine area by personnel wearing the appropriate protective equipment, with procedures in place to obtain the passengers' bags and personal belongings, and provisions made for customs and immigration personnel to properly, and safely, process the individuals into the country.

Figure 11.5.

Passenger Locator Card.

Source: World Health Organization.

The decision whether to quarantine an entire flight or airport population must be taken with great consideration. A large-scale quarantine will have a significant impact on flight operations at that airport and throughout the National Airspace System. Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) Report 5 addressed the questions of deciding whether to quarantine and how to go about it (Stambaugh, Sensenig, Casagrande, Flagg, & Gerrity, 2008). The quarantine of an entire airport would involve a massive mobilization of community and federal resources, but the ACRP study was based on a more basic assumption, which would be to effectively quarantine up to 200 passengers from an international flight for a period of 2 weeks. The study addressed the four phases of quarantine: (1) the decision to quarantine, (2) establishing quarantine, (3) quarantine operations, and (4) demobilization and recovery.

The study revealed the estimated cost to acquire and maintain the basic supplies to accomplish such a quarantine would exceed $100,000, a cost that does not take into account the cost of the space that would be needed for the quarantine, which was estimated to be $15,000 per month (depending on local variances) (Stambaugh et al., 2008). Quarantine operations would include establishing accommodations and renting showers and portable toilets, which could cost up to another $20,000 or more, plus another $150,000 or more to provide lodging, food, recreation, communications, sanitation, basic health services, security, and cleaning (Stambaugh et al., 2008).

However, the decision to impose a quarantine order on international travelers lies with the CDC, not the airport or an airline. Airlines have a duty to report certain illnesses, but only federal public health officials are authorized to implement a quarantine. The CDC may also choose less-extreme measures, such as a voluntary home quarantine, vaccinations, or collecting passenger information cards with follow-up by public health officials to determine if anyone develops symptoms, as occurred during the 2003 SARS outbreak (Stambaugh et al., 2008).

Once the decision is made to quarantine passengers, health officials must decide where individuals exhibiting symptoms will be taken, as well as how and where to put the remaining passengers. Keeping passengers on the aircraft for an extended period of time is not desirable. A site must be located, along with a method of transportation to get the passengers and crew from the aircraft to the facility. Vehicle operators and other personnel involved with moving the passengers and crew will also have to take protective measures (Stambaugh et al., 2008). Individuals with functional needs must also be accounted for; thus, wheelchairs and a lift service may be necessary to help some passengers off the aircraft into the quarantine facility.

The quarantine location should have accommodations for sleeping, bathing, entertainment, and communications, plus access to medical care, along with supplies and staffing for food preparation, cleaning, counseling, or additional considerations. If the quarantine facility is offsite, these responsibilities shift to the CDC or state and local health providers, but the airport operator still must ensure that the aircraft, along with any personnel involved with the quarantine, are properly taken care of. The aircraft must be cleaned, and airport and airline personnel involved in the quarantine operation must be screened for symptoms. From an airport operator perspective, one should conclude that these individuals would be out of commission and out of the work schedule for at least a few days.

If the quarantine facility is on the airport, the airport operator will likely be more involved with providing access to the facility and possibly providing support for the quarantine operation. Additionally, the CDC may only use an on-airport facility temporarily, which will necessitate another transfer of potentially affected passengers and crew, followed by a proper cleanup of the facility that was used. At the end of the quarantine, passengers and crew may still need to finish their journey, which may require providing transportation back to the airport to rebook passengers on other flights.

Resource Management

The airport operator must ensure a list of resources is available to decision makers during an incident. Airport operators must assume that during an incident, particularly a natural disaster, there will be critical shortages of power, potable water, firefighting agents, and portable equipment, such as lights and generators, and further that emergencies will deplete the resources of responders quickly. Local transportation systems may also be affected by the disaster (bridges collapsed, highways blocked or damaged), making the replenishment of resources difficult or not possible for a period of time. However, airports do have a benefit in that they are not limited by highway transportation methods. Airports have historically accepted relief aircraft bringing in aid and resources to a community during a natural disaster by both Fixed-Wing aircraft and helicopters.

Resource typing is essential to ensuring that the necessary resources are identified and available for use when needed. Additionally, a resource manager should be appointed to ensure that all agencies are maintaining resources in a readiness state and that key points of contact, purchasing contracts, and other elements necessary to ordering up resources are in order.

A complete list of resources should be included in the appendix of the AEP that includes personnel (i.e., volunteers, off-airport responders), communications equipment, vehicles, heavy equipment, portable pumps and hoses, postincident recovery materials, such as tools, fuel, sandbags, and lumber, portable power generators, and mass care supplies (first aid, potable water, blankets, and lighting) (FAA, 2010, p. 90). Any resources that are not available at the airport that must be provided by a mutual aid organization should also be noted.

All response agencies should be self-sustainable for the first 24 hours of an incident; this standard helps to identify how many resources will be needed. Resource typing includes determining what is needed, why it is required, how much, who needs it, where it needs to be delivered, and when it is required. The Supply Group within the Incident Command structure will first try to fill resource needs with airport resources and then notify suppliers, negotiate terms, and arrange for transport of resources as necessary. The finance and administrative team should be kept aware of budget issues, with all transactions being properly recorded (FAA, 2010, p. 92).

After the emergency, the resource manager or the logistics unit within the Incident Command structure is responsible for disposing of excess stock, reimbursing owners for property or use of equipment, acknowledging suppliers, donors, and volunteer agencies, and exploring potential future agreements and contracts that will better facilitate resource needs in the future.

Airport Operations and Maintenance

Even though the day-to-day roles of Operations and Maintenance are separate, the AEP AC treats them as a singular component in the emergency response context. However, many airports have very clear lines of distinction between the roles of Operations and Maintenance during an emergency. The Operations and Maintenance section of the AEP outlines the overall statement of capabilities and responsibilities of operations and maintenance personnel during an emergency.

The AC acknowledges that often Airport Operations or Airport Maintenance personnel are the first to respond to many airport emergencies, as a result of the nature of their duties, which requires them to be either in the airfield or in the terminal building most of the time. Airport Operations personnel represent airport management throughout the stages of an emergency, and they may have to establish Incident Command and act in the capacity as the IC either during the initial or other stages of the emergency. At some small non-hub airports, Airport Operations personnel are not onsite 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, so other arrangements must be made to notify Operations and Maintenance personnel of an emergency at the airport. Fixed Base Operators (FBOs), or air carriers operating at the airport after Operations and Maintenance personnel have completed their duty day, may have the responsibility for notifying an on-call airport representative, or local first responders may have to make the contact.

Primarily, the role of Airport Operations in an emergency is based on their assigned mission within the AEP and is airport-specific. Generally speaking, Operations ensures that all notifications have been made, will either assume Incident Command or support the IC by providing resources and communications services, and makes the initial determination regarding the issuance of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) to close a portion of or the entire airport.

Airport Maintenance personnel, if they are not required to be actively engaged in the emergency, will typically stand by and respond to requests for assistance from various response agencies. Many airfield maintenance personnel are trained in operating vehicles on the airport and can be highly effective at providing escorts for off-airport responders to get to an incident site. Maintenance personnel can also access supplies and equipment necessary for the support of the incident. A senior member of the maintenance department should also respond to the EOC in order to receive and coordinate requests for resources and assistance. A member of the maintenance department should also ensure that the command vehicle, mobile command centers, buses, and other vehicles are provided to the scene and are operational as soon as possible. All maintenance personnel who operate on the airfield should be provided with a grid map and should understand the procedures for notifying responders and other airport personnel during an emergency.

Maintenance personnel should maintain a resource list, ensure the safety of facilities during the recovery phase from a natural disaster, clear debris as necessary, provide sanitation services, potable water, and backup electrical power, transport portable emergency shelters to appropriate locations, and provide heavy equipment, cones, stakes, flags, and signs. Many large airports also keep buses equipped with body bags, blankets, cots, stretchers, and other items necessary to support an aircraft crash response.

Airport Operations personnel ensure compliance with regulations during and after emergency operations, noting any violations of regulations that occurred to facilitate the response. Operations personnel should follow up with any regulatory violation by properly notifying the FAA, TSA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or other appropriate agency. During the recovery phase, Airport Operations, if they do not already have the Incident Command responsibility, will typically take over IC responsibilities and oversee the recovery phase to get the airport back to full operation.

The Airport Emergency Command Center and Operations

It is often said that all emergency management is local. This statement reflects the approach taken by the United States when it comes to a local disaster. Initially, local response is supposed to handle the event, disaster, or incident, but when local resources are overwhelmed, the municipality calls on the state to assist. When the state’s resources are overwhelmed, then a request is made to the federal government. This concept is reflected on an airport, where most emergencies are handled by Airport Operations personnel, firefighters, police, security, and emergency medical personnel and are supported by the airport’s communications or dispatch center, without the need to activate a large, Incident Command structure beyond the single IC. A single Incident Command post is established on-scene, with the communications center providing logistical support, overall communications, and coordination. In essence, the communications center8 functions as a lesser emergency command center for small-scale incidents.

However, for a large-scale emergency or natural disaster, the efforts of first-response agency personnel and others must be coordinated to ensure an effective response. In these situations, EOCs play a critical role in acquiring, allocating, and tracking resources; managing and distributing information; and setting response priorities among many incident sites (FEMA, 2008a). EOCs are a critical link in the emergency response chain, enabling ICs to focus on the needs of the incident and serve as a conduit of information between the Incident Command and higher levels of the Multiagency Coordination System (MACS).

In a large-scale disaster, numerous government agencies activate their individual EOCs, so it is feasible that there will be more than a dozen different EOCs of various natures, such as airline, FBI, state, and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), involved in managing the incident. Some agencies set up their own local EOC and have a representative in the airport’s EOC, while coordinating with their parent agency EOC located thousands of miles from the actual incident. Some good examples are the TSA, the FBI, and the air carrier. The TSA, in addition to setting up its own command structure and sending representatives to both the scene and the airport EOC, also coordinates and exchanges information with the Transportation Emergency Operations Center (TSOC), located in Virginia. The FBI will set up multiple incident centers and will also coordinate with the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) in Washington, DC, while the airlines will set up a local emergency response center, provide a representative to the airport EOC, plus manage the family victim center, while still working with their Network Operations Center (NOC), which manages all airline activities, 24/7. With numerous EOCs, an Incident Command Post, Staging Areas, family assistance rooms, press rooms (along with dozens of PIOs, at least one from each major agency), and countless other moving parts, the MACS can help resolve differences among the various agencies (FEMA, 2008a) and provide a pool of resources.

