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. 2021 Jul 21;23(8):929. doi: 10.3390/e23080929

New Result on the Feedback Capacity of the Action-Dependent Dirty Paper Wiretap Channel

Guangfen Xie 1,2,, Bin Dai 1,2,*,
Editor: Song-Nam Hong
PMCID: PMC8394643  PMID: 34441069

Abstract

The Gaussian wiretap channel with noncausal state interference available at the transmitter, which is also called the dirty paper wiretap channel (DP-WTC), has been extensively studied in the literature. Recently, it has been shown that taking actions on the corrupted state interference of the DP-WTC (also called the action-dependent DP-WTC) helps to increase the secrecy capacity of the DP-WTC. Subsequently, it has been shown that channel feedback further increases the secrecy capacity of the action-dependent DP-WTC (AD-DP-WTC), and a sub-optimal feedback scheme is proposed for this feedback model. In this paper, a two-step hybrid scheme and a corresponding new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback are proposed. The proposed new lower bound is shown to be optimal (achieving the secrecy capacity) and tighter than the existing one in the literature for some cases, and the results of this paper are further explained via numerical examples.

Keywords: action encoder, channel feedback, dirty paper channel, intelligent reflecting surfaces, wiretap channel

1. Introduction

Dirty paper coding is one of the most important pre-coding schemes in wireless communications and has a wide range of applications in information hiding [1]. Dirty paper coding was first investigated by Costa in his well-known paper on the dirty paper channel (DPC) [2], where a corrupted Gaussian state interference of a white Gaussian channel is noncausally known at the transmitter and not available at the receiver. Costa showed that the capacity of the DPC equals the capacity of the same model without state interference, which indicates that though the receiver does not know the state interference, it can still be perfectly removed by using dirty paper coding.

Note that in [2], the channel state is assumed to be generated by nature. However, in some practical scenarios, the state is affected or controlled by the communication systems, e.g., in intelligent reflecting surface-aided communication systems, the state is formed in part by the reflecting phase shift which is actually controlled by the transceiver [3]. Such a case was first investigated by Weissman in his paper on the action-dependent dirty paper channel (AD-DPC) [4], where the corrupted state interference of the DPC is affected and noncausally known by the transmitter. In [4], a lower bound on the capacity of AD-DPC was proposed, and the capacity was fully determined in [5].

In recent years, the study of the above dirty paper channels under additional secrecy constraints has received a lot attention. Specifically, [6] studied the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with state interference noncausally known by the transmitter, and obtained upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity. The authors of [7] extended the model studied in [6] to the broadcast situation, and also provided bounds on the secrecy capacity region of this extended model. The authors of [8,9] studied the Gaussian case of [6], namely, the dirty paper wiretap channel, and proposed bounds on the secrecy capacity. Furthermore, [8,9] pointed out that the proposed secret dirty paper coding increases the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel [10]. The above works mainly adopted the tools in [11,12] for establishing the secrecy rate/capacity. Very recently, the authors of [13] studied the AD-DPC with an additional eavesdropper, which is also called the action-dependent dirty paper wiretap channel (AD-DP-WTC), and proposed lower and upper bounds on the secrecy capacity. Note that the capacity results given in [9,13] indicate that:

  • There is a penalty term between secrecy capacity and capacity of the same model without secrecy constraints.

  • If the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s, the secrecy capacity may equal zero, i.e., no positive rate can be guaranteed for secure communications.

Very recently, it has been shown that channel feedback is an effective way to enhance the secrecy capacities of the DP-WTC [14,15] and the multi-input multi-output (MIMO) X-channels [16]. In [16], it has been shown that feedback increases the secure degrees of freedom (SDoF) region of the MIMO X-channel with secrecy constraints, which indicates that feedback also enlarges the secrecy capacity of the same model, even if the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the legitimate receiver’s. The authors of [14,15,16] mainly adopted the idea of a generating secret key from the channel feedback and using this key to encrypt the transmitted message. Subsequently, [13] showed that a variation of the classical Schalkwijk–Kailath (SK) feedback scheme [17] for the point-to-point white Gaussian channel achieves the secrecy capacity of the DP-WTC with noiseless feedback, and the secrecy capacity equals the capacity of the same model without secrecy constraints, i.e., to achieve perfect secrecy, no rate needs to be sacrificed even if the eavesdropper gains advantage over the legitimate receiver. In addition, the authors of [13] also proposed a sub-optimal SK type feedback scheme for the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback (see Figure 1), i.e., this scheme achieves a lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback, and the secrecy capacity remains open.

