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. 2020 Nov 21;193:104343. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104343

Revenge of the experts: Will COVID-19 renew or diminish public trust in science?

Barry Eichengreen a,b,c, Cevat Giray Aksoy d,e,f,, Orkun Saka g,h,i
PMCID: PMC8486491  PMID: 34629566

Abstract

It is sometimes said that an effect of the COVID-19 pandemic will be heightened appreciation of the importance of scientific research and expertise. We test this hypothesis by examining how exposure to previous epidemics affected trust in science and scientists. Building on the “impressionable years hypothesis” that attitudes are durably formed during the ages 18–25, we focus on individuals exposed to epidemics in their country of residence at this particular stage of the life course. Combining data from a 2018 Wellcome Trust survey of more than 75,000 individuals in 138 countries with data on global epidemics since 1970, we show that such exposure has no impact on views of science as an endeavor but that it significantly reduces trust in scientists and in the benefits of their work. We also illustrate that the decline in trust is driven by the individuals with little previous training in science subjects. Finally, our evidence suggests that epidemic-induced distrust translates into lower compliance with health-related policies in the form of negative views towards vaccines and lower rates of child vaccination.

Keywords: Epidemics, Trust, Scientists, Impressionable years


“More shutdowns are avoidable, but the public needs to trust science.”

(Anthony Stephen Fauci, Director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases’ remarks at a virtual symposium hosted by Harvard University on 5 August 2020)

1. Introduction

The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted disagreements among scientists, leading to criticism from politicians and the public.1 It has renewed long-standing concerns that lay perceptions of scientific disputes diminish the regard in which scientific findings are held and further “misunderstanding of how science operates and/or…[lead] people to ignore scientific advice” (Dieckmann and Johnson, 2019). It has put on display leaders’ “longstanding practice of undermining scientific expertise for political purposes” (Friedman and Plumer, 2020) and of engaging in “denigration of scientific expertise and harassment of scientists” (Scientists for Science-Based Policy, 2020).

One can distinguish several questions under this heading. First, are assessments of science as an endeavor and scientists as experts affected positively or negatively by the circumstances of a pandemic? Second, will changes in attitudes and opinions adhere mainly to the scientific endeavor or individual scientists? Will any reassessment of the importance of science apply to both the undertaking and those engaging in it, or will the public continue to trust science as a potential source of a vaccine, for example, while criticizing individual scientists who warn that the time needed to develop that vaccine will be lengthy?

We investigate in this paper how exposure to past epidemics affected trust in science and scientists. We use data from the 2018 Wellcome Global Monitor (WGM), which includes responses to questions about trust in science and scientists from over 75,000 individuals in 138 countries. We link these individual responses to the incidence of epidemics since 1970 as tabulated in the EM-DAT International Disasters Database. Building on work suggesting that individual attitudes and behavior are durably molded in what psychologists refer to as the “impressionable” late-adolescent and early-adult years, we show that impressionable-year epidemic exposure does not influence respondents’ long-term views of the value of science as an endeavor or of its role in containing the spread of diseases. However, such exposure is negatively associated with trust in scientists and, specifically, with views of their integrity and trustworthiness. Specifically, an individual with the highest exposure to an epidemic (relative to zero exposure) is 11 percentage points less likely to have trust in the scientist (the respective average of this variable in our sample is 76%).

Our data and setting allow us to extend and complement existing studies. We can examine trust in science and trust in scientists as separate outcomes. Using the cross-cohort variation generated by past epidemics, our analysis offers the broadest cross-national evidence to date on the relationship between exposure to epidemics and scientific trust. Whereas previous papers have looked at individual countries, our data cover 138 countries. This inspires greater confidence in the generality of the findings.

The negative relationship between past epidemic exposure during one’s impressionable years and current trust in scientists is robust to controlling for a battery of political and economic shocks that may have coincided with an individual’s impressionable years. We utilize the methodology developed by Oster (2019) to show that our results are unlikely to be driven by omitted variables. In addition, there is no such association in the case of trust in public health professionals (doctors, nurses, traditional healers, and others helping to manage the public-health consequences of an epidemic). And in line with the impressionable year hypothesis, this relationship is specific to the epidemic exposure between the ages of 18 and 25.

Public distrust in science and scientists during and following an epidemic can be a product both of individuals’ backgrounds and of miscommunication by the scientific community. Such miscommunication, including conflicting statements by different experts, is more likely in crisis periods when the pressure to quickly produce and disseminate scientific findings is intense (IFPRI, 2020). Members of the public who are not familiar with the scientific process may interpret the conflicting views of scientists and criticism of some studies by the authors of others as signs of bias or dishonesty. This paper cannot analyze the first argument, due to lack of data on scientific communication during past epidemics. But we provide suggestive evidence for the second, showing that individuals with little scientific training drive the negative relationship between past epidemic exposure and trust in scientists.

Effective epidemic control depends on public compliance with government mandates based on scientific advice. For example, trust in scientists recommending policies such as mask wearing, social distancing, lockdowns and mass vaccination will be associated with greater compliance with those recommendations. We directly investigate this channel, establishing that epidemic-induced distrust in scientists is associated with lower compliance with health-related advice. In particular, we show that past epidemic exposure negatively shapes respondents’ long-term attitudes towards vaccination and reduces the likelihood that their children are vaccinated against childhood diseases.

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, there are a number of studies of the impact of epidemics on trust-related outcomes, which reach conflicting results. Aassve et al. (2020) find that the Spanish Flu had permanent negative consequences for individuals’ social trust. Bol et al. (2020), on the other hand, survey citizens of 15 European countries and find that COVID-19-related lockdowns were associated with a 2% increase in trust in government in the short term. Fluckiger et al. (2019), focusing on Ebola in West Africa, provide evidence that exposure to the epidemic enhanced trust in government, especially where governments responded robustly. In contrast, Aksoy et al. (2020) find a negative impact of past exposure to epidemics on confidence in government.

In addition, we know of one paper that has explored changes in trust in science following the outbreak of COVID-19. Agley (2020) shows that the overall level of trust in science remained unchanged between December 2019 and March 2020 in the United States, although conservatives reported slight increases and liberals reported slight decreases.2

Second, our paper is related to the literature on the trust in science and expert advice. Gauchat (2012) investigates public trust in science in the United States and documents differences by social class, ethnicity, gender, church attendance, and region. Sapienza and Zingales (2013) examine whether information about the consensus views of economists affects the views of average citizens, finding that knowledge of expert views sometimes moves public opinion in the opposite direction.

Third, there is the literature on scientific communication, which shows that different findings across studies may be seen by the public as discrediting the investigators, depending on how disagreements are presented (Scheufele, 2013, Van Der Bles et al., 2020). These analyses point to the importance of scientists cultivating an aura of trustworthiness, in addition to asserting expertise (Fiske and Dupree, 2014). Related to this is the literature concerned with science and public opinion (Drummond and Fischhoff, 2017), in which it is argued that scientific knowledge may be invoked or dismissed insofar as it supports or challenges non-scientific (economic or political) concerns.

Fourth, there is the literature on the impressionable years. A seminal study pointing to the importance of this stage of the lifecycle is the survey of women attending Bennington College between 1935 and 1939 (Newcomb, 1943, Newcomb et al., 1967), among whom beliefs and values formed then remained stable for long periods. An early statement of the resulting hypothesis is Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, Krosnick and Alwin, 1989, among others, then pinpoint the impressionable years as running from ages 18 to 25.

When rationalizing the importance of the impressionable years, some scholars draw on Mannheim’s concept of the “fresh encounter,” suggesting that views are durably formed when late adolescents first encounter new ideas or events. Others invoke Erikson (1968) to suggest that individuals at this age are open to new influences because they are at the stage of life when they are forming a sense of self and identity. Still others suggest that attitudes are pliable at this stage of the lifecycle because views have not yet been hardened by confirmatory information (Converse, 1976). Spear (2000) links the the impressionable years to work in neurology, suggesting that these neurochemical and anatomical changes between the adolescent and adult brain are associated with durable attitude formation. Niemi and Sobieszek (1977, p.221 et seq) suggest that only in the late adolescent years have young people developed “the cognitive capacity to deal with political ideas” and that the same can be said to some extent of individuals in their university years (p.222).

In terms of applications, Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2013) establish that experiencing a recession between the ages of 18 and 25 has a significant impact on political preferences and beliefs about the economy. Using survey data from Chile, Etchegaray et al. (2018) show that individuals in their impressionable years in periods of political repression have a greater tendency to withhold their opinions, compared to those who grew up in less repressive times. Farzanegan and Gholipour (2019) find that Iranians experiencing the Iran-Iraq War in their impressionable years are more likely to prioritize a strong defense.

Finally, the present paper is related to Aksoy et al. (2020), where we find a negative impact of past epidemic exposure in confidence in the current political leader and in the integrity of the elections through which that leader is selected. But whereas, in that paper, we were able to investigate trust in the leader only in one setting (that of national government), here we observe views of the trustworthiness of scientists in two different settings: universities and private companies. In addition, we are able to link the changes in trust in the responsible authorities with compliance with their advice; we show that epidemic exposure that erodes trust in scientists is also associated with a reduced willingness to vaccinate one’s children, both within the same group of individuals included in WGM survey.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section Section 3 outlines our empirical design and identification strategy. Section 4 presents the baseline results, after which Section 5 concludes.

2. Data

Our principal data sources are 2018 Wellcome Global Monitor (WGM) and the EM-DAT International Disasters Database. WGM is a nationally representative survey fielded in 2018. Our final merged sample includes 138 countries. WGM is the first global survey of how people think and feel about key health and science challenges, including attitudes towards vaccines; trust in doctors, nurses and scientists; trust in medical advice from the government; whether people believe in the benefits of science.

The main outcome variables of interest come from questions asked of all WGM respondents regarding their trust in science and scientists:

  • (i)

    “in general, would you say that you trust science a lot, some, not much, or not at all?”;

  • (ii)
    “how much do you trust scientists working in colleges/universities in this country to do each of the following?”
    • a.
      to do their work with the intention of benefiting the public
    • b.
      to be open and honest about who is paying for their work
  • (iii)
    “thinking about companies - for example, those who make medicines or agricultural supplies - how much do you trust scientists working for companies in this country to do each of the following?”
    • c.
      to do their work with the intention of benefiting the public
    • d.
      to be open and honest about who is paying for their work
  • (iv)

    “in general, how much do you trust scientists to find out accurate information about the world? A lot, some, not much, or not at all?”

Responses were coded on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging from “A lot” (1) to “Not at all” (4). We code “A lot” and “Some” as 1 and zero otherwise in order to estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM).3

WGM also provides information on respondents’ demographic characteristics (age, gender, educational attainment, marital status, religion, and urban/rural residence), labor market outcomes, and within-country income quintiles. Controlling for employment status and income allows us to measure the impact of past epidemics on trust in science and scientists beyond any direct effect of epidemics on material well-being.

We also examine responses to three parallel questions as placebo outcomes, namely whether the respondents have trust in doctors and nurses; hospitals and health clinics; traditional healers. This helps us to determine whether what we are capturing is the impact of epidemic exposure on views of scientists specifically, as distinct from any impact on views of healthcare-related institutions and professionals.

Data on the worldwide epidemic occurrence and effects are drawn from the EM-DAT International Disasters Database from 1970 to the present.4 These data are compiled from UN agencies, non-governmental organizations, insurance companies, research institutes, press agencies, and other sources. It includes all epidemics (viral, bacterial, parasitic, fungal, and prion) meeting one or more of the following criteria: (i) 10 or more people dead; (ii) 100 or more people affected; (iii) declaration of a state of emergency; (iv) a call for international assistance.

