Disconnect between research and policy

This book is part of the American Psychological Association’s Psychology, Crime and Justice series of which the overt aim is to showcase psychologists’ contribution to the study of crime and criminal justice (Maruna, 2020, p. 28). Its covert aim is to dispel the stereotype of psychologists as reductionists who pathologise criminal behaviour, ignoring the role played by cultural, economic, historical and situational factors.

The author

The author of the book is the total opposite of this caricature. Haney’s involvement in research into the environmental, situational and structural influences on behaviour goes back to the early 1970s when he assisted David Rosenhan (1973) with his ground-breaking research for On Being Sane in Insane Places. Haney continued participating in innovative, if not controversial (see Haslam et al., 2019; Le Texier, 2019), research with his involvement in the Stanford Prison Experiment (Haney et al., 1973). With dual qualifications in psychology and law he went on to become a highly regarded academic, expert witness, researcher and member of influential bodies such as the National Academy of Sciences committee on the causes and consequences of mass incarceration. His fields of expertise include death penalty mitigation (e.g. Haney, 1997), the psychology of imprisonment (e.g. Haney & Zimbardo, 1998), racial biases in sentencing (e.g. Haney & Hurtado, 1994), solitary confinement (Haney, 2020) and psychology’s potential role in changing law (e.g. Haney, 1980, 1993). Few, if any, will therefore challenge Haney’s credentials to write a book aimed at closing the gaps he sees between the well-established and integrated body of scientific knowledge about the origins of crime on the one hand and the enduring public opinion about who commits crime and the criminal justice system’s fundamental operating assumptions about crime on the other hand.

Content of the book

Haney argues that these gaps stem from a flawed legal fiction that underpins the United States’ criminal justice system, namely the crime master narrative that conceptualises street (i.e. not corporate, or white collar) crime as the exclusive product of poor choices autonomous people make because they are evil, immoral or have personality disorders. He explains that this narrative has several consequences. It permeates jury considerations, media messages, political discourse, prosecutors’ arguments and public discussions. It is used to justify harsh sentences, including in extreme cases capital punishment, because it implies that crime rates can be reduced by removing offenders from society through incarceration hence perpetuating the era of mass incarceration in the United States. It serves as a stereotype that stops legal decision-makers from critically analysing specific cases because they presume offenders acted autonomously and precludes the media from highlighting the narrative’s limitations. The media consequently embellishes the negative traits of offenders ignoring the structural and interpersonal reasons that might explain the relevant offences. The public therefore hear only the crime master narrative and remain uninformed about the broader reasons for crime.

Haney believes that the legal roots of this narrative predate the establishment of America and has persisted despite some nineteenth- and early twentieth-century commentators pointing out that external factors such as poverty also played a role. He firstly attributes blame for the narrative’s continued popularity on psychologists’ emphasis on individualism and point to their and other academics, voters' and politicians’ enthusiastic acceptance of theories that the crime master narrative is based on, namely craniometry, phrenology, eugenics and instinct theories that have all been debunked. Other factors that ensure its dominance are religion, psychology and law’s adoption of the free will doctrine and the wide support for the narrative in the media, politics and corrections (e.g. officers’ unions’ promotion of tough-on-crime legislation such as three strikes laws). Haney reminds readers how both major candidates in the 1996 presidential campaign adopted the term superpredator that John DiIlio, who is a supporter of the narrative, coined in his editorials in The Wall Street Journal.

Haney argues that the narrative is contradicted by a huge body of theoretical and empirical work by developmental and forensic psychologists, criminologists and sociologists that demonstrates that individual factors’ contribution to criminal behaviour is small. However, the problem facing scholars and researchers is that the simplicity of this narrative makes it difficult for scholars and researchers to introduce complex context-based alternative explanations of criminal behaviour and crime prevention methods.