Figure 1.

Figure 1

The AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback.

In this paper, we derive a new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback, which is based on a hybrid two-step feedback scheme. The proposed new lower bound is shown to be optimal and tighter than the existing one in the literature for some cases, and the results of this paper are further explained via numerical examples. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A formal definition of the model studied in this paper and previous results are introduced in Section 2. The main result and the corresponding proof are given in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Section 5 includes the summary of all results in this paper and discusses future work.

2. Model Formulation and Previous Results

2.1. Model Formulation

For the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback (see Figure 1), the i-th (i{1,2,,N}) channel inputs and outputs are given by

Si=Ai+Wi,Yi=Xi+Si+η1,i,Zi=Yi+η2,i (1)

where Xi is the output of the channel encoder subject to an average power constraint P (1Ni=1NE[Xi2]P), Ai is the output of the action encoder subject to an average power constraint PA (1Ni=1NE[Ai2]PA), Yi and Zi are channel outputs, respectively, at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and Wi, η1,i, η2,i are independent Gaussian noises and are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) across the time index i. Note that WiN(0,σw2), η1,iN(0,σ12), and η2,iN(0,σ22). The transmitted message M is uniformly drawn in its alphabet M={1,2,,|M|}.

At time instant i (i{1,2,,N}), a corrupted state interference Si is generated through a white Gaussian channel with i.i.d. noise WiN(0,σw2) and channel input Ai, where Ai is a (stochastic) function of the message M. Since the corrupted state interference SN=(S1,,SN) is noncausally known by the channel encoder, the i-th channel input Xi is a (stochastic) function of the message M, SN, and the feedback Yi1=(Y1,Y2,,Yi1).

The legitimate receiver generates an estimation M^=ψ(YN), where ψ is the legitimate receiver’s decoding function, and the average decoding error probability equals

Pe=1|M|mM1Pr{ψ(YN)m|msent}. (2)

The eavesdropper’s equivocation rate of the message M is denoted by

Δ=1NH(M|ZN). (3)

A rate R is said to be achievable with perfect weak secrecy if for any ϵ and sufficiently large N, there exists a channel encoder–decoder such that

log|M|N=R,ΔRϵ,Peϵ. (4)

The secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with feedback, which is the maximum achievable secrecy rate defined in (4), is denoted by Csagf. A new lower bound, Rsagf on Csagf, will be given in the next section.

2.2. SK Feedback Scheme for the Point-to-Point White Gaussian Channel

For the point-to-point white Gaussian channel with feedback, at time i (i{1,2,,N}), channel input and output are given by

Yi=Xi+ηi, (5)

where Xi is the channel input subject to an average power constraint P (1Ni=1NE[Xi2]P), and ηiN(0,σ2) is the i.i.d. channel noise. The channel input Xi is a function of the message M and the feedback Yi1. It is well known that the capacity Cgf of the white Gaussian channel with feedback equals the capacity Cg of the same model without feedback, i.e.,

Cgf=Cg=12log(1+Pσ2). (6)

The authors of [17] showed that the classical SK scheme achieves Cgf, and this scheme is described below.

Since M takes the values in M={1,2,,2NR}, we divide the interval [0.5,0.5] into 2NR equally spaced sub-intervals, and the center of each sub-interval is mapped to a message value in M. Let θ be the center of the sub-interval with respect to (w.r.t.) the message M.

At time 1, the transmitter transmits

X1=12Pθ. (7)

The receiver receives Y1=X1+η1, and obtains an estimation of θ by computing

θ^1=Y112P=θ+η112P=θ+ϵ1, (8)

where ϵ1=θ^1θ=η112P, and α1σ212P.

At time k (2kN), the receiver obtains Yk=Xk+ηk, and obtains an estimation of θk by computing

θ^k=θ^k1E[Ykϵk1]E[Yk2]Yk, (9)

where

ϵk=θ^kθ, (10)

(10) yields that

ϵk=ϵk1E[Ykϵk1]E[Yk2]Yk. (11)

At time k (k{2,3,,N}), the transmitter sends

Xk=Pαk1ϵk1, (12)

where αk1Var(ϵk1).