Our dataset includes 47 different types of epidemics and pandemics since 1970. This includes large outbreaks of Cholera, Ebola, and H1N1 and also more limited epidemics. Averaged across available years, H1N1, Ebola, Dysentery, Measles, Meningitis, Cholera, Yellow Fever, Diarrhoeal Syndromes, Marburg Virus, and Pneumonia were the top 10 diseases causing epidemic mortality worldwide.

Many of these epidemics and pandemics affected multiple countries. 138 countries experienced at least one epidemic since 1970. This includes 51 countries in Africa, 40 in Asia, 22 in the Americas, 19 in Europe, and 5 in Oceania. The most epidemic-prone countries in the dataset are Niger (25), Nigeria (25), Congo (22), Cameroon (21), Mozambique (20), Sudan (20), Uganda (20) and India (19). Advanced countries in our sample all experienced 5 or fewer epidemics.5

Each epidemic is identified with the country where it took place. When an epidemic affects several countries, several separate entries are made to the database for each. EM-DAT provides information on the start and end date of the epidemic, the number of deaths, and the number of individuals affected. The number of individuals affected refers to the total number requiring immediate assistance (assistance with basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation, and immediate medical treatment) during the period of emergency. We aggregate the epidemic related information in this database at the county-year level and merge it with WGM. Fig. 1 provides a visual summary.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Share of respondents who trust science and scientists. Notes: Panel A illustrates share of respondents who trust science a lot or some. Panel B illustrates share of respondents who trust scientists a lot or some. Countries are grouped in quintiles. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018.

We also use country level information from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset to control for individuals’ past experiences and get information on past media consumption (TV units per capita and radio units per capita). Country level past economic experience variables come from the World Bank. The data on political regime comes from the Polity.6

3. Empirical Model

To assess the effect of past exposure to an epidemic on an individual’s trust in science and scientists, we estimate the following OLS specification:

Yi,c,a=β0+β1Xi+β2Exposuretoepidemic(18-25)ica+β3Cc+β4Aa+β5CcAge+εica (1)

where Yica is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent i with age a in country c has trust in science or scientists. To operationalize Exposure to epidemic (1825), we calculate for each individual the number of people affected by an epidemic as a share of the population, averaged over the 8 years when the individual was in his or her impressionable years (18–25 years old).7 The coefficient of interest is β2, which captures the impact of past exposure to an epidemic on the trust in science or scientists.

We specify the Xi vector of individual characteristics to include: indicator variables for living in an urban area and for having a child (any child under 15), and dummy variables for gender (male), employment status (full-time employed by an employer, full-time self-employed, part-time employed with intention for full-time, part-time employed with no intention for full-time, unemployed, out of workforce), religion (religious vs. non-religious), educational attainment (tertiary education, secondary education), and within-country income quintiles.

To account for unobservable characteristics, we include fixed effects separately at the levels of country (Cc) and age cohort (Aa) (that is, cohort fixed effects). The country dummies control for all variation in the outcome variable due to factors that vary cross-nationally. The cohort fixed effects control for the variation in the outcome variable caused by factors that are heterogeneous across (but homogenous within) birth cohorts.8 By controlling for these and other variables separately, we can be confident that their effects are not being picked up by impressionable-year epidemic exposure. In addition to saturating our specification with country and cohort fixed-effects, we include country-specific age trends (Cc*Age).9 These address the possibility that, even though we control for overall cohort and age-related factors, the interaction of age and attitudes may differ across countries. In further robustness checks, we also include country*income quintile, country*employment status and country*education fixed effects.

We cluster standard errors by country and use sampling weights provided by the WGM to make the data representative at the country level.

3.1. Identification

One can imagine several potential threats to this strategy. First, age-specific factors may matter if different generations were exposed to epidemics with different probabilities; given advances in science and improvements in national healthcare systems, one might anticipate that epidemics are less likely to be experienced by younger generations. We address these concerns by including a full set of cohort fixed effects determined by an individual’s year of birth.

Second, generational trends in science attitudes could also be heterogeneous across countries. Some national cultures may be more flexible and open to change in individual values and beliefs, leading to larger differences across generations. We therefore include country-specific age trends in our models.

Third, although we fully saturate our specifications with fixed effects, there could still be other past exposures that are correlated with epidemics and matter for individuals’ views regarding science and scientists. To capture these additional exposures, we control for various aspects of the political and socio-economic environment (GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation rate, political regime -the Polity2 score-, assassinations, general strikes, terrorism/guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions, anti-government demonstrations, government crises, physicians per capita and university enrollment per capita) in the country in question during the individual’s impressionable years. Thus, we confirm that including these controls for other past exposures and conditions has minimal impact on the stability of our coefficients of interest.

Lastly, we control for contemporaneous individual characteristics and economic circumstances as captured by the WGM. These contemporaneous controls minimize the possibility that the impact of a past epidemic is transferred to current outcomes via one of these variables. These variables might also be considered as ‘bad controls’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As we reported in the Appendix A, removing them does not substantively change any of our findings.

4. Results

4.1. Main results

Table 1 reports the results for all dependent variables in WGM dataset related to respondents’ views of scientists: whether the respondent has trust in scientists in their country; trusts that scientists working for private companies in their country aim to benefit the public; trusts that scientists working for private companies in their country are honest about who is paying for their work; trusts that scientists working for universities in their country aim to benefit the public; trusts that scientists working for universities in their country are honest about who is paying for their work; and trusts that scientists can find out accurate information about the world.

Table 1.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Trust in Scientists.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Trust in scientists

Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −2.937* −2.821* −3.454** −3.408** −3.162** −3.525**
(1.600) (1.645) (1.330) (1.422) (1.468) (1.421)
Observations 83,014 82,854 82,854 82,854 82,854 82,854



Outcome → Scientists working for private companies benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −1.552*** −1.559*** −1.283*** −1.289*** −1.141** −1.346***
(0.354) (0.349) (0.338) (0.389) (0.447) (0.375)
Observations 81,554 81,406 81,406 81,406 81,406 81,406



Outcome → Scientists working for private companies are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −2.105*** −2.106*** −1.731*** −1.915*** −1.611*** −1.779***
(0.597) (0.611) (0.642) (0.661) (0.466) (0.620)
Observations 76,856 76,723 76,723 76,723 76,723 76,723



Outcome → Scientists working for universities benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.150 0.226 −0.616 −0.836* −0.572 −0.808*
(0.727) (0.752) (0.478) (0.459) (0.500) (0.448)
Observations 81,307 81,147 81,147 81,147 81,147 81,147



Outcome → Scientists working for universities are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.042*** −2.980*** −3.330*** −3.442*** −3.259*** −3.337***
(0.375) (0.413) (0.446) (0.471) (0.356) (0.531)
Observations 76,123 75,992 75,992 75,992 75,992 75,992



Outcome → Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −1.352 −1.188 −1.438** −1.873*** −1.185 −1.704**
(0.988) (1.137) (0.664) (0.644) (0.752) (0.717)
Observations 84,104 83,939 83,939 83,939 83,939 83,939



Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country * Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country * Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country * Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.

Models/Columns 1–3, estimated on the full sample of respondents, progressively increase the tightness of identification by adding controls at each step. Models/Columns 4–6 then add fixed effects, where individuals in the treatment and control groups are only compared within the same country and income level (Model 4), the same country and employment status (Model 5), and the same country and educational attainment (Model 6).

The coefficients on impressionable-year epidemic exposure are negative and significant at conventional levels in 29 of 36 cases.10 The estimates in Column 3 of Table 1, for example, show that an individual with the highest exposure to epidemics (0.032, that is, the highest number of people affected by an epidemic as a share of the population averaged during an individual’s formative years) relative to individuals with no exposure is on average 11 percentage points (−3.454 * 0.032) less likely to trust in scientists in their country (the respective average of this variable in our sample is 76%).11

Table 2 reports estimates of the same models for six additional dependent variables. The first three are related to the societal impact of science: whether the respondent has trust in science; thinks that science will help improve life for the next generation; and thinks that studying disease is a part of science. The next three are placebo tests that address the possibility that what we are picking up is not the impact on the perceived trustworthiness and public-spiritedness of scientists engaged in health-related research specifically but the impact on perceptions of individuals engaged in tasks related to healthcare and health outcomes generally. In contrast to Table 1, Table 2 shows that formative-year epidemic exposure has a positive, small and statistically insignificant effect on almost all of these outcome variables. The effect we find is not a general decline in trust in science, but only in scientists. It is not a general decline in trust in everyone engaged in health care, only in scientists researching health care related issues.12

Table 2.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Trust in Science and Placebo Outcomes.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.124 0.256 0.256 −0.039 0.533 0.164
(0.503) (0.599) (0.408) (0.484) (0.406) (0.423)
Observations 85,368 85,199 85,199 85,199 85,199 85,199



Outcome → Science and technology will help improve life
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.562* 0.669* 0.685 0.641 0.730 0.655
(0.336) (0.357) (0.462) (0.482) (0.489) (0.457)
Observations 86,585 86,397 86,397 86,397 86,397 86,397



Outcome → Studying diseases is a part of science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.126 0.209 0.369 0.130 0.462 0.417
(0.576) (0.496) (0.423) (0.344) (0.389) (0.404)
Observations 88,326 88,138 88,138 88,138 88,138 88,138



Outcome → Have trust in doctors and nurses
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 1.296 1.332 1.585 1.427 1.513 1.400
(1.291) (1.272) (1.196) (1.380) (1.112) (1.235)
Observations 92,026 91,835 91,835 91,835 91,835 91,835



Outcome → Have trust in hospitals and health clinics
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.702 0.748 1.341 1.446 1.122 1.251
(1.482) (1.382) (1.323) (1.569) (1.228) (1.378)
Observations 90,030 89,851 89,851 89,851 89,851 89,851



Outcome → Have trust in traditional healers
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.115 0.031 −0.696 −0.663 −0.987** −0.667
(1.056) (0.966) (0.505) (0.480) (0.405) (0.501)
Observations 87,942 87,761 87,761 87,761 87,761 87,761



Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country*Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country*Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%.

4.2. Heterogeneity by the level of science education

Given that previous work points to science education as shaping views of science and scientists, we also estimate our main specification for two subsamples: respondents who learned about science at most at the primary school level, versus respondents who learned about science at least at the secondary school level. The results, in Table 3 , reveal substantial differences. They suggest that our results are driven by the sample of individuals with little or no science education. Additional analysis (not presented here but available upon request) suggests that these results cannot be explained by the possible interruption in education due to exposure to an epidemic.13

Table 3.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Confidence in Scientists by the Level of Science Education.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Sample → Respondents learned about science at most at primary school level
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −4.521*** −4.140*** −2.443** 0.186 −0.891 −0.253
(0.888) (1.162) (0.971) (1.323) (3.436) (0.488)
Observations 14,434 13,984 12,931 13,752 12,668 14,300



Sample → Respondents learned about science at least at secondary school level
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 1.332 3.270*** −1.545 1.529 −0.441 −1.315
(2.547) (0.831) (2.370) (1.780) (1.285) (1.037)



Observations 57,892 57,054 54,130 57,206 53,755 59,232
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.

4.3. Are the results driven by other past experience?

In a robustness check, we control for other political and socio-economic experiences, the timing of which corresponds to the same impressionable years (ages 18–25). For each individual we add GDP growth, GDP per capita, inflation rate, political regime - Polity2 score-, assassinations, general strikes, terrorism/guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions, anti-government demonstrations, government crises, physicians per capita and university enrollment per capita at the time of the survey response.14 If such shocks coincide with epidemics, omitting them may exaggerate the estimated effect of the latter.

