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. 2020 May 13;22(5):548. doi: 10.3390/e22050548

Novel Models of Image Permutation and Diffusion Based on Perturbed Digital Chaos

Thang Manh Hoang 1,*, Safwan El Assad 2
PMCID: PMC7517044  PMID: 33286318

Abstract

Most of chaos-based cryptosystems utilize stationary dynamics of chaos for the permutation and diffusion, and many of those are successfully attacked. In this paper, novel models of the image permutation and diffusion are proposed, in which chaotic map is perturbed at bit level on state variables, on control parameters or on both. Amounts of perturbation are initially the coordinate of pixels in the permutation, the value of ciphered word in the diffusion, and then a value extracted from state variables in every iteration. Under the persistent perturbation, dynamics of chaotic map is nonstationary and dependent on the image content. The simulation results and analyses demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models by means of the good statistical properties of transformed image obtained after just only a single round.

Keywords: chaos-based image encryption, chaotic cryptography, dynamics perturbation, chaotic permutation, chaotic diffusion

1. Introduction

For recent decades, chaos has been discovered in natural, human, and engineering models [1]. It has been also generated by human for pragmatic applications. Two of prominent applications are chaotic communications [2] and chaos-based cryptography [3]. Recently, chaos-based image encryption has attracted increasing interest [4,5,6,7]. That is due to the good cryptographic properties of chaotic sequences [8,9,10,11] and a chaotic system can be implemented on digital hardware [12,13,14,15]. In digital hardware, dynamics of any chaotic system is degraded to periodic orbits due to the round-off errors by the limited number of bits represented for values of state variables and control parameters [16,17,18]. The larger the number of bits representing for chaotic state variable and control parameters is, the longer the length of period is obtained. Beside that, the period of orbits produced by a chaotic map can be lengthened by several methods as suggested in Reference [19]. Two of such methods are perturbation on chaotic states by another chaotic map [20,21] and by using linear feedback shift register (LFSR) [22].

For chaos-based cryptography, at least one of encryption processes is involved by chaos. Along with the Feistel structure, the substitution-permutation network (SPN) structure attains the properties of confusion and diffusion [23], which are widely employed in both conventional block ciphers [24,25] and chaotic ones [26,27,28,29]. Typically, the SPN structure can be realized in chaotic ciphers by means of the combination of permutation and diffusion processes, for example, References [30,31]. The advantage of the SPN structure is that the cryptographic statistics can be increased by means of increasing the number of rounds in each of permutation and diffusion processes and/or in a whole.

For most of chaos-based image cryptosystems, a chaotic system is used for generating chaotic sequences for the permutation and diffusion processes. Firstly, the chaotic permutation is implemented with the involvement of at least one chaotic system to shuffle pixels or bits of pixels within the image. The permutation rule can be static in the form of table or dynamic by inducing from chaotic values. Secondly, the chaotic diffusion is usually realized by a mixture between chaotic values and values of plain pixels. In literature, most of successful attacks on chaotic ciphers are based on weaknesses in algorithms of permutation and diffusion processes, for example, References [32,33,34,35,36,37]. Besides, the works [38,39] points out the criteria and assessment to a chaotic cryptosystem.

Under a cryptographic point of view, it is obviously that the more complicated dynamics of chaos allows the stronger chaos-based cryptosystem. Recently, many chaos-based cryptosystems were proposed with the use of more complicated chaos. Along with the use of hyperchaotic, time-delay, fractional order, and spatiotemporal chaotic systems, complicated dynamics can be obtained by mixed of various chaotic systems such as References [40,41,42,43,44,45]. In such the chaos-based cryptosystems, chaotic systems work with fixed values of control parameters and with non-disturbed chaotic orbits. In other words, dynamics of chaotic maps is stationary in generating encryption keys for the permutation and diffusion.

It is also well-known that analysis of chaotic dynamics can be performed by the observation and measurement of dynamics like trace formulas [46,47,48,49] or inference of control parameters [50,51,52], and so forth. Many analysis methods success with additive perturbation [46,47,48]. With the development of analysis methods, analysis of chaotic dynamics can used as a powerful tool to attack chaos-based cryptosystems [53]. However, to date, there has not been any report about a successful attack to a chaotic block cipher by means of analysis of chaotic dynamics. By applying analysis of chaotic dynamics, chaotic cryptosystems based on stationary dynamics will become possibly insecure in the future. Therefore, one of potential approaches of chaotic image encryption is based on perturbed chaos.

Definitely, a chaos-based cryptosystem becomes much stronger if its encryption keys are dependent on the image content. The involvement of image content in chaotic dynamics is created by an external perturbation. In fact, there are two approaches to create the connection between the image content and encryption keys, dependent on whether the image content involves in chaotic dynamics or not. Firstly, the connection between the image content and encryption keys is established by means of state perturbation, for example, References [9,42,54,55,56,57,58]. References [9,54] present the a selection mechanism in which the image content is used for selecting one of chaotic sequences to generate keystreams. The initial values of chaotic system are fixed, and neither state variables nor control parameters of chaotic system is disturbed during generation of chaotic sequences. As presented in Reference [42], the initial value and the value of parameter of chaotic system are generated with the use of image content for whole encryption, but the parameter of chaotic map deciding the manner of the permutation and diffusion is dependent on the image content of blocks. The advantage is that the value of parameter of chaotic system is updated after every block of image. As presented in Reference [55], the initial value of chaotic map in the diffusion process is calculated by the value of pixels, and the output of chaotic map is used to compute the ciphertext. The important point is that the image content involves in the diffusion by means of its initial value of chaotic map. Whereas, the value of control parameters is kept constant. The same approach as given in References [55,59] is used in the work by G. Ye et al. [56], in which the initial value of chaotic map is computed by information entropy of plain image. In Reference [59], the diffusion process utilizes one of state variables of hyper-chaotic Chen’s system, in which only initial value of chaotic map is being updated after every pixel. In the work of H. Li et al. [58], the orbit of two-dimensional logistic-adjusted-sine map (2D-LASM) is disturbed by the coordinate and the value of pixels during the generation of the keystreams for the permutation and diffusion, while the value of control parameters of (2D-LASM) is kept constant. In another way, the initial value of chaotic map is the output of authentication by SHA-256 as in Reference [57], or the value of control parameter of chaotic map is calculated by the image content as in Reference [60] for generation of finite state machines for the diffusion. As reported in Reference [61], the value of control parameter of Logistic map is calculated by the image content, and it is kept constant in the encryption process. The common point in those works is that control parameters of chaotic maps are unperturbed, so dynamics of chaotic maps is stationary.

Secondly, the dependence of encryption keys on the image content can be created by perturbing on control parameters of chaotic systems. To the best of our knowledge, there are a limited number of published works in this way as in References [62,63]. Specifically, in the work proposed by J. Chen et al. [62], the control parameter of Logistic map is perturbed in the pixel swapping confusion and diffusion processes. In the work by T. Song [63], the control parameter of Logistic map is computed by using the value of pixels, and updated in the diffusion process. In fact, the disadvantage is that the value range of control parameter must be always monitored and adjusted under a condition. Moreover, a number of additional arithmetic operations along with those of chaotic map requires higher computational complexity and resource.

In addition to two main approaches as above described, some other works presents the utilization of perturbed chaos for cryptosystems, for example, References [21,62,64,65]. In References [21,64,65], the chaotic maps are perturbed by additional transformations of state variables or by some conditions, rather than by information of pixels. In fact, additional equations and conditions make chaotic maps more mathematically complicated, but not really perturbed by any external force. Thus, dynamics of chaotic maps is stationary, and the vulnerability still exists [66].

Overall, perturbed dynamics of chaos with the dependence on the image content offers the cryptographic properties better than those with stationary dynamics in terms of statistics and it can resist from the type of chosen plaintext attack. However, reported image cryptosystems based on perturbed chaos have the proprietary structures with the use of specific chaotic systems, and perturbation is realized in arithmetic operations. Under the viewpoint of hardware, more arithmetic operations will require more resource and may reduce the speed of the encryption. In other words, there is a lack of models with a simpler perturbation than those in previous works, utilization of various chaotic maps, and suitability for hardware implementation.

In this paper, novel models of perturbed digital chaos are proposed for the image permutation and diffusion. Perturbation on chaotic dynamics is carried out at bit level by three schemes, that is, perturbation on state variables, on control parameters and on both state variables and control parameters (“on both” for short). Amounts of perturbation can be either the coordinate of pixels in the permutation and the value of pixels in the diffusion or the value extracted from state variables. Chaotic dynamics becomes nonstationary and it provides cryptographic advantages for the image permutation and diffusion. The example and simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed models with the use of Logistic map. It is noted that this work will not go into analysis of dynamic properties of chaotic systems under perturbation, and ones can find that in other works, for example, References [19,46,67,68], and so forth.

The main contributions of the work are as follows: The structures of chaotic perturbation with an external force are generalized, in which three schemes of perturbation are clearly expressed. The models of the permutation and diffusion for the chaotic image encryption are proposed by means of utilizing the corresponding schemes of perturbation. The perturbation is the coordinate of pixels in the permutation and the value of pixels in the diffusion. The statistical and security analyses are carried out for the example using the generic Logistic map as a proof of effectiveness of the proposed models.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows—Section 2 presents some basic preliminaries. The general structures of perturbed chaotic map are given in Section 3. Next, the proposed models of permutation and diffusion for chaotic image encryption are detailed in Section 4. Section 5 shows the example and the simulation results for the permutation and diffusion with various schemes of perturbation using the Logistic map. Finally, Section 6 gives some concluding remarks of the work.

2. Some Basic Preliminaries

2.1. Representation of Images

Let us consider the raster format of a grayscale image is represented as a 2-dimensional matrix I with the size M×N. The element of I at the location (x,y) is called a pixel P(x,y) in binary of k bits as PXY=bk1bk2b1b0. The image can be considered as a collection of pixels represented by

I=x=0M1y=0N1P(x,y), (1)

where M and N are the number of rows and columns of pixels, respectively. In the following text, an entity formed by a collection of elements is denoted by ⋃ with an associated index. In the case of RGB image, each of three color layers can be considered as a grayscale image.

2.2. Bit Representation for Real Numbers

Let us consider that a chaotic map in Equation (6) is implemented in a digital platform. So, the value of state variables and that of control parameters are represented in one of two formats, that is, fixed-point or floating-point number. Fixed-point representation is suitable for most chaotic maps because the value of state variables and of control parameters are in the narrow ranges. Signed and unsigned fixed-point numbers are illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Figure 1

Representation of fixed-point number.

For example, the Logistic map has the range of (0,1) for chaotic state variable, and that of [3.57,4.0] for the control parameter, thus, the format of unsigned fixed-point is suitable. The number of bits required for the integer part in the value of chaotic state and of control parameter are 1 and 3, respectively.

For a signed fixed-point representation, a real number is represented one bit for the sign S, m(int) bits for the integer part and m(frac) bits for the fractional part; or m=1+m(int)+m(frac). The fixed-point number can be written in sequence of bits as (S)bm(int)1b0(.)b1bm(frac). Note that the binary point is in the parentheses, ‘(’ and ‘)’. The value is V=(1)Si=m(frac)m(int)1bi×2i.

For a unsigned fixed-point representation, there is no sign bit. Thus, the number of bits is m=m(int)+m(frac); representation in bit sequence is bm(int)1b0(.)b1bm(frac); and the value is V=i=m(frac)m(int)1bi×2i.

