Prominent critiques warn that states of emergency allow unnecessary magnification of state control, justifying authoritarian rule while privileging interests of elites and the private sector (e.g. Agamben 2005; Chomsky 2020; Foucault 2004). While enabling critical insight into the misuse of state power, too often this scholarship portrays states of emergency as inherently unjustifiable (Scarry 2010) and depicts citizens as merely powerless or blinded by the state (Honig 2009). In contrast, New Zealand’s state of emergency and four‐week ‘lockdown’ in response to COVID‐19 reveals extensive citizen–state collaboration, suggesting how collective responsibility, care and blame may be co‐constituted by states and citizenries in the midst of crises.
In a pre‐emptive move to dampen potential dissent, the Labour government worked hard to portray the lockdown as a positive, collective enterprise. A massive government media campaign proclaimed: ‘we’re all in it together’, ‘unite against COVID‐19’; the police commissioner brushed aside concerns over enforcement by stressing lawbreakers would initially only be issued warnings; and authorities asked New Zealanders self‐isolating after returning from abroad to agree to turn on their cell phones’ trackers to enable monitoring.
Citizens likewise engaged in imbuing the lockdown with an overall positive tenor. Grassroots movements called for renaming the ‘lockdown’ a ‘rāhui’ or protective prohibition, employing a Māori term connoting collective care for the environment. A nation‐wide (later global) display of stuffed animals intended to inspire ‘hope’ was sparked by Prime Minister Ardern’s early endorsement of Teddy Bears in Windows. Public enthusiasm verged on scapegoating as thousands of calls to the police were made of people contravening emergency regulations; a new police online reporting system received 9,600 reports in 48 hours (Anonymous 2020).
Despite neoliberal rhetoric’s emphasis on individualism, societies operate through a range of interpersonal, collective and state–citizen obligations (Trnka and Trundle 2017). Even opposition or scepticism towards government doesn’t necessarily dissolve views of the state as the final bastion of protection (Kirtsoglou 2010) or dissipate desires for more ‘caring’ state–citizen relations (Hage 2003).
Recognising citizens’ involvement in states of emergency requires looking beyond critiques of top‐down impositions of power. As fears over containing COVID‐19 abound, it’s vital to understand how citizen–state relations co‐constitute responsibility and care, and what this might mean for those deemed uncompliant and potentially subject to blame.
References
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