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. 2022 Nov 17;10:280. Originally published 2021 Apr 9. [Version 3] doi: 10.12688/f1000research.52439.3

SARS-CoV-2 and the role of close contact in transmission: a systematic review

Igho J Onakpoya 1,2,a, Carl J Heneghan 1, Elizabeth A Spencer 1, Jon Brassey 3, Annette Plüddemann 1, David H Evans 4, John M Conly 5, Tom Jefferson 1
PMCID: PMC9636487  PMID: 36398277

Version Changes

Revised. Amendments from Version 2

We expanded the methods section to show how study eligibility was determined. We have included some data on the frequency of SARs in different geographical regions. We also note in our limitations, the effect of seasonality on the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. In addition, we have revised Figure 3a.

Abstract

Background: SARS-CoV-2 transmission has been reported to be associated with close contact with infected individuals. However, the mechanistic pathway for transmission in close contact settings is unclear. Our objective was to identify, appraise and summarise the evidence from studies assessing the role of close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission. 

Methods: This review is part of an Open Evidence Review on Transmission Dynamics of SARS-CoV-2. We conduct ongoing searches using WHO Covid-19 Database, LitCovid, medRxiv, PubMed and Google Scholar; assess study quality based on the QUADAS-2 criteria and report important findings on an ongoing basis.

Results: We included 278 studies: 258 primary studies and 20 systematic reviews. The settings for primary studies were predominantly in home/quarantine facilities (39.5%) and acute care hospitals (12%). The overall reporting quality of the studies was low-to-moderate. There was significant heterogeneity in design and methodology. The frequency of attack rates (PCR testing) varied between 2.1-75%; attack rates were highest in prison and wedding venues, and in households. The frequency of secondary attack rates was 0.3-100% with rates highest in home/quarantine settings. Three studies showed no transmission if the index case was a recurrent infection. Viral culture was performed in four studies of which three found replication-competent virus; culture results were negative where index cases had recurrent infections. Eighteen studies performed genomic sequencing with phylogenetic analysis – the completeness of genomic similarity ranged from 77-100%. Findings from systematic reviews showed that children were significantly less likely to transmit SARS-CoV-2 and household contact was associated with a significantly increased risk of infection.

Conclusions: The evidence from published studies demonstrates that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted in close contact settings. The risk of transmission is greater in household contacts. There was a wide variation in methodology. Standardized guidelines for reporting transmission in close contact settings should be developed.

Keywords: Close contact, transmission, COVID-19, systematic review

Introduction

The SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic is a major public health concern. Based on WHO data, there have been over 533 million confirmed cases and over two and a half million deaths globally as of 15th June 2022 1 . Many national governments have implemented prevention and control measures and vaccines are now being approved and administered; the overall global spread of the virus now appears to be slowing 2 , but the virus continues to evolve. Current evidence from epidemiologic and virologic studies suggest SARS-CoV-2 is primarily transmitted via exposure to infectious respiratory fluids such as fine aerosols and respiratory droplets, and to a lesser extent through fomites; however, the relative contributions of the different modes of transmission is not completely understood 35 . Controversy still exists about how the virus is transmitted and the relative frequency of the modes of transmission and if these modes may be altered in specific settings 6, 7 .

Although close contact is thought to be associated with transmission of SARS-CoV-2, there is uncertainty about the thresholds of proximity for “close contact” and the factors that may influence the transmission in a “close contact”. Furthermore, there is lack of clarity about how research should be conducted in the setting of transmission with close contact which may include transmission via any one of or the combination of respiratory droplets, direct contact, or indirect contact.

Several studies investigating the role of close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission have been published but the pathways and thresholds for transmission are not well established. The objective of this review was to identify, appraise and summarize the evidence from primary studies and systematic reviews investigating the role of close contact in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. Terminology for this article can be found in Box 1.

Box 1. Terminology.

Close contact: Someone who was within 6 feet of an infected person for a cumulative total of 15 minutes or more over a 24-hour period starting from 2 days before illness onset (or, for asymptomatic patients, 2 days prior to a positive test result) until the time the patient is isolated 1 ; The World Health Organization (WHO) additionally includes direct physical contact with a probable or confirmed case, direct care for a patient with probable or confirmed COVID-19 disease without using proper personal protective equipment (PPE), and other situations as indicated by local risk assessments.

Attack rate: The proportion of those who become ill after a specified exposure 2 .

Secondary attack rate: The probability that an infection occurs among susceptible persons within a reasonable incubation period after known contact with an infectious person in household or other close-contact environments 3 .

Cycle threshold: The number of cycles required for the fluorescent signal to cross the threshold. Ct levels are inversely proportional to the amount of target nucleic acid in the sample 4 .

1 https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/global-covid-19/operational-considerations-contact-tracing.html#:~:text=Close contact is defined by, time the patient is isolated

2 https://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/foodborne_disease/Annex_7.pdf

3 https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/32113505/

4 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7521909/

Methods

We are undertaking an open evidence review examining the factors and circumstances that impact on the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, based on our published protocol last updated on the 1 December 2020 (Version 3: 1 December 2020, Extended data: Appendix 1 8 ). This review aims to identify, appraise, and summarize the evidence (from peer-reviewed studies or studies awaiting peer review) examining the role of close contact in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and the factors that influence transmissibility. We are conducting an ongoing search in WHO Covid-19 Database, LitCovid, medRxiv, and Google Scholar for SARS-CoV-2 for keywords and associated synonyms. For this review, we also conducted searches on PubMed. The searches for this update were initially conducted up to 20th December 2020 ( Extended data: Appendix 2 8 ). The searches were further updated till 30th April 2022. We did not impose any language restrictions. Two reviewers (IJO and JB) independently screened articles to determine eligibility. A third reviewer (EAS) independently cross-checked the data. Any disagreements were resolved through discussion.

We included studies of any design that investigated transmission associated with close contact but excluded predictive or modelling studies. We reviewed the results for relevance and for articles that appeared particularly relevant, we undertook forward citation matching to identify relevant results. We assessed the risk of bias of included primary studies using five domains from the QUADAS-2 criteria 9 ; we adapted this tool because the included studies were not primarily designed as diagnostic accuracy studies. We examined the following domains in each included study: 1 – Did the authors describe the study methods in sufficient detail to allow for replication of the study? 2 – Were the sample studies clearly described? 3 – Was the reporting of the results and the analysis of the findings appropriate? 4 – Did the study authors account for any limitations due to bias? 5 – Are the study results applicable to the study population? We did not perform formal assessments of the quality of included systematic reviews but summarized their findings, including quality of their included studies as reported by the authors. We extracted the following information from included studies: study design characteristics including the definition used for “close contact”, population, main methods, and associated outcomes including the number of swab samples taken with frequency and timing of samples, and cycle thresholds. We also extracted information on viral cultures including the methods used. One reviewer (IJO) assessed the risk of bias from primary studies, and these were independently verified by a second reviewer (EAS). One reviewer (IJO) extracted data from the included primary studies, and these were independently checked by a second reviewer (CJH). One reviewer (CJH) extracted data from the included systematic reviews, and these were independently checked by a second reviewer (IJO). Disagreements in the data extraction or bias assessments were resolved by consensus. We presented the results in tabular format, and bar charts used to present the frequency of positive tests. We reported results of specific subgroups of studies where relevant. Because of substantial heterogeneity across the included studies, we considered meta-analyses inappropriate.

Results

We identified 1514 non-duplicate citations of which 538 were considered eligible ( Figure 1). We excluded 260 full-text studies for various reasons (see Extended data: Appendix 3 8 for the list of excluded studies and reasons for exclusion). Finally, we included 278 studies: 258 primary studies and 20 systematic reviews (see Extended data: Appendix 4 for references to included studies). The main characteristics of the included primary studies and systematic reviews are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.

Figure 1. Flow diagram showing the process for inclusion of studies assessing close contact transmission in SARS-CoV-2.

Figure 1.

Table 1. Main Characteristics of Included Studies Conducted in Close Contact Settings.

