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BMJ - PMC COVID-19 Collection logoLink to BMJ - PMC COVID-19 Collection
. 2020 Oct 1;5(10):e003549. doi: 10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003549

Symptoms of a broken system: the gender gaps in COVID-19 decision-making

Kim Robin van Daalen 1,2,, Csongor Bajnoczki 3, Maisoon Chowdhury 2, Sara Dada 2,4, Parnian Khorsand 2, Anna Socha 3, Arush Lal 2, Laura Jung 2,5, Lujain Alqodmani 6, Irene Torres 7, Samiratou Ouedraogo 8,9, Amina Jama Mahmud 10,11, Roopa Dhatt 2, Alexandra Phelan 12, Dheepa Rajan 3
PMCID: PMC7533958  PMID: 33004348

Summary box.

  • Despite numerous global and national commitments to gender-inclusive global health governance, COVID-19 followed the usual modus operandi –excluding women’s voices. A mere 3.5% of 115 identified COVID-19 decision-making and expert task forces have gender parity in their membership while 85.2% are majority men.

  • With 87 countries included in this analysis, information regarding task force composition and membership criteria was not easily publicly accessible for the majority of United Nations Member States, impeding the ability to hold countries accountable to previously made commitments.

  • Lack of representation is one symptom of a broken system where governance is not inclusive of gender, geography, sexual orientation, race, socio-economic status or disciplines within and beyond health – ultimately excluding those who offer unique perspectives and expertise.

  • Functional health systems require radical and systemic change that ensures gender-responsive and intersectional practices are the norm – rather than the exception.

  • Open, inclusive and transparent communication and decision-making must be prioritised over closed-door or traditional forms of governance.

  • Data collection and governance policies must include sex and gender data, and strive for an intersectionality approach that includes going beyond binary representation in order to produce results that are inclusive of the full gender spectrum.

A growing chorus of voices are questioning the glaring lack of women in COVID-19 decision-making bodies. Men dominating leadership positions in global health has long been the default mode of governing. This is a symptom of a broken system where governance is not inclusive of any type of diversity, be it gender, geography, sexual orientation, race, socio-economic status or disciplines within and beyond health – excluding those who offer unique perspectives, expertise and lived realities. This not only reinforces inequitable power structures but undermines an effective COVID-19 response – ultimately costing lives.

By providing quantitative data, we critically assess the gender gap in task forces organised to prevent, monitor and mitigate COVID-19, and emphasise the paramount exclusion of gender-diverse voices.

Retreating to the non-inclusive default mode of governance

The global community was unprepared as COVID-19 struck. As a result, countries swiftly established expert and decision-making structures through traditional processes: reaching out to government ministry directors, prominent experts and heads of well-known institutions. Most of these positions are typically held by men, as evidenced by our analysis of 115 expert and decision-making COVID-19 task forces from 87 countries: 85.2% of identified national task forces (n=115) contain mostly men, only 11.4% contain predominantly women and a mere 3.5% exhibit gender parity.* Similarly, 81.2% (n=65) of these task forces were headed by men (table 1).

Table 1.