Appendix Table A1 reports the results across the same six outcome variables related to trust in scientists and shows that the impact of epidemic exposure on trust in scientists -if anything- become larger, not smaller, once we control for these other past political and economic shocks. This is consistent with the idea that what we are capturing is specific to epidemics and not related to other coincident shocks.

4.4. Changes in actual behaviour

We ask whether the loss of trust in scientists has implications for actual behavior. We focus on changes in vaccine-related attitudes and on the tendency for individuals to vaccinate their own children. Table 4 presents estimates analogous to Model 3 of Table 1, while simultaneously controlling for other past economic and political shocks. Individuals exposed to epidemics in their impressionable years are more likely to have negative attitudes towards vaccination and less likely to vaccinate their children. This suggests that the change in attitudes that we document have consequences for actual behavior.

Table 4.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic on Attitudes towards Vaccines.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome → Children received a vaccine Children received a vaccine Vaccines are important for children to have Vaccines are important for children to have Vaccines are safe Vaccines are safe Vaccines are effective Vaccines are effective
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −1.341*** −1.479*** −1.562*** −1.272** −4.694*** −4.461*** −2.446*** −1.959***
(0.311) (0.334) (0.538) (0.522) (0.490) (0.533) (0.602) (0.624)



Observations 25,774 25,774 30,955 30,955 30,330 30,330 30,383 30,383
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Past controls (18–25) No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

4.5. Robustness to omitted variable bias

One might be concerned that our results are driven by other omitted factors that shape the individuals’ trust. We therefore follow the method proposed by Oster (2019) to investigate the importance of unobservables. In Appendix Table A2, we first reproduce the baseline estimates for our main outcomes in the top row. The second row then presents estimation bounds where we define Rmax upper bound as 1.3 times the R-squared in specifications that control for observables.15 The bottom row presents Oster’s delta, which indicates the degree of selection on unobservables relative to observables that would be needed to fully explain our results by omitted variable bias.

The results show very limited movement in the coefficients. High delta values also indicate that the unobservables have less effect on our coefficient of interest than the observables. The value of Oster’s delta ranges between 2 and 132 across models, which is reassuring, as it is unlikely that there are unobserved factors that are 2–132 times as important as all observables we include in our preferred specification.

4.6. Are the results unique to impressionable years?

The results in Appendix Table A3 suggest that the effect is insignificant when individuals are exposed to epidemics in any stage of life other than when they are between ages 18 and 25. These results are consistent with the idea that there is something special about the late adolescent and early adult years that leaves a long-lasting legacy in beliefs and attitudes.

4.7. Multiple hypothesis testing

We also conducted multiple hypothesis testing by employing a randomization inference technique suggested by Young (2019). This helps us establish the robustness of our results for the null that our treatment does not have any effect across any of the outcome variables (i.e., treatment is irrelevant), taking into account the multiplicity of the hypothesis testing procedure. The method essentially builds on repeatedly randomizing the treatment variable in each estimation and comparing the pool of randomized estimates to the estimates derived via the true treatment variable. The results, presented in Appendix Table A4, show that our findings remain robust when evaluated via these joint tests of treatment significance.

4.8. Robustness to alternative treatment definitions

In our baseline results, we standardize our treatment variable by dividing the average number of epidemic-affected people with the average population size of the country during one’s impressionable years. This standardization is crucial as one would expect that countries with larger populations would naturally have more people infected by an epidemic since viruses are socially transmitted and the eventual toll would depend on how many people live in a country.

Nevertheless, one might be concerned that a small population in a country may increase the intensity of the epidemic as well as the intensity of the epidemic affecting the population counts (through both mortality and immigration). We, therefore, checked the robustness of our results using population unadjusted treatment variable: simply the number of individuals affected by an epidemic averaged over the 8 years when the individual was aged 18–25. The results presented in Table A5, Table A6 show that our results are robust to this alternative definition.

In addition, in Table A7, Table A8, we show that our results remain qualitatively identical when we use the treatment variable adjused by a time-invariant population size (that is, using a population measure as of 1970).

4.9. Heterogeneity by the country characteristics

We consider the baseline specification (Column 3 of Table 1) for two subsamples: (i) countries with below and above median physicians per capita at the time of the epidemic; (ii) low-income countries vs. high-income countries. We report these results in Appendix Table A9, where each cell reports point estimates for a different outcome varible.

The negative impact of epidemic exposure on trust in scientists seems to be driven by countries with below median physicians per capita at the time of the epidemic and low-income countries. This pattern is in line with evidence from Aksoy et al. (2020), who find that people in the low-income countries more likely to see their governments and leaders less trustworthy and unreliable when they are exposed to epidemics during their impressionable years.

4.10. Are the results driven by the intensive or extensive margin?

In Appendix Table A10, we distinguish the intensive and extensive margins of the treatment. For the extensive margin, we mean whether the effect is due to any level of epidemic exposure. To capture this, we construct a binary variable based on whether the number of people affected by epidemics during the individual’s impressionable years is positive or zero. For the intensive margin, we limit the sample to individuals with positive epidemic exposure in their impressionable years.

Appendix Table A10 shows that the treatment works via the intensive margin. It is not simply being exposed to an epidemic that generates the effect; rather, conditional on being exposed, the severity of the epidemic drives the results.

4.11. Are large epidemics different?

As shown in Appendix Table A10, the effects we identify are driven by intensive margin. To further investigate this, in Appendix Table A11, we use indicators for the top 0.5% of exposures to epidemics, the top 1%, the top 2%, and the top 5%, each in a separate estimation. An epidemic exposure in the scale of top 0.5, 1, or 2% of all past experiences causes a significant fall in an individual’s confidence in scientists. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect tends to increase with more intense experiences.

4.12. Excluding potential “bad controls”

One might worry that certain individual characteristics (such as household income) are themselves affected by epidemic related economic shocks. We therefore checked for potential “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) by excluding these individual characterisitics. Doing so does not substantively change the point estimates for our variables of interest (see Appendix Table A12).16

4.13. Robutness to controlling for the number of epidemic experience

Table A13 shows that our results are robust to controlling for the number of epidemics experienced by individuals over their lifetime.

4.14. Robustness to excluding most affected countries

To check whether our results are driven by a small set of countries, we exclude the most affected countries and reestimate our main models. The results presented in Appendix Table A14 show that our results remain robust.

5. Discussion

COVID-19 has the potential to reshape every aspect of society, including how science and scientists are perceived. It is not clear, however, whether trust in science and scientists will be enhanced or diminished, or whether such changes will affect mainly science as an endeavor or scientists as individuals.

If past epidemics are a guide, the virus will not have an impact on the regard in which science as an undertaking is held. Members of the public will continue to believe that science has the potential to improve society. However, it will reduce trust in individual scientists, worsen perceptions of their honesty, and weaken the belief that their activities benefit the public. This distinction is consistent with the literatures in psychology and cognitive science on how individuals assign blame in complex, high-stakes social settings and with their tendency to blame individuals rather than institutions (see e.g. Wright, 1993, Wilinson-Ryan, 2020). It is consistent with what we observe in, inter alia, the United States, where politicians and commentators have questioned the value of the public-policy recommendations offered by individual scientists (viz. Senator Rand Paul’s comment “As much as I respect you, Dr. Fauci, I don’t think you’re the end-all”) while at the same time seeking to mobilize all available scientific resources to develop a vaccine (the Trump Administration’s “Operation Warp Speed”).

Whether evidence from past epidemics provide an accurate guide to the likely effects on trust in scientists of COVID-19 can be questioned of course. The spread of COVID-19 is global, where some past epidemics were limited to a handful of countries. COVID-19 is arguably the first epidemic to occur in the era of widespread social media, which may have an effect on the spread of misinformation as well as information and on the formulation of opinions. We cannot speak definitively to this question of external validity. Our results in this paper however hold for epidemics that strike multiple countries as well as for those that are limited to a small number of countries.

The State of Science Index (2018) survey suggests that scientists are distrusted because they are seen as members of the elite. It suggests individuals feel that scientists, being self-interested and human, can be unduly influenced by government and corporate agendas, or because they feel that scientists’ conclusions are based on personal beliefs and data. Our finding that past epidemic exposure negatively affects views of scientists working for private companies but not as much of scientists working for universities suggests that suspicion of corporate agendas is especially salient in this connection. That epidemic exposure affects views of scientists but not of science is consistent with this emphasis on investigator agendas and beliefs, insofar as bias due to self interest more plausibly skews results when a study is undertaken by an individual than a large team, in the latter case cancelling out individual biases (Dieckmann and Johnson, 2019). Still other surveys find that a significant share of respondents take disagreement among scientists, which is not unlikely in the context of a swiftly unfolding pandemic, as evidence that their conclusions are based on personal belief (rather than on issues of data and methodology), or as simply indicating that the investigators in question are incompetent.

Addressing concerns about corporate agendas, personal bias and disagreement in scientific communication is even more important in this light. Our results suggest that it is especially important to tailor any such response to the concerns expressed by members of the generation (“Generation Z”) currently in their impressionable years.

Footnotes

The order of author names is randomized via AEA Randomization Tool (code: tOjmA7DVzybq). All authors contributed equally to this manuscript. We thank Nicolás Ajzenman, Chris Anderson (discussant), Belinda Archibong, Sascha Becker, Damien Bol, Ralph De Haas, Anna Getmansky (discussant), Luigi Guiso, Bruce Hardy, Beata Javorcik, André Sapir, Konstantin Sonin, Dan Treisman, and webinar participants at the Bank of Finland, Comparative Economics Webinar series, EBRD, LSE and University of Sussex for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Kimiya Akhyani for providing very useful research assistance. Views presented are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the EBRD. All interpretations, errors, and omissions are our own.

2

However, this study considers only the short-term impact of a single epidemic. In contrast, we consider a larger class of epidemics and test for persistent effects of experiencing epidemics during a critical juncture in individuals’ life cycle, namely ‘impressionable years’.

3

In Table A16, Table A17, we also show that our results are robust to using ordered logit and multinomial logit models.

4

EM-DAT was established in 1973 as a non-profit within the School of Public Health of the Catholic University of Louvain; it subsequently became a collaborating center of the World Health Organization. It also gathers historical information on epidemics that took place before it was founded; however, those data are patchy and biased towards well-recorded epidemics. Hence we only focus on epidemic cases that EM-DAT “live” collected after it was founded in early 1970s.

5

We provide the full country-year-epidemic list in Appendix Table A18.

6

Past experience variables include GDP growth, GDP per capita, the inflation rate, the political regime (the Polity2 score), assassinations, general strikes, terrorism/guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations, government crises, physicians per capita and university enrollment per capita.

7

In Table A5, Table A6, we show that our results are robust to using “population unadjusted epidemic exposure” variable. Additionally, the results are qualitatively same once we employ a time-invariant measure for population (see Table A7, Table A8).

8

Since WGM contains a cross-section of countries at a single point in time (as of 2018), our cohort fixed effects fully coincide with the age dummies that one would ideally like to include in Eq. (1). Thus, even though we cannot separately estimate the age-fixed effects due to such perfect collinearity, our setting indirectly controls for all age-related heterogeneity by including these cohort fixed-effects.

9

Our results remain virtually unchanged when we include country-quadratic age trends. These results are available upon request.

10

Later in a robustness check, we confirm the relevance of our treatment variable across multiple hypotheses.

11

We use the highest number in terms of past epidemics exposure as this varible is highly skewed with more than half of the respondents having no experience at all; and thus, it would not be appropriate to benchmark the effect size with mean or median.

12

One could be concerned that our preferred specification (Model 3) in Table 1, Table 2 contains country-specific age trends, which could be collinear with our treatment variable (Exposure to Epidemic (1825)). On the one hand, there is little to suspect that our treatment variable would vary in a certain direction in line with the age of the respondents in a country since we focus on the same past experience window (ages 18–25) irrespective of what the age of the respondent is at the time of the survey. On the other hand, it is reassuring that our results change very little when we drop these age trends in our estimations (see Models 1 and 2 in Table 1, Table 2).