The function of an EOC is to provide a physical location where multiagency response coordination can occur so as to form a common operating picture of the incident, obtain additional resources, and relieve on-scene command of the burden of external coordination (FEMA, 2010, p. 15). A common operating picture is an overview of the incident that provides incident information enabling either the IC or Unified Command to make effective, consistent, and timely decisions. Primarily, EOC personnel ensure that responders who are on-scene have the resources, including personnel, information, tools, and equipment, needed to respond to the incident. An EOC promotes problem solving at the lowest level and provides strategic direction and guidance to the incident management personnel, but an EOC does not typically “assume command” over the on-scene IC. The airport EOCs can facilitate multiagency communications and acquire and track resources, manage much of the Public Information requests, authorize emergency expenditures, and provide legal support.

EOCs are staffed by personnel representing multiple jurisdictions and functional disciplines with access to a wide variety of resources. The physical size, staffing, and equipping of an EOC will depend on the size of the incident management workload. An EOC should include the following core functions:

• 1. Coordination through the participation of multiple agencies.
• 2. Communication through extensive radio, telephone, and computer systems.
• 3. Resource allocation through resource typing and management.
• 4. Tracking by personnel who are not involved with on-scene management and can track the use of resources and costs.
• 5. Information collection, analysis, and dissemination through shared intelligence and information.

Once an EOC is activated, communication and coordination should be established between the EOC and the ICP, but the EOC, in most cases, does not command the on-scene, tactical level of the incident. EOCs should be both flexible and scalable, performing functions such as situational assessment, determining incident priorities, allocating resources, providing policy direction, coordinating with other regional response coordination centers, and providing Public Information through a Joint Information Center (JIC).

The EOC is a designated area on the airport used in supporting and coordinating operations for accidents and incidents, both safety and security in nature. The center should have the necessary communications equipment to communicate with all responsible agencies under the AEP and, most importantly, the ICP (NFPA, 2013, pp. 424–28). While the local, Incident Command structure directs on-scene incident management activities and maintains command and control, EOCs are activated as necessary to support the Incident Command effort (FEMA, 2010, p. 16).

Airport EOCs can be as simple as a desk in the Airport Operations office of a small, commercial service or general aviation airport, all the way up to an expansive multimillion-dollar, state-of-the-art dispatch, communications, and emergency coordination center. EOCs should be located away from the primary public areas of the airport, but they should still be accessible by off-airport responders, ideally without responders having to go through the screening checkpoint. Key personnel should be able to access the EOC within their required response times, and suppliers and support personnel should also be able to access the facility without undue delay. A separate entryway should be constructed for security purposes, as well as to allow a location for responding personnel to sign-in/sign-out. The entry should be protected by an armed law enforcement officer, who has no other duties other than the protection of the EOC. A separate individual should be responsible for the administrative processes so that the police officer guarding the EOC should not be distracted filling out paperwork and handing out identification badges.

The facility should be in an area that is resistant to blast pressures, either have no windows or windows that are glazed to reduce shattering, and should be away from identified areas of vulnerability for the airport (for instance, not next to the landside pickup and dropoff areas, which could make the EOC vulnerable to attack by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device or active shooter). If the EOC is in the public area, it should not be labeled as the EOC but as another type of conference room, such as Conference Room A or some other label, so that off-airport personnel can easily locate the EOC, while ensuring the center is not an obvious target for attack. The EOC should have adequate heating, ventilation, and air conditioning, fresh water supplies, an Uninterruptible Power Supply in case of a power outage, backup generators and fuel, and working landlines. Backup power generators, potable water, coffee, and food may also be included in an EOC to sustain personnel during long hours. For a sudden emergency, not everyone has time to stop for food, and the first personnel to reach the EOC could be there for an extended period of time.

Alternate EOCs can often be established should the primary EOC become nonoperational. Alternate EOCs can be set up as a hot site, warm site, or cold site. Hot sites can be used as soon as personnel arrive. They are the most expensive to maintain and require duplicate systems and equipment and the ongoing payment of utilities, but they are essentially ready to go when a responder enters the room. A warm site has critical systems and equipment in place, but equipment must be powered up, requiring several minutes to start up. A cold site is an empty shell, without any systems and equipment in place and no arrangements for utilities. Cold sites require the longest period of time for startup, and either responders must bring their own equipment, or Airport Maintenance must provide the equipment and materials to get the place operational. If an airport cannot afford an alternate facility, it may be practical to consider a mutual aid agreement with a neighboring jurisdiction to use its EOC, particularly during natural disasters that could affect the operation of the airport’s EOC.

Some EOCs are combined with the airport’s communications center, while others are separated, but usually within close proximity or adjacent to the communications center. It is logical to establish the EOC next to the communications center, as activating EOC is typically the responsibility of the communications center personnel. Communications center personnel are familiar with how to set up the various technologies, including computers, telephony, CCTV cameras and monitors, digital projectors, and other related equipment. Communications center personnel usually have at least one individual in the EOC to assist with technical functions, and often, if available, an additional person to enter significant occurrences during the event in the logbook. This running situational report is often projected onto a screen so that incoming personnel can see the latest information. Past information is usually printed and handed out, or it is consolidated into a briefing or summary sheet.

Additional breakout rooms can be used by various organizations and individuals to get away from the primary activity of the operations center and to coordinate and discuss information, policies, and plans. For a security response, while the FBI may leave one agent in the EOC, it is very common for the FBI to establish its own command center, away from the airport’s EOC, and to utilize separate and secured office areas to conduct briefings, for hostage negotiations, and for staging for its response personnel. The air carrier involved in the incident will usually set up its own EOC, but should also have representatives in the airport EOC.

An EOC can also serve as a gathering area for local elected and appointed officials who may have primary responsibility for policy decisions. However, EOC commanders must guard against the EOC becoming a “hangout” for local officials and others who want to feel they are “part of the action,” but have no jurisdictional responsibilities or authority. Some airport executives who understand this dynamic have designed EOCs with a variety of breakout rooms that are close to the functional areas of the EOC, often with glass partitions, CCTV access, and radio monitoring capabilities, so that various elected and appointed officials can observe the action, and still have a private location, where they can make decisions and discuss the incident.

A typical EOC table is equipped, at each station, with a computer and/or Internet and power plugins for laptops, a landline, and additional power outlets to keep personal electronic devices such as smartphones and tablets charged. A copy of the AEP may also be available online with phone directories. Some EOCs are designed with four primary tables representing the following functions: operational, logistical, planning, and administration/finance, while the command function is in an adjacent room. This design allows command personnel to be somewhat removed but still in close proximity to staff functions and personnel.

An EOC can be established using a series of large tables that serve as the five areas of Incident Command: command, operations, logistics, administration/finance, and planning. Or EOCs can be organized by function: police, fire, Airport Operations, airline, sheriff, etc. Regardless, the right method of establishing an EOC is what works best for that particular airport.

An example of a newer communications center and EOC is the Airport Response Coordination Center (ARCC) at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). The ARCC is staffed with personnel from LAX’s airside, landside, police, maintenance, and government agencies (TSA) and provides basic communications center functionality. CCTV cameras capture much of the activity at the airport, and personnel can dispatch field operators to investigate issues and solve problems. During a major incident or airport emergency, LAX can activate the Departmental Operations Center (DOC), which functions as the nerve center for dealing with critical incidents. The DOC uses a combination setup, with various areas around the center established by the Incident Command System (ICS) (operations, logistics, etc.) and specific positions within each area (PIO, TSA, police, etc.).

Many airport EOCs have standard stations, such as police, fire, operations, and PIO; however, not all personnel are needed during all incidents, and EOC commanders must also ensure that only necessary personnel are in the EOC. Factors to consider in staffing the EOC include the mission, the timeframe, the knowledge necessary to perform the critical tasks, and who has the authority to make decisions. The timeframe is also important to space requirements, as personnel must be relieved after a period of time, so there are double-staffing situations that take place as personnel rotate in and out.

The mission of the EOC is the desired outcome(s) of the particular emergency, but overall its function is to support Incident Command. Unless they can fulfill some other role, nonessential personnel do not belong in the EOC. Personnel who have the necessary knowledge, skill, and ability to perform the critical tasks may be in the EOC, and, ideally, these individuals will also have the authority to make the critical decisions (FEMA, 2008a). While many personnel are knowledgeable about a situation or may have an opinion on what should be done, few have the authority to enact policy. However, advisors with the technical expertise to provide counsel to the policy makers may be needed.

Organizing the Emergency Operations Center

Unlike the ICS, which is governed by NIMS and has a specific organizational structure, NIMS does not require an EOC to organize under the ICS principles. FEMA notes that there are four ways to organize an EOC, and each structure comes with its own advantages and disadvantages. In some cases, the structure of an EOC may depend on state law or local policies. An EOC can be organized by Major Management Activities, around an ICS structure, by Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), or as a Multi-Agency Command (MAC) Group (FEMA, 2008a).

Organizing by Major Management Activities divides the EOC into four working groups: policy, resources, operations, and coordination. The policy group focuses on the overall strategy for the response, as well as overall response priorities and policy setting (FEMA, 2008a). The resource group includes representatives from any responding agency or organization that can provide resources such as transportation, utilities, and materials. The operations group includes representatives from each agency with responsibilities under the AEP and typically includes police, fire, Public Works, EMSs, and other agencies as dictated by the incident (FEMA, 2008a). The coordination group collects and analyzes data. The advantage of managing by activities is organization is relatively simple with straightforward lines of communication and a simple chain of command. However, linking to the ICS on-scene might be unclear because there is not a one-to-one match between the incident management personnel on-scene and the EOC.

Organizing around ICS is an attempt to align the EOC organizational structure with the on-scene Incident Command structure, but for this very reason, organizing around ICS may cause confusion about who has the command authority. However, large-incident logistical and financial support is often more easily coordinated from the EOC, rather than on-scene, and clear lines-of-connection are drawn between the functions of the EOC and the on-scene Incident Command. Organizing around ICS has five levels: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration. Important to remember is that the EOC command function is not the IC. Confusion can exist when organizing an EOC around ICS. The IC or Unified Command are on-scene command structures, whereas the EOC command function is more of a policy group that makes decisions and establishes the overall strategy of the response (FEMA, 2008a). The operations function coordinates with on-scene operations responders, which includes police, fire, Airport Operations, Airport Maintenance, and EMS personnel. The planning function serves the same purpose as it does at the incident scene, gathering and analyzing information, keeping decision makers informed, and tracking resources, along with developing Incident Action Plans (IAPs). IAPs set forth specific goals and objectives to be obtained within a set timeframe. IAPs can derive from the Command function/group, which sets the strategic objectives. The planning function/group breaks down the strategic vision into measurable goals and then considers the operational challenges and the overall situation at hand to develop the IAP. Ideally, the Operations function/group then works toward achieving the goals and objectives of the IAP. The logistics function fundamentally serves as the grocery store for the incident, as these individuals have the purchasing authority, along with lists of the necessary resources and the authority to acquire them. The finance/administration function coordinates financial management processes for the incident, tracks personnel hours worked, including hours worked by off-airport responders (for potential reimbursement later), and, if an attorney is present, provides legal advice. In some cases, the on-scene Incident Command may retain certain roles at the incident site, while pushing other responsibilities, such as finance/administration, logistics, and planning, to their EOC counterparts.