Identified national COVID-19 task forces

# Country (Reference) Name of the task force convened Type of task force Gender Women head of force Public Women head of gov Note
1 Albania23 Technical Committee of Experts(for Covid-19)
“Komiteti i Ekspertëve”
Expert 8W; 3M (11 total)
72.7%W
Unknown Yes No, Edi Rama N/A
2 Algeria24 National Committee for Monitoring and Follow-up of the Corona Virus (Covid-19)
اللجنة الوطنية العلمية لرصد ومتابعة تفشي فيروس كورون
Expert 0W; 11M (11 total)
0%W
No, Abderahmane Ben Bouzid Yes No, Abdelaziz Djerad N/A
3 Argentina25 26 Committee of medical and scientific experts
“Comité de expertos médicos y cientificos”
Expert 4W; 6M (10 total)
40%W
Unknown Yes No, Alberto Fernández N/A
4 Armenia27 28 Interdepartmental Commission for Coordinating the Prevention of the Spread of the new Coronavirus
“միջգերատեսչական հանձնաժողով”
Decision-making 4W; 10M (14 total)
28.6%W
No, Arsen Torosyan Yes No, Nikol Pashinyan N/A
IT working group modelling spread of coronavirus in Armenia
(No formal name)
Expert 0W; 12M (12 total)
0%W
Unknown Yes Photo reference(s) were used to determine gender composition.
5 Australia29–32 Australian National COVID-19 Coordination Commission Decision-making 2W; 6M (8 total)
25%W
No, Neville Power Yes No, Scott Morrison N/A
Australian Health Protection Principal Committee Decision-making 3W; 6M (9 total)
33.3%W
No, Brendan Murphy Yes N/A
6 Austria33 Coronavirus Taskforce
“Hausinternen Stabs der Coronavirus-Taskforce”
Decision-making 6W; 4M (10 total)
60%W
Unknown Yes No, Sebastian Kurz N/A
Advisory Team to the Coronavirus Taskforce
“Beraterstabs der Coronavirus-Taskforce”
Expert 5W; 13M (18 total)
27.8%W
Unknown Yes N/A
7 Bahamas34 35 National Coordination Committee on COVID-19 Decision-making 6W; 11M (17 total)
35.3%
Yes (co-chair),
Pearl McMillan and Matt Aubry
Yes No, Hubert Minnis N/A
8 Bahrain36 National Taskforce for Combating Coronavirus (COVID-19)
الفريق الوطني للتصدي لفيروس كورونا
Decision-making and expert 2W; 3M (5 total)
40%
Unknown Yes No, Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa N/A
9 Bangladesh37 National Committee for Prevention and Control of Covid-19
“জাতীয় কমিটি কোভিড -১৯ এর প্রতিরোধ ও নিয়ন্ত্রণের জন্য”
Decision-making 4W; 28M (32 total)
12.5%W
No, Zahid Maleque Yes Yes, Sheikh Hasina N/A
10 Belgium38 39 Scientific Committee for Coronavirus
“Wetenschappelijk comité Coronavirus”
“Comité scientifique Coronavirus”
Expert 3W; 2M (5 total)
60%W
No, Steven van Gucht Yes Yes, Sophie Wilmes N/A
11 Benin40 Interdepartmental Committee
“Comité interministériel”
Decision-making 0W; 4M (4 total)
0%W
No, unknown Yes No, Patrice Talon N/A
12 Bhutan41 Health Emergency Management Committee Decision-making 2W; 11M (13 total)
15.4% W
Yes, Lyonpo Dechen Wangmo Yes No, Lotay Tshering N/A
Technical Advisory Group Expert 2W; 11M (13 total)
15.4%W
No, Sithar Dorjee Yes N/A
13 Bolivia42 Scientific Advisory Council
“Consejo Científico Asesor para la lucha contra COVID-19 en Bolivia”
Expert 2W; 6M (8 total)
25%W
No, Carlos Javier Cuellar Yes Yes, Jeanine Añez N/A
14 Botswana43 COVID-19 Task Force Team Expert 0W; 4M (4 total)
0%W
No, unknown Yes No, Mokgweetsi Masisi N/A
15 Brazil44–49 Interministerial Executive Group on Public Health Emergency of National and International Importance
“Grupo Executivo Interministerial de Emergência em Saúde Pública de Importância Nacional e Internacional”
Decision-making 1W; 8M (9 total)
11.1%W
Unknown Yes No, Jair Bolsonaro N/A
Crisis Committee for Supervision and Monitoring of Covid-19 Impacts
“Comitê de Crise para Supervisão e Monitoramento dos Impactos da Covid-19”
Unclear 1W; 21M (22 total)
4.5%W
Unknown Yes N/A
16 Bulgaria50 Medical Council
“медицинския мозъчен тръст"
Expert 5W; 11M (16 total)
31.3%W
Unknown Yes No, Boyko Borisov Committee was dispersed (functioned until 4 April)
17 Burkina Faso51 Name unknown Decision-making & Expert 5W; 14M (19 total)
26.3%W
Unknown No No, Christophe Joseph Marie Dabiré N/A
18 Cape Verde52–54 Council of Ministers
“Conselho de Ministros”
Decision-making 3W; 12M (15 total)
20%W
Unknown Yes No, Ulisses Correia e Silva N/A
19 Canada55–59 Cabinet Committee on the federal response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Decision-making 4W; 4M (8 total)
50%W
Yes, Chrystia Freeland Yes No, Justin Trudeau N/A
Special Advisory Committee on COVID-19 Expert 12W; 11M
(23 total) 52.2%W
Yes, Theresa Tam and Sadiq Shahab Yes N/A
20 Chad60 Scientific Committee for Covid-19
“Comité Scientifique Covid-19”
Expert 4W; 33M (37 total)
10.8%W
Unknown No No, Idriss Déby N/A
21 Chile61 Scientific Advisory Council for Covid-19
“Consejo científico asesor por Covid-19”
Expert 4W; 6M (10 total)
40%W
Unknown Yes No, Sebastián Piñera N/A
22 China 62–66 Central Leading Group on Responding to the Novel Coronavirus Disease Outbreak
“Xīnxíng guānzhuàng bìngdú gǎnrǎn xìng fèiyán zhōngyāng lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ”
Decision-making 1W; 8M (9 total)
11.1%W
No, Li Keqiang Yes No, Li Keqiang N/A
Central Steering Group (unofficial name)
“Zhōngyāng zhǐdǎo xiǎozǔ”
Other 2W; 10M (12 total)
16.7%W
Yes, Sun Chunlan Yes N/A
23 Colombia67 Contingency plan to respond to the emergency by COVID-19
“Plan de contingencia para responder ante la emergencia por COVID-19”
Decision-making 5W; 9M (14 total)
35.7%W