13

We also check the role of media consumption in shaping attitudes towards scientists at the time of the epidemics. To do so, we use the country-level data from CNTS, which reports TV units per capita and Radio units per capita for a large number of countries. In particular, we calculate the average values for each dimension during the impressionable years of each individual. We then create interaction terms, Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)*TV Per Capita (18–25) and Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)*Radio Per Capita (18–25), and include them (alongside standalone variables) in our baseline model as reported in Appendix Table A15. The results show that none of the interactions are statistically significant, suggesting that media consumption is not likely to be the main transmission channel in our setting.

14

In particular, we calculate the average values for each one of these dimensions during the impressionable years of each individual. Including these past experiences as controls naturally makes for smaller samples, since the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive covers only some of the countries and years in our main sample.

15

Estimation bounds on the treatment effect range between the coefficient from the main specification and the coefficient estimated under the assumption that observables are as important as unobservables for the level of Rmax. Rmax specifies the maximum R-squared that can be achieved if all unobservables were included in the regression.

16

We therefore keep these controls in our baseline specification to avoid omitted variable bias.

Appendix A.

See Table A1, Table A2, Table A3, Table A4, Table A5, Table A6, Table A7, Table A8, Table A9, Table A10, Table A11, Table A12, Table A13, Table A14, Table A15, Table A16, Table A17, Table A18 .

Table A1.

Robustness to Controlling for Other Economic, Education Related and Political Shocks.

(1) (2)
Outcome → Trust in scientists Trust in scientists
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −1.548***
(0.528)
−1.839***
(0.570)
Observations 30,666 30,666
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies benefit the public
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −0.738
(1.030)
−0.837
(1.167)
Observations 30,273 30,273
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for private companies are honest
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −2.001***
(0.387)
−2.465***
(0.573)
Observations 28,789 28,789
Outcome → Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities benefit the public
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −2.616***
(0.634)
−2.684***
(0.748)
Observations 30,067 30,067
Outcome → Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists working for universities are honest
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −4.007***
(1.183)
−3.841***
(1.214)
Observations 28,437 28,437
Outcome → Scientists find out accurate information Scientists find out accurate information
Exposure to epidemic (18–25) −1.551***
(0.373)
−0.974**
(0.456)



Observations 30,980 30,980
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects Yes Yes
Labour market controls Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes
Past controls (18–25) No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A2.

Robustness to Omitted Variable Bias.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Trust in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.454** −1.283*** −1.731*** −0.616 −3.330*** −1.438**
(1.330) (0.338) (0.642) (0.478) (0.446) (0.664)
Bounds on the treatment effect (δ = 1, Rmax = 1.3*R) (-3.454, −3.044) (-1.238, −1.134) (-1.731, −2.301) (-0.616, 0.649) (-3.330, −2.587) (-1.438, −0.827)
Treatment effect excludes 0 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Delta (Rmax = 1.3*R) −44.41 −132.15 13.52 −1.97 −39.39 −5.367

Notes: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. Bounds on the Democracy 18–25 effect are calculated using Stata code psacalc, which calculates estimates of treatment effects and relative degree of selection in linear models as proposed in Oster (2019). Delta, δ, calculates an estimate of the proportional degree of selection given a maximum value of the R-squared. Delta is assumed to be 1 in the analysis, which means that the observed and the unobserved factors have an equally important effect on the coefficient of interest. Rmax specifies the maximum R-squared which would result if all unobservables were included in the regression. We define Rmax upper bound as 1.3 times the R-squared from the main specification that controls for all observables.

Table A3.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic on Trust in Scientists During Formative Years (18–25) vs. During Other Years.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome → Trust in scientists Trust in scientists Trust in scientists Trust in scientists Trust in scientists
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.454** −4.433** −3.086** −2.361*** −6.326***
(1.330) (1.915) (1.184) (0.836) (1.023)
Exposure to Epidemic (2–9) −0.044
(0.990)
Exposure to Epidemic (10–17) 0.078
(0.942)
Exposure to Epidemic (26–33) −0.753
(1.152)
Exposure to Epidemic (34–42) −0.932



Observations 82,854 58,284 71,109 60,943 42,018
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A4.

Multiple Hypothesis Testing on Variables Related to Trust in Scientists.

Randomization-c p-values (joint test of treatment significance) 0.005***
Randomization-t p-values (joint test of treatment significance) N/A
Randomization-c p-values (Westfall-Young multiple testing of treatment significance) 0.037**
Randomization-t p-values (Westfall-Young multiple testing of treatment significance) 0.020**

Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Randomization-t technique does not produce p-values for the joint test

of treatment significance. Results are derived from 100 iterations. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor,

2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017.

Table A5.

Robustness to Using Population Unadjusted Treatment Variable - Trust in Scientists.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Trust in scientists
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.067 −0.060 −0.095** −0.089** −0.079* −0.093**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042)
Observations 85,746 85,586 85,586 85,586 85,586 85,586
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.043* −0.045* −0.060*** −0.057*** −0.048** −0.058***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.017)
Observations 84,228 84,080 84,080 84,080 84,080 84,080
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.092*** −0.093*** −0.096*** −0.105*** −0.086*** −0.091***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015)
Observations 79,312 79,179 79,179 79,179 79,179 79,179
Outcome → Scientists working for universities benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. 0.031 0.034 −0.037* −0.044* −0.034 −0.041**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020)
Observations 83,930 83,770 83,770 83,770 83,770 83,770
Outcome → Scientists working for universities are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.106*** −0.101*** −0.143*** −0.148*** −0.139*** −0.144***
(0.030) (0.031) (0.023) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022)
Observations 78,540 78,409 78,409 78,409 78,409 78,409
Outcome → Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.022 −0.012 −0.060 −0.078* −0.047 −0.066
(0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.042)



Observations 86,857 86,692 86,692 86,692 86,692 86,692
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country*Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country*Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A6.

Robustness to Using Population Unadjusted Treatment Variable - Trust in Science and Placebo Outcomes.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.000 0.009 −0.025 −0.039 −0.009 −0.028
(0.031) (0.032) (0.043) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043)
Observations 88,129 87,960 87,960 87,960 87,960 87,960
Outcome → Science and technology will help improve life
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. 0.013 0.018 −0.004 −0.008 0.003 −0.004
(0.031) (0.032) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.037)
Observations 89,271 89,083 89,083 89,083 89,083 89,083
Outcome → Studying diseases is a part of science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. −0.032 −0.026 0.003 −0.005 0.007 0.008
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 91,104 90,916 90,916 90,916 90,916 90,916
Outcome → Have trust in doctors and nurses
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. 0.083** 0.083** 0.079 0.076 0.073* 0.073*
(0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.047) (0.042) (0.044)
Observations 95,061 94,870 94,870 94,870 94,870 94,870
Outcome → Have trust in hospitals and health clinics
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. 0.077** 0.074** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.104*** 0.115***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 92,985 92,806 92,806 92,806 92,806 92,806
Outcome → Have trust in traditional healers
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)nopop. 0.042 0.034 −0.010 −0.015 −0.022 −0.008
(0.042) (0.041) (0.019) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019)



Observations 90,775 90,594 90,594 90,594 90,594 90,594
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country*Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country*Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A7.

Robustness to Using Treatment Variable with a Fixed Population in 1970 - Trust in Scientists.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Trust in scientists
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 −1.277 −1.226 −1.546** −1.521* −1.402* −1.567**
(0.825) (0.848) (0.745) (0.783) (0.797) (0.780)
Observations 83,014 82,854 82,854 82,854 82,854 82,854
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 −0.743*** −0.750*** −0.624*** −0.611*** −0.530** −0.645***
(0.173) (0.177) (0.156) (0.194) (0.226) (0.179)
Observations 81,554 81,406 81,406 81,406 81,406 81,406
Outcome → Scientists working for private companies are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 −0.989*** −0.996*** −0.811*** −0.895*** −0.716*** −0.820***
(0.226) (0.227) (0.261) (0.266) (0.207) (0.259)
Observations 76,856 76,723 76,723 76,723 76,723 76,723
Outcome → Scientists working for universities benefit the public
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.112 0.145 −0.261 −0.350* −0.232 −0.347*
(0.345) (0.358) (0.194) (0.192) (0.205) (0.185)
Observations 81,307 81,147 81,147 81,147 81,147 81,147
Outcome → Scientists working for universities are honest
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 −1.367*** −1.334*** −1.515*** −1.563*** −1.455*** −1.527***
(0.260) (0.279) (0.166) (0.172) (0.175) (0.176)
Observations 76,123 75,992 75,992 75,992 75,992 75,992
Outcome → Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 −0.526 −0.447 −0.581* −0.783** −0.455 −0.695*
(0.487) (0.555) (0.342) (0.345) (0.373) (0.376)



Observations 84,104 83,939 83,939 83,939 83,939 83,939
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country*Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country*Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A8.

Robustness to Using Treatment Variable with a Fixed Population in 1970 - Trust in Science and Placebo Outcomes.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.073 0.133 0.112 −0.036 0.255 0.069
(0.231) (0.281) (0.188) (0.212) (0.190) (0.191)
Observations 85,368 85,199 85,199 85,199 85,199 85,199
Outcome → Science and technology will help improve life
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.290* 0.338** 0.360 0.334 0.398 0.345
(0.151) (0.155) (0.213) (0.228) (0.209) (0.212)
Observations 0.041 0.049 0.052 0.064 0.067 0.060
Outcome → Studying diseases is a part of science
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.005 0.043 0.139 0.040 0.184 0.167
(0.259) (0.219) (0.192) (0.147) (0.177) (0.183)
Observations 88,326 88,138 88,138 88,138 88,138 88,138
Outcome → Have trust in doctors and nurses
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.693 0.706 0.829* 0.774 0.791* 0.752
(0.541) (0.533) (0.471) (0.556) (0.438) (0.496)
Observations 92,026 91,835 91,835 91,835 91,835 91,835
Outcome → Have trust in hospitals and health clinics
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.421 0.435 0.714 0.793 0.607 0.678
(0.652) (0.604) (0.531) (0.633) (0.499) (0.557)
Observations 90,030 89,851 89,851 89,851 89,851 89,851
Outcome → Have trust in traditional healers
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)pop70 0.130 0.090 −0.294 −0.278 −0.453* −0.271
(0.475) (0.433) (0.264) (0.250) (0.233) (0.258)



Observations 87,942 87,761 87,761 87,761 87,761 87,761
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No No No
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Labour market controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Country-specific age trends No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*Income fixed effects No No No Yes No No
Country*Empl. fixed effects No No No No Yes No
Country*Educ. fixed effects No No No No No Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A9.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Confidence in Scientists – Country Level Heterogeneity.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to out accurate information
Sample → Countries with below median physicians per capita at the time of the epidemic
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −2.538** −0.941 −1.290 −1.480*** −3.821*** −1.500***
(1.198) (0.704) (1.880) (0.477) (0.920) (0.389)
Observations 23,471 22,897 21,429 22,657 21,188 23,457



Sample → Countries with above median physicians per capita at the time of the epidemic
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 8.534 3.150 23.543 3.551 −2.854 −10.120
(8.792) (19.549) (19.378) (17.570) (20.983) (15.787)
Observations 24,971 24,950 23,849 24,936 23,538 25,752



Sample → Countries with below median-income at the time of the epidemic
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.385** −1.205*** −2.169*** −0.653 −3.238*** −0.833
(1.399) (0.416) (0.747) (0.642) (0.615) (0.611)
Observations 32,979 32,195 30,127 31,915 29,857 33,153