Organizing by ESF provides similar structures to the ICS model, with each ESF assigned to a General Staff position. According to FEMA’s IS-775 EOC Management and Operations course (FEMA, 2008a), the ESF agencies are organized as follows:

The Operations area includes:

• 1.Public Works/Emergency Engineering Branch
• 2.Firefighting Branch
• 3.Public Health and Medical Services Branch
• 4.Urban Search and Rescue Branch
• 5.Public Safety/Law Enforcement Branch

The Planning area includes:

• 1.Situation Analysis Unit
• 2.Documentation Unit
• 3.Advanced Planning Unit
• 4.Technical Services Unit
• 5.Damage Assessment
• 6.Resource Status Unit
• 7.GIS

The Logistics area includes:

• 1.Situation Analysis Unit
• 2.Communications Unit
• 3.Food Unit
• 4.Medical Unit
• 5.Transportation Unit
• 6.Supply Unit
• 7.Facilities Unit

The Finance/Administration area includes:

• 1.Compensation Claims Unit
• 2.Cost Unit
• 3.Purchasing/Procurement Unit
• 4.Time Unit
• 5.Disaster Financial Assistance

The advantage of organizing around an ESF is that it matches up well with the on-scene Incident Command organizations; however, it may not correspond directly with federal emergency support facilities. Additionally, personnel staffing the ESF require an enormous amount of additional training to ensure that they can perform their responsibilities.

Organizing Around a Multi-Agency Command Group

In this structure, a MAC Group is comprised of representatives from various organizations that are authorized to commit agency resources and funds. MAC Groups can often include organizations such as the local Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, and volunteer or other organizations with special expertise or knowledge that might be able to use their contacts, political influence, and technical expertise to aid in the management of an incident. The MAC Group Coordinator is in a position to provide supervision to the various units, such as the Situation Assessment Unit, the Resource Status Information Unit, and the JIC. The Situation Unit collects and assembles information needed for the MAC Group to accomplish the mission, and the Resource Unit helps determine the status of resources, as well as their availability and state of readiness.

The JIC is a Public Information unit that coordinates PIOs from a variety of agencies to push information to the media and, ultimately, to the public. A JIC is also a key component of other forms of EOC organizational structures and is not exclusive to the MAC Group. MACs work well to coordinate amongst other MAC entities to provide short-term, multiagency coordination and decision making when no other mechanisms exist, but they lack clearly defined and standardized relationships to other MAC entities.

As with all other forms of organizational structures in emergency management, ultimately, the airport operator should establish a system that works best for its operation in order to fulfill its critical tasks. However, airport ICs should be familiar with the variety of EOC structures that may be used by support agencies, as the airport operator may not get to dictate how a supporting EOC functions. Tabletop and orientation exercises are useful for learning how other agencies carry out their EOC functions and how the airport can integrate into larger-scale operations.

The core mission of an EOC is to provide overall coordination for a disaster or event. Essential to this coordination function is the ability to communicate with the various agencies in a real-time basis, in order to both build and share the common operating picture and to deploy assets and resources without delay. The basic requirements for communications under NIMS are that the systems be interoperable and redundant (FEMA, 2008b). Interoperability is the ability for first responders and those who support them to communicate with each other, specifically, the ability to exchange voice and/or data on demand and in real time.

A lack of redundant or interoperable communications can delay a response and put lives in jeopardy. Studies identify six key reasons for lack of interoperability: aging equipment; limited funding to update or replace equipment; different funding priorities and budget cycles; limited or fragmented planning; the reluctance of agencies to give up control over their communication systems; and limited radio-spectrum availability (FEMA, 2008b).

Many jurisdictions have not kept up with the times and still have older equipment with higher maintenance costs, reduced reliability, or that is obsolete and incompatible with newer digital communications systems. Even the newer digital systems are hampered by proprietary software, which may not effectively connect with proprietary systems installed for other government agencies.

A significant issue today is the ability of outside entities, such as hackers, or even curious citizens, to eavesdrop on essential emergency communications or, in extreme cases, to actually block communications. Thirty years ago, electronic supply stores sold police and fire radio scanners. Truncated radio systems eventually rendered many of the scanners useless, but then technology continued to advance, and now the scanner is obsolete, replaced with apps on tablets and smartphones. An unfortunate reality with cybersecurity is that the more security that is put into a software system, the less interoperable it becomes.

Some interoperability issues can be resolved or at least mitigated by identifying which agencies need to communicate with each other and how the information should be transmitted. A variety of information can now be sent in forms other than radio transmission; for example, routine information that is not time-sensitive can be sent by email. Time-sensitive information should still be sent by radio, while sensitive or classified information should be sent by landline. If necessary in an emergency, a cell phone can be used, with the understanding that cell phone transmissions can be intercepted. Text messaging, tweets, and message board postings are other methods used to communicate. However, procedures must be in place so that responders know to look at their text messages throughout the incident.

Communications is not the only area in which technology is changing the operations of an EOC or the function of emergency management. Today, a variety of software packages can assist with the emergency management process, including software that can conduct drills and improvised plans before, during, and after an event. Additionally, the software can set up incident communications; alert and notify responders via multiple mediums, including phone, email, text messaging, and Twitter accounts; integrate Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to enhance situational awareness; and be used to automatically build communication transcripts, to conduct electronic logbook activities, and to generate incident reports from an ICS database.

One of the most significant advancements in emergency management software is when it is combined with GIS technology, real-time photos provided by responders, or even posted via social media by individuals involved in the incident or observing the incident and, if available, cameras placed on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Some software also includes hazard-modeling tools that can determine the spread rate of a chemical plume or the evacuation or standoff distance for an improvised explosive device and also suggest the locations of roadblocks.

Another component of EOC communications is pushing out information about the incident to the public. Prior to the invention of social media, the primary method by which an airport would get information to the public was through the media. Today, however, airports have complete capabilities (just as much as anyone else) to push information directly to the public, without being filtered by the media, through the use of websites, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and other forms of social media. The media still remains a primary source of information for the general public, as they can often provide context and can deliver their content via broadcast TV and social media. PIO functions are further addressed under the Public Information Officer section.

Activating the EOC is typically the call of the jurisdictional authority or can be at the behest of the IC as the IC sees the incident rapidly expanding or involving a cascading series of events. Imminent emergencies, such as hurricane warnings, pending flooding, or predictions of hazardous weather, can also trigger the activation of an EOC. The AEP should provide guidance about when the EOC should be activated, along with the personnel responsible for its activation. Opening the EOC in some situations is self-evident, such as the crash of a large airliner, an active shooter or hijack attempt, or a natural disaster occurring at the airport or in the nearby community.

The Incident Command Post and Mobile Command Unit

The ICP is the on-scene location where the various Incident Command functions, such as the IC, Operations sector chief and response personnel, and others, are carried out. At an airport, the first responder on-scene to an airplane crash is usually either Airport Operations, airport police, or airport fire personnel. In most cases, the ICP is established by the first individual on-scene with Incident Command responsibilities. Normally, the vehicle driven by that individual is the de facto mobile, ICP. Airport fire and some police command vehicles, which are usually sport utility vehicles, come equipped with some Incident Command materials, such as extensive radio systems to talk to a variety of agencies, including the very high frequency (VHF) radios for talking to the ATCT and the pilots, whiteboards with placards to indicate the placement of response vehicles or to build the Incident Command organizational chart, and emergency response vests to readily identify key individuals on-scene. Essentially, the ICP is located wherever the on-scene commander sets it up.

Many large airports use Mobile Command Units (MCUs) for on-scene Incident Command. For a large-scale incident, it is not unusual to see what amounts to a recreational vehicle park, full of various MCUs from numerous agencies.

An MCU can act as a base of operations for a critical incident, providing communications, CCTV surveillance, and onsite, sheltered, miniature command centers. Many large-scale airports have their own MCU, while smaller airports typically rely on the MCUs from local police and fire departments. A variety of MCUs, both self-propelled and towed models, are commercially available off-the-shelf. Both versions have advantages and disadvantages. While the self-propelled version can be driven directly to the incident scene, it may not be large enough to meet the needs of the airport. A towed-trailer can keep personnel inside completely concealed from view, as well as out of the elements, if that is a desire, but may be less mobile should the situation call for its relocation. Even if the tow vehicle is still attached, there are usually electronic connections, antennas, and other items that may have to be disconnected prior to moving the post.

The type of MCU and its design, layout, and interior depend on the core functions of the command unit at the airport. If the MCU is to provide support for all of the various agencies that have core responsibilities, such as police, fire, EMS, and Airport Operations, then the needs of these agencies should be taken into consideration. However, since most off-airport fire and police agencies also have their own MCUs, airport management may wish to focus more on their core needs rather than trying to focus on all needs at once. For example, if the airport’s MCU is also supposed to support EMS functions, then medical equipment and supplies should also be kept on board, but if EMS at the airport has its own unit, then the airport operator should use that space for something else.

Primarily, an airport MCU is a command and control center, so the inclusion of a small meeting space, along with essential communications equipment that mirrors equipment in the airport communications and EOCs, is essential. The NIMS includes Mobile Communications Centers (MCCs) in their resource typing catalog, listing capabilities, workstations, equipment, and personnel requirements. The NIMS Type IV MCU (MCC or Mobile EOC in NIMS vernacular) is typically a converted sport utility vehicle or travel trailer, with one to two workstations, standard radiofrequency (RF) communications, cellular phone systems (through individual user files), and a basic computer system. A full NIMS Type I MCU may be up to a 53-foot custom trailer or bus chassis, with six to 10 workstations, numerous RF transceivers, high-speed Internet access and satellite capability, PDX (phone data exchange) office-style phone and cellular systems, CCTV video, computer-aided dispatch, and Ethernet connections with 120V AC-protected receptacles.

All types of MCUs should be able to operate in an environment with little to no basic services, including electrical service, phone lines, or cell towers, for a period of time. MCUs should be able to provide their own power generation and fuel supply to operate a minimum of 3 to 4 days without refueling. Ideally, an MCU should require minimal setup time, operate as a forward EOC, facilitate communications between multiple agencies, and serve basic personnel needs such as a bathroom, mini refrigerator, microwave, and coffee maker (FEMA, 2005, pp. 26–28). While most airport emergencies do not require the MCU to operate independently for long periods of time, during a natural disaster, the airport may still be expected to maintain some level of minimal functionality, in which case an MCU can fulfill some of an airport’s operational and communications requirements, until water, electricity, and other necessary resources can be restored.

When acquiring an MCU, airport operators should first determine the essential functions of the MCU while on-scene and how long it will take to carry out these functions. Then, other airports with MCUs should be researched to determine how those airports use their MCU and what they have found to be most important to be included, along with operational issues and challenges they did not foresee.

National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System

The organization of on-scene Incident Command is one of the most important elements of any effective response. Today, that response operates under the NIMS.