Unknown Yes No, Iván Duque N/A
24 Comoros68 Comité National de Coordination – Cadre de Gestion et de Coordination de la Crise du Covid-19
“National Coordination Committee - Management and Coordination Framework for the Covid-19 Crisis”
Decision-making & expert 2W; 33M (35 total)
5.7%W
Unknown No No, Azali Assoumani N/A
25 Congo69 National coordination for the management of the coronavirus pandemic
“Coordination nationale de gestion de la pandémie de coronavirus (COVID-19)”
Decision-making 3W; 12M (15 total)
20%W
Yes, Jacqueline Lydia Mikolo Yes No, Clément Mouamba N/A
26 Costa Rica70 The National Commission for Risk Prevention and Emergency Attention
“La Comisión Nacional de Prevención de Riesgos y Atención de Emergencias (CNE)”
Decision-making 3W; 17M (20 total)
15%W
No, Alexander Solís Delgado Yes No, Carlos Alvarado Quesada N/A
27 Côte d'Ivoire71 The scientific committee
“Le comité scientifique”
Expert 1W; 5M (6 total)
16.7%W
Unknown No No, Amadou Gon Coulibaly N/A
28 Cuba72 73 The working group for the prevention and control of COVID-19
“El grupo de trabajo para la prevención y el control de la COVID-19”
Decision-making 5W; 10M (15 total)
33.3%W
No, Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, Manuel Marrero Cruz and Salvador Valdés Mesa Yes No, Manuel Marrero Cruz Photo reference(s) were used to determine gender composition. This may not be complete.
29 Cyprus74–76 Council of Ministers Decision-making 1W; 11M (12 total)
8.3%W
No, Nicos Anastasiades Yes No, Nicos Anastasiades N/A
30 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea77 78 (enlarged) Political Bureau Decision-making 1W; 47M (48 total)
2.1%W
No, Kim Jong-un Yes No, Kim Jong-un Photo reference(s) were used to determine gender composition.
31 Democratic Republic of the Congo79–81 Multisectoral crisis committee
“Comité multisectoriel de crise”
Decision-making 3W; 16M (19 total)
15.8%W
No, Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba Yes No, Sylvestre Ilunga Ilunkamba Photo reference(s) were used to determine gender composition.
Management Committee of the National Solidarity Fund against Coronavirus
“Comité de gestion du Fonds national de solidarité contre le Coronavirus (FNSCC)”
Other 2W; 10M (12 total)
16.7%W
No, Révérend Dominique Mukanya Yes N/A
32 Djibouti82 83 Steering committee
“Comité de pilotage”
Decision-making 1W; 9M (10 total)
10%W
No, Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed Yes No, Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed N/A
33 Dominican Republic84 Emergency and Health Management Committee to Combat COVID-19
“Comité de Emergencia y Gestión Sanitaria para el Combate del COVID-19”
Decision-making and expert 1W; 6M (7 total)
14.3%W
No, Amado Alejandro Baez Yes No, Danilo Medina N/A
34 Ecuador85 86 COVID-19 Technical Team
“Mesa Técnica COVID-19”
Expert 8W; 23M (31 total)
25.8%W
Unknown Yes No, Lenín Moreno N/A
National Epidemiological Coordination
“Coordinación Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemiológica”
Expert 3W; 2M (5 total)
60%W
Unknown Yes N/A
35 Estonia87 Government Commission
“Valitsuskomisjon”
Decision-making 1W; 9M (10 total)
10%W
No, Jüri Ratas Yes No, Jüri Ratas N/A
Scientific Advisory Board
“Teadusnõukoda”
Expert 3W; 2M (5 total)
60%W
Yes, Irja Lutsar Yes N/A
36 Eswatini88 National Emergency Management Committee Decision-making 3W; 8M (11 total)
27.27%W
No, Themba N. Masuku Yes No, Ambrose Mandvulo Dlamini N/A
National Emergency Task Force Other 7W; 21M (28 total)
25%W
Unknown Yes N/A
37 Ethiopia89 90 COVID19 National Ministerial Committee Decision-making 2W; 2M (four total)
50%W
Unknown Yes No, Abiy Ahmed N/A
National COVID-19 advisory committee Expert 6W; 17M (23 total)
26.1%M
Unknown Yes N/A
38 Finland91 92 Working group on essential work-related travel and other traffic Other 11W; 7M (18 total)
61.1%W
Yes, Sonja Hämäläinen Yes Yes, Sanna Marin N/A
Working group to examine realisation of children’s rights in aftermath of coronavirus Other 4W; 2M (6 total)
66.6%W
No, Esa Iivonen Yes N/A
39 France93–96 The Covid-19 Scientific Council
“Le Conseil Scientifique Covid-19”
Expert 2W; 9M (11 total)
18.2%W
No, Jean-François Delfraissy Yes No, Édouard Philippe N/A
Research and expertise analysis committee
“Comité analyse recherche et expertise”
Expert 5W; 7M (12 total)
41.7%W
Yes, Françoise Barré-Sinoussi Yes N/A
40 Gabon97 Scientific committee on the Coronavirus epidemic
“Comité scientifique sur l’épidémie à Coronavirus (CS Covid-19)”
Expert 1W; 7M (8 total)
12.5%W
Yes, Pr Marielle Bouyou Akothe Yes No, Julien Nkoghe Bekale N/A
41 Ghana98 99 Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee (IMCC) on Decentralisation (IMCCoD) Decision-making 3W; 7M (10 total)
30%W
Unknown Yes No, Nana Akufo-Addo N/A
42 Greece100 Commission for the Management of Emergency Events due to Infectious Diseases Decision-making and expert 8W; 18M (26 total)
30.8%W
Unknown Yes
No, Kyriakos Mitsotakis
N/A
43 Grenada101–103 Name unknown Decision-making and expert 0W; 5M (five total)
0%W
No, unknown Yes No, Keith Mitchell N/A
44 Guinea104–106 Scientific Council for Response to the Coronavirus Disease Pandemic
“Conseil scientifique de riposte contre la pandémie de la maladie à coronavirus (COVID-19)”
Expert 3W; 14M (17 total)
17.6%W
Yes, Pr Yolande Izazy Yes No, Ibrahima Kassory Fofana N/A