As a real number is represented as a bit sequence, bitwise operations can be applied to change the state of bits.

2.3. Representation of Bit Sequence and Bit Arrangement

Here, the bit arrangement is to permute bits, but the term “bit arrangement” is used to avoid confusing the “permutation” of pixels in the later part of the paper. Let us consider two arrays of bit sequences A=Ai1iIA and B=Bi1iIB. Bit sequences of A and B are Ai=j=1JAai,j and Bi=j=1JBbi,j, respectively. There, ai,j and bi,j are jth bits of ith sequences, and JA and JB are the lengths of bit sequences Ai and Bi, respectively. In order to simplify for the representation, the size of A and B is denoted by IA×JA and IB×JB, respectively.

Let us define a bit arrangement for a general case of IAIB and JAJB. Bit sequences of A are constructed by bits from sequences of B. The rule of bit arrangement is encoded by a matrix Y, and the arrangement operator is denoted by ∘, such that A=YB. For the matrix Y=yi,j1iIA,1jJA, yi,j is the combination of indexes indicating a bit of B. Each row of Y, Yi=yi,j1jJA, is used for constructing a bit sequence Ai, in other words, bit sequences of A are Ai=YiB. It is noted that a bit bi,j of B can be used multiple times in A.

For example, the array of bit sequences B has the size of (IB,JB)=(5,4) as

B=b1,1b1,2b1,3b1,4b2,1b2,2b2,3b2,4b3,1b3,2b3,3b3,4b4,1b4,2b4,3b4,4b5,1b5,2b5,3b5,4. (2)

The array A is constructed from bits of B. A is with three bit sequences, and each sequence has six bits; or the size of A is (IA,JA)=(3,6). The matrix Y is

Y=(4,3)(1,4)(2,3)(4,1)(2,2)(3,1)(1,3)(3,4)(3,2)(2,1)(5,4)(3,2)(4,3)(3,2)(1,4)(3,1)(5,3)(2,2). (3)

So, the array A is as

A=YB=b4,3b1,4b2,3b4,1b2,2b3,1b1,3b3,4b3,2b2,1b5,4b3,2b4,3b3,2b1,4b3,1b5,3b2,2, (4)

where, three bit sequences are A1=b4,3b1,4b2,3b4,1b2,2b3,1, A2=b1,3b3,4b3,2b2,1b5,4b3,2 and A3=b4,3b3,2b1,4b3,1b5,3b2,2.

If a certain bit of Ai is fixed with a predefined state ’0’ or ’1’, the terms BIT0 and BIT1 are used to indicate the states ‘0’ and ‘1’ in Yi, respectively. For instance, the value of bits in A is fixed such as A1=(1)b1,4b2,3b4,1b2,2(0), so Y1 must be as Y1=[BIT1,(1,4),(2,3),(4,1),(2,2),BIT0].

Moreover, except for a number of bits with fixed values, let us define HY to be the number of bits in A taken from B as

HY=i=1IAj=1JAyi,jyi,j(BIT0,BIT1). (5)

These will be used in the proposed models of permutation and diffusion in the later part of the paper.

3. Perturbed Digital Chaotic Map

It is definitely that dynamics of a chaotic system becomes nonstationary if the chaotic system is perturbed by an external force. In this section, a chaotic map with perturbation at bit level is described in two primitive schemes, that is, perturbation on state variables and on control parameters of chaotic map. The third scheme is the combination of two mentioned ones, in which both state variables and control parameters of chaotic map are perturbed. In any scheme, dynamics of chaotic system becomes complicated and that brings advantages in terms of cryptographic properties.

Let us consider a chaotic map defined by

Xn+1=F(Xn,Γ),Xn=[xn(D)xn(D1)xn(2)xn(1)],Γn=[γn(G)γn(G1)γn(2)γn(1)], (6)

where Xn and Γn are vectors of chaotic state variables and of control parameters, respectively; D is the number of dimensions, and G is the number of control parameters; D=||Xn|| and G=||Γn||. The perturbation on state variables is

Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ0), (7)

on control parameters is

Xn+1=F(Xn,Γ^n), (8)

and on the both of state variables and control parameters is

Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ^n). (9)

There, X^n and Γ^n are the perturbed variables and control parameters, respectively described as

X^n=ΨX(Xn,ΔX),ΔX=ΩX(Xn,EX),ΔX=[δX(D)δX(D1)δX(2)δX(1)]T, (10)

and

Γ^n=ΨΓ(Γn,ΔΓ),ΔΓ=ΩΓ(Xn,EΓ),ΔΓ=[δΓ(G)δΓ(G1)δΓ(2)δΓ(1)]T. (11)

There, X^n and Γ^n are X^n=[x^n(D)x^n(D1)x^n(2)x^n(1)] and Γ^n=[γ^n(G)γ^n(G1)γ^n(2)γ^n(1)], respectively; ΔX and ΔΓ are instant amounts of perturbation; ΨX and ΨΓ define the operations of perturbation; ΩX={ωX(i),i={1,,D}} and ΩΓ={ωΓ(i),i={1,,G}} are sets of functions to produce amounts of perturbation; EX and EΓ are vectors of external forces. Note that, the subscripts X and Γ denote for the notations belonging to state variables and control parameters, respectively.

In hardware perspective, values of state variables and control parameters are represented in a format of real number. Thus, all of functions, that is, ΩX, ΩΓ, ΨX, and ΨΓ, operate at bit level. Specifically, at bit level, each bit of operands in such the functions can be manipulated by basic logic gates AND, OR, NOR, NAND, NOT, XOR, XNOR or their combination.

Figure 2 illustrates the proposed schemes of perturbation. The perturbation can be on chaotic state variables, control parameters, or both. IV is a vector of initial condition.

Figure 2.

Figure 2

Chaotic map with perturbations (a) on state variables, (b) control parameters, and (c) both of state variables and control parameters.

In any scheme, perturbation must ensure that chaos exhibits and values of Xn and Γn must be within valid ranges. As given in Equations (10) and (11), the value ranges of Xn and Γn are dependent on both amounts and functions of perturbation. At bit level, values of Xn and Γn are represented in the format of fixed point as shown in Section 2.2. Therefore, ΔX and ΔΓ define the perturbation to Xn and Γn, respectively. The disturbance level on a chaotic map is really dependent on the position of perturbed bits in the representation.

Also, values of X^n and Γ^n are represented by a number of bits, and specific position of perturbed bits is pointed out by perturbation functions ΨX(.) and ΨΓ(.). Let us ΘX and ΘΓ respectively be vectors of value tolerances of state variables and control parameters, ΘX=|X^nXn| and ΘΓ=|Γ^nΓn|. Equivalently, at each time of perturbation, X^n and Γ^n in Equations (7)–(9) are

X^n=Xn±ΘX, (12)

and,

Γ^n=Γn±ΘΓ, (13)

where, ΘX={θX(i),i={1,,D}} and ΘΓ={θΓ(i),i={1,,G}}. As described above, values of θX(i) and θΓ(i) are dependent on the state of bits in δX(i) and δΓ(i) making bits in xn(i) and γn(i) changed. The value ranges of θX(i) and θΓ(i) can be figured out when the positions of perturbed bits are known in a specific scheme of perturbation. In general, this can be defined by ones, and the larger amounts of perturbation will make the more complexity in chaotic dynamics. This suggests that the higher significant bits of Xn and Γn should be perturbed.

As shown in Equations (10) and (11), the amounts of perturbation, ΔX and ΔΓ, are dependent on pairs of values (Xn,EX) and (Xn,EΓ), respectively. At bit level, all functions of ΩX and ΩΓ are bitwise operations, thus basic logic gates and their combination can be used for bit manipulation.

4. Proposed Models of Permutation and Diffusion

In this section, the models of permutation and diffusion are proposed those are based on the proposed schemes of perturbation as described in the previous Section. It is noted that the XOR operation is chosen as the function of perturbation. The superscripts (p) and (d) are associated on the notations to indicate the permutation and diffusion.

4.1. Proposed Chaotic Pixel Permutation (CPP) with Perturbation

Pixel permutation shuffles pixels within the space of image using chaos. The idea of bit-level perturbation to chaotic map as illustrated in Section 3 is employed to propose three configurations of CPP as illustrated in Figure 3. The perturbation to a chaotic system is carried out on state variables (CPP-1), on control parameters (CPP-2), and on both (CPP-3) as in Figure 3a, Figure 3b, and Figure 3c, respectively.

Figure 3.

Figure 3

The structure of Chaotic Pixel Permutations (CPPs) with the perturbation.

It is assumed that a D-dimensional chaotic map F(.) has G control parameters. Values of state variables and control parameter are represented in the fixed-point format by m1(p) and m2(p) bits, respectively. So, values of state variables Xn and its perturbation ΔX(p) can be seen as arrays of bit sequences with the size of D×m1(p). Similarly, values of control parameters Γn(p) and its perturbations ΔΓ(p) are represented by arrays of bit sequences with the size of G×m2(p) bits. Bit arrangements Y1(p), iY1(p), Y2(p), Y3(p), and Y4(p) are to arrange the size of arrays of bit sequences as described Section 2.3. The size of inputs and outputs is given in Table 1.

Table 1.

Bit arrangement.

Bit Arrangements Size of Inputs Size of Outputs
Y1(p) Q×k1 D×m1(p)
Y3(p) G×m2(p)
iY1(p) D×m1(p) Q×k1
Y2(p) D×m1(p)
Y4(p) G×m2(p)

In chaotic behavior, there are constraints in the value ranges of chaotic state variables and control parameters. Specifically, the constraints are met by fixing a number of bits in chaotic state variables and in control parameters, while the rest number of bits can be changeable by the perturbation. So, the number of bits Q×m1(p) representing for the coordinate of pixels XYpresent and XYnew must be less than the number of changeable bits in all the schemes of perturbation. For simplest case, the coordinate of pixels is encoded by a sequence of k1 bits, in which row and column numbers of pixels are respectively represented by k1(x) and k1(y) bits; k1=k1(x)+k1(y).

The XOR operation is chosen as the perturbation functions ΨX and ΨΓ in Equations (10) and (11). In this paper, bit arrangements play a role of the sets of functions ΩX(.) and ΩΓ(.) generating amounts of perturbation ΔX(p) and ΔΓ(p), respectively. For the CPP-1, the chaotic map is perturbed by means of modification of bits in chaotic state variables Xn with bits in an amount of perturbation ΔX(p) after every iteration n (1nR(p)), while the value of control parameters Γ(p) is kept constant. Therefore, the deterministic orbit of chaotic map is destroyed by such the perturbation amount ΔX(p). Similarly, the value of control parameters of chaotic map Γ(p) are changed after every iteration in the CPP-2. Under the perturbation on control parameters, dynamics of chaotic map becomes nonstationary. The CPP-3 is the combination of the CPP-1 and CPP-2 that both state variables and control parameters are updated after every iteration.