In [17], it has been shown that the decoding error Pe of the above coding scheme is upper bounded by

PePr{|ϵN|>12|M|1}2Q(12·2NR1αN), (13)

where Q(x) is the tail of the unit Gaussian distribution evaluated at x, and

αN=σ212P(σ2P+σ2)N1. (14)

From (13) and (14), we conclude that if

R<12log(1+Pσ2)=Cgf, (15)

Pe0 as N. Recently, [18] showed that the above classical SK scheme, which is not designed with the consideration of secrecy, already achieves the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with noiseless feedback, i.e., the corresponding secrecy capacity equals the capacity Cgf of the same model without secrecy constraints.

2.3. Previous Results on the AD-DP-WTC with Feedback

For the capacity Csagf of the AD-DP-WTC with feedback, [13] showed that it is bounded by

LCsagfCag, (16)

where

Cag=max(ρ1,ρ2):ρ12+ρ22112log(1+P(1ρ12ρ22)σ12)+12log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12), (17)
L=max(ρ1,ρ2):ρ12+ρ22112log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12). (18)

Note that Cag is the capacity of the AD-DPC without feedback, and is given in [5].

Proof Sketch of (16).

Since the capacity Csagf of the AD-DP-WTC with feedback is no larger than that of the same model without secrecy constraints, and feedback does not increase the capacity of the AD-DPC [4], and Cag serves as a trivial upper bound on Csagf. The lower bound CsagfL is derived by constructing

X=ρ2PPAA+ρ1PσwW, (19)

for ρ12+ρ22=1, and

X=ρ2PPAA+ρ1PσwW+G, (20)

for ρ12+ρ22<1, where G is randomly generated according to GN(0,P(1ρ12ρ22)) and it is independent of A and W. Substituting (19) and (20) into (1), the AD-DP-WTC with feedback is equivalent to the Gaussian wiretap channel with feedback with input A, channel noise W+G+η1+η2, channel output Y of the legitimate receiver, and the channel output Z of the eavesdropper. Directly applying the SK scheme introduced in the preceding subsection, we conclude that L is achievable. Moreover, from [18], we know that the SK scheme also achieves the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with noiseless feedback, which indicates that L is achievable with perfect weak secrecy, and the proof is completed. □

Note that the above lower and upper bounds on Csagf do not meet in general, and exploring a tighter lower bound on Csagf is the motivation of this paper.

3. Main Results of this Paper

3.1. A New Lower Bound on the Secrecy Capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with Feedback

Theorem 1.

A new lower bound on the secrecy capacity Csagf of the AD-DP-WTC with feedback is given by

Rsagf=max(ρ1,ρ2):ρ12+ρ22112log(1+(1ρ12ρ22)Pσ12)+12log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12)12log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12+σ22). (21)

Remark 1.

Comparing the new lower bound in (21) with the upper bound Cag in (16), it is easy to see that there still exists a gap between the two bounds due to the penalty term 12log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12+σ22).

The following Corollary 1 shows that the proposed new lower bound in (21) is optimal for a special case. Moreover, the following Corollary 2 shows that the new lower bound in (21) is tighter than the existing lower bound in (16) when σw2 tends to infinity.

Corollary 1.

For σ22,

limσ22Rsagf=Cag, (22)

which indicates that the secrecy capacity is determined for this case.

Proof. 

Formula (22) is directly obtained by using (21) and letting σ22. Hence the proof is completed. □

Corollary 2.

limσw2Rsagflimσw2L, (23)

where L is the existing lower bound defined in (18).

Proof. 

Define the gap RG between the new lower bound in (21) and the existing lower bound in (18) by

RG=RsagfL=max(ρ1,ρ2):ρ12+ρ22112log(1+(1ρ12ρ22)Pσ12)12log(1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12+σ22). (24)
  • For the case that the maximum is achieved when ρ12+ρ22=1,
    limσw2RG=0. (25)
  • For the case that the maximum is achieved when ρ12+ρ22<1,
    limσw2RG>0. (26)

Combining (25) and (26), we conclude that limσw2RG0, which indicates that limσw2 Rsagflimσw2L. The proof of Corollary 2 is completed. □

Proof Sketch of Theorem 1. 