Study ID Country Study Design/
Setting
Type of
transmission
Population/
environment
Test method Timing of
sample
collection
Viral
culture
Cycle
threshold
Other information
Abdulrahman 2020 Bahrain Observational
comparative
Country-wide
09/2020
Community Before and after study
of subjects attending
2 religious events
PCR Not reported No >40 was
considered
negative
A 10-day period before the event was compared to a 10-
day period beginning 10 days after the event.
All symptomatic individuals and close contacts to a
confirmed case were tested. Positive and negative
controls were included for quality control purposes.
Adamik 2020 Poland Observational
Home
Household 9756 index cases;
3553 secondary cases
Not reported Not reported No No Only cases for which clear epidemiological links were
registered as household transmission together with their
source cases were included. Cases in social care units and
households of minimum 15 inhabitants were removed
from the analysis, as an initial analysis revealed that those
were not representative for the overall population, due to
over-represented comorbidities and severe cases.
Afonso 2021 Brazil Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
June 15 to
October 28, 2020
Household 267 children and
adolescents who were
household contacts
of parents and/or
relatives who were
essential workers
(index cases)
RT-PCR Within 10-12
days of contact
with index case
No <25, 25–30,
or >30
Ct cut-offs corresponded to high, moderate, or low viral
load respectively.
Essential workers included HCWs, public security workers,
university staff and others.
Agergaard 2020 Denmark Home
quarantine with
1 asymptomatic
index case
11/03/2020 to
01/04/2020
Household Family cluster of 5:
Index case arranged a
self-imposed 2-week
home quarantine
along with family of
four
PCR
Serology
Not reported
for PCR
No Not specified
for PCR
Index case recently returned from skiing trip in Austria
iFlash SARS-CoV-2 N/S IgM/IgG cut-off: ≥12 AU/ml =
positive.
DiaSorin SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 IgG cut-off: ≥15 AU/ml =
positive
Akaishi 2021 Japan Observational
Homes
Community
July 2020 to
March 2021
Household
Community
2179 participants
with recent history of
close contact in home,
dormitory, school,
workplace, hotels,
restaurants, bars, cars,
or other places
RT-PCR Unclear No Not specified 4550 participants had reliable data regarding the place of
contact; however, only 2179 of these were documented
as close contacts.
The study period was before the replacement of major
viral strains spreading in the locality from the original
strains to N501Y mutant strains in May 2021.
Angulo-Bazán
2021
Peru Observational
retrospective
Household
23/04/2020 to
02/05/2020
Household 52 households in
Metropolitan Lima
with only one member
with COVID-19
Contacts cohabited in
same home with index
case
RT-PCR
(index)
Serology
Not reported No Not specified Evaluation was conducted 13.6 ± 3.7 days after the
diagnostic test
Armann 2021 Germany Observational
- cross-sectional
Schools, homes
May to October
2020
Local
Household
1538 students and
507 teachers were
initially enrolled,
and 1334 students
and 445 teachers
completed both study
visits.
Serology Week 0 and
Week 16
No N/A an index (S/C) of < 1.4 was considered negative whereas
one >/= 1.4 was considered positive) and an ELISA
detecting IgG against the S1 domain of the SARS-CoV-2
spike protein (Euroimmun® Anti-SARS CoV-2 ELISA) (a
ratio < 0.8 was considered negative, 0.8–1.1 equivocal,
>1.1 positive)
Arnedo-Pena 2020 Spain Retrospective
cohort
Homes
February-May
2020
Household 347 index cases: 745
household contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not specified COVID-19 cases of community outbreaks and from
institutions as nursing homes were excluded.
Secondary attack rate was defined as the proportion of
secondary cases from the total of contacts that live in the
household of index case.
Atherstone 2021 USA Observational
Community
December 2020
Community 441 close contacts of
COVID-19 patients at 2
high school wrestling
tournaments
RT-PCR Unclear No Not specified 5 close contacts excluded because of previous SARS-CoV-
2 positive test
Baettig 2020 Switzerland Retrospective
case series
Military canton
March 2020
Local 1 index case; 55
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
PCR: Within
24 hrs of
index case for
symptomatic
subjects
Serology: 14
days post-
exposure
No Not reported Positive cases were defined with two positive PCR testing
for SARS-CoV-2 from nasopharyngeal swabs.
Baker 2020 USA Observational
Acute-care
hospital
Nosocomial 44 HCWs who
provided care for a
hospitalized patient
with COVID-19 without
PPE due to delayed
diagnosis of COVID-19
RT-PCR Not reported No Not specified Contact and droplet precautions (including eye
protection) were instituted
Bao 2020 China Observational
Entertainment
venue
January and
February 2020
Community Potentially exposed
workers, customers
and their family
members potentially
exposed to COVID-19
subject at a swimming
pool
RT-PCR Not reported No Not specified Men and women exhibited different usage behaviour in
that male bathers occupied the entire area, but mainly
stayed at the lounge hall, while female bathers always
went home after a bath. The temperature and humidity
were significantly higher than what they would have been
in an open air-conditioning environment.
Basso 2020 Norway Observational
study
Hospital
Nosocomial Quarantined HCWs
exposed to COVID-19
patient
PCR
Serology
Approximately
2 weeks after
viral exposure;
3 weeks for
serology
No N/A
S/CO ratio ≥1
is positive for
antibody
The HCWs were quarantined for 2 weeks due to
participation in aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs)
with insufficient personal protective equipment (PPE),
or close contact viral exposure (defined as ≤2 m for ≥15
min).
Bays 2020 USA Observational
study
Community
hospital and
university
medical centre
February and
March, 2020
Nosocomial Two index patients
and 421 exposed
HCWs
RT-PCR Not reported No Not specified Exposed staff were identified by analyzing the EMR
and conducting active case finding in combination with
structured interviews. They wore neither surgical masks
nor eye protection, and were risk stratified based on
examination of the medical record and subsequent
phone interviews as follows: high risk: nose or mouth
exposed during intubation or bronchoscopy; moderate:
nose or mouth exposed and for over 2 minutes; and low:
nose or mouth exposed under 2 minutes. Ct was 25 for 1
index case - day 15
Bender 2021 Germany Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
February to
March 2020
Community 59 index cases; 280
contacts
Not specified Not specified No Not specified
Bernardes-Souza
2021
Brazil Observational-
case-control
Homes
May and June
2020
Household 95 cases and 393
controls
Index cases were
logistics workers
RT-PCR
Serology
Beginning of
each visit
No N/A Logistics worker was defined as an individual with an
occupation focused on the transportation of people or
goods and whose job involves traveling outside the town
of residence at least once a week.
A sample was considered positive if IgM or IgG antibodies
were detectable.
Bhatt 2022 Canada Observational
- cohort
Home
Sept 2020 to
March 2021
Household 180 index participants;
515 household
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
At the study
visit: within 14
days of patient
screening or
consent
No Not specified Samples were considered antibody positive for a
particular isotype (IgG, IgA or IgM) when both antispike
and anti-nucleocapsid antibodies were detected above
the cut-off values (signal-to-cut-off value ≥ 1) for that
isotype. Samples were considered positive for SARS-CoV-
2 antibody if they were positive for IgG or for both IgA
and IgM.
Bi 2020 China Retrospective
cohort
Home or
quarantine facility
January-February
2020
Local
Household
Community
391 SARS-CoV-2
cases and 1286 close
contacts
RT-PCR RT-PCR No Not reported Close contacts were identified through contact tracing of
a confirmed case and were defined as those who lived in
the same apartment, shared a meal, travelled, or socially
interacted with an index case 2 days before symptom
onset. Casual contacts (e.g., other clinic patients) and
some close contacts (e.g., nurses) who wore a mask
during exposure were not included in this group.
Bi 2021 Switzerland Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
April 3rd to June
30th 2020
Household 4534 household
members
Serology N/A No N/A IgG antibodies by ELISA
Bistaraki 2021 Greece Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
October to
December 2020
Household
Community
29,385 index cases;
64,608 contacts
Not specified Not specified No Not specified Various social distancing measures were imposed
depending on the COVID-19 risk of each regional unit in
Greece. Lockdown in place
Bjorkman 2021 USA Observational
Residence halls in
university
August 17
– November 25
2020
Local 6408 residential
students
RT-qPCR Not specified No N/A
Blaisdell 2020 USA Observational
study
4 overnight
camps
June–August
2020
Community Multi-layered
prevention and
mitigation strategy
642 children and 380
staff members, aged
7–70 years
RT-PCR 4.1 to 9.1 days
after camp
arrival
No Not specified Hygiene measures: Precamp quarantine, pre- and
postarrival testing and symptom screening, cohorting,
and physical distancing between cohorts. In addition,
camps required use of face coverings, enhanced hygiene
measures, enhanced cleaning and disinfecting, maximal
outdoor programming, and early and rapid identification
of infection and isolation.
Böhmer 2020 Germany Observational
Workplace, home
January-February
2020
Local
Household
1 index case; 241
contacts
RT-PCR
WGS
3-5 days post-
exposure
No Not reported
Boscolo-Rizzo
2020
Italy Cross-sectional
Homes
March to April
2020
Household 179 primary cases;
296 household
contacts
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported
Brown 2020 USA Survey - cross-
sectional
Classroom
February to
March, 2020
Local Students exposed
to an index case
(teacher)
Serology 2 weeks post-
exposure to
index case
No Reciprocal
titres of >400
considered
positive
Reciprocal
titres of >100
but <400
considered
indeterminate
Burke 2020 USA Observational
prospective
Homes
February to
March 2020
Household 10 primary cases; 445
close contacts
Not reported Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
infected case
No Not reported 19 (4%) of the 445 contacts were members of a patient’s
household, and five of these 19 contacts continued to
have household exposure to the patient with confirmed
COVID-19 during the patient’s isolation period; 104 (23%)
were community members who spent at least 10 minutes
within 6 feet of a patient with confirmed disease; 100
(22%) were community members who were exposed**
to a patient in a health care setting; and 222 (50%) were
health care personnel
Calvani 2021 Italy Observational
- case-control
Homes
Schools
October to
December 2020
Local
Household
162 children (81 SARS-
CoV-2 positive and 81
Controls)
Antigen rapid
detection test
(Ag RDT)
NAAT
Not specified No Ag RDT < 10 UI
was confirmed
by a positive
SARS-CoV-2
NAAT result
Canova 2020 Switzerland Observational
case series
Primary care
setting
Nosocomial 1 index case; 21 HCWs
who interacted with
index case without
PPE
RT-PCR 7 days after
the initial
exposure
No Not reported
Carazo 2021 Canada Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
May 6 to June 22
2020
Household 9,096 household
contacts of 4,542
SARS-CoV-2 infected
HCWs
PCR Not specified No Not specified Secondary household attack rates were estimated in a
subsample of 3,823 participants who lived in households
with ≥2 members where the HCW was the first case.
Cariani 2020 Italy Retrospective
Hospital
March to April
2020
Nosocomial HCWs in close contact
with SARS-CoV-
2-positive cases
(patients, co-workers,
or relatives), or with
symptoms of RTI
RT-PCR Not reported No <40
considered
positive
Carvalho 2022 Brazil Observational
Homes
16 April to 3
November 2020
Household 60 family clusters:
household contacts
of HCWs
RT-qPCR Not specified No Not specified
Cerami 2021 USA Observational
- cohort
Homes
April to October
2020
Household 100 index cases and
208 of their household
members
PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Within 3 weeks No Not specified
Charlotte 2020 France Retrospective
Indoor choir
rehearsal
March 2020
Community Nonventilated room;
sitting less close to
one another than
usual, but at <1.82m
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Chaw 2020 Brunei Observational
Various
March 2020
Local
Community
Primary cases:
Presumably infected
at religious event in
Malaysia
Secondary cases:
Epidemiologic link to a
primary case
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Household, workplace, social, and a local religious
gathering. Initial cluster of SARS-CoV-2 cases arose
from 19 persons who had attended the Tablighi Jama’at
gathering in Malaysia, resulting in 52 locally transmitted
cases.
Chen 2020 China Aircraft
24 January 2020
Aircraft Close contact to 2
passengers presenting
with a fever and URTI
symptoms
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported The aircraft was equipped with air handling systems.
Chen 2020a China Retrospective
observational
Home or
workplace
January-March
2020
Local
Household
69 recurrent-positive
patients; 209 close
contacts
RT-PCR Every 3 days No Not specified
Chen 2020b China Prospective
cohort
Hospital
January-February
2020
Nosocomial 5 index patients; 105
HCWs
RT-PCR
Serology
From 14 days
post-exposure:
1st & 14th day
of quarantine
No <40
considered
positive
Chen 2020c China Observational
Various
January to March
2020
Local
Household
Community
Nosocomial
157 locally reported
confirmed cases,
30 asymptomatic
infections: 2147 close
contacts
Not reported Unclear No Not reported Family members, relatives, friends/pilgrims, colleagues/
classmates, medical staff, and general personnel judged
by the investigator.
Cheng 2020 Taiwan Observational
Homes, hospital
January to March
2020
Household
Nosocomial
100 confirmed cases
of confirmed: 2761
close contacts
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported
Chu 2020 USA Observational
Various
January 2020
Community Close contacts for an
early confirmed case
of COVID-19
RT-PCR
Serology
Unclear No Antibody
titres >400
considered
seropositive.
Office, community, Urgent care clinic identified via contact
tracing
Chu 2021 USA Retrospective
cohort study
Household
Household Household contacts
of primary cases
defined as children
and adolescents with
lab-confirmed COVID-
19 (n=224)
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Did not distinguish between confirmed and probable
cases among household contacts. A “primary case”
is camp attendee with the earliest onset date in the
household and a “secondary case” as a household contact
with confirmed or probable COVID-19.
Contejean 2020 France Observational
Comparative
Tertiary-care
university
hospital
Feb-Mar 2020
Nosocomial HCW exposed to
COVID-19 patients
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported:
result was
+ve if 3/5 of
gene targets
amplified
Hygiene measures: All employees were encouraged
to wear a face mask as often as possible in hospital
(particularly in the presence of other persons), to wash/
disinfect their hands regularly (and after every contact
with other persons), to stay at least 2 meters away from
others, to cover their mouth and nose with a tissue or
sleeve when coughing or sneezing, to put used tissues
in the bin immediately and wash hands afterwards, to
avoid touching eyes, mouth. Educational messages were
released on the internal website and on posters placed in
all hospital premises.
Cordery 2021 UK Observational
Schools
Homes
September 2020
Local
Household
5 symptomatic cases
13 bubble contacts
8 child household
contacts
15 adult household
contacts
PCR Days 7, 14,
and 21
No Not specified
COVID-19 National
Emergency
Response Center
2020
S. Korea Observational
Various
January to March
2020
Local
Household
Nosocomial
30 cases; 2,370
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Homes, work, hospitals
Craxford 2021 UK Observational
- cohort
Homes
April to July 2020
Household 178 household
contacts of 137 HCWs
Serology Within 5
months of
tracking HCWs
No N/A
Danis 2020 France Observational
case series
Chalet, school
January to
February 2020
Local
Household
I adult case with 15
contacts in chalet; 1
paediatric case with
172 school contacts
RT-PCR Within 5 days
of diagnosis of
cases
No Not reported The index case stayed 4 days in the chalet with 10 English
tourists and a family of 5 French residents. One paediatric
case, with picornavirus and influenza A coinfection, visited
3 different schools while symptomatic.
Dattner 2020 Israel Observational
Home
March to June
2020
Household 637 households,
average household
size of 5.3
RT-PCR
Serology
Serology: 4
weeks post
PCR testing
No Not reported
de Brito 2020 Brazil Observational
descriptive
Household
April-May 2020
Household Socially distanced
household contacts of
index case
RT-PCR
Serology
Serology: 4
weeks post-
exposure
PCR unclear
No Not reported Index case: First member of the cluster who had
symptoms and who had a known risk of exposure outside
the household during the family's stay in the same
condominium; secondary case: Contacts with the index
case. Asymptomatic patients: Those who had household
contact and positive serology but no symptoms. Probable
cases corresponded to confirmed case contacts who
developed symptoms compatible with COVID despite
negative serology and/or negative RT-PCR results.
Deng 2020 China Observational
Home
January to
February 2020
Household 27 cases; 347 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Desmet 2020 Belgium Observational
- cross-sectional
School
November 2019
to March 2020
Local 84 aged between
6 and 30 months
attending day-care
RT-PCR First weeks of
the epidemic in
Belgium
No Not reported
Dimcheff 2020 USA Survey: cross-
sectional
Tertiary-care
referral facility
June 8 to July 8,
2020
Community
Nosocomial
Household
HCW exposed to
COVID-19 patients
either in or outside
hospital
Serology 8 weeks post-
exposure
No Not reported Hygiene measures: Daily COVID-19 symptom screening
upon building entry, exclusion of visitors from the facility,
and institution of telework in remote offices or at home,
isolation of confirmed COVID-19 patients, conversion of
COVID-19 wards to negative pressure environments, use
of PAPRs) or N95 respirators along with PPE by staff.
Dong 2020 China Observational
Homes
Household 135 cases; 259 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Doung-ngern 2020 Thailand Retrospective
case-control
Various
March to April
2020
Local 3 large clusters in
nightclubs, boxing
stadiums, and a state
enterprise office
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Hygiene measures: Consistent wearing of masks,
handwashing, and social distancing in public.
Draper 2020 Australia Observational
Various
March to April
2020
Local
Household
Nosocomial
28 cases; 445 close
contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
infected case
No Not reported Cruise ship, homes, aircraft, hospital
Dub 2020 Finland Retrospective
cohort (2)
School and
Household
Local
Household
School and household
contacts of 2 index
cases who contracted
COVID-19 at school
RT-PCR
Serology
Serology: >4
weeks post-
exposure
No MNT titre of
≥ 6 considered
positive
FMIA titre
3·4 U/ml
considered
positive
Expert Taskforce
2020
Japan Observational
prospective
Cruise ship
February 2020
Local 3,711 persons in
cruise ship
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Passengers were allowed a 60-minute period on an
exterior deck each day, during which they were instructed
to wear masks, refrain from touching anything, and
maintain a 1-meter distance from others. Monitors
observed these periods. After each group came a 30-
minute period in which the areas were disinfected. Room
cleaning was suspended. Food and clean linens were
delivered to cabin doors by crew, and dirty dishes and
linens were picked up at cabin doors by crew.
Only symptomatic close contacts were tested initially.
Farronato 2021 Italy Observational
Homes
June 2020 to
August 2020
Household 49 child contacts of
52 cases
Serology 22 and 152
days of
diagnosis
No N/A Anti-S1 and anti-nucleocapsid ELISA. CBC buffer as
controls.
Fateh-Moghadam
2020
Italy Observational
Various
March to April
2020
Community 2,812 cases; 6,690
community contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Institutional settings including nursing homes, hospitals,
day and residential centers for the disabled and similar
structures, and convents
Firestone 2020 USA Observational
retrospective
Motorcycle rally
August-
September 2020
Local 51 primary event-
associated cases,
and 35 secondary or
tertiary cases
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Unclear No Not reported Secondary cases: Laboratory-confirmed infections in
persons who did not attend the rally but who received
SARS-CoV-2–positive test results after having contact with
a person who had a primary case during their infectious
period. Tertiary cases were laboratory-confirmed cases
in persons who had contact with a person who had a
secondary case during their infectious period.
SARS-CoV-2 RNA-positive clinical specimens were
obtained from clinical laboratories, and
Fontanet 2021 France Retrospective
cohort study
School
March to April
2020
Local 2004 participants:
pupils, their parents
and siblings, as well
as teachers and non-
teaching staff of a
high school
Serology 10 weeks No N/A
Galow 2021 Germany Observational
Homes
June 2020
Household 143 index cases; 248
household contacts
Serology Not specified No N/A
Gamboa Moreno
2021
Spain Observational
Schools
Homes
Sept. 7 to Oct. 31,
2020
Household
Community
Exposures:
School - 729
Home - 974
PCR Not specified No Not specified There were strict non-pharmaceutical measures at school
settings and proper epidemiological surveillance.
Gan 2020 China Observational
retrospective
survey
Various
January-February
2020
Local
Household
Community
1 052 cases in 366
epidemic clusters
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Family living together, gathering dinner, collective work,
ride-thy-car, other aggregation exposure,
Gaskell 2021 UK Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
October to
December 2020
Household 343 households with
1242 participants
Serology Within 10
days of
completing the
questionnaire
No N/A Strictly orthodox Jewish Community.
Ge 2021 China Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
January to August
2020
Household
Community
730 index patients
8852 close contacts
RT-PCR Unclear: index
patients and
their contacts
received
regular testing
No Not specified Close contacts were centrally quarantined for at least 14
days except in areas with limited resources where home
self-quarantine was alternatively suggested.
Ghinai 2020 USA Observational
2 Social
gatherings
January-March
2020
Community 16 cases (7 confirmed
and 9 probable) (1
index case)
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported A birthday party, funeral, and church attendance.
Gold 2021 USA Observational
School
Homes
Dec. 1, 2020–Jan.
22, 2021
Local
Household
9 school clusters
(n=45); 69 household
members
RT-PCR Within
5–10 days
of their last
documented
in-school
exposure
No Not specified Students and staff members exposed to a COVID-19
patient were advised to quarantine for a minimum of
7 days if a specimen collected ≥5 days after exposure
was negative for SARS-CoV-2 and they remained
asymptomatic or for 10 days if they were not tested and
remained asymptomatic.
Gomaa 2021 Egypt Observational
- cohort
Homes
April to October
2020
Household 23 index cases; 98
household contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Days 1, 3, 6, 9
and 14
No Not specified Microneutralization Assay used to test for antibodies
Gonçalves 2021 Brazil Observational
- case-control
Homes
April–June 2020
Household 271 case-patients and
1,396 controls
RT-PCR
Serology
Not specified No Not specified Controls were the seronegative persons in 3
representative community surveys of SARS-CoV-2
antibody prevalence.
Gong 2020 China Observational
Various
January-February
2020
Household
Community
3 clusters: 5 index
cases; 9 close contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Travelling and dining, or were living together.
Gu 2020 China Observational
Karaoke room
January 2020
Local 14 people exposed
to 2 index cases in a
karaoke room
RT-PCR
Serology
PCR: Within
72 hrs post-
exposure
Serology: 6
weeks post-
exposure
No Not reported
Hamner 2020 USA Observational
Choir practice
March 2020
Local 1 index case; 60 close
contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of index case
No Not reported
Han 2020 S. Korea Observational
Spa facility
Mar-April 2020
Community Contacts for 10 index
cases from Spa facility
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Hast 2022 USA Observational
School
December
2020–January
2021
Local 90 index cases; 628
school contacts
RT-PCR 5 to 7 days
post-exposure;
up to 10
days where
necessary
No Not specified
Heavey 2020 Ireland Observational
School
March 2020
Local 6 index cases; 1155
contacts
Not reported Not reported No No Three paediatric cases and three adult cases of COVID-
19 with a history of school attendance were identified.
Exposed at school in the classroom, during sports
lessons, music lessons and during choir practice for a
religious ceremony, which involved a number of schools
mixing in a church environment.
Helsingen 2020 Norway RCT
Training facilities
May-June 2020
Local Members of the
participating training
facilities age 18 years
or older who were not
at increased risk for
severe Covid-19
RT-PCR
Serology
Serology: 4
weeks after
start of study
No Not reported Hygiene measures: Avoidance of body contact; 1
metre distance between individuals at all times; 2
metre distance for high intensity activities; provision of
disinfectants at all workstations; cleaning requirements
of all equipment after use by participant; regular cleaning
of facilities and access control by facility employees to
ensure distance measures and avoid overcrowding.
Changing rooms were open, but showers and saunas
remained closed.
All participants were mailed a home-test kit including
two swabs and a tube with virus transport medium for
SARS-CoV-2 RNA.
Hendrix 2020 USA Observational
Hair salon
May 2020
Local Contacts for 2 stylists
who tested positive for
COVID-19
PCR Not reported No Not reported Hygiene measures: During all interactions with clients
at salon A, stylist A wore a double-layered cotton face
covering, and stylist B wore a double-layered cotton face
covering or a surgical mask.
Hirschman 2020 USA Observational
study
Home and social
gatherings
June 2020
Household
Community
2 index cases;
58 primary and
secondary contacts
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported
Hobbs 2020 USA Case-control
study
University
Medical Centre
September-
November 2020
Local
Household
Community
397 children and
adolescents: Cases
154; controls 243
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Hoehl 2021 Germany Observational
Daycare Centre
12 weeks (June-
Sept 2020)
Local
Community
Attendees and staff
from 50 day-care
centres
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Hygiene measures: Barring children and staff with
symptoms of COVID-19, other than runny nose, from
entering the facilities, as well as denying access to
individuals with known exposure to SARS-CoV-2. Access
to the facilities was also denied to children if a household
member was symptomatic or was in quarantine due
to contact with SARS-CoV-2. Wearing of masks was
not mandatory for children or nor staff. The access of
caregivers to the facilities was limited.
Hong 2020 China Observational
prospective
Home
January-April
2020
Household 9 patients with
recurrent infection; 13
close contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
NGS
After re-
admission of
index patients.
No Not reported
Hsu 2021 Taiwan Observational
Homes
Jan. 28/01/2020
to 28/02/2021
Household 18 index cases, 145
household contacts
RT-PCR Testing
was done
if contacts
showed
symptoms
No Not specified
Hu 2020 China Observational
Train travellers
19 Dec. 2019 to 6
Mar. 2020
Local 2334 index patients
and 72 093 close
contacts who had
co-travel times of 0-8
hours
Not specified Not specified No Not specified
Hu 2021 China Observational
retrospective
Various
January to April
2020
Household
Community
1178 cases; 15,648
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Homes, social events, travel, other settings.
Hu 2021 China Observational
Aircrafts
Jan. 4 to Mar. 14,
2020
Local 175 index cases; 5622
close contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Hua 2020 China Observational
retrospective
Home
January to April
2020
Household Children and adult
contacts from the 314
families
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Huang 2020 China Prospective
contact-tracing
study
Restaurant, home
January 2020
Household
Community
1 index case; 22 close
contacts
RT-PCR Within 3 days
of index cases
No Not reported Close contacts quarantined at home or hospital.
Huang 2020a Taiwan Retrospective
case series
Various
January-April
2020
Local
Household
Community
Nosocomial
15 primary cases:
3795 close contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Aircraft, home, classroom, workplace, hospital.
Huang 2021 Taiwan Observational
Hospital
Feb. to Mar. 2020
Nosocomial 181 close contacts:
HCWs (n=127),
in-patients
(n=27), persons
accompanying
hospital patients
(n=27)
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not specified No 21.3 on day
9 and 16.7
on day 12 for
index case
The index case was admitted due to heart failure and
cellulitis.
Islam 2020 Bangladesh Observational
Various
March to June
2020
Local
Household
Community
Nosocomial
181 cases; 391 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Household, health care facility, funeral ceremony, public
transportation, family members, and others.
Jashaninejad 2021 Iran Observational
- cohort
Homes
Mid-May to mid-
July, 2020
Household 323 index cases and
989 related close
contacts
RT-PCR Unclear: after
identification
through
contact tracing
No Not specified
Jeewandara 2021 Sri-Lanka Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
15 April 2020 to
19 May 2020
Household
Community
3 cases; 1093 close
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Within 14 days No Not specified All RT-qPCR positive, close contacts were classified as
cases and were hospitalized. RT-qPCR negative contacts
were directed to a quarantine facility for 14 days to
ensure that they stay isolated under observation of health
staff.
-COV-2 Total antibody responses were assessed using
ELISA.
Jia 2020 China Observational
Home
January to
February 2020
Household 11 clusters (n=583) RT-PCR Not reported No <37
considered
positive
A close contact was defined as a person who did
not take effective protection against a suspected or
confirmed case 2 d before the onset of symptoms or an
asymptomatic infected person 2 d before sampling.
Ct-value of 40 or more was defined as negative.
Jiang 2020 China Observational
Home
January to
February 2020
Household
Community
8 index cases, 300
contacts
rRT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Every 24 hours
for 2 weeks
No <37
considered
positive
Ct value ≥40 was considered negative. The maximum
likelihood phylogenetic tree of the complete genomes
was conducted by using RAxML software with 1000
bootstrap replicates, employing the general time-
reversible nucleotide substitution mode.
Jing 2020 China Retrospective
cohort study
Homes
January-February
2020
Household 195 unrelated close
contact groups (215
primary cases, 134
secondary or tertiary
cases, and 1964
uninfected close
contacts)
RT-PCR Days 1 and 14
of quarantine
No Not reported
Jing 2020a China Observational
study
Homes, public
places
February 2020
Household
Community
68 clusters involving
217 cases
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Jones 2021 UK
France
Observational
Super League
Rugby
August to
October 2020
Local 136: 8 index cases:
28 identified close
contacts and 100
other players
RT-PCR Within 14 days
of match day
No Not specified:
Ct for index
cases 17.8
to 27
Close contacts were defined by analysis of video footage
for player interactions and microtechnology (GPS) data
for proximity analysis. All participants were within a ≤7-
day RT-PCR screening cycle.
Jordan 2022 Spain Observational
Schools
29 June to 31 July
2020
Local 2 index cases; 253
close contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Days 0, 7, 14
for PCR; 0 and
5 weeks for
serology
No Not specified Stringent infection control measures were in place. IgG
serology.
Kang 2020 S. Korea Observational
Night clubs
April-May 2020
Local 96 primary cases and
150 secondary cases;
5,517 visitors
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Kant 2020 India Retrospective
(contact tracing)
Regional Medical
Research Centre
May 2020
Local
Community
Nosocomial
1 index case
diagnosed post-
mortem: number of
exposures unclear
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported Contacts traced: People from the market where the index
case had his shop, his treating physicians, people who
attended his funeral, family members and friends.
Karumanagoundar
2021
India Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
March–May 2020
Household
Community
931 primary cases; 15
702 contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Katlama 2022 France Observational
Homes
July to September
2020
Household 87 index cases and
255 contacts
Serology Prior to a
potential
second wave of
the epidemic
that emerged
in France in
early October
2020
No N/A The presence of IgG antibodies against the nucleocapsid
protein was measured and interpreted using
commercially available chemiluminescent microparticle
immunoassay (CMIA) kits.
Kawasuji 2020 Japan Case-control
study
University
Hospital
April-May 2020
Nosocomial 28 index cases: 105
close contacts
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported Index patients and those with secondary transmission
were estimated based on serial intervals in the family
clusters.
Khanh 2020 Vietnam Retrospective
Aircraft
March 2020
Community 1 index case: 217
close contacts
PCR 4 days after
positive test
result of index
case
No Not reported Successfully traced passengers and crew members were
interviewed by use of a standard questionnaire, tested for
SARS-CoV-2.
Kim 2020 S. Korea Retrospective
observational
Home setting
January-April
2020
Household 107 paediatric index
cases: 248 household
members of which
207 were exposed
RT-PCR Within 2 days
of COVID-19
diagnosis of
the index case
No Ct value of ≤35
is positive and
>40 is negative
Guardian wore a KF94 (N95 equivalent) mask, gloves, full
body suit (or waterproof long-sleeve gowns) and goggles.
Kim 2020a S. Korea Case series
Various
January-February
2020
Household
Community
1 index case; 4 close
contacts
RT-PCR 4 days post-
exposure
No N/A 2 household contacts, 1 church contact, 1 restaurant
Kim 2020b S. Korea Retrospective
observational
University
hospital
February 2020
Nosocomial 4 confirmed cases:
290 contacts
RT-PCR Within 8 days
of index case
diagnosis
No Ct <35 was
considered
positive
Medical staff in the triage room used level-D PPE and
everyone in the hospital was encouraged to wear
masks and follow hand hygiene practices. Contact
with confirmed COVID-19 cases was frequent among
inpatients and medical support personnel.
Kim 2021 S. Korea Observational
Dental clinic
May 2020
Local 1 index case, 8 close
contacts (HCWs)
RT-PCR
Serology
Start and
the end of
a two-week
quarantine.
Serologic
tests were
performed
one to two
months post-
quarantine
No 22.38 for RdRp
and 22.52 for
E genes
All HCWs wore particulate filtering respirators with 94%
filter capacity and gloves, but none wore eye protection
or gowns. Patient (index case) did not wear a face mask.
Kitahara 2022 Japan Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
Aug. 1 to Sept. 6
2020
Household
Community
20 index cases; 114
close contacts
RT-PCR 1-3 days after
identification
and symptoms
onset
No Not specified
Klompas 2021 USA Observational
- case-control
Hospital (acute
care)
September 2020
Nosocomial 1 large cluster with
1 index case; 1457
direct and associated
contacts
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Every 3 days No Not specified
Kolodziej 2022 Netherlands Observational
- cohort
Homes
October to
December 2020
Household 85 index cases; 241
household contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Saliva samples
by self-
sampling at
day 1, 3, 5, 7,
10, 14, 21, 28,
35, and 42;
NPS and OPS
sample day 7;
Capillary blood
day 42
No Not specified
Koureas 2021 Greece Observational
Homes
8 April–4 June
2020
Household 40 infected
households: 135 cases
and 286 contacts
RT-PCR Day 0, day 7,
day 14
No Not specified
Kumar 2021 India Observational
Community
March-May 2020
Community 144 source cases: RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported Persons with symptoms of ILI and SARI as well as known
high-risk contacts of a confirmed COVID-19 patient were
included.
Kuwelker 2021 Norway Prospective
case-ascertained
study
Homes
Feb-April 2020
Household 112 index cases; 179
household members
Serology 6-8 weeks
after symptom
onset in the
index case.
No N/A Single-person households were excluded from the
analysis. Serum samples from index cases and household
members were collected 6-8 weeks after symptom onset
in the index case.
Kuwelker 2021 Norway Observational
- cohort
Homes
28th February to
4th April 2020
Household 112 households (291
participants)
Serology 6–8 weeks
after NP
sampling of
index patient
No Individuals
with titres
≥100 were
defined as
positive
ELISA was used for detecting SARS-CoV-2-specific
antibodies. IgG antibody.
Kwok 2020 Hong Kong Retrospective
observational
Quarantine or
isolation
February 2020
Local
Household
53 cases; 206 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported A secondary case referred to the first generation of