Respectively, the state variables of chaotic map with the perturbation as given in Figure 3a–c are

X^0=IV(p)ΔX(p),Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ0(p))forn={1R(p)}, (14)
X0=IV(p),Γ^0(p)=Γ0(p)ΔΓ(p),Xn+1=F(Xn,Γ^n(p))forn={1R(p)}, (15)
X^0=IV(p)ΔX(p),Γ^0(p)=Γ0(p)ΔΓ(p),Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ^n(p))forn={1R(p)}. (16)

The perturbed state variables and control parameters are as

X^n=XnΔX(p),Γ^n(p)=Γn(p)ΔΓ(p). (17)

Amounts of perturbation are represented in arrays of bit sequences ΔX(p) and ΔΓ(p) after bit arrangements as

ΔX(p)=Y1(p)XYpresentforn=1;Y2(p)Xnfor2nR(p), (18)

and

ΔΓ(p)=Y3(p)XYpresentforn=1;Y4(p)Xnfor2nR(p), (19)

After R(p) iterations, the value of XR(p) is used to obtain the new coordinate of pixels as

XYnew=XYpresent(iY1(p)XR(p)). (20)

It is noted that ∘ is the bit arrangement as given in Section 2.3.

4.2. Inverse Chaotic Pixel Permutation

Let us consider Inverse Chaotic Pixel Permutation (iCPP) as shown in Figure 3. The present coordinate of pixels is converted into bits sequence XYpresent, and the XOR operation is used to produce new position, XYnew, at the last iteration. Therefore, corresponding to CPP in Figure 3, there are three structures of iCPP which are denoted iCPP-1, iCPP-2, and iCPP-3, dependent on the way of perturbation to the chaotic map. The structure of iCPP-1, iCPP-2, and iCPP-3 is identical to that of CPP-1, CPP-2, and CPP-3, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 3. The equations describing for iCPPs are the same those for CPPs as in Equations(14)–(20). The value of all parameters in iCPPs must be set the same as that in the corresponding CPPs to recover the original position of pixels as explained in Section 4.1. The main difference between iCPPs and CPPs is that pixels of image in iCPPs are permuted in a reverse direction in compared with that in CPPs of the encryptor, for example, from the pixel at position (M1,N1) backward to (0,0).

4.3. Chaotic Diffusion with Perturbation

The idea of bit-level perturbation to chaotic map as illustrated in Section 3 is again employed to propose three configurations of chaotic diffusion (CD) in Figure 4. The chaotic system is perturbed on state variables, control parameters and on both as illustrated in Figure 4a, Figure 4b, and Figure 4c, respectively. Here, the difference in these structures in compared with those of CPPs is the feedback of CXY. Pixels are diffused sequentially. Array of bit sequences C0 with the size of Z×k2 as an initial ciphertext is used for the first pixel of diffusion. PXY and CXY with the size of Z×k2 are arrays of bit sequences of plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. The bit arrangements in the diffusion Y1(d), iY1(d), Y2(d), Y3(d), Y4(d), Y5(d) and iY5(d), are with the size of inputs and outputs as shown in Table 2. Notably, the constraint is that Z×k2 must be less than the number of changeable bits of state variables and control parameters in all schemes of perturbation. As a simplest application, the value of pixels is represented by a sequence of k2 bits.

Figure 4.

Figure 4

The structure of chaotic diffusions (CDs) with the perturbation.

Table 2.

Bit arrangement.

Bit Arrangements Size of Inputs Size of Outputs
Y1(d) Z×k1 D×m1(d)
Y3(d) G×m2(d)
iY1(d) D×m1(d) Q×k1
Y2(d) D×m1(d)
Y4(d) G×m2(d)
Y5(d) Z×k2 Z×k2
iY5(d)

Respectively, three equations describing the diffusion as displayed in Figure 4a, Figure 4b, and Figure 4c are

X^0=IV(d)ΔX(p),Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ0(d))forn={1R(d)}, (21)
X0=IV(d),Γ^0(p)=Γ0(p)ΔΓ(p),Xn+1=F(Xn,Γ^n(d))forn={1R(d)}, (22)
X^0=IV(d)ΔX(p),Γ^0(p)=Γ0(p)ΔΓ(p),Xn+1=F(X^n,Γ^n(d))forn={1R(d)}. (23)

The perturbed state variables and control parameters in Equations (21)–(23) are

X^n=XnΔX(d),Γ^n(d)=Γn(d)ΔΓ(d). (24)

There, R(d) is the number of iterations for each pixel in the diffusion. It is assumed that the encryption starts with the pixel at (x,y)=(0,0) toward to the last one at (x,y)=(M1,N1), so the arrays of bit sequences ΔX(d) and ΔΓ(d) in Figure 4 are

ΔX(d)=Y1(d)C0forn=1and(x,y)=(0,0);Y1(d)CXYforn=1and(x,y)(0,0);Y2(d)Xnfor2nR(d)and(x,y), (25)

and

ΔΓ(d)=Y3(d)C0forn=1and(x,y)=(0,0);Y3(d)CXYforn=1and(x,y)(0,0);Y4(d)Xnfor2nR(d)and(x,y), (26)

It is noted that CXY is shared between the encryptor and decryptor in the diffusion. After R(d) iterations, the array of bit sequences of ciphered pixels is

CXY=(Y5(d)PXY)(iY1(d)Xn). (27)

4.4. Inverse Chaotic Diffusion

Similarly, three configurations of Inverse Chaotic Diffusion (iCDs) in the decryptor are illustrated in Figure 5. These are almost identical to those of CDs in Figure 4, except for the additional block Z1 and the ciphertext CXY being interchanged with the plaintext PXY at the output. The block Z1 is to make the cipher data CXY delayed to become CXY1 in the feedback. The equations for ΔX(d) and ΔΓ(d) in the decryptor are

ΔX(d)=Y1(d)C0forn=1and(x,y)=(0,0);Y1(d)CXY1forn=1and(x,y)(0,0);Y2(d)Xnfor2nR(d)and(x,y), (28)

and

ΔΓ(d)=Y3(d)C0forn=1and(x,y)=(0,0);Y3(d)CXY1forn=1and(x,y)(0,0);Y4(d)Xnfor2nR(d)and(x,y). (29)

Figure 5.

Figure 5

Figure 5

The structure of inverse CD with the perturbation.

The recovered plain pixels in the form of array of bit sequences after inverse diffusion are

PXY=iY5(d)(CXY(iY1(d)Xn)). (30)

The value of parameters and the operation of iCD are the same as those of CD as described in Section 4.3.

4.5. Space of Secret Keys

It is assumed that the number of bits representing for the value of Xn and for that of Γn in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5 are D×m1(d) and G×m2(d), respectively. The secret keys of the proposed permutation and diffusion are the value sets of initial vectors of state variables and initial values of control parameters. It is noted that bit arrangements are considered as structural parameters rather than secret keys.

Let us define sparam be the number of bits representing for param. Table 3 shows the number of bits encoding for values of initial vectors and control parameters for the permutation and diffusion. In fact, the number of bits representing for the secret keys is dependent on the number of perturbed bits in state variables and control parameters. Specifically, the initial value of IV(p), IV(d), C0, Γ0(p) and Γ0(d)) is represented in the format of fixed point and its values are varying in specific ranges. In the scheme of perturbation on control parameters, the state of some bits in the value of control parameters is fixed to ensure that chaos exhibits while that of the other bits are changeable by perturbation. Similarly in the scheme of perturbation on state variables, some selected bits of state variables are with fixed states while the others are changeable. In other words, a number of bits with fixed states do not contribute to the key space of the permutation and diffusion.

Table 3.

The maximum number of bits representing for the initial values.

Parameter Maximum Number of Bits
IV(p) sIV(p)
IV(d) sIV(d)
Γ0(p) sΓ(p)
Γ0(d) sΓ(d)
C0 sk2

However, the number of changeable bits is as large as possible and must be larger than the number of bits encoding for the coordinate and the value of pixels in the appropriate scheme of perturbation.

4.6. Computational Complexity and Resource Analysis

It is emphasized that the cryptosystems working at bit level are designed with the aim to implement on hardware platforms such as Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Here, the computational complexity is considered in the context of using FPGAs, rather than on PC where the basic data unit is byte. In addition, the example will be given to illustrate the computational complexity.

In fact, the computational complexity and resource required for the proposed models are dependent on equations of chaotic maps and a number of bits are used for representing values of state variables and control parameters. The advantage of cryptosystems implemented on the customized hardware is that a number of bits representing for the format of fixed point can be tailored for the requirement of security and application.

The requirement of computational resource is as follows. The chaotic map requires a number of arithmetic operations and logic gates, that is, multipliers, divisors, adders, and subtractors. A number of XOR gates are used for the perturbation. A number of registers are needed to store arithmetic operands and the result. A memory space is necessary to store the plain image, and the permutation and diffusion are performed on this memory. Moreover, as it is implemented on customized hardware, all the blocks of bit arrangement in the proposed models are interconnection wires.

One of advantages in using chaotic maps for image encryption is the low computational complexity. The speed of hardware implementation is dependent mainly on the speed of arithmetic operations of chaotic map, the read/write cycles of memory during the permutation and diffusion.

For example, the Logistic map in Equation (31) is chosen for the scheme of perturbation on state variable. The hardware resource for the Logistic map is as shown in Table 4. Accordingly, it requires four registers, two multipliers, and one substractor. In addition, a number of XOR gates are necessary to implement the perturbation. In fact, it is small necessary resource to implement when it is compared with the available resource of typical FPGA devices.

Table 4.

Hardware components to implement the Logistic map.

Term Register (Buffer) Multiplier Substractor
xn
a
T1=axn
T2=(1xn)
T1T2

5. Example and Simulation

It is noted that this work is to propose the design of permutation and diffusion with different schemes of perturbation, rather than a cryptosystem. In addition, due to the limit of the space, the example is mainly to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, and only representative samples of simulation results are illustrated in case that other ones are the same. The more detail on the specific application using this approach to design a cryptosystem will be found in other papers published somewhere later.

In this example, the generic 1D Logistic map,

xn+1=axn(1xn), (31)

is employed for both the permutation and diffusion.

5.1. Percentage of Bits Generated by Logistic Map

The Logistic map in Equation (31) is simulated, in which values of xn and a are represented in the format of fixed point as 1.32 and 2.32, respectively. Different values of a are as given in Table 5. It is noted that a=3.9999 is written with 4 digits after fraction point, but in fact the exactly value is 4.0232. The initial value of x is 0.1234567890. For each value of a, the Logistic map is iterated 196,608 times to produce chaotic sequences. Due to the value range of xn(0,1), so the bit b0 representing for its integer part is always ‘0’. The percentage of bits (PoB) for bits b1 to b32 and distribution of values (DoV) of chaotic sequences generated by the Logistic map with different values of a are displayed in Figure 6.

Table 5.

Chosen values of a for the percentage of bits (PoB) and distribution of values (DoV) analysis.

Chosen Values of a Bit Representation in the Format of 2.32
3.6250 11.10100000000000000000000000000000
3.6875 11.10110000000000000000000000000000
3.7500 11.11000000000000000000000000000000
3.8125 11.11010000000000000000000000000000
3.8750 11.11100000000000000000000000000000
3.9375 11.11110000000000000000000000000000
3.9688 11.11111000000000000000000000000000
3.9844 11.11111100000000000000000000000000
3.9999 11.11111111111111111111111111111111

Figure 6.

Figure 6

Figure 6

Figure 6

Figure 6

Percentage of bits and distribution of values of xn.

It is clear from Figure 6 that the lower significant bits, that is, from bits b9 to b32, have PoBs of ‘0’ roughly equal to those of bits ‘1’ for every chosen value of a; whereas the PoBs of b1 to b8 are biased to either ’0’ or ’1’. Besides, DoVs of chaotic sequences are uneven for every value of a. The best DoV is obtained with a=3.9999 as shown in Figure 6q. Intuitively, there is a correlation between PoBs and DoVs. The better DoV is, the better PoBs of higher significant bits are obtained. In addition, PoBs for lower significant bits are independent from DoVs. It suggests that lower significant bits should be utilized for the bit-level encryption, and the value of a should be chosen as close to 4.0 as possible.