Alternative theory

Haney recommends that those who want to understand the origins of criminal behaviour should consider the five-component model that Masten and Garmezy (1985) used to explain negative behavioural outcomes in developmental psychopathology. The first structural component is the risk factors (events and experiences) that are statistically associated with a greater likelihood of psychological and behavioural problems, including crime in later life (Garmezy & Masten, 1986). Other authors call these risk factors adverse childhood experiences (see Herman et al., 1997) or criminogenic needs (see Bonta & Andrews, 2017), but they agree that their presence can increase the likelihood of later behaviour problems and criminal behaviour if not dealt with. Well-known risk factors include early traumatic events and lack of appropriate parental supervision. Masten and Garmezy define the second component, stressors, as ‘any change in the environment which typically – in the average person – induces a high degree of continual tensions and interferes with normal patterns of response’ (p. 6). For children these could include death of a loved one, frequently moving locations and/or schools, poor scholastic performance and parental discord. The co-occurrence, duration, intensity, timing (e.g. age at which they occur) and number of stressors influence their impact, especially if children experience them across family, neighbourhood, peer and school systems (see Ainsworth, 1989). People’s coping mechanisms determine their ability to respond to stressors, and some children’s circumstances might be such that they fail to develop functional coping mechanisms or develop situation-specific coping mechanisms (e.g. to survive in a dangerous neighbourhood) that are dysfunctional in other settings. The two other components of the model primarily serve as mediators. Children’s health, cognitive ability and prior experience can increase their vulnerability, particularly when they are young and lack the abilities to ‘perceive, interpret, and deal with stressors’ (Masten & Garmezy, 1985, p. 37). Maltreatment, for instance, appears to have ‘its most pervasive impact during the first decade of life’ (Van der Kolk et al., 2005, p. 399). Protective factors, such as good bonds with siblings or good cognitive abilities or athletic skills, can on the other hand shield otherwise vulnerable children when they experience trauma. Many children experience risk factors and stressors, but it is the cumulative effect of experiencing many of them simultaneously for a long time in the absence of protective factors that lead to negative life outcomes.

Empirical evidence

Haney dedicates five chapters to reviewing and analysing empirical research findings that contradict the crime master narrative.

Criminogenic trauma

Researchers found that children are more likely to offend as adults if their developmental needs were not met and they experienced maltreatment defined as ‘acts of omission or commission by a parent or guardian that are judged by a mixture of community values and professional expertise to be inappropriate and damaging’ (Garbarino, 1989, p. 219). Direct maltreatment includes prenatal (e.g. having mothers who abused alcohol and/or were victims of domestic violence) and perinatal (complications at birth) factors; attachment problems (including the impact of abandonment and traumatic separation); child neglect, defined as ‘when the basic need of a child is not met, regardless of the cause[s]’ (Dubowitz et al., 1993, p. 23) and physical and emotional abuse (also see Dubowitz et al., 2005). Indirect maltreatment includes parental mental health and substance use problems; exposure to family violence, conflict, or turmoil and/or community violence; multiple family transitions; and problems at school such as not bonding with other children and dropping out.

State interventions

Haney devotes a chapter on the criminogenic impact of institutions such as foster care, schools and juvenile detention centres that ostensibly attempt to prevent criminal behaviour. Placing at-risk children in foster care can retraumatise them because they are separated from their families and sometimes put in the custody of people who are insensitive, uncaring and even abusive. Children are also frequently moved from one placement to another, compounding the traumatic impact of foster care. Public schools increasingly criminalise bad classroom behaviour by introducing zero-tolerance policies that increase suspensions and expulsions and require mandatory reporting to the police. Haney is particularly scathing about juvenile detention centres referring to court decisions, research and official reports published during the last 50 years that have documented the overcrowding, poor living conditions and prevalence of punitive and physical and sexual abusive behaviour within them. He argues that placing children and young people in juvenile detention centres retraumatises them and deprives them of the opportunities of reaching the milestones typical for people of their age (e.g. obtaining a driver’s licence). Detainees furthermore often develop dysfunctional survival strategies that they continue using when they are discharged, making it difficult for them to adjust in society and frequently leading to further incarceration.

Haney concludes this chapter by pointing out that the American juvenile system continues moving away from a rehabilitation to a punitive model that nowadays increasingly includes the management of juveniles in the adult system. This is happening despite research findings that demonstrate that this practice significantly increases the risk that juveniles will be rearrested within a year after discharge (e.g. Bishop et al., 1998–1999).