infection induced by an index case following contact with
this case.
Ladhani 2020 UK Prospective
Care homes
April 2020
Nosocomial 6 London care homes
reporting a suspected
outbreak (2 or more
cases); 254 staff
members
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported 254 of 474 (54%) staff members provided a nasal self-
swab; 12 were symptomatic at the time of swabbing.
Ladhani 2020a UK Prospective
Care homes
April 2020
Nosocomial 6 London care
homes reporting a
suspected outbreak
(2 or more cases); 254
staff members; 264
residents
RT-PCR Not reported Yes Unclear: Ct
values <35
were cultured
254 of 474 (54%) staff members provided a nasal self-
swab; 12 were symptomatic at the time of swabbing.
Laws 2020 USA Prospective
cohort
Home setting
March-May 2020
Household 1 paediatric index
case: 188 household
contacts
RT-PCR Study
enrolment (day
0); study close-
out (day 14)
No Not reported Index case: household member with earliest symptom
onset (and positive SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR test result).
Community prevalence in the 2 metropolitan areas was
low during this time, and both were under stay-at-home
orders. All enrolled index case patients and household
contacts were followed prospectively for 14 days.
Five households were selected for intensive swabbing
requiring collection of respiratory specimens from all
household members during four interim visits regardless
of symptom presence.
Laws 2021 USA Observational
- cohort
Homes
March to May
2020
Household 188 household
contacts
RT-PCR Days 0 and 14 No Not specified
Laxminarayan
2020
India Observational
Various
April to August
2020
Local
Household
Community
3,084,885 known
exposed contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Individual-level epidemiological data on cases and
contacts, as well as laboratory test results, were available
from 575,071 tested contacts of 84,965 confirmed cases.
Lee 2020 S. Korea Observational
Hospital
February-June
2020
Household 12 paediatric cases;
12 guardians as close
contact. All guardians
used PPE
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Lee 2020a S. Korea Observational
Homes
February to
March 2020
Household 23 close contacts PCR Unclear No Not reported
Lewis 2020 USA Observational
Homes
March to April
2020
Household 58 households (Utah,
n = 34; Wisconsin,
n = 24), 58 primary
patients and 188
household contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Not reported No Not reported
Li 2020 China Observational
Home setting
Feb 2020
Household Family cluster of
1 index case: 5
household contacts
RT-PCR One day after
index case
tested positive
No Not reported Unknown when index case started shedding virus.
Li 2020a China Observational
case series
Home, hospital
January-February
2020
Household
Nosocomial
2-family cluster of 1
index case: 7 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Li 2020b China Retrospective
observational
Home
January-February
2020
Household 3-family cluster of 3
index cases: 14 close
contacts
RT-PCR Every 2–3 days
until hospital
discharge.
No <38
considered
positive
Li 2020c China Retrospective
observational
Home
January-March
2020
Household 30 cases from 35
cluster-onset families
(COFs) and 41 cases
from 16 solitary-onset
families (SOFs)
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Li 2020d China Observational
Household
February to
March 2020
Household 105 index patients;
392 household
contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
infected case
No Not reported
Li 2021a China Observational
- cohort
Homes
Dec 2, 2019 to
April 18, 2020
Household 24985 primary cases
and 52822 household
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Li 2021b China Observational
Homes
Community
January 23-
February 25,
2020.
Household
Community
476 symptomatic
persons; 2,382 close
contacts
PCR Not specified No Not specified
Lin 2021 China Observational
Home
January 2020
Household 1 paediatric index
case; 5 household
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Not specified No Serology: Test
result ≥ 10.0
AU/mL was
reported as
positive
Liu 2020 China Retrospective
observational
Home setting
Feb 2020
Household Family cluster of
1 index case: 7
household contacts
RT-PCR Immediately
after index
case tested
positive
No If both the
nCovORF1ab
and nCoV-NP
showed
positive
results,
COVID-19
infection was
considered
Unclear whether the index case was actually the first case
Liu 2020a China Retrospective
case series
Hospital
January 2020
Nosocomial 30 HCWs with direct
contact with patients
RT-PCR Not reported No <40
considered
positive
30 cases have a history of direct contact with patients
with neo-coronary pneumonia (within 1 m), 1 to 28
contacts, an average of 12 (7,16) contact times, contact
time of 0.5 to 3.5 h, the average cumulative contact time
of 2 (1.5, 2.7) h.
Liu 2020b China Retrospective
cohort study
Various
January-March
2020
Household
Community
Nosocomial
1158 index cases:
11,580 contacts
RT-PCR Every several
days
No Not reported Homes, social venues, various types of transportations
Liu 2020c China Prospective
observational
Unclear 147 asymptomatic
carriers: 1150 close
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported RT-PCR for asymptomatic carriers - testing method not
described for close contacts
Liu 2021 USA Observational
- cohort
Homes
Dec. 2020 to Feb.
2021
Household 15 index cases; 50
household contacts
RT-PCR Every 3 days
for 14 days
after index
positivity.
No Not specified
López 2020 USA Retrospective
contact tracing
School setting
April-July 2020
Local
Household
12 index paediatric
cases: 101 facility
contacts; 184 overall
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Index case: first confirmed case identified in a person at
the childcare facility
Primary case: Earliest confirmed case linked to the
outbreak.
Overall attack rates include facility-associated cases,
nonfacility contact cases and all facility staff members and
attendees and nonfacility contacts.
López 2021 Spain Observational
- cohort
Homes
April to June 2020
Household 89 index cases; 229
household members
PCR Not specified No Not specified
Lopez Bernal 2020 UK Observational
Homes
January to March
2020
Household
Community
233 households with
two or more people;
472 contacts.
PCR Unclear No Not reported Healthcare workers, returning travellers and airplane
exposures were excluded.
Lopez Bernal 2022 UK Observational
Homes
Community
January to March
2020
Household
Community
233 households with
472 contacts
PCR If and when
contacts
developed
symptoms
No Not specified
Lucey 2020 Ireland Observational
Hospital
March-May 2020
Nosocomial 5 HCWs in cluster 1;
2 HCWs in cluster 3;
HCW in cluster 2 not
specified; 52 patients
infected with SARS-
CoV-2;
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not reported No Not reported SARS-CoV-2 RNA was extracted from nasopharyngeal
swabs obtained from COVID-19 cases and their
corresponding HCWs were sequenced to completion.
HA COVID-19 was classified into two groups according to
the length of admission: >7 days and >14 days.
Majority of patients required assistance with mobility
(65%) and selfcare (77%).
Luo 2020 China Observational
retrospective
Public transport
January 2020
Community 1 index case; 243
close contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
index case
No Not reported The tour coach was with 49 seats was fully occupied with
all windows closed and the ventilation system on during
the 2.5-hour trip.
Luo 2020a China Prospective
cohort study
Various
January to March
2020
Household
Community
Nosocomial
391 index cases; 3410
close contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Every 24 hours. No Not reported Homes, public transport; healthcare settings,
entertainment venues, workplace, multiple settings
Lyngse 2020 Denmark Retrospective
Homes
February to July
2020
Household 990 primary cases;
2226 household
contacts
Not reported Within 14 days
of exposure to
primary case
No Not reported Secondary cases: those who had a positive test within 14
days of the primary case being tested positive. 3 phases
of epidemic examined.
Assumed that the secondary household members were
infected by the household primary case, although some
of these secondary cases could represent co-primary
cases. A longer cut-off time period could result in
misclassification of cases among household members
with somewhere else being the source of secondary
infections.
Ma 2020 China Observational
Medical isolation
Unclear 1665 close contacts RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Macartney 2020 Australia Prospective
cohort study
Educational
settings
April to May 2020
Local 27 primary cases; 633
contacts
RT-PCR,
serology, or
both
PCR: 5–10
days after last
case contact if
not previously
collected
Serology: day
21 following
last case
contact.
No Not reported Index case: The first identified laboratory-confirmed
case who attended the facility while infectious. A school
or ECEC setting primary case was defined as the initial
infectious case or cases in that setting, and might or
might not have been the index case.
Primary case: Initial infectious case or cases in that
setting, and might or might not have been the index case
Secondary case: Close contact with SARS-CoV-2 infection
(detected through nucleic acid testing or serological
testing, or both), which was considered likely to have
occurred via transmission in that educational setting.
Malheiro 2020 Portugal Retrospective
cohort study
Homes
March to April
2020
Household Intervention group
(n=98), Control
(n=453)
Not reported Not reported No Not reported The intervention group comprised all COVID-19
confirmed cases that were either identified as close
contacts of an index caseor returned from affected areas
and placed under mandatory quarantine, with daily
follow-up until laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV-
2 infection. The control group included all COVID-19
confirmed cases that were not subject to contact tracing
nor to quarantine measures preceding the diagnosis.
Maltezou 2020 Greece Retrospective
observational
Home setting
February to June
2020
Household 203 SARS-CoV-2-
infected children;
number of index cases
and close contacts
unclear
RT-PCR Not reported No Ct >38
considered
negative
A family cluster was defined as the detection of at least
2 cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection within a family. First
case was defined as the first COVID-19 case in a family.
High, moderate, or low viral load (Ct <25, 25–30 or >30,
respectively).
Maltezou 2020a Greece Retrospective
observational
Home setting
February to May
2020
Household 23 family clusters
of COVID-19; 109
household members
RT-PCR Not reported No <25, 25– 30
or >30
A family cluster was defined as the detection of at least
2 cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection within a family. Index
case was defined as the first laboratory-diagnosed case
in the family.
Mao 2020 China Cross-sectional
study
Home, family
gatherings
January-March
2020
Household
Local
67 clusters with 226
cases confirmed cases
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Martínez-Baz 2022 Spain Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
11 May to 31
December 2020
Household
Community
20,048 index cases;
59,900 close contacts
RT-qPCR 0 and 10 days
after the last
contact
No Not specified
Martinez-Fierro
2020
Mexico Cross-sectional
June-July 2020
Unclear 19 asymptomatic
index cases; 81
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Not reported No Not reported
McLean 2022 USA Observational
Homes
April 2020 to
April 2021
Household 226 primary cases,
404 household
contacts
rRT-PCR Daily No Not specified
Mercado-Reyes
2022
Colombia Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
Sept. 21 to Dec.
11 2020.
Household 17863 participants Serology Not specified No N/A
Metlay 2021 USA Observational
- cohort
Homes
March 4 and May
17, 2020
Household 7262 index cases;
17917 household
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No N/A
Meylan 2021 Switzerland Observational
- cross-sectional
Hospital
18 May and 12
June 2020.
Nosocomial 1872 HCWs Serology Over a 4-week
period
No N/A
Miller 2021 UK Observationa
- cohort
Homes
May 2020
Household 431 contacts of 172
symptomatic index
cases
PCR
Serology
PCR: days 0
and 7
Serology: day
35
Yes ≤39
Montecucco 2021 Italy Observational
University
October 2020
– March 2021
Local
Household
Community
53 cases; 346 close
contacts.
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Mponponsuo 2020 Canada Observational
Hospital
March-April 2020
Nosocomial 5 HCWs were index
cases; 39 HCWs (16
underwent testing)
and 33 patients
were exposed (22
underwent testing)
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported All 5 HCWs had E gene cycle threshold (Ct) values
between 10.9 and 30.2. Those exposed to the index
HCWs were followed for 30 days.
Musa 2021 Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Observational
Homes
August–
December 2020
Household 383 households and
793 contacts
RT-PCR Within 2–14
days
No Not specified
Ng 2020 Singapore Retrospective
cohort study
Various
January-April
2020
Household
Local
Community
1114 PCR-confirmed
COVID-19 index cases
in the community in
Singapore. 13 026
close contacts (1863
household, 2319 work,
and 3588 social)
RT-PCR
Serology
If contacts
reported
symptoms
No Not reported Lower risk contacts: Other contacts who were with the
index case for 10–30 min within 2 m
Contacts who reported symptoms were admitted to the
hospital for COVID-19 testing by PCR.
Ng 2021 Malaysia Observational
Homes
1 Feb. to 31 Dec.
2020
Household 185 index patients;
848 household
contacts
RT-PCR Within 0–14
days
No Not specified
Ning 2020 China Observational
study
Various
January-February
2020
Household
Local
Community
Local cases: 3,435
close contacts
Imported cases: 3,666
close contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Imported cases, farmers' markets, malls, and wildlife
exposure.
Njuguna 2020 USA Observational
Prison
May 2020
Local 98 incarcerated and
detained persons
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Unclear how many index or close contacts.
Nsekuye 2021 Rwanda Observational
Homes
Night clubs
14 March to 4
May 2020
Local
Household
Community
40 cases; 1035
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No N/A
Ogata 2021 Japan Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
August 2020–
February 2021
Household 236 index cases; 496
household contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No N/A
Ogawa 2020 Japan Observational
Hospital
Nosocomial 1 index patient; 15
HCWs were contact
RT-PCR
Serology
RT-PCR: 10th
day after
exposure
Serology:
Before
isolation
No Not specified Viral culture performed for only the index patient.
Paireau 2022 France Retrospective
observational
Various
January to March
2020
Household
Local
Nosocomial
735 index cases; 6,082
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Family, home, work, hospital.
Index case: A case whose detection initiated an
investigation of its contacts through
contact tracing
Only contacts who developed symptoms compatible with
COVID-19 were tested for SARS-CoV-2
Pang 2022 Singapore Observational
- cohort
Nursing home
March 2020
Local 164 participants: 108
residents and 56
healthcare staff
PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not specified No N/A
Park 2020 S. Korea Retrospective
observational
Various
February 2020
Local
Household
Community
2 index cases; 328
contacts
RT-PCR 24 hrs for 37
first contacts;
others within 2
weeks
No <40
considered
positive
Aircraft, home, restaurant, clinic, pharmacy.
Contact tracing of COVID-19 cases was conducted from 1
day before symptom onset or 1 day before the case was
sampled.
Park 2020a S. Korea Observational
study
Homes
January to March
2020
Household
Non-household
5,706 COVID-19 index
patients; 59,073
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Park 2020b S. Korea Observational
study
Workplace, home
March 2020
Local
Household
216 employees, 225
household contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of report of
infected case
No Not reported Employees do not generally go between floors, and they
do not have an in-house restaurant for meals.
Sent a total of 16,628 text messages to persons who
stayed >5 minutes near the building X; we tracked these
persons by using cell phone location data.
Passarelli 2020 Brazil Observational
Hospital
August 2020
Nosocomial 6 index cases; 6 close
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No <40
considered
positive
All index cases were asymptomatic hospital visitors.
Patel 2020 UK Retrospective
observational
Hospital,
community
March to April
2020
Household 107 cases; 195
household contacts
RT-PCR Not tested No Not reported
Pavli 2020 Greece Observational
contact tracing
Aircraft
February to
March 2020
Aircraft 6 index cases; 891
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported A COVID-19 case was defined at that time as a case with
signs and symptoms compatible with COVID-19 in a
patient with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection,
recent travel history to a country with evidence of local
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 or close contact with a
laboratory-confirmed case.
Petersen 2021 Faroe Islands Observational
- cohort
Homes
March 3–April 22
Household 584 close contacts Serology Within 16
weeks
No N/A
Pett 2021 UK Observational
Home
Community
26 Feb. to 26
April 2020
Household
Community
27 cases; 392 contacts Not specified Not specified No N/A
Phiriyasart 2020 Thailand Observational
Homes
April 2020
Household 471 household
contacts
RT-PCR Within 5 days
of exposure
No Not reported
Poletti 2020 Italy Observational
February-April
2020
Unclear 5,484 close contacts
from clusters
RT-PCR
Serology
Not reported No Not reported Only contacts belonging to clusters (i.e., groups of
contacts identified by one positive index case) were
included.
1,364 (25%) were tested with only RT-PCR, 3,493 (64%)
with only serology at least a month after the reporting
date of their index case and 627 (11%) were tested both
by RT-PCR and serology.
Powell 2022 UK Observational
Schools
November to
December 2020
Local 183 school contacts RT-PCR
Serology
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Days 0 and 7
PCR
Days 0 and 30
serology
No Not specified
Pung 2020 Singapore Observational
Various
February 2020
Local
Community
425 close contacts
from 3 clusters; index
case unclear
PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not reported No Not reported Company conference, church, tour group.
Close contacts under quarantine for 14 days from last
exposure to the individual with confirmed COVID-19,
either at home or at designated government quarantine
facilities.
Pung 2020a Singapore Observational
Homes
Up till March
2020
Household 277 were primary or
co-primary cases: 875
household contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Household contacts were tested if they showed
symptoms of SARS-CoV-2 infection, or if aged 12 years
or below.
Qian 2020 Hong Kong Observational
retrospective
Various
January to
February 2020
Local
Household
Community
Unclear Not reported Not reported No Not reported Homes, transport, restaurants, shopping and
entertainment venues.
Four categories of infected individuals were considered
based on their relationship: family members, family
relatives, socially connected individuals, and socially
non-connected individuals
Ratovoson 2022 Madagascar Observational
Homes
March to June
2020.
Household 96 index cases and
179 household
contacts.
RT-qPCR
Serology
First visit and
every 7 days
until 21 days.
No Not specified
Ravindran 2020 Indonesia Retrospective
cohort
Wedding
March 2020
Local 41 guests; no. of index
cases unclear
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported Primary case: Any person who attended the wedding
events in Bali Indonesia
during 15–21 March 2020 and who tested positive.
Secondary case: any person who tested positive on
SARS-CoV-2 after the 14-day period and who was a close
contact of a COVID-19 case from the wedding events.
Razvi 2020 UK Observational
study
Hospital
May to June 2020
Nosocomial 2,521 HCWs Serology Voluntary
first-come,
first-served
basis
No N/A
Reukers 2021 Netherlands Observational
cohort
Homes
March to May
2020
Household 55 index cases with
187 household
contacts
RT-qPCR
Serology
Serology: 4–6
weeks
No Not specified
Robles Pellitero
2021
Spain Observational
- case-control
Homes
September 2020
Household Case: 96 cases
Controls: 182
Cohabitants: 586
Not specified Not specified No Not specified Case: person whose address was recorded more than
one cohabiting person diagnosed of COVID-19 declared
in the SIVE during the study period.
Control: person in whose home there were no more
persons diagnosed with COVID-19 disease in the study
period.
Rosenberg 2020 USA Observational
retrospective
Homes
March 2020
Household 229 cases; 498
household contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Roxby 2020 USA Observational
- cross-sectional
Nursing home
March 2020
Nosocomial 80 residents and 62
staff members; no
index case
RT-PCR Day 1 and 7
days late
No No Residents isolated in their rooms; no communal meals or
activities, no visitors allowed in the facility, staff member
screening and exclusion of symptomatic staff members
implemented. Enhanced hygiene practices were put into
effect, including cleaning and disinfection of frequently
touched surfaces and additional hand hygiene stations
in hallways for workers to use. All residents were tested
again 7 days later.
Sakamoto 2022 Japan Observational
Hospital
April to early May
2020
Nosocomial 2 clusters with 517
contacts (HCWs)
RT-PCR Day 0, then
if patients
developed
symptoms
No Not specified Some surgeons reported not wearing masks during their
biweekly conferences in a small conference room and
other HCWs reported using the small break room without
masks.
Sang 2020 China Case series
Home
February 2020
Household 1 index case; 6 family
members
Not reported Within 24 hrs
of index case
No Not reported Central air conditioner was always running at home.
Sarti 2021 Italy Observational
- retrospective
Workplace
Nov. to Dec. 2020
Local 1 index case; 5
contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of contact with
index case
No Not specified Six workers were working together at full time regimen
for 5 days a week for an average of 8 h daily. Prevention
measures were in place.
Satter 2022 Bangladesh Observational
- cohort
Homes
Community
27 June to 26
September 2020
Local
Community
37 index cases; 684
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
RT-PCR: days 1,
7, 14, and 28
Serology: day 1
and day 28
No Not specified
Schoeps 2021 Germany Observational
- cohort
Educational
institutions
August to
December 2020
Local 441 index cases;
14,591 contacts
PCR Between seven
and 10 days
after their last
contact with
the index case
No Not reported
Schumacher 2021 Qatar Prospective
cohort study
Football team
June to
September 2020
Local 1337; no index cases RT-PCR
Serology
RT-PCR: Every
3–5 days
Serology: Every
4 weeks
No ≤30 positive Strict hygiene measures and regular testing.
Two phases, the quarantine phase (entry until exit) and
the training and match phase (after quarantine exit until
the first test done during the week after the last match.
Ct >30 but <40 reactive.
1337 subjects were tested at least once; however, some
players and staff joined their team and were gradually
included in (or left) the programme during the study
period.
Schwierzeck 2020 Germany Observational
Hospital
paediatric dialysis
unit
Nosocomial 1 index case; 48
contacts
RT-PCR 24 hrs after
index case
No Not specified Outbreak was defined as two or more COVID-19
infections resulting from a common exposure.
Semakula 2021 Rwanda Observational
Homes
Community
14 March 2020 to
20 July 2020
Household
Community
2216 index cases;
11809 contacts
PCR Not specified No Not specified
Shah 2020 India Observational
Homes
March to July
2020
Household 74 primary cases; 386
household contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Shah 2021 India Observational
Homes
March to July
2020
Household 72 paediatric index
cases; 287 household
contacts
Not specified Not specified No Not specified
Shen 2020 USA Observational
Social gathering
January to
February 2020
Household
Community
1 index case: 539
social and family
contacts
RT-PCR If contact had
symptoms
No Not specified
Sikkema 2020 Netherlands Cross-sectional
Hospital
March 2020
Nosocomial 1796 HCWs; index
case not specified
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
N/A No <32
considered
positive
HCWs across 3 hospitals.
Son 2020 S. Korea Observational
study
Homes
January to March
2020
Household 108 primary cases;
3223 contacts
RT-PCR Unclear No Not reported
Song 2020 China Observational
case series
Home
January 2020
Household 4 family clusters. 4
index cases: 18 close
contacts
RT-PCR 0 to 72 hrs
after index
case tested
positive
No Not reported
Sordo 2022 Australia Observational
- cohort
Homes
July-October
2020
Household 229 primary cases and
659 close contacts.
PCR
Serology
Not specified No Serology: 4-
fold or greater
increase in a
SARS-CoV-2
antibody of
any subclass
Soriano-Arandes
2021
Spain Observational
Homes
July-October
2020
Household 3392 household
contacts linked to
1040 paediatric index
cases
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified NPIs were applied in all schools, including face masks in
classrooms and school buildings in children older than
6 years.
Speake 2020 Australia Observational
retrospective
Aircraft
March 2020
Aircraft 241 passengers
some of whom had
disembarked from 1
of 3 cruise ships that
had recently docked
in Sydney Harbour. 6
primary cases initially
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Within 2 weeks
of primary
cases
Yes Not specified Primary cases as passengers with SARS-CoV-2 who had
been on a cruise ship with a known outbreak in the 14
days before illness onset and whose specimen yielded
a virus genomic sequence closely matching that of the
ship’s outbreak strain
Secondary cases: Passengers with PCR-confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 infection who had not been on a cruise ship with
a known SARS-CoV-2 outbreak within 14 days of illness
onset and in whom symptoms developed >48 hours
after and within 14 days of the flight; or international
passengers who had not been on a cruise ship in the 14
days before illness and whose specimens yielded a WGS
lineage not known to be in circulation at their place of
origin but that closely matched the lineage of a primary
case on the flight.
Stein-Zamir 2020 Israel Observational
- cross-sectional
Schools
May 2020
Local 1,190 students aged
12–18 years (grades
7–12) and 162 staff
members.
PCR Unclear No Not reported
Stich 2021 Germany Observational
Homes
May–August
2020
Household 1,625 study
participants from 405
households
RT-PCR
Serology
PCR: Within 24
hours
No Not specified
Sugano 2020 Japan Observational
retrospective
Music concerts
February 2020
Local 1 index case; 72
exposures
RT-PCR Not reported No Not specified
Sun 2020 China Observational
Homes
Household Family clusters Not reported Not reported No Not reported
Sun 2021 China Observational
Homes
May 2020
Household 50 household contacts RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Sundar 2021 India Observational
Homes
Community
August 2020
Household
Community
496 contacts of 18
cases
RT-PCR Day 3 or day
4 of symptom
onset. Days
6 to 10 for
asymptomatic
contacts
No Not specified
Tadesse 2021 Ethiopia Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
July 2020
Household 40 households Serology Not specified No Not specified
Tanaka 2021 Japan Observational
Homes
April to May 2020
Household 687 household
contacts of 307 index
cases
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified Assessed transmissibility of the SARS-CoV-2 Alpha Variant.
Tanaka 2022 USA Observational
Homes
June to
December 2020.
Household 101 households with
477 individuals
RT-PCR Every 3–7 days
for up to 4
weeks
No Not specified
Taylor 2020 USA Observational
Skilled nursing
facilities
April-June 2020
Nosocomial 259 tested residents,
and 341 tested HCP
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Weekly serial
testing (every
7–10 days)
No Not specified
Teherani 2020 USA Observational
Homes
March to June
2020
Household 32 paediatric cases;
144 household
contacts
PCR Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
infected case
No Not reported Only children who presented with symptoms concerning
for COVID-19 infection were included.
Thangaraj 2020 India Observational
Tourist group
February 2020
Community 1 index case; 26 close
contacts
RT-PCR Within 24 hrs
of index case
No Not reported
Torres 2020 Chile Cross-sectional
Community
March-May 2020
Community 1009 students and
235 staff
Serology 8–10 weeks
after school
outbreak
No N/A The school was closed on March 13, and the entire
community was placed in quarantine.
Tsang 2022 China Observational
- retrospective
Homes
Community
22 January to 30
May, 2020
Household
Community
97 laboratory-
confirmed index
cases and 3158 close
contacts
RT-PCR Days 1, 4, 7
and 14
No Not specified
Tshokey 2020 Bhutan Observational
Tourists
May 2020
Local
Community
27 index cases; 75
high-risk contacts,
1095 primary
contacts; 448
secondary contacts
RT-PCR High-risk
contacts:
minimum of
three times
with RT-PCR
No ≤ 40
considered
positive
Tsushita 2022 Japan Observational
Special training
venue
May 2020
Local 1 index case; 23
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified Training comprised individual physical fitness training
in the first week, basic movement training conducted
by two people in addition to this in the second week,
and practical training conducted by two people while
randomly changing the combination from the third week.
van der Hoek 2020 Netherlands Observational
Household
March to April
2020
Household 231 cases; 709 close
contacts. 54 families
have 239 participants,
185 of whom are
family members.
RT-PCR
Serology
Not reported No Not reported
Vičar 2021 Czech
Republic
Observational
Homes
March to October
2020
Household 226 household
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not specified
Wang 2020 China Observational
Home
January-February
2020
Nosocomial
Household
25 HCWs, 43 family
members
RT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not reported No Not reported
Wang 2020a China Retrospective
observational
Home
February 2020
Household 85 primary cases: 155
household contacts in
78 households
RT-PCR Not reported No <37
considered
positive
Wang 2020b China Retrospective
cohort study
Homes
February to
March 2020
Household 124 primary cases;
335 close contacts
RT-PCR Within 2 weeks
of symptom
onset of the
primary case
No Not reported
Wee 2020 Singapore Observational
Tertiary Hospital
February to May
2020
Nosocomial 28 index cases; 253
staff close-contacts
and 45 patient close-
contacts
RT-PCR If patient
close-contacts
or staff
close-contacts
developed
symptoms
No Not specified Infection control bundle was implemented comprising
infrastructural enhancements, improved PPE, and social
distancing between patients. Patients were advised to
wear surgical masks, to remain within their room or
cohorted cubicle at all times, and to avoid mingling with
each other.
Wendt 2020 Germany Observational
Hospital
March 2020
Nosocomial 1 index case physician;
187 contacts with
HCWs and 67 contacts
with patients - 23
high-risk contacts in
total
RT-PCR
Serology
5-days post
exposure
(5- & 10-days
post exposure
for high-risk
contacts
No <36 or <39
considered
positive
All high-risk contacts and the index physician were
examined serologically on days 15 or 16 and days 22 or
23 after exposure.
White 2022a Ireland Observational
Schools
August to
October 2020
Local 56 index cases; 485
school close contacts
PCR Within the
14-day period
after the last
exposure to
the index case
No Not specified
White 2022b Ireland Observational
Aircrafts
November to
December 2020
Local 165 infectious cases;
899 flight close
contacts
PCR Within the
14-day period
after the last
exposure to
the index case
No Not specified
Wiens 2021 South Sudan Observational
- cross-sectional
Homes
August to
September 2020
Household 435 households with
2,214 participants
Serology Not specified No N/A
Wolf 2020 Germany Observational
case series
Hospital
quarantine
January-February
2020
Household Family cluster: 1 index
case, 4 close contacts
RT-PCR 5-days after
index case
tested positive
No Not reported The parents were asked to wear masks; wearing masks
was not practical for the children.
Wong 2020 Hong Kong Observational
Hospital
February 2020
Nosocomial 1 index case in AIIR:
71 staff and 49
patients
RT-PCR End of 28-day
surveillance
No Not specified
Wood 2021 UK Retrospective
cohort
HCW homes
Household 241,266 adults did not
share a household
with young children;
41,198, 23,783 and
3,850 shared a
household with 1, 2
and 3 or more young
children
PCR Not reported No Not reported Primary exposure was the number of children aged 0 to
11 years in each household.
Wu 2020 China Retrospective
cohort study
Various
January-February
2020
Household
Local
Community
144 cases, 2994 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Shared transport, visit, medical care, household, brief
contact.
Wu 2020a China Prospective
observational
Homes
February to
March 2020
Household 35 index cases; 148
household contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported All consecutive patients with probable or confirmed
COVID-19 admitted to the Fifth Affiliated Hospital of Sun
Yat-sen University from 17 January to 29 February 2020
were enrolled. All included patients and their household
members were interviewed.
Wu 2021 China Observational
- retrospective
Home
Workplace
Community
January to April
2020
Local
Household
Community
578 index cases and
4214 close contacts
RT-PCR Within the
14-day period
after the last
exposure to
the index case
No N/A 393 symptomatic index cases with 3136 close contacts
and 185 asymptomatic index cases with 1078 close
contacts
Xie 2020 China Cross-sectional
Home
January-February
2020
Household 2 family clusters with
61 residents (5 cases)
RT-PCR 7 days after
primary or
index cases
diagnosed
No Not reported
Xie 2021 China Observational
- cohort
Homes
January to
February 2020
Household 79 household contacts
of hospitalised
patients
RT-PCR Not specified No N/A
Xin 2020 China Prospective
cohort study
Homes
January to March
2020
Household 31 primary cases; 106
household contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Yang 2020 China Observational
cohort study
Home
quarantine February-May
2020
Household
Local
93 recurrent-positive
patients; 96 close
contacts and 1,200
candidate contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Within 14 days
post-exposure
Yes ≤ 40
considered
positive
Yau 2020 Canada Retrospective
cohort study
Hospital dialysis
unit
April 2020
Nosocomial 2 index cases; 330
contacts (237 patients
and 93 staff)
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported All symptomatic contacts were referred for testing but
asymptomatic household contacts were not routinely
tested as per public health protocols at the time.
Ye 2020 China Observational
Religious
gathering
January-February
2020
Local
Community
66 confirmed cases
and 15 asymptomatic
infections: 1,293 close
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported All close contacts were quarantined
Yi 2021 China Observational
- cohort
Homes
January to
February 2020
Household 96 families; 475 close
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No <37 positive
>40 negative
Yoon 2020 S. Korea Observational
Childcare Centre
February-March
2020
Local 1 index case: 190
persons (154 children
and 36 adults) were
identified as contacts;
44 were defined as
close contacts (37
children and 7 adults)
PCR 8–9 days
after the last
exposure
No <37
considered
positive
Wearing masks, more frequent hand hygiene, and
disinfection of the environment were required before the
child index case tested positive.
Yousaf 2020 USA Survey: cross-
sectional
Tertiary-care
referral facility
June 8 to July 8,
2020
Household 198 household
contacts; index cases
not specified
RT-PCR Day 1 of study No Not reported
Yu 2020 China Observational
study
Homes
January to
February 2020
Household 560 index cases; 1587
close contacts
Not reported Within 2 weeks
of exposure to
primary case
No Not reported Exposure environments included workplace, medical
centre, etc. Contact methods included eating or living
together, sleeping together, living in same house, etc.
Yung 2020 Singapore Observational
prospective
Homes
March to April
2020
Household 137 households, 213
paediatric contacts
Not reported Unclear No Not reported
Zhang 2020 China Retrospective
Observational
Aircraft
March-April 2020
Aircraft 4462 passengers
screened for
COVID-19 based on
close contact
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported All passengers were quarantined after arrival.
Zhang 2020a China Retrospective
observational
Various
January-March
2020
Household
Local
Community
359 cases: 369 close
contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Households, social contact, workplace.
Zhang 2020b China Observational
study
Hospital
April 2020
Household 3 index cases; 10 close
contacts
RT-PCR
Serology
Not reported No <37
considered
positive
Ct value of 40 or more was defined as a negative test.
Zhang 2020c China Observational
Quarantine
January-February
2020
Local
Household
Multi-family cluster
of 22 cases: 93 close
contacts
RT-PCR Not specified No Not reported All close contacts were quarantined in centralized
facilities.
Zhang 2020d China Observational
Supermarket
January-February
2020
Local 1 index case: 8437
contacts
RT-PCR Not reported No Not reported
Zhang 2021 China Observational
Homes
Workplace
February 2020
Local
Household
1 index case; 178
close contacts
qRT-PCR
WGS
Phylogenetic
analysis
Not specified No ≤38 positive
Zhuang 2020 China Observational study
Various
January to
February 2020
Household
Community
Cluster outbreaks;
8363 close contacts
Not reported Not reported No Not reported Family and non-family cases.

