Skip to main content
PLOS One logoLink to PLOS One
. 2021 Nov 2;16(11):e0259466. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0259466

Assessing the introduction risk of vector-borne animal diseases for the Netherlands using MINTRISK: A Model for INTegrated RISK assessment

Clazien J de Vos 1,*, Wil H G J Hennen 2, Herman J W van Roermund 1, Sofie Dhollander 3, Egil A J Fischer 1,¤, Aline A de Koeijer 1
Editor: Fernanda C Dórea4
PMCID: PMC8562800  PMID: 34727138

Abstract

To evaluate and compare the risk of emerging vector-borne diseases (VBDs), a Model for INTegrated RISK assessment, MINTRISK, was developed to assess the introduction risk of VBDs for new regions in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner. MINTRISK is a web-based calculation tool, that provides semi-quantitative risk scores that can be used for prioritization purposes. Input into MINTRISK is entered by answering questions regarding entry, transmission, establishment, spread, persistence and impact of a selected VBD. Answers can be chosen from qualitative answer categories with accompanying quantitative explanation to ensure consistent answering. The quantitative information is subsequently used as input for the model calculations to estimate the risk for each individual step in the model and for the summarizing output values (rate of introduction; epidemic size; overall risk). The risk assessor can indicate his uncertainty on each answer, and this is accounted for by Monte Carlo simulation. MINTRISK was used to assess the risk of four VBDs (African horse sickness, epizootic haemorrhagic disease, Rift Valley fever, and West Nile fever) for the Netherlands with the aim to prioritise these diseases for preparedness. Results indicated that the overall risk estimate was very high for all evaluated diseases but epizootic haemorrhagic disease. Uncertainty intervals were, however, wide limiting the options for ranking of the diseases. Risk profiles of the VBDs differed. Whereas all diseases were estimated to have a very high economic impact once introduced, the estimated introduction rates differed from low for Rift Valley fever and epizootic haemorrhagic disease to moderate for African horse sickness and very high for West Nile fever. Entry of infected mosquitoes on board of aircraft was deemed the most likely route of introduction for West Nile fever into the Netherlands, followed by entry of infected migratory birds.

Introduction

International trade, globalization, and changes in demographics, land use, and climate all contribute to the geographical expansion of vector-borne diseases (VBDs), not only threatening public health but also livestock health. In the last decades, the Netherlands experienced two major epidemics of VBDs affecting ruminants resulting in severe economic losses for the Dutch livestock industry, namely bluetongue in 2006–2007 and Schmallenberg in 2011–2012 [1,2]. In recent years, several new zoonotic VBDs were detected in the Netherlands, with first tick-borne encephalitis in 2015 [3,4], then Usutu in 2016 [5], and most recently, West Nile fever in 2020 [6,7]. This, combined with the increased incidence of VBDs such as West Nile fever and bluetongue in other European countries [814], has led to growing concern about the threat of VBDs for the Dutch livestock industry bringing about the need for tools to evaluate and compare the risk of emerging VBDs to allow for prioritisation in risk management.

A Framework to assess Emerging VEctor-borne disease Risks (FEVER) was developed that addresses all elements that contribute to the risk of vector-borne animal diseases for newly affected areas, i.e. the probabilities and consequences of entry, establishment, spread and persistence [15,16]. FEVER provides a structured approach ensuring consistency and completeness among VBD risk assessments. However, a tool to evaluate and combine the results of the different elements of such a risk assessment in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner was lacking. Such a tool would make it possible to compare diseases for the risk they pose enabling prioritisation of VBDs, and to target, e.g., surveillance and vaccine development at those diseases that pose the highest threat to the livestock industry or public health.

Available methods to combine the separate elements of a risk assessment into a summarising output parameter range from relatively simple methods such as risk matrices [17] to rather complex methods such as Bayesian belief networks [18]. Where risk matrices do not allow for incorporation of uncertainty, Bayesian belief networks require complex probability matrices that are very data intensive. An intermediate approach is described by Havelaar et al. [19] who used the principles of multi-criteria analysis (MCA) [20] to quantitatively estimate the risk of emerging zoonoses to the Netherlands based on seven input parameters. Since FEVER has many more input parameters, the MCA approach was considered not suitable to arrive at an overall risk estimate in this framework. An alternative approach that also allows for incorporation of uncertainty is the knowledge-based approach (KBA) [21] that was used to summarise the output of pest risk assessments [2224]. With this approach, expert knowledge on infection biology is used to combine the input parameters using either simple calculations or decision rules, or more complex algorithms that take into account the complexity of the infection processes. KBA is a flexible approach, allowing to adapt the level of detail in the calculations to reflect the different levels of complexity and uncertainty in different modules of the model. For that reason, KBA was used to combine the results of FEVER into an overall risk estimate.

In this paper we describe the resulting calculation tool MINTRISK (Model for INTegrated RISK assessment) and illustrate its application in a risk assessment for emerging VBDs. We used MINTRISK to assess the risk of four VBDs for the Netherlands with the aim to prioritise diseases for preparedness. The outcome of this risk assessment can be used to support policy makers in managing the risk of VBD introduction.

Material and methods

MINTRISK

MINTRISK is a semi-quantitative calculation tool based on the FEVER framework [15] to assess the introduction risk of a wide variety of vector-borne livestock diseases that are transmitted by arthropod vectors. The geographical area for which the introduction risk is assessed is named the area at risk. The regions from where the VBD can be introduced are named the risk regions. The routes along which the VBD can travel from the risk regions to the area at risk are named pathways. The calculations in MINTRISK account for the disease transmission dynamics between vertebrate host animals and arthropod vectors. If a disease is zoonotic, spill over to humans is accounted for only in the impact assessment.

MINTRISK uses six steps to evaluate the introduction risk of vector-borne livestock diseases (Fig 1). These steps include (1) entry, i.e., the rate at which a pathogen is expected to enter the area at risk, (2) transmission, i.e., the ability of the pathogen to spread to susceptible hosts in the area at risk via a competent vector, (3) establishment, i.e., the probability that the pathogen can spread from vector to host and vice versa given the conditions of entry into the area at risk (pathway, time and location), (4) spread, i.e., the extent to which the pathogen is able to spread in the area at risk in a single vector season, (5) persistence, i.e., the likelihood that the pathogen will maintain itself in the area at risk for a prolonged period resulting in endemicity, and (6) impact of the disease on the livestock sector and–if zoonotic–on public health in the area at risk, including economic, socio-ethical, and environmental consequences. Results of MINTRISK are given per step and for three summarizing output parameters, i.e. the rate of introduction, the epidemic size, and an overall risk estimate (Fig 1). The rate of introduction is defined as the expected annual number of entries resulting in successful establishment. The epidemic size returns the estimated number of host animals infected after introduction of the disease, considering a maximum of four vector seasons. The overall risk gives an estimate of the expected economic losses (in Euros) per year considering both the rate of introduction and the economic impact of each individual introduction.

Fig 1. Outline of MINTRISK.

Fig 1

MINTRISK was built as a web-based tool that can be accessed at http://www.wecr.wur.nl/mintrisk2. The model was developed in Microsoft Visual Studio 2017 (.ASP.NET) with C# using DEVexpress components (Visual Studio Dev Essentials) for the user interface. Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio 18 was used to develop the relational database consisting of connected tables in which model parameters and descriptors are defined and where user input and results are stored.

Input into MINTRISK is entered by scoring a set of questions for each step, mostly by choosing from five qualitative answer categories (very low, low, moderate, high, very high) with accompanying quantitative explanation tailored for each question (S1 Appendix). The latter ensures consistent answering of the questions, also when different risk assessors contribute to a comparative risk assessment. The quantitative explanation of the answer categories is mostly on a logarithmic scale, accounting for the prevailing uncertainty when estimating parameter values for infection dynamics of VBDs. In addition, the risk assessor can indicate his/her uncertainty in answering each question, choosing from three categories (low, moderate, high). MINTRISK also offers the opportunity to indicate complete absence of data by offering the option to select ‘unknown’ when answering the questions.

When performing the model calculations in MINTRISK, the qualitative answers to the questions are converted into numerical values between 0 and 1 using a linear scale. For each answer category, a most likely value has been set with an associated uncertainty interval as indicated in Fig 2. Monte Carlo simulation is used to account for uncertainty in the model calculations with the numerical value for each question being sampled from a triangular distribution representing the uncertainty interval for this question. When the risk assessor has indicated that his/her uncertainty is moderate or high, this uncertainty interval is extended to include the values of one or two adjacent answer categories, respectively. This approach sometimes results in a skewed distribution, especially for the answer categories ‘very low’ and ‘very high’, as for those answer categories the uncertainty interval can only be extended on one side. In case the risk assessor has selected the option ‘unknown’ when answering a question, the numerical value is sampled from a Uniform(0,1) distribution.

Fig 2. Schematic overview of how qualitative input into MINTRISK is transformed into quantitative input that can be used for the model calculations and how results are subsequently transformed back into qualitative risk levels.

Fig 2

The numerical values sampled from the triangular distributions are subsequently log-transformed to obtain quantitative input values for the model calculations (see S1 Appendix). This log-transformation is such that the quantitative input values for the questions correspond with the indicated quantitative explanation of the answer categories selected for the questions. The input parameters are then connected by algorithms that allow for the infection dynamics of VBDs, resulting in a quantitative output value and uncertainty distribution for each step in the model. These algorithms are given in the paragraphs below. The quantitative output of each step is subsequently inverse log-transformed into a semi-quantitative risk score. The inverse log-transformation is such that the resulting risk scores correspond with the most relevant range of quantitative results for each output parameter. This implies that the inverse log-transformation is not by definition on the same scale as the log-transformation at the start of the calculations. A quantitative explanation of the obtained risk scores for each output parameter of MINTRISK is provided in S2 Appendix.

Calculations not only return a semi-quantitative risk score for each individual step in MINTRISK, but also for the summarizing output parameters, i.e. the rate of introduction, the epidemic size, and the overall risk estimate (Fig 1). In contrast to the sampled numerical input values, the resulting semi-quantitative risk scores are not bounded by 0 and 1, where a value below 0 indicates a very low to negligible risk and a value above 1 indicates an extremely high risk. Since MINTRISK takes into account uncertainty in input values using Monte Carlo simulation, the results of MINTRISK for the semi-quantitative risk scores are also given by uncertainty distributions. The semi-quantitative risk scores are translated into qualitative risk levels based on the median result (Fig 2).

In the next paragraphs, calculations in MINTRISK are described in detail per step. A comprehensive overview of all parameters in MINTRISK is given in Table 1.

Table 1. List of parameters used for calculations in MINTRISK.

Step Parameter Description Type
Entry
V Annual volume of host animals / vectors / commodities / humans moved along the pathway from the risk region to the area at risk User input
P surv_transport Probability that pathogen will survive in the pathway until arrival in the area at risk User input
P surv_PM Probability that pathogen is still present upon arrival in the area at risk despite preventive measures User input
P end_pt Probability of pathway being infected if disease is endemic in the risk region (equals prevalence of infection in host animals / vectors / humans in endemic situation) User input
P epi_pt Probability of pathway being infected if disease is endemic in the risk region Calculated
Prev epi_pt Prevalence of infection in host animals / vectors / humans in the risk region if disease is epidemic User input
F epi Frequency of epidemics (per year) in the risk region User input
Area Fraction of the total area of the risk region affected by an epidemic User input
HRP RR Length of the high-risk period in years in the risk region User input
Entry Annual rate of entry (number of infected entries per pathway) Calculated
Transmission
R Basic reproduction number of the infection in a fully susceptible population with abundant presence of vectors User input
F susc_host Fraction of the host population susceptible to infection in the area at risk User input
D vector Reduction factor to account for non-homogeneous distribution of the vector in the area at risk User input
R opt Reproduction number of the infection under optimal conditions in the area at risk Calculated
RS_R opt Semi-quantitative risk score for the optimal reproduction number (Ropt) Risk score
Establishment
P inf_1 Probability of first transmission step (from host to vector or from vector to host) User input
P inf_2 Probability of second transmission step (from vector to host or from host to vector) User input
Est Probability of establishment in the area at risk Calculated
Spread
R eff Effective reproduction number accounting for the dilution effect Calculated
R CM Effective reproduction number when control measures are applied Calculated
Dilution Dilution effect due to presence of non-susceptible hosts in the area at risk User input
CM vector Effectiveness of vector control measures in reducing spread of the infection User input
CM host Effectiveness of other control measures aimed at host animals in reducing spread of the infection User input
IG season Number of infection generations in one vector season User input
IG eff Effective number of infection generations in one vector season, considering spatial and ecological conditions limiting spread of infection Calculated
IG det Number of infection generations until detection of disease Calculated
Overlap Overlap between vector abundance and susceptible host animal density User input
Local Inhibition of local spread by spatial effects User input
Mov vector Contribution of vectors to long-distance spread User input
Mov host Contribution of host animals to long-distance spread User input
HRP AaR Length of the high-risk period in the area at risk (years) User input
T season Length of the vector season (fraction of the year) User input
PopS Population size of susceptible host animals (epidemiological units) in the area at risk User input
Inf Total Total number of infected hosts (epidemiological units) during the first vector season Calculated
Persistence
Inf Winter Number of infected hosts (epidemiological units) of the last infection generation of the vector season (before start of the adverse/winter season) Calculated
P overwinter Probability that the infection overwinters until the next vector season per infected host animal present at the end of the vector season Calculated
Pers Expected number of infected hosts (epidemiological units) at the start of the next vector season Calculated
Impact
Eco DA Direct agricultural losses per infected epidemiological unit User input
Eco IA Indirect agricultural losses per infected epidemiological unit User input
Eco PH Economic losses due to human cases per 100 infected epidemiological units (only if zoonotic) User input
Eco IC Indirect agricultural losses for the entire area at risk User input
Eco SE Economic losses due to side effects for the entire area at risk User input
Eco Economic impact (Euros) Calculated
RS_Eco Semi-quantitative risk score for the economic impact (Eco) Risk score
Soc Socio-ethical impact Calculated
Env Environmental impact Calculated
Summarizing output parameters
Intro Annual number of entries resulting in successful establishment in the area at risk Calculated
RS_Intro Semi-quantitative risk score for the rate of introduction (Intro) Risk score
RS_Intro final Final semi-quantitative risk score for the rate of introduction Risk score
ES Estimated epidemic size (total number of infected epidemiological units over 4 vector seasons) Calculated
Risk Overall risk estimate (expected annual economic loss due to introduction of the infection) Risk score

Entry

There is usually not one single route along which a pathogen can enter a new area. Therefore, MINTRISK allows the risk assessor to assess the rate of entry via different pathways and from different risk regions. Pathways can either be classified as infected host animals or their products (host), infected vectors (vector), or–if the infection is zoonotic–infected humans (human). The semi-quantitative risk score for the rate of entry is calculated separately for each pathway considering the prevalence in either host animals, vectors, or humans in the risk region, and whether the occurrence of the infection in the risk region is endemic or epidemic. If humans are considered dead-end hosts for the infection, the pathways related to entry of infected humans are ignored by MINTRISK.

The annual rate of entry (Entry) is calculated as:

Entry=V×max(Pend_pt,Pepi_pt)×Psurv_transport×Psurv_PM (1)

where V is the annual volume of animals, vectors, humans, or commodities moved along the pathway from the risk region to the area at risk, Pend_pt is the probability of the pathway being infected if the infection is endemic in the risk region whereas Pepi_pt is the probability of the pathway being infected if the infection occurs epidemically, Psurv_transport is the probability that the pathogen will survive in the pathway until arrival in the area at risk, and Psurv_PM is the probability that the pathogen is still present upon arrival in the area at risk despite measures taken to prevent its entry, such as clinical inspection, testing, quarantine, application of acaricides, insecticide spraying, or treatment of products. Pend_pt equals the expected prevalence of infection in the risk region in an endemic situation in either host animals, vectors, or humans, where the value used in the calculations depends on the classification of the pathway (pt is host, vector or human). The probability of infection of pathways originating from risk regions with epidemic occurrence of the disease (Pepi_pt) is not only based on the expected prevalence in either host animals, vectors, or humans under epidemic conditions, but also on the frequency of epidemics (per year) in the risk region (Fepi), the fraction of the total area of the risk region that will be affected by an epidemic (Area), and the length of the high-risk period in years in the risk region (HRPRR), where the high-risk period is defined as the period from first infection in the risk region until detection and notification, during which spread of the infection is not confined by control measures. Pepi_pt is calculated as:

Pepi_pt=Min(Fepi×Area×HRPRR×Prevepi_pt,1) (2)

where Prevepi_pt is the expected prevalence in pathway type pt (animal, vector or human).

