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. Author manuscript; available in PMC: 2021 Nov 2.
Published in final edited form as: Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2020 Jun;41(6):691–709. doi: 10.1017/ice.2020.45

A Systematic Review of The Effectiveness of Cohorting To Reduce Transmission of Healthcare-associated C. difficile and Multi-Drug Resistant Organisms

Cybele L Abad 1,2, Anna K Barker 3, Nasia Safdar 4,5,6
PMCID: PMC8561649  NIHMSID: NIHMS1744281  PMID: 32216852

Abstract

BACKGROUND:

Cohorting of patients and staff is a control strategy often used to prevent the spread of infection in healthcare institutions. However, a comprehensive evaluation of cohorting as a prevention approach is lacking.

METHODS:

We performed a systematic review of studies that used cohorting as part of an infection control strategy to reduce hospital-acquired infections. We included studies published between 1966 to November 30, 2019 in adult populations hospitalized in acute-care hospitals.

RESULTS:

87 studies met inclusion criteria. Studies were quasi-experimental “before and after” (n=35), retrospective (n= 49), or prospective (n=3). Case-control analysis was performed in 7 studies. Cohorting was performed with other infection control strategies in the setting of Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) (n=22) Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI) (n=6), Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus (VRE) (n=17), carbapenem resistant Enterobacteriaceae infections (n=22), A. baumannii (15), or other gram negative infections (n=5). Cohorting was performed either simultaneously (56/87, 64.4%) or in phases (31/87, 35.6%) to help contain transmission. In 60 studies, both patients and staff were cohorted. Majority of studies (77/87, 88.5%) showed a decline in infection or colonization rates after a multi-faceted approach that included cohorting as part of the intervention. Hand hygiene compliance improved in about half of studies (8/15) during intervention.

CONCLUSION:

Cohorting of staff, or patients, or both is a frequently used and reasonable component of an enhanced infection control strategy. However, determining the effectiveness of cohorting as a strategy to reduce transmission of MDRO and C. difficile infections is difficult to assess particularly in endemic situations.

Keywords: Cohorting, Infection Control, Multi-drug resistant organism (MDRO)

Summary:

Cohorting is frequently used as a component of an enhanced infection control strategy. Determining the effectiveness of cohorting as a strategy to reduce transmission of MDRO and C.difficile infections is difficult to assess.

INTRODUCTION

Multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs) are increasingly common in healthcare settings, and are associated with considerable morbidity, mortality and costs. This growing crisis in antimicrobial resistance has prompted increased attention on infection control (IC) efforts to reduce transmission in healthcare settings. IC measures are typically implemented as bundles of enhanced surveillance, education, hand hygiene, personal protective equipment and environmental controls (such as single patient rooms and room disinfection). One such method of reducing transmission is cohorting, often employed when routine measures fail to control an outbreak.

Cohorting is the practice of grouping together patients who are colonized or infected with the same organism to confine their care to one area and prevent contact with other susceptible patients.1 It has been used extensively for managing outbreaks of multi drug-resistant organisms (MDRO) including Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)2,3, Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus (VRE)4,5, Clostridioides difficile infection (CDI)6, Extended Spectrum Beta Lactamase (ESBL)7 producing organisms, and Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE).810 It has also been used to contain viral outbreaks such as respiratory syncytial virus among children11,12 and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).13 Staff cohorting, or assigning healthcare personnel to care only for patients infected or colonized with a single target pathogen, limits further transmission of the target pathogen to uninfected patients.14,15 However, cohorting, particularly of staff, is usually costly and difficult to maintain due to staff shortages in hospitals.16

A comprehensive evaluation of patient and staff cohorting as a prevention approach is lacking. We performed a systematic review to determine its effectiveness as an infection control strategy.

METHODS

This systematic review is reported according to the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines.17

Study Criteria

We included studies published between 1966 to November 30, 2019 in adult populations hospitalized in acute-care hospitals. We only included studies that reported use of patient and/or staff cohorting as part of an infection control intervention AND which included outcome data, reported either as absolute number of colonization/infections or colonization/infection rates. Studies involving the pediatric population, or performed in long-term acute care facilities (e.g. LTAC or nursing homes) were excluded.

Search Methods

With the help of a professional librarian we searched MEDLINE, EMBASE (OvidSP), from inception through November 30, 2019. We used medical subject headings (MeSH) and terms for cohorting AND multi drug-resistant organisms (e.g. VRE, MRSA, ESBL, CRE) or C. difficile. Reference lists of included studies and studies cited in previous reviews were screened. Furthermore, 2 independent reviewers (CLA, NS) performed abstract screenings and full-text reviews. Reviewers were not blinded for author, institution, or journal names. Language was restricted to English.

Data Abstraction and Management

The following data were abstracted: study design, country, study year(s), type of hospital/setting, type of infection, description of infection control interventions and outcomes. For purposes of this study, cohorting was defined as a grouping together or segregation of patients colonized or infected with the same organism in one area of a unit (e.g. geographic) or in a specially built or separate unit, entirely. Cohorting could involve patients, or both patients and staff. Data was extracted by CLA, and discrepancies were resolved by consensus between the two authors (CLA and NS).

Quality and Bias Assessment

We used the Downs and Black Checklist for Measuring Quality18, which has 27 items for evaluating the following parameters: reporting, internal and external validity, confounding, and power. The maximum score is 28. The risk of bias was independently assessed by two reviewers (AB, CLA) without blinding to the journal or study authorship. Discrepancies were resolved by discussion or involvement of a third review author (NS) if required.

Outcomes

The primary outcome was rate of colonization or hospital-acquired infection (HAI). Acceptable definitions were incidence rates or incidence density (e.g. # colonization or HAI/1000 patient days), absolute number of colonizations/infections, or risk ratio. Secondary outcomes included compliance with infection control intervention/s and adverse events.

Data Synthesis

We considered a formal meta-analysis inappropriate because of heterogeneity in outcome measures and patient populations.

RESULTS:

We searched PUBMED and EMBASE databases, yielding a total of 2,356 articles. Title and abstracts were screened, and 159 articles were retrieved for review. Screening of references added 19 additional papers. After careful review, 87 studies met inclusion criteria 38,10,1998 (Figure 1). The full search strategy is attached in supplementary Appendix 1.