Table 2. Main characteristics of included Systematic Reviews.

Study ID
(n=20)
Fulfils
systematic
review
methods
Research question (search date up
to)
No. of included studies
(No. of participants)
Main results Key conclusions
Chen 2021 Yes To estimate seroprevalence by different
types of exposures, within each WHO
region, we categorized all study
participants into five groups:
1) close contacts,
2) high-risk healthcare workers,
3) low-risk healthcare workers,
4) general populations, and
5) poorly defined populations
(Search from Dec 1, 2019, to Sep 25,
2020).
230 studies involving
1,445,028 participants were
included in our meta-analysis
after full-text scrutiny:
Close contacts 16 studies
2901 positives out of 9,349
participants.
Estimated seroprevalence of all infections,
22.9% [95% CI, 11.1-34.7] compared to
relatively low prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 specific
antibodies among general populations, 6,5%
(5.8-7.2%)
The overall risk of bias was low.
There were a very limited
number of high-quality studies
of exposed populations,
especially for healthcare workers
and close contacts, and studies
to address this knowledge gap
are needed. Pooled estimates
of SARS-CoV-2 seroprevalence
based on currently available
data demonstrate a higher
infection risk among close
contacts and healthcare workers
lacking PPE.
Chu 2020 Yes To investigate the effects of physical
distance, face masks, and eye
protection on virus transmission in
healthcare and non-healthcare (e.g.,
community) settings (Searched up to
March 26, 2020)
Identified 172 studies; 44
studies included in the
meta-analysis which 7 were
Covid-19.
A strong association was found of proximity of
the exposed individual with the risk of infection
(unadjusted n=10 736, RR 0·30, 95% CI 0·20 to
0·44; adjusted n=7782, aOR 0·18, 95% CI 0·09
to 0·38; absolute risk [AR] 12·8% with shorter
distance vs 2·6% with further distance, risk
difference. There were six studies on COVID-19,
the association was seen irrespective of
causative virus (p value for interaction=0·49).
The risk of bias was generally low-to-moderate.
Physical distancing of at least
1m is strongly associated with
protection, but distances of up
to 2m might be more effective.
Fung 2020 Yes To review and analyze available studies
of the household SARs for SARS-CoV-2.
Searched PubMed, bioRxiv, and
medRxiv on 2 September 2020 for
published and prepublished studies
reporting empirical estimates of
household SARs for SARS-CoV-2.