MINTRISK thus offers the risk assessor the option to indicate whether the VBD is endemic or epidemic in the risk region, where epidemic was defined as the incidental presence of the disease in regions where the disease is normally absent, and endemic was defined as the continuous presence of the disease in the risk region over a longer period (i.e. years). The risk assessor can also decide to enter values for both epidemic and endemic presence. In that case, MINTRISK uses a worst-case approach by selecting the parameter (Pend or Pepi) resulting in the highest semi-quantitative risk score for Entry (see Eq 1). This will mostly be Pend, because its calculation does not include any risk-reducing parameters. If little data is available on the disease situation in the risk region, it is advised to opt for endemic presence in MINTRISK to avoid a false sense of precision.

Transmission

The probability of transmission is estimated in an early stage in MINTRISK, as there is no need for a full risk assessment if transmission is very low or even negligible. The risk score for the probability of transmission is an indication of the reproduction number R under optimal conditions in the area at risk, i.e. in a local area where both vectors and vertebrate host animals are present in sufficient numbers and in a time period in which temperatures favour spread of the infection. This optimal R value (Ropt) is calculated taking into account the distribution of the vector in the area at risk, i.e. patchy (< 5% of the area) or homogeneous (≥ 5% of the area), and correcting for the protective effect of vaccination or previous exposure to the infection in the host population if applicable. Ropt is calculated as:

Ropt=Fsusc_host×Dvector×R (3)

where Fsusc_host is the fraction of the host population that is susceptible to the infection, Dvector is the reduction of R if the distribution of the vector is patchy, and R is the basic reproduction number in a fully susceptible host population with abundant presence of vectors. The value of Dvector is set to 0.9 if the distribution of the vector in the area at risk is classified as patchy, whereas its value is set to 1 if the vector is homogeneously distributed in the area at risk or if the distribution is unknown. Dvector will thus only result in a limited reduction of R if the distribution of the vector is patchy, as transmission in local hotspots can still be efficient. The rate of transmission in larger areas of the area at risk, will however be reduced if vector distribution is patchy.

Establishment

The probability of establishment depends on the pathway, local area, and time of entry of the infection in the area at risk and is thus calculated separately for each pathway. For a successful establishment, the infection needs to complete a full transmission cycle, i.e. the infection has to pass from an introduced infected host animal via a local vector to an indigenous host animal, or from an introduced infected vector via an indigenous host animal to a local vector. The probability of establishment (Est) is calculated as:

Est=Pinf_1×Pinf_2 (4)

where Pinf_1 is the probability of the first transmission step occurring, and Pinf_2 the probability of the second transmission step occurring. If entry of the pathogen occurs via contaminated animal products, vaccines, or infected humans, the first transmission step needs to consider the most likely route of infection of either local vectors or host animals.

Rate of introduction

The rate of introduction, i.e. the expected annual number of entries resulting in successful establishment, is calculated separately for each pathway that is entered into MINTRISK by the risk assessor, using the output parameters of the steps for entry and establishment. The rate of introduction (Intro) is calculated as:

Intro=Entry×Est (5)

To define the qualitative risk level for the rate of introduction, also the output of the transmission step is considered, but only when Ropt is below 1, because in such situations the infection will fade out even if establishment is successful in first instance. If Ropt < 1, the qualitative risk level for the rate of introduction is therefore based on the minimum of the semi-quantitative risk scores obtained for Ropt and Intro, i.e. the minimum of the numerical values for these parameters after inverse log-transformation (Eq 6). More details on the inverse log-transformation are given in S2 Appendix. The final semi-quantitative risk score for the rate of introduction (RS_Introfinal) is thus calculated as:

RS_Introfinal={RS_IntroRopt1Min(RS_Ropt,RS_Intro)Ropt<1 (6)

where RS_Intro is the semi-quantitative risk score for the rate of introduction based on entry and establishment only (after inverse log-transformation of Intro, Eq 5), and RS_Ropt is the semi-quantitative risk score for transmission (after inverse log-transformation of Ropt, Eq 3).

Then, the risk assessor is asked to select a maximum of three pathways to include in the further MINTRISK calculations, which naturally are those pathways that have the highest value for RS_Introfinal. All calculations in MINTRISK up till this stage are deterministic, i.e., they are based on the most likely values for each of the entered answers. This is to avoid extensive simulation time in case numerous pathways are entered into the model. However, if one would have extreme uncertainty about a certain pathway, it could be worthwhile to evaluate its impact by including this pathway in one or more test runs, even though it has a relatively low score for RS_Introfinal. Pathways not selected at this stage will be ignored in the further model calculations. The final output of the MINTRISK calculations for this section and beyond is based on the selected pathway with the highest output value for RS_Introfinal. This pathway can, however, vary between model iterations, because further calculations for the selected pathways do include Monte Carlo simulation to account for uncertainty in input parameters in MINTRISK.

Spread

In this step, the extent of spread of the disease in the first vector season is evaluated. The epidemiological unit considered in this step should equal the epidemiological unit for which the basic reproduction number was given in the transmission step (see paragraph on Transmission) and can, e.g., be individual host animals or herds or flocks. The semi-quantitative risk score for spread is based on the total number of epidemiological units that is expected to get infected during the first vector season. This is calculated primarily from the optimal reproduction number (Ropt) as calculated in the transmission step, the number of infection generations that fit in one vector season (IGseason), and the number of infection generations until detection of the disease (IGdet). However, spread can be limited by several aspects which is accounted for in MINTRISK by adjusting the values of Ropt and IGseason. First, the presence of non-susceptible hosts in the area where the infection is present might result in a so-called dilution effect [15,25,26] if infectious vectors also feed on these animals, resulting in an effective reproduction number (Reff) that is calculated as:

Reff=Ropt×(1Dilution) (7)

where Dilution is the expected dilution effect. The dilution effect is estimated as the proportion of non-susceptible hosts over the total number of hosts bitten by the competent vectors of a given VBD pathogen. This proportion depends on the host preference of the competent vectors and the abundance of different host animal species.

Spatial characteristics can either limit or favour spread of the infection. In MINTRISK, four parameters are considered, i.e. the overlap between vector abundance and host animal density in the area at risk (Overlap), inhibition of local spread by spatial effects (Local), and contribution of host animals and vectors to long-distance spread (Movhost and Movvector). These parameters tend to affect spread after the first few transmission cycles given successful establishment, whereas they have less influence on the initial transmission of the infection in the area at risk. The rate of transmission is not only determined by the reproduction number, but also by the expected time interval between infection generations. Therefore, these parameters were modelled as factors that affect the number of infection generations in the vector season, which is the reciprocal of the time interval between infection generations. If all four parameters would maximally inhibit transmission, the number of infection generations is reduced by 50%. The effective number of infection generations (IGeff) is calculated as:

IGeff=IGseason×3+Overlap+(1Local)+Max(Movvector,Movhost)6 (8)

Please note that the questions to assess Local, Movvector, and Movhost come without accompanying quantitative explanation. The qualitative answers to these questions are converted into numerical values between 0 and 1 using linear scaling and Monte Carlo simulation (Fig 2), after which their values are directly used in the calculations.

As soon as the infection is detected, control measures will be implemented that reduce the transmission of the infection, resulting in a lowered value of the reproduction number (RCM) that is calculated as:

RCM=ReffCMvector×CMhost (9)

where CMvector is the effect of vector control measures on local and long-distance spread and CMhost the effect of other control measures aimed at host animals.

The rate of transmission of the infection is thus expected to differ between the first phase of the epidemic, which is the high-risk period with undetected spread of the infection and no control measures in place yet, and the second phase of the epidemic that starts upon detection of the disease resulting in control measures. In MINTRISK, the length of the first phase is expressed by the number of infection generations until detection of the disease (IGdet), which is calculated as:

IGdet={IGeffHRPAaRTseasonIGeff×(HRPAaRTseason)HRPAaR<Tseason (10)

where HRPAaR is the length of the high-risk period in the area at risk expressed in years, and Tseason is the length of the vector season expressed as a fraction of the year.

In calculating the total number of epidemiological units infected during the first vector season (Inftotal), MINTRISK takes into account the length of the high-risk period by changing the transmission parameter from Reff to RCM after detection of the disease. This is only relevant if detection is expected to occur in the first vector season, i.e. HRPAaR < Tseason. Furthermore, the tool accounts for the unlikely event that transmission of the infection will result in natural fade out of the disease in small populations by ensuring that the total number of infected epidemiological units will not exceed the population size (PopS). Inftotal is calculated as:

Inftotal=Min(PopS,{i=0IGeffReffiHRPAaRTseasoni=0IGdetReffi+(ReffIGdet×j=1IGeffIGdetRCMj)HRPAaR<Tseason) (11)

MINTRISK also calculates the total number of infections of the last infection generation in the vector season (Infwinter) as an input for the persistence step (next paragraph). Infwinter is calculated as:

Infwinter=Min(PopS,{ReffIGeffHRPAaRTseasonReffIGdet×RCM(IGeffIGdet)HRPAaR<Tseason) (12)

Persistence

To estimate the likelihood of persistence, the probability that the infection can survive into the next vector season is evaluated. To this end, the probability of overwintering in both the host animal and vector population are addressed, as well as the probability of overwintering via other mechanisms such as non-zero vector activity [27] or survival in the environment. The risk assessor is asked to score the probability of overwintering via six independent mechanisms: persistent infection in the host, vertical transmission in the host, direct host-to-host transmission, survival of infected adult vectors, vertical transmission in the vector, and overwintering via other mechanisms. The probability that the infection overwinters until the next vector season (Poverwinter) for each infected host animal that is present at the end of the vector season, is then set equal to the probability of the overwintering route that has the highest risk score. Effectively, this comes down to sorting out the most likely mechanism for overwintering in the area at risk and scoring the probability for this overwintering route. The likelihood of persistence (Pers) is then calculated as the expected number of infected epidemiological units at the start of the next vector season:

Pers=Infwinter×Poverwinter (13)

Epidemic size

The expected epidemic size (ES) is calculated taking into account both the number of infected epidemiological units in the first vector season (Inftotal) and the expected number of infected epidemiological units at the start of the next vector season (Pers). Different equations are used depending on the length of the high-risk period in the area at risk, because only after detection of the disease, control measures will be put in place resulting in a reduction of the transmission parameter from Reff to RCM.

ES=Min(PopS,{Inftotal+Pers×(1+RCMIGeff×Poverwinter+(RCMIGeff)2×Poverwinter2)×i=0IGeffRCMi,HRPAaR1Inftotal+Pers×(i=1IGeffReffi+(ReffIGeff×Poverwinter×i=1IGeffRCMi)×(1+RCMIGeff×Poverwinter)),1<HRPAaR3InfTotal×i=03Persi,HRPAaR>3) (14)

In calculating the epidemic size, we assumed that the spread of the infection in the first vector season started with a single infected epidemiological unit, and that each infected epidemiological unit at the start of the new vector season will have a similar probability of inducing new infections. If persistence is high, this might result in a large number of infections in the next vector seasons, exceeding the total population size. Therefore, the total population size (PopS) was included in Eq 14 to ensure that the epidemic size does not exceed the total population size. The epidemic size is calculated over a total of four vector seasons.

Impact

The impact assessment consists of the evaluation of the economic, socio-ethical and environmental consequences related to the introduction and spread of a vector-borne disease. While the economic consequences can be expressed in monetary values, the quantification of socio-ethical and environmental consequences is less straightforward. To avoid the subjective translation of these elements into monetary or utility values, MINTRISK only accounts for the economic consequences in the overall risk estimate. The questions on socio-ethical and environmental consequences were nevertheless included to raise awareness. Results of these sections can be used to indicate the potentially adverse consequences of disease introduction even if economic consequences are limited.

The main variables determining the impact of disease introduction are the number of epidemiological units (host animals and/or farms) infected, the geographical area affected by the disease, the control measures applied to contain or eradicate the pathogen, and–in case the disease is zoonotic–the number of humans infected and the severity of illness. The economic impact (Eco) is calculated as:

Eco=(EcoDA+EcoIA+EcoPH100)×ES+EcoIC+EcoSE (15)

where EcoDA are the direct agricultural losses due to e.g. morbidity, mortality and production losses and EcoIA are the indirect agricultural losses related to e.g. empty barns and losses in the supplying and delivering industry (e.g. feed companies and slaughterhouses). Both parameters are estimated per epidemiological unit and multiplied with the estimated epidemic size (ES) to arrive at the total economic losses at farm level. EcoPH are the economic losses due to human disease related to e.g. medical treatment and reduced economic productivity. These losses only need to be considered if the vector-borne disease is zoonotic. As the number of infected humans is mostly low compared to the number of infected host animals, EcoPH is estimated for the expected number of human cases per 100 infected host animals in order to scale these losses to the epidemic size in host animals. EcoIC are the indirect agricultural economic losses at national or regional level due to presence of the disease. These include costs incurred due to movement standstills, trade restrictions and control measures. EcoSE are economic losses due to side effects, such as reduced tourism in affected areas. EcoIC and EcoSE are assumed to be related to the geographical area affected rather than the number of epidemiological units infected and are therefore both estimated at the national or regional level.

No accompanying quantitative explanation is available when entering the answer categories for the questions in the sections on socio-ethical and environmental impact in MINTRISK. In these sections of MINTRISK, the numerical values sampled are therefore not log-transformed, but directly used to calculate the semi-quantitative risk scores and resulting qualitative risk levels. The socio-ethical impact (Soc) is calculated as the maximum risk score entered for each of the five categories of socio-ethical consequences distinguished in MINTRISK, i.e. socio-ethical impact related to the human disease burden, socio-ethical impact related to reduced animal welfare, socio-ethical impact related to disease in pet animals, socio-ethical impact related to culling of livestock to control the disease, and socio-ethical impact related to loss of recreational outdoor space. Likewise, the environmental impact (Env) is calculated as the maximum risk score entered for each of the three categories of environmental consequences distinguished in MINTRISK, i.e. environmental impact related to loss of biodiversity, environmental impact related to effects on nature values, and environmental impact related to vector control.

Overall risk estimate

The overall risk estimate in MINTRISK provides an indication of the expected annual economic loss due to introduction of the vector-borne disease. This parameter is only calculated at the level of semi-quantitative risk scores. Usually, risk is calculated as the product of probability and impact. Since the risk scores are on a log10 scale, in this model the risk score for the rate of introduction (RS_Introfinal) and the risk score for the economic impact (RS_Eco) are summed to obtain the overall risk estimate:

Risk=RS_Introfinal+RS_Eco (16)

Risk assessment

We evaluated the annual introduction risk of four VBDs for the Netherlands. Diseases included were OIE listed [28] and had never occurred in the Netherlands at the time that this assessment was performed. The diseases selected were African horse sickness (AHS), epizootic haemorrhagic disease (EHD), Rift Valley fever (RVF), and West Nile fever (WNF). AHS and EHD were considered because of their close relatedness to bluetongue (BT) [2931], which caused a huge epidemic in the Netherlands in the period 2006–2008 [9,32]. All three diseases are transmitted by midges (Culicoides spp.). The risk assessment of EHD was limited to EHD virus serotype 6, because of its occurrence in North-Africa and Turkey, where clinical disease in cattle has been reported [33]. WNF was considered, because of the steady expansion of its geographic distribution in Europe and the geographic proximity to the Netherlands [10,13]. RVF is not present in Europe yet and might therefore pose a lower threat to the Netherlands. However, the outbreaks in the Arabian Peninsula in 2000 [3436] and serological studies indicating the presence of the virus in the Mediterranean (Turkey, North Africa) [37] have raised awareness in Europe for this disease. The long period of silent spread often observed in RVF epidemics [38,39] warrants increased vigilance as unnoticed presence of the virus in the European Union will result in a high introduction risk by trade in live animals. WNF and RVF are both transmitted by mosquito vectors of the genera Culex, which are abundantly present in the Netherlands [40,41]. WNF and RVF are both zoonotic diseases. An overview of the diseases, their pathogens, arthropod vectors, susceptible vertebrate hosts, and geographical distribution is given in Table 2.