The NIMS can be a highly effective tool in managing an incident, although, in and of itself, it is neither an operational incident management plan nor a resource allocation plan. NIMS is a set of core doctrines, principles, terminology, and organizational processes that enable effective management of an incident (FEMA, 2008b, p. 3). It is most important to remember that NIMS is supposed to be flexible and adaptable to a particular situation. NIMS is designed to fit the situation and circumstances, not for the situation to fit into NIMS. Emergency management practitioners are cautioned from becoming NIMS Disciples, a slang term used in the industry to describe those individuals or agencies that are more focused on seeing that NIMS principles and processes are adhered to during an incident than on the actual outcome of the incident.

NIMS is not only a response plan to be used during large-scale incidents. It can be used to manage irregular operations, snow removal, and special events, such as an air show or a major sporting event such as an upcoming Super Bowl. NIMS is designed to be scalable to be used from day-to-day incidents all the way up to mass casualty or natural disasters. It is intended to standardize resource management procedures and emergency management vocabulary across all domains. During an airplane crash, it is not unusual to have a variety of federal, state, and local responders from numerous domains, including police, fire, and EMS, plus off-airport personnel from a variety of agencies, including the FAA, NTSB, FBI, and EPA. Additionally, even airport firefighting and police personnel must use slightly different terms than their city or county counterparts, but NIMS is designed to reduce the confusion to the extent possible.

A core principle of NIMS is that everyone is speaking the same language. A good example is seen in the change of language on the notification of an aircraft emergency. Previously, airports would use a variety of terms to describe an airplane incident or airplane crash, including terms such as yellow alert, red alert, local standby, and so forth. NIMS formalized, and the FAA standardized through the use of the AC AEP, that aircraft incidents would be referred to as Alert 1, Alert 2, Alert 3, etc. That said, there are still those in the aviation domain that have not embraced NIMS terminology and principles. Airline pilots do not use the terms Alert 1, Alert 2, and the like to describe the type of emergency they are experiencing, even though this is the same terminology that determines the level of Aircraft Rescue and Firefighting response. Pilots will describe the problem the aircraft is experiencing or they are having (e.g., “smoke in the cockpit,” “can’t get the landing gear down”), and it is up to either the FAA air traffic controller or the airport operator to determine the level of emergency response.

National Incident Management System Core Components

The core components of NIMS are: Preparedness, Communications and Information Management, Resource Management, Command and Management, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance (FEMA, 2008b, p. 9).

• 1. Preparedness relates to the concept of building relationships between agencies having emergency management responsibilities, as well as having a unified approach to emergency management planning. Effective incident management begins long before an actual incident. Preparedness involves an integrated combination of planning, training, exercises, personnel qualification and certification standards, and equipment certification (FEMA, 2008b).
• 2. Communications and Information Management emphasizes the importance of having a Common Operating Picture, along with standardizing communications and information management systems. Communications and incident management are based on the interoperability, reliability, scalability, portability, resiliency, and redundancy of communications and information systems (FEMA, 2008b).
• 3. Resource Management is the process of identifying and typing resources and having a system in place to request, support, track, demobilize, and, ultimately, reimburse personnel and agencies. The flow of resources must be fluid and adaptable to the requirements of the incident, and NIMS defines standardized mechanisms and establishes the resource management process to identify requirements; order and acquire resources; mobilize, track, and report resource status; recover and demobilize resources; reimburse for resource use; and inventory resources (FEMA, 2008b).
• 4. Command and Management is one of the most important areas of NIMS and relates to three core principles: the ICS, MACS, and joint Public Information processes. Each concept is explained more fully later in this section.
• 5. Ongoing Maintenance and Management focuses on keeping NIMS and ICS relevant with revisions and the integration of technology into the incident management domain, such as the use of software-based notification systems and UAVs for surveillance, Search and Rescue (SAR), and other functions.

While a small-scale incident may have only one IC or incident manager, large-scale incidents have numerous command authorities from a variety of federal, state, and local agencies. NIMS promotes a unified approach to incident response and emergency management, commonly called Unified Command.

Unified Command

A significant challenge in a multiagency response is that the personnel from each agency tend only to take orders from personnel within their own leadership structure. For example, police may only listen to police supervisors and commanders, firefighters to their chiefs, and so forth (Pfeifer, 2013, p. 4). Rather than attempt to change the nature of first-response personnel, which is to respond to their superiors and peers within their own organizational structure, the concept of Unified Command instead recognizes and accounts for this reality.

Unified Command applies to incidents involving multiple jurisdictions or agencies, enabling them to coordinate and effectively interact across legal, geographic, and functional responsibilities. Unified Command consists of ICs from various jurisdictions, such as police, fire, Airport Operations, and EMS, operating together to form a single command structure. Within the Unified Command, ICs make joint decisions and speak as “one voice.” Any differences are theoretically worked out within the Unified Command, and each responder continues to report to a single supervisor with the responder’s area of expertise. Within Unified Command, a police officer would not tell firefighters how to do their job, but instead the key decisions would be made at the command level, with each jurisdictional entity (police, fire, etc.) issuing its orders through its appropriate chain of command (FEMA, 2008b, pp. 6–7). Another dynamic of responding to extreme events is that crisis managers often limit their connectivity to their own network, providing information to those within their group and limiting the amount of information provided to others outside the group (Pfeifer, 2013, p. 4). Unified Command features one set of incident objectives, a singular planning process, and one IAP. Other features of Unified Command include integrating multijurisdictional or multiagency General Staff personnel into other functional areas.

Much has already been written about several aspects of NIMS, including the importance of communications and information management and resource management. This section focuses on the Command and Management portion of NIMS—the ICS, MACS, and Public Information—the fundamental elements of incident management that together are the most visible elements of incident management (FEMA, 2008b).

Incident Command System

Local communications dispatchers and a few emergency management or response personnel can handle the vast majority of incidents in the community and at an airport, but when an incident dictates a multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary, and multiagency response, ICS provides a flexible mechanism for a coordinated response. ICS was first developed over the course of several wildfire seasons in Southern California in the 1970s.

Emergency management/response personnel include Federal, State, territorial, tribal, substate regional, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector organizations, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and all other organizations and individuals who assume an emergency management role.

FEMA, 2008b, p. 45

In Introduction to Emergency Management, Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola (2013) note that for ICS to work, it must provide effective operations at three levels of incident character: single jurisdiction and/or single agency, single jurisdiction with multiagency support, and multijurisdictional or multiagency support. Therefore, ICS must adapt to a wide variety of emergencies, from natural disasters to terrorist attacks to airplane crashes.

When implemented correctly, ICS maintains the autonomy of each agency, utilizes management-by-objectives, and maintains effective span of control. ICS is meant to resolve the issue common at many emergencies prior to the implementation of ICS, which was to have multiple agencies assigning their own commanders, resulting in power struggles, miscommunication, and duplication of efforts (Haddow et al., 2013, pp. 51–81). ICS features several characteristics, including common terminology, a modular organization that expands as the situation demands, reliance on IAPs, the complete accountability of personnel and resources, and information and intelligence management (Figure 11.6 ).

Figure 11.6.

ICS structure.

Source: FEMA, 2008b.

As noted previously, the five major functional areas within ICS are command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration.

Command

The command section includes directing and maintaining communication and collaboration with responders and multiple agencies, ensuring safety for those on-scene, and communicating with the public. The commander may be a single IC who is responsible for the command function at all times, or a unified command staff, which consists of the PIO, Safety Officer, and the Liaison Officer. If only a single IC is assigned, that individual is responsible for fulfilling the functions of the PIO, Safety Officer, and Liaison Officer.

In this section, the term command refers jointly to both the person and the function. The overall responsibilities of the IC include:

• 1.Naming the incident;
• 2.Establishing immediate priorities and an ICP;
• 3.Determining the incident’s strategic goals and developing, approving, and implementing the IAP;
• 4.Developing the command structure appropriate for the incident;
• 5.Assessing resource needs and ordering resources;
• 6.Coordinating overall emergency activities while ensuring adequate safety measures are in place to protect responders and others;
• 7.Coordinating with outside agencies; and
• 8.Authorizing information released to the media.

The media plays a primary role in communicating with the public. Even in the age of social media, many people still look to mainstream media (TV and radio) and the daily print media (newspapers) for their information. The PIO gathers and releases information that has been approved by the IC or the Unified Command to the media and, when appropriate, through social media channels. The PIO must determine their own staffing needs (i.e., how many PIOs they will need to handle the incident) and monitor the public reaction to the information. In a multiagency response, a lead PIO must be designated and is part of the command staff. The lead PIO is responsible for operating the JIC and must coordinate the release of information with other agencies involved in the incident. PIOs develop press releases and arrange tours or interviews with key personnel, such as the Airport Director and IC.

The Safety Officer monitors incident operations to ensure the health and safety of emergency response personnel and to advise the IC on all matters related to operational safety. The Safety Officer also has the extraordinary authority, by way of the IC, to stop or prevent unsafe acts during the incident operations. Safety Officers must conduct a visual reconnaissance of the incident, review and approve the medical plan, ensure that all personnel have PPE, as appropriate, and investigate any accidents that occur during the incident.

The Liaison Officer (sometimes abbreviated LNO or LO) is the point of contact for representatives from other governmental, nongovernmental, and private entities that have responsibilities within the emergency plan. The Liaison Officer must maintain contact with all of the involved agencies and provide information to the Planning function about the agencies to prepare the IAP. The Liaison Officer must identify all of the agency representatives and have up-to-date and complete contact information. The Liaison Officer must keep the various agencies aware of the status of the incident and monitor the operations to identify potential interagency conflicts and issues.

The aforementioned personnel comprise the command staff. General Staff includes section chiefs from the Operations, Logistics, Planning, and Administration/Finance functional areas.

Operations

The Operations section is responsible for the tactical operations at the incident site. It can be easy to confuse the Operations section with the Airport Operations department; however, the Operations section is functional by nature, not agency specific. The Operations section includes personnel from police, fire, EMS, Airport Operations, Airport Maintenance, and, in some cases, airport communications personnel, but this is by no means a complete list of individuals that could comprise personnel within the Operations section. The Operations Section Chief (OSC) and the Operations Section focus on the Priorities of Work (i.e., life, scene stability, property, environment, restoration operations) and activate and supervise personnel in accordance with the IAP.

For Aircraft Accident response, firefighter personnel commonly fill the roles of the IC and the OSC, at least for the initial first few minutes of the incident. At airports where an Airport Operations emergency manager is always designated as the IC, the lead or chief firefighter is the OSC for the response phase. The OSC conducts a visual reconnaissance of the incident, briefs and assigns personnel their duties, and ensures safe tactical operations. They also help develop portions of the IAP and briefs personnel accordingly about their duties under the plan. OSC chiefs commonly change over when a normal shift changes or a shift in the mission. For example, during an aircraft crash, ARFF commonly assume the OSC role until the firefighting and lifesaving phases of the incident are over, then turn the OSC role over to Airport Operations, or if on-scene, the NTSB.