Criminogenic contexts

Haney discusses research that shows that crime is always a function of situational and personal factors, that crime is more likely to occur in some social contexts and that some people are more likely to offend in those contexts. People who are more susceptible to offending in these high-risk settings are those with several criminogenic risk factors who are troubled and/or disadvantaged, lack a secure sense of self and experience enduring stressors.

Problematical contexts are those where people have limited economic opportunities, experience a sense of alienation from mainstream society, frequently carry weapons and/or have a greater likelihood of encountering interpersonal conflict. Haney identifies two specific contexts where people distrust institutions and live according to social norms and expectations that support criminal behaviour.

The first context is neighbourhoods where there is a high concentration of people who lack economic opportunities and feel unsupported by government agencies. Here people often use drugs to self-medicate, and to support their own drug use they frequently become involved in illegal drug dealing as a pathway to financial self-efficiency and a better future. They might furthermore join gangs as a way of adapting to their environment (Vigil, 1983) and because gangs provide them with identities (Vigil, 1988), personal companionship and protection in a dangerous environment. They consequently adopt a criminal lifestyle that justifies crime and violence and will forever be stigmatised as gangsters.

The second context is prisons where people live in harsh and often overcrowded circumstances and are cut off from prosocial contact and compelled to establish bonds with other criminals with whom they share painful experiences and sometimes rely on for protection. Ex-detainees are stigmatised and often do not receive adequate physical and mental health services and find it difficult to find housing and work.

Poverty

Haney cites the aphorism that ‘the majestic quality of the law . . . prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in the streets, and from stealing bread’ (France, 1894, p. 34). Adults and children who experience long-term poverty are exposed to the cumulative effect of many risk factors for criminal behaviour and often have few, if any, protective factors. Poverty deprives people from material necessities and residential permanency that bring community and informal functional support systems, thereby exposing them to transience, instability and harsh and unsupportive institutions that serve as an ongoing stressor. Poor people therefore often experience untreated physical and health problems, and feel angry, frustrated, hopeless, overwhelmed and alienated from mainstream society. They frequently adopt dysfunctional coping mechanisms that become entrenched, such as using substances to self-medicate and engaging in criminal behaviour, mostly drug dealing, to earn money, which further compound their difficulties.

Poor parents’ life situation makes it difficult for them to identify and/or to meet their children’s physical needs (e.g. for food and housing that is free of environmental hazards such as lead) and psychological needs. Their children might therefore suffer physical (e.g. premature birth and lower birth weight), psychological and cognitive problems that impact on their academic performance and life prospects. Poor children often blame their parents for their circumstances, thereby harming the parent–child relationship, and must often prematurely adopt adult roles and responsibilities. They grow up in dysfunctional neighbourhoods where they are exposed to criminal and violent behaviour and poor role models and attend substandard schools where they associate with peers who are in the same situation as they are. Their teachers are often overburdened and/or uninterested teachers who cannot meet their pupils’ needs.

Biographical racism

Haney defines biographical racism as ‘the accumulation of a wide range of race-based inequalities, inequities, and injustice that persons of Color experience over the course of their lifetime’ (p. 267). Haley reviews literature that shows that African Americans differ significantly from their White counterparts on most, if not all, socio-economic well-being measures, including poverty. Many people from minority groups furthermore ‘still encounter expressions of racial hatred, live in racially segregated neighbourhoods, and endure the suspicion widespread among many people in positions of authority’ (Nightingale, 1994, p. 10). They consequently experience minority or racial stress (see, Williams & Williams-Morris, 2000) that adversely influences their cognitive, mental and physical health and exposes them to living conditions that ‘deprive them of necessary medical care, adequate housing, food and clothing’ (Lassiter, 1987, p. 39).