Table 2. Overview of causing pathogens, vertebrate host animals, arthropod vectors, and geographical distribution of four vector-borne diseasesa.

Disease Pathogenb Vertebrate host animal Vector Zoonosis Geographical distribution
African horse sickness AHS virus (Orbivirus, Reoviridae) Equines Culicoides spp. No Sub Saharan Africa
Epizootic haemorrhagic disease EHD virus serotype 6 (Orbivirus, Reoviridae) Deer, bovines, sheep Culicoides spp. No Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey, Reunion Island, Guadeloupe, Australia, USA
Rift Valley fever RVF virus (Phlebovirus, Bunyaviridae) Bovines, sheep, goats, wild ungulates, rodents Aedes spp., Culex spp., Anopheles spp., Ochlerotatus spp. Yes Africa, Arabian Peninsula
West Nile fever West Nile virus (Flavivirus, Flaviviridae) Birds, equines Culex spp. Yes South, Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East, Asia, Australia, North, Central and South America, Africa

a Sources

African horse sickness [29,31,42,43].

Epizootic haemorrhagic disease [30,33,44,45].

Rift Valley fever [37,4649].

West Nile fever [8,5053].

b Genus and family of pathogen given between brackets.

The risk assessment was an update of an assessment performed in 2015 [16]. We started out with an extensive list of potential pathways for introduction for each of the diseases using the FEVER framework. Only pathways with a non-negligible risk in the qualitative risk assessment were included in MINTRISK (Table 3). Infected humans were not evaluated as pathways for introduction because humans are considered dead-end hosts for both WNF and RVF.

Table 3. Pathways entered into MINTRISK to assess the introduction risk of each disease.

Type Pathway AHS EHD RVF WNF
Host–animal
Legal trade in livestock/equines X
Illegal trade in livestock/equines X X X
Import of zoo animals X
Movement of competition horses X
Migratory birds X
Host–product
Biological material including modified live vaccines X X
Vector
Transport vehicles (aircraft, ship, road transport) X X X
Containers on aircraft or ship X X
Imported products (plant material, tires) X
Traded animals (livestock, pets) X X
Migration of wildlife
Migratory birds

Pathways selected for inclusion in the model calculations are indicated in bold.

Questions in MINTRISK were answered using information from global databases, scientific literature, and expert opinion. Answers to all questions in the assessment are documented in S3 Appendix. Semi-quantitative risk scores were calculated in MINTRISK using 1,000 iterations.

Results

Rate of introduction

The rate of introduction provides an indication of the annual probability of successful entry, i.e. entry of the pathogen resulting in establishment in the area at risk and subsequent spread. The estimated rate of introduction for the pathway contributing most to the introduction risk varied from low for EHD (median risk score 0.32) and RVF (median risk score 0.39) to very high (median risk score 0.87) for WNF (Fig 3). The rate of introduction of AHS was estimated to be moderate (median risk score 0.51). Uncertainty about the rate of introduction was high.

Fig 3. Risk scores (median values) and their uncertainty (95% uncertainty interval) for the rate of introduction of four vector-borne diseases for the Netherlands via selected pathways.

Fig 3

AHS = African horse sickness; EHD = epizootic haemorrhagic disease; RVF = Rift Valley fever; WNF = West Nile fever.

For both AHS and EHD we assumed that at least one of the Palearctic Culicoides species in the Netherlands is a competent vector for these viruses and that establishment is thus possible. Infected adult vectors (Culicoides spp.) that enter the Netherlands via traded livestock contributed most to the rate of AHS introduction (Fig 3). This was also an important pathway for EHD, together with illegal trade in livestock from Mediterranean countries. Illegal import of livestock contributed most to the rate of introduction of RVF, with infected mosquitoes arriving in the Netherlands in aircraft or containers having a slightly lower risk score. The risk score for these pathways was much higher for WNF (very high and high, respectively), due to the higher numbers of aircraft and containers arriving from infected areas. The rate of introduction via migratory birds was also evaluated as high for WNF.

Impact

The impact of a VBD is largely dependent on the epidemic size (Fig 4). The estimated epidemic size was very low for AHS (median risk score -0.11); high for RVF (median risk score 0.67); and very high for EHD and WNF (median risk score 0.87 and 1.29, respectively). It should be noted that a negative risk score indicates a very low to negligible impact, whereas a risk score > 1 indicates an extremely high impact (see Material and Methods and S2 Appendix). The epidemic size depends on both the extent of spread in the vector season and the probability of persistence. WNF had the highest risk estimate for both parameters, even though the probability of overwintering of RVF starting from a single infected host was higher for RVF than WNF. However, the probability of persistence was higher for WNF due to a higher expected number of infected animals at the start of the winter season.

Fig 4. Risk scores (median values) and their uncertainty (95% uncertainty interval) for the estimated epidemic size of four vector-borne diseases for the Netherlands.

Fig 4

AHS = African horse sickness; EHD = epizootic haemorrhagic disease; RVF = Rift Valley fever; WNF = West Nile fever.

The estimated economic impact was very high for all four diseases (Fig 5) with a median risk score of 1 for EHD, 0.93 for RVF, 0.9 for AHS, and 0.87 for WNF. The very high risk scores for AHS, EHD and RVF are mainly explained from the expected trade restrictions (export ban) in case of an outbreak of these diseases, even if only few animals would be infected. The estimated epidemic size for AHS was, for example, very low, resulting in limited economic losses due to infected hosts, even though the expected direct agricultural losses per infected host were estimated to be very high. The very high risk score for WNF was unexpected, since all questions related to the economic impact were answered as low or very low. The direct and indirect losses per infected host will be extremely low indeed, since wild birds are the epidemiological units in the MINTRISK calculations for WNF, with equines and humans being spill over hosts only. Furthermore, no trade bans are to be expected if West Nile virus would be detected in the country. The very high economic impact is therefore solely explained from the estimated epidemic size, which was extremely high (Fig 4).

Fig 5. Risk scores (median values) and their uncertainty (95% uncertainty interval) for the estimated impact of four vector-borne diseases for the Netherlands.

Fig 5

AHS = African horse sickness; EHD = epizootic haemorrhagic disease; RVF = Rift Valley fever; WNF = West Nile fever.

Socio-ethical impact is expected to be high to very high for all diseases except EHD (Fig 5). For WNF and RVF, the high socio-ethical impact is mainly related to societal anxiety due to potentially fatal infections in humans. For AHS, and to a lesser extent for WNF, the high socio-ethical impact can be attributed to the impact on animal welfare, with severe disease in equines also resulting in human suffering given the often-close relationship of humans and horses in the Netherlands. Furthermore, morbidity and mortality in equines is expected to be very high in case of an AHS outbreak. Moderate environmental impact is expected for EHD and WNF as these diseases are primarily wildlife diseases and might result in severe mortality in vulnerable populations, albeit the estimates include high uncertainty (Fig 5). The environmental impact of AHS and RVF is expected to be very low.

Overall risk

The overall risk estimate calculated by MINTRISK takes into account the results of all six steps of the FEVER framework. The resulting risk scores can be used to prioritize VBDs for risk management. The overall risk estimate was very high for all evaluated VBDs but EHD (Fig 6). The overall risk estimate for EHD was high. Ranking of the VBDs based on the overall risk estimate is difficult given the overlapping uncertainty intervals. The results of the risk assessment were therefore also presented using a risk profile diagram (Fig 7). This diagram is a kind of P-I diagram, indicating the rate of introduction (Probability) on the x-axis and the economic impact of disease (Impact) on the y-axis as well as their uncertainty intervals. Such a risk profile diagram is very helpful to indicate the type of risk posed by the VBD. The risk profile diagram can be subdivided into four quadrants, with VBDs ending up in the upper right quadrant being of most concern since these have both a moderate to very high rate of introduction and a moderate to very high impact. Now, it can be seen that the risk of WNF is related to both an estimated high introduction rate and a high economic impact, while the risk of EHD and RVF is mainly due to an estimated high economic impact. The full uncertainty interval of WNF is in the upper right quadrant, indicating that this disease poses the highest risk to the Netherlands. The uncertainty intervals of AHS, EHD and RVF show a large overlap, making it impossible to rank these VBDs based on the results of MINTRISK, even when considering the risk profile diagram. All three diseases have huge uncertainty on the rate of introduction. Uncertainty on the economic impact is, however, much higher for EHD and RVF than for AHS. This can be explained from the uncertainty on the estimated epidemic size (Fig 4). Despite the wide uncertainty intervals, it can be concluded that it is likely that economic impact is high to very high for all four diseases with the uncertainty intervals being fully located in the upper part of the diagram.

Fig 6. Risk scores (median values) and their uncertainty (95% uncertainty interval) for the overall risk estimate of four vector-borne diseases for the Netherlands.

Fig 6

AHS = African horse sickness; EHD = epizootic haemorrhagic disease; RVF = Rift Valley fever; WNF = West Nile fever.

Fig 7. Risk profile diagram indicating how the rate of introduction and the economic impact contribute to the overall risk estimate.

Fig 7

Dots indicate the median values for each disease with the lines enclosing the 95% uncertainty interval. Values outside the dotted square (i.e. beyond 0 and 1) indicate an extremely low (<0) or an extremely high (>1) risk. AHS = African horse sickness; EHD = epizootic haemorrhagic disease; RVF = Rift Valley fever; WNF = West Nile fever.

Discussion

Model results

Results indicate that the four VBDs considered in this study mainly differed for their rate of introduction and less for the expected economic impact of disease. Nevertheless, it is important to not only consider the probability of introduction when performing an import risk assessment, but also the impact of disease. This is even more true for VBDs if there is no competent vector or host in the area where the entry occurs or when weather conditions are not favourable for establishment. Based on the results of this study, WNF should be prioritized for risk management in the Netherlands, both having the highest rate of introduction (Fig 3), and the highest overall risk score (Fig 6). The introduction risk of EHD was estimated to be lowest, despite this disease having the highest risk score for the economic impact (Fig 5). The relatively low rate of introduction of EHD can be explained by the fact that we limited the assessment to EHD virus serotype 6, which has a limited geographical distribution. Pathways potentially resulting in introductions from the Mediterranean, Australia and the USA were considered for EHD, with illegal importations of livestock from regions in the Mediterranean posing the highest risk. When considering the quantitative explanation of the results (S2 Appendix), an introduction of EHD or RVF resulting in establishment is expected to occur once every 100 to 1000 years, whereas a successful introduction of AHS is to be expected once every 10 to 100 years. The rate of successful WNF introductions was estimated to be even 1 to 10 times per year. It was thus not a great surprise that in August 2020, the first West Nile virus-positive bird ever was detected in the Netherlands (in a common whitethroat, Curruca communis) [6]. Soon after, in autumn 2020, the first autochthonous human cases of West Nile fever were reported in the Netherlands [7]. The virus had probably been circulating silently in the Dutch wild bird population for a longer period with West Nile virus-specific antibodies detected in serum samples of birds (Eurasian coot, Fulica atra; carrion crow, Corvus corone) that were collected for avian influenza surveillance in 2014–2015 [54]. This is in accordance with observations by Zehender et al. [55] that West Nile virus may be present in enzootic circulation for several years before transmission to dead-end hosts is observed.

In a risk assessment by EFSA for the European Union (EU), WNF also had a much higher rate of introduction than AHS, EHD and RVF. However, results obtained by EFSA indicated a lower introduction risk with a moderate rate of introduction for WNF and a very low rate of introduction for AHS, EHD and RVF [56]. EFSA, however, only considered imports of live animals in their assessment, whereas we also included the introduction via infected vectors or commodities. Commodities were only considered for AHS and EHD (biological products including modified live vaccines) and had a relatively low introduction risk and were therefore not included in the final assessment. The entry of infected vectors via various routes (aircraft, containers) appeared to be an important pathway for all VBDs evaluated in this study (Fig 3). Estimates for the numbers of vectors moved along the different pathways were, however, more uncertain than estimates of the numbers of animals imported.

The risk of RVF introduction into the EU has recently been updated by EFSA [37] given the outbreaks in the French overseas department of Mayotte [57] and the recent findings of RVF seroprevalence in Turkey [37,58,59]. They now included the introduction risk via vectors [60] and concluded that the Netherlands was among the countries having the highest rate of introduction for RVF in Europe, although the rate of introduction was still classified as low. This is similar to our result for RVF. EFSA [37] concluded that introduction of RVF is most likely via passive movement of infected vectors shipped by aircraft, containers or road transport. These pathways also had a high introduction risk in our study.

The introduction risk of VBDs for European countries was also evaluated with bespoke models. De Vos et al. [61] estimated that AHS would be successfully introduced into the Netherlands on average once every 2000 years, which is far less than the current estimate based on MINTRISK, which suggests an introduction once every 10 to 100 years. However, De Vos et al. [61] only considered legal movements of equines. In this study, the introduction risk via movement of competition horses was also evaluated, but we concluded that this pathway had negligible risk and therefore the pathway was not selected for inclusion in the final MINTRISK calculations. The current risk estimate was based on the pathways illegal import of equines and entry of midges via legal animal trade (including ruminants), pathways which were not considered by De Vos et al. [61]. In a similar study on AHS for France, Faverjon et al. [62] also concluded that the risk for legal movements of equines was low with an expected introduction every 2000 years. They, however, concluded that the risk of successful introductions via infected vectors would be even tenfold lower, which is in contrast to the results obtained with MINTRISK in this study. It should, however, be noted that Faverjon et al. [62] included an additional transmission step from vector to host in assessing the probability of establishment and considered factors such as temperature and vector abundance limiting establishment, whereas in MINTRISK we assumed favourable conditions for transmission upon entry. Brown et al. [63] estimated the probability of West Nile virus-infected mosquitoes arriving in the United Kingdom (UK) aboard aircraft from the United States (US) and concluded that this is expected to happen almost every year with on average 5 infected mosquitoes entering the UK each vector season. This estimate is in the same order of magnitude as the rate of WNF entry via this pathway into the Netherlands as estimated by MINTRISK, with a median risk score of 0.8 equalling an expected number of 10 entries annually. Note that we considered all WNF infected regions worldwide and not only the US as regions of origin of the virus. Bessell et al. [64] estimated the probability of WNF entry in Great Britain via migratory birds and concluded that this is also a high risk introduction route with an expected median value of 2 entries per year, which is in the same order of magnitude as our risk estimate for the Netherlands with a median risk score of 0.77 for the rate of entry, equalling an expected number of 7 entries per year. Rolin et al. [65] evaluated the introduction risk of RVF for the US and the EU and concluded that the most likely introduction routes for the EU would be entry via legally or illegally imported ruminants and mechanical transport of vectors in e.g. aircraft and ship cargo holds. Our assessment in MINTRISK indicated that indeed illegal imports of ruminants, and entry of mosquitoes via aircraft or containers had a relatively high risk score for the rate of introduction. However, the legal import of ruminants was assessed to have a negligible risk in this study and therefore this pathway was not selected for inclusion in the final MINTRISK calculations.