Considered only English-language
records posted on or after 1 January
2019.
22 papers met the eligibility
criteria: 6 papers reported
results of prospective
studies and 16 reported
retrospective studies. The
number of household
contacts evaluated per study
ranged from 11 to 10592.
The 22 studies considered 20 291 household
contacts, 3151 (15.5%) of whom tested
positive for SARS-CoV-2. Household secondary
attack rate estimates ranged from 3.9% in
the Northern Territory, Australia to 36.4% in
Shandong, China.

The overall pooled random-effects estimate of
SAR was 17.1% (95% confidence interval [CI],
13.7–21.2%), with significant heterogeneity
(p<0.0001).

The household secondary attack rate was
highest for index cases aged 10–19 years
(18.6%; 95% CI, 14.0–24.0%) and lowest for
those younger than 9 (5.3%; 95% CI, 1.3–13.7%).
Four of the studies were judged to be of high
quality; 14 as moderate quality; and 4 as low
quality. Between-study variation could not be
explained by differences in study quality.
Secondary attack rates reported
using a single follow-up test may
be underestimated and testing
household contacts of COVID-19
cases on multiple occasions may
increase the yield for identifying
secondary cases.

There is a critical need for
studies in Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America to investigate
whether there are setting-
specific differences that
influence the household SAR.
Goodwin
2021
Yes What evidence is there for the
transmission in indoor residential
settings?
What evidence is there for transmission
in indoor workplace settings?
What evidence is there for transmission
in other indoor settings (social,
community, leisure, religious, public
transport)?
Do particular activities convey greater
risk (e.g. shouting, singing, eating
together, sharing bedrooms)?
What evidence is there for the
appropriate length of distancing
between people?

Searches were conducted in May 2020
in PubMed, medRxiv, arXiv, Scopus,
WHO COVID-19 database, Compendex
& Inspec.
58 articles were included. Pooled secondary attack rate within households
was 11% (95%CI = 9, 13). There were insufficient
data to evaluate the transmission risks
associated with specific activities.
The overall quality of the
evidence was low.
Irfan 2021 Yes To assess transmission and risks for
SARS-CoV-2 in children (by age-
groups or grades) in community and
educational-settings compared to
adults.

Searches conducted in PubMed,
EMBASE, Cochrane Library, WHO
COVID-19 Database, China National
Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI)
Database, WanFang Database, Latin
American and Caribbean Health
Sciences Literature (LILACS), Google
Scholar, and preprints from medRixv
and bioRixv) covering a timeline from
December 1, 2019, to April 1, 2021.
90 studies were included. In educational-settings, children attending
daycare/preschools (OR = 0.53, 95% CI = 0.38-
0.72) were observed to be at lower-risk when
compared to adults, with odds of infection
among primary (OR = 0.85, 95% CI = 0.55-1.31)
and high-schoolers (OR = 1.30, 95% CI = 0.71-
2.38) comparable to adults.

28/29 prevalence studies were of good quality
while one was of fair quality. 25/31 of contact-
tracing studies were of good quality while six
were of fair quality. 22/30 of studies conducted
in educational settings were good quality while
eight were of fair quality.
Children and adolescents
had lower odds of infection in
educational settings compared
to community and household
clusters.
Koh 2020 Yes The secondary attack rate (SAR) in
household and healthcare settings.
Search between Jan 1 and July 25,
2020.
118 studies, 57 were
included in the meta-
analyses.
Pooled household secondary attack rate
was 18.1% (95% CI: 15.7%, 20.6%) significant
heterogeneity (P<0.001).

No significant difference in secondary attack
rates in terms of the definition of household
close contacts, whether based on living in the
same household (18.2%; 95% CI: 15.3%, 21.2%)
or on relationships such as family and close
relatives (17.8%; 95% CI: 13.8%, 21.8%)

In three studies, the household secondary
attack rates of symptomatic index cases
(20.0%; 95% CI: 11.4%, 28.6%) was higher than
asymptomatic ones (4.7%; 95% CI: 1.1%, 8.3%)

Secondary attack rate from 14 studies showed
close contacts adults were more likely to be
infected compared to children (<18), relative risk
1.71 (95% CI: 1.35, 2.17).

43 high-quality studies were included for meta-
analysis.
There was variation in the
definition of household contacts;
most included only those who
resided with the index case,
some studies expanded this
to include others who spent
at least a night in the same
residence or a specified duration
of at least 24 hours of living
together, while others included
family members or close
relatives.
Li 2020 No (quality
assessment
not
performed)
Carriage and transmission potential
of SARS-CoV-2 in children in school
and community settings (Search
performed on 21 June 2020 with
entry date limits from late 2019)
33 studies were included for
this review. Four new studies
on SARS-CoV-2 transmission
in school settings were
identified.
There is a lack of direct evidence on the
dynamics of child transmission, however the
evidence to date suggests that children are
unlikely to be major transmitters of SARS-CoV-2.
The balance of evidence
suggests that children play
only a limited role in overall
transmission, but it is noted
that the relative contribution
of children to SARS-CoV-2
transmission may change
with reopening of society and
schools.
Ludvigsson
2020
No (quality
assessment
not
performed)
Are children the main drivers of the
COVID-19 pandemic (Search to 11
May 2020)
47 full texts studied in detail. This review showed that children constituted a
small fraction of individuals with COVID-19.
Children are unlikely to be the
main drivers of the pandemic.
Data on viral loads were scarce
but indicated that children may
have lower levels than adults.
Madewell
2020
Yes What is the household secondary
attack rate for severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)?
( Searched through Oct 19, 2020)
single database assessed
54 studies with 77,758
participants were included.
Household secondary attack rate was 16.6%;
restricted index cases to children (<18 years),
lower SAR of 0.5%. SAR for household and
family contacts was 3 times higher than for
close contacts (4.8%; 95% CI, 3.4%-6.5%;
P<0.001).

Estimated mean household secondary attack
rates from symptomatic index cases was
significantly higher than from asymptomatic
or presymptomatic index cases (18% vs 0.7%,
P<0.001).

Estimated mean household secondary attack
rates to spouses (37.8%; 95% CI, 25.8%-50.5%)
was higher than to other contacts (17.8%; 95%
CI, 11.7%-24.8%). Significant heterogeneity was
found among studies of spouses (I2 = 78.6%;
P<0 .001) and other relationships (I2 = 83.5%;
P<0.001).

Contact frequency with index case associated
with higher odds of infection. At least 5
contacts during 2 days before the index case
was confirmed; at least 4 contacts and 1 to 3
contacts, or frequent contact within 1 meter.

Secondary attack rates for households
with 1 contact was significantly higher than
households with at least 3 contacts (41.5%
vs 22.8%, P<0.001) but not different than
households with 2 contacts.
There was significant heterogeneity in
secondary attack rates between studies with
1 contact (I2 = 52.9%; P = .049), 2 contacts
(I2 = 93.6%; P<0.001), or 3 or more contacts
(I2 = 91.6%; P<0 .001).

16 of 54 studies (29.6%) were at high risk of
bias, 27 (50.0%) were moderate, and 11 (20.4%)
were low.
Secondary attack rates were
higher in households from
symptomatic index cases than
asymptomatic index cases, to
adult contacts than to child
contacts, to spouses than to
other family contacts, and in
households with 1 contact than
households with 3 or more
contacts. Our study had several
limitations. The most notable is
the large amount of unexplained
heterogeneity across studies.
This is likely attributable to
variability in study definitions
of index cases and household
contacts, frequency and type
of testing, sociodemographic
factors, household
characteristics (e.g., density, air
ventilation), and local policies
(e.g., centralized isolation). The
findings of this study suggest
that households are and will
continue to be important
venues for transmission, even
where community transmission
is reduced.
Madewell
2021
No (quality
assessed
in previous
review)
To further the understanding of SARS-
CoV-2 transmission in the household.

PubMed and reference lists of eligible
articles were used to search for records
published between October 20, 2020,
and June 17, 2021.
A total of 87 studies
representing 1 249 163
household contacts from 30
countries.
The estimated household secondary attack rate
for all 87 studies was 18.9% (95% CI, 16.2%-
22.0%). Quality of included studies not reported.
Household remains an
important site of SARS-CoV-2
transmission.
Qiu 2021 Yes To critically appraise available data
about secondary attack rates from
people with asymptomatic, pre-
symptomatic and symptomatic SARS-
CoV-2 infection.

Medline, EMBASE, China Academic
Journals full-text database (CNKI), and
pre-print servers were searched from
30 December 2019 to 3 July 2020.
80 studies were included. Majority of studies identified index cases with
a clear diagnosis, had an acceptable case
definition and sufficiently followed up close
contacts (for a minimum of 14 days). However,
in some studies the definition of close contact
and setting of transmission was not provided.
The overall reporting quality was uncertain.

Summary secondary attack rate estimate for
asymptomatic cases was 1% (95% CI 0%–2%).
The summary secondary attack rate estimate
for presymptomatic index subjects was 7%
(95% CI 3%–11%). The summary estimate of
secondary attack rate from symptomatic index
subjects was 6% (95% CI 5%–8%).
Asymptomatic patients can
transmit SARS-CoV-2 to others,
but such individuals are
responsible for fewer secondary
infections than people with
symptoms.
Shi 2022 Yes To examine the transmissibility and
pathogenicity of COVID-19 reflected
by the secondary infection rate (SIR),
secondary attack rate (SAR), and
symptomatic infection ratio.

Searches were conducted in Web
of Science and PubMed, and Chinese
databases, including China National
Knowledge Infrastructure, WANFANG
Database, and the VIP Database for
Chinese Technical Periodicals. 17
August 2020
A total of 105 studies were
identified, with 35042
infected cases and 897912
close contacts.
28 studies were of high quality, 66 studies were
of moderate quality, and 11 were of low quality.

The secondary attack rate was 6.6% (95%
CI, 5.7%−7.5%). Household contact had
significantly higher secondary attack rate
(19.6%, 95% CI [15.4–24.2%]) than community
contact (SAR, 8.1%, 95% CI [5.2–11.5%];
P=0.013) and medical contact (SAR, 3.8%, 95%
CI [0.9–8.4%]; P<0.001).
There is a higher risk of infection
among household contacts.
Silverberg
2022
Yes To identify the role of children in SARS-
CoV-2 transmission to other children
and adults.

MEDLINE, EMBASE, CINAHL, Cochrane
Central Register of Controlled Trials,
and Web of Science were electronically
searched for articles published before
March 31, 2021.
40 articles were included.
357 paediatric index cases.
The overall SAR was 8.4% among known
contacts (5.7% in children and 26.4% in adults).
Children were significantly less likely to be
infected than adults: OR 0.21 (95% CI 0.05-0.91),
with no heterogeneity (I2=0%)

Ten were deemed to be of good quality and
have low risk of bias, while 22 were of fair
quality and 8 were of poor quality.
Children transmit COVID-19 at
a lower rate to children than to
adults. Household adults are
at highest risk of transmission
from an infected child.
Thompson
2021
Yes To estimate SAR of SARS-CoV-2 in
households, schools, workplaces,
healthcare facilities, and social settings.

Searches were conducted in MEDLINE,
Embase, MedRxiv, BioRxiv, arXiv, and
Wellcome Open Research with no
language restrictions up to July 6,
2020.
45 studies were included for
meta-analysis.
Household SAR was 21.1% (95%CI: 17.4–24.8).
The SAR increased with longer durations of
exposure (14.2% [95% CI: 5.8–22.5] with ≤5
days of exposure to an index case vs 34.9%
[95%CI 16.3–53.6] with >5 days of exposure;
P=0.05. SARs were significantly higher for
presymptomatic and symptomatic index
cases, estimated at 9.3% (95% CI: 4.5–14.0,
P=0.01) and 13.6% (95%CI 9.7–17.5, P<0.001),
respectively.

Articles that met the inclusion criteria for meta-
analysis all had high quality scores.
Exposure in settings with
familiar contacts increases SARS-
CoV-2 transmission potential.
Tian 2020 Yes Searched published literatures and
preprints in international databases of
PubMed and medRxiv, and in five major
Chinese databases as of 20 April 2020
18 studies were included
for meta-analysis. A total of
32,149 close contacts were
documented.
The pooled SAR was 0.07 (95%CI 0.03-0.12).
Household setting and social gatherings were
associated with significantly elevated SARs
(P<0.01).

17 studies were high quality, and one was
moderate quality using the AHRQ criteria.
The transmission risk of
SARS-CoV-2 is much higher
in households than in other
scenarios.
Viner 2021 Yes To assess child and adolescent
susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2 compared
with adults.

Searched 2 electronic databases,
PubMed and the medical preprint
server medRxiv, on May 16, 2020, and
updated this on July 28, 2020
32 studies comprising 41 640
children and adolescents
and 268 945 adults met
inclusion criteria.
The pooled odds ratio of being an infected
contact in children compared with adults
was 0.56 (95% CI, 0.37-0.85), with substantial
heterogeneity (I2=94.6%).

Two studies were high quality, 22 were medium
quality, 7 were low quality, and 1 was uncertain
quality.
Children have a lower
susceptibility to SARS-CoV-2
infection compared with adults
Viner 2022 Yes Research questions:
(a) To what extent do CYP under 20
years of age transmit SARS-CoV-
2 to other CYP and to adults in
household and child-specific (e.g.
educational) settings?; (b) how does
transmission differ between household
and educational settings?; and (c)
is community infection incidence
associated with prevalence of or
transmission of infection within
educational settings?

Searched four electronic databases
(PubMed; medRxiv; COVID-19 Living
Evidence database; Europe PMC) to 28
July 2021.
37 studies were included. The pooled estimates of SAR were 7.6% (3.6,
15.9) for household studies, significantly higher
than the pooled estimate for school studies
of 0.7% (0.2, 2.7), P=0.002)). Across all studies,
pooled risk of transmission was lower from child
index cases than adults (OR 0.49 (0.25, 0.98).