Interministerial Committee for the Fight against the Coronavirus-19 epidemic
“Comité Interministerial de Lutte contre L'épidémie de Coronavirus-19”
Decision-making 3W; 19M (22 total)
13.6% W
No, Ibrahima Kassory Fofana No N/A
45 Haiti107 Scientific unit to fight against the coronavirus
“Cellule scientifique pour lutter contre le coronavirus”
Expert 2W; 12M (14 total)
14.3%W
No, Patrick Dely Yes No, Joseph Jouthe N/A
Communication unit on the pandemic
“Cellule de communication sur la pandémie”
Other 1W; 10M (11 total)
9.1%W
No, Eddy Jackson Alexis Yes N/A
46 Hungary 86 87 Operational Staff (Coronaviral Defence Operational Staff)
“Koronavírus-fertőzés Elleni Védekezésért Felelős Operatív Törzs”
Decision-making 1W; 14M (15 total)
6.7%W
No, Sándor Pintér and Miklós Kásler Yes No, Viktor Orbán N/A
47 India108 COVID-19 Task Force Decision-making and expert 2W; 14M (16 total)
12.5%W
No, Narendra Modi Yes No, Narendra Modi N/A
48 Iraq109 110 High Committee for the National Health and Safety to combat Coronavirus
اللجنة العليا للصحة والسلامة الوطنية
Decision-making 0W; 24M (24 total)
0%W
No, Adel Abdul Mahdi Yes No, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi N/A
49 Ireland111–113 National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET) Decision-making 13W; 19M (32 total)
40.6%W
No, Tony Holohan Yes No, Micheál Martin N/A
Expert advisory group on COVID-19 Expert 8W; 10M (18 total)
44.4%W
No, Cillian de Gascun Yes No N/A
50 Italy114–117 Operational Committee on Coronavirus for Civil Protection
“Comitato tecnico Scientifico per l'emergenza Coronavirus”
Decision-making 2W; 5M (7 total)
28.6%W
No, Giuseppe Conte Yes No, Giuseppe Conte N/A
Scientific Technical Committee
“Comitato Tecnico Scientifico”
Expert 0W; 7M (7 total)
0%W
No, Agostino Miozzo Yes N/A
Task force tech anti-Covid-19 Other 18W; 56M (74 total)
24.3%W
Yes, Fidelia Cascini (co-chair) Yes N/A
51 Jamaica118 COVID-19 Economic Recovery Task Force Decision-making 4W; 18M (22 total)
18.18%W
No, Nigel Clarke Yes No, Andrew Holness N/A
52 Japan119 120 Novel Coronavirus Infectious Disease Control Expert Committee Expert 2W; 10M (12 total)
16.7%W
Unknown Yes No, Shinzo Abe N/A
Special mission task force on remote medicine Other 4W; 4M (8 total)
50%W
Unknown Yes N/A
53 Kenya121 122 National Emergency Response Committee Decision-making 4W; 17M (21 total)
19%W
No, Mutahi Kagwe Yes No, Uhuru Kenyatta N/A
54 Lao People’s Democratic Republic123 National Taskforce Committee for Covid-19 Prevention and Control Decision-making 0W; 11M (11 total)
0%W
No, Somdy Douangdy Yes No, Thongloun Sisoulith N/A
55 Libya124 Supreme Committee for Combating COVID-19
اللجنة العليا لمكافحة وباء «كورونا
Decision-making 1W; 3M (4 total)
25%W
No, Abdel Razek al-Nadhuri Yes No, Fayez al-Sarraj N/A
Medical Advisory Committee
اللجنة الطبية الاستشارية
Expert 2W; 9M (11 total)
18.18%W
Yes, Fathia Al-Uraibi and Ahmed Al-Hassi Yes N/A
56 Lithuania125 126 Committee responsible for COVID-19 management
(Official name unclear)
Decision-making 0W; 11M (11 total)
0% W
No, Saulius Skvernelis Yes No, Saulius Skvernelis N/A
57 Luxembourg127 Advisory Council to accompany the measures decided as part of the fight against COVID-19 Expert 3W; 5M (8 total)
37.5%W
Unknown Yes No, Xavier Bettel N/A
58 Malawi128 Special Cabinet Committee on Coronavirus Decision-making 1W; 10M (11 total)
9.1%W
No, Jappie Mtuwa Mhango Yes No, Lazarus McCarthy Chakwera N/A
59 Mali129 130 Crisis Committee
“Le Comité de crise”
Decision-making 0W; 12M (12 total)
0%W
No, Akory Agiknane No No, Boubou Cissé N/A
Scientific and Technical Committee of the National Public Health Institute
“Comité Scientifique et Technique de l’Institut National de Santé Publique –INSP”
Expert 1W; 9M (10 total)
10%W
No, Ousmane Koita No N/A
60 Myanmar131 132 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Control and Emergency Response Committee Decision-making 0W; 10M (10 total)
0%W
No, U Myint Swe Yes Yes, Aung San Suu Kyi N/A
61 Netherlands133 Outbreak Management Team
(No Dutch name)
Expert 6W; 3M (9 total)
67%
No, Jaap van Dissel Yes No, Mark Rutte The list here consists of the permanent members and excludes the invited members.
62 New Zealand134 Epidemic Response Select Committee Expert 4W; 7M (11 total)
36.4%W
Unknown Yes Yes, Jacinda Ardern The committee was disestablished on 26 May 2020.
63 Niger135 The Advisory Committee
“Le Comité Consultatif”
Expert 1W; 12M (13 total)
7.7%W
No, Alkache Alhada No No, Brigi Rafini N/A
64 Nigeria136 Presidential Task Force for the Control of the Coronavirus Decision-making 1W; 11M (12 total)
8.3%W
No, Garbu Shehu Yes No, Muhammadu Buhari N/A
65 Oman137 High level Ministerial Committee on Corona Development
اللجنة العليا المكلفة ببحث آلية التعامل مع التطورات الناتجةعن انتشار فيروس كورونا كوفيد19
Decision-making 1W; 9M (10 total)
10%W
No, Hammoud bin Faisal Al Busaidi No No, Haitham bin Tariq N/A
66 Paraguay138 Emergency Operations Centre of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare to give a national response to the eventual Coronavirus pandemic
“Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia del Ministerio de Salud Pública y Bienestar Social para dar respuesta nacional de la eventual Pandemia por Coronavirus”
Decision-making and expert 2W; 6M (8 total)
25%W