Figure 1:

Figure 1:

Flow Diagram

Characteristics of Included Studies

Of the 87 studies, there were no randomized controlled trials. Majority were retrospective (n= 49) or quasi-experimental “before and after” (n=35)3,4,10,20,21,23,24,26,28,29,3134,38,40,42,43,46,51,52,55,5759,62,68,76,77,80,83,85,86,89,97 studies. The remaining 3 were prospective studies8,25,41. Case-control analysis was done in 7 studies22,35,53,72,82,93,98. Most were performed in tertiary level (n=75), followed by secondary (n=7), 33,35,44,47,80,88,97 primary (n=2) 4,58 and specialty hospitals (n=3) [e.g. military hospital, research institute]57,73,74. There were 29 studies carried out in the ICU7,8,1921,26,28,30,43,44,48,50,52,55,5760,62,66,67,70,71,74,77,8891, 19 studies in wards4,5,29,34,41,42,64,68,72,82,85,87, or specialty areas22,24,49,54,65,83,84, and 39 involved multiple units or were hospital-wide3,6,10,23,25,27,3133,3540,4547,51,53,56,61,63,69,73,75,76,7881,86,9298. Majority of studies (65/87, 74.7%) were performed in the setting of an outbreak while the rest were not 4,6,10,20,21,23,28,32,38,40,41,43,44,54,57,62,68,70,73,7581,83,86,89,9395. Most focused on specific pathogens, including MRSA (n=22)3,22,24,26,28,3234,3741,44,50,54,62,64,65,77,81,83, VRE (n=17)4,5,25,30,48,55,61,63,6870,79,82,87,92,94,96, Clostridioides difficile (n=6) 6,29,35,47,76,85, Extended spectrum beta-lactamase producing organisms (ESBL) or Carbapenem resistant enterobacteriaceae (CRE) [n=22]10,27,31,36,46,49,51,52,58,59,7173,75,78,80,84,88,90,93,97,98, and multi drug resistant -Acinetobacter baumanni (MDR-Abau) [n=15]7,1921,42,43,45,53,56,60,66,67,74,91,95. A few studies (n=5) 8,23,57,89,99 looked at multiple MDR organisms (MDRO). Summary of study findings is in Table 1 and characteristics of included studies are in Table 2.

Table 1:

Summary of Study Findings

Characteristic N %
Type of Pathogen 87 100
Clostridioides difficile 6 6.90
MRSA 22 25.29
CRE/ESBL 22 25.29
A. baumannii 15 17.24
VRE 17 19.54
Other (e.g multiple gram negative organisms) 5 5.75
Setting
 Outbreak/Epidemic 65 74.71
 Non-outbreak/Endemic 22 25.29
Infection control intervention
 Mainly cohorting 10 11.49
 Multi-modal 77 88.51
Cohorting Style
 Patient only 27 31.0
 Both patient and staff 60 68.9
Type of Cohort Area ^
 Separate ward or unit 35 40.23
 Grouping or geographic 54 62.07
Primary Outcome *
 Decrease (in number or rate) 77 88.5
 Increase 2 2.30
 No change 8 9.20

MRSA - Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus; CRE- Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae, ESBL – Extended Spectrum Beta-lactamase; VRE- Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus

^

Total not 87, as 2 studies did both

*

Colonization or infection

Table 2:

Summary of Included Studies

AUTHOR, YR (ref) Country Study Design, duration, setting, [beds] Outbreak(N) Endemic [organism] Infection control intervention
C. difficile
Struelens, 1991 85 Belgium QE, 8/1988 – 6/1990 Tertiary [840], surgical and medical units Ob Nosocomial C. difficile disease (NCDD) Multi-modal
Cherifi, 200629 Belgium QE, 3/2003–4/2003 Tertiary [758], Geriatric ward Ob Multi-modal
Debast, 2009 35 Neth R, w/ case control 3/2005–2/2005 secondary, [341] hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Price, 201076 UK QE, 1/2008 to 3/2009, Tertiary [820], hospital wide En Cohort ward and ASP only
Islam 201347 UK R, 10/ 2008–6/2011 Secondary [800], Hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Garcia-Lecona 20186 Mexico R, 1/2014–12/2016 Tertiary [500], Hospital wide En Cohorting only
MRSA
Selkon, 198081 UK R, 1967–1978 Tertiary, Hospital Wide Ob Cohorting and screening only
Arnow, 198222 US R with case-control, 2/19759/1975, Tertiary, Burn unit Ob Multi-modal
Duckworth, 198837 UK R, 1982–1985 (5 phases) Tertiary, SC Hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Murray-leisure, 19903 US QE,10/1987–8/1989 (2 phases) Tertiary [884], Hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Cohen, 199132 US QE, 7/1983–6/1990 (3 phases) Tertiary [500[, Hospital wide En Multi-modal
Faoagali, 199238 Aus R, 1979–1989 Tertiary [1200], Hospital wide En Multi-modal
Cox, 199533 UK QE, 4/1991–12/1992: Secondary, Hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Mayall, 199664 Aus R, 12/1992–6/1994, Tertiary [500], thoracic ward Ob Multi-modal
Meier, 199665 US R, 3/1993–6/1993 Tertiary [900], Burn unit Ob Multi-modal
Farrington, 199839 UK QE, 1985–1997, Tertiary Hospital wide Ob Multi-modal
Fitzpatrick, 200041 Ireland Prospective, tertiary referral teaching hospital [486], rehabilitation ward En (88) Cohorting only
Cepeda, 200528 UK PQE; 6/2000–6/2001: Tertiary, MC, ICU En Multi-modal
Curran, 200634 UK QE, 1/2002–4/2004 Tertiary,Vascular surgery ward Ob Multi modal
Singh, 200683 US R, QE; 1996–1999 pre intervention; 2000–2004 postintervention, Tertiary; Transplant unit En Multi-modal
Raineri, 200777 Italy QE, 1996–2005 1996–1997 (p1) 1998–20022 (p2) 2003–2005 (p3) Tertiary, ICU En Multi-modal
Gilroy 200944 US R, 9/2000–5/2008 Secondary [506], ICU (Dedicated unit) En Cohorting only
Khan, 200950 Canada R, 7/2000–9/2000 Tertiary, ICU Ob Multi-modal
Batra, 201026 UK R, QE, 1/1/2002 to 4/ 20/06, Tertiary [840] ICU Ob/En Multi-modal
Kusachi, 201154 Japan R, 9/1987 to 8/2007, Tertiary, digestive surgeries En Multi-modal
Barbut, 201324 FRA QE, 12/2006–8/2008 (pre); 9/2008–12/2009 (intervention) Tertiary Burn unit Ob Multi-modal
Fisher, 201340 Singapore PQE,Tertiary hospital [995], hospital wide En Multi-modal
Marshall, 201362 Aus PQE, university-affiliated tertiary [350], ICU En Multi-modal
VRE
Karanfil, 199248 US R, 3/2000–6/2000 Tertiary [376], cardio thoracic ICU Ob (6) Multi-modal
Lai, 199855 US QE, 5/1993–8/1996 Tertiary [347], ICU Ob (359) Multi-modal
Jochimsen, 19994 US QE, 3/1995–2/1996 Primary, medical ward En Cohorting
Montecalvo, 199968 US PQE, 11/1993–7/1994 (pre) and 7/1994–7/1995 (post), Tertiary [650], SC Oncology ward En Multi-modal
Bartley, 200125 Aus P, 1/1997–12/1999, tertiary hospital[800], ICU/IDS/ Renal ward Ob (49) Multi-modal
Ridwan, 200294 Neth R, 6/2000–9/2000, tertiary teaching hospital [1042], hospital wide Ob (43) Multi-modal
Sample, 20025 US R, 4/1998–9/1998 Tertiary [1100], HematologyOncology ward Ob (13) Multi-modal
Timmers, 200287 Neth R, 11/1998 to 12/1999, Tertiary, hematology ward Ob (24) Multi-modal
Christiansen, 200496 Aus R, July to Dec 2001, Tertiary, hospital wide Ob (169) Multi-modal
Mascini, 2006 63 Neth R, 5/2000–1/2003, Tertiary [1042], hospital wide Ob (89) Multi-modal
Lucet, 200761 France R, 9/2005–10/2005 Tertiary, Multiple units Ob (37) Multi-modal
Schmidt-Heiber, 200779 Germany R, 4/2005–12/2005, Tertiary, hematology ward w/ ICU Ob (33) Multi-modal
Kurup, 200892 Singapore R, 3/2005–6/2005, Tertiary [1600], hospital wide Ob (151) Multi-modal
Servais, 200982 France R w/ case control study, 1/2007–3/2007, Tertiary [2000], Nephrology department Ob (14) Multi-modal
Morris-Downes, 201070 Ireland R, 2000–2008, Tertiary [800] ICU En Multi-modal
Moretti, 201169 Brazil R, 7/2007– 12/2009, Tertiary [400] hospital wide Ob (66) Multi-modal
Chotiprasitsakul, 201630 Thailand R, 6/2013–1/2014 Tertiary, ICU Ob (26) Multi-modal
A. baumannii
Podnos, 20017 US R, 11/1996 to 12/1997 Tertiary, ICU Ob (52) Multi-modal
Longo, 200560 Italy R, 4/2005–5/2005, Tertiary, ICU Ob (14) Multi-modal
Apisarnarnthanarak, 200820 Thailand R, 1/2005–12/2007, Tertiary [500], ICUs En Multi-modal
Kohlenberg 200953 Germany R w/ case control study, 2/2006 – 11/2006,Tertiary, hospital wide Ob (32) Multi-modal
Palmore, 201174 US R, 5/2007–12/2009 (2 outbreaks) Research hospital, ICU Ob (29 an 22, but 63 total) Multi-modal
Ayraud-Thevenot 201291 France R, 1/2006–5/2006; 1/2009 (2 outbreaks) Tertiary [1500], ICU Ob (20 and 7) Multi-modal
Landelle, 201356 France R, 12/2007–6/2009, Tertiary [860], hospital wide Ob (38) Multi-modal
Alfandari, 201419 France R, 9/2011– 6/2012, Tertiary [400], ICU Ob (20) Multi-modal
Apisarnarnthanarak, 201421 Thailand PQE, 5/2010– 12/2012, Tertiary [650], ICU En Multi-modal
Cho, 201495 Korea R, 7/2007–6/2009 (P1), 7/2009–12/2012, Tertiary [800], hospital-wide En Multi-modal
Gray, 201545 Canada R, 3/2012–1/2014, Tertiary [637], multiple units Ob (29) Multi-modal
Gavalda, 201643 Spain PQE,1/2011–1/ 2012 (pre) 2/2012–12/2014 (post) Tertiary [800], ICU En Multi-modal
Molter, 201667 Germany R, 12/2011–1/2012, Tertiary, ICU Ob (10) Multi-modal
Gagnaire, 201742 France QE, 10/2012–11/2012, Tertiary [1600], neurosurgery ward Ob (5) Multi-modal
Metan, 201966 Turkey R, 1/2016–6/2016, Tertiary, ICU Ob (10) Multi-modal
CRE/ESBL
Ohana 200672 France R w/ case control, 9/199912/2002, Tertiary, Physical medicine and Rehabilitation unit Ob CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Laurent 200859 Belgium QE, 1/2005–5/2006 (P1= 8/2005–10/2005; P2= 11/2005–12/2005) Tertiary, ICU Ob ESBL Multi-modal
Kochar 200952 US QE, 1/2004–12/2005 (pre); 1/2006–4/2006 (post intervention) Tertiary, ICU Ob CRE-KPN Other MDRO Multi-modal
Langer 200958 US PQE, 4/2007–6/2007 Primary, ICU Ob ESBL KPN Multi-modal
Carbonne 201027 France R, 9/2009–10/2009 Tertiary, multiple hospitals Ob (13) CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Gregory 201098 Puerto Rico R, case control, 2/20089/2008, Tertiary [328], hospital wide Ob (26) CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Kassis-Chikhani 201049 France R, 12/2003–10/2004, Tertiary [716], srugery care center Ob (8) CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Munoz-price 201071 US R, 1/2009–1/2010, Tertiary [1500], Surgical ICU Ob (10) CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Agodi 201190 Italy R, 3/2009–5/2009, Tertiary [500], ICU Ob (16) CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Ciobotaro 201197 Israel QE,1/2006–1/2007; 2/20076/2010 Secondary, Hospital wide Ob CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Cohen 201131 Israel PQE, 2006–2010, in phases Tertiary[775], hospital wide Ob CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Schwaber 201180 Israel QE, 1/2005–4/2007 (pre), 4/2007–5/2008 (post) Secondary, multiple hospitals Ob CRE Multi-modal
Palmore 201373 US R, 8/2013–12/2013, Research center (National institute of health) Ob CRE-KPN Multi-modal
Sisirak 201384 Bosnia R, 1/2010–1/2011, Tertiary, Orthopedic center Ob (78) CRE S. marcescens Multi-modal
Vergara-lopez 201388 Spain R, 3/2009–11/2011, Secondary [240], ICU Ob (42) MDR K. oxytoca Multi-modal
Kim 201451 Korea QE, 2008–3/2010 (pre), to 4/2010–2011 (post) Tertiary[900], Hospital wide Ob CRE Multi-modal
Nouvenne 201493 Italy R, cross sectional study w/ case control, 8/2011–5/2012, Tertiary [1218), hospital wide Ob (133) CRE-KPN Cohorting
Viale 201410 Italy QE, 6/2010–1/2014 Tertiary, [1450] ICU Transplant, HemaOncology units Ob CRE Multi-modal
Hussein 201746 Italy RQE, 1/2005–6/2016, secondary and tertiary hospital [830], hospital wide Ob CRE Multi-modal
Decraene 201836 UK R, 2010–2017, Tertiary, hospital wide Ob CRE- E. coli, KPN Multi-modal
Pirs 201975 Slovenia R, 10/2014–2/2016, Tertiary [2200], hospital wide Ob (42) CRE Multi-modal
Reeme 201978 US R, 7/2016–4/2017, Tertiary [566], Transplant ICU/step down/Rehab unit Ob (8) CRE Multi-modal
Other MDROs
Landrum 200857 US PQE 5/2006–8/2006 Military hospital, ICU En (ESKAPE) Multi-modal
Rosenberger, 20118 US P, 8/2009–11/2009 Tertiary, Surgical trauma burn ICU Ob (multiple GN- MDRO) Multi-modal
Stumpfs, 201386 Brazil QE, 3/2010–2/2011 (pre), 3/2011–2/2012 (post) Tertiary [795], Hospital wide En (multiple GNMDRO, MRSA) Cohorting
Wongchaoren, 201389 Thailand PQE, 9/2012– 11/2012, Tertiary, ICU En ESBL, A. baumannii, P. aeruginosa, MRSA Cohorting w/ feedback
Arruda, 201923 Brazil PQE, Tertiary [188] hospital wide En Multiple MDROs Cohorting only

UK- United Kingdom, US- United States, Aus- Australia, Neth-Netherlands, QE- quasi-experimental, R- retrospective, PQE-prospective quasi-experimental, CC- case-control, MC- multi –center, ICU- intensive care unit, Ob- Outbreak, End-Endemic, P- patient, S-staff, CDI- C. difficile infection, CRE – Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae, CR-KPN- Carbapenem Resistant Klebsiella pneumoniae, MRSA- Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus, Abau- A. baumannii, ESBL-Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase, GN- gram-negative, MDRO-Multi-drug Resistant Organism; ESKAP: E. coli/Staphylococcus/KPN/Abau/Pseudomonas aeruginosa, VRE-Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus, PD – Patient days RR- Relative Risk, OR- Odds Ratio,