24 studies had high quality, and 13 were
medium quality.
SAR were markedly lower
in school compared with
household settings, suggesting
that household transmission
is more important than school
transmission in this pandemic.
Xu 2020 Yes Evidence for transmission of COVID-
19 by children in schools ( search in
MEDLINE up to 14 September 2020.
Further hand-searched reference lists
of the retrieved eligible publications
to identify additional relevant studies).
Included children (defined as ≤18
years old) who were attending school,
and their close contacts (family and
household members, teachers, school
support staff) during the COVID-19
pandemic
11 studies were included: 5
cohort studies and 6 cross-
sectional studies.
Overall infection attack rate (IAR) in cohort
studies: 0.08%, 95% CI 0.00%-0.86%. IARs for
students and school staff were 0.15% (95% CI
0.00%-0.93%) and 0.70% (95% CI = 0.00%-3.56%)
respectively (p<0.01). Six cross-sectional studies
reported 639 SARS-CoV-2 positive cases in 6682
study participants tested [overall SARS-CoV-2
positivity rate: 8.00% (95% CI = 2.17%-16.95%).
SARS-CoV-2 positivity rate was estimated to
be 8.74% (95% CI = 2.34%-18.53%) among
students, compared to 13.68% (95% CI = 1.68%-
33.89%) among school staff (p<0.01).

Overall study quality was judged to be poor with
risk of performance and attrition bias.
There is limited high-quality
evidence to quantify the extent
of SARS-CoV-2 transmission
in schools or to compare it
to community transmission.
Emerging evidence suggests
lower IAR and SARS-CoV-2
positivity rate in students
compared to school staff.
Yanes-Lane
2020
Yes Proportion of asymptomatic infection
among coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19) positive persons and their
transmission potential. (Search up to
up to 22 June 2020)
28 studies were included. Asymptomatic COVID-19 infection at time
of testing ranged from 20% – 75%; among
three studies in contacts it was 8.2% to 50%.
Asymptomatic infection in obstetric patients
pooled proportion was 95% (95% CI, 45% to
100%) of which 59% (49% to 68%) remained
asymptomatic through follow-up;
Among nursing home residents, the
proportion of asymptomatic was 54% (42%
to 65%) of which 28% (13% to 50%) remained
asymptomatic through follow-up.

The overall quality of included studies was
moderate-to-high.
The proportion of asymptomatic
infection among COVID-19
positive persons appears high
and transmission potential
seems substantial.
Zhu 2021 Meta-
analysis:
Quality assessment
not reported
Role of children in SARS-CoV-2 in
household transmission clusters
( Search between Dec 2019 & Aug
2020).
57 articles with 213 clusters
were included.
8 (3.8%) transmission clusters were identified as
having a paediatric index case. Asymptomatic
index cases were associated with lower
secondary attack rates in contacts than
symptomatic index cases [RR] 0.17 (95% CI,0.09-
0.29). SAR in paediatric household contacts was
lower than in adult household contacts (RR,
0.62; 95% CI, 0.42-0.91).
The data suggest that should
children become infected at
school during this period, they
are unlikely to spread SARS-
CoV-2 to their co-habiting family
members.

Quality of included studies

None of the included primary studies reported a published protocol except one (Helsingen 2020). The risk of bias of the included primary studies is shown in Table 3. One hundred and twenty-four studies (48.1%) adequately reported the methods used, and 158 (61.2%) adequately described the sources of sample collection. Only nine studies (3.5%) adequately reported methods used to address biases. The overall reporting across the studies was judged as low to moderate (see the risk of bias graph in Figure 2).

Figure 2. Risk of bias graph in primary studies of close contacts in SARS-CoV-2.

Figure 2.

Table 3. Risk of Bias.

Study ID Description of
methods and
sufficient detail
to replicate?
Sample
sources
clear?
Analysis &
reporting
appropriate?
Is bias
dealt
with?
Results
applicable?
Notes
Abdulrahman 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Adamik 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear
Afonso 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Agergaard 2020 No Yes Yes No Yes
Akaishi 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Angulo-Bazán 2020 Yes No Yes Unclear Yes
Armann 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Arnedo-Pena 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Atherstone 2021 No No Yes Unclear Yes
Baettig 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Baker 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Bao 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Basso 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Bays 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Bender 2021 Unclear No Yes Unclear Unclear Evidence was obtained from
a single outbreak and might
not be applicable to other
settings. Recall bias
Bernardes-Souza 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes Recall bias
Bhatt 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Bi 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Bi 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Bistaraki 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Bjorkman 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Blaisdell 2020 Yes No Yes Unclear Yes
Böhmer 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Boscolo-Rizzo 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Brown 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Burke 2020 Unclear No Yes No Yes
Calvani 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes Recall bias
Canova 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Carazo 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Cariani 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Carvalho 2022 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Cerami 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Charlotte 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Chaw 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Chen 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear
Chen 2020a Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Chen 2020b Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Chen 2020c Unclear No Yes No Yes
Cheng 2020 Yes No Yes Unclear Yes
Chu 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Chu 2020a Unclear Unclear Unclear No Yes
Contejean 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Cordery 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
COVID-19 National
Emergency Response
Center 2020
Unclear No Yes No Yes
Craxford 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Danis 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Dattner 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
de Brito 2020 Yes Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Deng 2020 Unclear No Unclear Unclear Unclear
Desmet 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Unclear
Dimcheff 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Dong 2020 Unclear No Unclear No Yes
Doung-ngern 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Draper 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Dub 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Expert Taskforce 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Farronato 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Fateh-Moghadam 2020 Unclear No Yes No Yes
Firestone 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Fontanet 2021 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Galow 2021 No Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Gamboa Moreno 2021 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear no explanation of sample
taking
Gan 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Gaskell 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Ge 2021 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Conducted sensitivity
analyses restricting the study
population to household and
nonhousehold contacts
Ghinai 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Gold 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes Method used to identify close
contacts not clearly described
Gomaa 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Gonçalves 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes Recall bias
Gong 2020 Yes Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Gu 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear No Unclear
Hamner 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Yes
Han 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Hast 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Heavey 2020 Unclear No Yes No Yes
Helsingen 2020 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hendrix 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Hirschman 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear No Yes
Hobbs 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Hoehl 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Hong 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Hsu 2021 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes Asymptomatic patients could
have been missed
Hu 2020 Unclear No Yes No Yes
Hu 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Hu 2021 Yes Yes Unclear Unclear Yes Criteria for categorizing times
into 0-1.5, 1.5-2.5, and >2.5
hrs unclear
Hua 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Huang 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear
Huang 2020a Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Huang 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Islam 2020 Yes No Yes No Yes
Jashaninejad 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Jeewandara 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Jia 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear
Jiang 2020 Yes Yes Unclear No Yes
Jing 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Jing 2020a Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Jones 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Jordan 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Kang 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Kant 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear No Unclear
Karumanagoundar 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Katlama 2022 Yes Yes Unclear Unclear Yes No formal statistical analysis
was planned
Kawasuji 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Khanh 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Kim 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Kim 2020a Unclear Yes Yes No Unclear
Kim 2020b Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Kim 2021 N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes
Kitahara 2022 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Klompas 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Kolodziej 2022 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Conducted sensitivity analyses
excluding households with a
possible other primary case
than the defined index case
Koureas 2021 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes Identification of the index
case was not possible in 10/40
households since two or more
household members were
simultaneously found to be
positive.
Kumar 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear No Unclear
Kuwelker 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Kuwelker 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Kwok 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Ladhani 2020 No Unclear Unclear No Yes
Ladhani 2020a Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Laws 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Laws 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Laxminarayan 2020 Yes No Yes No Yes
Lee 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Lee 2020a Unclear No Yes No Yes
Lewis 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Li 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear No Unclear
Li 2020a Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Li 2020b Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Li 2020c Unclear No Unclear Unclear Unclear
Li 2020d Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Li 2021a Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Li 2021b Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Lin 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Liu 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear No Yes
Liu 2020a Yes Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Liu 2020b Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Liu 2020c Unclear Unclear Unclear No Unclear
Liu 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
López 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
López 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Lopez Bernal 2020 Yes Unclear Yes No Yes
Lopez Bernal 2022 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Lucey 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Luo 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Luo 2020a Unclear Yes Yes Yes Yes They use multiple imputation
to minimise inferential bias,
and they discuss recall bias,
selection bias and regression
to the mean.
Lyngse 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Yes Yes They investigate bias within
their data and discuss this
fairly fully
Ma 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Macartney 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Malheiro 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Maltezou 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Yes
Maltezou 2020a Unclear Unclear Unclear No Yes
Mao 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Unclear
Martínez-Baz 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Martinez-Fierro 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
McLean 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Mercado-Reyes 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Metlay 2021 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Meylan 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Miller 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Montecucco 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Mponponsuo 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Yes Yes Recall bias was minimized
by examining multiple data
sources for both index cases
and exposed persons
Musa 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Ng 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Yes Yes Authors looked at differences
that could have led to bias
Ng 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Ning 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Njuguna 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Nsekuye 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Ogata 2021 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Ogawa 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Yes
Paireau 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Pang 2022 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Park 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Park 2020a Unclear No Yes No Yes
Park 2020b Unclear Yes Yes No Unclear
Passarelli 2020 Unclear No Unclear Unclear Yes
Patel 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Pavli 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Petersen 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Pett 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Phiriyasart 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Poletti 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Yes Unclear
Powell 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Pung 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Pung 2020a Unclear No Unclear Unclear Unclear
Qian 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear No Unclear
Ratovoson 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Ravindran 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Razvi 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Reukers 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Robles Pellitero 2021 Yes No Yes Unclear Yes Recall bias
Rosenberg 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Roxby 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Sakamoto 2022 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes Use of protection is
unclear; testing only
done is participants were
symptomatic
Sang 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear No Unclear
Sarti 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Satter 2022 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Schoeps 2021 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Advised DPHAs to report
consecutive index cases over
at least a 4-week period or
longer, thus reducing the
chance of systematic under-
or over-reporting
Schumacher 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Schwierzeck 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Semakula 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Shah 2020 Unclear No Unclear No Yes
Shah 2021 Unclear No Yes Unclear Yes
Shen 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Sikkema 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Son 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes No Yes
Song 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Sordo 2022 Yes No Yes Unclear Yes
Soriano-Arandes 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes To avoid selection bias in case
recruitment, paediatricians
recorded all positive cases
seen in daily practice
Speake 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Stein-Zamir 2020 Yes Unclear Yes No Yes
Stich 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Sugano 2020 Unclear Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Sun 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Sun 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Sundar 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Tadesse 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Tanaka 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Tanaka 2022 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes Used a convenience
recruitment strategy.
Taylor 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Teherani 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Thangaraj 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Unclear
Torres 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Tsang 2022 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Tshokey 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Tsushita 2022 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
van der Hoek 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Vičar 2021 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Wang 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Wang 2020a Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Wang 2020b Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Wee 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Wendt 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
White 2022a Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
White 2022b Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Wiens 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes For households with more
than 10 people, only the first-
degree relatives of the head
of household were eligible for
study inclusion.
Wolf 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Wong 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Wood 2020 Unclear No Yes Unclear Yes
Wu 2020 Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Wu 2020a Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Yes
Wu 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Xie 2020 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Xie 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Xin 2020 Yes No Yes No Yes
Yang 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Yau 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Ye 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Yi 2021 Unclear Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Yoon 2020 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Yousaf 2020 Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Yu 2020 Yes No Yes No Yes
Yung 2020 Unclear Yes Yes No Yes
Zhang 2020 Unclear Unclear Unclear No Unclear
Zhang 2020a Yes Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear
Zhang 2020b Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Yes
Zhang 2020c Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear Unclear
Zhang 2020d Unclear Yes Unclear Unclear Unclear
Zhang 2021 Yes Yes Yes Unclear Yes
Zhuang 2020 Unclear No Yes No Unclear

Reviews

We included 20 systematic reviews investigating the role of close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission ( Table 2). The studies included in the reviews were primarily observational. In one review (Chen 2020), there was a higher risk of infection in close contacts and healthcare workers without PPE compared to the general population. A second review (Chu 2020) found a significant association between proximity of exposure (distance <1m), absence of barriers (not using face covering or eye protection) and the risk of infection. Two reviews (Shi 2022, Tian 2020) showed that the risk of infection was significantly higher in household settings compared to other settings. The authors of four reviews (Li 2020, Ludvigsson 2020, Silverberg 2022, Zhu 2020) concluded that children were unlikely to be the main conduit for transmission of SARS-CoV-2, and results of two reviews (Koh 2020, Viner 2021) showed that adults with close contact exposure were significantly more likely to be infected compared with children. In one review (Xu 2020), the attack rates were significantly less in students compared with staff (p<0.01), and two (Irfan 2021, Viner 2022) showed that children in educational settings (mainly schools) had lower odds of infection compared to children in household or community clusters. One review (Fung 2020) reported household SARs ranging from 3.9% to 36.4%, but also highlighted the lack of SARS-CoV-2 research in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Three reviews (Madewell 2020, Qiu 2021, Thompson 2021) found that SARs were higher in households from symptomatic index cases than asymptomatic index cases; a further update (Madewell 2021) concluded that household transmission remained an important setting for SARS-CoV-2 transmission. One review (Yanes-Lane 2020) concluded that the proportion of asymptomatic infection was high (20–75%).

In two reviews (Koh 2020, Yanes-Lane 2020), studies judged to be of low quality were excluded from their meta-analyses. In one review (Chen 2020, Goodwin 2021), the overall quality was reported as low, while ≥80% of included studies were reported as moderate or high quality in another seven (Fung 2020, Irfan 2021, Madewell 2020, Shi 2022, Silverberg 2022, Tian 2020, Viner 2021). In one review (Thompson 2021), all included studies had high quality scores. Another review (Chu 2020) reported the overall risk of bias as low-to-moderate, and one (Xu 2020) rated the overall quality as low. The overall reporting quality in one review (Qiu 2021) was reported as uncertain, while 69% of included studies in one review (Viner 2021) were of moderate quality. Four reviews did not assess study quality (see Table 2).

Primary studies

We found 258 primary studies ( Table 1). In general, the studies did not report any hypothesis but assessed epidemiological or mechanistic evidence for transmission associated with close contact settings. One hundred and twenty-two studies (47.3%) were conducted in Asia, 77 (29.8%) in Europe, 40 (15.5%) in North America, 10 (3.9%) in South America, six (2.3%) in Africa and four (1.6%) in Australasia.

Study settings

The study settings included home/quarantine facilities (n=102), hospital (n=31), social/religious gatherings (n=13), public transport (n=10) care homes (n=5), and educational settings (n=15). Nineteen studies used two settings (home plus one other setting). In 41 studies (15.9%), the settings were multiple (3 or more different settings). Three studies were conducted in professional sports settings: one Super League Rugby (Jones 2020), one football team (Schumacher 2020), and one special training venue (Tsushita 2022).

Study designs

All the included studies were observational in design except one RCT (Helsingen 2020): 52 studies were described as cohort, nine were case series and 21 cross-sectional. One study used a before and after study design. The number of close contact participants included ranged from 4 to 72093. Three studies (Chen 2020a, Hong 2020, Yang 2020) examined transmission dynamics in close contacts of index or primary cases with recurrent SARS-CoV-2 infections.

Definition of close contacts

One hundred and one studies (39.1%) reported definitions of close contacts ( Table 4). There was a variation in the definitions across the studies. Twenty-four studies (9.3%) defined close contact as exposure to the index or primary case within two metres for at least 15 minutes while four defined it as being within 2m for at least 10 minutes. In 30 studies, there was no specified distance reported - close contact definitions included unprotected exposure, face-to-face contact, living in the same household or bedroom, sharing a meal, having same postal address, or having repeated and prolonged contact. In seven studies of airline passengers, close contact was defined as all passengers on the flight (Chen 2020), seated within two rows of the index case (Draper 2020, Pavli 2020, Speake 2020, White 2020b), seated within three rows of the index case (Hu 2021), or being within 2m for at least 15 minutes (Khanh 2020). One hundred and sixty studies (62.1%) did not define close contact and the definition was unclear in four studies. Fifty-five studies (21.3%) defined other types of contacts including primary contact, secondary contact, high-risk contact, household contact, social contact, and work contact (see Table 4).

Table 4. Definition of Close Contacts and Other Contacts.