Unknown Yes No, Mario Abdo Benítez N/A
67 Philippines139 Inter-Agency task force Decision-making 0W; 4M (4 total)
0%W
No, Francisco T. Duque, Karlo Nograles, and Roy Cimatu No No, Rodrigo Duterte N/A
National task force Covid-19
“National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council - NDRRMC)”
Decision-making 0W; 4M (4 total)
0%W
No, Delfin Negrillo Lorenzana No N/A
68 Portugal140 141 Task Force for operationalisation and implementation of measures for prevention and control of infection with new Coronavirus – COVID-19
“Task Force para a operacionalização e a implementação de medidas para prevenção e controlo da infeção por novo Coronavírus - COVID-19”
Decision-making & expert 44W; 32M (76 total)
57.9% W
Yes, Graça Freitas Yes No, António Costa N/A
National Council for Public Health
“Conselho Nacional de Saúde”
Decision-making and expert 6W; 15M (21 total)
28.6%W
Unknown Yes N/A
69 Qatar142 Supreme Committee on Disaster Management
“للجنة العليا لإدارة الأزماتا”
Decision-making 1W; 15M (16 total)
6.25%W
No, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdul Aziz Al Thani Yes No, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa bin Abdul Aziz Al Thani N/A
70 Saudi Arabia143 Designated Committee to Monitor Corona Pandemic
اللجنة المعنية بمتابعة مستجدات الوضع الصحي لفيروس كورونا
Decision-making 0W; 17M (17 total)
0.0%W
No, Unknown Yes No, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud N/A
71 Serbia144 Crisis Team for the Control of Infectious Diseases COVID-19
“Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести COVID-19”
Decision-making 6W; 21M (27 total)
16.7%W
Yes, Ana Brnabić, and Zlatibor Lonĉar (co-chairs with two others) Yes Yes, Ana Brnabić This list excludes the additional engaged experts, only including the formal members.
72 Singapore145 Multi-Ministry Taskforce on Wuhan Coronavirus Decision-making 1W; 10M (11 total)
9.1%W
No, Gan Kim Yong and Lawrence Wong Yes No, Lee Hsien Loong N/A
73 South Africa146 147 Ministerial Advisory Committees on COVID-19 Expert 30W; 24M (54 total)
55.6%W
No, Salim S. Abdool Karim Yes No, Cyril Ramaphosa N/A
74 South Sudan148 High Level Task Force Committee to take Extra Precautionary Measures in Combating the Spread of Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Decision-making 3W; 13M (16 total)
18.8%W
No, Salva Kiir Mayardit No No, Salva Kiir Mayardit N/A
75 Spain149 150 Scientific Technical Committee COVID-19
“el Comité Científico Técnico COVID-19
Expert 3W; 4M (7 total)
42.9%W
Unknown Yes No, Pedro Sánchez N/A
76 Sri Lanka151 152 Presidential Task Force on economic revival and poverty eradication Other 1W; 30M (31 total)
3.2%W
No, Basil Rajapaksa Yes No, Gotabaya Rajapaksa N/A
77 Sweden153 Management Team of the Public Health Agency
“Folkhälsomyndighetens ledningsgrupp”
Unclear 5W; 2M (7 total)
71.4%W
No, Johan Carlson Yes No, Stefan Löfven N/A
78 Switzerland154–156 Swiss National COVID-19 Science Task Force Expert 2W; 5M (7 total)
28.6%W
No, Matthias Egger Yes Yes, Simonetta Sommaruga N/A
Corona Crisis Team of the Federal Council
“Krisenstab des Bundesrats Corona”
Decision-making 2W; 12M (14 total) 14.3%W Yes, Simonetta Sommaruga Yes N/A
79 Thailand157 National committee for controlling the spread of COVID-19
“คณะกรรมการแห่งชาติเพื่อควบคุมการแพร่กระจายของ COVID-19”
Decision-making 0W; 28M (28 total)
0%W
No, Prayut Chan-o-cha No No, Prayut Chan-o-cha N/A
80 Togo158 159 COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis Management Unit
“Cellule sectorielle de la gestion de la crise à la Pandémie de covid-19”
Decision-making and Expert 2W; 9M (11 total)
18.2%W
Unknown Yes No, Komi Sélom Klassou N/A
81 Trinidad & Tobago160 Team for COVID-19 ‘Road to Recovery’
(Official name unknown)
Decision-making 1W; 21M (22 total)
4.5%W
No, Keith Rowley Yes No, Keith Rowley N/A
82 Turkey161 Coronavirus Scientific Committee
“Koronavirüs Bilim Kurulu”
Expert 14W; 22M (36 total)
39.9%W
Unknown Yes No, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan N/A
83 Uganda162 National Response Fund to COVID-19 Other 3W; 12M (15 total)
20%W
No, Emmanuel Katongole Yes No, Ruhakana Rugunda Information was obtained through Wikipedia and sources references on the Wikipedia page.
84 United Kingdom163–165 New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Advisory Group Expert 2W; 14M (16 total) 12.5%W No, Peter Horby Yes No, Boris Johnson N/A
Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens Expert 3W; 13M (16 total)
18.8%W
No, Thomas Evans Yes N/A
Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation Expert 4W; 16M (20 total)
20%W
No, Andrew Pollard Yes N/A
85 United States166–168 White House Coronavirus Task Force Decision-making 2W; 20M (22 total)
9.1%W
No, Donald Trump Yes No, Donald Trump N/A
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) COVID-19 Response Team Expert 14W; 3M (17 total)
82.4%W
Unknown Yes N/A
86 Uruguay169 Committee of Scientific Experts in Crisis Management
“Comité de Expertos Científicos en Gestión de la Crisis”
Expert 1W; 6M (7 total)
14.3%W
No, Julio Rolon Vicioso Yes No, Luis Lacalle Pou N/A
87 Vietnam170 National Steering Committee for COVID-19 Prevention and Control
“Ban chỉ đạo quốc gia về phòng chống và kiểm soát COVID-19”
Decision-making 1W; 13M (14 total)
7.1%W
No, Đỗ Xuân Tuyên No No, Nguyễn Xuân Phúc N/A