5.2. Permutation and Diffusion with Logistic Map

The 1D Logistic map in Equation (31) is employed for the permutation and diffusion, so D=1, and G=1. The notations for state variable and control parameter are Xn=[xn], Γn=[an], ΔX=[δx] and ΔΓ=[δa]. The superscripts (p) and (d) associate with the notations to mention the permutation and diffusion, respectively. It is noted that Logistic map exhibits chaos with 3.56995a4.0, and the value range of xn is (0,1).

5.2.1. Chosen Value of Parameters

Values of xn and an in the permutation and diffusion are represented in the format of fixed point as given in Table 6. The format of fixed point for the control parameters an(p) and an(d), and the state variables xn(p) and xn(d) is given in Table 7, in which some bits are with fixed states ‘0’ and ‘1’, and bits denoted by ‘x’ are perturbed. The bit patterns of state variables and control parameters in Table 7 indicate that the state of bits b0 of both xn(p) and xn(d) is fixed at ‘0’, while that of b1, b0, b1 and b3 of an(p) and b1, b0, b1, b3 and b4 of an(d) is always ‘1’. The XOR operation is used as the perturbation operator. Therefore, the state of bits in perturbation amounts δx(p), δx(d), δa(p), and δa(d) must be ‘0’ at positions corresponding to bits with fixed states in xn(p), xn(d), an(p), and an(d), respectively.

Table 6.

The number of bits representing for the value of state variables and control parameters of Logistic maps, and for the coordinate and the value of pixels in the permutation and diffusion.

Parameter No. of Bits The Format
m1(p) 33 1.32
m2(p) 36 2.34
m1(d) 33 1.32
m2(d) 37 2.35
k1 16 16.0
k2 8 8.0
Table 7.

Bit patterns of state variables and control parameters.

State Variables & Parameters Patterns of Bit Representation
an(p) 11.1 × 1xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
an(d) 11.1 × 11xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xn(p) 0.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xn(d) 0.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

The initial values of state variables and control parameters are chosen as in Table 8. If the perturbation is applied to, values of state variables and control parameters and amounts of perturbation will vary in the specific ranges as given in Table 9.

Table 8.

Initial values of cryptosystem’s parameters.

Parameter Initial and Adopted Values
a0(p) 3.6250
a0(d) 3.68750
IV(p) 0.0123456789
IV(d) 0.9876543210
C0 123
Table 9.

Value ranges of state variables, control parameters, and amounts of perturbation.

State Variables, Control Parameters and Amounts of Perturbation Value Ranges
a^n(p) [3.6250,3.7500) and [3.8750,4.0)
δa(p) [0,0.1250) and [0.2500,0.3750)
a^n(d) [3.6875,3.7500) and [3.9375,4.0)
δa(d) [0,0.0625) and [0.2500,0.3125)
x^n(p) (0,1)
δx(p) (0,1)
x^n(d) (0,1)
δx(d) (0,1)

For simplest assumption, let us represent the coordinate and the value of pixels by a 1D sequence of bits, or Q=1 and Z=1. The 8-bit grayscale images with the size of 256×256 are encrypted, so the row and column numbers are encoded by 8 bits. In other words, XYpresent is represented by a bit sequence of k1=16 bits as (b15b14b13b12b11b10b9b8b7b6b5b4b3b2b1b0) in which the sequences (b15b8) and (b7b0) are encoded for values of xpresent and ypresent, respectively. The value of pixels is represented by a sequence of 8 bits, that is, Z=1 and k2=8. Therefore, The bit arrangements are chosen as in Table 10, in which the bits with fixed states in the state variables and control parameters have the position indicated by BIT0. It is noted from the bit arrangements Y2(p), Y4(p), Y2(d) and Y4(d) in Table 10 that the bits with poor PoBs in xn as displayed in Figure 6 are deliberately used in the permutation and diffusion to consolidate the suggestion to utilize lower significant bits in the encryption.

Table 10.

Matrices of bit arrangement.

Y1(p) [BIT0 (1.1) (1.9) (1.2) (1.10) (1.3) (1.11) (1.4) (1.12) (1.5) (1.13) (1.6) (1.14) (1.7) (1.15) (1.8) (1.16) (1.1) (1.9) (1.2) (1.10) (1.3) (1.11) (1.4) (1.12) (1.5) (1.13) (1.6) (1.14) (1.7) (1.15) (1.8) (1.16)]
iY1(p) [(1.30) (1.18) (1.12) (1.20) (1.16) (1.25) (1.19) (1.13) (1.24) (1.11) (1.26) (1.17) (1.21) (1.24) (1.22) (1.27)]
Y2(p) [BIT0 (1.33) (1.32) (1.31) (1.30) (1.29) (1.28) (1.27) (1.26) (1.25) (1.24) (1.23) (1.22) (1.21) (1.20) (1.19) (1.18) (1.17) (1.16) (1.15) (1.14) (1.13) (1.12) (1.11) (1.10) (1.9) (1.8) (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.3) (1.2)]
Y3(p) [BIT0 BIT0 BIT0 (1.8) BIT0 (1.16) (1.7) (1.15) (1.6) (1.14) (1.5) (1.13) (1.4) (1.12) (1.3) (1.11) (1.2) (1.10) (1.1) (1.9) (1.8) (1.16) (1.7) (1.15) (1.6) (1.14) (1.5) (1.13) (1.4) (1.12) (1.3) (1.11) (1.2) (1.10) (1.1) (1.9)]
Y4(p) [BIT0 BIT0 BIT0 (1.33) BIT0 (1.32) (1.31) (1.30) (1.29) (1.28) (1.27) (1.26) (1.25) (1.24) (1.23) (1.22) (1.21) (1.20) (1.19) (1.18) (1.17) (1.16) (1.15) (1.14) (1.13) (1.12) (1.11) (1.10) (1.9) (1.8) (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.3) (1.2)]
Y1(d) [BIT0 (1.8) (1.2) (1.5) (1.1) (1.7) (1.2) (1.6) (1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.7) (1.8) (1.4) (1.2) (1.7) (1.1) (1.5) (1.3) (1.6) (1.2) (1.4) (1.8) (1.1) (1.3) (1.4) (1.6) (1.5) (1.8) (1.6) (1.1) (1.7) (1.3)]
iY1(d) [(1.3) (1.8) (1.2) (1.20) (1.16) (1.6) (1.21) (1.30)]
Y2(d) [BIT0 (1.16) (1.11) (1.29) (1.32) (1.18) (1.13) (1.10) (1.7) (1.14) (1.31) (1.4) (1.12) (1.26) (1.5) (1.17) (1.9) (1.22) (1.24) (1.15) (1.21) (1.28) (1.23) (1.6) (1.33) (1.19) (1.8) (1.30) (1.2) (1.3) (1.27) (1.20) (1.25)]
Y3(d) [BIT0 BIT0 BIT0 (1.8) BIT0 BIT0 (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.4) (1.3) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8)]
Y4(d) [BIT0 BIT0 BIT0 (1.33) BIT0 BIT0 (1.32) (1.31) (1.30) (1.29) (1.28) (1.27) (1.26) (1.25) (1.24) (1.23) (1.22) (1.21) (1.20) (1.19) (1.18) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.9) (1.10) (1.11) (1.12) (1.13) (1.14) (1.15) (1.16) (1.17)]
Y5(d) [(1.8) (1.7) (1.6) (1.5) (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4)]
iY5(d) [(1.5) (1.6) (1.7) (1.8) (1.4) (1.3) (1.2) (1.1)]

In this example, the four 8-bit grayscale images [69] and two special ones with the size of 256×256 are used for the simulation, that is, Lena, Cameraman, House, and Peppers, Black and White. The simulation is carried out for the permutation and diffusion separately, and the input of the permutation and diffusion processes are the original images. The value of other parameters is chosen as: the number of iterations for each data unit in the permutation and diffusion is R(p)=10 and R(d)=10, respectively; and the number of permutation and diffusion rounds is N(p)=3 and N(d)=3.

Next, the simulation results is to show to effectiveness of the proposed schemes by means of the PoBs and DoVs of perturbed state variables and control parameters.

5.2.2. Simulation Result of Permutation with Perturbation

The PoB and DoV are measured for values of state variables, control parameters as well as amounts of perturbation in the permutation and diffusion processes. It is noted that only significant samples of results are illustrated representatively to save the space.

Permuted images with the perturbation on the state variable, control parameter, and on both are illustrated in Figure 7, Figure 8 and Figure 9. The first column displays the original images, and the second, third and fourth columns are permuted images with different number of permutation rounds N(p)=1, 2, and 3, respectively. It is clear that the visual structure of the original images are completely removed in the permuted images, even after the first round of permutation.

Figure 7.

Figure 7

The permuted images with the perturbation on state variable.

Figure 8.

Figure 8

The permuted images with the perturbation on control parameter.

Figure 9.

Figure 9

The permuted images with the perturbation on both.

Let us analyze the DoV for state variable and control parameter, and amounts of perturbation for each scheme of perturbation. Specifically, the analysis is carried out with the chaotic sequence x^n(p) and the amount of perturbation δx(p) for the perturbation on state variable; with the value sequence of control parameter of a^n(p) and the amount of perturbation of δa(p) for the perturbation on control parameter; and with the chaotic sequence of x^n(p), the value sequence of control parameter of a^n(p), the amounts of perturbation of δx(p) and δa(p) for the perturbation on both. The PoBs for the perturbation amounts are also shown in all schemes of perturbation.

Table 7 shows the chosen pattern of bit representation for an(p) to explain the bias of bits in PoBs. There are some bits with the fixed state of ‘1’ and some perturbed bits with ‘x’. Due to the fixed state of bits, the value range of control parameter is broken apart to separate portions as given in Table 9, and it can be seen in Figures 11b,c and 12e,f in presenting the DoVs of control parameters and amounts of perturbation.

Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 illustrate for the PoBs and DoVs in the perturbation on state variable, control parameter, and on both, respectively. The PoBs are displayed in the first column, and the DoVs are in the second and third columns. Notably, the permutation process uses the coordinates of pixels (x,y) as the input. In addition, for any image with the same size, the permutation rule is the same in every permutation round for any image with the same size, or it is independent from the pixel values. Thus, for each of images, the PoBs and DoVs of the first round of permutation are shown.

Figure 10.

Figure 10

Permutation with the perturbation on state variable: PoB and DoV of amount of permutation and perturbed state variable.

Figure 11.

Figure 11

Permutation with the perturbation on control parameter: PoB and DoV of amount of permutation and perturbed control parameter.

Figure 12.

Figure 12

Permutation with the perturbation on both: PoB and DoV of amounts of permutation, and perturbed state variable and control parameter.

It is clear from the first column of Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 that the PoBs of amounts of perturbation are even for most significant bits, and it is biased for a few lower significant bits in every scheme of perturbation. That is because the higher significant bits of xn(p) are utilized to construct the amounts of perturbation δx(p) and δa(p) by the bit arrangement rules Y2(p) and Y4(p) in Table 10. This is agreed with the PoBs of xn as shown in Figure 6. In other words, the lower significant bits of xn(p) should be employed to generate amounts of perturbation.