Some people from minorities consequently find it difficult to respond to their children’s needs, and Haney reports several challenges that minority children face. Their risk of being victims of physical and other abuse is significantly elevated, increasing the possibility of perpetuating cycles of intergenerational trauma. They are more likely to be within the child welfare and foster care system where they are exposed to the tough and often criminogenic factors mentioned earlier. Many of them grow up in communities where violence is endemic and where they are exposed to traumatic events without access to a supportive infrastructure to help them deal with their experiences (Roberts, 2002) and therefore experience mental health problems (Rich & Grey, 2005). Those who access social services are often treated unsympathetically, and they are more likely to be institutionalised for emotional problems (Roberts, 2002). They are more likely to be suspended in pre-school and disciplined at school, but less likely to be admitted to special education programmes. Minority adolescents are over-represented in the juvenile justice system and more likely to be transferred to adult courts.

Haney cites research that shows that minority people distrust the police because they are significantly more likely to be stopped, searched and arrested by them. People’s race therefore increases the risk that they will offend and that they will be arrested, and even imprisoned, even if they do not commit crimes. One corollary of the well-documented over-representation of adult people from minority groups in prisons is that many children from these groups grow up in the absence of one or both their parents.

Deconstructing the not everybody fallacy

Haney next turns to discrediting what he calls the not everybody fallacy used by the media and politicians to support the autonomous choice doctrine. The crux of this fallacy is that many poor people from minority groups who grow up in dysfunctional neighbourhoods and experience criminogenic trauma do not turn to crime. They particularly point out that not all siblings who come from the same disadvantaged and dysfunctional families become law breakers and that this shows that law breakers freely choose to offend. Haney maintains that their argument suffers from six logical and empirical problems. First, it ignores the reality that people respond differently to common experiences, for instance not all people who smoke develop cancer. Second, there is ample strong evidence showing that most human decisions are not the result of a conscious and deliberate decision-making process and, more specifically, that many offences are committed impulsively and often by people who have used substances. Third, people’s circumstances restrict their perceptions of the options they have and their abilities to exercise those choices. People with histories of criminogenic trauma often fail to recognise and/or fully appreciate the options they have and lack the confidence and abilities to use them. Fourth, siblings might experience growing up in the same family differently depending on their age, family dynamics, gender and the interaction between these factors. Fifth, comparing people with life histories that involve multiple traumas and adverse experiences ignores the cumulative effect of those traumas and experiences and the influence of different personal and external factors. Finally, people with exact histories could either externalise (e.g. by offending) or internalise (e.g. by developing mental illnesses or withdrawing from society) their experiences.

Law reform

Haney has previously exposed weaknesses in the American criminal justice system (e.g. Haney, 2006) and here argues that three context-based legal reforms are necessary to address them. First, criminal law doctrines and crime control policies should be changed to accommodate research and theoretical information about the role historical and immediate socio-situational factors play in offending. Criminal responsibility is a not a binary construct, but falls somewhere on a continuum (see Diamond, 1961), and ‘some defendants should be able to prove that they lived under . . . [adverse environmental conditions] . . . and that these conditions were causally connected to the crimes charged’ (Delgado, 1985, pp. 85–86) and influenced their criminal responsibility (p. 327). He acknowledges that such an approach will require a thorough investigation to identify the psychological mechanisms that explain defendants’ offending behaviour.

Second, more sophisticated sentencing models that consider research data regarding the actual causes of offending should be adopted. Haney complains that mandatory minimum sentences legislation leaves presiding officers very little discretion to consider offenders’ social histories, circumstances and special characteristics. His view is that sentence hearings have become ‘highly abbreviated and pro forma affairs’ (p. 328), and he criticises defence lawyers and judges for not making use of the US Supreme Court's decision in United States v Booker (2005) that some sentencing guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory. He advocates for a departure from the exclusive focus on retribution during sentencing that makes the severity of the crime the focus in the determination of the sentence. Instead, he calls for the adoption of a more nuanced approach where sentencers consider both the harmful impact the criminal act had on victims and the quality of their lives, and the impact imprisonment will have on offenders, which extends beyond merely the number of days in prison. He encourages defence lawyers to adopt a holistic lawyering approach that is more perceptive and responsive to their clients’ situations.