Study Quality and Bias Assessment

Our average study score was 14.9 (range 12–22) points. Studies scored highly on external validity but poorly on power. (Supplementary Appendix 2)

Description of Cohorting

Cohorting was performed in the setting of other infection control interventions, either maintained throughout the duration of the interventions (56/87, 64.4 %), or limited to certain phases (31/87, 35.6%)3,5,8,19,20,26,28,31,32,3639,46,49,50,5356,63,64,67,69,70,77,78,85,87,89,93. In majority of studies, cohorting was described as physical separation of patients within a section of a unit (55/87, 63%). In about a third, a dedicated area or ward was created for patients (34/87, 39%)3,4,6,19,23,29,32,33,3538,41,4345,47,59,61,69,76,7882,86,92,93,9599 w/ two studies doing both37,38. In majority of studies, both patients and staff were cohorted (60/87, 68.9%) while the rest (27/87, 31.0%) cohorted patients alone6,10,20,21,24,26,30,32,35,37,38,40,41,43,44,51,54,62,65,70,77,8385,89,92,95. Potential adverse effects from cohorting were discussed in 12 studies8,19,25,28,33,34,44,59,61,78,86,89. These adverse effects included increased anxiety or feeling of isolation 28,34, increased workload for the healthcare team61,78, higher cost19,33, disruption of patient care59,61, potentially less time spent with the healthcare team28, increase in other MDRO25, or no adverse effects8. In one study86 the authors used surrogate markers such as falls and pressure ulcers to evaluate adverse events from contact precautions, and none was observed. In contrast, in two studies 44,89, cohorting led to increased time spent with patients89 and decreased cost44. A description of cohorting and the other interventions used is summarized in Table 3 and Supplementary Appendix 3, respectively.

Table 3:

Description of Cohorting Strategy by Pathogen

Author, year COHORT AREA Separate (S) Geographic (G) P S PS Cohorting in phases (Yes or No) DESCRIPTION of COHORTING
S G Patient (P) staff (S), or both (PS)
C. difficile
Struelens, 1991 Y
Cherifi, 2006 N
Debast, 2009 N
Price, 2010 N The cohorting ward was specifically for patients with CDI. Patients testing positive for CDI who still had ongoing diarrhea were transferred to the cohort ward on the same day. The ward had its own nursing staff and all patients admitted to the ward were transferred to the care of the infectious diseases team. All staff working on the ward wore scrubs and put on a new apron and gloves between each patient contact. A small minority of CDI patients had health needs, most usually surgical or high-dependency, which prevented transfer to the ward; however, all patients eligible for transfer to the ward were accommodated there.
Islam 2013 N 11 bed cohort ward; This had two four-bedded bays providing separate female and male areas, a double bay and one side-room. All patients had their own commode, stethoscope and disposable bed curtains.
Garcia-Lecona 2018 N Common isolation unit (CIU)- A CIU consisted of 1 room with 4 beds was designated for CDI patients. The CIU had 1–2 nurses and 1 medical attendant per shift.
MRSA
Selkon, 1980 N The unit has eight single cubicles and two double rooms, all with ante-rooms and en suite toilet and shower facilities. The windows are sealed, ventilation being provided by a plenum system in which air is released into the corridor and then passes through grilles on the doors into the ante-room and then to the patient’s room (providing 10 air changes per hour). The air is removed from the patient’s room through a central exhaust system and discharged at roof height: Each ante-room is fitted with a wash-hand basin and everyone entering the room puts on a gown and removes it on leaving this area. The nursing and ancillary staff are permanently employed on the unit.
Arnow, 1982 N
Duckworth, 1988 Y The isolation bay was located at the end of the ward and had a maximum of five patients at any one time and was open for 7 weeks. The Isolation ward was 14-bed capacity, and was opened during phase 5 of the intervention
Murray-leisure, 1990 Y In 10/1998 a single unit was established
Cohen, 1991 Y Cohorting was done only until 1985
Faoagali, 1992 Y Cohort ward was separate from main hospital, but on campus
Cox, 1995 N Though the cohort area was completely separated from the ward by double doors, and had a separate team of nurses, cases continued to occur in the main ward, particularly in the adjacent bay. A vacant ward in a more isolated part of the hospital site was therefore refurbished and the patients moved there.
Mayall, 1996 Y Positive patients were cohorted into two four-bed bays at one end of the ward. A four-bed bay was left vacant between these patients and other patients from whom MRSA was not isolated: this was reopened in mid-January. Previously colonized patients remained cohorted until discharge. Nurses assigned to these two bays for a single shift did not work elsewhere.
Meier, 1996 N
Farrington, 1998 Y
Fitzpatrick, 2000 N Cohorting in a separate MRSA cohort ward – comprised of three open plan three-bedded areas with assisted and ambulant showering facilities, two single rooms with en suite facilities, a staff changing room with showering facilities, and a rehabilitation room, incorporating physiotherapy and occupational therapy facilities which converts to a patient recreation room after hours.
Cepeda, 2005
Curran, 2006 N Cohort w/ in the unit
Singh, 2006 N
Raineri, 2007 Y From 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2002, the ICU was divided into two five-bed bays.
From 1 January 2003 the ICU moved to another floor, where it was structured into two single rooms, one two-bed and two three-bed bays. MRSA-positive patients, either colonized or infected, where always isolated in single rooms or cohorted in the same bay
Gilroy 2009 N A cohort unit with 17 private rooms, each with a bathroom; contact precautions was only for those colonized w/ other MDRO
Khan, 2009 Y
Batra, 2010 Y
Kusachi, 2010 Y
Barbut, 2013 N
Fisher, 2013 N Patients were placed in isolation or, more usually, in a designated cohort cubicle, established on each ward.
Marshall, 2013 N
VRE
Karanfil, 1992 N
Lai, 1998 Y
Jochimsen, 1999 N Patients were cohorted on a single hospital ward with dedicated nursing staff and patient-care equipment. Patients requiring many different levels of care, from intensive care to rehabilitation, were placed on the same unit
Montecalvo, 1999 N
Bartley, 2001 N A six-bed bay in the Infectious Diseases ward was converted into a VRE-only hemodialysis facility.
Ridwan, 2002 N
Sample, 2002 Y
Timmers, 2002 Y The first cohort consisted of all “known VRE-positive” patients. Additionally, patients who had been hospitalized between November 1998 and August 1999 were considered “possibly VRE-positive”, irrespective of culture results. They were cohorted and barrier nursed. No sharing of any article between patients was allowed in this patient group. New patients, who had never been admitted to the hematology ward before, were considered to be a “true VRE negative” cohort,” and were nursed in separate rooms, without isolation precautions. Nurse cohorting: On every shift nurses were strictly allocated to either VRE-positive or -negative patients. Clinicians conducted their rounds visiting the VRE-negative patients first, followed by the “possibly colonized patients” and the VRE- positive patients last.
Christiansen, 2004 N 3 cohorts established - Positive patients were transferred into dedicated isolation wards where strict contact gown and glove precautions were maintained. Patients who had been in the same ward as positive patients were accommodated in designated “contact” wards. Patients who had not been admitted to Royal Perth Hospital previously during the outbreak, those who had not been in contact with a carrier, and those who had had four negative rectal swabs were placed in designated “clean” wards. Standard precautions were practiced in the latter two patient cohorts. Each cohort had dedicated nursing staff, thus ensuring that movement of nursing staff between VRE-positive and VRE-negative patients did not occur.
Mascini,2006 Y P1 (6/2000–10/2000): 4 Cohorts: epidemic VRE (epiVRE) patients, roommates of epiVRE patients, wardmates of epiVRE patients, and newly admitted patients; staff cohorting in 4 cohorts; P2 (11/2000–6/2001): 3 Cohorts: epiVRE patients, possibly epiVRE patients, and newly admitted patients; staff cohorting in 3 cohorts; Preemptive isolation of all patients hospitalized in the ward between January and November 2000, regardless of culture results (patients labeled in hospital information system)
Lucet, 2007 N All 14 VRE-positive patients in the hospital were cohorted in the rooms opening into one corridor and, later on, in one of the ID units. No other patients were admitted to the cohorting area. Contact precautions were reinforced for these patients according to published guidelines; staff cohorting was done as well.
Schmidt-Heiber, 2007 N Patients were housed on separate hematologic wards according to their VRE status. Those with an unknown VRE status were housed on a separate ward and then grouped according to the VREscreening results. Each patient cohort was attended by a separate nursing staff.
Kurup, 2008 N VRE cohorts stretched the capacity of the existing 16-bed isolation ward. Consequently, the latter was extended to a 46-bed ward by temporarily displacing an adjacent colorectal ward.
Servais, 2009 N
Moretti, 2010 Y Establishment of a new hospital unit with 14 individual rooms exclusively for VRE patients
Morris-Downes, 2010 Y
Chotiprasitsakul, 2016 N Each unit was divided into 3 zones: confirmed positive VRE zone, VRE-contact zone and non-contact zone. The patients in the confirmed positive VRE and VRE-contact zones had contact precautions implemented, while the patients in the non-contact VRE zone had standard precautions continued.
A baumannii
Podnos, 2001 N
Longo, 2005 N
Apisarnarnthan arak, 2008 Y Cohorting in a section of the unit during period 2
Kohlenberg 2009 Y Cohorting was started only during second phase
Palmore, 2011 N
Ayraud-Thevenot, 2012 N Patients cohorted in a three-bedded area, physically separated from the rest of the unit and with dedicated healthcare workers.
Landelle, 2013 Y Patient cohorted in a 6- bed isolation unit created in a medical ward and cared for by trained and dedicated healthcare workers
Alfandari, 2014 Y A second cohorting sector for carbapenem resistant A. baumannii (CRAb) patients was created in an isolated 4-bed sector of the infectious diseases unit,
Apisarnarnthan arak, 2014 N Cohorting of patients in one section of the unit
Cho, 2014 N 4 cohort rooms, of 16 beds dedicated to MDRO
Gray, 2015 N A cohort ward was created
Molter, 2015 Y Cohorting (started D4 of outbreak) a designated area for care of patients colonized or infected was defined in the MICU and a separate nursing team took over; cohorting of patients was established to separate patients colonized with CRAb and their contact patients (grey area) from unaffected patients (yellow area).
Gavalda, 2016 N Cohorting to a unique unit; the cohorting practice was maintained during the entire post-intervention period, even when screening cultures were not systematically performed.
Gagnaire, 2017 N
Metan, 2019 N
CRE/ESBL
Ohana 2006 N Carriers were cohorted in the same bedrooms or placed in single rooms
Laurent 2008 N All colonized patients received cohorted care from a designated nursing staff in a dedicated 6-bed ICU, with additional nurses provided to staff this unit. After 2 weeks, the nursing staff assigned to the cohorting unit was permuted with another team to relieve the staff members from the extra workload and to maintain a high level of compliance with infection control measures.
Kochar 2009 N
Langer 2009 N Cohorted all patients in adjacent private ICU rooms and assigned dedicated nursing staff.
Carbonne 2010 N Cohorting separately case and contact patients.
Gregory 2010 N Patients with infection or colonization were placed in a cohort in 1 unit with a dedicated nursing staff.
Kassis 2010 Y Defined 5 distinct sections (cohorting); Nursing staff was assigned exclusively to one of the five sections.
Munoz-price 2010 N Cohorted in an open, 4-patient pod. Respiratory therapists, nursing staff, and nursing aids were also cohorted during their shifts and on a rotating basis, to care exclusively for patients known to harbor KPC-producing K. pneumoniae.
Agodi 2011 N
Ciobotaro 2011 N Clinical cases as well as carriers of CRKP were cohorted in separated locations. The cohorted carriers were treated exclusively by dedicated nursing personnel
Cohen 2011 Y Cohorting of CRKP patients with dedicated nursing staff and screening of patients neighboring a patient newly identified as a carrier of CRKP, which was started in March 2007
Schwaber 2011 N Placement of patients in self-contained nursing units—either single rooms or cohorts—containing all materials needed for their care and staffed by dedicated nurses on all shifts.
Palmore 2013 N
Sisirak 2013 N
Vergara-lopez 2013 N Nurse cohorting
Kim 2014 N
Nouvenne 2014 Y A 14-bed isolation ward with a staff-cohorting management was activated (10/2011–2/2012);
Viale 2014 N Targeted cohorting of carriers
Hussein 2017 Y
Decraene 2018 Y Patient and staff cohorting in dedicated CRE wards (3/2015–12/2015)
Pirs 2018 N
Reeme 2019 Y The cohorting unit was an 8-bed hospital ward initially designed for containment of Ebola hemorrhagic fever cases and was used for cohorting KPC cases during this outbreak.
Other MDROs
Landrum 2008 N
Rosenberger, 2011 Y Patient cohorting/enhanced isolation in ICU (until discharge): The main front entrance was closed, and all traffic was redirected through the back entrance of the unit, decreasing unnecessary flow in the “high-risk” area. Nursing staff assigned to provide care for either two isolation or two non-isolation patients, and no nurse provided care to both an isolation and a non-isolation patient. Staff rounds in the ICU were modified; Procedures and diagnostic tests were performed at the bedside without transportation out of the unit unless absolutely necessary. When a procedure outside the unit was necessary for an isolated patient, his or her exit from the unit was through the previously closed front door to avoid passage in front of the rooms of non-isolated patients
Stumpfs, 2013 N Patient cohort in a special unit -the 34 beds of the unit were located in 16 rooms for adult MDRO-infected patients and 2 additional rooms for respiratory isolation. Patients were transferred to the unit when they were identified as infected or colonized with MDROs.
Wongchaoren, 2013 Y 8 bed cohort area in the unit, 1 nurse per shift in the area
Arruda, 2019 N

Effect of Cohorting: Outcome

C. difficile infection (CDI)

Six studies evaluated the effect of cohorting on CDI 6,29,36,47,76,85. In all but one study85, patients were cohorted in separate units from patients without CDI. Two studies were performed in hospitals where C. difficile was endemic 6,76. CDI rates or numbers decreased in 4/6 studies29,35,76,85. In one study6, there was no change in number of CDI recurrences despite cohorting, while in the other47, cohorted patients had a higher risk of CDI recurrence, with an OR of 3.94 (1.23–12.65; P =0.021) [Table 4].