In contrast to the other VBDs, the main reservoir hosts for West Nile virus are wild birds rather than domestic animals. Evaluation of the introduction and transmission risk of WNF might therefore need additional parameters that were not included in MINTRISK. In MINTRISK, the probability of transmission and establishment is primarily based on the distribution of reservoir hosts and vectors, whereas environmental and climatic factors might be as important in evaluating these steps. Tran et al. [66], for example, identified anomalies in early summer temperatures, the presence of wetlands and location under migratory bird routes as risk factors for WNF outbreaks. Climate change might thus affect the WNF risk for The Netherlands, which is located under the Western migration flyways and has abundant wetlands. Furthermore, the evaluation of the economic impact of WNF was more difficult in MINTRISK because the agricultural losses are related to infections in equines rather than birds. The economic impact could thus not directly be linked to the estimated epidemic size, as wild birds were the epidemiological unit in the MINTRISK calculations, and not equines. Therefore, we estimated the economic impact by scaling the expected number of equine cases to the expected number of infected birds by assuming that on average 1 infected equine host would be reported for every 105 infections in wild birds and 1 infected human host for every 104 infections in wild birds (number of human cases reported in 2018 ~5 times higher than the number of equine cases reported; seroprevalence in wild birds between 1 and 10%) [6771]. These low ratios automatically resulted in selection of the ‘very low’ answer category for the questions addressing the economic losses per infected epidemiological unit. However, these ‘very low’ answer categories still result in an overestimate of the economic losses in an affected territory when expressed in Euros per infected bird. The generic approach of MINTRISK lacks flexibility to correct for this as there are only five answer categories for each question and these were scaled to account for the most likely economic losses per infected livestock animal. Another contributor to the very high estimated economic impact for WNF is the huge expected epidemic size of a WNF epidemic in the Netherlands which resulted from a relatively high transmission rate (R0 between 3 and 10) and a high probability of overwintering. Estimates for transmission (R0) were mainly derived from modelling studies (S3 Appendix) and these varied widely depending on e.g. ecological and climatic conditions [72,73]. Survival of an infected vector was deemed the most likely route of overwintering. However, reports on survival in mosquitoes are from areas where West Nile virus is highly prevalent [74,75] and might not be representative for the Dutch situation. As a result, the potential for spread and persistence in the Netherlands could easily have been overestimated in MINTRISK. So far, there is no indication that presence of West Nile virus in the Netherlands is resulting in extensive spread and severe economic losses, with no human or equine cases reported in 2021 up till 1 September. This could also be due to the fact that both the winter of 2020/21 and the summer of 2021 have been relatively cold compared to previous years resulting in less favourable conditions for overwintering and transmission. In general, observations from Europe show that spread of West Nile virus after recent introductions like in Germany and the Netherlands may be limited, whereas in Southern and Eastern Europe massive spread has been observed in recent years [14,76].

Assets of MINTRISK

MINTRISK is classified as a generic risk assessment tool that can be used to assess the introduction risk for multiple diseases, allowing for prioritization of diseases for risk management [77]. In contrast to other generic risk assessment tools developed in recent years, MINTRISK was especially designed to evaluate the introduction risk of VBDs. The input and algorithms of MINTRISK put strong emphasis on the vector-host-pathogen interactions in estimating the probabilities of establishment, spread and persistence. The tool was primarily designed for livestock diseases transmitted by arthropod vectors and has been used to assess the introduction risk of diseases transmitted by midges, mosquitoes, ticks and sand flies [16,37,56, this study]. MINTRISK has, however, been most extensively tested for diseases transmitted by mosquitoes and midges and might be slightly less suited for in-depth risk assessments of tick-borne diseases. Tick-borne diseases have different dynamics in transmission and persistence, with in general fewer infection generations per vector season but higher probabilities of persistence in case of transstadial transmission in the vector.

MINTRISK is one of the most complete generic risk assessment tools for disease introductions, not only addressing the probabilities of entry and exposure, but also the impact of disease over a longer period. Most generic tools in the veterinary field evaluate the introduction risk up till entry [78,79] or first infection in a new area [8082], although some also address the epidemiological consequences [19,77,83]. MINTRISK, on the other hand, not only assesses the epidemiological consequences, but also the economic, socio-ethical and environmental impact. This study illustrates the added value of including these impact estimates: whereas the estimated epidemic size differed widely for the four VBDs evaluated (Fig 4), the estimated economic impact was similar for all diseases (Fig 5). This is explained by the huge contribution of indirect agricultural economic losses due to, e.g., movement standstills, trade restrictions and control measures to the total economic losses induced by notifiable livestock diseases [84]. Socio-ethical and environmental impact, on the contrary, differed for the four VBDs and these estimates could also be considered by decision makers in prioritizing diseases for prevention and control.

MINTRISK is a very flexible tool that can be used for both quick and in-depth risk assessments of VBDs. For a quick assessment, the questions can be answered by experts and a first indication of the risk can be obtained as soon as all questions have been answered, regardless of the level of uncertainty entered and the number of questions answered as ‘unknown’. An in-depth risk assessment, on the contrary, requires analysis of data derived from global databases on, e.g., worldwide disease occurrence and international trade, extensive literature search to estimate disease-related parameters, and expert consultation to complement any missing values. An in-depth risk assessment will in general result in narrowing of the uncertainty intervals, although uncertainty intervals can still be wide, as seen in the current assessment. This is due to the inherent nature of MINTRISK working with quantitative estimates sampled from intervals on a logarithmic scale rather than with exact values, although the tool allows the user to enter an ‘own value’ if an exact number is known. Even if ‘low’ uncertainty would be entered for all questions, i.e., input values are sampled in a range of 1 log10 difference only, the uncertainty sampled for the individual input parameters of the model will add to a relatively high uncertainty for the overall risk estimate. The logarithmic scale used to answer questions in MINTRISK was chosen to account for the fact that values of many input parameters needed for vector-borne risk assessment are not exactly known, although the order of magnitude is often available. The logarithmic scale allows the risk assessor to provide a rather robust estimate for these parameters rather than pretending a false sense of preciseness by entering an exact value. As a consequence, results of MINTRISK are primarily useful to compare VBDs or areas at risk for their introduction risk, rather than providing an exact estimate of the introduction risk. A similar approach was used by Havelaar et al. [19] to assign boundaries to risk levels for emerging zoonotic pathogens, but they used point estimates for each level in the subsequent calculations limiting the uncertainty obtained for the resulting risk scores.

Not all questions are equally important in assessing the risk of VBDs using MINTRISK. Therefore, the risk assessor is advised to put most efforts to answer those questions that have most impact on the risk estimate. Examples would be the prevalence of disease in vectors and hosts in the risk regions; the number of vectors, hosts or commodities transported to the area at risk; the reproduction number R0; and the number of infection generations in a single vector season. Although the questions on overwintering also affect the overall risk estimate, the effort on answering those questions could be limited to the most likely overwintering route as only this answer will be used to estimate the likelihood of persistence (Eq 13). MINTRISK has no built-in tool for sensitivity analysis, but the tool is very flexible to perform what-if analysis. Input values can be easily changed, and model calculations rerun. Furthermore, the attribution of the different steps in the tool to the overall risk estimate can be deducted from the risk estimates for the individual steps.

MINTRISK was developed to enable comparison of VBDs and/or areas with respect to their introduction risk in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner. This was achieved by providing quantitative explanations for the qualitative answer categories in the tool. There are, however, a few questions in MINTRISK that are very hard to quantify, and these come without accompanying quantitative explanation. These include, e.g., questions on the socio-ethical and environmental impact of VBDs. The resulting risk scores for socio-ethical and environmental impact were therefore not used to calculate the overall risk estimate. They are, however, presented as separate output to raise awareness on possible adverse effects even if economic impact would be limited.

Pathways in MINTRISK have not been predefined to allow for flexibility accounting for the many different modes in which VBDs might be transported from risk regions to the area at risk. The risk assessor can enter multiple pathways, but only a maximum of three are used to calculate the overall risk estimate. In developing the tool, we assumed that there are only few pathways that drive the risk, especially when calculations are performed on a logarithmic scale. The risk assessor needs to select the pathways to include in the risk calculations based on the individual pathway’s risk score for the rate of introduction (RS_Introfinal). In general, the pathways with the highest value for RS_Introfinal will be selected. The number and type of pathways entered into MINTRISK when starting out the risk assessment is, however, decided upon by the risk assessor and pathways not entered at this stage will never show up as important, even if they would be. Hence, the initial set of pathways entered into the tool might differ between risk assessors and as such result in inconsistencies among VBD risk assessments, despite the consistency in answers given to the questions in MINTRISK. We therefore recommend to seek consensus among risk assessors on the initial set of pathways to consider. The structured questionnaire of the FEVER framework [15] provides an extensive list of possible pathways that can be used as a guidance when starting out the risk assessment. In the current risk assessment, for example, we started with a qualitative assessment of multiple pathways using FEVER and only included those with a non-negligible risk in MINTRISK.

Conclusions

MINTRISK is a flexible tool to assess the introduction risk of VBDs in an objective, transparent and repeatable manner. The tool provides semi-quantitative risk scores that can be used for prioritization purposes. The overall risk estimate is calculated from the rate of introduction and the economic impact of disease. Results of a case study estimating the risk of four VBDs for the Netherlands indicated that the overall risk estimate was comparable for all diseases, despite the diseases having a different risk profile. Visualisation of the risk scores in a risk profile diagram allows for interpretation of these risk profiles. All diseases were estimated to have a high economic impact once introduced, but the estimated introduction rates differed, with WNF being the disease most likely to be introduced. Shortly after finishing this study, WNF was detected indeed in the Netherlands in both wild birds and humans.

Supporting information

S1 Appendix. Overview of input parameters in MINTRISK.

(DOCX)

S2 Appendix. Overview of the intermediate results for each input step and results for each output parameter of MINTRISK.

(DOCX)

S3 Appendix. Overview of input in MINTRISK to assess the introduction risk of four vector-borne diseases to the Netherlands.

(DOCX)

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Barbara van der Hout (Wageningen Economic Research) for technical assistance in the development of MINTRISK.

Data Availability

All relevant data are within the manuscript and its Supporting Information files.

Funding Statement

The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026). URL Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-landbouw-natuur-en-voedselkwaliteit URL Wageningen University & Research: https://www.wur.nl/en.htm URL European Food Safety Authority: https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