The main idea of the achievable scheme is briefly illustrated by Figure 2 and Figure 3. In Figure 2, we split the message M into two parts M=(M1,M2), where the sub-message Mj(j=1,2) is uniformly distributed in Mj={1,,2NRj}. The sub-message M1 is available at both the action encoder and channel encoder, and the sub-message M2 is only available at the channel encoder. Let Xi=Ui+Vi+Gi, where M1 is encoded as Ui with power ρ22P, M2 is encoded as Vi with power P=(1ρ12ρ22)P, Gi=ρ12Pσw2Wi, and 1ρj1 for j=1,2. Moreover, M1 is also encoded as Ai with power PA, and

Ui=ρ22PPAAi, (27)

which indicates that Ui is a deterministic function of Ai. □

Figure 2.

Figure 2

The new coding scheme of AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback.

Figure 3.

Figure 3

Equivalentcoding scheme. (a) The equivalent channel model of the sub-message M1. (b) The equivalent channel model of the sub-message M2.

The i-th (i{1,2,,N}) channel inputs and outputs are rewritten as

Yi=Xi+Si+η1,i=Ui+Vi+Gi+Ai+Wi+η1,i=Ai+Vi+Wi+η1,iZi=Yi+η2,i, (28)

where Wi=Gi+Wi is an i.i.d Gaussian noise process with zero mean and variance σw2=(σw+ρ12P)2, and Ai=Ai+Ui is subject to an average power constraint P=PA+ρ22P+2ρ22PPA.

In Figure 3, since M1 is known by the channel encoder, the codeword Ai=Ai+Ui can be subtracted when applying an SK type feedback scheme to M2, i.e., the transmission of M2 is through an equivalent channel with input Vi, output

Yi=YiAi=Vi+Wi+η1,i. (29)

Moreover, since M1 and SN are known by the channel encoder, WN=SNAN and GN=ρ12Pσw2WN, WN=WN+GN can be viewed as state interference which is noncausally known at the encoder of the equivalent channel of M2 (namely, the equivalent encoder of M2).

In addition, the transmission of M1 is through an equivalent channel with inputs Ai=Ai+Ui, output Yi=Ai+Vi+Wi+η1,i, and channel noise η1,i=Vi+Wi+η1,i, which is nonwhite Gaussian noise since Vi is not i.i.d generated.

Then, applying an SK type scheme to M2, and Wyner’s random binning scheme [11] together with Feinstein’s greedy coding scheme [19] to M1, the lower bound in Theorem 1 is obtained. The detail of the proof is given in the next section.

3.2. Numerical Results

Figure 4 plots the upper bound, the existing lower bound and the new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with feedback for PA=10, σw2=2000, σ12=30, σ22=100, and P taking values in [0,30]. From Figure 4, we see that our new scheme performs better than the existing one when the noise variance σw2 is large enough.

Figure 4.

Figure 4

Comparison of the bounds on the secrecy capacity of AD-DP-WTC with feedback for PA=10, σw2=2000, σ12=30, σ22=100, and P taking values in [0,30].

Figure 5 plots the bounds for PA=5, σw2=240, σ12=30, σ22=2500, and P taking values in [0,30]. From Figure 5, we see that our new lower bound almost meets the upper bound when the eavesdropper’s channel noise variance σ22 is large enough.

Figure 5.

Figure 5

Comparison of the bounds on the secrecy capacity of AD-DP-WTC with feedback for PA=5, σw2=240, σ12=30, σ22=2500, and P taking values in [0,30].

4. Proof of Theorem 1

The encoding and decoding procedure of Figure 3 is described below. Since M2 takes values in M2{1,2,,2NR2}, the interval [−0.5,0.5] is divided into 2NR2 equally spaced sub-intervals, and the center of each sub-interval is mapped to a message value. Let θ be the center of the sub-interval w.r.t. the message M2 (the variance of θ approximately equals 112 ). Let AN=(A1=0,A2,,AN)=(0,A2N), where A2N=(A2,,AN). Here, A2N is the codeword of the sub-message M1 and a dummy message M1, and it is generated by Feinstein’s greedy construction for the non-i.i.d. Gaussian channel [19]. Moreover, M1 and M1 are uniformly distributed in {1,,2(N1)R1} and {1,,2(N1)R}, respectively.