Table 4:

Summary of Study Outcomes by Pathogen and Endemicity

Pathogen Cohorting Pre intervention Post-intervention Risk ratio Outcome
C. difficile
Outbreak
Struelens 1991 G 1.47/1000 admissions
1.5/10,000 patient days [PD]
0.39/1000
0.34/10,000
0.26 (0.46–0.87) 0.23 (NR) Decrease
Cherifi 2006 SU 99 /100,000 [PD] 31/100,000 0.31 (0.13–0.77), p=0.013 Decrease
Debast 2009 SU 45 0 NA Decrease
Islam 2013 SU 5/110 21/138 3.34 (1.3–8.6) p= 0.021 Increase
Endemic
Price 2010 SU 1.3/1000 bed days [BD] 0.6/1000 0.46 (NR) Decrease
Garcia-Lecona 2018 SU 7/91 recurrences 14/85 2.14 (0.91–5.05), p= 0.08 No change
MRSA
Outbreak
Selkon 1980 SU 6.5 /1000 patients 0.527/1000 0.08 (NR), p=0.05 Decrease
Arnow 1982 G 2.5 /100 PD 0/100 PD 0 Decrease
Duckworth 1988 SU 169 67 Decrease
Murray-Leisure 1990 SU 16 / month
Colonization: 6/53 (11.3%)
1–3/month 0/39 (0) NA
0
Decrease
Cox 1995 SU 35/month 1–2/month NA Decrease
Mayall 1996 SU Colonization: 19% 6.4% 0.34 (NR) Decrease
Meier 1996 SU 6 0 Decrease
Cohen 1991 G 3.5/1000 discharges 1.5/1000 0.29 (NR) Decrease
Faoagali 1992 G 11/40131 admissions 720/48818 49 (NR) Increase
Farrington 1998 G 29% (# cases/# infections) 14% 0.48 (NR) Decrease
Curran 2006 G 1–7/month 0–2/month P<0.0005 Decrease
Khan 2009 G 9 0 NA Decrease
Batra 2010 G 1.06 (1.03–1.08) A 1.12 (0.632.01)
B 0.71 (0.182.88)^
C 3.85 (0.818.59)
NR No change
Barbut 2013 G 7.22/1000 PD 0.77/1000 P<00001 Decrease
Endemic
Fitzpatrick 2000 SU NR
NR
26/88 (27%) infected 23/88 (23%) decolonized NA Not reported
Cepeda 2005 G Hospital A 20.6/1000 PD
Hospital B 28.2/1000 PD
15.5/1000
22.2/1000
A: 0.72[0.44–1.17], p=0.91
B: 0.76[0.37–1.58], p=0.77 (HR)
No change
G Acquisition 45.6% 9.9% 0.22 (NR), p<0.001
Singh 2006 Infection 40.4 (19/47) 4.1 (4/97) p<0.001 Decrease
Bacteremia 25.5 (12/47) 4.1 (4/97) p<0.01
Raineri 2007 G 3.5/1000 PD 1.7/1000 (p2)
0.7/1000 (p3)
P= 0.0023
P=0.048
Decrease
Gilroy 2009 SU 0.66/1000 PD 0.43/1000
0.23/1000
0.65 (NR)
0.53 (NR)
Kusachi 2010 G 34/833 (4.1%) D 40/1807 (2.2)
E 5/1302 (0.4)
0.18 (NR), p<0.002 Decrease
G Infection 0.26/1000 PD (0.18–0.34) 0.11/1000
(0.07–0.19)
0.42 Decrease
Fisher 2013 Acquisition 10% 5 0.5 (NR) Decrease
Hand hygiene compliance 47% (44–49) 69% (68–71) 14.6 (NR) Improved
Marshall 2013 G 18.5/ 1000 risk days
Hand hygiene compliance: Glove use 698/795 (87.8%)
7.9/1000
12–34%
622/722 (86.2)
HR 0.39 (0.24–0.62)
NA
P=0.3
Improved
No change
No change
VRE
Outbreak
Karanfil 1992 G 6 0 NA Decrease
Lai 1998 G 24/month
Hand hygiene: 51%
2–7/month
100%
NA Decrease
Increase
49 0 NA Outbreak
Bartley 2001 G MRSA incidence : 10.9/mo 19/mo p=0.013 control 4 mos Increase
Ridwan 2002 G 43 NR NA Partial control 4 mos
Sample 2002 G 3.5/1000 PD 0.8/1000 0.22 (NR) p=0.001 Decrease; outbreak control 5 mos
Timmers 2002 G 24 0 Outbreak control week 44
Christiansen 2004 SU 169 0 Outbreak control in 6 mos
Mascini 2006 G P1 NR
Hand hygiene: 31%
PII 0.67 (0.41–1.1)
PIII 0.02 (0.002–0.6) 275%
Outbreak control in 3 yrs Increase
Lucet 2007 SU 37 0 Outbreak control 4 wks
Schmidt-Heiber 2007 SU 33 0 Outbreak control 33 wks
Kurup 2008 SU 29/254 (11.4%) 6/142 (4.2) Outbreak control 3 mos
Servais 2009 SU 14 0 Outbreak control 2 mos
Moretti 2010 SU 75.8/1000 PD 0.45/1000 P<0.001 Decrease
Endemic
Jochimsen 1999 SU 0.28/100 admissions
Infection control compliance: 5/23 (21%)
0.09/100
36/41 (88%)
0.32 (0.69–15.85), p=0.2
p<0.001
No change Decrease
Montecalvo 1999 G Infection 2.1/1000 PD 0.45/1000 0.22 (0.05–0.92), p=0.04 Decrease
Colonization 20.7/1000 PD 10.3/10000 0.5 (0.33–0.75), p <0.001 Decrease
G Colonization 1.96/10,000 BD (2001) 4.98/10,000 (2006)
3.18/10,000 (2007)
P<0.01 (2006 vs 2007) Decrease
Morris-Downes 2010 BSI
0.091 (2001)
0.78 (2005) P < 0.001 Increase
Hand hygiene 28% (20050 88 (67–93) [2008] NR Increase
Chotiprasitsakul 2016 G 26 0 Outbreak control 33 wks
A. baumannii
Endemic
Apisarnarnthanarak Colonization/Infection P2 1.2/1000 P<0.001 Decrease
2008 3.6/1000 PD P3 0.85/1000
G Hand hygiene−0.31 +/− 0.7 P2 0.75 +/− 0.8
P3 0.54 +/− 0.1
NR No change
Infection rates P2 1.74/1000 p<0.001 Decrease
P1 11.1/1000 PD P3 0.69/1000 p<0.001
Apisnarnthanarak
2014
G Surveillance P2 2.11/1000 p<0.001 Decrease
P1 12.15/1000PD P3 0.98/1000 p<0.001
Hand hygiene P2/P3 NS No change
Infection rates 0.46/1000 P=0.96 (2010) No change
0.35/1000 PD (2007) 0.06/1000 P<0.001 (2012) Decrease
Cho 2014 SU
Hand hygiene: 5.6L/1000 PD 7.5/1000
11.9/1000
P<0.001 (2012) Decrease
Gavalda 2015 SU 10.78/1000 PD (2011) 5.87/1000
1.74/1000
0.69/1000
0.54 (0.41–0.73) (2012)
0.3 (0.18–0.48) (2013)
0.4 (0.18–0.89) (2014),
p<0.02
Decrease
Outbreak
Podnos 2001 G 52 0 Outbreak control 13 mos
Longo 2005 G 14 0 Outbreak control i 2 mos
Kohlenberg 2009 G 32 0 Outbreak control 10 mos
Palmore 2011 G Total 63
1st outbreak 29
2nd oubreak 22
0
0
Control in 6 mos 3 mos
Ayraud-Thevenot 1st outbreak = 20 2nd outbreak= Outbreak
2012 G 7 control 152 days vs. 25 days
Landelle 2013 SU 38 0 Outbreak control 18 mos
Alfandari 2014 SU 8 0 Outbreak control 9 mos
Gray 2015 SU 29 0 Outbreak control 20 mos
Molter 2015 G 10 0 Outbreak control 1 mo
Gagnaire 2017 G 5 0 Outbreak control 37 days
VAP 10.19/1000 PD 3.645/1000 P=0.198 No change
CLABSI 14.33 12.90/1000 P=1 No change
Metan 2019 G CAUTI 11.05 6.858/1000 P=0.27 No change
Hand hygiene 58% 62% p=0.38 No change
Enterobacteriaceae
Ohana 2006 G 2.36/1000 PD (2000–2002) 0/1000 (2003) 0 Decrease
Laurent 2008 SU 11.57/1000 PD 0.08/1000 0.11 (NS) Decrease
Kochar 2008 G 9.7/1000 PD 3.7/1000 0.38 p<0.001 Decrease
Langer 2009 G 8.6/1000 PD 0 Decrease
Carbonne 2010 G 13 0 Outbreak control in 1 mo
26 0 Outbreak control in 7 mos
Gregory 2010 SU Hand hygiene (no baseline)
Contact precaution (no baseline)
108/225 (48%)
139/225 (62%)
Not indicated
Kassis 2010 G 8 0 Outbreak
control after 1 yr
Munoz-price 2010 G 10 0 Outbreak control in 7 mos
Agodi 2011 G 16 0 Outbreak control in 4 mos
Ciobotaro 2011 SU 3.4/10000 – 8.2/10000 PD 0.5/10000 0.91 (0.85–0.97), p<0.001 Decrease
30/1000 hospital beds P2 13.4 p<0.001 Decrease
P3 8.3 p =0.76 No change
Cohen 2011 G P4 4.3 p=0.27 No change
Compliance w/ cohorting 71 +/− 20 Not reported
w/ active surveillance 43 +/− 10
Schwaber 2011 SU 55.5/100,000 PD 11.7 0.21 (NR) p<0.001 Decrease
Palmore 2013 G 8 then 15 0 Outbreak control 1 yr
Hand hygiene: 84–88% Close to 100% Increase
Sisirak 2013 G 78 0 Outbreak control 1 yr
Vergara-Lopez 2013 G 1.91/100 PD 1.24/100 P2 0.82/100 P3 NR Decrease
Kim 2014 G 5.49 to 9.81/100,000 PD 1.61/100,000 0.88 (NR) p<0.001 Decrease
Hand hygiene: 35.2 78% Increase
Nouvenne 2014 SU 18–23/ month (13.2–16.9% incidence) 3–13
(8/month, 1.2%)
P=0.04 Decrease
Infection rate : 36.6% 22.5% P= 0.07 No change
Viale 2014 CRE BSI 1.05 (0.99 – 1.11) p 0.09 IRR 0.96 (0.92–0.99), p=0.03 Decrease
G CRE Colonization NR 0.96 (0.95–0.97),
p<0.0001
Decrease
Hussein 2017 G CRE incidence186.6 /100,000 HD 23.4/100,000 p<0.05 Decrease
CRE BSI 25.5/100,000 HD 3.7–4.4/100,000 p<0.05 Decrease
E. coli 0.15 (0.04–0.67) 0.02 (0–0.14) p<0.001 Decrease
Decraene 2018 SU KPN 0.19 (0.04–0.82) 0.27 (0.090.78) p=0.015 Decrease
Pirs 2018 G 42 0 Outbreak control 6 mos
Reeme 2019 SU 8 0 Outbreak control 9 mos
Other MDRO
Outbreak
Rosenberger 2011 G 6 0 Outbreak control 2 mos
Endemic
Landrum 2008 G VAP 60.6/1000 PD 11.1/1000 0.18 (NR), p=0.029 Decrease
Stumpfs 2013 SU MDRO incidence: 0.65
VRE 0.69
−1.04
−1.04
p<0.01
p<0.01
Decrease
Decrease
SU Hand hygiene 54% 66% p<0.05 Increase
Wongchaoren 2013 Gloves 16.7% 37.2% p<0.05 Increase
Environmental cleaning 90% 90% NR No change
Arruda 2019 SU 2/1000 PD 2.8/1000 PD IDR 1.35 (1.01–1.810, p=0.04 Decrease