The DoVs of amounts of perturbation δx(p) are spread over the range of (0,1) for the perturbation on state variable and on both as depicted in Figure 10b and Figure 12b. In contrast, the DoVs of perturbed state variable x^n(p) cover the lower range of (0,1) for the perturbation on state variable in Figure 10c and the full range of (0,1) for the perturbation on both in Figure 12c. In addition, the DoVs of δx(p) in the schemes of perturbation on state variable and on both are fairly flat while that of x^n(p) is not.

As demonstrated in Figure 11 and Figure 12, the DoVs of control parameter a^n(p) and its amounts of perturbation δx(p) and δa(p) do not cover full range of (0,1) because the bit pattern of an(p) is chosen as in Table 7. The bits at the positions b1, b0, b1, b3 are fixed at the state ‘1’, while bits at b2, b4,...b34 are perturbed. This makes the value range of control parameter reduced and partitioned apart. One perturbed bit in-between of two fixed bits, that is, the bit b2, in the fractional portion of the bit pattern of an(p) makes the value ranges of δa(p) and a^n(p) divided into two separate portions as shown Figure 11 and Figure 12. That is agreed with the portions of value ranges given in Table 9. In general, there are 2nb separate portions of value ranges for nb perturbed bits in-between fixed bits.

5.2.3. Simulation Result of Diffusion with Perturbation

Figure 13, Figure 14 and Figure 15 illustrate the original images and its corresponding diffused ones in the second, third, and fourth columns with different number of diffusion rounds, that is, N(d)=1, 2, and 3. Note that each pixel is iterated ten times (R(d)=10). It is clear that the visual structure of the original images is completely destroyed in the diffused images, even after the first round of diffusion.

Figure 13.

Figure 13

The diffused images with the perturbation on state variable.

Figure 14.

Figure 14

The diffused images with the perturbation on control parameter.

Figure 15.

Figure 15

The diffused images with the perturbation on both.

To save the space, the PoBs and DoVs in the diffusion of only Cameraman image are illustrated in Figure 16, Figure 17, Figure 18 and Figure 19. The result shows almost the same to those in the permutation as described above.

Figure 16.

Figure 16

Diffused Cameraman: PoBs and DoVs with the perturbation on state variable.

Figure 17.

Figure 17

Diffused Cameraman: PoBs and DoVs with the perturbation on control parameter.

Figure 18.

Figure 18

Diffused Cameraman: PoBs and DoVs of state variable with the perturbation on both.

Figure 19.

Figure 19

Diffused Cameraman: PoBs and DoVs of control parameter with the perturbation on both.

The PoBs in the first column shows the bias to bit ‘1’ at the bit positions b28 and b29 of δx(d) in Figure 16 and Figure 18, and at b20, b21, b22, b24 and b25 of δa(d) in Figure 17 and Figure 19. The bias also occurs to bit ‘0’ at the bit positions b8 and b14 of δx(d) in Figure 16. As described by Y2(d) and Y4(d) in Table 10, the bias is caused by higher significant bits of x^n(d) employed to construct the amounts of perturbation δx(d) and δa(d). This is also agreed with the PoBs of xn as shown in Figure 6. Similar to above permutation, the lower significant bits of xn(d) should be chosen to generate amounts of perturbation in the diffusion.

5.2.4. Space of Secret Keys

The secret keys in the proposed permutation and diffusion are the initial values of state variables and control parameters. In fact, values of state variables and control parameters are changed during perturbation. The Logistic map in chaotic behavior requires the control parameter and the state variable varying in defined ranges. That is, the integer portions of values of state variables and control parameters must be ‘0’ and ‘11’, respectively. In addition, there are some bits in the fractional portions of control parameters must be kept constant at the state of ‘1’, for example, bit b1, to ensure that the value range of control parameters in (3.56995,4.0). Therefore, the constraints make the initial values of state variables and parameters contribute the number of bits to the secret keys less than its definition.

According to the adopted values of parameters for the permutation and diffusion in this example, the number of bits represents for the secret keys is dependent on not only that of perturbed bits, but also the constraints in the value ranges of state variables and control parameters of chaotic map. Table 11 shows the number of bits for the secret keys of permutation and diffusion in different schemes of perturbation. The values of control parameters, a0(p) and a0(d), in the scheme of perturbation on the state variables (CPP-1 and CD-1) are fixed, so those contribute 33 and 34 bits to the secret keys, respectively, while other initial values provide 32 bits as defined by the bit patterns in Table 7. In other words, the number of bits in the secret keys can be at least 64 and 72 for the permutation and diffusion, respectively.

Table 11.

The number of bits in the secret keys of the permutation and diffusion with perturbation.

The Number of Bits in the Secret Keys
Scheme Max. No. of Bits # of Bits Sum
Permutation CPP-1 sIV(p) 32 65
sa(p) 33
CPP-2 sIV(p) 32 64
sa(p) 32
CPP-3 sIV(p) 32 64
sa(p) 32
Diffusion CD-1 sIV(d) 32 74
sa(d) 34
sC0 8
CD-2 sIV(d) 32 72
sa(d) 32
sC0 8
CD-3 sIV(d) 32 72
sa(d) 32
sC0 8

It is assumed that the cryptosystem consists of the permutation and diffusion with the perturbation of Logistic map as described above. Therefore, the secret key of a cryptosystem is at least 136 bits in length. That is long enough to resist from the brute force attack running on nowadays computers.

5.2.5. Statistical Analyses

Here, some appropriate statistical analyses related to the content of images are carried out for the exemplar structures of permutation and diffusion. That is, the histogram, information entropy, correlation coefficients, sensitivity of secret keys, measurement of quality, and chosen-plaintext attack as well as chosen-ciphertext one are computed for this example. In the presentation of results in the tables, bad results and the best one are in italic and in bold, respectively.

It is noted that it is unbiased to compare the statistical measures for the permutation and diffusion processes in this work with those obtained by a whole cryptosystem. The simulation result is compared with that in recent works to show the advantages. However, the statistical measures for each of the permutation and diffusion show the separate contribution, if these are employed to construct a cryptosystem.

  1. Histogram analysis

    Histogram reflects the distribution of pixel values of an image. Histogram analysis of an image is considered by means of statistical histogram. The χ2 is measured for statistical histogram. It is defined by
    χ2=i=0K1(OiEi)2Ei, (32)
    where K is the number of grey level (K=256 for 8-bit grayscale images), and Oi and Ei are respectively observed and expected occurrence frequencies of gray level i, with 0iK1. Expected occurrence frequencies of 8-bit grayscale images is Ei=M×NK; M and N are the number of rows and columns of images. The unilateral hypothesis test is to consider the significance of the histogram conforming a uniform distribution. The hypothesis test is accepted (or the histogram is uniformly distributed) if χ2χα2(K1). In this example, the significance level α=0.05 is considered and χ0.052(255)=293.247.

    It is noted that the analysis of histogram is only applied to the diffusion. Four original images and two special images (Black and White images) are employed in the simulation for the histogram analysis. Table 12 shows values of χ2 which are computed for original and diffused images for different rounds of diffusion. The χ2 values of original images are quite large in compared with those of diffused ones. It means that the histograms of original images have clear structures. Specifically, the χ2 values of most diffused images are less then χ0.052(255) after the first round of diffusion, or the histograms of diffused images have uniform distributions. The diffused images of Black and White have uniform histograms from the third round of iteration. However, histogram structures still exist in the first-round diffused Black and White images. It seems that there is not much difference in χ2-test result in different schemes of perturbation. The test results show that the diffusion process provides the histogram statistics equivalent to those produced by a whole cryptosystem for example, Reference [58].

  2. Information entropy

    The information entropy IE(V) is used for measuring the probability of appearance of symbol vi in the message source V [70]. Here, the message source is the encrypted images and symbols are pixels. Calculation of IE(V) for an image is
    IE(V)=i=02k21p(vi)log21p(vi), (33)
    where p(vi) is the probability in finding pixels with value of vi in an image. IE(V) is in bit. In the case of 8-bit grayscale image, the maximum of IE(vi) is 8 as the ideal value. Here, the entropy is only considered for diffused images only, because the permutation does not change values of pixels. Under a cryptographic point of view, the better the statistical property in a diffused image, the closer the value of IE(V) to the ideal one.

    Table 13 presents the information entropy of diffused images obtained by different schemes of perturbation. For four test images, the entropy of original images is much less than the ideal one, while that of most diffused images is very close to the ideal one, that is, larger than 7.99 regardless to the scheme of perturbation and the number of diffusion rounds as well. However, the diffused images of Black and White have low entropy at the first round of diffusion and it increases to the ideal one at the second and third round of diffusion. The result shows that the information entropy of diffused images are equivalent to that in most previous works, for example, References [27,29,58,62].

  3. Correlation coefficient

    The correlation coefficient (CC) among adjacent pixels reflects one of visual properties of images, and it is high in natural images. the CCs in three directions, that is, horizontal, vertical and diagonal adjacency, are measured for a specific pixel. Thus, it is expected that CCs are close to zero in encrypted images.

    Here, the CCs are considered for both permuted and diffused images, and are computed on the full range of images. Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18 and Table 19 show the CCs of permuted, original and diffused images for four test images. Due to special content, the CCs are computed for only diffused Black and White images. The CCs are around or larger than 0.9 for four test images, and are infinity for Black and White images. Those of transformed images are relatively close to zero, and seem to be independent from chosen scheme of perturbation and from the number of rounds. In other words, the visual structure are removed in transformed images. The result of correlation coefficients is also comparable to that given in recent reports, for example, References [27,29,58,62].

  4. Sensitivity of secret keys

    The sensitivity of secret key is considered by means of ciphertext difference rate (CDR) as proposed in Reference [71]. The CDR is computed by
    Cdr=Diff(C,C1)+Diff(C,C2)2M×N×100%, (34)
    where M and N are the size of images; C is the ciphertext using the secret key K; C1 and C2 are ciphertexts using the secret keys K+ΔK and KΔK, respectively; the function Diff(A,B) returns the difference in the number of pixels between images A and B. The function Diff(.) is
    Diff(A,B)=x=1Mx=1NDifp(A(x,y),B(x,y)), (35)
    where Difp(.) is
    Difp(A(x,y),B(x,y))=1,forA(x,y)B(x,y),0,forA(x,y)=B(x,y). (36)

    It is clear that the value difference in pairs of pixels is considered for the CDR. Thus, this can be used for analyzing the sensitivity of secret keys in both the permutation and diffusion for four test images, and only in the diffusion for two special images, Black and White.

    Here, the secret keys are initial values of (IV(p), a0(p)) for the permutation, and (IV(d), a0(d)) for the diffusion. Thus, the sensitivity will be considered for each of components of the secret key, and ΔKname(Schemei) denotes the difference in the component name of the scheme Schemei. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness, only the value of a single component of the secret key is added to and subtracted from the tolerance ΔKname(Schemei) to produce C1 and C2 while the other values are as previously chosen for the above simulation. The smallest value is made by the lowest significant bit for ΔKname(Schemei) in different schemes of perturbation as shown in Table 20.