References

  • 1.Velthuis AGJ, Saatkamp HW, Mourits MCM, De Koeijer AA, Elbers ARW. Financial consequences of the Dutch bluetongue serotype 8 epidemics of 2006 and 2007. Prev Vet Med. 2010; 93: 294–304. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2009.11.007 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 2.Koenraadt CJM, Balenghien T, Carpenter S, Ducheyne E, Elbers ARW, Fife M, et al. Bluetongue, Schmallenberg—what is next? Culicoides-borne viral diseases in the 21st Century. BMC Vet Res. 2014; 10: 77. doi: 10.1186/1746-6148-10-77 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 3.Jahfari S, De Vries A, Rijks JM, Van Gucht S, Vennema H, Sprong H, et al. Tick-Borne Encephalitis Virus in Ticks and Roe Deer, the Netherlands. Emerg Infect Dis. 2017; 23(6): 1028–1030. doi: 10.3201/eid2306.161247 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 4.Dekker M, Laverman GD, De Vries A, Reimerink J, Geeraedts F. Emergence of tick-borne encephalitis (TBE) in the Netherlands. Ticks Tick Borne Dis. 2019; 10: 176–179. doi: 10.1016/j.ttbdis.2018.10.008 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 5.Rijks JM, Kik ML, Slaterus R, Foppen RPB, Stroo A, IJzer J, et al. Widespread Usutu virus outbreak in birds in the Netherlands 2016. Euro Surveill. 2016; 21:30391. doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2016.21.45.30391 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 6.Sikkema RS, Schrama M, Van den Berg T, Morren J, Munger E, Krol L, et al. Detection of West Nile virus in a common whitethroat (Curruca communis) and Culex mosquitoes in the Netherlands, 2020. Euro Surveill. 2020; 25(40): 2001704. doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.40.2001704 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 7.Vlaskamp DRM, Thijsen SFT, Reimerink J, Hilkens P, Bouvy WH, Bantjes SE, et al. First autochthonous human West Nile virus infections in the Netherlands, July to August 2020. Euro Surveill. 2020; 25(46): 2001904. doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.46.2001904 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 8.Sambri V, Capobianchi M, Charrel R, Fyodorova M, Gaibani P, Gould E, et al. West Nile virus in Europe: Emergence, epidemiology, diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. Clin Microbiol Infect. 2013; 19: 699–704. doi: 10.1111/1469-0691.12211 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 9.Zientara S, Sánchez-Vizcaíno JM. Control of bluetongue in Europe. Vet Microbiol. 2013; 165: 33–37. doi: 10.1016/j.vetmic.2013.01.010 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 10.Camp JV, Nowotny N. The knowns and unknowns of West Nile virus in Europe: what did we learn from the 2018 outbreak? Expert Rev Anti Infect Ther. 2020; 18(2): 145–154. doi: 10.1080/14787210.2020.1713751 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 11.Baylis M, Caminade C, Turner J, Jones AE. The role of climate change in a developing threat: the case of bluetongue in Europe. Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 2017; 36(2): 467–478. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 12.MacLachlan NJ, Zientara S, Wilson WC, Richt JA, Savini G. Bluetongue and epizootic hemorrhagic disease viruses: recent developments with these globally re-emerging arboviral infections of ruminants. Curr Opin Virol. 2019; 34: 56–62. coi: doi: 10.1016/j.coviro.2018.12.005 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 13.Ziegler U, Lühken R, Keller M, Cadar D, Van der Grinten E, Michel F, et al. West Nile virus epizootic in Germany, 2018. Antiviral Res. 2019; 162: 39–43. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2018.12.005 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 14.Bakonyi T, Haussig JM. West Nile virus keeps on moving up in Europe. Euro Surveill. 2020; 25(46): 2001938. doi: 10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2020.25.46.2001938 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 15.De Vos C, Hoek M, Fischer E, De Koeijer A. Bremmer J. Risk assessment framework for emerging vector-borne livestock diseases. Report 11-CVI0168. Lelystad, the Netherlands: Central Veterinary Institute, part of Wageningen UR; 2011 [Cited 2018 Feb 15]. Available from: https://edepot.wur.nl/198115.
  • 16.De Vos CJ, Van Roermund HJW, De Koeijer AA, Fischer EAJ. Risk assessment of seven emerging vector-borne animal diseases for The Netherlands: a structured approach. In: Lindberg A, Thulke HH, editors. Society for Veterinary Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine. Proceedings of a meeting held in Elsinore. Denmark; 2016. pp. 215–228.
  • 17.Cox LA. What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices? Risk Anal. 2008; 28(2): 497–512. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2008.01030.x [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 18.Jensen FV, Nielsen TD. Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs. 2nd ed. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer; 2007. [Google Scholar]
  • 19.Havelaar AH, Van Rosse F, Bucura C, Toetenel MA, Haagsma JA, Kurowicka D, et al. Prioritizing Emerging Zoonoses in The Netherlands. PLoS ONE 2010; 5(11): e13965. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0013965 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 20.Mourits M, Oude Lansink AGJM. Multi-criteria decision making to evaluate quarantaine disease control strategies. In: Oude Lansink AGJM, editor. New approaches to the economics of plant health. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer; 2007. pp 131–144. [Google Scholar]
  • 21.Hennen WHGJ. DETECTOR: knowledge-based systems for dairy farm management support and policy analysis: Methods and applications. PhD-thesis. The Hague, the Netherlands: Agricultural Economics Research Institute. 1995 Feb 17 [Cited 2021 Feb 23]. Available from: https://edepot.wur.nl/165784.
  • 22.Hennen WHGJ. PRA Scoring tool: Development of a more objective quantitative scoring method for Pest Risk Analysis, The Hague, the Netherlands: Agricultural Economics Research Institute; 2007.
  • 23.Schrader G, Baker R, Griessinger D, Hart A, Holt J, Hennen WHGJ, et al. Best practice for quantifying uncertainty and summarising and communicating risk. EU Framework 7 Research Project: Enhancements of Pest Risk Analysis Techniques. Grant Agreement No. 212459; 2011.
  • 24.Holt J, Leach AW, Knight JD, Griessinger D, MacLeod A, Van der Gaag DJ et al. Tools for visualizing and integrating pest risk assessment ratings and uncertainties. EPPO Bulletin 2012; 42(1): 35–41. doi: 10.1111/j.1365-2338.2012.02548.x [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 25.Keesing F, Holt RD, Ostfeld RS. Effects of species diversity on disease risk. Ecol Lett. 2006; 9: 485–498. doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2006.00885.x [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 26.Lo Lacono G, Robin CA, Newton JR, Gubbins S, Wood JLN. Where are the horses? With the sheep or cows? Uncertain host location, vector-feeding preferences and the risk of African horse sickness transmission in Great Britain. J. R. Soc. Interface 10, 20130194. doi: 10.1098/rsif.2013.0194 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 27.Napp S, Gubbins S, Calistri P, Allepuz A, Alba A, García-Bocanegra I, et al. Quantitative assessment of the probability of bluetongue virus overwintering by horizontal transmission: application to Germany. Vet Res. 2011; 42: 4. doi: 10.1186/1297-9716-42-4 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 28.OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) 2021. OIE-Listed diseases, infections and infestations in force in 2021. 2021 Jan 1 [Cited 2021 Feb 23]. Available from: https://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/oie-listed-diseases-2021/
  • 29.Coetzer JAW, Guthrie AJ. African horse sickness. In: Coetzer JAW, Tustin RC, editors. Infectious Diseases of Livestock, 2nd ed. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press Southern Africa; 2004. pp. 1231–1246. [Google Scholar]
  • 30.Maclachlan NJ, Osburn BI. Epizootic haemorrhagic disease of deer. In: Coetzer JAW, Tustin RC, editors. Infectious Diseases of Livestock. 2nd ed. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press Southern Africa; 2004. pp. 1227–1230. [Google Scholar]
  • 31.MacLachlan NJ, Guthrie AJ. Re-emergence of Bluetongue, African horse sickness, and other Orbivirus diseases. Vet. Res. 2010; 41: 35. doi: 10.1051/vetres/2010007 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 32.Elbers ARW, Backx A, Meroc E, Gerbier G, Staubach C, Hendrickx G, et al. Field observations during the bluetongue serotype 8 epidemic in 2006. I. Detection of first outbreaks and clinical signs in sheep and cattle in Belgium, France and the Netherlands. Prev Vet Med. 2008; 87: 21–30. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2008.06.004 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 33.Savini G, Afonso A, Mellor P, Aradaib I, Yadin H, Sanaa M, et al. Epizootic haemorrhagic disease. Res Vet Sci. 2011; 91: 1–17. doi: 10.1016/j.rvsc.2011.05.004 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 34.Al-Afaleq AI, Abu Elzein EME, Mousa SM, Abbas AM. A retrospective study of Rift Valley fever in Saudi Arabia. Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 2003; 22(3): 867–871. doi: 10.20506/rst.22.3.1436 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 35.Balkhy HH, Memish ZA. Rift Valley fever: an uninvited zoonosis in the Arabian peninsula. Int J Antimicrob Agents 2003; 21(2): 153–157. doi: 10.1016/s0924-8579(02)00295-9 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 36.Madani TA, Al-Mazrou YY, Al-Jeffri MH, Mishkhas AA, Al-Rabeah AM, Turkistani AM, et al. Rift Valley fever epidemic in Saudi Arabia: epidemiological, clinical, and laboratory characteristics. Clin Infect Dis. 2003; 37: 1084–92. doi: 10.1086/378747 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 37.Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Depner K, Drewe JA, et al. Rift Valley Fever–epidemiological update and risk of introduction into Europe. EFSA Journal 2020; 18(3): 6041. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6041 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 38.Paweska JT. Rift Valley fever. Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 2015; 34(2): 375–389. [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 39.Rissmann M, Stoek F, Pickin MJ, Groschup MH. Mechanisms of inter-epidemic maintenance of Rift Valley fever phlebovirus. Antiviral Res. 2020; 174: 104692. doi: 10.1016/j.antiviral.2019.104692 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 40.Fischer EAJ, Boender GJ, Nodelijk G, De Koeijer AA, Van Roermund HJW. The transmission potential of Rift Valley fever virus among livestock in the Netherlands: a modelling study. Vet Res. 2013; 44: 58. doi: 10.1186/1297-9716-44-58 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 41.Ibañez-Justicia A, Stroo A, Dik M, Beeuwkes J, Scholte EJ. National Mosquito (Diptera: Culicidae) Survey in The Netherlands 2010–2013. J Med Entomol. 2015; 52(2): 185–198. doi: 10.1093/jme/tju058 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 42.Mellor PS, Hamblin C. African horse sickness. Vet Res. 2004; 35: 445–466. doi: 10.1051/vetres:2004021 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 43.Boinas F, Calistri P, Domingo M, Martínez-Avilés M, Martínez-López B, Rodríguez-Sánchez B, et al. Scientific report on African horse sickness submitted to EFSA. 2009 May 28 [Cited 2021 Feb 23]. Available from: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/scientific_output/files/main_documents/4e.pdf
  • 44.EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare). Scientific Opinion on Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease. EFSA Journal 2009; 7(12): 1418. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2009.1418 [DOI]
  • 45.Sailleau C, Zanella G, Breard E, Viarouge C, Desprat A, Vitour D, et al. Co-circulation of bluetongue and epizootic haemorrhagic disease viruses in cattle in Reunion Island. Vet Microbiol. 2012; 155: 191–197. doi: 10.1016/j.vetmic.2011.09.006 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 46.Swanepoel R, Coetzer JAW. Rift Valley Fever. In: Coetzer JAW, Tustin RC, editors. Infectious Diseases of Livestock, 2nd ed. Cape Town, South Africa: Oxford University Press Southern Africa; 2004. pp. 1037–1070. [Google Scholar]
  • 47.EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare). Scientific Opinion on The Risk of a Rift Valley Fever Incursion and its Persistence within the Community. EFSA Journal 2005; 238: 1–128. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2005.238 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 48.EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare). Scientific Opinion on Rift Valley fever. EFSA Journal 2013;11(4): 3180. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2013.3180 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 49.Pepin M, Bouloy M, Bird BH, Kemp A, Paweska J. Rift Valley fever virus (Bunyaviridae: Phlebovirus): an update on pathogenesis, molecular epidemiology, vectors, diagnostics and prevention. Vet Res. 2010; 41: 61. doi: 10.1051/vetres/2010033 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 50.Hayes EB, Komar N, Nasci RS, Montgomery SP, O’Leary DRO, Campbell GL. Epidemiology and Transmission Dynamics of West Nile Virus Disease. Emerg Infect Dis. 2005; 11(8): 1167–1173. doi: 10.3201/eid1108.050289a [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 51.Reiter P. West Nile virus in Europe: Understanding the present to gauge the future. Euro Surveill. 2010; 15(10): 19508. doi: 10.2807/ese.15.10.19508 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 52.Pradier S, Lecollinet S, Leblond A. West Nile virus epidemiology and factors triggering change in its distribution in Europe. Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 2012; 31(3): 829–844. doi: 10.20506/rst.31.3.2167 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 53.Roberts H, Crabb J. West Nile virus: Potential risk factors and the likelihood for introduction into the United Kingdom. 2012 May 1 [Cited 2021 Feb 23]. Available from: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140507133914/http://www.defra.gov.uk/animal-diseases/files/qra-wnv-120501.pdf.
  • 54.Lim SM, Geervliet M, Verhagen JH, Müskens GJDM, Majoor FA, Osterhaus ADME, et al. Serologic evidence of West Nile virus and Usutu virus infections in Eurasian coots in the Netherlands. Zoonoses Public Health. 2018; 65:96–102. doi: 10.1111/zph.12375 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 55.Zehender G, Veo C, Ebranati E, Carta V, Rovida F, Percivalle E, et al. Reconstructing the recent West Nile virus lineage 2 epidemic in Europe and Italy using discrete and continuous phylogeography. PLoS ONE 2017; 12(7): e0179679. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0179679 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 56.EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), More S, Bicout D, Bøtner A, Butterworth A, Calistri P, et al. Scientific opinion on vector-borne diseases. EFSA Journal 2017; 15(5):4793. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2017.08.010 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 57.EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare), Nielsen SS, Alvarez J, Bicout DJ, Calistri P, Depner K. Scientific Opinion on the rift Valley Fever: risk of persistence, spread and impact in Mayotte (France). EFSA Journal 2020; 18(4): 6093. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2020.6093 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 58.Gur S, Kale M, Erol N, Yapici O, Mamak N and Yavru S. The first serological evidence for Rift Valley fever infection in the camel, goitered gazelle and Anatolian water buffaloes in Turkey. Trop Anim Health Prod. 2017; 49: 1531–1535. doi: 10.1007/s11250-017-1359-8 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 59.Yilmaz A, Yilmaz H, Faburay B, Karakullukcu A, Kasapcopur A, Barut K, et al. Presence of antibodies to Rift Valley fever virus in children, cattle and sheep in Turkey. J Virol Antivir Res. 2017; 6: 29. doi: 10.4172/2324-8955-c1-003 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 60.Van Bortel W, Petric D, Ibáñez Justicia A, Wint W, Krit M, Mariën J, et al. Assessment of the probability of entry of Rift Valley fever virus into the EU through active or passive movement of vectors. EFSA Supporting Publication 2020; 2020:EN-1801. doi: 10.2903/sp.efsa.2020.EN-1801 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 61.De Vos CJ, Hoek CA, Nodelijk G. Risk of introducing African horse sickness virus into the Netherlands by international equine movements. Prev Vet Med. 2012; 106: 108–122. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.01.019 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 62.Faverjon C, Leblond A, Hendrikx P, Balenghien T, De Vos CJ, Fischer EAJ, et al. A spatiotemporal model to assess the introduction risk of African horse sickness by import of animals and vectors in France. BMC Vet Res. 2015; 11: 127. doi: 10.1186/s12917-015-0435-4 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 63.Brown EBE, Adkin A, Fooks AR, Stephenson B, Medlock JM, Snary EL. Assessing the Risks of West Nile Virus–Infected Mosquitoes from Transatlantic Aircraft: Implications for Disease Emergence in the United Kingdom. Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis. 2012; 12(4): 310–320. doi: 10.1089/vbz.2010.0176 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 64.Bessell PR, Robinson RA, Golding N, Searle KR, Handel IG, Boden LA, et al. Quantifying the Risk of Introduction of West Nile Virus into Great Britain by Migrating Passerine Birds. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2014; 63(5): e347–e359. doi: 10.1111/tbed.12310 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 65.Rolin AI, Berrang-Ford L, Kulkarni MA. The risk of Rift Valley fever virus introduction and establishment in the United States and European Union. Emerg Microbes Infect. 2013; 2: e81. doi: 10.1038/emi.2013.81 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 66.Tran A, Sudre B, Paz S, Rossi M, Desbrosse A, Chevalier V, et al. Environmental predictors of West Nile fever risk in Europe. Int J Health Geogr. 2014; 13: 26. doi: 10.1186/1476-072X-13-26 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 67.Durand B, Tran A, Balança G, Chevalier V. Geographic variations of the bird-borne structural risk of West Nile virus circulation in Europe. PLoS ONE 2017; 12(10): e0185962. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0185962 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 68.ADNS (Animal Disease Notification System), 2019. Overview of animal disease info from 2018. Report summary. 2019 Jan 7 [Cited 2020 Jan 13]. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/food/sites/food/files/animals/docs/ad_adns_overview_2018.pdf.
  • 69.ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control). Epidemiological update: West Nile virus transmission season in Europe, 2018. 2018 Dec 14 [Cited 2020 Jan 13] Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/news-events/epidemiological-update-west-nile-virus-transmission-season-europe-2018.
  • 70.Eybpoosh S, Fazlalipour M, Baniasadi V, Pouriayevali MH, Sadeghi F, Vasmehjani AA, et al. Epidemiology of West Nile Virus in the Eastern Mediterranean region: A systematic review. PLoS Negl Trop Dis. 2019; 13(1): e0007081. doi: 10.1371/journal.pntd.0007081 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 71.Knap N, Korva M, Ivović V, Kalan K, Jelovšek M, Sagadin M, et al. West Nile Virus in Slovenia. Viruses 2020; 12:720. doi: 10.3390/v12070720 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 72.Braks M, Mancini G, Swart M, Goffredo M. Risk of vector-borne diseases for the EU: Entomological aspects: Part 2. EFSA supporting publication 2017; 2017:EN-1184. doi: 10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1184 [DOI]
  • 73.Vogels CBF, Hartemink N, Koenraadt CJM. Modelling West Nile virus transmission risk in Europe: effect of temperature and mosquito biotypes on the basic reproduction number. Sci Rep. 2017; 7: 5022. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-05185-4 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 74.Rudolf I, Betášová L, Blažejová H, Venclíková K, Straková P, Šebesta O, et al. West Nile virus in overwintering mosquitoes, central Europe. Parasit Vectors 2017; 10:452. doi: 10.1186/s13071-017-2399-7 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 75.Nasci RS, Savage HM, White DJ, Miller JR, Cropp BC, Godsey MS, et al. West Nile virus in overwintering Culex mosquitoes, New York City, 2000. Emerg Infect Dis. 2001; 7: 742–744. doi: 10.3201/eid0704.010426 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 76.ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control). Historical data by year–West Nile virus seasonal surveillance [Cited 2021 Sep 8] Available from: https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/west-nile-fever/surveillance-and-disease-data/historical.
  • 77.De Vos CJ, Taylor RA, Simons RRL, Roberts H, Hultén C, De Koeijer AA, et al. Cross-Validation of Generic Risk Assessment Tools for Animal Disease Incursion Based on a Case Study for African Swine Fever. Front Vet Sci. 2020; 7: 56. doi: 10.3389/fvets.2020.00056 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 78.Roberts H, Carbon M, Hartley M, Sabirovic M. Assessing the risk of disease introduction in imports. Vet Rec. 2011; 168: 447–448. doi: 10.1136/vr.d1784 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 79.Simons RRL, Horigan V, Ip S, Taylor RA, Crescio MI, Maurella C, et al. A spatial risk assessment model framework for incursion of exotic animal disease into the European Union Member States. Microb Risk Anal. 2019; 13: 100075. doi: 10.1016/j.mran.2019.05.001 [DOI] [Google Scholar]
  • 80.De Vos CJ, Petie R, Van Klink E, Swanenburg M. Rapid risk assessment of exotic animal disease introduction. In: The 15th International Symposium of Veterinary Epidemiology and Economics. Chiang Mai, Thailand; 2018. pp. 253.
  • 81.Taylor RA, Berriman ADC, Gale P, Kelly LA, Snary EL. A generic framework for spatial quantitative risk assessments of infectious diseases: lumpy skin disease case study. Transbound Emerg Dis. 2019; 66: 131–43. doi: 10.1111/tbed.12993 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 82.Taylor RA, Condoleo R, Simons RRL, Gale P, Kelly LA, Snary EL. The risk of infection of African swine fever virus in European swine through boar movement and legal trade of pigs and pig meat. Front Vet Sci. 2020; 6: 486. doi: 10.3389/fvets.2019.00486 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 83.Bessell PR, Auty HK, Roberts H, McKendrick IJ, Bronsvoort BMdC, Boden LA. A Tool for Prioritizing Livestock Disease Threats to Scotland. Front Vet Sci. 2020; 7: 223. doi: 10.3389/fvets.2020.00223 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 84.Horst HS, De Vos CJ, Tomassen FHM, Stelwagen J. The economic evaluation of control and eradication of epidemic livestock diseases. Rev Sci Tech Off Int Epiz. 1999; 18(2): 367–379. doi: 10.20506/rst.18.2.1169 [DOI] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]

Decision Letter 0

Fernanda C Dórea

16 Aug 2021

PONE-D-21-20706

Assessing the introduction risk of vector-borne animal diseases for the Netherlands using MINTRISK: A Model for INTegrated RISK assessment

PLOS ONE

Dear Dr. de Vos,

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS ONE’s publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

Both reviewers were very positive to the paper, and the amount of comments just reflects their engagement in contributing to making this a great paper for publication.

Please submit your revised manuscript by Sep 30 2021 11:59PM. If you will need more time than this to complete your revisions, please reply to this message or contact the journal office at plosone@plos.org. When you're ready to submit your revision, log on to https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/ and select the 'Submissions Needing Revision' folder to locate your manuscript file.

Please include the following items when submitting your revised manuscript:

  • A rebuttal letter that responds to each point raised by the academic editor and reviewer(s). You should upload this letter as a separate file labeled 'Response to Reviewers'.

  • A marked-up copy of your manuscript that highlights changes made to the original version. You should upload this as a separate file labeled 'Revised Manuscript with Track Changes'.

  • An unmarked version of your revised paper without tracked changes. You should upload this as a separate file labeled 'Manuscript'.

If you would like to make changes to your financial disclosure, please include your updated statement in your cover letter. Guidelines for resubmitting your figure files are available below the reviewer comments at the end of this letter.

If applicable, we recommend that you deposit your laboratory protocols in protocols.io to enhance the reproducibility of your results. Protocols.io assigns your protocol its own identifier (DOI) so that it can be cited independently in the future. For instructions see: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/submission-guidelines#loc-laboratory-protocols. Additionally, PLOS ONE offers an option for publishing peer-reviewed Lab Protocol articles, which describe protocols hosted on protocols.io. Read more information on sharing protocols at https://plos.org/protocols?utm_medium=editorial-email&utm_source=authorletters&utm_campaign=protocols.