G- geographic, SU- special or dedicated unit; NR – Not reported, RR Risk ratio, IDR – incidence density ratio Bolded- cohorting intervention

Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA)

Twenty-two studies included the use of cohorting to control MRSA infection3,22,24,26,28,3234,3741,44,50,54,62,64,65,77,81,83. MRSA was endemic in 10 28,32,38,40,41,44,54,62,77,83. Cohorting was used as the major intervention in only 3 studies41,44,81; all other studies used multiple other interventions. Majority of studies showed a decrease in MRSA colonization/ infection after initiation of a multi-faceted strategy, although rates remained unchanged in 326,28,44 and increased in 1.38. In 3 studies22,33,34 rates of MRSA infection specifically declined after initiation of cohorting. 2 studies looked at compliance w/ hand hygiene40,62 or use of gloves, which did not change during the intervention period. A summary of outcomes is in Table 4.

Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus (VRE)

Seventeen studies included cohorting as part of a strategy to help control VRE infection4,5,25,30,48,55,61,63,6870,79,82,87,92,94,96. All but 3 studies 4,68,70 were performed in the setting of a VRE outbreak. There was a significant decline in VRE numbers or incidence after enhanced infection control measures with the exception of 1 study4. In that study4, there was a noted decrease from 0.28 /100 admissions vs. 0.09/100 admissions specifically during the cohort ward intervention [RR 0.32 (CI=95, 0.69–15.85) P=0.2], but this was not statistically significant. However, in this study, staff compliance w/ infection control measures improved during the cohort intervention from 5/23 (21%) to 36/41 (88%)p<0.001. In another study, only partial control of the outbreak was achieved despite multiple interventions94. Time to outbreak control was varied - as short as 2 months in one82, to as long as 3 years in another63. Hand hygiene compliance, which was reported in 3 studies4,63,70 all improved during the intervention phase.