The NIMS recognizes that an effective span of control for an individual is about five to seven other individuals or groups. As the span of control expands, ICs have a variety of options, including branches, divisions and/or groups, task forces, strike teams, or single resources. Divisions or groups are established when the number of resources exceeds the manageable span of control of both the Incident Command and the OSC. Divisions are established to divide the incident into physical or geographical areas of operation, while Groups are used to divide the incident into functional areas (fire, police, EMS). Branches are established when the number of divisions or groups exceeds the recommended span of control (FEMA, 2008b, p. 55), and may be functional, geographic, or both, for instance, the multicasualty or fire branch director, which may have control over several divisions, plus a rapid intervention crew, a HAZMAT team, and a small boat team.

Single resources are individual personnel or equipment and any associated operators. Task forces are any combination of resources assembled for a specific mission or operational need, while Strike Team has a set number resources of the same kind. For example, a Task Force of police officers and EMS personnel may be created to enter an area of an active shooting, after the primary shooter has been neutralized, to perform tactical medical care. A Strike Team of three ARFF trucks may be assigned to attack one portion of a fire, in the case of an airplane crash where the fuselage has broken up and is lying in several locations of the airport.

The Operations Section can add branches to their organizational structure as necessary to manage the incident. Additional branches typically include fire, EMS, police, Public Works and Air Operations. Each branch director is responsible for implementing standard operating procedures (e.g., attack fire, respond to active shooter) and implementing pertinent sections of the IAP.

The Staging Area manager also reports to the OSC. The Staging Area manager identifies the location and establishes the boundaries of the Staging Area. Many airports already have predesignated Staging Areas that are located near airport access gates. In a mass casualty incident, multiple Staging Areas may have to be designated. Law enforcement personnel protect the Staging Area, control access, and ensure only authorized personnel are allowed onto the airfield. If Airport Operations continue during the incident, an Airport Operations representative should also be at the Staging Area to ensure that every vehicle accessing the airfield is properly escorted to the incident site.

Planning

The Planning section gathers information and works with the IC to develop the IAP. An IAP provides a concise and coherent means of capturing and communicating the overall priorities, objectives, strategies, and tactics of the incident both operational and support activities (FEMA, 2008b).

The Planning Section Chief (PSC) collects, evaluates, and disseminates information about the incident and the status of resources. The PSC must have a good understanding of the current situation, predict the probable course of future events, and prepare primary and alternative strategies to manage the incident moving forward. The PSC must work closely with the IC and the OSC to develop the common operating picture and to understand the overall objectives of the incident to develop a realistic IAP.

As the incident expands, the PSC can add additional branches, including the Situation Unit Leader, Resources Unit Leader, Documentation Unit Leader, Demobilization Unit Leader, and Technical Specialists. A variety of specialists often assist the PSC, including meteorologists, infectious disease specialists, radiological and HAZMAT specialists, and field observers. Plans are built around operational cycles, which are sometimes referred to as the “Planning P.”

The Planning P (Figure 11.7 ) is a guide used in the planning process that helps establish mission objectives that are measurable and achievable. Planning P is useful for both short-term and long-term planning of Incident Command. It engages the five levels of ICS such that each supports the operational elements of the plan. In the initial response phase, efforts are allocated to thoroughly understanding the situation (i.e., gaining situational awareness). During the initial response, an Incident Briefing Form (ICS 201) is used to document the incident name and time it started, along with a map or overview sketch and known resources available to the IC (and estimated time of arrival [ETA] if relevant). ICS 201 also contains a summary of current actions to date and other information relevant to the incident. The next phase in Planning P is to establish the incident objectives, through a meeting by the IC, command staff, and the General Staff (e.g., operations, planning, logistics, and administration section leaders). Once mission objectives are determined, the OSC reviews with the General Staff the tactics (i.e., tactical direction) the OSC is proposing to meet the response objectives in the established timeline and to makes resource allocations. The OSC prepares the plan and delivers a briefing to the Command and General Staff; adjustments are made and a final plan is approved. Once the plan is executed, adjustments are made as directed by the OSC and personnel in the Operations section. The five phases in the planning process utilizing Planning P as a guide are:

• 1. Understanding the situation involves gathering, reporting, and analyzing information to get the most accurate picture of the incident;
• 2. Establishing incident objectives involves determining an effective strategy and prioritizing incident objectives and alternatives;
• 3. Developing tactical direction and resource assignments involves determining the tactical direction and resources needed to implement the strategy for one operation, which is typically 12 or 24 hours. Input and buy-in is sought from the command staff during this time;
• 4. Preparing and approving the plan involves the actual preparation of plans in the proper format and briefing operational personnel of the plan, along with associated assignments and orders; and
• 5. Evaluating and revising the plan, the fifth phase, involves comparing the planned progress with the actual progress and adjusting the plan, as necessary, either immediately or in preparation for the next operational period.

Figure 11.7.

Planning workflow chart “Planning P”.

Source: FEMA NIMS at https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/planningp.pdf.

Logistics

The Logistics Section provides facilities, services, and materials in support of the incident. The Logistics Section Chief (LSC) participates in developing the IAP and activates the Service Branch and the Support Branch, as needed. The LSC has the necessary procurement cards, as well as the purchasing authority, to obtain needed items without delay. The Service Branch can include a communications unit, a medical unit, and a food unit. The Support Branch can include a supply unit, a facilities unit, and a ground support unit.

The LSC determines the level of service required to support the operations, anticipates needs, and coordinates with the OSC for the delivery of needed equipment. The LSC must also prioritize requests and work with a variety of private contractors and NGOs, such as the Salvation Army, to provide food and other necessary items to responders, passengers, and others involved with the incident.

Finance/Administration

The Finance/Administration Section Chief (FSC) must account for the funds used during the response and recovery phase of the disaster. The FSC is responsible for expanding the organizational structure to include a Time Unit Leader, a Procurement Unit Leader, a Cost Unit Leader, and a Compensation and Claims Unit Leader, or Workers Compensation specialist. On some occasions, the FSC branch may also include an attorney. An accurate tracking of how the money is spent is necessary, as citizens, politicians, and public officials are concerned about cost efficiencies related to the use of public funds. Also, after a disaster, insurance companies and FEMA, for federal disasters, may reimburse airports. The FSC should maintain contact with the airport executive staff on all financial matters. Some expenditures may be above the purchasing authority of those in the finance or logistics sections.

Information and Intelligence

Depending on the type of incident, an additional functional area, commonly called the Intelligence branch or division, may be established. This area is associated with security-related incidents. The Intelligence section is responsible for developing and managing information related to security plans and operations as directed by the IC. This responsibility could include the protection of Sensitive Security Information, information that is For Official Use Only (FOUO), Law Enforcement Sensitive information (an FBI classification), or national security classified information. The intelligence branch must also coordinate with the OSC when the information may affect Operational Security, and the PIO particularly where the information affects public awareness.

The Intelligence function can also include additional branches, such as the Investigation Operations Group, which is responsible for the overall investigative effort; an Intelligence group responsible for obtaining intelligence at various levels, including unclassified, Sensitive Security Information, classified materials, and open source data; a Forensics group responsible for the collection of forensic evidence and maintaining the integrity of the crime scene; and an Investigative Support Group to ensure investigative personnel are available when needed and are provided with the necessary resources.

For a major security incident in which the intelligence and investigations function is part of the Incident Command structure, the airport operator acts in a support role, providing facilities, access to the site, and other necessities to support the investigative team. Airport management personnel should not expect to be included as part of any of the intelligence and investigation function, unless this function impacts the operational status of the airport.

Incident Management Teams–SEADOG and WESTDOG

Incident Management Teams (IMTs) are comprised of command staff and General Staff members and can be deployed as needed (FEMA, 2008b). The airport should establish an IMT to deploy to off-airport crashes to provide support to communities, responders, and other airports during natural disasters. While an IMT may not actually act as a command authority while deploying to an incident off-airport because of the jurisdictional responsibilities of the agency where the incident took place, an IMT can act in a support capacity, either as an ESF or to provide advice and resources, such as how to maintain the integrity of the accident scene until the NTSB arrives. Airports can also provide support to other airports during or after a natural disaster, by providing experts in airport management and operations, resources, materials, and equipment.

After Hurricane Ivan hit land at Pensacola, Florida, in 2004, causing widespread flooding, tornadoes, and damage to the airport and the community at large, two organizations were formed to assist airports during national disasters, SEADOG and WESTDOG.

SEADOG is the Southeast Airports Disaster Operations Group and WESTDOG is the Western Airports Disaster Operations Group. The organizations were created as a way for airports to assist other airports in their region during natural disasters. ACRP Report 73 (IEM et al., 2012) addressed the best practices in developing Airport-to-Airport Mutual Aid Programs (MAPs), related to logistical, financial, and legal considerations.

Airports routinely rely on mutual aid assistance during large-scale disasters; however, some disasters are so widespread mutual aid may be unavailable, and airports may not be the first priority for mutual aid responders. Many municipal and private nonaviation industries that provide power, sanitation, potable water, and other public utilities have mutual aid agreements with other municipalities. SEADOG and WESTDOG are based on the same principle. Municipalities operate by a general rule of thumb that outside aid should not be expected to reach their community sooner than 72 hours after a disaster, but airports may have to be back in business much more quickly in order to enable the arrival of outside aid and facilitate the evacuation of affected populations (IEM et al., 2012, p. 4).

Airports are excellent resources for other airports to call upon during disasters as they have the exact type of assets and knowledgeable human resources to assist in the unique operating requirements of airport systems (IEM et al., 2012, p. 5). Just as a police officer would understand the basics of law enforcement if redeployed to another jurisdiction, Airport Operations personnel understand the priorities of airport management and have the skills necessary to continue the operation of the airport (security, safety, maintenance, and other key functions that require a unique, airport-specific background).

Individuals from other commercial service airports will have the appropriate security clearances to operate in the Security Areas of an airport. However, individuals responding from general aviation airports will likely not have the same security clearance. General aviation personnel may not be allowed unescorted access to an active, commercial service airfield, but can perform other functions. If the airport is closed to commercial operations, then this may not be an issue until the airport reopens.

During some natural disasters, the airport will voluntarily not comply with Part 139 and cease commercial operations for several hours or several days. At this point, the airport is technically not a commercial service airport and may not be required to comply with Title 49 CFR Part 1542 (Airport Security). The Airport Security Coordinator should work with the local TSA senior official in charge to determine the exact status and requirements (if any) for regulatory security compliance during emergency operations.

Since 2004, both SEADOG and WESTDOG have demonstrated an ability to deliver aid to airports more effectively and earlier than the 72-hour window (IEM et al., 2012, p. 5). However, while many airports may be interested in forming or participating in such groups, there may be financial, legal, and logistical hurdles to overcome.