Men were overrepresented in global task forces to a similar extent to that of national task forces (table 2). For instance, the WHO’s first, second and third International Health Regulations Emergency committees consisted of 23.8%, 23.8% and 37.5% women, respectively. Expert groups, compared with decision-making committees, more frequently had higher proportions of women or gender parity, reflecting potential societal biases and stereotypes in terms of gender roles. In the USA, for example, the White House Coronavirus Task Force consists of 9.1% women, whereas the chief public health agency’s COVID-19 Response Team contains 82.4% women. Evidently, COVID-19 governance followed the usual modus operandi, despite numerous global and national commitments to gender-responsive health governance.

Table 2.

Identified global COVID-19 task forces

# Name of the task force convened Gender Women head of force Public Women head of international body Note
1 World Health Organization (WHO) – China Joint Mission Team 171 3W; 22 M (25 total)
12% W
No, Bruce Aylward Yes No, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus List includes members and advisors
2 WHO International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Committee for Pneumonia due to the Novel Coronavirus 2019-nCoV 172 5W; 16 M (21 total)
23.8% W
No, Didier Houssin Yes No, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus List includes members and advisors
3 WHO International Health Regulations Second Emergency Committee 173 5W; 16M (21 total)
23.8%W
No, Didier Houssin Yes No, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus List includes members and advisors
4 WHO International Health Regulations Third Emergency Committee for COVID-19 174 12W; 20 M (32 total)
37.5% W
No, Didier Houssin Yes No, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus List includes members and advisors
5 European Union (EU) COVID-19 Coordinating Response Team 175 4W; 2M (6 total)
66.7% W
Yes, Ursula von der Leyden Yes Yes, Ursula von der Leyden N/A
6 EU Commission’s advisory panel on COVID-19 176 2W; 6M (8 total)
25% W
Unknown Yes Yes, Ursula von der Leyden N/A
7 Africa Taskforce on Coronavirus Preparedness and Response 177 2W; 14M (16 total)
12.5% W
No, John Nkengasong Yes N/A Joint effort of the African Union and Africa CDC