    The simulation is carried out with four test images and two special ones, Black and White and the results are shown in Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, Table 24, Table 25 and Table 26 for the example that Cdr_IV, Cdr_a and Cdr_C0 are the ciphertext difference rates with a tolerance in three initial values, IV, a, and C0, respectively. Overall, Cdr_IV, Cdr_a and Cdr_C0 are very close to unity with smallest tolerances in each component of the secret keys for any round of diffusion and for every scheme of perturbation. Specifically, for all images, the diffusion produces very good sensitivity to secret key with Cdr larger than 0.994 for every scheme of perturbation. However, for four test images, for the perturbation on state variable, the sensitivity to Cdr_IV is worse at the first round of permutation than that in larger number of permutation rounds. For every scheme of perturbation, sensitivity to Cdr_a is worse at the first round of permutation than that in larger number of permutation rounds. The result is obtained with the bit arrangements as given in Table 10, and it can be improved if higher significant bits of xn(p) and xn(d) are avoided to generate amounts of perturbation. Here, the result of CDRs is comparable to that in Reference [27].

    In addition, the sensitivity to the secret keys can be considered by means of number of pixels change rate (NPCR) and unified average changing intensity (UACI) [72,73]. These are as
    NPCR=x,yD(x,y)M×N×100%, (37)
    and
    UACI=1N2x,yc1(x,y)C2(x,y)|255×100%, (38)
    where D(x,y)=1 if C1(x,y)=C2(x,y), and D(x,y)=0 if C1(x,y)C2(x,y); C1 and C2 are described in Equation (34). The tolerance in the secret keys is as shown in Table 20. The simulation for six test images with the permutation and diffusion using the secret keys with and without the tolerance. The resultant images are used to compute for NPCR and UACI. It is noted that only these are inappropriate for permuted images of Black and White.

    Table 27, Table 28, Table 29, Table 30, Table 31 and Table 32 demonstrated NPCR and UACI for the permuted and diffused images with various schemes of perturbation. Generally, for every scheme of perturbation and for test images except two special content ones (Black and White), NPCR of permutation is increased with the increase of number of rounds, and it is lower than that of diffusion for every component of secret keys. NPCR of diffusion is saturated and fluctuated in the range of 99.4% to 99.7% regardless of number of diffusion rounds, schemes of perturbation, and components of secret keys.

    Similarity, for test images except for Black and White and for every scheme of permutation, UACI of permutation is increased with the increase of number of permutation rounds, and it is lower than that of diffusion. UACI of diffusion is fluctuated within the range of 31.7% to 34.7% for every scheme of perturbation and for every component of secret keys. However, UACI of permutation is different for different test images, and it is better sensitivity to ΔIV than to Δa.

    The values of NPCR and UACI of diffusion in this work are equivalent to those of encrypted images by a whole cryptosystem in most of previous works, for example, References [27,29,58,62].

  5. Measurement of permutation and diffusion quality

    Here, the quality of permutation and diffusion of three schemes of perturbation in the example is measured using the test images by the Mean-Squared-Error (MSE) and Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR). Those are performed to compare the plain images P and permuted ones C as
    MSE=1M×Nx=1My=1N|P(x,y)C(x,y)|2, (39)
    where, P(x,y) and C(x,y) are values of pixels at (x,y) in P and C, respectively, and
    PSNR=20×log10255sqrt(MSE). (40)

    The larger value of MSE is, the higher quality of permutation is obtained. In contrast, the value of PSNR is expected as small as possible. Table 33 shows the quality of permutation by means of MSE and PSNR for four images excepted for Black and White. Values of MSE for the images are large, and those of PSNR are small correspondingly. It means that most pixels of the plain image P are with values different from those in permuted one C, or high quality of permutation is obtained. However, the result shows that values of MSE and PSNR are only unequal for different plain images, but independent from the schemes of perturbation and the number of permutation rounds.

    Besides, both MSE and PSNR are also used for measuring the quality of diffusion. In addition, the sensitivity to the plain images and diffused ones is characterized the quality of diffusion by means of NPCR and UACI. These are considered as follows. A pair of plain images, P and P1 are diffused, in which P1 is a modified version of P with a small change by the state of the least significant bit (LSB). The corresponding pair of diffused images C and C1 are obtained for analyzing the sensitivity to the plaintext. Similarly, the image C is achieved by modifying the diffused image C, and then inversely diffused to obtain the recovered plain image P. Here, the diffusion and inverse diffusion processes are carried out on sequential pixels, therefore, the modification is made to the first pixels of P and C. Here, the NPCR and UACI are given in Equations (37) and (38), and computed on the pairs of (C, C1) and (P, P) for analyzing the sensitivity to plaintext and ciphertext.

    Table 34 and Table 35 display the MSE, PSNR, NPCR and UACI calculated for six pairs of test images, that is, (C, C1) and (P, P), to measure the quality of diffusion and inverse diffusion. Clearly, large values of MSE, NPCR and UACI, and small values of PSNR are obtained. It means that with small tolerances in P and C generate huge difference in C1 and P, respectively; or high quality of diffusion is achieved. Overall, all of measures are independent from the schemes of perturbation and the number of diffusion rounds.

    In detail, values of MSE and PSNR of diffusion in Table 34 are dependent on the content of plain images, while those of NPCR and UACI are not. Values of MSE and PSNR of Cameraman, Black and White images in the diffusion is better than those of Lena, House and Peppers images.

    As given in Table 35 for the inverse diffusion, values of not only MSE, PSNR, but also UACI are dependent on the content of plain images, and those measures of Cameraman, Black and White images are larger than those of Lena, House and Peppers. Values of UACI of Black and White images are extremely good, while those of House are worse.

    The quality for each of permutation and diffusion processes in this example is better than those in recent works, for example, Reference [74,75].

  6. Chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks

    In this work, the permutation and diffusion processes are considered separately. According to the structure of perturbation as given in Section 4.1 and the figures therein, the permuted image in does not depends on the content of plain image. In other words, the permutation algorithms can not resist again chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks. However, the permutation process usually combines with a diffusion one in construction of cryptosystem.

    Here, the diffusion algorithms as described in in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 have image-content sensitivity. The value of pixels are perturbed on the state variables and control parameters of chaotic map. This is similar to the case of authentication as given in References [57,76,77], where the hashed keys with limited lengths (e.g., 256 bits) are computed using the content of image. However, the better advantage in the proposed models in compared with previous works is that the the diffused image is dependent on every value of pixels, or it means that the length of hashed keys is equal to that of image in bits, that is, M×N×k2 bits. Consequently, the diffusion algorithms strongly resist from the types of chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks.

    The simulation result in this example in Table 34 and Table 35 shows the image-content sensitivity by means of MSE, PSNR, NPCR and UACI as the evidence of the image-content sensitivity and resistance from chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks.

Table 12.

χ2-test results of original and diffused images.

Perturbation Round χ2 Test
Lena Cameraman House Peppers Black White
Plaintext 30,577.703 161,271.875 299,789.226 36,777.515 16,711,680 16,711,680
On state variable 1 227.977 313.219 316.805 249.102 22,864.141 27,165.805
2 221.000 266.859 315.852 251.000 340.109 333.063
3 284.180 264.977 273.344 276.367 253.516 259.984
On control parameter 1 284.086 299.234 295.859 299.328 11,590.945 13,372.102
2 299.852 258.188 286.273 254.219 308.008 277.750
3 202.352 241.664 270.242 253.891 238.492 286.703
On both 1 245.086 402.266 218.141 220.531 20,335.578 27,947.445
2 274.539 278.383 237.500 245.391 346.742 406.969
3 249.180 218.383 263.602 231.000 254.031 282.359
Table 13.

Information entropy of original and diffused images.

Perturbation Round IE
Lena Cameraman House Peppers Black White
Plaintext 7.5691 6.9046 6.4971 7.3785 0 0
On state variable 1 7.9975 7.9966 7.9965 7.9973 7.7786 7.7001
2 7.9976 7.9971 7.9965 7.9972 7.9963 7.9963
3 7.9969 7.9971 7.9970 7.9969 7.9972 7.9971
On control parameter 1 7.9969 7.9967 7.9968 7.9967 7.8807 7.8623
2 7.9967 7.9972 7.9969 7.9972 7.9966 7.9969
3 7.9978 7.9973 7.9970 7.9972 7.9974 7.9968
On both 1 7.9973 7.9956 7.9976 7.9976 7.8051 7.7197
2 7.9970 7.9969 7.9974 7.9973 7.9962 7.9955
3 7.9973 7.9976 7.9971 7.9975 7.9972 7.9969
Table 14.

Correlation coefficients of permuted, original and diffused Lena image.

CCs of Lena Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Permutation On state variable 1 −0.00149 0.00281 0.00459
2 0.00636 −0.00316 0.00186
3 0.00104 0.00567 −0.00178
On control parameter 1 0.00404 0.00186 −0.00447
2 −0.00317 0.00474 0.00226
3 0.00432 −0.00125 −0.00538
On both 1 −0.00177 0.00019 0.00383
2 −0.00158 −0.00042 0.00238
3 0.00050 −0.00266 0.00627
Plaintext 0.93998 0.96934 0.91793
Diffusion On state variable 1 0.00400 −0.00131 −0.00288
2 −0.00260 0.01085 0.00013
3 0.00598 0.00835 −0.00248
On control parameter 1 0.00102 −0.00715 −0.00139
2 0.00121 0.00446 0.00829
3 0.00150 −0.00272 −0.00231
On both 1 0.00034 0.00272 0.00070
2 −0.00829 0.00105 −0.00458
3 0.00211 −0.00063 −0.00040
Table 15.

Correlation coefficients of permuted, original and diffused Cameraman image.

CCs of Cameraman Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Permutation On state variable 1 −0.00264 0.00256 −0.00015
2 0.00304 −0.00099 −0.00230
3 0.00295 −0.00813 −0.00334
On control parameter 1 −0.00007 −0.00572 0.00292
2 −0.00148 0.00059 −0.00221
3 −0.00002 −0.00730 −0.00038
On both 1 0.00016 0.00699 −0.00164
2 0.00109 −0.00307 −0.00197
3 0.00142 0.00110 −0.00177
Plaintext 0.91957 0.95494 0.89619
Diffusion On state variable 1 −0.00179 0.00109 0.00259
2 −0.00550 0.00317 −0.00412
3 −0.00091 −0.00021 −0.00421
On control parameter 1 0.00127 −0.00033 0.00351
2 −0.00086 −0.00360 0.00576
3 0.00621 −0.00220 0.00038
On both 1 −0.00147 −0.00302 −0.00257
2 0.00396 −0.00156 0.00449
3 −0.00305 0.00035 −0.00381
Table 16.

Correlation coefficients of permuted, original and diffused House image.

CCs of House Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Permutation On state variable 1 −0.00188 −0.00469 0.00974
2 −0.00069 0.00607 −0.00130
3 −0.00218 −0.00551 −0.00226
On control parameter 1 0.00321 0.00240 −0.00824
2 0.00351 0.00244 −0.00432
3 −0.00174 −0.00843 −0.00204
On both 1 −0.00305 0.00655 −0.00033
2 −0.00494 0.00361 0.00058
3 −0.00776 −0.00395 −0.00247
Plaintext 0.97807 0.96528 0.94835
Diffusion On state variable 1 −0.00276 −0.00311 0.00080
2 −0.00514 −0.00252 −0.00372
3 0.00223 0.00283 0.00318
On control parameter 1 −0.00158 0.00838 −0.00022
2 0.00250 0.00110 −0.00296
3 −0.00127 −0.00378 −0.00435
On both 1 0.00623 0.00086 0.00006
2 −0.00305 0.00285 0.00833
3 0.00254 0.00117 0.00283
Table 17.

Correlation coefficients of permuted, original and diffused Peppers image.