Study ID Definitions of close contacts Definition of other contacts Contact duration & proximity
Abdulrahman 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Adamik 2020 Not defined Other cases in each of the infected households were
regarded as secondary cases
Not reported
Afonso 2021 Not defined Essential activity workers with COVID‐19, confirmed by the
RT‐PCR, were considered the primary case (index cases)
at their households. Their respective infected household
contacts were defined as secondary case or secondary
transmission cases.
Not reported
Agergaard 2020 Not defined Not reported 2 weeks
Akaishi 2021 1) Contact with a COVID-19 patient between 2 days
before and 14 days after the onset of symptoms, 2) no
usage of masks, 3) distance less than 1 m, and 4) more
than 15 min of contact
Lower-risk contact was defined as being in the same place
as the COVID-19 patients, but without fulfilling the above-
described criteria for close contact.
<1m for >15 min
Angulo-Bazán 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Armann 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Arnedo-Pena 2020 Close contacts living in the same household of the
index case and no other sources of transmission apart
from the index case could be found.
Closed contacts from work, social events, relatives live in
other household were excluded and index cases live alone.
Not reported
Atherstone 2021 CDC definition: <6 feet away from someone with
suspected or confirmed COVID-19 for a cumulative
total of 15 minutes or more
over a 24-hour period
Not reported <1m for >15 min
Baettig 2020 Close contact: Less than 2 m for more than 15 min in
the last 48 hours before onset symptom of the
COVID-19 positive index patient.
Not reported <2m for >15 mins 48 hours
before onset symptom of the
COVID-19 positive index patient
Baker 2020 Not defined Not reported Median cumulative time spent
with the patient 45 mins (10–720
mins)
Bao 2020 Not defined Not reported Average stay duration of 2.5
hr daily before the COVID‐19
outbreak.
Basso 2020 Close contact: ≥15 min at ≤2 m, or during AGPs,
between HCWs and the non-isolated COVID-19 patient
Not reported ≤2 m for ≥15 min or during AGP
Bays 2020 Not defined Not reported Not specified
Bender 2021 Person with >15 minutes face-to-face contact within a
maximum distance of 2 m to the index case
Not reported <2m for >15min
Bernardes-Souza
2021
Not defined Not reported Not reported
Bhatt 2022 Not defined Household members: people residing in the same dwelling
as the index participant.
Not reported
Bi 2020 Close contacts were identified as those who lived
in the same apartment, shared a meal, travelled, or
socially interacted with an index case 2 days before
symptom onset.
Casual contacts (eg, other clinic patients) and some close
contacts (eg, nurses) who wore a mask during exposure
were not included in this group.
Not specified
Bi 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Bistaraki 2021 Not defined Household contacts were defined as people who lived in
the same house with the confirmed SARS-CoV-2 patient.
Not reported
Bjorkman 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Blaisdell 2020 Not defined Not reported 1 week
Böhmer 2020 High risk if they had cumulative face-to-face contact
with a patient with laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2
infection for at least 15 min, had direct contact with
secretions or body fluids of a patient with confirmed
COVID-19, or, in the case of health-care workers, had
worked within 2 m of a patient with confirmed
COVID-19 without PPE
All other contacts were classified as low-risk contacts. Face-to-face for at least 15
minutes, direct contact without
PPE
Boscolo-Rizzo 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Brown 2020 Not defined Not reported Mean in-class time = 50 minutes
Burke 2020 Either at least 10 minutes spent within 6 feet of the
patient with confirmed COVID-19 (e.g., in a waiting
room) or having spent time in the same airspace (e.g.,
the same examination room) for 0–2 hours after the
confirmed COVID-19 patient.
Not reported Within 6 feet for at least 10
minutes
Calvani 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Canova 2020 Not defined Not reported 5 HCWs: >30 minutes
5 HCWs: >15-30 mins
6 HCWs: 5-15 mins
5 HCWs: ≤5 mins
Carazo 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Cariani 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Carvalho 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Cerami 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Charlotte 2020 Not defined Not reported 2-hours
Chaw 2020 Close contact: Any person living in the same
household as a confirmed case-patient or someone
who had been within 1 m of a confirmed case-patient
in an enclosed space for >15 minutes
Not reported Within 1m for >15 mins
Chen 2020 Close contact: All passengers were regarded as close
contacts
Not reported Flight duration 5 hours approx
Chen 2020a Close contacts are persons who have had close
contact with re-positive patients without effective
protection with masks, such as living and working
together
Not reported Not specified
Chen 2020b Not defined Not reported Not specified
Chen 2020c Community contact: Any close contact (being within
6 feet of the case-patient) for a prolonged time (>10
minutes); being an office co-worker of the case-
patient with close contact of any duration; contact
with infectious secretions from the case-patient; or
sharing a healthcare waiting room or area during the
same time and up to 2 hours after the case-patient was
present.
Healthcare contact: Face-to-face interaction between
healthcare personnel (HCP) and the case-patient without
wearing the full PPE that was recommended at the time
of the investigation or potential contact with the case-
patient’s secretions by HCP without wearing full PPE.
>10 mins to 2 hours
Cheng 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Chu 2020 Close contact was a person who did not wear
appropriate PPE while having face-to-face contact
with a confirmed case for more than 15 minutes
during the investigation period. A contact was listed
as a household contact if he or she lived in the same
household with the index case. Those listed as family
contacts were family members not living in the same
household.
For health care settings, medical staff, hospital workers,
and other patients in the same setting were included;
close contact was defined by contacting an index case
within 2 m without appropriate PPE and without a
minimal requirement of exposure time
Those listed as family contacts were family members not
living in the same household.
Within 2 m without PPE, face-to-
face contact for >15 minutes
Chu 2021 Not defined Not reported Stayed ≥1 night in the household
during case’s infectious period
Contejean 2020 Close contact: Distance <2 meters for >10 minutes
was defined as close contact
Not reported <2 metres for >10 minutes
Cordery 2021 Not defined Pupil contacts were children who were either in the same
bubble as the Case (Bubble Contact, BC) or in a class within
the same school that was adjacent in terms of age-group
or proximity (School Contact, SC).
Household contacts (HC) were adults and children of any
age normally resident with the Case
Not reported
COVID-19 National
Emergency
Response Center
2020
Close contact (or high risk exposure)” was being within
2 meters of a COVID-19 case
Daily contact (or low risk exposure) was defined as having
proximity with a person who was a confirmed COVID-19
case, without having had close contact.
Not reported
Craxford 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Danis 2020 All children and teachers who were in the same class
as the symptomatic pediatric case were considered as
high risk contacts and were isolated at home.
Moderate/high risk: Person who had prolonged
(> 15 min) direct face-to-face contact within 1 m with
a confirmed case, shared the same hospital room,
lived in the same household or shared any leisure or
professional activity in close proximity with a confirmed
case, or travelled together with a COVID-19 case in
any kind of conveyance, without appropriate individual
protection equipment.
Low risk: Person who had a close (within 1 m) but short
(< 15 min) contact with a confirmed case, or a distant (> 1 m)
but prolonged contact in public settings, or any contact in
private settings that does not match with the moderate/
high risk of exposure criteria.
Negligible risk: Person who had short (< 15 min)
contact with a confirmed case in public settings such as in
public transportation, restaurants and shops; healthcare
personnel who treated a confirmed case while wearing
appropriate PPE without any breach identified.
4 days in chalet
Dattner 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
de Brito 2020 Close contact: Close and prolonged contact in the
same room
Not reported Not specified
Deng 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Desmet 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Dimcheff 2020 Close contact: Within 2 m or 6 feet) with an individual
with confirmed COVID-19 for >15 minutes with the
example being exposed to a family member at home
who has had a positive COVID-19 nasal swab
Not reported Within 2m for >15 mins
Dong 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Doung-ngern 2020 High-risk if they were family members or lived in the
same household as a COVID-19 patient, if they were
within a 1-meter distance of a COVID-19 patient longer
than 15 minutes; if they were exposed to coughs,
sneezes, or secretions of a COVID-19 patient and were
not wearing protective gear, such as a mask; or if they
were in the same closed environment within a 1-meter
distance of a COVID-19 patient longer than 15 minutes
and were not wearing protective gear
Not reported <15 min vs >15 min, <1m vs >1m
Draper 2020 Close contact was defined as anyone who had face-
to-face contact with a confirmed COVID-19 case for
more than 15 minutes cumulatively or continuously
(e.g., household setting or healthcare setting without
appropriate use of personal protective equipment)
or who was in the same room with an infectious case
for more than 2 hours (e.g., school room, workplace)
while a case was symptomatic or during the 24 hours
preceding symptom onset. Aircraft close contacts
included passengers seated in the same row as, or in
the two rows in front of or behind, an infectious case.
If the case was a crew member, the passengers in the
area in which the crew member worked were classified
as close contacts. Passengers disembarking from
cruise ships with high incidence of COVID-19 were also
classified as close contacts for surveillance purposes.
Not reported Not reported
Dub 2020 Close household contact, i.e., an individual sharing
the main residence of the secondary case
A regular household contact, i.e., an individual who would
regularly host or stay in the same residence of a secondary
case (stepsibling, divorced parent and new partner).
Extended contact, i.e., an individual who would have
frequent contact with the secondary case around and
after the exposure, for example, grandparents who were
involved in caring of the secondary case, according to
parents’ reports.
<2 meters for >10 minutes
Expert Taskforce 2020 Close contact: Cabinmates of confirmed case-patients Not reported Not specified
Farronato 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Fateh-Moghadam 2020 Contact of a COVID-19 case has been considered any
person who has had contact with a COVID-19 case
within a time frame ranging from 48 hours before the
onset of symptoms of the case to 14 days after the
onset of symptoms
Not reported Not reported
Firestone 2020 Close contact: Being within 6 feet of a patient with
laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 infection for ≥15
minutes
Not reported Within 2m for >15 mins
Fontanet 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Galow 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Gamboa Moreno 2021 Not defined School contact was a close contact that originated from an
exposure to a case within the school environment.
Family or social contact was a contact with a case outside
the school environment.
Not reported
Gan 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Gaskell 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Ge 2021 A close nonhousehold contact was defined as an
individual exposed (within 1 meter) to an index patient
A household contact was defined as an individual in the
same household or an individual who dined together with
the index patient.
Within 1m
Ghinai 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Gold 2021 Persons exposed to an index patient at school within
6 ft for >15 minutes per day during a 24-hour period
while the index patient was infectious (48 hours before
to 10 days after symptom onset or, if asymptomatic, 48
hours before to 10 days after specimen collection).
N/A <1m for >15 min
Gomaa 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Gonçalves 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Gong 2020 Close contact: Anyone who was closely in contact with
a suspected, confirmed and asymptomatic case without
effective personal protection (classified protection
according to the contact situation, including gloves,
medical protective masks, protective face screens,
isolation clothing, etc.) since onset of symptoms in
the suspected case and confirmed case or the day
asymptomatic case’s specimens were collected. The
close contact included: (i) living, working, or studying
in one house or classroom, (ii) diagnosing, treating,
or visiting cases in hospital ward, (iii) being within
short distance in the same vehicle, (iv) other situations
assessed by the field investigators.
Not reported Not reported
Gu 2020 Not defined Not reported 5 hrs, no natural ventilation or
face masks; distance between
each other <0.5 m
Hamner 2020 Close contact: Within 6 feet of infected case Not reported 2.5 hrs within 2 m
Han 2020 Close contact: Travel was defined as someone who
was in close contact with a confirmed case for over
three hours as they travelled to another region aside
from Region A. Close contact: meal was defined as
someone who was in close contact with a confirmed
case for over 30 minutes after having a meal together.
A casual contact was defined as someone who spent
several minutes with a confirmed case within the same
space without any mask on (or a person was established as
a contact by an Epidemic intelligence Officer).
30 mins to 3 hours
Hast 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Heavey 2020 Close contact: Any individual who has had greater
than 15 minutes face-to-face (<2 meters distance*)
contact with a case, in any setting.
Casual contact: Any individual who has shared a closed
space with a case for less than two hours.
Up to 2 hours in duration
Helsingen 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Hendrix 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Hirschman 2020 Close contact: Within 6 feet of an infected person for
at least 15 minutes starting from 2 days before illness
onset.
Not reported "Hours"
Hobbs 2020 Close contact: Within 6 feet for ≥15 minutes) with a person with
known COVID-19, school or childcare
attendance, and family or community exposures ≤14
days before the SARS-CoV-2 test
Not reported Within 2 m for ≥15 minutes
Hoehl 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Hong 2020 Anyone who ever came within 2 m of a diagnosed
patient without the use of effective personal protective
equipment
Not reported 258 person-days
Hsu 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Hu 2020 A person who had co-travelled on a train within a three-
row seat distance of a confirmed case (index patient)
within 14 days before symptom onset.
Not reported Not reported
Hu 2021 Close contacts were defined as individuals who had
close-proximity interactions (within 1 meter) with
clinically suspected and laboratory-confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 cases, for the period from 2 days before, to 14
days after, the potential infector’s symptom onset. For
those exposed to asymptomatic subjects, the contact
period was from 2 days before, to 14 days after, a
respiratory sample was taken for real-time RT-PCR
testing. Close contacts included, but were not limited
to, household contacts (i.e., household members
regularly living with the case), relatives (i.e., family
members who had close contacts with the case but
did not live with the case), social contacts (i.e., a work
colleague or classmate), and other close contacts (i.e.,
caregivers and patients in the same ward, persons
sharing a vehicle, and those providing a service in
public places, such as restaurants or movie theatres)
Not reported Not reported
Hu 2021 Passengers within 3 rows of the index case seat were
considered to be close contacts for estimating the
upper bound of risk detailed below
Lower bound of risk: passengers assumed to be travelling
with their family members or friends if a small group of
passengers included one index COVID-19 patient, and
passengers seated immediately adjacent to this index
patient shared the same departure and destination.
Within 3 rows of the index case seat
Hua 2020 Not defined Not reported
Huang 2020 Close contacts quarantined at home or hospital Not reported Not reported
Huang 2020a Not defined Not reported Not reported
Huang 2021 Contact with the index case within 2 m without using
appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) and
without a minimum requirement of exposure time in
hospital settings.
Not reported Not reported
Islam 2020 Close contact was defined as individuals who were
closely linked by contact tracing and were considered
a close contact group provided that no PPE was worn
having direct face to face contacts.
Household contacts were defined as individuals who lived
and were sharing the same room and same apartment in
the same household. Family contacts were those who are
the members of the same family but not living in the same
household.
Face-to-face
Jashaninejad 2021 Person who had exposure or lived with a probable or
confirmed case or had direct and face-to-face contact 2
days before and 14 days after exposure with the index
case.
Not reported Not reported
Jeewandara 2021 Close contacts were defined as individuals living in
Bandaranayaka watta and who had direct physical
contact or associated with cases (distance of 1m) within
a period of 2 days from identification of the index case.
Non-close contacts were defined as those who were living
within the CMC region as the cases, or those who worked
with cases in the same causal occupations but were not
qualified to be defined as close contacts.
Within 1m
Jia 2020 A close contact was defined as a person who did
not take effective protection against a suspected or
confirmed case 2 d before the onset of symptoms or
an asymptomatic infected person 2 d before sampling.
Not reported Not reported
Jiang 2020 Close contacts: Lived with the patients and individuals
who had contact with the patients within 1 meter
without wearing proper personal protection. Ct
value ≥40 was considered negative. The maximum
likelihood phylogenetic tree of the complete genomes
was conducted by using RAxML software with 1000
bootstrap replicates, employing the general time-
reversible nucleotide substitution mode
Not reported 1 m
Jing 2020 A close contact was defined as an individual who
had unprotected close contact (within 1 m) with a
confirmed case within 2 days before their symptom
onset or sample collection. Individuals who were linked
by contact tracing were considered a close contact
group
Not reported Not reported
Jing 2020a Not defined Not reported Not reported
Jones 2021 Close contacts were defined by analysis of video
footage for player interactions and microtechnology
(GPS) data for proximity analysis.
Not reported Within 1 m, face-to-face for ≥3
secs
Jordan 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Kang 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Kant 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Karumanagoundar 2021 High-risk contact is defined as any person who was in
proximity with individuals positive for COVID-19 within
2 m of proximity for 15 min.
Contact: any individual comes in proximity with individuals
positive for COVID-19.
Low-risk contact is defined as any person who was in
proximity with individuals positive for COVID-19 and
sharing same environment but not having high exposure.
Household contact: any individual living in the same
household and comes in proximity with the individual with
COVID-19 confirmed.
Community contact: any individual other than living in the
same household and comes in proximity with the individual
with COVID-19 confirmed.
Congregation exposure: individual who have attended the
religious congregation event held during February and
March 2020 (newspaper reference)
<2m for >15min
Katlama 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Kawasuji 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Khanh 2020 Close contact: <2 m distance for >15 minutes.
Successfully traced passengers and crew members
were interviewed by use of a standard questionnaire,
tested for SARS-CoV-2
Not reported <2 m distance for >15 minutes.
Kim 2020 Not defined Household contact: Occurring at least 1 day after but
within 14 days from the last point of exposure.
2 days during the
presymptomatic period and 1
day during the symptomatic
period of the index case.
Kim 2020a Not defined Not reported 2 hrs to 4 days
Kim 2020b Contact was defined as presence in the same room
with COVID-19 confirmed patients, or in the same
outpatient clinic or examination room, 30 minutes
before and after COVID-19 confirmed patients. Within 2
m of confirmed patients (via CCTV)
Not reported Within 2 m of confirmed patients
for 30 mins
Kim 2021 Not defined Not reported Face-to-face
Kitahara 2022 Contact with confirmed case for >15 mins without
wearing proper PPE
Not reported >15 mins
Klompas 2021 Shared a room with an infected patient, and employees
who had face-to-face contact within 6 feet of an
infected employee or patient for at least 15 minutes
during which either party was not wearing a mask
Direct contact: spending ≥15 minutes interacting with staff
or patients on cluster units
<1m for >15 min
Kolodziej 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Koureas 2021 Any person who had unprotected close contact (<2 m,
more than 15 min) with a confirmed case from 2 days
before symptom onset (if not available from sample
collection) until the patient’s isolation.
Household Secondary Contact: Any person residing in the
same house/apartment with a Household Index Case.
<2m for >15min
Kumar 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Kuwelker 2021 Not defined Household members were defined as individuals who resided in the
same household as the index case.
Not reported
Kuwelker 2021 Not defined Household members were defined as individuals who
resided in the same household as an index patient.
Not reported
Kwok 2020 Close contacts referred to anyone who: (i) provided
care to the case (including a family member or
healthcare worker) or had other close physical contact;
or (ii) stayed at the same place (including household
members or visitors) while the case was ill.
Not reported Not reported
Ladhani 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Ladhani 2020a Not defined Not reported Not reported
Laws 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Laws 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Laxminarayan 2020 High-risk contacts had close social contact or direct
physical contact with index cases without protective
measures
High-risk travel exposures—defined as close proximity
to an infected individual in a shared conveyance for ≥6
hours
Low-risk contacts were in the proximity of index cases but
did not meet criteria for high-risk exposure
Not reported
Lee 2020 Not defined: Frequent close contact Not reported >1 m
Lee 2020a Close contact (household contact) Not reported Mean contact period was
calculated to be 7.7 days.
Lewis 2020 Not defined Household contacts were defined as all persons living in
the same household as the primary patient.
Not reported
Li 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Li 2020a Not defined Not reported Not reported
Li 2020b Close contact was defined as an act of sharing a meal,
party, vehicle or living room with a confirmed or latently
infected patient within 14 days.
Not reported Not reported
Li 2020c Close contacts were mainly those who have not
taken effective protection from close contact with
the suspected and confirmed cases 2 days before
symptoms appeared, or the asymptomatic infected
persons 2 days before the specimen collection.
Not reported Not reported
Li 2020d Not defined Not reported Not reported
Li 2021a Not defined Household contact of an identified case was broadly
defined as a family member or close relative who had
unprotected contact with the case within 2 days before the
symptom onset or test-positive specimen collection of the
case but did not necessarily live at the same address.
Not reported
Li 2021b Someone who had contact with an index case-patient
without effective protection and within 1 meter,
regardless of contact duration.
Persons who had close contact with the index case-
patient during or 2 days before the index case patient’s
illness onset were counted as close contacts
Not reported Within 1m regardless of duration
Lin 2021 Those in proximity to cases within 2 days before the
onset of symptoms of suspected and confirmed
cases or 2 days before the sampling of asymptomatic
infected persons when effective protection or
distancing measures were not in effect.
Close contacts also included those in proximity to
cases in aggregated epidemic settings within 2 weeks
before diagnosis such as homes, offices, school classes,
and so forth with 2 or more cases of fever and/or
respiratory symptoms.
Not reported Not reported
Liu 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Liu 2020a Direct contact with patients with neo-coronary
pneumonia (within 1 m)
Not reported Within 1m for 2.5 hrs
Liu 2020b Close contacts were defined by the China Prevention
and Control Scheme of COVID-19.
Not reported 7.8 (95%CI: 7.0–8.7) close contacts per index case.
Liu 2020c Not defined Not reported Not reported
Liu 2021 Not defined Household contacts were broadly defined as any individual
residing with the index case during the infectious period.
Not reported
López 2020 Close contact: Anyone who was within 6 feet of a
person with COVID-19 for at least 15 minutes ≤2 days
before the patient’s symptom onset.
Not reported ≤1.83m of a person with COVID-
19 for at least 15 minutes
≤2 days before the patient’s
symptom onset
López 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Lopez Bernal 2020 Household contacts were defined as those living or
spending significant time in the same household.
Household contacts, others with direct face to face
contact and healthcare workers who had not worn
recommended PPE
Not reported Not reported
Lopez Bernal 2022 Not defined Household contacts were defined as those living or
spending substantial time (overnight) in the same
household.
Other contacts: not classified as close contacts
Community contacts:
Not reported
Lucey 2020 Close contact: HCW or patient who spent more than
15 minutes face-to-face within 2 metres of a confirmed
case or patients who shared a multi-bedded room with
a confirmed case for more than 2 hours.
Not reported Not reported
Luo 2020 The tour coach was with 49 seats was fully occupied
with all windows closed and the ventilation system on
during the 2.5-hour trip.
Not reported 1 to 4.5m; up to 2.5 hours on
a bus
Luo 2020a Close contacts: Anyone who has had contact, without
effective protection regardless of duration of exposure,
with 1 or more persons with suspected or confirmed
COVID-19 any time starting 2 days before onset of
symptoms in persons with a suspected or confirmed
case, or 2 days before sampling for laboratory testing
of asymptomatic infected persons.
Not reported Not reported
Lyngse 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Ma 2020 Not defined Not reported Longest contact time: 8 days
Shortest contact time: 0 days
Macartney 2020 Close contacts: Children or staff with face-to-face
contact for at least 15 min, or who shared a closed
indoor space for at least 40 min with a case during
their infectious period.
Not reported Face-to-face contact for at least
15 min, or who shared a closed
indoor space for at least 40 min
Malheiro 2020 Close contacts (high risk)were defined as individuals
who have spent 15 min or more in closeproximity (2 m
or less) to, or in a closed space with, a case.
Not reported Not reported
Maltezou 2020 Close contact was defined as a contact of >15 minutes
within a distance of <2 m with a COVID-19 case.
Household members were defined as persons living in the
same residence.
>15 minutes within <2 m
Maltezou 2020a Close contact was defined as a contact of >15 minutes
within a distance of <2 meters with a COVID-19 case
Household contacts were defined as persons either living
in the same residence or having close contacts with a
family member for >4 hours daily in the family residence.
Household: >4 hours daily
Close contact: >15 minutes
within <2 m
Mao 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Martínez-Baz 2022 Any person who had face-to-face contact with a
confirmed COVID-19 infected individuals within 2 m
for more than a total of 15 minutes without personal
protection within a timeframe ranging from two days
before to 10 days after the onset of symptoms in
the case, or in the two days before 10 days after the
sample which led to confirmation was taken from
asymptomatic cases
Not reported Within 2m for >15 mins
Martinez-Fierro 2020 Individual who has had closer than <6 feet for ≥15 min
with people with a positive diagnosis for COVID-19
, whether they were symptomatic or asymptomatic
according to the CDC definition
Not reported ≥15 min at a distance of <1.83m
McLean 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Mercado-Reyes 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Metlay 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Meylan 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Miller 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Montecucco 2021 A person who had exposure or lived with a probable or
confirmed case or had direct and face-to-face contact
exposure with the index case in the period between
two days before the positive PCR test or two days
preceding the onset of COVID-19 symptoms and end of
isolation after infection resolution.
Not reported Not reported
Mponponsuo 2020 An interaction of >15 minutes at a distance of <1 m Not reported >15 minutes at a distance of <1 m
Musa 2021 Not defined A household contact was defined as any person living
in the same household as the index case at the time of
recruitment.
Not reported
Ng 2020 Close contacts were individuals who had contact for
at least 30 min within a 2 m distance from the index
case.
Work contacts were defined as individuals who came
into close contact with the index case at work, from 2 days
before the onset of symptoms to isolation of the case, to
account for pre-symptomatic transmission.
Social contacts were defined as individuals who came
into close contact with the index case, from 2 days before
onset of symptoms to isolation of the case, through social
activities. Transport contacts were excluded
Lower risk contacts: Other contacts who were with the
index case for 10–30 min within 2 m
At least 30 min within a 2 m
Ng 2021 Not defined Household contact was defined as all persons living in
the same household of the index patient at diagnosis,
regardless of duration or proximity of contact.
Not reported
Ning 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Njuguna 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Nsekuye 2021 High risk contacts (red-ring) were those who had come
into unprotected face-to-face contact (within 2 m) or
having been in a closed environment (e.g., household
members) with a COVID-19 case for >15 min.
Unprotected direct contact with infectious secretions
of a COVID-19 case was also considered high risk
(red-ring: these are immediate family, friends, relatives
or co-workers that were more likely to have received
exposure to transmission).
A contact of a COVID-19 case was defined as any person
who had contact with a COVID-19 case within a timeframe
ranging from 72 h before the onset of symptoms of the
case to 14 days after the onset of symptoms.
Low risk contacts were those who had come into contact
while masked, within more than 2 m or for less than 15
min.
<2m for >15min
Ogata 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Ogawa 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Paireau 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Pang 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Park 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Park 2020a High-risk contact (household contacts of COVID-19
patients, healthcare personnel)
Household contact was a person who lived in the
household of a COVID-19 patient and a nonhousehold
contact was a person who did not reside in the same
household as a confirmed COVID-19 patient.
Not reported
Park 2020b Not defined Not reported Not reported
Passarelli 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Patel 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Pavli 2020 Close contacts were defined as persons sitting within
a distance of <2 m for >15 min, including passengers
seated two seats around the index case and all crew
members and persons who had close contact with the
index case.
Not reported <2 m for >15 min
Petersen 2021 Household members and contacts who were within 2
meters of an infected person for >15 minutes, who had
direct physical contact or provided caregiving without
using personal protective equipment, or who had
similar exposures, were defined as close contacts.
Not reported <2m for >15min
Pett 2021 Not defined Household contact: living or spending significant time in
the same household.
High risk: persons in healthcare settings (e.g., healthcare
workers, cleaners, visitors) who have not worn
recommended PPE
OR laboratory workers who have not used appropriate
laboratory precautions during the following exposures to
the patient. OR
Direct contact with the case or their body fluids or their
laboratory specimens OR presence in the same room of a
healthcare setting when an aerosol generating procedure
is undertaken on the case