Haney finally proposes prison reform that minimises or eliminates the traumatic impact of imprisonment on inmates and introduces trauma-informed offender programmes. He suggests that correctional officers should contribute to this reform process because they will have to implement the changes, and many of them are also traumatised by the current climate within prisons.

Haney concedes that bringing about these changes will require strong political will because many powerful people and entities have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. He nevertheless recommends the adoption of a restorative justice approach because it involves victims, offenders and members of the community where offences took place and is less reliant on state-based sanctions. Unlike the current approach, restorative justice could address the underlying reasons for the offending in specific communities and respect the personhood of offenders and could enhance their reintegration into the relevant communities.

Social justice

Haney agrees with Judge Bazelon who said that criminal behaviour can be traced to social and economic ‘accidents of birth’ (1976, p. 405) and sees social injustice as the root of the problem of offending. He accepts that none of his proposed reforms will work unless America addresses ‘the persistent and severe economic and racial disparities that continue to plague the nation’ (p. 364). He does not address how this can be done but focuses on how the criminal justice system can be organised to prioritise prevention over punishment. There should first be a shift in the country’s political priorities that allow it to move to context crime prevention practices that address disadvantaged people’s social contextual and networks. He gives many examples of how this can be done, including that child protection services should focus on multisystemic programmes that eliminate risk and maximise protective factors. Other examples include adopting interventions that focus on communities’ strengths rather than their deficits and using hardening methods to assist them, such as installing surveillance cameras, reducing the availably of weapons and eliminating the reasons that induce community members to join gangs.

Another reform could be to make structural changes to communities aimed at preventing ex-prisoners from relapsing because they experience stressful social relationships, unstable housing and a lack of employment opportunities. Changes could include giving ex-prisoners access to trauma-informed counselling, substance rehabilitation services, medical and mental health services, work opportunities and monetary support. Probation and parole services should move away from a supervision and surveillance model to one that focuses on supporting ex-prisoners overcome their addiction and find stable housing and employment. The long-term impact that inmates’ imprisonment will have on their families should be assessed, and resources should be made available to families to limit the potential harm the absence of parents will have on children to prevent cycles of crime.

Haney further advocates for the removal of ‘the draconian prohibitions and restrictions that follow formerly incarcerated persons back into the community’ (p. 380). These include stopping them from fully engaging in political activities (e.g. holding an office), living in some forms of housing and doing some types of work. He also refers to previous research that shows the accumulated debts (e.g. for unpaid child support and other fines) fathers face after their release from prison (Haney, 2018).

Finally, governments should pursue racial justice in law, give all people access to an effective public mental health system and reduce poverty. Haney quotes statistics to support his argument that the motive for most robberies is financial and that many ex-prisoners continue to break the law because upon release from prison they return ‘to crime-ridden environments, plagued by the stigma of incarceration, and often suffering from a general lack of social and family support’ (Early, 1996, p. 3). He contends that governments will be able to pay for poverty-reduction programmes if they invest less in incarcerating people.

Assessment of the book

Haney used this book to consolidate and expand arguments that he has frequently made during the last 40 years, and whilst it is a though-provoking book it at times felt like he was over-elaborating and repeating some of the central themes. He, nevertheless, with reference to empirical and theoretical information, makes a compelling argument that the crime master narrative is not serving America well and that a paradigm shift is necessary regarding criminal law doctrines and crime control policies. The author’s proposed law reforms make intuitive sense, but these proposals would have been more compelling if he had placed them within more comprehensive international comparisons of criminal law doctrines and crime control policies, as he did when he referred to the Norwegian prison system (see p. 337). The Norwegian system is important because the country has a very low per capita prison population (see Broomen, 2018), but what about European countries with different systems where the prison population gap with the United States is smaller and shrinking (see Buonanno et al., 2011)?