Encoding procedure: Before the transmission, for a given sub-message M1, first, a dummy message M1 is randomly chosen from its alphabet {1,,2(N1)R}. Then, Feinstein’s greedy construction [19] is applied to encode the message pair (M1,M1) as the codeword A2N=(A2,,AN).

At time 1, the equivalent encoders of M1 and M2, respectively, send

A1=0,V1=12P(θW112P+B), (30)

where

B=i=2NE(Yiεi1)E(Yi)2Wi,P=(1ρ12ρ22)P,Yi=Vi+η1,i (31)

and εi1 will be defined later.

At time 2, once receiving the feedback Y1=V1+W1+η1,1, the equivalent encoder of M2 computes

Y112P=θ+B+η1,112P=θ+B+ε1, (32)

where ε1=η1,112P and α1=Var(ε1). The equivalent encoders of M1 and M2, respectively, send A2 (the first component of A2N) and

V2=Pα1ε1. (33)

At time k (3kN), once receiving the feedback Yk1=Ak1+Vk1+η1,k1+Wk1, the equivalent encoder of M2 computes

εk1=εk2E(Yk1εk2)E(Yk1)2Yk1, (34)

where Yk1=Yk1Ak1Wk1=Vk1+η1,k1 and αk1=Var(εk1). The equivalent encoders of M1 and M2, respectively, send Ak (the k1-th component of A2N) and

Vk=Pαk1εk1. (35)

Lemma 1.

For 3kN, the general terms of αk1 and Vk can be expressed as

αk1=Var(εk1)=α1(σ12P+σ12)k2, (36)
Vk=112αk1(σ12P+σ12)k2η1,1i=1k2αiαk1P(σ12)k2i(P+σ12)k(i+1)η1,i+1. (37)

Proof. 

The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix A. □

Decoding procedure: The legitimate receiver does a two-step decoding scheme. First, by applying Feinstein’s decoding rule [19] to the decoding of A2N. According to Feinstein’s lemma [19], the decoding error probability of M1 and M1, denoted by Pe1, can be arbitrarily small if

R1+RI(A2N;Y2N)N1, (38)

where Y2N=(Y2,Y3,,YN).

Second, after decoding M1, the legitimate receiver obtains Ak for all 2kN, and subtracts Ak from Yk, then the legitimate receiver obtains Yk=YkAk=Vk+η1,k+Wk.

At time 1, the legitimate receiver obtains Y1=V1+W1+η1,1 and computes

θ^1=Y112P=θ+B+ε1. (39)

At time k (2kN), the legitimate receiver’s estimation θ^k of θ is given by

θ^k=θ^k1E(Ykεk1)E(Yk)2Yk=(a)θ^k1+εkεk1E(Ykεk1)E(Yk)2Wk=θ^1+εkε1j=2kE(Yjεj1)E(Yj)2Wj=(b)θ+εk+Bj=2kE(Yjεj1)E(Yj)2Wj, (40)

where Yk=Vk+η1,k+Wk,Yk=Vk+η1,k, (a) follows from (34), and (b) follows from (39). From (40), we can conclude that for k=N,

θ^N=θ+εN+Bj=2NE(Yjεj1)E(Yj)2Wj=(c)θ+εN, (41)

where (c) follows from (31).

Now we bound the decoding error probability Pe2 of M2 as follows. From θ^N=θ+εN and the definition of θ, we have

Pe2Pr[|εN|12(|M2|1)](d)2Q(12×2NR2αN)=(e)2Q12σ12+P12P2NR22N2log(1+Pσ12)=2Q12σ12+P12P2N(12log(1+Pσ12)R2), (42)

where (d) following from Q(x) is the tail of the unit Gaussian distribution evaluated at x, and (e) is from Lemma 1. Since Q(x) is decreasing while x is increasing, from (42), we can conclude that if

R212log(1+Pσ12)=12log(1+(1ρ12ρ22)Pσ12), (43)

Pe20 as N is large enough.

Note that the total decoding error probability Pe of M=(M1,M2) is upper bounded by PePe1+Pe2. From the above analysis, we conclude that Pe0 as N tends to infinity if (38) and (43) are guaranteed.