Sample → Countries with above median-income at the time of the epidemic
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −16.196 −11.317 0.243 −18.143 –22.066 −26.570*
(19.432) (20.752) (16.352) (11.706) (12.233) (13.173)
Observations 34,116 33,929 32,465 33,963 32,155 34,984

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1.Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A10.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Trust in Scientists - Intensive and Extensive Margins.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Intensive margin
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.762* −1.870*** −2.354** −2.782 −4.154*** −1.807***
(2.233) (0.389) (0.983) (1.986) (0.916) (0.348)
Observations 35,807 34,932 32,912 34,673 32,542 35,805



Extensive margin
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.001 −0.005 0.007 −0.002 0.001 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)



Observations 82,854 81,406 76,723 81,147 75,992 83,939
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demographic characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income quintile fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Labour market controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A11.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Trust in Scientists by Exposure Thresholds.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Top 0.5 per cent
(Exposure to Epidemic, 18–25)
−0.274***
(0.014)
−0.188***
(0.015)
−0.134***
(0.016)
0.008
(0.014)
−0.134***
(0.016)
0.008
(0.014)
Observations 27,212 26,639 25,102 26,644 25,102 26,644
Top 1 per cent
(Exposure to Epidemic, 18–25)
−0.125
(0.085)
−0.011
(0.093)
−0.136***
(0.013)
−0.018
(0.018)
−0.136***
(0.013)
−0.018
(0.018)
Observations 27,212 26,639 25,102 26,644 25,102 26,644
Top 2 per cent
(Exposure to Epidemic, 18–25)
−0.134**
(0.058)
−0.113**
(0.056)
−0.089*
(0.052)
−0.108
(0.066)
−0.089*
(0.052)
−0.108
(0.066)
Observations 27,212 26,639 25,102 26,644 25,102 26,644
Top 5 per cent
(Exposure to Epidemic, 18–25)
−0.024
(0.030)
0.029
(0.026)
0.043
(0.031)
0.009
(0.027)
0.043
(0.031)
0.009
(0.027)
Observations 27,212 26,639 25,102 26,644 25,102 26,644

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A12.

Robutness to Excluding Potentially “Bad Controls”

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.544*** −1.296*** −1.767*** −0.703 −3.365*** −1.626***
(1.344) (0.337) (0.601) (0.465) (0.455) (0.616)
Observations 83,014 81,554 76,856 81,307 76,123 84,104



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science Science and technology will help improve life Studying diseases is a part of science Have trust in doctors and nurses Have trust in hospitals and health clinics Have trust in traditional healers

Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.114 0.561 0.247 1.557 1.314 −0.615
(0.402) (0.471) (0.446) (1.222) (1.389) (0.545)
Observations 85,368 86,585 88,326 92,026 90,030 87,942
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A13.

Robutness to Controlling for the Number of Epidemic Experience.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.454** −1.283*** −1.731*** −0.616 −3.330*** −1.438**
(1.330) (0.338) (0.642) (0.478) (0.446) (0.664)
The number of epidemics exp. −0.193*** −0.178*** −0.146*** −0.189*** −0.223*** −0.297***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 82,854 81,406 76,723 81,147 75,992 83,939

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A14.

Robustness to Excluding Most Affected Countries (i.e. excluding top 5 percentile).

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −3.427** −1.326*** −1.965*** −0.580 −3.269*** −1.413**
(1.351) (0.313) (0.489) (0.463) (0.451) (0.667)
Observations 79,223 77,719 73,214 77,537 72,531 80,286



(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Outcome → Have trust in science Science and technology will help improve life Studying diseases is a part of science Have trust in doctors and nurses Have trust in hospitals and health clinics Have trust in traditional healers

Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.122 0.551 0.189 1.569 1.290 −0.711
(0.468) (0.473) (0.364) (1.235) (1.360) (0.528)
Observations 81,346 82,578 84,246 87,743 85,761 83,696

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1.Source: The most affected countries are * Madagascar, Philippines, Niger, Zimbabwe, Bolivia, Chad, and Republic of Congo. Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A15.

The Impact of Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) on Confidence in Scientists – Exploring the Role of Media.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) −14.230** −8.094*** −20.589*** −8.239 –22.039** −3.383
(7.009) (2.589) (5.054) (5.618) (8.671) (6.349)
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)*TV Per Capita (18–25) −0.002 0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25)*Radio Per Capita (18–25) 0.012 0.001 0.007 −0.000 0.013 0.004
(0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
TV Per Capita (18–25) −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Radio Per Capita (18–25) −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000*** 0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 28,085 27,889 26,453 27,746 26,150 28,471

Notes: Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1.Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A16.

Robutness to Ordered Logit Estimation.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 22300*** 66.00*** 301.81*** 104.13* 2646.74*** 92.46***
(95100) (92.37) (520.52) (278.16) (5196.73) (416.19)
Observations 82,854 81,406 76,723 81,147 75,792 83,939
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science Science and technology will help improve life Studying diseases is a part of science Have trust in doctors and nurses Have trust in hospitals and health clinics Have trust in traditional healers
Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 2.050 0.002 0.023 0.011 0.000 0.770
(6.791) (0.010) (0.090) (0.062) (0.042) (6.013)



Observations 85,199 86,397 88,138 91,835 89,851 87,761
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Male dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-specific age trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Notes: Odds ratios are reported (an odds ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive association and an odds ratio less than 1 indicates a negative association). Outcomes “Confidence in scientists”, “Scientists working for private companies benefit the public”, “Scientists working for private companies are honest”, “ Scientists working for universities benefit the public”, “ Scientists working for universities are honest”, “Scientists to find out accurate information”, “Have trust in science”, “Have trust in doctors and nurses”, “Have trust in traditional healers” are coded as (1) a lot, (2) some, (3) not much, (4) not at all. Outcomes “Science and technology will help improve life”, “Studying diseases is a part of science” and “Have trust in hospitals and health clinics” are coded as (1) yes, 2 (no). Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A17.

Robutness to Multinomial Logit Estimation.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Confidence in scientists Scientists working for private companies benefit the public Scientists working for private companies are honest Scientists working for universities benefit the public Scientists working for universities are honest Scientists to find out accurate information
(2) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 64370.22 0.000** 0.000* 192.841 28700*** 0.073
(628762.5) (0.000) (0.001) (1051.95) (13100) (0.407)
(3) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 153000*** 0.331 8.244 3065.431** 60954.08*** 117.29
(735000) (0.829) (24.318) (10000.84) (110188) (632.23)
(4) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 30200*** 9.997 144.46* 0.227 0.214 424.53***
(10900) (49.451) (380.651) (1.547) (1.470) (2863.42)
Observations 82,854 81,406 76,723 81,147 75,792 83,939
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outcome → Have trust in science Science and technology will help improve life Studying diseases is a part of science Have trust in doctors and nurses Have trust in hospitals and health clinics Have trust in traditional healers
(2) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 95.00 0.002 0.023 176.00 0.000 45700***
(379.78) (0.010) (0.090) (721.90) (0.042) (34900)
(3) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 5.240 -- -- 0.024 -- 54200***
(18.20) (0.178) (35800)
(4) Exposure to Epidemic (18–25) 0.113 -- -- 13900** -- 29,600
(0.874) (13400) (46100)
Observations 85,199 86,397 88,138 91,835 89,851 87,761

Notes: Relative risk (probability) ratios are reported (a relative risk ratio greater than 1 indicates a positive association and a relative risk ratio less than 1 indicates a negative association). Outcomes “Confidence in scientists”, “Scientists working for private companies benefit the public”, “Scientists working for private companies are honest”, “ Scientists working for universities benefit the public”, “ Scientists working for universities are honest”, “Scientists to find out accurate information”, “Have trust in science”, “Have trust in doctors and nurses”, “Have trust in traditional healers” are coded as (1) a lot, (2) some, (3) not much, (4) not at all. Outcomes “Science and technology will help improve life”, “Studying diseases is a part of science” and “Have trust in hospitals and health clinics” are coded as (1) yes, 2 (no). Category 1 (i.e., “a lot” option) used for the baseline comparison group. Specification is Column 3 of Table 1. Results use the Gallup sampling weights and robust standard errors are clustered at the country level. Source: Wellcome Global Monitor, 2018 and EM-DAT International Disaster Database, 1970–2017. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A18.

Full List of Epidemics from the EM-DAT Database.