This analysis was based on a large-scale effort collecting data on COVID-19 global and national decision-making and expert bodies for 193 UN Member States through a crowdsourcing effort, targeted grey literature searches, and outreach to national governments or World Health Organization (WHO) country offices. Data collection was completed June 2020. Gender was determined based on prefixes, pronouns and online bibliographies (table 3). Most information pertaining to task force construction, leadership and membership criteria (eg, expertise) was not easily accessible nor publicly available, impeding research and, ultimately, the ability to hold countries accountable to previously made commitments.

Table 3.

Identification of national COVID-19 task forces

Category # UN member states
Able to identify complete task force information of at least one task force formed in response to COVID-19. 87 Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Cape Verde; Canada; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Congo; Costa Rica; Côte d'Ivoire; Cuba; Cyprus; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Estonia; Eswatini; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon; Ghana; Greece; Grenada; Guinea; Haiti; Hungary; India; Iraq; Ireland; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Kenya; Lao People’s Democratic Republic; Libya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malawi; Mali; Myanmar; Netherlands; New Zealand; Niger; Nigeria; Oman; Paraguay; Philippines; Portugal; Qatar; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; South Sudan; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad & Tobago; Turkey; Uganda; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Vietnam
Able to identify the name of at least one task force formed in response to COVID-19, but not the task force composition. 44 Afghanistan; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Azerbaijan; Belize; Burundi; Cambodia; Central African Republic; Equatorial Guinea; Fiji; Gambia; Guinea-Bissau; Iceland; Indonesia; Jordan; Latvia; Lebanon; Liberia; Liechtenstein; Madagascar; Maldives; Malaysia; Mauritius; Micronesia; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nauru; Nepal; Pakistan; Republic of Korea; Republic of Moldova; Rwanda; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Samoa; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Suriname; Tonga; Tunisia; Zimbabwe
Able to identify the existence of at least one task force formed in response to COVID-19 but not the name or the task force composition. 7 Denmark; Kiribati; Kuwait; Mexico; Seychelles; Solomon Islands; Somalia
Not able to identify the existence of at least one task force formed in response to COVID-19. 55 Andorra; Barbados; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brunei Darussalam; Cameroon; Croatia; Czech Republic; Dominica; Egypt; El Salvador; Eritrea; Georgia; Germany; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; Iran; Israel; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Lesotho; Malta; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Monaco; Montenegro; Nicaragua; North Macedonia; Norway; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Panama; Peru; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; San Marino; Sao Tome and Principe; Slovakia; Slovenia; Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Timor-Leste; Turkmenistan; Tuvalu; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Republic of Tanzania; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Yemen; Zambia

The default governance mode is losing out on key perspectives and expertise

While current evidence suggests direct COVID-19 severity and mortality is higher for men, women are disproportionately burdened by compounded social and economic impacts.1 2 Decision-making bodies which are neither inclusive nor diverse can easily overlook the reality that COVID-19 acts as a multiplier of pre-existing gender-based inequities. Many governments established COVID-19 response measures which disregarded women’s higher levels of income loss, expanded and unpaid family care responsibilities, and gendered poverty rates. Ignorance of these implications exacerbates (lifetime) poverty and hunger.3 Response measures often do not account for women’s increased exposure to domestic and sexual violence or their loss of access to essential health services. Furthermore, many lockdown policies do not consider maternal and reproductive health service as essential care.4–6 Experiences from Ebola and Zika demonstrated rises in maternal morbidity and mortality, unwanted pregnancies and unsafe abortions.3 Despite being publicly praised with hollow applause, the majority of COVID-19 frontline health and social workforce are women who are underpaid, unpaid or are not recognised as essential at all. Failure to adequately provide resources and personal protective equipment exacerbates disease transmission and disproportionately harms workers in the health and social care sectors, which are predominated by women.7 The situation is even more dire for marginalised individuals, such as those identifying as non-binary, transgender or genderqueer, as they are forced to navigate the discriminatory impacts of gender-based quarantine guidelines, which authorise specific days when women or men are allowed in public. As seen in Panama, this often led to harassment, abuse, arrest and fines of transgender people who were wrongfully profiled.8–10