Equivocation analysis: We bound the equivocation rate H(M|ZN)N as follows:

H(M|ZN)N=H(M1,M2|ZN)N=H(M1|ZN)+H(M2|ZN,M1)N. (44)

The first part H(M1|ZN)N of (44) is bounded by

H(M1|ZN)N=H(M1|Z1,Z2N)N=(f)H(M1|Z2N)N=1N(h(M1,Z2N)h(Z2N))=1N(h(M1,Z2N,A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N)h(Z2N))=1N(h(M1,A2N)+h(Z2N|M1,A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N)h(Z2N))=1N(h(M1,A2N)I(Z2N;M1,A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))=1N(h(M1,A2N|Z2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))=1N(h(A2N|Z2N)+H(M1|A2N,Z2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))=1N(h(A2N|Z2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N)+h(A2N)h(A2N))=1N(h(A2N)I(Z2N;A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))=(g)1N(H(M1,M1)I(Z2N;A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))=1N((N1)(R1+R)I(Z2N;A2N)h(A2N|M1,Z2N))(h)N1N(R1+R)I(Z2N;A2N)Nδ(ε)N=N1N(R1+R)I(Z2N;A2N)N1N1Nδ(ε)N, (45)

where (f) follows from the Markov chain M1Z2NZ1 and Z2N=(Z2,Z3,,ZN), (g) is due to the fact that A2N is a deterministic function of M1,M1, and (h) follows from Fano’s inequality when the codeword A2N is generated by Feinstein’s greedy construction [19], i.e., if

RI(Z2N;A2N)N1, (46)

given M1, the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability Pew of M1 is arbitrarily small (Pewϵ) as N tends to infinity, then using Fano’s inequality, we have

h(A2N|M1,Z2N)δ(Pew)δ(ε). (47)

Formula (45) indicates that N is sufficiently large, if

RI(Z2N;A2N)N1, (48)

we have

H(M1|ZN)NR1ϵ, (49)

where ϵ0 as N.

From (46) and (48), we conclude that

R=I(Z2N;A2N)N1. (50)

Substituting (50) into (38) and noting that the maximum of R1 is achieved when N, then we have

R1limNI(A2N;Y2N)I(A2N;Z2N)N1 (51)

Lemma 2.

The fundamental limit of R1 in (51) is upper bounded by

R1limNI(A2N;Y2N)I(A2N;Z2N)N112log1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ1212log1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12+σ22 (52)

Proof. 

The Proof of Lemma 2 is in Appendix B. □

The second part H(M2|ZN,M1)N of (44) is bounded by

H(M2|ZN,M1)N=(a)H(θ|ZN,M1)N1NH(θZN,η1,1,,η1,N,η2,2,,η2,N,W1,,WN,M1,M1)=(b)1NH(θ12P(θW112P+B)+W1+η1,1+η2,1,A2+Pα1ε1+W2+η1,2+η2,2,A3+f2,3(η1,1,η1,2)+W3+η1,3+η2,3,,AN+f2,N(η1,1,,η1,N1)+WN+η1,N+η2,N,η1,1,,η1,N,η2,2,,η2,N,W1,,WN,M1,M1)=1NH(θ|12Pθ+η2,1,η1,1,,η1,N,η2,2,,η2,N,W1,,WN,M1,M1)=(c)1NH(θ|12Pθ+η2,1)=(d)1N{H(θ)h(12Pθ+η2,1)+h(η2,1)}(e)R212Nlog(1+Pσ22) (53)

where (a) follows from the fact that there is a one-to-one mapping between M2 and θ, (b) follows from (28), (30), (33) and (A5), (c) follows from the fact that θ and η2,1 are independent of η1,1,,η1,N,η2,2,,η2,N,W1,,WN,M1,M1, (d) follows from the fact that θ and η2,1 are independent of each other, and (e) follows from H(θ)=NR2, and the variance of θ equals 112 as N tends to infinity.

Substituting (49) and (53) into (44), we have

H(M|ZN)N=H(M1|ZN)+H(M2|ZN,M1)NR1ϵ+R212Nlog(1+Pσ22)=R(ϵ+12Nlog(1+Pσ22)) (54)

where R=R1+R2. Choosing sufficiently large N, H(M|ZN)NRϵ is satisfied. Finally, combining (43) and (52), the lower bound in Theorem 1 is derived, and the proof is completed.