Country Year Epidemic Total no of affected people Total no of deaths
Afghanistan 1998 cholera 15,783 185
Afghanistan 1999 cholera 20,702 135
Afghanistan 2000 cholera 2228 50
Afghanistan 2001 cholera 4425 154
Afghanistan 2002 leishmaniasis 206,834 102
Afghanistan 2005 cholera 3245 0
Afghanistan 2008 cholera 1100 17
Albania 1996 poliovirus 66 7
Albania 2002 unknown 226 0
Algeria 1991 typhiod 204 0
Algeria 1997 typhiod 364 1
Angola 1987 cholera 673 59
Angola 1989 cholera 15,525 766
Angola 1995 meningitis 1007 0
Angola 1998 meningitis 1113 115
Angola 1999 poliovirus 873 188
Angola 2000 meningitis 117 18
Angola 2001 meningitis 420 39
Angola 2004 marburg virus 45 329
Angola 2006 cholera 57,570 2354
Angola 2007 cholera 18,343 515
Angola 2008 cholera 17,437 363
Angola 2009 diarrhoeal syndrome 25,938 116
Angola 2015 yellow fever 4599 384
Angola 2018 cholera 139 2
Argentina 1992 cholera 3883 67
Argentina 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 13,366 6
Australia 2002 sars 6 0
Australia 2016 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2016 0
Bangladesh 1977 cholera 10,461 260
Bangladesh 1982 cholera 173,460 2696
Bangladesh 1986 water-borne diseases 52,000 165
Bangladesh 1987 601,200 750
Bangladesh 1991 1,608,000 2700
Bangladesh 1993 5660 38
Bangladesh 1995 21,236 400
Bangladesh 1996 10,000 20
Bangladesh 1997 14,330 64
Bangladesh 1998 185,000 151
Bangladesh 2000 26,214 31
Bangladesh 2002 49,904 96
Bangladesh 2004 nipah viral disease 54 32
Bangladesh 2007 cholera 284,910 86
Bangladesh 2017 diphteria 789 15
Belarus 1995 282 13
Belarus 1997 605 0
Belgium 1945 poliovirus 104 0
Benin 1976 poliovirus 7 1
Benin 1987 403 65
Benin 1989 2411 228
Benin 1996 yellow fever 21 65
Benin 1997 226 47
Benin 1998 527 78
Benin 1999 diarrhoeal syndrome 241 9
Benin 2000 meningitis 7762 351
Benin 2001 meningitis 9760 378
Benin 2002 452 50
Benin 2003 cholera 265 3
Benin 2005 cholera 206 4
Benin 2008 cholera 988 33
Benin 2010 cholera 1037 25
Benin 2013 cholera 486 6
Benin 2016 cholera 678 13
Benin 2019 meningitis 24 13
Bhutan 1985 247 41
Bhutan 1992 cholera 494 0
Bolivia 1969 poliovirus 77 18
Bolivia 1989 yellow fever 97 67
Bolivia 1991 cholera 17,665 329
Bolivia 1997 cholera 734 18
Bolivia 1998 cholera 165 5
Bolivia 1999 yellow fever 68 33
Bolivia 2007 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 228 1
Bolivia 2008 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 7202 27
Bolivia 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 25,236 29
Bolivia 2018 h1n1 1428 23
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000 hepatitis a 400 0
Botswana 1988 14,618 183
Botswana 2006 diarrhoeal syndrome 22,264 470
Botswana 2008 cholera 15 2
Brazil 1974 30,000 1500
Brazil 1975 107 0
Brazil 1986 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 34,722 0
Brazil 1988 170 0
Brazil 1991 cholera 15,240 196
Brazil 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 112,939 2
Brazil 1997 25,900 0
Brazil 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 214,340 13
Brazil 1999 cholera 235 3
Brazil 2002 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 317,730 57
Brazil 2008 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 162,701 123
Brazil 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 126,139 23
Brazil 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 942,153 0
Brazil 2016 yellow fever 777 261
Brazil 2017 yellow fever 310 154
Burkina Faso 1969 meningitis 4550 304
Burkina Faso 1979 1612 241
Burkina Faso 1981 10,013 1091
Burkina Faso 1983 yellow fever 386 237
Burkina Faso 1984 1000 0
Burkina Faso 1996 40,967 4135
Burkina Faso 1997 17,996 2274
Burkina Faso 1998 cholera 441 26
Burkina Faso 2001 meningitis 20,820 2978
Burkina Faso 2003 meningitis 7146 1058
Burkina Faso 2004 meningitis 2783 527
Burkina Faso 2005 cholera 606 9
Burkina Faso 2006 meningitis 7402 784
Burkina Faso 2007 meningitis 20,765 1490
Burkina Faso 2008 measles 53,000 550
Burkina Faso 2009 meningitis 2892 389
Burkina Faso 2010 meningitis 5960 841
Burkina Faso 2017 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 9029 18
Burundi 1978 cholera 1530 54
Burundi 1992 2068 220
Burundi 1997 typhus 24,350 21
Burundi 1999 616,434 80
Burundi 2000 730,691 308
Burundi 2002 2163 87
Burundi 2003 cholera 230 6
Burundi 2011 cholera 600 12
Burundi 2016 cholera 193 1
Cabo Verde 1994 cholera 12,344 245
Cabo Verde 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 20,147 6
Cambodia 1992 380,400 50
Cambodia 1997 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 227 3
Cambodia 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 15,069 490
Cambodia 1999 cholera 874 56
Cambodia 2006 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4368 0
Cambodia 2007 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 17,000 182
Cameroon 1988 340 39
Cameroon 1989 550 100
Cameroon 1990 yellow fever 172 118
Cameroon 1991 cholera 1343 308
Cameroon 1992 7865 731
Cameroon 1993 4070 513
Cameroon 1996 cholera 2825 378
Cameroon 1997 shigellosis 479 109
Cameroon 1998 cholera 2086 239
Cameroon 1999 105 14
Cameroon 2000 meningitis 65 22
Cameroon 2001 meningitis 542 31
Cameroon 2004 cholera 2924 46
Cameroon 2005 cholera 1400 42
Cameroon 2006 cholera 71 8
Cameroon 2009 cholera 1456 109
Cameroon 2010 cholera 7869 515
Cameroon 2011 cholera 16,706 639
Cameroon 2014 cholera 2056 111
Cameroon 2015 measles 858 0
Cameroon 2018 cholera 942 57
Canada 1918 h1n1 2,000,000 50,000
Canada 1953 poliovirus 8000 481
Canada 1991 171 18
Canada 2001 cryptosporidiosis 399 1
Canada 2002 sars 347 45
Central African Republic 1992 418 56
Central African Republic 1999 86 14
Central African Republic 2000 2572 448
Central African Republic 2001 meningitis 1473 343
Central African Republic 2002 hepatitis e 727 6
Central African Republic 2003 shigellosis 379 23
Central African Republic 2011 cholera 172 16
Central African Republic 2013 measles 63 0
Central African Republic 2016 cholera 266 21
Central African Republic 2018 hepatitis e 119 1
Central African Republic 2019 measles 3600 53
Chad 1971 cholera 7476 2312
Chad 1988 6794 433
Chad 1991 cholera 12,204 1262
Chad 1996 cholera 1317 94
Chad 1997 2835 239
Chad 2000 meningitis 9673 1209
Chad 2001 cholera 3444 113
Chad 2003 cholera 131 11
Chad 2004 cholera 3567 144
Chad 2005 6000 115
Chad 2006 cholera 216 20
Chad 2008 hepatitis e 1755 22
Chad 2009 meningitis 871 102
Chad 2010 measles 5319 239
Chad 2011 cholera 18,123 557
Chad 2012 meningitis 1708 88
Chad 2017 cholera 652 58
Chad 2018 measles 4227 90
Chile 1991 cholera 40 1
China 1987 rotavirus 1000 0
China 1988 2000 0
China 2002 sars 6652 369
China 2004 h5n1 9 16
China 2005 septicaemia 168 38
Colombia 1991 cholera 14,137 350
Colombia 1996 cholera 3000 62
Colombia 2012 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 23,235 0
Colombia 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1171 91
Colombia 2016 yellow fever 12 0
Colombia 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 79,639 169
Comoros (the) 1989 typhiod 450 3
Comoros (the) 1998 cholera 3200 40
Comoros (the) 1999 cholera 140 14
Comoros (the) 2005 chikungunya 2282 0
Comoros (the) 2007 cholera 1490 29
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 1976 ebola 262 245
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 1996 cholera 1954 202
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 1997 cholera 1411 54
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 1998 cholera 13,884 972
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 1999 marburg virus 72 3
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2000 63 26
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2001 cholera 11,094 838
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2002 h1n1 539,375 2502
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2003 cholera 20,401 786
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2004 typhiod 46,220 406
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2005 cholera 4872 101
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2006 cholera 2986 151
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2007 ebola 419 172
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2009 cholera 15,909 209
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2010 cholera 4342 56
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2011 cholera 28,757 636
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2012 cholera 23,626 608
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2014 ebola 17 49
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2016 measles 2638 55
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2017 cholera 1022 43
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2018 ebola 3454 2297
Congo (the Dem.Rep.) 2019 measles 277,000 5872
Congo (the) 1997 cholera 485 83
Congo (the) 1999 cholera 99 15
Congo (the) 2001 ebola 13 19
Congo (the) 2002 ebola 15 128
Congo (the) 2003 ebola 2 29
Congo (the) 2005 ebola 2 10
Congo (the) 2006 cholera 3030 50
Congo (the) 2008 cholera 630 26
Congo (the) 2010 poliovirus 524 219
Congo (the) 2011 chikungunya 10,819 65
Congo (the) 2012 57 5
Congo (the) 2013 cholera 1071 16
Congo (the) 2019 measles 208,246 3819
Costa Rica 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4786 0
Costa Rica 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 12,000 3
Costa Rica 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4852 0
Cuba 1993 neuromyelopathy 49,358 0
Cuba 1997 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 823 3
Cyprus 1996 meningitis 280 0
Côte d’Ivoire 1970 cholera 1500 120
Côte d’Ivoire 1991 cholera 50 16
Côte d’Ivoire 1995 cholera 2027 150
Côte d’Ivoire 2001 cholera 3180 196
Côte d’Ivoire 2002 cholera 861 77
Côte d’Ivoire 2005 210 40
Côte d’Ivoire 2006 cholera 451 42
Côte d’Ivoire 2007 meningitis 150 30
Côte d’Ivoire 2017 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 621 2
Djibouti 1994 cholera 239 10
Djibouti 1997 cholera 827 29
Djibouti 1998 2000 43
Djibouti 2000 cholera 419 4
Djibouti 2007 cholera 562 6
Dominican Republic (the) 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1252 2
Dominican Republic (the) 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 3270 25
Dominican Republic (the) 2010 cholera 17,321 130
Dominican Republic (the) 2011 cholera 220 1
Dominican Republic (the) 2012 cholera 26,090 167
Dominican Republic (the) 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 16,907 34
Ecuador 1967 poliovirus 528 36
Ecuador 1969 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 40,000 400
Ecuador 1977 typhiod 300 0
Ecuador 1991 cholera 15,131 343
Ecuador 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 3399 0
Ecuador 1998 cholera 11 1
Ecuador 2000 100,220 8
Ecuador 2002 unknown 100 0
Ecuador 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4000 4
Ecuador 2012 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 6967 11
Egypt 2004 hepatitis a 143 15
El Salvador 1969 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 19 12
El Salvador 1991 cholera 5625 155
El Salvador 1992 cholera 350 0
El Salvador 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 9296 5
El Salvador 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1670 0
El Salvador 2000 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 211 24
El Salvador 2002 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2399 6
El Salvador 2003 pneumonia 50,000 304
El Salvador 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4598 7
El Salvador 2014 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 12,783 4