We look forward to receiving your revised manuscript.

Kind regards,

Fernanda C. Dórea

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Journal Requirements:

When submitting your revision, we need you to address these additional requirements.

1. Please ensure that your manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements, including those for file naming. The PLOS ONE style templates can be found at

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=wjVg/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_main_body.pdf and

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=ba62/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_title_authors_affiliations.pdf

2. Thank you for stating the following in the Acknowledgments Section of your manuscript:

“The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026). The authors would like to thank Barbara van der Hout (Wageningen Economic Research) for technical assistance in the development of MINTRISK.”

We note that you have provided funding information within the Acknowledgements. Please note that funding information should not appear in the Acknowledgments section or other areas of your manuscript. We will only publish funding information present in the Funding Statement section of the online submission form.

Please remove any funding-related text from the manuscript and let us know how you would like to update your Funding Statement. Currently, your Funding Statement reads as follows:

“The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026).

URL Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-landbouw-natuur-en-voedselkwaliteit

URL Wageningen University & Research: https://www.wur.nl/en.htm

URL European Food Safety Authority: https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en

The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.”

Please include your amended statements within your cover letter; we will change the online submission form on your behalf.

3.Please review your reference list to ensure that it is complete and correct. If you have cited papers that have been retracted, please include the rationale for doing so in the manuscript text, or remove these references and replace them with relevant current references. Any changes to the reference list should be mentioned in the rebuttal letter that accompanies your revised manuscript. If you need to cite a retracted article, indicate the article’s retracted status in the References list and also include a citation and full reference for the retraction notice.

[Note: HTML markup is below. Please do not edit.]

Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

1. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

The manuscript must describe a technically sound piece of scientific research with data that supports the conclusions. Experiments must have been conducted rigorously, with appropriate controls, replication, and sample sizes. The conclusions must be drawn appropriately based on the data presented.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

2. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer #1: I Don't Know

Reviewer #2: N/A

**********

3. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

The PLOS Data policy requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception (please refer to the Data Availability Statement in the manuscript PDF file). The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data—e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party—those must be specified.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

4. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS ONE does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

5. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer #1: Over the years I have been following the development of the MINTRISK model and therefore, I read, with great interest, the manuscript, especially as it described the application of the MINTRISK model to assess the risk of introduction of specific vector borne diseases (VBDs: AHS, EHD, RVF, WNF) for a specific country (the Netherlands).

MINTRISK model includes (almost) all major parameters of the ecology and epidemiology for wide variety of VBDs transmitted by Dipteran vectors in a comprehensive way for others to appreciate; tick borne diseases fall outside its scope as described in 576-583 (since this is not a discovery of the current paper I think the authors could present MINT RISK as such from the beginning). The fact that it takes 98 specific questions to be answered in a semi-qualitative manner for each pathways to assess the risk of a specific VBD for a specific area at a certain moment is a perfect illustration of the complexity and temporal and spatial variation of VBDs. Illustrating this is for me the most important merit of the MINTRISK project and model; it forms a great help to others, just starting in the field of VBDs modeling and risk assessing, that in depth knowledge of the disease system is required to even begin to understand, assess or to project risks of VBDs in context.

The down side is that applying the model to compare risk of VBDs in your own specific situation is very labor and data intensive, while the utility of the overall risk output, besides the appreciation of the complexity is not so obvious. The authors are well aware and focus mainly on discussing the individual scores which are much more informative than overall risk output. Complements for the authors to dare to write such an elaborate manuscript and to choose not to make short cuts.

It is obvious (e.g. lines 46-47, 364, 370-371, 486, 558, 569-570) that the MINTRISK model has been developed, applied to and described for the Netherlands before West Nile virus was introduced in the Netherlands in 2020. The authors attempted to address this fact in the text (lines 495-503) but, in my opinion, this could be improved. In addition, I would to invite the authors to embrace this situation and fully address this fact and how the results are in line or what surprised them or not. This is the test case and it would be a pity to let this go to waste. I am very interested in their take on the assessment of the high economic impact (due to estimated epidemic size) of WNV in the Netherlands while there are no currently no signs for this. Maybe they can elaborate why the estimate was so high while in reality this does not seem to pan out yet.

In the following I will elaborate on more specific points in detail.

Content:

Line 36: When addressing the main result (WNV has high introduction rate) in the abstract, as a reader, I would also like to find the main factor(s) causing this in the abstract. In addition I do not think it is surprising that all four VBDs chosen for this review have high economic impact, as this was probably one of the reason why they were chosen to be included. It would have been very interesting to choose another disease and see whether the gut feeling of importance diseases for Europe also was reflected in the MintRisk tool, e.g. JEV or EEE.

Line 46-47: As stated in the general comments above it is obvious that the manuscript has been written for the larger part before the introduction of WNV in the Netherlands. Please update the manuscript (see general comment above), including adapting this sentence by adding WNF to this list of recent introduced VBDs in the Netherlands.

Line 183 & 189: The reasoning, behind the definition of an area being patchy (<5%) and homogeneous (>5%) and the accompanying value setting of Dvector, escapes me. An explanation or example of both would help me understand.

Line 240: Please replace non-susceptible animal with non-susceptible host (there are many animals in an area). In my opinion this was scored good (looking in specific in WNV)

Line 249-254: Please add a comment on the anticipated resolution of this assessment of overlap.

Line 516-518: Please add reference on the EFSA report on Assessment of the introduction RVF by vectors into Europe Van Bortel et al. 2020.

Line 541: Strange statement. Why would one only consider USA as region of origin of WNV?

Line 562-566: The reasoning is original and a interesting source for the estimate, but the spill over from the virus amplification cycle in birds-mosquitoes to horses and humans is largely determined by exposure (and sampling and reporting bias) rather than a mathematical algorithm.

Line 569-570: Could you put this outcome in perspective with the current situation in areas where WNV is introduced. There is a large difference the evolution of WNV after introductions between countries (compare Spain and France with Italy and Greece, and how does situation of Germany fit in).

Figure 1: Although it is unlikely to change, the term Rate of Introduction in the text means something else than what I would “intuitional” would think ( I would think it is synonym for entry). However the terminology is applied according the description of the paper so it is ok.

Figure 3 fig 5: Since the model is best used when comparing diseases I would put arrange the x-axes by parameter and not disease. The authors could also consider whether it is feasible and necessary to subject the data to statistical analysis whether the various risk scores are actually different between diseases.

Table 2: Why is importation of zoo-animals not considered as a source of WNV

Editorial:

Line 30: In line with the other three diseases I would refer to West Nile fever (WNF) as the disease caused by the infection with West Nile virus (and not only West Nile). Please adapt this through the manuscript.

Line 113-114: Please are write the sentence that it becomes clear that ‘very low’ and ‘very high’ are names of the categories of the answers. The current sentence is now rather confusing. In addition, make sure you unify the term; both ‘answering categories’ and ‘answer categories’ (e.g. in line 123) are used.

Line 132: Sentence is missing a word or do calculations return a risk score

Line 371: Please adjust reference numbers. Should be [11-12]. As I did not check all references, please recheck all references in the list and numbering in the text.

Table 1: I cannot find a definition of host in the text. Please add as the one of line 140 does not suffice to exclude humans, who I as a biologist define as a vertebrate animal (I do not think anthropogenic definitions helps us to understand transmission cycles).

S1-S3; The questions start with Q18. Where are Questions 1-17?

S3: I think the tables are a bit confusing as the columns of pathways are still present when they are only considered until question 51. Please adjust.

Reviewer #2: The authors present a tool called MINTRISK, which can be used to assess the risk of introduction and spread of vector-borne diseases in new areas outwith their current range. The model not only considers the potential for outbreaks in the area of concern but also the potential economic and (to a slightly lesser extent) societal impacts of vector-borne disease outbreaks if they were to occur. Applications to four diseases (African horse sickness, epizootic haemorrhagic disease Rift Valley fever and West Nile) and the risks they pose to the Netherlands are given. The work appears to be novel, extending on the previously established FEVER framework to combine different aspects of risk assessments in an objective way. There were some places where I struggled to follow how the model was constructed and so I have some suggestions for areas of clarification and/or improvement. However, whilst it may look like quite a lot of comments, I would hope that these are relatively minor and are mainly just points of clarification, as I think that this is a valuable tool which should be published.

Details of suggested amendments are given below. I have tried to score then by importance with *** denoting the most important and * denoting a fairly incidental comment in the hope that that is of help to the authors:

Introduction (Paragraph 1) (**): It seems odd to be that there is no mention that West Nile has recently been reported in the Netherlands. I notice this is mentioned in the discussion but in particular lines 46-50 don’t read right to me knowing that WN has recently been found in the Netherlands.

Material and Methods (***): There are a lot of parameter values in this paper. A table detailing what each parameter is called, what it measures, where it comes from (user input or otherwise) would be very helpful as I was constantly scrolling up and down to remember what each thing was and how it was calculated. I did realise (too late) that there is a table of questions etc. in Appendix 1 which goes some way towards doing this but what I would really like to see is a Table in the main text with all there terms involved in the Equations included.

Lines 86-88 (**): When I first read through this I was somewhat confused because it seems that transmission is simply the first half of establishment e.g. transmission is the ability of the pathogen to spread to vector to host and establishment is the ability of the pathogen to spread from vector to host and back again. This made me worry that the same thing may be modelled twice. I see now that it seems to be more of an either/or approach where the introduction risk score comes from entry*establishment if Ropt>1 but it can come from just the transmission term (Ropt) if Ropt<1. I wonder if this can be clarified earlier on to avoid my initial concerns/confusion?

Line 162 (**): “frequency of epidemics per year”?

Eqn 2 (***): This is stated to be a probability but it is not possible that it could be >1? For example, Fepi=0.5, Area=1, HRPrr=3, Prev=0.7 gives Pepi_pt=1.05. Whilst this may be an unlikely set of values I don't see why it would be implausible?

Lines 188-189 (*): The specific question in MINTRISK is "What is the estimated value of the basic reproduction ratio?", which is less descriptive than the definition here. I think it would be preferable to use this description in the MINTRISK question, as R will be affected by vector-host ratio so it may be important for users to know the assumed context?

Lines 189-191 (**): A 10% reduction in R0 when the vector is present in less than 5% of the area doesn't seem like very much - and likewise no reduction for anything more than 5% coverage doesn't seem like much. What's the justification for this choice? How sensitive are results to it?

Line 203 (*): Intuitively when I think of “introduction” I find myself thinking of what has been described in the paper as “entry”. I think it would be easier to follow if this section talked about “introduction and establishment” (although I appreciate that doesn’t fit nicely into the equations).

Lines 227-230 (**): So am I correct that each individual result is based on only a single pathway (though that pathway could be one of up to three for any given run)? Could this not lead to quite severe underestimation of risk i.e. if there are three pathways all with similar risk will that not lead to a higher overall risk (because it would be cumulative) than the case where there is one pathway with this risk and the other two have negligible risk?

Lines 254-255 (**): I don't follow this logic. Why would long-distance spread of hosts or vectors mean more infection generations in a season (or vice versa). I can see how it would increase the population at risk but not the generation time. To be clear, when I read infection generation I'm essentially thinking of the length of a gonotrophic cycle - is that the definition here? I think there needs to be a bit more justification/clarification here.

Lines 255 (**): Why 50%? How sensitive are the results to this choice?

Eqn 11 (***): This just seems to add the value for Reff in each generation but surely the number of infectives at the start of the generation will need to be included each time. For example, if Reff was 5, there were 3 generations and HRP>Tseason then this formula would give 15 infections (I think); however surely it should be 5 new infections in generation 1, then each of those 5 infections produces 5 more in generation 2 (giving 5*5=25 new infections) and then those 25 each generate a 5 new infections (giving 25*5=125 new infections). So the total number of infections would be 5+25+125=155? Unless the idea is that it is a separate introduction for each generation season and so there are 5 secondary infections each generation season with no onward spread from there but then I think the text needs to be much clearer about is meant by spread because I would interpret that is repeated introductions rather than spread. What am I missing here? Note my same confusion reappears in Eqns 12 and 14.

Lines 295-297 (**): What is the justification for focussing only on the most likely route? If there were multiple potential routes it should be possible to determine the expected number of cases of overwintering by at least one of those routes. I think what's done is fine when it's expected that one route will dominate but if there are multiple likely routes then will it not underestimate risk?

Eqn 14 (**): I think I read somewhere that you only consider the first 3 years, which would explain the 3 at the top of the last summation, however I can’t find where I read that now. It would be good to mention that next to this equation. If I didn’t read that somewhere, why only sum to 3?

Line 336 (**): Any justification for the choice of 100?

Line 346-351 (**): Why the maximum? I would have thought a cumulative measure of socio-ethical impact would be preferable in cases where one impact doesn’t dominate?

Lines 434-439 (**): Does this not suggest an issue with the model calibration if a high number of infections is able to drive a high economic impact even when the user has specified economic impact to be low? Has there been much evidence of economic impact in worse affected areas like Italy, for example?

Appendixes (**): Some explanation of the parameterisation of the log transformation would probably be helpful i.e. it is of the form a^((IV+b)*c) but it would be good to explain briefly how a, b and c are determined. Likewise for Appendix 2.

**********

6. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article (what does this mean?). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

If you choose “no”, your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review? For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our Privacy Policy.

Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #2: Yes: David A Ewing

[NOTE: If reviewer comments were submitted as an attachment file, they will be attached to this email and accessible via the submission site. Please log into your account, locate the manuscript record, and check for the action link "View Attachments". If this link does not appear, there are no attachment files.]

While revising your submission, please upload your figure files to the Preflight Analysis and Conversion Engine (PACE) digital diagnostic tool, https://pacev2.apexcovantage.com/. PACE helps ensure that figures meet PLOS requirements. To use PACE, you must first register as a user. Registration is free. Then, login and navigate to the UPLOAD tab, where you will find detailed instructions on how to use the tool. If you encounter any issues or have any questions when using PACE, please email PLOS at figures@plos.org. Please note that Supporting Information files do not need this step.

PLoS One. 2021 Nov 2;16(11):e0259466. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0259466.r002

Author response to Decision Letter 0


23 Sep 2021

1. Please ensure that your manuscript meets PLOS ONE's style requirements, including those for file naming. The PLOS ONE style templates can be found at

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=wjVg/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_main_body.pdf and

https://journals.plos.org/plosone/s/file?id=ba62/PLOSOne_formatting_sample_title_authors_affiliations.pdf

We have carefully studied the guidelines and updated the manuscript’s layout to meet PLOS ONE’s style requirements.

2. Thank you for stating the following in the Acknowledgments Section of your manuscript:

“The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026). The authors would like to thank Barbara van der Hout (Wageningen Economic Research) for technical assistance in the development of MINTRISK.”

We note that you have provided funding information within the Acknowledgements. Please note that funding information should not appear in the Acknowledgments section or other areas of your manuscript. We will only publish funding information present in the Funding Statement section of the online submission form.

Please remove any funding-related text from the manuscript and let us know how you would like to update your Funding Statement. Currently, your Funding Statement reads as follows:

“The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026).

URL Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-landbouw-natuur-en-voedselkwaliteit

URL Wageningen University & Research: https://www.wur.nl/en.htm

URL European Food Safety Authority: https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en

The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.”

Please include your amended statements within your cover letter; we will change the online submission form on your behalf.

We have removed the information on funding from the Acknowledgements Section. The Funding Statement should read as follows:

“The development of MINTRISK was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (KB-12-009.01-001), Wageningen University & Research (KB-33-001-006-WBVR) and the European Food Safety Authority (NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2016/13-CT01; NP/EFSA/ALPHA/2017/10; PO/ALPHA/2019/06). The case study on vector-borne diseases was funded by the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (BO-20-009-026).”

3.Please review your reference list to ensure that it is complete and correct. If you have cited papers that have been retracted, please include the rationale for doing so in the manuscript text, or remove these references and replace them with relevant current references. Any changes to the reference list should be mentioned in the rebuttal letter that accompanies your revised manuscript. If you need to cite a retracted article, indicate the article’s retracted status in the References list and also include a citation and full reference for the retraction notice.

We reviewed the reference list and ensured that it is complete and correct.

Changes made to the reference list are:

• Two references (Sikkema et al., 2020 and Vlaskmap et al., 2020) were moved up in the reference list, because these publications are now referred to in the Introduction section.