5. Conclusions and Future Work

This paper shows a new lower bound on the secrecy capacity of the AD-DP-WTC with noiseless feedback by proposing a novel two-step hybrid feedback scheme. The numerical result shows that when the noise variance σw2 is large enough, our new feedback scheme performs better than the existing one in the literature. Moreover, when the eavesdropper’s channel noise variance is fairly large, our new feedback scheme is almost optimal (the new lower bound almost equals the upper bound). Possible future work could be to extend the proposed feedback scheme to the multiple-access situation.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant 2020YFB1806405; in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62071392; and in part by the 111 Project No.111-2-14.

Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1

From (32), we know that ε1=η1,112P and α1=Var(ε1), and hence α1=E(η1,112P)2=σ1212P.

In the same way, since ε2=ε1E(Y2ε1)E(Y2)2Y2 and α2=Var(ε2), we have

α2=Var(ε2)=Eε1E(Y2ε1)E(Y2)2Y22=E(ε1)2E(Y2ε1)2E(Y2)2=α1α1PP+σ12=α1σ12P+σ12, (A1)

where Y2=V2+η1,2=Pα1ε1+η1,2.

For 3kN,

αk1=Var(εk1)=(a)Eεk2E(Yk1εk2)E(Yk1)2Yk12=E(εk2)2E(Yk1εk2)2E(Yk1)2=αk2αk2PP+σ12=αk2σ12P+σ12=α1σ12P+σ12k2, (A2)

where (a) follows from (34), and Yk1=Vk1+η1,k1=Pαk2εk2+η1,k1.

Now, it remains to further compute the second part of Lemma 1. According to (35), we have Vk=Pαk1εk1, and it can be further expressed as

Vk=Pαk1εk1=(b)Pαk1εk2E(Vk1+η1,k1)εk2E(Vk1+η1,k1)2(Vk1+η1,k1)=Pαk2αk2αk1εk2E(Vk1+η1,k1)εk2E(Vk1+η1,k1)2(Vk1+η1,k1)=αk2αk1Vk1Pαk1αk2PP+σ12(Vk1+η1,k1)=αk2αk1σ12P+σ12Vk1αk2αk1PP+σ12η1,k1, (A3)

where (b) follows from (34), and Yk1=Vk1+η1,k1=Pαk2εk2+η1,k1.

Therefore, we conclude that

V3=α1α2σ12P+σ12V2α1α2PP+σ12η1,2,V4=α2α3σ12P+σ12V3α2α3PP+σ12η1,3=α1α3σ12P+σ122V2i=12αiα3P(σ12)2i(P+σ12)4(i+1)η1,i+1Vk=α1αk1σ12P+σ12k2V2i=1k2αiαk1P(σ12)k2i(P+σ12)k(i+1)η1,i+1=(c)112αk1σ12P+σ12k2η1,1i=1k2αiαk1P(σ12)k2i(P+σ12)k(i+1)η1,i+1 (A4)

where (c) follows from V2=Pα1ε1=Pα1η1,112P. From (A4) and (33), we see that Vk is a function of (η1,1,η1,2,,η1,k1), i.e.,

Vk=f2,k(η1,1,η1,2,,η1,k1),2kN. (A5)

Finally, according to (A2) and (A4), we complete the proof of Lemma 1.

Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2

Since

limNI(A2N;Y2N)I(A2N;Z2N)N1=limNh(Y2N)h(Y2N|A2N)h(Z2N)+h(Z2N|A2N)N1=(a)limNh(Y2N)N1h(Z2N)N1h(η1,2N)N1+h(η1,2N+η2,2N)N1, (A6)

where (a) is due to the fact that Y2N=A2N+η1,2N,Z2N=Y2N+η2,2N, η1,2N=V2N+W2N+η1,2N and A2N is independent of η1,2N,η2,2N, and η1,2N=(η1,2,η1,3,,η1,N),η2,2N=(η2,2,η2,3,,η2,N).

For the part h(Y2N)N1h(Z2N)N1 of (A6), we have

limNh(Y2N)N1h(Z2N)N1=limNh(Y2N)N1h(Y2N+η2,2N)N1(b)limNh(Y2N)N112log(22h(Y2N)N1+2πeσ22)(c)12log2πe(P+P+σw2+σ12)12log2πe(P+P+σw2+σ12+σ22), (A7)

where (b) follows from the entropy power inequality, (c) follows from h(Y2N)N112log(22h(Y2N)N1+2πeσ22) increasing while h(Y2N)N1 is increasing and

h(Y2N)N11N1i=2Nh(Yi)1N1i=2N12log2πeE(Yi2)=NN11Ni=2N12log2πeE(Yi2)12NN1log2πe(P+P+σw2+σ12), (A8)

where P=PA+ρ22P+2ρ2PPA,P=P(1ρ12ρ22),σw2=(σw+ρ1P)2, and the last inequality of (A8) is from Jensen’s inequality.