El Salvador 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 16,573 5
Equatorial Guinea 2004 946 15
Ethiopia 1970 cholera 4000 500
Ethiopia 1980 dysentery 25,000 157
Ethiopia 1981 50,000 990
Ethiopia 1985 cholera 4815 1101
Ethiopia 1988 41,304 7400
Ethiopia 1999 276 9
Ethiopia 2000 meningitis 7033 371
Ethiopia 2001 meningitis 8166 429
Ethiopia 2005 964 74
Ethiopia 2006 diarrhoeal syndrome 32,848 351
Ethiopia 2008 diarrhoeal syndrome 3134 20
Ethiopia 2009 cholera 13,652 135
Ethiopia 2010 diarrhoeal syndrome 967 16
Ethiopia 2013 yellow fever 288 110
Ethiopia 2018 measles 4000 0
Ethiopia 2019 cholera 1916 39
Fiji 2019 measles 14 0
France 2002 sars 6 1
Gabon 1988 cholera 132 0
Gabon 1996 ebola 15 45
Gabon 2001 ebola 10 50
Gabon 2004 typhiod 100 1
Gabon 2007 chikungunya 17,900 0
Gabon 2010 chikungunya 551 0
Gambia (the) 1997 793 120
Gambia (the) 2000 meningitis 116 21
Germany 2002 609 0
Ghana 1977 cholera 6558 0
Ghana 1984 1500 103
Ghana 1988 138 15
Ghana 1989 19 0
Ghana 1996 3757 411
Ghana 1997 159 26
Ghana 1998 cholera 1546 67
Ghana 1999 diarrhoeal syndrome 1196 24
Ghana 2001 1141 12
Ghana 2005 cholera 2248 40
Ghana 2010 meningitis 100 27
Ghana 2011 cholera 10,002 101
Ghana 2012 cholera 5441 76
Ghana 2013 cholera 560 18
Ghana 2014 cholera 56,469 249
Ghana 2015 meningitis 465 85
Ghana 2016 cholera 172 0
Guatemala 1969 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 8 4
Guatemala 1991 cholera 26,800 180
Guatemala 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 3402 0
Guatemala 1998 cholera 1345 17
Guatemala 2002 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2042 1
Guatemala 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1977 8
Guatemala 2015 chikungunya 15,211 0
Guatemala 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 6264 17
Guinea 1987 30 18
Guinea 1999 cholera 123 12
Guinea 2000 yellow fever 322 190
Guinea 2001 cholera 143 12
Guinea 2002 123 23
Guinea 2003 yellow fever 43 24
Guinea 2006 cholera 298 129
Guinea 2007 cholera 2410 90
Guinea 2012 cholera 5523 105
Guinea 2013 measles 143 0
Guinea 2014 ebola 3814 2544
Guinea 2017 measles 122 0
Guinea-Bissau 1987 cholera 6000 68
Guinea-Bissau 1996 cholera 26,967 961
Guinea-Bissau 1997 cholera 22,299 781
Guinea-Bissau 1999 2169 404
Guinea-Bissau 2008 cholera 14,004 221
Haiti 1963 2724 0
Haiti 2003 typhiod 200 40
Haiti 2010 cholera 513,997 6908
Haiti 2012 cholera 5817 50
Haiti 2014 chikungunya 39,343 0
Haiti 2015 cholera 20,000 170
Haiti 2016 cholera 6096 0
Honduras 1965 poliovirus 170 7
Honduras 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 15,998 5
Honduras 1998 cholera 2452 17
Honduras 2002 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4530 8
Honduras 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 11,771 7
Honduras 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 27,000 67
Honduras 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 34,128 27
Honduras 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 71,216 128
Hong Kong 2002 sars 1456 299
India 1967 13,576 3029
India 1977 cholera 9091 0
India 1978 1000 48
India 1984 dysentery 27,000 3290
India 1985 6589 854
India 1986 11,600 265
India 1990 diarrhoeal syndrome 18,000 90
India 1994 pneumonia 5150 53
India 1996 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 8423 354
India 1997 890 80
India 1998 cholera 15,238 807
India 1999 79,504 281
India 2000 1851 191
India 2001 cholera 58,889 89
India 2002 5153 50
India 2003 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2185 0
India 2005 chikungunya 155,813 640
India 2009 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 1521 311
India 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1318 121
Indonesia 1968 bubonic 94 40
Indonesia 1977 cholera 29,942 37
Indonesia 1978 cholera 70 11
Indonesia 1982 cholera 200 39
Indonesia 1984 4000 105
Indonesia 1986 500,700 59
Indonesia 1991 15,000 170
Indonesia 1996 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 5373 117
Indonesia 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 32,665 777
Indonesia 1999 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 4645 56
Indonesia 2000 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1719 25
Indonesia 2002 shigellosis 759 17
Indonesia 2004 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 58,322 745
Indonesia 2005 poliovirus 329 0
Indonesia 2007 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 35,211 403
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1965 cholera 2500 288
Iraq 1978 cholera 51 1
Iraq 1997 185 0
Iraq 2007 cholera 4696 24
Iraq 2008 cholera 892 11
Iraq 2015 cholera 2217 0
Ireland 2000 1374 2
Ireland 2002 sars 1 0
Israel 2000 west nile fever 139 12
Italy 2002 10,001 3
Jamaica 1990 typhiod 300 0
Jamaica 2006 280 3
Japan 1977 cholera 74 1
Japan 1978 h1n1 2,000,000 0
Japan 1997 campylobacter 460 0
Jordan 1981 cholera 715 4
Kazakhstan 1998 593 7
Kazakhstan 1999 typhus 166 0
Kazakhstan 2000 typhus 114 0
Kenya 1991 200 26
Kenya 1994 6,500,000 1000
Kenya 1997 cholera 33,036 932
Kenya 1998 cholera 1025 27
Kenya 1999 329,570 1814
Kenya 2000 cholera 721 50
Kenya 2001 743 40
Kenya 2004 141 8
Kenya 2005 1645 53
Kenya 2006 rift valley fever 588 170
Kenya 2009 cholera 10,446 251
Kenya 2010 cholera 3880 57
Kenya 2014 cholera 3459 72
Kenya 2017 cholera 4421 76
Kenya 2019 cholera 3847 26
Korea (the Republic of) 1969 cholera 1538 137
Korea (the Republic of) 1998 shigellosis 350 0
Korea (the Republic of) 2000 39,531 6
Korea (the Republic of) 2002 sars 3 0
Korea (the Republic of) 2015 mers 185 36
Kuwait 2002 sars 1 0
Kyrgyzstan 1997 336 22
Kyrgyzstan 1998 typhiod 458 0
Kyrgyzstan 2010 poliovirus 141 0
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1987 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2000 63
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1994 cholera 8000 500
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 1995 cholera 244 34
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 2000 9685 0
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 36,000 77
Latvia 2000 diphteria 102 0
Lesotho 1974 typhiod 500 0
Lesotho 1999 dysentery 1862 28
Lesotho 2000 1834 28
Liberia 1980 cholera 1887 466
Liberia 1995 yellow fever 359 9
Liberia 1998 diarrhoeal syndrome 560 12
Liberia 2000 cholera 112 3
Liberia 2002 diarrhoeal syndrome 661 0
Liberia 2003 cholera 19,418 0
Liberia 2005 cholera 674 29
Liberia 2014 ebola 10,682 4810
Macao 2002 sars 1 0
Macedonia FYR 2002 unknown 200 0
Madagascar 1999 cholera 18,228 981
Madagascar 2002 h1n1 21,975 671
Madagascar 2008 rift valley fever 520 20
Madagascar 2009 chikungunya 702 0
Madagascar 2013 pneumonia 660 113
Madagascar 2017 plague 2384 207
Madagascar 2018 measles 98,415 0
Malawi 1989 444 35
Malawi 1997 622 10
Malawi 2000 cholera 3323 83
Malawi 2001 cholera 40,266 1131
Malawi 2002 cholera 773 41
Malawi 2006 cholera 852 20
Malawi 2008 cholera 5269 113
Malawi 2009 measles 11,461 62
Malawi 2014 cholera 693 11
Malawi 2017 cholera 450 6
Malaysia 1968 cholera 5 2
Malaysia 1977 typhiod 50 0
Malaysia 1991 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 3750 263
Malaysia 1996 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 5407 13
Malaysia 1997 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 21,684 78
Malaysia 1998 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 160 105
Malaysia 2000 enterovirus 988 4
Malaysia 2002 sars 3 2
Maldives 1978 cholera 11,258 219
Maldives 2011 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1289 4
Mali 1969 4023 513
Mali 1979 80 30
Mali 1981 4153 412
Mali 1984 cholera 4502 1022
Mali 1987 yellow fever 305 145
Mali 1988 159 47
Mali 1996 meningitis 2208 345
Mali 1997 9666 1098
Mali 2002 282 33
Mali 2003 cholera 1216 106
Mali 2005 cholera 168 43
Mali 2006 151 9
Mali 2009 meningitis 86 10
Mali 2011 cholera 1190 49
Mali 2014 ebola 7 6
Mauritania 1982 12 5
Mauritania 1987 yellow fever 178 35
Mauritania 1988 cholera 575 38
Mauritania 1998 rift valley fever 344 6
Mauritania 2005 cholera 2585 55
Mauritius 1980 typhiod 108 0
Mauritius 2005 chikungunya 2553 0
Mexico 1991 cholera 5000 52
Mexico 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 6525 16
Mexico 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 41,687 0
Moldova 1999 1647 0
Mongolia 1996 cholera 108 8
Mongolia 2002 sars 9 0
Mongolia 2008 enterovirus 3151 0
Morocco 1966 meningitis 2942 200
Mozambique 1980 cholera 200 10
Mozambique 1983 cholera 5679 189
Mozambique 1990 cholera 4000 588
Mozambique 1992 cholera 225,673 587
Mozambique 1997 cholera 27,201 637
Mozambique 1998 cholera 2600 209
Mozambique 2000 18,583 11
Mozambique 2001 cholera 611 7
Mozambique 2002 cholera 2028 17
Mozambique 2003 cholera 24,134 159
Mozambique 2006 cholera 5692 27
Mozambique 2007 cholera 7547 78
Mozambique 2008 cholera 19,310 155
Mozambique 2009 cholera 19,776 198
Mozambique 2010 cholera 3188 44
Mozambique 2011 cholera 325 13
Mozambique 2013 cholera 317 2
Mozambique 2014 cholera 5118 43
Mozambique 2017 cholera 1799 1
Mozambique 2019 cholera 3577 0
Myanmar 1983 800 10
Namibia 2000 meningitis 58 14
Namibia 2001 12,098 134
Namibia 2006 poliovirus 47 10
Namibia 2007 cholera 250 7
Namibia 2008 cholera 203 9
Namibia 2013 cholera 518 17
Nepal 1963 5000 1000
Nepal 1967 bubonic 24 17
Nepal 1982 1475 0
Nepal 1990 cholera 3800 150
Nepal 1991 diarrhoeal syndrome 45,341 1334
Nepal 1992 diarrhoeal syndrome 50,000 640
Nepal 1995 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 772 126
Nepal 1996 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 697 118
Nepal 1997 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 1364 84
Nepal 1998 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 300 52
Nepal 1999 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 944 150
Nepal 2000 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 592 69
Nepal 2001 diarrhoeal syndrome 242 13
Nepal 2009 diarrhoeal syndrome 58,874 314
Nepal 2010 diarrhoeal syndrome 5372 73
Netherlands (the) 1999 legionellosis 200 13
New Zealand 2002 sars 1 0
Nicaragua 1967 444 53
Nicaragua 1991 cholera 381 2
Nicaragua 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 13,406 18
Nicaragua 1998 cholera 3356 7
Nicaragua 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2050 8
Nicaragua 2010 leptospirosis 395 16
Nicaragua 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1310 3
Nicaragua 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 94,513 15
Niger (the) 1969 yellow fever 5 2
Niger (the) 1970 2677 319
Niger (the) 1989 1785 186
Niger (the) 1991 90,147 2842
Niger (the) 1995 63,691 3022
Niger (the) 1996 10,475 882
Niger (the) 1997 2156 262
Niger (the) 1999 741 49
Niger (the) 2000 1151 190
Niger (the) 2001 48,067 573
Niger (the) 2002 meningitis 3306 316
Niger (the) 2003 1861 195
Niger (the) 2004 20,132 154
Niger (the) 2005 cholera 387 44
Niger (the) 2006 meningitis 784 62
Niger (the) 2008 meningitis 2805 173
Niger (the) 2009 meningitis 4513 169
Niger (the) 2010 meningitis 1217 103
Niger (the) 2011 cholera 2130 48
Niger (the) 2012 cholera 4874 97
Niger (the) 2014 meningitis 1639 153
Niger (the) 2015 measles 3370 6
Niger (the) 2016 rift valley fever 78 23
Niger (the) 2017 meningitis 2390 118
Niger (the) 2018 cholera 3824 78
Nigeria 1969 yellow fever 80,000 2000
Nigeria 1986 yellow fever 1400 1073
Nigeria 1987 120 100
Nigeria 1989 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 41 29
Nigeria 1991 cholera 11,200 7689
Nigeria 1996 cerebro spinal 42,586 5539
Nigeria 1998 acute neurological syndrome 211 39