CCs of Peppers Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Permutation On state variable 1 0.00126 0.00560 −0.00196
2 −0.00378 0.00150 0.00998
3 0.00630 0.00290 −0.00124
On control parameter 1 −0.00130 0.00101 −0.00116
2 −0.00210 0.00167 −0.00204
3 0.00610 0.00559 −0.00486
On both 1 −0.00391 −0.00237 0.00564
2 0.00463 0.00445 0.00077
3 −0.00186 0.00124 −0.00264
Plaintext 0.94777 0.94819 0.90359
Diffusion On state variable 1 0.00312 0.00428 0.00276
2 −0.00706 −0.00263 −0.00587
3 0.01129 0.00016 0.00548
On control parameter 1 −0.00205 0.00658 0.00358
2 −0.00166 0.00271 0.00156
3 −0.00023 −0.00465 −0.00167
On both 1 0.00629 0.00720 −0.00560
2 −0.00117 0.00391 0.00134
3 0.00265 −0.00378 0.00388
Table 18.

Correlation coefficients of diffused Black image.

CCs of Black Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Plaintext NaN NaN NaN
Diffusion On state variable 1 −0.01423 −0.01140 0.00404
2 0.00063 0.00347 −0.00619
3 −0.00670 0.00135 −0.00505
On control parameter 1 0.00736 0.00133 −0.00894
2 0.00318 −0.00488 −0.00340
3 −0.00170 0.00001 0.00363
On both 1 −0.00087 0.00442 0.01184
2 −0.00169 −0.00663 0.00323
3 0.00367 −0.00358 −0.00115
Table 19.

Correlation coefficients of diffused White image.

CCs of White Image
Perturbation Round Horizontal Vertical Diagonal
Plaintext NaN NaN NaN
Diffusion On state variable 1 0.00650 0.07976 0.00418
2 −0.00068 0.00049 −0.00469
3 −0.00545 −0.00087 0.00173
On control parameter 1 0.02599 0.01076 −0.00367
2 0.00802 0.00179 −0.00064
3 −0.00398 0.00487 0.00032
On both 1 0.01336 −0.04708 0.00202
2 0.00213 −0.01066 0.00210
3 −0.00394 0.00377 −0.00268
Table 20.

The values of ΔK for Cdr.

ΔK Amount in Binary Value of Tolerance
Permutation ΔKIV(CPP1) 0.00000000000000000000000000000001 232
ΔKa(CPP2) 0.0000000000000000000000000000000001 234
ΔKIV(CPP3) 0.00000000000000000000000000000001 232
ΔKa(CPP3) 0.0000000000000000000000000000000001 234
Diffusion ΔKIV(CD1) 0.00000000000000000000000000000001 232
ΔKa(CD2) 0.00000000000000000000000000000000001 235
ΔKIV(CD3) 0.00000000000000000000000000000001 232
ΔKa(CD3) 0.00000000000000000000000000000000001 235
ΔKC0 00000001 1
Table 21.

Ciphertext difference rates of permuted and diffused Lena image.

CDRs of Lena Image
Perturbation Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 81.876 63.679 -
2 92.301 84.467 -
3 96.131 92.413 -
On control parameter 1 99.384 80.531 -
2 99.424 91.125 -
3 99.439 95.380 -
On both 1 99.177 81.901 -
2 99.414 92.160 -
3 99.427 96.044 -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.485 99.516 99.528
2 99.591 99.583 99.607
3 99.607 99.599 99.603
On control parameter 1 99.530 99.546 99.509
2 99.628 99.643 99.638
3 99.617 99.609 99.622
On both 1 99.496 99.459 99.441
2 99.602 99.591 99.616
3 99.640 99.615 99.605
Table 22.

Ciphertext difference rates of permuted and diffused Cameraman image.

CDRs of Cameraman Image
Perturbation Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 81.145 63.070 -
2 91.579 83.722 -
3 95.350 91.621 -
On control parameter 1 98.576 79.908 -
2 98.669 90.435 -
3 98.658 94.621 -
On both 1 98.399 81.179 -
2 98.618 91.403 -
3 98.583 95.308 -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.506 99.501 99.485
2 99.598 99.541 99.601
3 99.622 99.590 99.608
On control parameter 1 99.550 99.565 99.550
2 99.566 99.567 99.608
3 99.610 99.593 99.622
On both 1 99.471 99.494 99.489
2 99.609 99.610 99.635
3 99.601 99.624 99.559
Table 23.

Ciphertext difference rates of permuted and diffused House image.

CDRs of House Image
Perturbation Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 80.491 62.514 -
2 90.806 83.016 -
3 94.501 90.883 -
On control parameter 1 97.781 79.177 -
2 97.842 89.648 -
3 97.790 93.845 -
On both 1 97.582 80.533 -
2 97.720 90.611 -
3 97.836 94.540 -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.505 99.526 99.534
2 99.593 99.598 99.626
3 99.611 99.619 99.609
On control parameter 1 99.539 99.547 99.546
2 99.598 99.609 99.621
3 99.615 99.603 99.630
On both 1 99.446 99.517 99.483
2 99.602 99.649 99.628
3 99.609 99.601 99.616
Table 24.

Ciphertext difference rates of permuted and diffused Peppers image.

CDRs of Peppers Image
Perturbation Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 81844 63.633 -
2 92.255 84.453 -
3 96.104 92.378 -
On control parameter 1 99.412 80.538 -
2 99.395 91.091 -
3 99.376 95.348 -
On both 1 99.132 81.837 -
2 99.332 92.104 -
3 99.342 95.979 -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.519 99.548 99.506
2 99.621 99.611 99.635
3 99.590 99.593 99.596
On control parameter 1 99.539 99.532 99.550
2 99.612 99.570 99.601
3 99.628 99.609 99.646
On both 1 99.525 99.506 99.492
2 99.614 99.593 99.605
3 99.607 99.581 99.622
Table 25.

Ciphertext difference rates of diffused Black image.

CDRs of Black Image
Diffusion Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 99.464 99.535 99.536
2 99.636 99.631 99.602
3 99.636 99.612 99.629
On control parameter 1 99.596 99.561 99.545
2 99.629 99.605 99.577
3 99.610 99.612 99.608
On both 1 99.505 99.490 99.496
2 99.621 99.611 99.612
3 99.612 99.596 99.619
Table 26.

Ciphertext difference rates of diffused White image.

CDRs of White Image
Diffusion Round Cdr_IV Cdr_a Cdr_C0
Permutation On state variable 1 99.526 99.307 99.551
2 99.584 99.601 99.602
3 99.635 99.597 99.608
On control parameter 1 99.601 99.532 99.548
2 99.608 99.596 99.609
3 99.605 99.610 99.634
On both 1 99.652 99.487 99.495
2 99.587 99.596 99.625
3 99.583 99.600 99.616
Table 27.

Sensitivity to secret keys: Lena image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: Lena Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 98.920 23.359 62.524 14.660 - -
2 99.370 23.433 83.701 19.769 - -
3 99.393 23.444 91.956 21.718 - -
On control parameter 1 99.361 23.383 61.656 14.564 - -
2 99.437 23.483 82.838 19.531 - -
3 99.448 23.497 91.330 21.544 - -
On both 1 98.921 23.393 64.369 15.141 - -
2 99.406 23.446 84.898 19.911 - -
3 99.414 23.416 92.648 21.802 - -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.474 32.444 99.506 32.512 99.532 32.560
2 99.548 33.392 99.577 33.485 99.582 33.557
3 99.585 33.326 99.622 33.474 99.606 33.394
On control parameter 1 99.513 32.449 99.550 32.376 99.529 32.437
2 99.641 33.510 99.629 33.430 99.683 33.407
3 99.614 33.447 99.593 33.573 99.606 33.468
On both 1 99.468 32.089 99.446 31.995 99.426 31.887
2 99.609 33.470 99.579 33.375 99.612 33.586
3 99.638 33.480 99.623 33.533 99.620 33.416
Table 28.

Sensitivity to secret keys: Cameraman image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: Cameraman Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 98.071 27.877 61.920 17.583 - -
2 98.602 27.971 82.889 23.405 - -
3 98.647 28.020 91.190 25.839 - -
On control parameter 1 98.555 27.962 61.220 17.229 - -
2 98.674 28.049 82.205 23.121 - -
3 98.659 28.053 90.585 25.709 - -
On both 1 98.160 27.717 63.721 18.064 - -
2 98.653 27.902 84.224 23.973 - -
3 98.496 28.072 91.945 26.125 - -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.461 32.415 99.487 32.640 99.500 32.382
2 99.600 33.496 99.567 33.348 99.609 33.454
3 99.652 33.332 99.628 33.155 99.565 33.427
On control parameter 1 99.542 32.622 99.539 32.430 99.516 32.513
2 99.554 33.576 99.545 33.477 99.628 33.544
3 99.608 33.472 99.616 33.351 99.617 33.427
On both 1 99.435 31.799 99.490 32.057 99.442 32.075
2 99.617 33.435 99.614 33.663 99.605 33.385
3 99.587 33.604 99.625 33.548 99.548 33.514
Table 29.

Sensitivity to secret keys: House image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: House Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 97.379 20.122 61.424 12.763 - -
2 97.783 20.326 82.204 17.091 - -
3 97.697 20.252 90.462 18.823 - -
On control parameter 1 97.836 20.289 60.628 12.628 - -
2 97.862 20.341 81.473 16.876 - -
3 97.772 20.339 89.882 18.700 - -
On both 1 97.325 20.172 63.226 13.152 - -
2 97.707 20.219 83.489 17.351 - -
3 97.765 20.353 91.173 18.894 - -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.516 32.538 99.526 32.392 99.535 32.441
2 99.553 33.448 99.585 33.333 99.619 33.575
3 99.614 33.525 99.640 33.423 99.619 33.477
On control parameter 1 99.498 32.336 99.559 32.508 99.559 32.399
2 99.574 33.368 99.631 33.329 99.619 33.619
3 99.614 33.439 99.605 33.383 99.623 33.398
On both 1 99.455 32.238 99.507 31.965 99.468 32.009
2 99.591 33.318 99.634 33.481 99.629 33.376
3 99.609 33.507 99.600 33.478 99.631 33.529
Table 30.

Sensitivity to secret keys: Peppers image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: House Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 98.917 23.692 62.494 14.903 - -
2 99.292 23.818 83.687 20.009 - -
3 99.377 23.869 91.925 21.990 - -
On control parameter 1 99.405 23.712 61.658 14.658 - -
2 99.446 23.858 82.838 19.715 - -
3 99.379 23.881 91.324 21.848 - -
On both 1 98.897 23.673 64.308 15.397 - -
2 99.313 23.774 84.856 20.233 - -
3 99.353 23.813 92.627 22.141 - -
Diffusion On state variable 1 99.539 32.535 99.524 32.530 99.489 32.251
2 99.599 33.483 99.591 33.446 99.655 33.359
3 99.617 33.597 99.629 33.506 99.564 33.451
On control parameter 1 99.536 32.516 99.529 32.735 99.541 32.409
2 99.602 33.342 99.593 33.397 99.583 33.332
3 99.651 33.562 99.616 33.392 99.641 33.527
On both 1 99.510 32.037 99.493 31.951 99.469 32.133
2 99.597 33.601 99.594 33.534 99.625 33.599
3 99.608 33.468 99.571 33.328 99.612 33.412
Table 31.