ACRP Report 73 classified six different categories of urgent needs where airports may need outside assistance, which are listed below (IEM et al., 2012, p. 10):

• 1.Category 1 is situations that started small, but grew in size to be too large for the airport to handle with its internal resources, and thus mutual aid agreements are activated;
• 2.Category 2 is situations, such as a power outage of the terminal or a shelter-in-place situation for a prolonged basis, the result of a community power outage or tornado outbreak, that may also affect the local community. Traditional mutual aid agreements typically serve in Category 2 situations as well;
• 3.Category 3 is a natural or a human-made disaster that damages or obstructs access to the airport, to the extent outside aid is required to return the airport to service. This is the level at which an airport-to-airport MAP can be most useful;
• 4.Category 4 is a regional disaster that does not damage the airport but puts extraordinary operational or unusual demands on the airport that exceed the capability of local staff and resources for a prolonged basis. An Airport-to-Airport MAP is recommended here as well;
• 5.Category 5 is an aviation disaster at the airport or in the vicinity of the airport that has a significant effect on the recovery of the airport to normal operations. Airport personnel who are part of the response to the disaster may be extraordinarily grief stricken and not able to return to work in the near-term. Airport-to-Airport MAPs may be useful in providing supplemental personnel from other airports to fulfill key operational, maintenance, or other roles. Other specialized services, such as grief counseling and assistance with PIO duties, may also be necessary and could be provided with a MAP, particularly at airports without a robust public affairs or Public Information system.
• 6.Category 6 is a situation where an essential piece of equipment has gone out-of-service, such as a fire truck causing the airport to fall below its ARFF index, or airfield lighting outages, where an Airport-to-Airport MAP could be able to loan essential vehicles or equipment in the interim.

In some cases, such as a large-scale disaster that effectively closes the airport for several days, a sort of ad hoc reverse-DOG, whereby personnel from the airport that has experienced the crash temporarily transfer to a nearby airport that has been designated to accept overflow or diverted air traffic during the investigation, may occur.

An example of a Category 5 airport need occurred at the Aspen/Pitkin County Airport, Colorado in 2001, when a charter flight crash resulted in multiple fatalities. Although aircraft operation was restored within 48 hours, the airport staff did not have the necessary expertise to deal with the recovery efforts, including the accident investigation, and working with the victims’ families (IEM et al., 2012, p. 10). As a result, the Colorado Aviation Recovery Support Team (CARST) was created to provide mentoring, support, and guidance to assist an airport in the recovery from an aviation incident, including disseminating Public Information, infrastructure support and recovery, coordination with the FAA and NTSB, organizational, employee, and community care, and family/victim assistance. The program is funded through the Colorado Division of Aeronautics, the Colorado Aeronautical Board, the Colorado Airport Operators Association, and the Colorado airport agencies that have allowed their staff members to participate in this program (CARST, n.d.).

Setting up an Airport-to-Airport MAP requires several key elements. First is the notion that the affected Airport Manager must retain full control and that all incoming volunteers remember they are present to assist and supplement, not to take control (IEM et al., 2012, p. 26). Second, aid teams must be self-sustaining and not add to the burden of the local airport staff. They should bring their own food, water, and other necessities to support themselves for the duration of their stay (IEM et al., 2012, p. 28). Teams should also understand and be fluent in the use of NIMS and ICS. Any airport that provides mutual aid to another airport should assume that its cost will not be reimbursed. Although there might be mechanisms in place to reimburse the volunteers, those might not apply in an Airport-to-Airport MAP, or the agreement may not be recognized by some insurance agencies, or FEMA, depending on a variety of circumstances, including the nature of federal aid or declaration of disaster by the president.

Any airport operator considering whether to engage in an Airport-to-Airport MAP should explore the legalities and the liabilities involved with sending staff, airport equipment, and materials to another airport. However, any obstacles that arise in assisting another airport during a disaster should not be cause to avoid participation, but should be worked out, as the mutual benefit is worth the effort.

Area Command and Multiagency Coordination

During a large-scale disaster affecting an entire community, the municipality may institute an Area Command. Area Commands oversee the management of large or evolving incidents with multiple IMTs or with numerous IMTs covering a large, geographical area. Area Commands are also used when a number of incidents of the same type, such as flooding, a wildfire, or hurricane, occur, causing multiple IMTs to compete for the same resources (FEMA, 2010).

MACSs allow various levels of governments to work together more effectively, by coordinating activities above the field level, and to prioritize the incident demands between critical or competing resources (FEMA, 2010). MACSs can be informal processes based on oral agreements between jurisdictions during an incident, or more formalized processes, which are laid out before an incident occurs. Whether formal or informal, a MACS can identify facilities, equipment, personnel, and procedures, integrating into a common system responsible for coordination and support of resources to emergency operations.

MACS facilities are often EOCs, communications centers, MCUs, or any location where activities can be coordinated. Some in the emergency management community at the state and regional levels see the airport EOC as a MACS, which may be accurate, but can be confusing when the term is used around airport personnel, who are generally unfamiliar with the concept.9

A MACS can also be certain personnel, such as agency administrators or executives who are authorized to commit agency resources and funds in a coordinated response effort, known as a MAC Group, and can also be procedures, such as business practices that define the activities, relationships, and functionality of the MACS (FEMA, 2010).

The primary functions of a MACS is to provide situational assessment, to determine incident priorities, to acquire and allocate resources, to support policy-level decisions, and to coordinate with other MACS elements and elected and appointed officials (FEMA, 2010).

The main difference between an Area Command and MACS is that a MACS provides off-scene coordination and support but does not have direct Incident Command authority, whereas Area Command has oversight and authority over the various IMTs. In a large-scale community disaster, the airport’s emergency management personnel may be considered an IMT under a city or county Area Command.

Public Information Officer

The PIO plays an important part in the management of an emergency. Although not a first responder in the true sense of the term, the PIO performs numerous functions that facilitate an effective response, such as distributing information to the public that reduces further casualties and keeps the public from obstructing police, fire, and EMS personnel. For a small, municipal-run airport, the PIO likely works for the city or county directly and represents the entire municipality, not only the airport operator. In this case, the PIO is unlikely to understand aviation terms and how things generally work. Whereas the PIO may have seen numerous police and fire-related incidents in the municipality, they often may not understand the differences in the aviation domain. The airport operator must ensure that the municipal PIO is fully educated on aviation incident management and that a knowledgeable airport staff member can assist the PIO.

Medium-size, commercial service and larger, general aviation airports may have a person on staff that is PIO as a collateral duty, whereas large, commercial service airports usually have a small staff that is dedicated to the PIO function. Traditionally, some of the PIO’s main challenges have come from within the PIO’s own organizational structure. Some in the command or political structure view the PIO as “the media” and seek to minimize the information given to this individual. This practice handicaps the PIO, disabling a powerful tool to assist with the response to, and recovery from, an emergency. The PIO may also experience distrust from the media who believe the PIO may be a gatekeeper, preventing them from getting the real story.

However, the PIO must develop a trusting relationship with those in the command structure, along with the media. That trust begins long before the emergency or natural disaster, and individuals who are assigned PIO functions should complete the NIMS PIO beginner and advanced training courses. Also, many PIOs are former news reporters and understand what the media needs—they know a good PIO learns quickly, has good people skills, and has integrity. A good PIO does not lie and projects integrity and credibility–reporters and photographers trust them (Jones, 2005, p. 92). However, one should never assume that the PIO function is somehow easy because it involves fewer hard skills (e.g., putting out fires, handling a firearm, applying a tourniquet to an injured passengers) and more soft skills, such as relationship building. Today’s PIOs experience even more challenges with the advent of social media, citizen journalists, and UAV technology.

The Public Information Officer in Incident Management

The PIO is a member of the ICS command staff and is charged with advising the IC or Unified Command of all matters related to Public Information related to the incident (Walsh et al., 2012). The PIO is an important role for three key reasons: (a) to distribute essential information to the public about the event or crisis so the public knows what actions to take; (b) to keep the public and media informed so the public does not obstruct response and recovery operations, or, in some cases, so the public can support the recovery or response; (c) to create the narrative about the event (to the extent possible). How the story of how the airport handled an incident is told can affect the response actions in the short term, recovery actions in the near term, and future actions, through political and interagency fallout, in the long term. In their book National Incident Management Systems: Principles and Practices, Walsh et al. (2012) note that in addition to the primary role of the PIO (keeping the IC informed), the PIO also handles:

• 1.Inquiries from the media, the public, and elected and appointed officials;
• 2.EPI and warnings;
• 3.Rumor monitoring and responses;
• 4.General media relations;
• 5.Other functions, including gathering, verifying, coordinating, and disseminating accurate, accessible, and timely information related to the incident, particularly information concerning the public’s health and safety, as well as public protection actions.

PIOs must be able to identify the key information that needs to be communicated to the public and craft messages that convey the information in a clear and understandable manner, which does not overwhelm the audience with too much at once (FEMA, 2008b). A top goal of the PIO is to reduce panic, by telling the public what actions to take, and to provide the public with enough information about the incident to act on the information, if appropriate, or to make informed decisions about what to do. For example, in an airplane crash, numerous audiences would require information from the PIO, and if no one in the Incident Command structure were designated and trained to handle these requests, the system would have to be developed ad hoc, and a responder or other person, who might not be trained in the job of the PIO, might be selected for the role. This situation could immediately have serious operational ramifications that hinder the overall response, as well as long-term political, bureaucratic, and legal impacts.

The list below is a sampling, based on a theoretical airplane crash, and crosses the functional lines between Emergency Public Notification, Protective Actions, and communication:

• 1.Family members of potential victims want to know where to go for more information about their loved ones;
• 2.Those with scheduled flights out of the airport want to know if the airport is open or if their flight is delayed;
• 3.Individuals who live near the incident want to know if there are HAZMATs on board, or if they should evacuate or shelter-in-place for any reason, and whether the accident has affected local transportation networks, such as shutting down highways or rail systems;
• 4.The IC or Unified Command will want to know any information about the incident that relates to the effectiveness of the response or the safety of the responders (e.g., a citizen is flying a UAV over the incident site, which poses a collision risk with medical evacuation helicopters);
• 5.Elected and appointed officials with responsibilities over the airport, the community, and/or the response want to know to which they should respond, and want to know that rescue personnel are on-scene and the situation is being handled;
• 6.Regulatory officials, such as the FAA and TSA, want to know what is happening. FAA officials are concerned with safety of the Airport Operations, safety of flight operations if the airport is staying open, and where the incident took place so they can respond. TSA officials want as much information as they can get in order to notify the Transportation Security Operation Center, to determine if this could be a terrorist event;
• 7.Off-airport responders, upon initial notification, will “tune-in” to the media channels to learn more about the event, to help form a common operating picture, as assets and personnel are deployed to the scene.