Nigeria 1999 diarrhoeal syndrome 2977 486
Nigeria 2000 cholera 1255 87
Nigeria 2001 cholera 2636 204
Nigeria 2002 diarrhoeal syndrome 3903 229
Nigeria 2004 cholera 1897 172
Nigeria 2005 23,873 619
Nigeria 2008 unknown 66 46
Nigeria 2009 meningitis 35,255 1701
Nigeria 2010 cholera 43,287 1872
Nigeria 2011 cholera 21,382 694
Nigeria 2012 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 29 10
Nigeria 2014 cholera 36,017 763
Nigeria 2015 cholera 2108 97
Nigeria 2016 meningitis 15,432 1287
Nigeria 2017 cholera 1704 11
Nigeria 2018 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 1081 90
Nigeria 2019 measles 22,834 98
Nigeria 2020 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 365 47
Pakistan 1968 cholera 1075 37
Pakistan 1998 cholera 9917 83
Pakistan 2000 diarrhoeal syndrome 258 14
Pakistan 2001 leishmaniasis 5000 0
Pakistan 2002 unknown 25 10
Pakistan 2004 100 2
Pakistan 2005 tetanos 111 22
Pakistan 2017 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2492 25
Pakistan 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 53,834 95
Palestine, State of 1983 943 0
Panama 1964 1200 0
Panama 1991 cholera 2057 43
Panama 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2124 1
Panama 2002 meningitis 173 0
Papua New Guinea 2001 1395 0
Papua New Guinea 2002 2215 122
Papua New Guinea 2009 h1n1 7391 192
Paraguay 1999 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 2273 0
Paraguay 2006 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 100,000 17
Paraguay 2008 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 5957 8
Paraguay 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 24 8
Paraguay 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 13,681 0
Paraguay 2011 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 16,264 44
Paraguay 2020 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 106,127 20
Peru 1991 cholera 283,353 1726
Peru 1997 cholera 174 1
Peru 1998 cholera 33,763 16
Peru 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 14,151 0
Peru 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 31,703 13
Peru 2012 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 20,106 11
Peru 2016 yellow fever 54 26
Philippines (the) 1977 681 57
Philippines (the) 1990 200 21
Philippines (the) 1996 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1673 30
Philippines (the) 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 11,000 202
Philippines (the) 1999 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 402 10
Philippines (the) 2000 diarrhoeal syndrome 664 1
Philippines (the) 2002 sars 12 2
Philippines (the) 2004 meningitis 98 32
Philippines (the) 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 123,939 737
Philippines (the) 2011 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 7595 56
Philippines (the) 2012 cholera 3158 30
Philippines (the) 2018 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 79,376 519
Philippines (the) 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 129,597 825
Romania 1996 527 0
Romania 1999 4743 0
Romania 2002 sars 1 0
Russian Federation 1995 150,000 0
Russian Federation 1997 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 4538 0
Russian Federation 1999 west nile fever 765 33
Russian Federation 2000 acute jaundice syndrome 2942 0
Russian Federation 2002 sars 1 0
Rwanda 1978 cholera 2000 0
Rwanda 1991 214 32
Rwanda 1996 cholera 106 10
Rwanda 1998 cholera 2951 55
Rwanda 1999 488 76
Rwanda 2000 meningitis 164 10
Rwanda 2002 meningitis 636 83
Rwanda 2004 typhiod 540 4
Rwanda 2006 cholera 300 35
Sao Tome and Principe 1989 cholera 1063 31
Sao Tome and Principe 2005 cholera 1349 25
Saudi Arabia 2000 rift valley fever 497 133
Saudi Arabia 2001 meningitis 74 35
Senegal 1965 yellow fever 150 60
Senegal 1978 cholera 298 5
Senegal 1985 cholera 3100 300
Senegal 1995 cholera 3031 188
Senegal 1998 2709 372
Senegal 2002 181 18
Senegal 2004 cholera 861 6
Senegal 2005 cholera 23,022 303
Senegal 2007 cholera 2825 16
Senegal 2014 ebola 1 0
Seychelles 2005 chikungunya 5461 0
Seychelles 2016 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 253 0
Sierra Leone 1985 cholera 3000 352
Sierra Leone 1996 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 953 226
Sierra Leone 1997 h1n1 2024 51
Sierra Leone 1998 cholera 1770 55
Sierra Leone 1999 dysentery 3228 133
Sierra Leone 2001 meningitis 3 12
Sierra Leone 2003 yellow fever 90 10
Sierra Leone 2004 cholera 633 56
Sierra Leone 2008 cholera 1746 170
Sierra Leone 2012 cholera 23,009 300
Sierra Leone 2014 ebola 14,124 3956
Singapore 1998 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 11 1
Singapore 2000 enterovirus 2022 2
Singapore 2002 sars 205 33
Singapore 2016 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 13,051 0
Solomon Islands 2013 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 6700 8
Solomon Islands 2016 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 1212 0
Somalia 1977 2671 0
Somalia 1985 cholera 4815 1262
Somalia 1986 cholera 7093 1307
Somalia 1994 17,000 100
Somalia 1996 cholera 5557 247
Somalia 1997 cholera 1044 0
Somalia 1998 cholera 14,564 481
Somalia 1999 cholera 175 15
Somalia 2000 cholera 2490 244
Somalia 2001 meningitis 111 33
Somalia 2002 cholera 1191 63
Somalia 2005 poliovirus 199 0
Somalia 2006 5876 103
Somalia 2007 cholera 35,687 1133
Somalia 2008 cholera 663 13
Somalia 2016 cholera 14,165 497
Somalia 2017 cholera 13,126 302
South Africa 2000 cholera 86,107 181
South Africa 2002 cholera 13,352 84
South Africa 2004 cholera 174 5
South Africa 2008 cholera 12,752 65
South Sudan 2013 poliovirus 3 0
South Sudan 2014 cholera 6486 149
South Sudan 2015 cholera 1818 47
South Sudan 2016 cholera 3826 68
South Sudan 2019 measles 937 7
Spain 1997 meningitis 1383 0
Spain 2001 legionellosis 751 2
Spain 2002 sars 1 0
Sri Lanka 1967 200,000 2
Sri Lanka 1977 cholera 728 0
Sri Lanka 1997 cholera 1695 36
Sri Lanka 1999 5936 1
Sri Lanka 2000 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 113 2
Sri Lanka 2004 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 15,000 88
Sri Lanka 2009 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 35,007 346
Sri Lanka 2011 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 26,343 167
Sri Lanka 2017 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 155,715 320
Sri Lanka 2019 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 18,760 28
Sudan (the) 1940 yellow fever 15,000 1500
Sudan (the) 1950 72,162 0
Sudan (the) 1965 2300 0
Sudan (the) 1976 ebola 299 150
Sudan (the) 1988 38,805 2770
Sudan (the) 1996 cholera 1800 700
Sudan (the) 1998 meningitis 22,403 1746
Sudan (the) 1999 cholera 3959 357
Sudan (the) 2000 2363 186
Sudan (the) 2002 leishmaniasis 1281 49
Sudan (the) 2003 yellow fever 178 27
Sudan (the) 2004 hepatitis e 8114 98
Sudan (the) 2005 meningitis 7454 650
Sudan (the) 2006 cholera 28,769 1142
Sudan (the) 2007 meningitis 7639 584
Sudan (the) 2008 diarrhoeal syndrome 212 15
Sudan (the) 2012 yellow fever 678 171
Sudan (the) 2016 632 19
Sudan (the) 2017 diarrhoeal syndrome 30,762 657
Sudan (the) 2019 cholera 510 24
Swaziland 1992 cholera 2228 30
Swaziland 2000 cholera 1449 32
Sweden 2002 diarrhoeal syndrome 350 0
Switzerland 2002 sars 1 0
Syrian Arab Rep. 1977 cholera 4165 88
Taiwan (Prov. of China) 1998 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 250,000 54
Taiwan (Prov. of China) 2002 sars 309 37
Tajikistan 1996 typhiod 7516 0
Tajikistan 1997 typhiod 15,618 168
Tajikistan 1999 typhiod 200 3
Tajikistan 2003 typhiod 256 0
Tajikistan 2010 poliovirus 456 21
Tanzania 1977 cholera 6050 500
Tanzania 1985 bubonic 118 10
Tanzania 1987 cholera 500 90
Tanzania 1991 1733 284
Tanzania 1992 cholera 40,249 2231
Tanzania 1997 cholera 42,350 2329
Tanzania 1998 cholera 40,677 2461
Tanzania 1999 diarrhoeal syndrome 529 56
Tanzania 2000 898 37
Tanzania 2001 diarrhoeal syndrome 515 25
Tanzania 2002 meningitis 149 9
Tanzania 2005 cholera 576 6
Tanzania 2006 cholera 1410 70
Tanzania 2007 rift valley fever 284 119
Tanzania 2009 cholera 600 12
Tanzania 2015 cholera 37,712 582
Tanzania 2019 cholera 216 3
Thailand 1977 cholera 2800 100
Thailand 2000 1946 89
Thailand 2002 sars 7 2
Thailand 2003 h5n1 4 7
Thailand 2004 h5n1 8 14
Thailand 2010 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 880 2
Thailand 2011 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 37,728 27
Timor-Leste 2005 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 336 22
Timor-Leste 2014 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 197 2
Togo 1988 1617 50
Togo 1996 2619 360
Togo 1998 cholera 3669 239
Togo 2001 meningitis 1567 235
Togo 2002 494 95
Togo 2003 cholera 790 40
Togo 2008 cholera 686 6
Togo 2010 meningitis 236 60
Togo 2013 cholera 168 7
Togo 2015 meningitis 324 24
Turkey 1964 2500 19
Turkey 1965 100,000 461
Turkey 1968 poliovirus 1975 98
Turkey 1977 100,000 0
Turkey 1987 cholera 150 11
Turkey 2004 h5n1 8 4
Turkey 2006 haemorrhagic fever syndrome 222 20
Uganda 1982 plague 153 3
Uganda 1986 plague 340 27
Uganda 1989 meningitis 961 156
Uganda 1990 meningitis 1170 197
Uganda 1997 o'nyongnyong fever 100,300 0
Uganda 1998 cholera 600 30
Uganda 1999 cholera 2205 122
Uganda 2000 ebola 723 259
Uganda 2001 9 14
Uganda 2003 cholera 242 35
Uganda 2004 cholera 53 3
Uganda 2005 cholera 726 21
Uganda 2006 meningitis 5702 203
Uganda 2007 hepatitis e 5937 132
Uganda 2008 cholera 388 28
Uganda 2009 cholera 544 17
Uganda 2010 yellow fever 190 48
Uganda 2012 cholera 5980 156
Uganda 2013 cholera 218,497 28
Uganda 2018 cholera 1000 31
Ukraine 1994 cholera 1333 71
Ukraine 1995 5336 204
Ukraine 1997 102 0
United Kingdom 1984 salmonella 16 26
United Kingdom 1985 legionellosis 144 34
United Kingdom 2001 meningitis 30 11
United Kingdom 2002 sars 4 0
USA 1990 encephalitis syndrome (aes) 50 3
USA 1993 cryptosporidiosis 403,000 100
USA 2002 west nile fever 3653 214
Uzbekistan 1998 148 40
Venezuela 1990 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 9506 74
Venezuela 1991 cholera 967 18
Venezuela 1995 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 32,280 0
Venezuela 2010 cholera 118 0
Viet Nam 1964 cholera 10,848 598
Viet Nam 1996 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 9706 45
Viet Nam 1998 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 8000 214
Viet Nam 2002 sars 58 5
Viet Nam 2003 h5n1 8 15
Viet Nam 2004 h5n1 51 42
Viet Nam 2005 acute neurological syndrome 83 16
Viet Nam 2016 dengue and dengue haemorrhagic fever 79,204 27
Yemen 2000 rift valley fever 289 32
Yemen 2005 poliovirus 179 0
Yemen 2015 3026 3
Yemen 2016 cholera 180 11
Yemen 2017 diphteria 298 35
Yemen 2019 cholera 521,028 932
Zambia 1990 yellow fever 667 85
Zambia 1991 cholera 13,154 0
Zambia 1992 cholera 11,659 0
Zambia 1999 cholera 13,083 462
Zambia 2000 cholera 1224 163
Zambia 2001 plague 425 11
Zambia 2003 cholera 3835 179
Zambia 2005 cholera 7615 21
Zambia 2006 cholera 105 5
Zambia 2007 cholera 115 5
Zambia 2008 cholera 8312 173
Zambia 2009 cholera 5198 87
Zambia 2012 cholera 153 2
Zambia 2017 cholera 4371 89
Zimbabwe 1992 cholera 5649 258
Zimbabwe 1996 500,000 1311
Zimbabwe 1998 cholera 377 22
Zimbabwe 1999 cholera 462 52
Zimbabwe 2000 cholera 2812 112
Zimbabwe 2002 cholera 452 4
Zimbabwe 2003 cholera 750 40
Zimbabwe 2005 cholera 1183 87
Zimbabwe 2007 10,000 67
Zimbabwe 2008 cholera 98,349 4276
Zimbabwe 2009 measles 1346 55
Zimbabwe 2010 typhiod 258 8
Zimbabwe 2011 cholera 1140 45
Zimbabwe 2014 cholera 11 0
Zimbabwe 2018 typhiod 5164 12

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