Sensitivity to secret keys: Black image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: House Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 99.458 33.840 99.475 34.093 99.655 34.720
2 99.631 33.481 99.634 33.311 99.588 33.423
3 99.658 33.527 99.628 33.464 99.635 33.485
On control parameter 1 99.574 32.691 99.550 32.792 99.536 32.796
2 99.643 33.532 99.612 33.557 99.590 33.438
3 99.593 33.447 99.626 33.466 99.611 33.541
On both 1 99.498 33.002 99.512 33.075 99.501 32.825
2 99.603 33.436 99.609 33.444 99.608 33.431
3 99.612 33.476 99.609 33.337 99.614 33.361
Table 32.

Sensitivity to secret keys: White image.

Sensitivity to Secret Keys: House Image
Permutation on Round ΔKIV ΔKa ΔKC0
NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%) NPCR (%) UACI (%)
Permutation On state variable 1 99.490 33.649 99.503 32.983 99.526 33.594
2 99.580 33.268 99.588 33.375 99.605 33.362
3 99.619 33.449 99.614 33.587 99.611 33.418
On control parameter 1 99.579 32.484 99.539 32.620 99.574 32.542
2 99.553 33.582 99.564 33.500 99.622 33.480
3 99.606 33.412 99.620 33.577 99.620 33.608
On both 1 99.715 33.137 99.490 32.962 99.486 32.627
2 99.591 33.239 99.579 33.613 99.619 33.342
3 99.580 33.431 99.596 33.449 99.602 33.627
Table 33.

Quality of permutation based on MSE and PSNR.

Perturbation Round Lena Cameraman House Peppers
MSE PSNR MSE PSNR MSE PSNR MSE PSNR
On state variable 1 5.498×103 10.729 9.292 ×103 8.450 4.180 ×103 11.919 5.658 ×103 10.604
2 5.448 ×103 10.769 9.420 ×103 8.390 4.208 ×103 11.890 5.634 ×103 10.622
3 5.475 ×103 10.747 9.359 ×103 8.419 4.200 ×103 11.898 5.636 ×103 10.621
On control parameter 1 5.471 ×103 10.750 9.422 ×103 8.389 4.184 ×103 11.915 5.679 ×103 10.588
2 5.461 ×103 10.758 9.355 ×103 8.421 4.220 ×103 11.877 5.642 ×103 10.617
3 5.481 ×103 10.742 9.446 ×103 8.378 4.235 ×103 11.862 5.666 ×103 10.598
On both 1 5.457 ×103 10.762 9.361 ×103 8.418 4.164 ×103 11.935 5.648 ×103 10.611
2 5.439 ×103 10.776 9.398 ×103 8.401 4.181 ×103 11.918 5.641 ×103 10.617
3 5.456 ×103 10.762 9.409 ×103 8.395 4.243 ×103 11.854 5.642 ×103 10.616
Table 34.

Quality of diffusion based on MSE, PSNR, NPCR and UACI.

Perturbation Round Lena Cameraman House
MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI
On state variable 1 9.053 ×103 8.563 99.669 33.507 1.171 ×104 7.447 99.530 32.436 7.673 ×103 9.281 99.519 32.343
2 8.950 ×103 8.613 99.582 33.446 1.174 ×104 7.435 99.640 33.405 7.720 ×103 9.255 99.611 33.529
3 9.008 ×103 8.585 99.596 33.343 1.174 ×104 7.436 99.612 33.423 7.734 ×103 9.247 99.634 33.464
On control parameter 1 9.017 ×103 8.580 99.626 33.515 1.181 ×104 7.408 99.538 32.625 7.617 ×103 9.313 99.599 32.417
2 9.028 ×103 8.575 99.603 33.475 1.180 ×104 7.411 99.651 33.663 7.716 ×103 9.257 99.544 33.480
3 9.027 ×103 8.575 99.609 33.412 1.178 ×104 7.420 99.594 33.377 7.641 ×103 9.299 99.596 33.475
On both 1 9.036 ×103 8.571 99.602 33.471 1.172 ×104 7.443 99.458 32.003 7.635 ×103 9.303 99.486 32.144
2 9.049 ×103 8.565 99.577 33.485 1.159 ×104 7.490 99.597 33.603 7.750 ×103 9.238 99.617 33.537
3 9.078 ×103 8.551 99.596 33.557 1.173 ×104 7.438 99.637 33.425 7.706 ×103 9.262 99.658 33.567
Perturbation Round Peppers Black White
MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI
On state variable 1 8.388 ×103 8.894 99.539 32.344 2.842 ×104 3.595 99.638 34.519 2.783 ×104 3.685 99.550 33.651
2 8.363 ×103 8.907 99.608 33.370 2.160 ×104 4.785 99.620 33.408 2.158 ×104 4.790 99.608 33.395
3 8.304 ×103 8.938 99.614 33.498 2.174 ×104 4.758 99.616 33.457 2.177 ×104 4.753 99.616 33.535
On control parameter 1 8.331 ×103 8.924 99.545 32.445 2.690 ×104 3.834 99.556 32.726 2.692 ×104 3.829 99.571 32.695
2 8.307 ×103 8.936 99.605 33.588 2.157 ×104 4.791 99.625 33.424 2.175 ×104 4.756 99.608 33.538
3 8.292 ×103 8.944 99.585 33.350 2.172 ×104 4.762 99.622 33.489 2.173 ×104 4.761 99.631 33.366
On both 1 8.400 ×103 8.888 99.492 32.118 2.797 ×104 3.663 99.464 32.788 2.844 ×104 3.592 99.567 32.127
2 8.317 ×103 8.931 99.645 33.318 2.162 ×104 4.781 99.585 33.380 2.188 ×104 4.730 99.634 33.577
3 8.337 ×103 8.921 99.605 33.522 2.178 ×104 4.751 99.619 33.314 2.168 ×104 4.771 99.583 33.539
Table 35.

Quality of inverse diffusion based on MSE, PSNR, NPCR and UACI.

Perturbation Round Lena Cameraman House
MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI
On state variable 1 9.006 ×103 8.586 99.640 30.508 1.174 ×104 7.436 99.526 34.751 7.766 ×103 9.229 99.507 28.680
2 9.076 ×103 8.552 99.616 30.638 1.174 ×104 7.433 99.606 34.740 7.661 ×103 9.288 99.588 28.407
3 9.033 ×103 8.573 99.612 30.610 1.168 ×104 7.457 99.600 34.599 7.652 ×103 9.293 99.567 28.457
On control parameter 1 9.064 ×103 8.558 99.602 30.650 1.172 ×104 7.440 99.527 34.648 7.758 ×103 9.233 99.542 28.635
2 8.993 ×103 8.592 99.617 30.439 1.166 ×104 7.465 99.628 34.646 7.738 ×103 9.244 99.660 28.643
3 8.991 ×103 8.593 99.611 30.463 1.168 ×104 7.457 99.619 34.590 7.685 ×103 9.275 99.643 28.482
On both 1 9.038 ×103 8.570 99.593 30.608 1.168 ×104 7.456 99.484 34.607 7.680 ×103 9.277 99.497 28.482
2 9.027 ×103 8.575 99.614 30.560 1.164 ×104 7.473 99.602 34.547 7.683 ×103 9.275 99.641 28.476
3 9.112 ×103 8.535 99.611 30.758 1.175 ×104 7.431 99.614 34.712 7.687 ×103 9.273 99.596 28.486
Perturbation Round Peppers Black White
MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI MSE PSNR NPCR UACI
On state variable 1 8.267 ×103 8.958 99.599 29.396 2.167 ×104 4.772 99.515 49.902 2.164 ×104 4.778 99.469 49.836
2 8.338 ×103 8.920 99.521 29.474 2.155 ×104 4.796 99.583 49.718 2.179 ×104 4.748 99.634 50.126
3 8.304 ×103 8.938 99.583 29.420 2.170 ×104 4.767 99.593 49.954 2.174 ×104 4.758 99.609 49.990
On control parameter 1 8.321 ×103 8.929 99.583 29.458 2.159 ×104 4.788 99.593 49.761 2.159 ×104 4.788 99.545 49.853
2 8.305 ×103 8.937 99.600 29.470 2.170 ×104 4.767 99.603 49.964 2.163 ×104 4.779 99.643 49.900
3 8.302 ×103 8.939 99.622 29.465 2.173 ×104 4.761 99.640 50.021 2.178 ×104 4.750 99.619 50.060
On both 1 8.304 ×103 8.938 99.498 29.425 2.172 ×104 4.762 99.492 50.025 2.148 ×104 4.810 99.469 49.646
2 8.298 ×103 8.941 99.599 29.396 2.159 ×104 4.789 99.626 49.821 2.173 ×104 4.760 99.631 50.057
3 8.322 ×103 8.928 99.643 29.464 2.170 ×104 4.766 99.611 49.968 2.175 ×104 4.756 99.652 50.046

6. Concluding Remarks

The present work has proposed the structural models of image permutation and diffusion based on perturbed digital chaos. Dynamics of chaotic map is nonstationary during encryption. This introduces a class of chaotic ciphers utilizing the perturbation. To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed models, the example employed the simplest chaotic map, that is, Logistic map. The simulation results of permutation and diffusion have been analyzed separately. Overall, the best result is obtained in the case of perturbation on both state variable and control parameter. The results are comparable to those reported in recent works, for example, References [27,55] and References [27,29,58,62]. There are some remarks in the proposed models of permutation and diffusion with the perturbed chaos.

Due to the dependency of image content, it should be ensured in any specific design that dynamics of chaos has good statistical properties and the cryptographic performance is obtained for special image contents. In fact, any chaotic map can be employed for the proposed models. A requirement for implementation is that the total number of perturbed bits in state variables or control parameters in a specific scheme of perturbation must be equal or larger than that representing for the coordinates and values of pixels. In addition, the key space of the proposed schemes is dependent on the number of perturbed bits. This can be expanded with the increase in the number of bits represented for state variables and control parameters in appropriate scheme of perturbation. It also means that the period of dynamics is lengthened. Besides, bits with fixed states in the value of state variables and control parameters will make value ranges of state variables and control parameters valid in separate intervals. The number of bits representing for chaotic variables and control parameters should be chosen to keep balanced between the expected size of key space and the resource available in the implementation platform.

Moreover, the structure of permutation is almost similar to that of diffusion in the same scheme of perturbation. The main difference in the structures is the way that the coordinate and the value of pixels are perturbed on state variables and control parameters, and in their recovery processes from the state variables. In the proposed structures, the rule of perturbation by means of controlling the switching is defined by Equations (19) and (18) for the permutation and by Equations (26) and (25) for diffusion. This can be changed to have better security performance. For specific sizes of images, the modulo operation can be used to figure out new coordinate of pixels in the case that the size of images along any axis is unequal to 2n; n is an integer.

Lastly, the required resource for hardware implementation is quite low in compared with typical FPGAs. In addition, there is no operation of comparison in the hardware, thus these models can have high speed operation. Further speed can be improved by combining more than one coordinate or value of pixels perturbing on chaotic dynamics at a time. This is allowed in the case the number of perturbed bits is large enough to attain that of bits of coordinates or values of pixels. The models can be simply realized in hardware with the use of multipliers, adders, XOR gates and switches. Hardware design will be implemented on FPGAs as the future work of the proposed models.

Author Contributions

Funding acquisition, T.M.H.; Validation, S.E.A.; Writing–original draft, T.M.H.; Writing–review & editing, T.M.H. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research is funded by Vietnam National Foundation for Science and Technology Development (NAFOSTED) under grant number 102.04-2018.06.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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