Effective change calls for bold solutions

The exclusion of women and gender minorities stems from a host of factors including inherent conscious and unconscious biases, discrimination, workplace culture and gendered expectations. Unfortunately, this is not new. Although women comprise 70% of the global health workforce, they hold only 25% of senior decision-making roles. Women from the Global South are particularly underrepresented at global level holding less than 5% of senior leadership roles. This exclusion creates a vicious cycle where perspectives and knowledge of large segments of the population continue to be excluded.11 12 One cannot expect a different result by replicating this same broken cycle over and over again. A ‘new default’ mode of diverse and intersectional governance is sorely needed to face future crises head-on and guide a healthy and equitable COVID-19 recovery. Reaching a critical mass of women in leadership – even as result of intentional selection or quotas – benefits governance processes through the disruption of groupthink, the introduction of novel viewpoints, a higher quality of monitoring and management, more effective risk management and robust deliberation.13

Interestingly, countries with women leaders have been associated with implementing particularly effective COVID-19 responses and have been better at reducing COVID-19 negative impacts (fewer deaths per capita, a lower peak in daily deaths and lower excess mortality). A recent study indicated that countries with women in positions of leadership suffered six times fewer deaths from COVID-19 as countries with governments led by men.14 Recognising the effectiveness of countries led by women may help in understanding the underlying prerequisites of effective leadership. Societies who elect female leaders may share a different set of values and perspectives, including gender equality, than more traditional societies.15 Countries where women lead seem to have political institutions and cultures that have prepared for inclusive governance being practised prior to COVID-19, influencing their COVID-19 response.

Gender quotas can establish a standard to redress inequalities in the public realm and enable more effective decision-making through gender parity. Increasing women’s representation is a key step towards addressing inequalities- but it cannot stop there.16 17 More women in leadership positions does not necessarily lead to changes in social norms nor does it guarantee the gender-responsive, gender-mainstreamed policies needed to mitigate the gendered vulnerabilities of pandemics. Women are not automatically gender-inclusive advocates, nor are men inevitably gender-exclusive.17 18 Furthermore, gender intersects with additional factors that act as significant barriers to healthcare access and participation. This requires recognising inequities across ability, race, income, ethnicity, class, religion and geography, and intentionally prioritising programmes and resources with an intersectional, inclusive lens. It is critical to highlight the gender-specific impacts of health threats, collect gender disaggregated data (as done for COVID-19 by Global Health 50/50)19 and leverage female experts (like WGH Operation 50/50).20 Claiming to not find any qualified women in global health is ultimately an unjustifiably poor excuse for excluding diverse perspectives. Systemic and cultural change must address traditional norms and attitudes, and embrace holistic gender-mainstreaming practices. This deep-rooted change is critical to ensure that health services and policies mitigate the adverse socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 and adequately meet the needs and safety of all populations.17 21

Going further than gender binaries

Despite employing colloquial binary terms such as ‘men’ and ‘women’ to denote gender, we reiterate that gender is non-binary, socially produced, self-identified and complex. In a non-pandemic scenario, we would have sought to conduct a survey to self-identify gender, with appropriate ethics review, privacy and data protections in place. By relying on binary definitions of “gender,” research initiatives (such as this one) and governance, emphasise the inability of current data to produce results that include the full gender spectrum. This means an entire segment of the population is misrepresented and side-lined from policy decisions that affect them. Promoting and integrating mechanisms that ensure inclusive intersectional data collection is one of the systemic changes needed for fair governance.

Inclusivity and transparency should be at the core of the 'new normal’

Our data exhibit what has become a disturbingly accepted pattern in global health governance. Collective efforts in policy-making continue to overlook opportunities to create inclusive and comprehensive decision-making, echoing gender inequalities in other areas such as academia and the sciences.22 The COVID-19 pandemic response requires inclusion of diverse perspectives, experiences and expertise in global health leadership. First, international and national task forces need to ensure diversity, particularly across gender, but also in terms of ethnic, racial, cultural, geographic and disability groups in decision-making and expert advisory bodies. Increasing representation and gender parity is a first step, but functional health systems require radical and systemic change that ensures gender-inclusive and intersectional practices are the norm – rather than the exception. Second, quick action in emergency scenarios is repeatedly used as a justification to sidestep transparency and restrict communication in the name of health security. Crises are precisely when transparent procedures and clear communication are required the most. Rather than relying on closed-door governance, open and transparent communication and decision-making should become the norm. Third, data collection and governance policies need to go beyond binary representation in order to produce results that are inclusive of the full gender spectrum.

A future with resilient health systems depends on radical action to establish decision-making groups that reflect the populations they represent, in the time of COVID-19 and beyond. Leaving these voices unheard today sets a precedent for continued silence in the years to come.

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to all people that provided information in our crowdsourcing effort and the Gender and COVID-19 working group for their input and thoughts.

Footnotes

Handling editor: Seye Abimbola

Twitter: @lairene1

Contributors: All authors contributed to the design and implementation of the research, to the analysis of the results and to the writing of the manuscript.

Funding: The authors have not declared a specific grant for this research from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors. Kim van Daalen is funded by the Gates Cambridge Scholarship (OPP1144) and received funding for publication from the Gates Foundation.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the policies or views of the affiliated institutions.

Competing interests: None declared.

Patient consent for publication: Not required.

Provenance and peer review: Not commissioned; externally peer reviewed.

Data availability statement: Data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article.

Author note: *Gender parity in task force composition is defined as 45-55% women.

References


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