• One new reference (Van Bortel et al., 2020) was added to the reference list as suggested by reviewer 1.

• Five new references (Nasci et al., 2001; Braks et al., 2017; Vogels et al., 2017; Rudolf et al., 2017; ECDC website) were added because of extending the discussion of the results for WNF.

Furthermore, a reference on the FEVER framework (De Vos et al., 2011) and two references on survival of WNV in mosquitoes during winter (Nasci et al., 2001; Rudolf et al., 2017) were added to S3 Appendix.

Response to Reviewers

We would like to thank both reviewers for carefully reading the manuscript and the useful comments they made. We appreciate the efforts they took to really understand how MINTRISK has been built. We have considered all comments made by the reviewers and revised the manuscript accordingly.

Please note that reference is made to line numbers in the marked-up copy of the manuscript highlighting changes made to the original version (‘Revised Manuscript with Track Changes’).

Reviewer #1

Over the years I have been following the development of the MINTRISK model and therefore, I read, with great interest, the manuscript, especially as it described the application of the MINTRISK model to assess the risk of introduction of specific vector borne diseases (VBDs: AHS, EHD, RVF, WNF) for a specific country (the Netherlands).

We would like to thank this reviewer for carefully reading the manuscript and providing helpful comments, with a special focus on West Nile fever. We have considered all comments given by this reviewer and revised the manuscript accordingly.

MINTRISK model includes (almost) all major parameters of the ecology and epidemiology for wide variety of VBDs transmitted by Dipteran vectors in a comprehensive way for others to appreciate; tick borne diseases fall outside its scope as described in 576-583 (since this is not a discovery of the current paper I think the authors could present MINT RISK as such from the beginning). The fact that it takes 98 specific questions to be answered in a semi-qualitative manner for each pathways to assess the risk of a specific VBD for a specific area at a certain moment is a perfect illustration of the complexity and temporal and spatial variation of VBDs. Illustrating this is for me the most important merit of the MINTRISK project and model; it forms a great help to others, just starting in the field of VBDs modelling and risk assessing, that in depth knowledge of the disease system is required to even begin to understand, assess or to project risks of VBDs in context.

When starting MINTRISK, the scope was risk assessment of livestock diseases transmitted by arthropod vectors including ticks. Although the tool has been most extensively used (and therefore tested) for Dipteran vectors, this is not to say that the tool could not be used for tick-borne diseases at all. The tool has also been used to assess the risk of two tick-borne diseases in the past (Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever and babesiosis) (De Vos et al., 2016). Therefore we have not presented MINTRISK as a tool for Dipteran vectors from the beginning of the manuscript.

The down side is that applying the model to compare risk of VBDs in your own specific situation is very labor and data intensive, while the utility of the overall risk output, besides the appreciation of the complexity is not so obvious. The authors are well aware and focus mainly on discussing the individual scores which are much more informative than overall risk output. Complements for the authors to dare to write such an elaborate manuscript and to choose not to make short cuts.

It is obvious (e.g. lines 46-47, 364, 370-371, 486, 558, 569-570) that the MINTRISK model has been developed, applied to and described for the Netherlands before West Nile virus was introduced in the Netherlands in 2020. The authors attempted to address this fact in the text (lines 495-503) but, in my opinion, this could be improved. In addition, I would to invite the authors to embrace this situation and fully address this fact and how the results are in line or what surprised them or not. This is the test case and it would be a pity to let this go to waste. I am very interested in their take on the assessment of the high economic impact (due to estimated epidemic size) of WNV in the Netherlands while there are no currently no signs for this. Maybe they can elaborate why the estimate was so high while in reality this does not seem to pan out yet.

In the following I will elaborate on more specific points in detail.

In the Introduction we have now added West Nile fever as one of the vector-borne diseases that were recently introduced into the Netherlands. In the Discussion section, we have elaborated on the results of MINTRISK for WNF, especially the economic impact, and tried to explain why results in MINTRISK are different from the situation observed in the Netherlands so far. As stated in the Discussion section, the assessment of the economic impact in MINTRISK is less straightforward for West Nile fever, with the reservoir hosts being wild birds rather than livestock.

Content:

Line 36: When addressing the main result (WNV has high introduction rate) in the abstract, as a reader, I would also like to find the main factor(s) causing this in the abstract. In addition I do not think it is surprising that all four VBDs chosen for this review have high economic impact, as this was probably one of the reason why they were chosen to be included. It would have been very interesting to choose another disease and see whether the gut feeling of importance diseases for Europe also was reflected in the MintRisk tool, e.g. JEV or EEE.

We added information on the main introduction routes for WNF to the abstract. As this resulted in > 300 words, we removed the first introductory sentence of the abstract.

We agree with the reviewer that it would have been interesting to also apply MINTRISK to vector-borne diseases that are considered less of a threat for the Netherlands. The selection of vector-borne diseases was made in close cooperation with the main funder of this work, the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality and was based on a sense of urgency at the time the study was initiated. Adding a new disease to the current analysis is data and labour intensive indeed and was not considered essential for the current publication in which the case study is used to illustrate the application of MINTRISK.

Line 46-47: As stated in the general comments above it is obvious that the manuscript has been written for the larger part before the introduction of WNV in the Netherlands. Please update the manuscript (see general comment above), including adapting this sentence by adding WNF to this list of recent introduced VBDs in the Netherlands.

The reviewer is right that most of the manuscript was prepared before the introduction of WNV in 2020, resulting in omission of this recent incursion in the Introduction section. We have now added the introduction of West Nile in lines 48-50.

Line 183 & 189: The reasoning, behind the definition of an area being patchy (<5%) and homogeneous (>5%) and the accompanying value setting of Dvector, escapes me. An explanation or example of both would help me understand.

This reduction value was included to account for those conditions where a vector is definitely not abundantly present. However, relationships between vector abundancy and transmission are not easy to incorporate in a generic model, since transmission could still be very efficient in those areas where the vector is present indeed. If the vector is present in a few areas, the transmission will go smoothly in those few areas, while there will be very slow spatial transmission in larger areas. If R0 is sufficiently high, the spill-over from one infected sub-area will lead to spread to other subareas with vectors, but with substantial delay. If R0 is low, i.e. close to 1, there will be a lot of opportunity for fade out, even if there would be multiple epidemic starts. Thus, a limited reduction of R0 appears to be the best way to easily incorporate this aspect. This question and parameter were built into MINTRISK to raise awareness with the risk assessor that these elements have to be considered when estimating transmission of vector-borne diseases. Although Dvector will contribute to a proper estimate for the transmission rate, it cannot really account for the spatial and ecological differences within an area at risk that might either favour or hamper transmission.

We added an explanation on the parameterization of Dvector in lines 217-220.

Line 240: Please replace non-susceptible animal with non-susceptible host (there are many animals in an area). In my opinion this was scored good (looking in specific in WNV)

We changed animals into hosts. This was indeed scored correctly in MINTRISK, as we only accounted for animals that are hosts for the vectors to feed on.

Line 249-254: Please add a comment on the anticipated resolution of this assessment of overlap.

The spatial resolution to assess the overlap between vector abundance and host animal density is the area at risk considered in the risk assessment. This will often be quite a large geographical area, e.g. a country like in this study. We added “in the area at risk” to ensure that the reader is aware on which resolution the overlap is assessed.

Line 516-518: Please add reference on the EFSA report on Assessment of the introduction RVF by vectors into Europe Van Bortel et al. 2020.

We added a reference to Van Bortel et al., 2020 as suggested.

Line 541: Strange statement. Why would one only consider USA as region of origin of WNV?

This statement was made to contrast our results with those from Brown et al., 2012. They only considered commercial flights from the US, whereas we considered flights from all WN infected regions worldwide. We see no need to change our wording here.

Line 562-566: The reasoning is original and a interesting source for the estimate, but the spill over from the virus amplification cycle in birds-mosquitoes to horses and humans is largely determined by exposure (and sampling and reporting bias) rather than a mathematical algorithm.

We agree that spill over of WNV to humans or horses does not have a linear relationship with the number of infections in birds. As a result, the observed ratios that we used could be a huge overestimate (or underestimate) for the Dutch situation, partly explaining the unexpectedly high economic impact given for WNF. Since MINTRISK is a generic risk assessment tool for vector-borne diseases, that does not allow for all disease-specific details, we considered this the best way to estimate economic impact due to spill over.

Line 569-570: Could you put this outcome in perspective with the current situation in areas where WNV is introduced. There is a large difference the evolution of WNV after introductions between countries (compare Spain and France with Italy and Greece, and how does situation of Germany fit in).

In lines 622-634 we elaborate on the assumptions for transmission (R0 value) and overwintering that we used when performing the risk assessment for WNF in MINTRISK and discussed why these might not have been correct for the Dutch situation.

Figure 1: Although it is unlikely to change, the term Rate of Introduction in the text means something else than what I would “intuitional” would think ( I would think it is synonym for entry). However the terminology is applied according the description of the paper so it is ok.

We have added clear definitions for the three summarizing output parameters to the manuscript in lines 101-106, directly after the definitions of the individual steps as we realized that these were missing in the main text. Hopefully this helps to avoid confusion with the reader.

Figure 3 fig 5: Since the model is best used when comparing diseases I would put arrange the x-axes by parameter and not disease. The authors could also consider whether it is feasible and necessary to subject the data to statistical analysis whether the various risk scores are actually different between diseases.

We agree with the reviewer that the aim of the calculations is to compare over diseases. However, for Fig 3, we did not rearrange the x-axes, since this is impossible with different pathways evaluated for each disease. For Fig 5, we appreciated the suggestion and decided to rearrange the x-axis to ease the comparison between diseases.

A statistical analysis on simulated data is usually not very helpful. In theory, one can get any difference significant if sufficient iterations are run. Therefore, we compared the diseases based on their median risk scores and their uncertainty intervals.

Table 2: Why is importation of zoo-animals not considered as a source of WNV

Before starting the risk assessment in MINTRISK, a qualitative risk assessment was performed for each disease using the FEVER framework. FEVER provides an extensive list of potential pathways to consider including the import of exotic or zoo animals (De Vos et al., 2011). In this qualitative assessment we did consider importation of zoo animals as a source of WNV, but concluded that the probability of entry and establishment was very low. Two important differences with migratory birds are the low numbers involved and the fact that zoo birds are subjected to import regulations. Pathways with a very low probability for introduction in the qualitative assessment were not selected for the semi-quantitative assessment in MINTRISK.

Editorial:

Line 30: In line with the other three diseases I would refer to West Nile fever (WNF) as the disease caused by the infection with West Nile virus (and not only West Nile). Please adapt this through the manuscript.

Thanks for this useful suggestion. We have changed West Nile (WN) into West Nile fever (WNF) throughout the manuscript.

Line 113-114: Please are write the sentence that it becomes clear that ‘very low’ and ‘very high’ are names of the categories of the answers. The current sentence is now rather confusing. In addition, make sure you unify the term; both ‘answering categories’ and ‘answer categories’ (e.g. in line 123) are used.

We changed the order of the sentence in line 113-114 (now lines 129-131) and put the answer categories between quotes to avoid any confusion for the reader.

We thank the reviewer for spotting inconsistencies in our wording when indicating the answer categories. We changed answering categories into answer categories throughout the manuscript.

Line 132: Sentence is missing a word or do calculations return a risk score

Calculations do indeed return a semi-quantitative risk score for each individual step in MINTRISK as described in lines 142-144. We added semi-quantitative to line 132 (now line 149) and hope it is clearer now.

Line 371: Please adjust reference numbers. Should be [11-12]. As I did not check all references, please recheck all references in the list and numbering in the text.

Thanks for noticing. We adjusted the reference numbers here and checked all references and their numbering throughout the manuscript. No other mistakes were found. Please note that some reference numbers have been updated in the revised manuscript after inclusion of new references.

Table 1: I cannot find a definition of host in the text. Please add as the one of line 140 does not suffice to exclude humans, who I as a biologist define as a vertebrate animal (I do not think anthropogenic definitions helps us to understand transmission cycles).

We agree with the reviewer that vertebrate hosts would include humans if susceptible. We changed the caption and headings in Table 1 to make clear that we only indicate vertebrate host animals in the third column. Whether or not humans are a vertebrate host is indicated in the fifth column (zoonosis). We included a comment in the first paragraph of the Material and Methods (lines 87-89) to make explicit that MINTRISK models the infection dynamics between arthropod vectors and vertebrate host animals, and not humans.

S1-S3; The questions start with Q18. Where are Questions 1-17?

Numbering of questions in MINTRISK was aligned with numbering of questions in FEVER. The FEVER framework starts with a hazard identification, based on 17 questions. Since the questions of the hazard identification are not used to semi-quantitatively estimate the introduction risk, those questions are missing from MINTRISK. We added a footnote on this to S1 and S3 Appendices.

S3: I think the tables are a bit confusing as the columns of pathways are still present when they are only considered until question 51. Please adjust.

We have now split the tables into two: one for the first three steps in MINTRISK (entry, transmission and establishment) in which questions are answered by pathway, and one for the second three steps (spread, persistence and impact) in which answers to the questions are independent of pathways.

Reviewer #2

The authors present a tool called MINTRISK, which can be used to assess the risk of introduction and spread of vector-borne diseases in new areas outwith their current range. The model not only considers the potential for outbreaks in the area of concern but also the potential economic and (to a slightly lesser extent) societal impacts of vector-borne disease outbreaks if they were to occur. Applications to four diseases (African horse sickness, epizootic haemorrhagic disease Rift Valley fever and West Nile) and the risks they pose to the Netherlands are given. The work appears to be novel, extending on the previously established FEVER framework to combine different aspects of risk assessments in an objective way. There were some places where I struggled to follow how the model was constructed and so I have some suggestions for areas of clarification and/or improvement. However, whilst it may look like quite a lot of comments, I would hope that these are relatively minor and are mainly just points of clarification, as I think that this is a valuable tool which should be published.

We would like to thank this reviewer for carefully reading the manuscript and providing helpful comments. We appreciate the efforts made by this reviewer to fully understand the mathematical equations of MINTRISK. We have considered all comments made by the reviewer and revised the manuscript accordingly.

Details of suggested amendments are given below. I have tried to score then by importance with *** denoting the most important and * denoting a fairly incidental comment in the hope that that is of help to the authors:

Introduction (Paragraph 1) (**): It seems odd to be that there is no mention that West Nile has recently been reported in the Netherlands. I notice this is mentioned in the discussion but in particular lines 46-50 don’t read right to me knowing that WN has recently been found in the Netherlands.

The reviewer is right that the recent introduction of West Nile in the Netherlands should also be stated in the Introduction section. We have added the introduction of West Nile in lines 48-50.

Material and Methods (***): There are a lot of parameter values in this paper. A table detailing what each parameter is called, what it measures, where it comes from (user input or otherwise) would be very helpful as I was constantly scrolling up and down to remember what each thing was and how it was calculated. I did realise (too late) that there is a table of questions etc. in Appendix 1 which goes some way towards doing this but what I would really like to see is a Table in the main text with all there terms involved in the Equations included.

We compiled a table with an overview of parameters in MINTRISK as suggested by the reviewer and added this table (Table 1) to the main body of the manuscript.

Lines 86-88 (**): When I first read through this I was somewhat confused because it seems that transmission is simply the first half of establishment e.g. transmission is the ability of the pathogen to spread to vector to host and establishment is the ability of the pathogen to spread from vector to host and back again. This made me worry that the same thing may be modelled twice. I see now that it seems to be more of an either/or approach where the introduction risk score comes from entry*establishment if Ropt>1 but it can come from just the transmission term (Ropt) if Ropt<1. I wonder if this can be clarified earlier on to avoid my initial concerns/confusion?

MINTRISK is based on the FEVER framework. In that framework, we advised risk assessors to first estimate the steps for entry and transmission and to only proceed with the risk assessment if both of them were non-negligible. That’s why transmission is estimated in an early stage in MINTRISK as well. We have added a sentence explaining this rationale to the manuscript in lines 204-205. Furthermore, the reviewer’s comment made us realise that the position of the transmission and establishment steps were not correctly positioned in Fig. 1 and therefore we slightly amended Fig 1.

Line 162 (**): “frequency of epidemics per year”?

Yes indeed. We added “per year” to this line.