One of Haney’s reasons for presenting such a comprehensive body of theoretical and empirical data in this book is that he agrees with others that the only real solution for the crime and incarceration problems is a total ‘social reorganisation’ (Christie, 1982, p. 25). The problem is, as Haney concedes on several occasions, that such reorganisation requires political reform (see Roberts, 2004), and this in turn necessitates changing the minds of the media, politicians and the public, and his book demonstrates that this has not happened in the last 40 years even though the theoretical and research insights presented in it have been well known. This brings me to what I think are three important unanswered questions in the book. First, do psychologists have a role to play in bringing about social changes? Further, if they have, why have social scientists, and psychologists specifically, been so unsuccessful in changing the thinking of the American media, politicians and practitioners? Finally, what can the next generation of researchers do to be more successful?

Psychologists’ role in bringing about social change

Society expects professionals such as psychologists to use their knowledge, skills and experience to the benefit of its members (e.g. MacDonald, 1995; Parsons, 1968). Psychologists’ role and ability to engage in social activism might be controversial (see Christie, 1982; Roberts, 2004), but their ethical duty to undertake socially-beneficial research and disseminate understandable accounts of their research findings available as broadly as possible is clear (Allan, 2020; Fuller et al., 2016; National Health and Medical Research Council, 2018). They should therefore endeavour to make information available to those whose role it is to bring about social change (e.g. policymakers and politicians) and those who should scrutinise such changes (e.g. the media and public) in an optimal manner.

Why have psychologists been so unsuccessful in influencing the media, policymakers, politicians and the public?

An unavoidable conclusion of this book is that during the last 40 years psychologists have had little influence on the media, policymakers, politicians and the public. There are possible reasons for this. Foremost, research findings do not change policy and must be disseminated to those that influence policy outcomes, but researchers primarily wrote papers for other researchers, and rarely for the media (Schorr, 1995), practitioners (Allan, 2020), policymakers and the public. Bodies funding research are increasingly requiring researchers to enhance the translation of their research into practice, and a common response across the disciplines has been to adopt an evidence-based model that includes as one of several steps the effective dissemination of findings to policymakers (Brownson & Jones, 2009; Freiberg & Carson, 2010). The premise underlying this approach is that policymakers read research findings and make rational decisions when they decide what research findings they will use. This assumption, however, is flawed (Nutley et al., 2002). First, policymakers are confronted by such a mass of potentially relevant information across the social sciences that they find it practically impossible (Leigh, 2009) and time consuming (Donohue, 2001) to read, assess and make rational decisions about policy issues (Nutley et al., 2002). Second, policy decision-makers are mostly collectives that make symbolic and non-instrumental decisions that are influenced by their emotions and affect (Freiberg & Carson, 2010). This is especially true in the highly emotional areas of crime, law and justice where victims naturally, and to some degree functionally, are angry and often looking for revenge (see Rilling & Sanfey, 2011). Tyler and Boeckmann (1997) further found that whilst people often gave instrumental reasons for supporting punitive measures (e.g. the desire to reduce crime), their reasons were often non-instrumental expressions of fear (e.g. the decline of discipline within society). Emotions also influence people’s assessment of risk (Slovic et al., 2005), and many people rightly or wrongly fear crime, allowing victim advocates, politicians (e.g. Guy, 2017) and the media to whip up their emotions for their own purposes. Policymakers might be trying to make rational decisions, but they are invariably confronted with their own emotions and affect as well as the mood of the public. They are therefore likely to try to weigh up the evidence, but will mostly find it difficult, if not impossible, to totally suppress their own emotions and ignore those of their constituents and the possible electoral impact of the latter. They therefore consciously or non-consciously make decisions to manage the underlying causes of their emotional discomfort (Freiberg & Carson, 2010).

What might psychologists do differently in future?

Psychologists’ empirical evidence on its own is unlikely to be the major determinant of policy outcomes, and they should engage in a far-reaching evidence-based dialogue with interested and affected parties (Freiberg & Carson, 2010). They should increasingly publish their research material in a format that is easily consumable by policymakers (Allan, 2020) and as a collective should make it easier for policymakers to access and assess their research findings. Researchers could do so by contextualising and integrating the empirical evidence they offer policymakers within an ‘evidence hierarchy’ (Leigh, 2009, p. 28) within a larger body of knowledge on the relevant topic (Curran et al., 2011). A possible format is the Cochrane Collaboration (2020), which is an international not-for-profit organisation that serves researchers who undertake meta-analyses and systematic and structured reviews on the effectiveness of health care interventions and policies.