Carbapenem Resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) /Extended Spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL) producing organisms

Twenty two studies evaluated the use of cohorting as part of an intervention to control drug-resistant Enterobacteriaceae, all in the setting of an outbreak9,10,27,31,36,46,49,51,52,58,59,7173,75,78,84,88,90,93,97,98. Most involved CRE, with the exception of 2 studies with ESBL-producing Klebsiella sp. 58,59. In both, rates of ESBL decreased; from 11.57/1000 PD to 0.08/1000 PD [RR 0.11] and from 8.6/1000 PD to 0, after intervention, respectively.

In all studies, there was control of the outbreak after use of multiple infection control interventions. In the study by Nouvenne93, there was a statistically significant decrease in the incidence of new cases from 18–23 cases/month to 8 cases/month (range 3–13) specifically after the cohorting intervention (p=0.04). The length of time until outbreak control varied widely, from as short as 1 month27 to as long as 1 year49,73,84. Among the four studies31,51,73,98 that reported hand hygiene compliance, there was an increase in compliance rates in 251,73; the other 2 did not provide baseline data.

A. baumannii

Fifteen studies looked at the use of enhanced infection control measures including cohorting in the setting of MDRO-A. baumannii infection7,1921,42,43,45,53,56,60,66,67,74,91,95. In 4 studies20,21,43,95, A. baumannii was endemic in the institution. In all instances there was control of the MDR-A. baumannii. However, time to outbreak control took 1–2 months42,60,67 to over a year in others7,45,56. In two studies that observed more than one outbreak74,91 control was shorter the second time around from 6 vs.3 months74 and 152 vs. 37 days91, respectively. In 4 studies20,21,66,95 that reported hand hygiene compliance rates, improvement was only noted in one95.

Other MDROs

Five studies 8,23,57,86,89 evaluated MDRO-related infections. Most studies were done in institutions where the MDRO was endemic, except for one8. In this study, the absolute number of multiple non-clonal gram-negative MDRO’s decreased from 6 to 0 post-intervention8. There was also a decrease in MDRO rates in 2 other studies57,86. The one study evaluated Ventilator associated pneumonia (VAP)- ESKAPE pathogen rates in a military hospital,57 and reported a decrease in VAP rates from 60.6 to 11.1/1000 patient days (p = 0.029). In the other study,86 there was a significant decrease in the trend of MDRO after an isolation unit was created (trend change from 0.65 to 1.04; P = .01). Most of the observed reduction was related to the reduction of infections due to VRE (trend change from 0.69 to 1.04; P = .01) and carbapenem-resistant P. aeruginosa (trend change from 1.35 to 1.45; P = .01). There was no significant change for ESBL-producing organisms, MRSA, and carbapenem-resistant A. baumannii. In the remaining two studies that also used cohorting as the main intervention23,89, there was no change in colonization or incidence rates despite it. In the study by Arruda23, in particular, there was no immediate effect of cohorting on the incidence density of MDR bacteria acquisition (β2: −1.32; 95% CI: 3.81 to 1.16; P = .28). In the sole study that reported hand hygiene compliance, there was a significant increase from 54 to 66% pre and post-intervention89.

DISCUSSION

In this systematic review, we found that cohorting was used in conjunction with other infection control measures, generally in the setting of an outbreak. While the majority of the studies in this review (77/87, 88.5%) showed a decline in colonization or infection rates after institution of a multi-faceted approach that included cohorting as part of the intervention, it is not possible to determine the independent effect of cohorting in these studies. Once pathogens (MRSA or gram negative MDROs) are endemic, control is challenging, even with cohorting.

Studies were heterogeneous and analysis of bias and risk assessment fell in the fair category (mean 14.9). Notably, the process of cohorting varied across all studies -- cohorting involved creation of a dedicated ward or separate unit, or just sectioning off a part of the unit; cohorting was performed throughout the duration of the outbreak, or maintained only in certain phases; and finally, cohorting either involved patients alone, or both staff and patients. All these differences make it difficult to assess the process of cohorting itself, but the outcomes were consistent across studies regardless of this variation in cohorting practices.

Most studies cohorted both patients and healthcare staff as opposed to patients alone (60 vs.27). In these studies, staff provided care for only those patients already infected or colonized with the resistant pathogen. Staff did not cross-cover between infected/ colonized and non-colonized patients. Intuitively, cohorting staff to care for infected and colonized patients should have a substantial impact on nosocomial transmission, and keeping infected and colonized patients separate from non-infected and non-colonized patients provides a powerful tool to prevent transmission. Assigning staff to cover only patients who are infected may be a key mechanism for preventing transmission in the healthcare setting100. Proving this theory is difficult, however, given the concomitant use of other interventions. However, staff cohorting can also be very costly, and can lead to increased burden to the provider and the healthcare system33, which may explain why in some studies in this review (31 vs. 56 studies), cohorting was done only in discrete phases, and was not continuous. Given the heterogeneity in the studies we were not able to compare the relative benefit of staff versus patient cohorting.

In a few studies that evaluated MRSA28,38,39,77 rates of infection remained unchanged or even increased despite the use of cohorting and other concomitant infection control strategies. In these studies, the failure to reduce infection was likely multifactorial and included a rise in numbers of colonized patients on admission, a possible change in strain,39 or because of delayed identification of unknown cases.38 In a systematic review of infection control isolation measures in the management of MRSA which included 46 studies,101 four studies (one of which is included here37) provided strong level of evidence that intensive control measures including patient isolation were effective in controlling MRSA. In the two other studies which are included in this review,38,39 isolation wards failed to prevent endemic MRSA.

The risk of recurrent C. difficile infection seemed higher with cohorting compared with use of single rooms, at least in 2 studies. The authors attributed this to the possibility that patients admitted to a cohort unit are at greater risk of C. difficile reinfection because of persistent exposure to environmental spores. However, there was no molecular typing or molecular analysis of the C. difficile strains. This would have helped differentiate between recrudescent infection versus reinfection from another source.

Interestingly, there was reduction of CRE or ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae in all 22 studies that used multi-modal interventions during an outbreak setting. This implies that cohorting as an intervention for outbreak control is reasonable as part of enhanced infection control precautions, often in conjunction with stewardship measures. However, the possibility of regression to the mean during the setting of an outbreak is often a confounding factor and must also be considered. Given the heterogeneity in organisms that comprise CRE, further study is also needed to determine if there is a differential risk of transmission among the CRE, in the context of the close proximity that comes with cohorting of patients.

Our systematic review has several limitations and strengths. The studies were too heterogeneous and did not allow for a formal meta-analysis. Given the multi-faceted approach to outbreak control, we also could not isolate the role or quantify the importance of cohorting in such a strategy. Despite the limitations, we used a comprehensive search strategy, data extraction and documentation of threats to validity to provide an evaluation of the shortcomings of existing research. Although we cannot determine the effect of cohorting as a separate strategy for infection control, the evidence thus far suggests that cohorting may be a reasonable strategy to add as part of a multi-modal approach in the effort to curtail MDRO outbreaks. Whether it is an effective strategy in endemic situations remains unknown and future studies should examine the effect of cohorting particularly for institutions where MDRO or C. difficile are endemic.

Supplementary Material

1

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

We would like to thank Ellen M. Aaronson, AHIP, Mayo Clinic Libraries, for help with the search strategy.

FUNDING:

No sources of funding were used in the publication of this manuscript.

Footnotes

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

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