The above list includes the IC, elected and appointed officials, regulatory officials, and the general public, but the most important audience for PIOs are themselves. Like the telephone game that kids play, when one person whispers a phrase to someone, who then whispers it to someone else, and so on, the information changes each time it is passed to another person. Therefore, the original information must be as accurate as possible.

The process of gathering information is through the on-scene command and other PIOs from other agencies, monitoring the media, and working closely with elected and appointed officials, community leaders, and, most importantly, the IC/Unified Command. Information should be confirmed through multiple sources; even the IC may not have the accurate picture, and the PIO must ensure that if the IC says one thing that the PIO cannot verify, the PIO should advise the IC that the IC may not have the best information on which to act. The three basic categories of Public Information are: Narrative Information, Advisories and Warnings, and Action Messages (Walsh et al., 2012, p. 3888).

• 1. Narrative Information provides an overview of the incident. This type of information is usually sound bites or video clips, which paint a picture of what has happened, its magnitude, and the progress of the event. Examples of narrative messages may be, “an aircraft has crashed,” “there has been a shooting at the airport,” or “the airport announces the startup of service to Cancun.” While all PIOs strive for accurate reporting of information, accuracy is not as important in the narrative information, as it is in Advisories and Warnings to the public. Also, in the beginning of an incident, information often comes to the IC piecemeal, and the initial information is not always as accurate as information that comes later, once the incident has matured.
• 2. Advisories and Warnings tell the public about a concern, along with specific action steps the public should take. Advisories and warnings are time-sensitive, and accuracy is important. These messages may also contain technical information, but should still be written using language most of the audience understands, minimizing acronyms and jargon. Examples of advisory or warning messages may be, “the airport is closed until further notice, call your airline to determine the status of your flight,” “all traffic should avoid the frontage road north of the airport as it is reserved for emergency response equipment at this time,” or “individuals are prohibited from operating drones10 over the incident site, and citizens failing to obey, may be subject to arrest …”
• 3. Action Messages prompt the public to take immediate action, with timeliness and accuracy possibly being a matter of life and death. Action messages require an all-out media blitz during which local TV and radio broadcasts are interrupted, reverse 911 systems are used, and public warning systems, such as tornado sirens, are activated. Examples of Action Messages may be, “residents that live north of the airport should evacuate immediately” (and advise on the route of the evacuation), or “all personnel at the airport should immediately seek shelter in a designated tornado shelter location.”

Just as social media has created additional challenges for PIOs, it has opened up new pathways for the airport to disseminate information directly to the public. Traditional methods included holding a press conference, issuing a press release, or giving direct interviews to media outlets. The challenge in these techniques is that the media outlet will then decide what information to disseminate to the public. While information related to emergency public notification or Protective Actions are often communicated directly and without a filter (the PIO must still ensure the media got the message right), the airport loses control of the overall narrative.

The narrative, as it relates to an incident, is the story that is told of how the airport responded to the event. The term narrative is similar to the type of message that can be sent by a PIO (referenced above), but in this context, narrative relates to how airport management handled the entire event.

Within the PIO community, there is a general theme that agencies should aspire to achieve in telling the airport story. Regardless of the circumstances, airports and government agencies want to ensure that they acted responsibly and they were concerned for the safety and security of everyone involved; there were plans in place, and they were followed to the extent possible; and further, steps are being taken to either avoid or mitigate future problems (Hoffman, 2008).

Airport Managers, elected and appointed officials, and other responsible parties may need to defend their actions in managing an incident three or more times: once to their supervisors or electorate, a second time in the court of public opinion, and a third time in actual court, which may involve lawsuits, testimony, and depositions. An effective way of creating the narrative outlined above is to work the problems backward—in advance. This means to ensure risk assessments have been conducted, materials and equipment necessary to handle the identified threats and hazards have been acquired, plans were drafted to handle the problems, personnel received training on responding to the problem, and exercises were conducted with actual follow-up actions to identify capability and training gaps in the plan. If an agency has fallen short of these expectations, then much of the public messaging that says “the airport did the right thing” will be perceived as spin, instead of a sincere effort to be prepared.

With technology, the field of journalism is changing, and PIOs and government agencies must adopt strategies to change with it. Some of the most significant influences on journalism today are the invention and widespread use of social media, the emergence of the citizen journalist, and the advent of UAV, or drone, technology.

Social media allows anyone with access to the Internet to say whatever is on the individual’s mind to a worldwide audience. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines “social media” as: “forms of electronic communication (as Web sites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.).

While thousands of social media avenues are available, a few are predominant. A few that have become standard are Twitter (a form of microblogging), Facebook (messaging, commentary, video and photo posting), YouTube (video posting), Periscope (live streaming), and websites. Other forms of social media become popular and unpopular on a yearly basis; consequently, part of the PIO’s job is to keep up with the current trends and know what forms of social media people are paying attention to.

With social media, a passenger can be sending out tweets (messages with a 140-character limit) to thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions of people, not only about what’s going on at the incident, but also photos and links to video of the event. Even someone with a small social media following can have a message or video go viral, as it’s reposted, retweeted, and re-sent through other social media outlets. During the active shooter incident at LAX on November 1, 2013, tens of thousands of passengers and others used their cell phones to videotape and photograph the scene of the shooting, uploading to their personal and professional social media outlets, all while evacuating the facility.

“When the shooting happened, I suddenly had 20,000 amateur journalists on the airfield,” noted John Kinney, director of emergency management at Los Angeles International Airport on November 1, 2013.

Kinney, J., personal interview, October 27, 2014, Denver, CO

Another dynamic that has come about as a result of social media is the citizen journalist, or blogger. According to WordPress.org, a hosting site for many blogs:

“Blog” is an abbreviated version of “weblog,” a term used to describe websites that maintain an ongoing chronicle of information. A blog features diary-type commentary and links to articles on other websites, usually presented as a list of entries in reverse chronological order. Blogs range from the personal to the political, and can focus on one narrow subject or a whole range of subjects.

WordPress.org, n.d.

Some blogs, like the Huffington Post, have expanded to legitimate news sources with staffs of professional reporters, photographers, and videographers. Blogs also crosslink to other blogs, which expands their reach, so that a posting on one blog may be reposted thousands of times over, reaching a global audience within a matter of minutes. Bloggers can make good investigative reporters and often work with mainstream investigative reporters, so their impact on what is said about the airport cannot be ignored by the PIO.

UAV technology allows aerial access to incident scenes that was previously only the domain of the news helicopter. For the media or public to see what was going on at an incident, either a helicopter or a very-long-range lens on a camera, or telescope, was needed. However, UAVs offer up-close access and are generally unaffected by police tape or an airport perimeter fence. News organizations are moving toward the use of UAVs, along with emergency management personnel and citizen journalists. CNN used a UAV to cover a story in Selma, Alabama, in 2015, and their use is beginning to spread throughout the nation. However, during an incident, UAVs operated by news agencies or private citizens can become a hazard to air navigation, violate the privacy of private citizens, and interfere with rescue operations.

PIOs must monitor mainstream media, but they must also monitor what is being said about the airport in the social media domain. The combination of social media, every citizen a journalist, and UAVs means that government entities must always operate with transparency, with the thought that everyone is watching and judging their actions.

Just as social media challenges PIOs, they also can use it as an effective tool to get information directly to the affected and interested populations, without a media filter. Many emergency exercises now have a social media component, and social media is also being used to communicate information during an incident to responders and other agencies (Raths, 2015).

Agencies can track road closures, power outages, needs of passengers in the terminal building, and other information, which can be uploaded and connected to GIS maps to help determine where first responders’ assets should be deployed (Raths, 2015). Social media, including mass texting, can be used to communicate with volunteers so that they do not have to report to the EOC before being deployed (Raths, 2015). Also, volunteers can be used to help monitor and manage social media duties, and can do so from their own location, rather than an EOC or similar area.

Operational Security and Health Information

While PIOs are in the business of passing information along to the public, two areas of information must be protected from public disclosure. Operational Security, aka OPSEC, includes Sensitive Security Information and information about procedures; deployment of police, FBI, or other law enforcement assets during a security incident; discussions about tactics; videos of certain weapons or law enforcement surveillance tools; and tactical deployments that must be kept from public disclosure. Again, social media, UAVs, and citizen journalists may identify such information on their own, but airports should have policies restricting their own personnel from releasing such information via any method. Numerous cases of a family friend posting about the death of a friend or a loved one in Iraq or Afghanistan before the deceased family was formally notified have occurred.

Also, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPPA) addresses the privacy of an individual’s health status and prohibits it from being publicly disclosed. Only certain personnel, such as law enforcement or clergy, will typically make a death notification; hospitals and health care professionals are required to adhere to HIPPA and can transmit information about the health status of an individual only under certain circumstances. The airport operator should not issue statements about the names and conditions of victims unless first cleared by medical professionals, the NTSB, or an other authorized entity. Furthermore, airlines are obligated to protect the identities of their passengers and crew and will likely not provide passenger manifests to the EOC.11 However, while police, fire, and Airport Operations will not be provided the passenger manifest, the American Red Cross works with the air carriers and the health and hospitals section leader to coordinate the status and location of victims and others involved in the incident.

Joint Information Systems/Joint Information Center

A large-scale airport incident will rapidly expand beyond the capabilities of local responders, activating a mutual aid response and expanding the role of the PIO. Every agency should have its own Public Information process and personnel, and a key goal during the incident is to coordinate public communication efforts and not point the finger of blame at other agencies. Also, the public messaging should not interfere with the response and recovery operations, but should seek to enhance such operations.

The Joint Information System (JIS) is an organized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism to ensure the delivery of understandable, timely, accurate, and consistent information to the public, across multiple jurisdictions, during a crisis. The key elements of JIS are interagency coordination, gathering, verifying, coordinating, and disseminating consistent messages, providing information to decision makers, and staying flexible and adaptable to the situation (FEMA, 2008a). A JIC is a location that facilitates the JIS. It is where PIOs from various agencies meet and perform PIO functions, across jurisdictions, private sector agencies (such as the airlines), and NGOs (Walsh et al., 2012, p. 3086). A single JIC is preferable, but multiple JICs may be necessary to provide the adaptability and necessary coverage for the event or incident. While JIC personnel gather and coordinate information, the ultimate authority for releasing information rests with the IC/Unified Command.

At an airport, JICs can be located near established media centers. A media center is a location to which media personnel are directed during an incident. The Birmingham/Shuttlesworth International Airport (Birmingham, Alabama), has a large meeting room that is set up to double as a media center, featuring a podium, effective lighting and seating, and a sound system, usable for press briefings, along with amenities for the press. Free access to the Internet, an abundance of AC/DC power outlets, a kitchen to provide coffee and snacks, a TV, and plug-ins for broadcast media personnel to pick up audio feeds are some elements of an effective media center. While the goal is to provide for the press during a situation, so they are less likely to interfere with Airport Operations, in no case should the media center be close to the family assistance area.