Researchers should also increasingly publish their research findings in a popular format consumable by the public in the print and digital media and learn the skills they will require to do so. Popular writing requires using a different format, such as starting with the key findings and the reasons for their importance before providing background and other details of research projects. The focus is further on readability and comprehensibility rather than rigour and therefore avoiding excessive caveating that could undermine the significance of the findings. Psychologists should specifically choose outlets that allow them to reach people who might not generally read material coming from researchers and from both the Conservative and Liberal spectrum using American terminology.

Freiberg and Carson (2010) advise contributors to criminal justice policies to use the enlightenment model of policy development (see Young et al., 2002) when they want to contribute evidence to the policymaking process. This model conceptualises policymaking as a democratic method of translating evidence into policy with process, debate, negotiation, persuasion and advocacy essential elements. Researchers’ role in this model is not finding evidence that addresses the decision problem itself, but rather contributing reliable contextual data to the discourse to ensure that decision-makers make informed policy decisions. Researchers should accept that policymakers consider broader issues such as emotions because they are the primary motivators of behaviour and consequently ‘a legitimate, acceptable ingredient in discussion of public policy’ (Welch, 1997, p. 87). Policymakers have a moral responsibility to respect the real-life experiences of the people whose lives the policy is meant to improve. Researchers’ challenge is to find ways of ensuring that the emotional arguments contribute rather than undermine the policymaking discourse (Freiberg & Carson, 2010).

Australasian perspective

The book focuses on the American legal and criminal justice system, and non-American readers could therefore question the relevance of the book to them. It is true that topics such as capital punishment do not have much relevance to Australian and New Zealand readers, but at a meta level many of the themes in the book will be familiar. Both New Zealand (Boome, 2018) and Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2020) have relatively high incarceration rates that hover around 200 per 100,000 adults. Both New Zealand (Sentencing Act, 2002; Sentencing and Parole Reform Act, 2010) and states within Australia have mandatory and indeterminate sentences that could affect young offenders (e.g. Criminal Code Compilation Act (WA), 1913; High Risk Serious Offenders Act (WA), 2020). The relevant legislation is modest compared to the legislation in some American states, but scholars in both countries criticised them because their impact on incarceration rates, especially those of Australian and Torres Strait Islanders (ATSI) and Māori and Pasifika people who are already over-represented in the Australian and New Zealand criminal justice systems (e.g. Brookbanks, 2012; Mackenzie, 2002; Oleson, 2015; Zdenkowski, 2000).

There are also concerns about foster care and juvenile detention in Australia and the Royal Commission into the Protection and Detention of Children in Northern Territory for instance found that ‘isolation has continued to be used inappropriately, punitively and inconsistently with the Youth Justice Act (NT) which has caused suffering to many children and young people and, very likely in some cases, lasting psychological damage’ (White & Gooda, 2017). The discussion of criminogenic trauma is of particular importance to ATSI (see Allan et al., 2020) and Māori people.

Conclusion

Correctional officers, judicial officers, lawyers, mental health practitioners, policymakers and students will find this comprehensive, informative, thought-provoking and well-reasoned book a good resource. The book is, however, also a reminder to psychology researchers who do criminal justice research that research data do not automatically translate into policy and that they should consider how they can enhance the translation of their research data into policy. This requires them to find effective ways of overcoming the simplistic, but nevertheless deep-seated, emotional stereotypes held by the media, policymakers and the public.

Ethical standards

Declaration of conflicts of interest

Alfred Allan has declared no conflict of interest.

Ethical approval

This book review does not contain any studies with human participants or animals performed by any of the authors. No ethics was required for this book review.

Alfred Allan
Edith Cowan University, Perth, Western Australia
a.allan@ecu.edu.au; associateeditor2ppl@anzappl.org
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7039-797X

© 2021 Alfred Allan