Eqn 2 (***): This is stated to be a probability but it is not possible that it could be >1? For example, Fepi=0.5, Area=1, HRPrr=3, Prev=0.7 gives Pepi_pt=1.05. Whilst this may be an unlikely set of values I don't see why it would be implausible?

The reviewer is right that, in theory, the value of Pepi_pt could be > 1. Whereas the values of Area and Prevepi_pt are always < 1, the values of Fepi and HRPRR are not. However, the latter two values are dependent on each other. If the frequency of epidemics would be > 1, then the length of the high risk period is by definition < 1 and vice versa. (The example above is thus not a realistic set of parameter values, suggesting one epidemic every 2 years, but detection of each epidemic only after a period of 3 years) Hence, a sensible set of input parameters will not result in a probability > 1 for Pepi_pt. Furthermore, values for Prevepi_pt are in general very low, even further reducing the possibilities for Pepi_pt being > 1. To ensure that the value of Pepi_pt does not exceed 1, we changed the equation in both the manuscript and the model code into:

P_(epi_pt)=Min(F_epi×Area×〖HRP〗_RR×〖Prev〗_(epi_pt),1)

Lines 188-189 (*): The specific question in MINTRISK is "What is the estimated value of the basic reproduction ratio?", which is less descriptive than the definition here. I think it would be preferable to use this description in the MINTRISK question, as R will be affected by vector-host ratio so it may be important for users to know the assumed context?

This has been accounted for in MINTRISK by providing additional information under the i-button. We added an additional comment in MINTRISK that R0 should be estimated for a fully susceptible host population. Users of MINTRISK are encouraged to read this additional information before answering each question.

Lines 189-191 (**): A 10% reduction in R0 when the vector is present in less than 5% of the area doesn't seem like very much - and likewise no reduction for anything more than 5% coverage doesn't seem like much. What's the justification for this choice? How sensitive are results to it?

The reviewer is right in that this will not result in a high reduction of R0 and hence will not severely affect MINTRISK’s estimate for transmission. This reduction value was included to account for those conditions where a vector is definitely not abundantly present. However, relationships between vector abundancy and transmission are not easy to incorporate in a generic model, since transmission might still be very efficient in those areas where the vector is present indeed. If the vector is present in a few areas, the transmission will go smoothly in those few areas, while there will be very slow spatial transmission in larger areas. If R0 is sufficiently high, the spill-over from one infected sub-area will lead to spread to other subareas with vectors, but with substantial delay. If R0 is low, i.e. close to 1, there will be a lot of opportunity for fade out, even if there would be multiple epidemic starts. Thus, a limited reduction of R0 appears to be the best way to easily incorporate this aspect. This question and parameter were built into MINTRISK to raise awareness with the risk assessor that these elements have to be considered when estimating transmission of vector-borne diseases. Although Dvector will contribute to a proper estimate for the transmission rate, it cannot account for the spatial and ecological differences within an area at risk that might either favour or hamper transmission.

We added an explanation on the parameterization of Dvector in lines 217-220.

Line 203 (*): Intuitively when I think of “introduction” I find myself thinking of what has been described in the paper as “entry”. I think it would be easier to follow if this section talked about “introduction and establishment” (although I appreciate that doesn’t fit nicely into the equations).

Thanks for noting this. We agree that entry and introduction are very close (maybe even synonyms) and that using introduction for the successful entry of a vector-borne disease (i.e. entry and establishment) might be somewhat confusing. We have tried to avoid confusion by giving clear definitions (lines 91-100) and providing Fig 1. However, upon rereading we realised that it might be helpful for the reader to include definitions for the summarizing output parameters as well at the start of the model description. These were therefore added to the manuscript in lines 101-106, directly after the definitions of the individual steps.

Lines 227-230 (**): So am I correct that each individual result is based on only a single pathway (though that pathway could be one of up to three for any given run)? Could this not lead to quite severe underestimation of risk i.e. if there are three pathways all with similar risk will that not lead to a higher overall risk (because it would be cumulative) than the case where there is one pathway with this risk and the other two have negligible risk?

The reviewer is correct that results of each iteration are based on a single pathway only, and that this pathway can vary among the (max 3) pathways selected. Since model input and output is given on a logarithmic scale, the pathway with the highest rate of introduction will in general drive the overall risk estimate, even if results of the individual pathways were added. The reviewer is right that the risk would be slightly higher if all three pathways had comparable risk (which is not a very common scenario), but even then, it would be at most 0.5 times higher than the calculated risk based on a single pathway.

When revising the paper, we realised that the logarithmic scale of answer categories and output was not communicated very clearly in the manuscript (although given in S1 and S2 Appendices). We therefore added a comment on this in lines 116-118.

Lines 254-255 (**): I don't follow this logic. Why would long-distance spread of hosts or vectors mean more infection generations in a season (or vice versa). I can see how it would increase the population at risk but not the generation time. To be clear, when I read infection generation I'm essentially thinking of the length of a gonotrophic cycle - is that the definition here? I think there needs to be a bit more justification/clarification here.

These parameters (Overlap, Local, Movvector and Movhost) affect the rate at with which the infection will spread in the area at risk. The rate of transmission is both determined by the R0 value and the number of infection generations in a vector season. We have chosen to model the effect of these parameters on disease spread by reducing the number of infection generations in case these parameters are limiting the efficient transmission of the infection. Less infection generations (and thus a longer time span between infection generations) will reduce the rate of transmission in the vector season and therefore also the number of infected host animals (epidemiological units). We have added a brief explanation on how these parameters would affect the number of infection generations in lines 282-289.

An infection generation can be compared to a generation in population biology, based on R0. Each next generation of infections is a new infection generation. The time needed from a “parent generation” to its “offspring generation” depends on the latent and infectious period in host animals and the extrinsic incubation period and infectious period (� lifespan) in vectors. The number of infection generations in one vector season is based on these parameters and the estimated length of the vector season. We added this definition to the information on this question in MINTRISK under the i-button to ensure that the risk assessor has a good understanding of infection generations.

Lines 255 (**): Why 50%? How sensitive are the results to this choice?

This 50% is an arbitrary choice. We deemed it unrealistic to include a larger reduction effect. All those aspects lead to slower transmission, which we incorporate into fewer infection generations per year, but they cannot stop transmission as such, since there are many routes of transmission possible in these vector borne diseases. In most assessments, these four parameters (Overlap, Local, Movvector and Movhost) will only result in a slight reduction of the number of infection generations.

Eqn 11 (***): This just seems to add the value for Reff in each generation but surely the number of infectives at the start of the generation will need to be included each time. For example, if Reff was 5, there were 3 generations and HRP>Tseason then this formula would give 15 infections (I think); however surely it should be 5 new infections in generation 1, then each of those 5 infections produces 5 more in generation 2 (giving 5*5=25 new infections) and then those 25 each generate a 5 new infections (giving 25*5=125 new infections). So the total number of infections would be 5+25+125=155? Unless the idea is that it is a separate introduction for each generation season and so there are 5 secondary infections each generation season with no onward spread from there but then I think the text needs to be much clearer about is meant by spread because I would interpret that is repeated introductions rather than spread. What am I missing here? Note my same confusion reappears in Eqns 12 and 14.

Equations 11, 12 and 14 are pretty complex equations indeed. We will try to explain using Eq 11 as an example. In the first line, i.e. if the HRP is longer than the vector season, the formula results in the sum of the number of infected animals in each new infection generation, which would be 1 to start with, Reff in the second generation, Reff^2 in the third generation etc. So, if Reff was 5 and IGeff was 3, this would result in a total of 1 + 5 + 25 +125 infections indeed. In the second line, i.e. if the HRP is shorter than the length of the vector season, the number of infected epidemiological units is calculated in two parts. First for the period before detection. This is equal to the calculation in the first line, but now only for the infection generations until detection of the disease (IGdet). Then the second part starts with the number of infected animals in the last generation before detection, which equals Reff^IGdet and this is multiplied with the expected number of animals in the next generations until the end of the vector season when control measures are in place. This number is calculated similarly to the number of infected animals before detection by summing the number of infected animals in each new infection generation.

In explaining Eq 11 to the reviewer, we realised that the summations should start with i=0 and not i=1. We changed this in the equation and checked the model code. In the model code, this was programmed correctly, so there was no need to update the calculations for the four vector-borne diseases.

Lines 295-297 (**): What is the justification for focussing only on the most likely route? If there were multiple potential routes it should be possible to determine the expected number of cases of overwintering by at least one of those routes. I think what's done is fine when it's expected that one route will dominate but if there are multiple likely routes then will it not underestimate risk?

Analogue to selecting only the pathway with the highest introduction score (see the reviewer’s comment for lines 227-230), we here also select only the overwintering route with the highest probability, because of the logarithmic scale at which input and output of MINTRISK is given.

Eqn 14 (**): I think I read somewhere that you only consider the first 3 years, which would explain the 3 at the top of the last summation, however I can’t find where I read that now. It would be good to mention that next to this equation. If I didn’t read that somewhere, why only sum to 3?

In the text below Eq 14, we state that the epidemic size is calculated over a total of four vector seasons. This explains the 3 at the top of the last summation, as the first year is indicated by i=0. We have now included definitions for the summarizing output parameters in lines 101-106 (in response to a comment of reviewer 1), where it is also stated that the epidemic size is calculated over four vector seasons.

Line 336 (**): Any justification for the choice of 100?

To calculate the economic impact of a zoonotic vector-borne disease, the economic costs due to human disease had to be offset to the number of infected animal hosts. Since humans are mostly spill over hosts, resulting in relatively few cases, we deemed it more easy to estimate the costs per 100 infected animals. The number of 100 was a bit of an arbitrary choice. It worked pretty well for RVF, since the number of expected human cases was estimated to be 1 for every 100 infected animals. For West Nile fever, the ratio between cases in humans and infections in birds is, however, lower with 1 expected human case for every 10^4 - 10^5 infected birds.

Line 346-351 (**): Why the maximum? I would have thought a cumulative measure of socio-ethical impact would be preferable in cases where one impact doesn’t dominate?

Analogue to selecting only the pathway with the highest introduction score (see the reviewer’s comment for lines 227-230) and to selecting only the overwintering route with the highest probability (see the reviewer’s comment for lines 295-297), we here also selected only the socio-ethical (and environmental) impact with the highest risk score, because of the logarithmic scale at which input and output of MINTRISK is given.

Lines 434-439 (**): Does this not suggest an issue with the model calibration if a high number of infections is able to drive a high economic impact even when the user has specified economic impact to be low? Has there been much evidence of economic impact in worse affected areas like Italy, for example?

Calculation of the economic impact in MINTRISK is partly based on the multiplication of the epidemic size with the costs per epidemiological unit (Eq 15). For the case of West Nile fever, the epidemiological units are wild birds, and not horses. Therefore we had to estimate the economic loss per infected wild bird, which will be very low indeed. The reviewer is right that we here encounter a potential issue with model scaling (not calibration though), since the five answer categories for economic losses per epidemiological unit were scaled to account for losses per infected livestock animal. As a consequence, even the very low answer category will probably have overestimated the economic loss per epidemiological unit (bird) for WNF. The ‘very low’ answer category still results in a loss between 1 and 10 Euros per infected bird, and this is repeated for three parameters (EcoDA, EcoIA, EcoPH). Using lower values for the answer categories of these input parameters would, however, hamper a proper assessment for diseases for which livestock animals are the reservoir host and thus the epidemiological unit in MINTRISK, since economic losses per animal can be high indeed, like for AHS. We conclude that the economic assessment for West Nile fever is providing less reliable results because of this issue. We slightly changed the wording in lines 474-477 to make clear that wild birds are the epidemiological units for the assessment and the issue with model scaling is further discussed in the Discussion section in lines 606-619.

Appendixes (**): Some explanation of the parameterisation of the log transformation would probably be helpful i.e. it is of the form a^((IV+b)*c) but it would be good to explain briefly how a, b and c are determined. Likewise for Appendix 2.

An explanation of the general equations used for the log-transformation and inverse log-transformation were added to footnote c in S1 Appendix and footnote a in S2 Appendix, respectively.

Attachment

Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers.docx

Decision Letter 1

Fernanda C Dórea

20 Oct 2021

Assessing the introduction risk of vector-borne animal diseases for the Netherlands using MINTRISK: A Model for INTegrated RISK assessment

PONE-D-21-20706R1

Dear Dr. de Vos,

We’re pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it meets all outstanding technical requirements.

Please check the one small last issue pointed out by reviewer 2, and if it needs correction, address it during production. 

Within one week, you’ll receive an e-mail detailing the required amendments. When these have been addressed, you’ll receive a formal acceptance letter and your manuscript will be scheduled for publication.

An invoice for payment will follow shortly after the formal acceptance. To ensure an efficient process, please log into Editorial Manager at http://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/, click the 'Update My Information' link at the top of the page, and double check that your user information is up-to-date. If you have any billing related questions, please contact our Author Billing department directly at authorbilling@plos.org.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please notify them about your upcoming paper to help maximize its impact. If they’ll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team as soon as possible -- no later than 48 hours after receiving the formal acceptance. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information, please contact onepress@plos.org.

Kind regards,

Fernanda C. Dórea

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

1. If the authors have adequately addressed your comments raised in a previous round of review and you feel that this manuscript is now acceptable for publication, you may indicate that here to bypass the “Comments to the Author” section, enter your conflict of interest statement in the “Confidential to Editor” section, and submit your "Accept" recommendation.

Reviewer #1: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #2: All comments have been addressed

**********

2. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

The manuscript must describe a technically sound piece of scientific research with data that supports the conclusions. Experiments must have been conducted rigorously, with appropriate controls, replication, and sample sizes. The conclusions must be drawn appropriately based on the data presented.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

3. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

4. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

The PLOS Data policy requires authors to make all data underlying the findings described in their manuscript fully available without restriction, with rare exception (please refer to the Data Availability Statement in the manuscript PDF file). The data should be provided as part of the manuscript or its supporting information, or deposited to a public repository. For example, in addition to summary statistics, the data points behind means, medians and variance measures should be available. If there are restrictions on publicly sharing data—e.g. participant privacy or use of data from a third party—those must be specified.

Reviewer #1: (No Response)

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

5. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

PLOS ONE does not copyedit accepted manuscripts, so the language in submitted articles must be clear, correct, and unambiguous. Any typographical or grammatical errors should be corrected at revision, so please note any specific errors here.

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

**********

6. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer #1: The authors took the points of both reviewers to heart and addressed them accordingly.

One small but important issue remains: Line 34 -36 Are the authors sure that this statements about likely route of virus by mosquitoes in an aircraft concerns West Nile virus and not Rift valley fever virus?

Reviewer #2: (No Response)

**********

7. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article (what does this mean?). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

If you choose “no”, your identity will remain anonymous but your review may still be made public.

Do you want your identity to be public for this peer review? For information about this choice, including consent withdrawal, please see our Privacy Policy.

Reviewer #1: Yes: Marieta A.H. Braks

Reviewer #2: Yes: David Ewing

Acceptance letter

Fernanda C Dórea

25 Oct 2021

PONE-D-21-20706R1

Assessing the introduction risk of vector-borne animal diseases for the Netherlands using MINTRISK: A Model for INTegrated RISK assessment

Dear Dr. de Vos:

I'm pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been deemed suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. Congratulations! Your manuscript is now with our production department.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please let them know about your upcoming paper now to help maximize its impact. If they'll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team within the next 48 hours. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information please contact onepress@plos.org.

If we can help with anything else, please email us at plosone@plos.org.

Thank you for submitting your work to PLOS ONE and supporting open access.

Kind regards,

PLOS ONE Editorial Office Staff

on behalf of

Dr. Fernanda C. Dórea

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Associated Data

    This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

    Supplementary Materials

    S1 Appendix. Overview of input parameters in MINTRISK.

    (DOCX)

    S2 Appendix. Overview of the intermediate results for each input step and results for each output parameter of MINTRISK.

    (DOCX)

    S3 Appendix. Overview of input in MINTRISK to assess the introduction risk of four vector-borne diseases to the Netherlands.

    (DOCX)

    Attachment

    Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers.docx

    Data Availability Statement

    All relevant data are within the manuscript and its Supporting Information files.


    Articles from PLoS ONE are provided here courtesy of PLOS

    RESOURCES