Summary

Regardless of the type of incident, several core functions, including command and control, communications, police, fire, public notification, emergency medical, resource management, and Airport Operations and maintenance, must be addressed. Each function plays a particular role in an incident.

Essentially, the three core elements of an effective emergency response are command, control, and communications. Command and control are carried out in the aviation domain through the use of the NIMS. Command can be a single IC, often predetermined by airport policy or as determined by the nature of the incident. Command is the ability to effectively manage others, including those who do not work directly for the commander, and control is the ability to have a system of Incident Command in place that has been trained and tested and has the available resources it needs. An effective communications network that is interoperable and redundant is the key to carrying out the command function.

Many emergencies, including natural disasters, require emergency public notifications, and in some cases, Protective Actions, such as evacuation and shelter-in-place. Airport management should have in place procedures to notify the airport population, in the airside, landside, and terminal areas, and tell them what is going on and what actions to take.

Police, fire, and EMS are the core first responders to nearly any emergency, and these personnel have numerous responsibilities throughout the AEP. Airport Operations and maintenance personnel fill supporting or command roles during an emergency, and they are the experts on both the function of the airport and the national aviation system, but also have the access, vehicles, and training necessary to maneuver on the AOA.

The NIMS, created after 9/11, is the standard method of managing disasters, incidents, and other events in the United States. It is based on three principles: the ICS, multiagency coordination, and Public Information.

The five functions of ICS are command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. For some incidents, an intelligence/investigative function is added. Command includes the IC or Unified Command personnel, a Safety Officer, a PIO, and a Liaison Officer. Operations are personnel that execute the plans and policies; planning personnel develop IAPs, in an attempt to set and meet Incident Command objectives. Finance/Administrative personnel track the use of resources and personnel, and logistics personnel acquire needed personnel, materials, and vehicles to support the incident objectives.

Multiagency coordination enables the resources of numerous agencies to be pooled for use by response personnel. PIOs also play an important role in incident management, in both disseminating essential information to the public and to the command team, and in writing the airport’s narrative on how the airport handled the event.

Creating Capabilities through the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.

It is well-known that a remote or even minor incident can have devastating consequences on the world’s commercial aviation system. Whether it is a poorly placed stalled vehicle on a critical airport access route, a small fire in a communications center, or unprecedented terror attacks like those of 9/11, the continuity of commercial aviation operations is a delicate balance. So how do we do that in a consistent, effective, and measurable way?

All aviation professionals, regardless of role, are faced with the complex simplicity of an overriding mission of moving people safely. It’s not enough to move them. It’s not enough to keep them safe. This is best accomplished by developing, maintaining, and improving the overall flow of the Continuity of Operations of the entire aviation system. It is the noble intent of the required exercise cycles to develop, enhance, and evaluate the capabilities necessary to move people safely, which leads one to wonder: In the mire of annual tabletops, biannual Aviation Security Contingency (AVSEC) plans, and triannual crash exercises do we progress toward mastery of our overriding mission or simply check a box toward compliance? The truth is we do not really know.

Capabilities development is not a cryptic process. It is both intuitive and well accepted in any learning methodology that one must progress from the basics of individual skills through low-level coordination and into progressively more complex coordinations. How effective the higher levels of command, communications, and coordination are should be the focus of any capability development methodology.

In an ideal world, capability and compliance would be synonymous, with one simply being a measure of the other. However, in an industry governed by a plethora of standards and best practices, one glaringly neglected best practice is that of ensuring that our compliance with industry standards actually yields legitimate capabilities.

We are all overwhelmed with compliance and keeping the whirlwind of day-to-day operations running smoothly. The last thing any of us wants is to add more to our plates; however, if I told you that you could package everything, including day-to-day operations, into a beautifully simple system that would ensure your FAA inspector would leave your airport in awe of your amazing abilities, would you be interested in reading further? If I told you that you could obtain this amazing system not only free, but that it could potentially lead to increased profits and gazillions of dollars in grant funds, would this interest you? If so, read on.

First introduced in 2002, the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) represents lessons learned and best practices from existing exercise programs and can be adapted to the full spectrum of scenarios and incidents. It is a proven methodology that, when properly applied, ensures capabilities are developed in a manner that supports local, state, and federal needs and is done so in a manner that is consistent with the National Response Plan and all its associated capabilities, standards, and best practices (e.g., NIMS/ICS). If you do it right and keep it simple, it will simplify your life and dramatically improve your operations. Simply put: If you follow the system, you will check all of the boxes in a way that will make you look like a “rock star.” The challenge is learning it and applying it consistently over time.

As with all processes, improvements come over time through regular evaluations, process reviews, and a commitment to implementing planned improvements. HSEEP is a progressive, building block approach used to identify existing core capabilities, determine target capabilities, and develop the knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to achieve, improve, or sustain those core capabilities. It is scalable by design and elegantly simple if you utilize the key (i.e., progressive) steps. Unfortunately, I often find HSEEP users who throw their hands up in frustration over the massive amount of work before them because they’ve rushed to build intricate full-scale exercises without considering all the foundational building blocks first. Baby steps, Baby … baby steps.

HSEEP Basics

The fundamental HSEEP progression begins with individual skill development training and a progression from drills, tabletop, and functional exercises that lead up to a full-scale exercise (Figure 11.8 ).

Figure 11.8.

HSEEP program progression.

Courtesy Justin Overholt, 2015.

At each step there are evaluations and improvement planning processes. The key thing to understand about HSEEP is that training is for individuals, exercises are for teams (Figure 11.9 ). This is an important distinction as nothing mires an exercise cycle like attempting to train and/or evaluate individuals during an exercise or hindering operational coordination and flow because the requisite individual skill development process was neglected.

Figure 11.9.

HSEEP training focus areas.

Courtesy Justin Overholt, 2015.

Exercises themselves are divided into two basic types: discussion based and operational based. One you talk through, the other you walk through. The Workshop and Tabletop Exercise (TTX) are the most commonly used discussion-based exercises. The main difference between the two is that workshops produce a plan and involve give-and-take to arrive at an end goal. A TTX should be a verbal demonstration of the player’s knowledge of the plan as it’s applied to a given scenario. A good TTX should be short, to the point, and reveal the strategic strengths and weaknesses of the plan being exercised. The workshop is where the plan was developed, the TTX is the talk through.

Operational-based exercises are the “walk through,” made up of drills, functional exercises (FE), and full-scale exercises (FSE) (Figure 11.10 ). The more you move, the bigger the exercise. Individual group’s drill (e.g., ARFF, EOC drills, EMS). A individual group drills (e.g., ARFF, EOC, EMS); a few groups practice working together towards better interoperability and interaction. These are FEs, limited in scope and focused on an interaction between groups.

Figure 11.10.

HSEEP “walk-through” exercises.

Courtesy Justin Overholt, 2015.

When all groups work together in real time (e.g., EOC, ARFF, and EMS) it’s considered a Full Scale Exercise, but these are not meant to be pomp-and-circumstance laden with unrealistic artificial timelines. These are capability-driven, objectively measured dress rehearsals of interoperability.

To put it into perspective, think of a kid’s soccer team. The core capability any team wants to have is the ability to win games. To win games you must score points. To score points everyone on the field has specific duties and responsibilities to perform. The better each individual does their job, in the context of the overall flow of the play, the more likely the team will score points and, ultimately, win games. A lot rides on individual skill, but if it’s unclear which goal the ball is to be kicked toward, no amount of mastery will overcome that ambiguity. The solution lies within the game itself. In the course of play, individual and organizational strengths and weaknesses are revealed and can be sustained or improved upon. Simply discussing the play book (TTX) won’t show physical skills, but will improve understanding of the strategy. Practicing just the offense or just the defense creates an integrated functionality critical to the game’s success. This highlights roles and responsibilities and gives the coach deep insights into how best to arrange the team.

An HSEEP process for a kid’s soccer team would look something like this: The coaches determine what skill sets can reasonably be developed and sustained, and basic plays are written (workshop). Skill sets are developed (individual training). Everyone gathers to learn what the coaches have developed as plays (seminar), each player states their understanding of the play as it relates specifically to them (TTX). When everyone has a reasonable understanding (and can state that understanding), they head out to the field to work on low-level coordination (drills). When the small groups are comfortable about what’s required of them, those groups are brought together and exercised (FEs). As capabilities grow, a scrimmage is arranged and you pretend to play a real game in real time. This is the FSE. Throughout the process you evaluate progress, identify areas for improvement, and work those out—rinse and repeat.

It’s important to note that all exercises—from TTX to FSE—are to run the plays as they are written and understood. These aren’t the forums for bartering, criticism, or argument. The HSEEP evaluation and improvement planning process provides the tools to objectively evaluate performance based on the stated objectives and targeted capabilities. Those evaluations provide the information necessary to develop an improvement plan. The vast majority of progress will be made identifying and improving upon the little things that prevent a smooth operational flow. The magic is in the drills and FEs.

When you’ve done the preliminary work and are ready to tackle the FSE, it’s easy to get sucked into the desire to evaluate too many objectives. After all, you’re going to do a variety of things, why not evaluate them all? While this may seem reasonable at first, collecting too much data can quickly dilute and overwhelm even the most proactive improvement processes. With too much data we tend to lose sight of what is really important, and for us, it’s Continuity of Operations. Every FSE conducted by a commercial airfield should focus squarely on Continuity of Operations. The things that will make the biggest improvements in safety, efficiency, and profitability all require Continuity of Operations. To keep things in perspective, I recommend using only three objectives for any FSE. Those objectives should be: Operational Communications, Operational Coordination, and EOC Operations. These objectives can be aligned with any target or core capability and will ensure the big picture is always in perspective.

The ability for ARFF firefighter’s to make bubbly wet stuff come out of the big green machines is a training objective, not an exercise objective. The ability of paramedics to triage, treat, and transport is similarly evaluated and improved by skills and drills. However, the ability of EMS providers to perform their critical tasks in a coordinated and well-communicated manner as they transition from collecting evacuees from an aircraft on fire to receiving those rescued from the postfire control rescue efforts is an objective of a FSE. To put it simply, if you don’t know how to put on your costume and don’t know your lines, you’re not ready for the show. What should be measured is how are all of those operations coordinated by the EOC, in support of Continuity of Operations, and is everything communicated in a consistent and effective manner.

Sadly, in the rush to satisfy the compliance box, progressive drills and FEs get neglected in hopes that the flash/wow factor of burning debris and moulaged patients garners the attention away from what should be the objectives. Just as operational flow is critical to the success of a commercial airfield, the operational flow of emergency response should be similarly scrutinized and aggressively improved.

HSEEP is an amazing tool and represents best practices for exercise conduct and design. By simply using the process you will ensure compliance with applicable standards and develop legitimate capabilities. Get the training, use the HSEEP templates, and keep it simple. Your training and exercise programs will give you the means to dramatically improve Continuity of Operations in ways you’ve never dreamed possible, all while putting a compliant smile on your FAA inspector’s face.