Based on the joint differential entropy, for the part h(η1,2N)N1 of (A6), we have

limNh(η1,2N)=limN12log(2πe)N1|K|, (A9)

where K is a covariance matrix, and

|K|=E(η1,2η1,2)E(η1,2η1,3)E(η1,2η1,N)E(η1,3η1,2)E(η1,3η1,3)E(η1,3η1,N)E(η1,Nη1,2)E(η1,Nη1,3)E(η1,Nη1,N)(N1)×(N1) (A10)

with

E(η1,kη1,k)=P+σw2+σ12,2kN (A11)
E(η1,kη1,j)=E(Vk+Wk+η1,k)(Vj+Wj+η1,j)=E(VkVj)+E(η1,kVj),2kN,k<jN. (A12)

According to (A4), we have

Vk=α1αk1σ12P+σ12k2V2i=1k2αiαk1P(σ12)k2i(P+σ12)k(i+1)η1,i+1,Vj=α1αj1σ12P+σ12j2V2i=1j2αiαj1P(σ12)j2i(P+σ12)j(i+1)η1,i+1=α1αj1σ12P+σ12j2V2i=1k2αiαj1P(σ12)j2i(P+σ12)j(i+1)η1,i+1αk1αj1P(σ12)jk1(P+σ12)jkη1,ki=kj2αiαj1P(σ12)j2i(P+σ12)j(i+1)η1,i+1, (A13)

Based on (A13), we can conclude that

E(η1,kVj)=Eη1,kαk1αj1P(σ12)jk1(P+σ12)jkη1,k=αk1αj1P(σ12)jk(P+σ12)jk=(d)Pσ12P+σ12jk2, (A14)

where (d) follows from (A2). For E(VkVj), we have

E(VkVj)=(e)E{[α1αk1(σ12P+σ12)k2V2i=1k2αiαk1P(σ12)k2i(P+σ12)k(i+1)η1,i+1]×[α1αj1(σ12P+σ12)j2V2i=1k2αiαj1P(σ12)j2i(P+σ12)j(i+1)η1,i+1]}=Pα1αk1α1αj1(σ12P+σ12)k+j4+i=1k2αiαk1αiαj1(P)2(σ12)k+j32i(P+σ12)k+j2(i+1)=(f)P(σ12P+σ12)k+j42+i=1k2(P)2σ12(σ12P+σ12)k+j2(i+1)2=P(σ12P+σ12)jk2, (A15)

where (e) follows from (A13), and (f) follows from (A2).

Hence, (A12) can be further calculated by

E(η1,kη1,j)=E(VkVj)+E(η1,kVj)=(g)0,2kN,k<jN, (A16)

where (g) follows from (A15) and (A14).

According to (A16) and (A11),

|K|=P+σw2+σ12000P+σw2+σ12000P+σw2+σ12(N1)×(N1) (A17)

Therefore, we can obtain that

limN1N1h(η1,2N)=limN12(N1)log(2πe)N1|K|=12log2πe(P+σw2+σ12). (A18)

Analogously, we have

limN1N1h(η1,2N+η2,2N)=12log2πe(P+σw2+σ12+σ22). (A19)

Substituting (A7), (A18) and (A19) into (A6), we prove that

limNI(A2N;Y2N)I(A2N;Z2N)N112log1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ1212log1+(PA+ρ2P)2P(1ρ12ρ22)+(σw+ρ1P)2+σ12+σ22, (A20)

which completes the proof.

Author Contributions

G.X. did the theoretical work, performed the experiments, analyzed the data, and drafting the work; B.D. designed the work, did the theoretical work, analyzed the data, interpreted the data for the work, and revised the work. Both of the authors approve the version to be published and agree to be accountable for all aspects of the work in ensuring that questions related to the accuracy or integrity of any part of the work are appropriately investigated and resolved. Both authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Footnotes

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