Lower risk: Persons in healthcare settings (e.g., healthcare
workers, cleaners) who have worn recommended PPE
during exposures to the patient.
Not reported
Phiriyasart 2020 Close contact was defined as a person who had at
least one of these following criteria : (i) a person who
came into close (within 1 meter) contact with, or had a
conversation with any patient for >5 minutes, or was
coughed or sneezed on by any patient when he/she did
not wear appropriate personal protective equipment
(PPE), e.g. a face mask, (ii) a person who was in an
enclosed space without proper ventilation, e.g. in the
same air-conditioned bus/air-conditioned room as any
patient , and was within one meter of any patient for
>15 minutes without wearing appropriate PPE.

High-risk close contact was defined as a close contact
who was likely to contract the virus from any patient
through exposure to respiratory secretions of any
patient while not wearing PPE according to standard
precautions.
A low-risk close contact was defined as a close contact who
was less likely to contract the virus from any patient. This
includes close contacts who have not met the definition for
high-risk close contacts.
Not reported
Poletti 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Powell 2022 Not defined Direct contacts are defined as the staff and students who
were asked to self-isolate.
Indirect contacts refer to household members of these
staff and students.
Not reported
Pung 2020 Close contacts: People who spend a prolonged time
within 2 m of a confirmed case
Other contacts: People who had some interactions with
the case.
Unclear
Pung 2020a Close household contacts Not reported Unclear
Qian 2020 Four categories of infected individuals were considered
based on their relationship: family members, family
relatives, socially connected individuals, and socially
non-connected individuals
Not reported Not reported
Ratovoson 2022 Defined as those who lived in the same house of a
symptomatic index case up to 4 days before symptom
onset or of an asymptomatic index case up to 4 days
prior to the collection date of the first positive test
result.
Not reported
Ravindran 2020 Close contact: Face-to-face contact for greater than
15 minutes cumulative in the period extending from
48 hours before onset of symptoms in a confirmed
case; or sharing of closed space with a confirmed
case for a prolonged period of time in the period
extending from 48 hours before onset of symptoms in
a confirmed case.
Not reported Face-to-face contact for at least
15 min, or who shared a closed
indoor space for prolonged
period 48 hrs before onset of
symptoms
Razvi 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Reukers 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Robles Pellitero 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Rosenberg 2020 Not defined Not reported
Roxby 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sakamoto 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sang 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sarti 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Satter 2022 Not defined A contact was defined as an individual who experienced
any of the following exposures during the 2 days before
and the 14 days after the onset of symptoms of a
laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case: (1) face-to-face
contact with a confirmed case within 1 m and for more
than 15 min (including travel, gossips, tea stall) or (2) direct
physical contact with a confirmed COVID-19 case.
<1m for >15 min
Schoeps 2021 A category-I contact is defined as a person who either
stayed face-to-face (<1·5 meters) with a COVID-19-case
for 15 minutes or longer, or in the same room
(i.e., irrespective of distance) for 30 minutes or longer
Not reported <1.5m for >15 min
Schumacher 2021 Close contact: Approximately 30–90 seconds in close
proximity (<1.5 m) of other players
Close social contacts (including sharing a car) 30–90 seconds in close proximity
(<1.5 m)
Schwierzeck 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Semakula 2021 Not defined A contact of a COVID-19 case was defined as any person
who had contact with a COVID-19 case within a timeframe
ranging from 72 hours before the onset of
symptoms of the case to 14 days after the onset of symptoms
Not reported
Shah 2020 Household contact was defined as contact sharing
same residential address.
Not reported Not reported
Shah 2021 Not defined Household contact was defined as an individual sharing
shame postal address, and secondary case was defined
as individual developing infection within 14 days from last
contact with the index case.
Not reported
Shen 2020 Close contacts defined as individuals who had close,
prolonged, and repeated interactions with the 2 source
cases (Cases 2 and 3).
All other contacts are defined as casual contacts. Not reported
Sikkema 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Son 2020 Not defined A contact was defined as anyone who was in contact with a
confirmed case from a day before the symptoms occurred,
in a manner that offered the potential for transmission
through respiratory droplets
Not reported
Song 2020 Shared the same bedroom, had dinner together Not reported Not reported
Sordo 2022 Not defined Close contacts were considered to be part of the same
household if they had the same address as the case.
Not reported
Soriano-Arandes 2021 Not defined Household contacts were defined as all persons living
in the same household as the first patient diagnosed,
regardless of the duration or proximity of the contact
Not reported
Speake 2020 2 rows in front and behind infectious passenger on an
airplane
Not reported Unclear
Stein-Zamir 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Stich 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sugano 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Sun 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sun 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Sundar 2021 Not defined Contacts were those who were exposed to the index case
in the pre-symptomatic (2 days prior to symptom onset)
or symptomatic period and satisfied at least one of the
following: a) persons at residence of index case, b) persons
at workplace who were exposed to the index case at close
range (less than 6 feet) for ≥15 minutes, and c) persons
outside the index case residence or workplace with close
range contact ≥15 minutes who are traceable
<1m for >15 min
Tadesse 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Tanaka 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Tanaka 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Taylor 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Teherani 2020 Household contacts (HCs) were defined as an adult
(18 years) or a child (<18 years) who resided in the
home with the SIC at the time of diagnosis.
Not reported Not reported
Thangaraj 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Torres 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Tsang 2022 A close contact of a case is defined as any person
who was in close proximity to the case without any
personal protection equipment, starting 2 days before
the symptom onset of the case or specimen collection
if the case was asymptomatic. Close contact settings
include but are not limited to (1) living, working,
dining or taking classes with the case in the same
closed space or in proximity; (2) providing health care
to or visiting the case at a hospital; and (3) sharing
transportation with and in close proximity to the case
(in flights, passengers within 3 rows of seats in the front
and back of a case as well as crew members who had
been in proximity to a case were considered as close
contacts); and (4) other individuals in close proximity to
the cases as determined by field investigators.
Not reported Not reported
Tshokey 2020 Close friends, roommates, flight seat partner, spouse
or partner, cousin, physician, tour driver
Primary contacts: Individuals coming in some form of
contact with the confirmed cases such as conveyance in
the same cars/flights, encounter in clinics, serving meals,
or providing housekeeping services in hotels.
Secondary contacts: Individuals coming in contact with
the primary contacts
Unclear
Tsushita 2022 Not defined Not reported Not reported
van der Hoek 2020 Not defined Not reported
Vičar 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Wang 2020 Not defined Not reported Unclear
Wang 2020a Not defined Not reported Unclear
Wang 2020b Close contact was defined as being within 1 m or 3 feet
of the primary case, such as eating around a table or
sitting together watching TV.
Not reported Unclear
Wee 2020 Not defined Not reported Within 2 m of the index case
for a cumulative time of ≥15
minutes, or who had performed
AGPs without appropriate PPE.
Wendt 2020 High-risk contacts: >15 min face-to-face contact,
sitting in a row behind physician for 45 mins, transfer in
an ambulance (45-min drive).
Not reported >15 min face-to-face contact
White 2022a A close contact was defined as an individual who was
within 1 m of a case of COVID-19 while wearing a mask,
or within 2 m if unmasked, in an indoor or outdoor
setting for a cumulative total of 15 min or more over a
24-hour period during the case’s infectious period.
Not reported <2m for >15 min
White 2022b A close contact was defined as an individual sitting
within a two-seat radius of an infectious case, where
one infectious case was identified on a flight. If any
close contact sitting within a two-seat radius of an
infectious case tested positive, all passengers on board
were then considered close contacts. If there were two
or more unrelated infectious cases on board the same
flight, all passengers were considered close contacts.
Not reported Within a two-seat radius of an
infectious case
Wiens 2021 Not defined Households were defined as a group of individuals that
sleep under the same roof most nights and share a
cooking pot.
Not reported
Wolf 2020 Not defined Not reported Not specified
Wong 2020 Contact case was defined as a patient or staff who
stayed or worked in the same ward as the index
patient. Patients who shared the same cubicle with the
index case were considered as ‘patient close contact’.
Staff close contact: Staff who had contact within 2 m
of the index case for a cumulative time of >15 min, or
had performed AGPs, without ‘appropriate’ PPE.
Casual contacts: All staff and patients who did not fulfil the
pre-defined criteria for close contacts.
Casual/low-risk contact: HCW wearing a facemask or
respirator only and have prolonged close contact with a
patient who was wearing a facemask, or HCW using all
recommended PPE or HCW (not using all recommended
PPE) who have brief interactions with a patient regardless
of whether patient was wearing a facemask.
Patient close contacts were quarantined into an AIIR (or
quarantine camp if the patient was deemed clinically stable
to be discharged from hospital) for 14 days.
Within 2 m of the index case for
a cumulative time of >15 min
Wood 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Wu 2020 Close contact: Been within 1 metre of a confirmed
case, without effective PPE, within the period for 5 days
before the symptom onset in the index case or 5 days
before sampling if the index case was asymptomatic.
Not reported Within 1 metre of a confirmed case,
without effective PPE
Wu 2020a Household contacts were defined as person who spent
at least 1 night in the house after the symptom onset
of the index patient. A household was defined as ≥2
people living together in the same indoor living space.
A household index was the first person to introduce
SARS-CoV-2 into the household.
Not reported At least 1 night
Wu 2021 Close contacts of symptomatic cases were individuals
who had exposed to a confirmed patient of SARSCoV-2
infection without wearing proper PPE (including
practising optimal hand hygiene or wearing gloves, and
wearing surgical facemasks and gowns) and/or stayed
with the case in close proximity (<1m) in a close/
semi-close environment such as household, office,
elevator, etc., which should have occurred within two
days before the onset of the symptomatic case until
when the symptomatic index case was isolated.

Close contacts of asymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 infections
were people who had a close contact (same definition
as above) with the confirmed asymptomatic index case
within two days before the asymptomatic case provided
specimens to test for SARS-CoV2 to the time when the
index case was isolated.
Not reported <1m for >15 min
Xie 2020 Close contact: An individual who has not taken
effective protection when in proximity of suspected or
confirmed cases 2 days before the onset of symptoms
or 2 days before the collection of asymptomatic
specimens.
Not reported Unclear
Xie 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Xin 2020 Close contacts were defined as persons who had a
short-range contact history for 2 days before the onset
of symptoms in COVID-19-suspected and -confirmed
cases, or 2 days before the collection of samples from
asymptomatic cases without taking effective protective
measures, such as family members in the same house,
direct caregivers, and medical staff who provided
direct medical care, colleagues in the same office or
workshop, etc.
The effective contact duration for the close contacts
was defined as the contact days with index patients with
confirmed COVID‐19, which was calculated as the last
contact date minus the start contact date, and all dates
were corresponding to the definition of close contacts
The median effective contact
duration with patients with
COVID‐19 was 4 (IQR: 1–6) days,
with 57 (53.8%) experiencing
effective contact between 3
and 11 days, and 9 (8.5%) with
effective contact duration
> 11 days
Yang 2020 Close contacts: Unprotected exposure. Candidate contacts: Teachers and classmates Not reported
Yau 2020 Close unprotected contact with someone who has
tested positive for COVID-19 in the last 14 days
Not reported Unclear
Ye 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Yi 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Yoon 2020 Close contact was defined as a person who had
face-to-face contact for >15 minutes or who had direct
physical contact with the index case-patient. Persons
who used the same shuttle bus were also considered
to be close contacts.
Not reported Face-to-face contact for
>15 minutes or direct physical
contact
Yousaf 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Yu 2020 Close contacts were defined as those who lived in the
same household, shared meals, travelled or had social
interactions with a confirmed case two days before the
onset of COVID-19 symptoms
Not reported Not reported
Yung 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Zhang 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Zhang 2020a Close contact: Refers to a person who had contact
with index case without using proper protection during
2 days before the index case was tested.
Not reported Not reported
Zhang 2020b Not defined Not reported Not reported
Zhang 2020c Close contacts were individuals who lived with a PCR-
confirmed case or interacted with a case within 1 metre
from the case without any personal protections.
Not reported Within 1m of case
Zhang 2020d Not defined Not reported Not reported
Zhang 2021 Not defined Not reported Not reported
Zhuang 2020 Not defined Not reported Not reported

Eighteen studies (7%) reported data on the contact duration between close contacts and the index or primary cases ( Table 4). The average contact duration ranged from 30 minutes to 8 days across 16 studies that investigated transmission rates using RT-PCR. In two studies that examined transmission using serology (Agergaard 2020, Hong 2020), the durations of contact were two weeks and 258 person-days, respectively. The mean contact duration was either unclear or not reported in 236 studies (91.2%).

Test methods

A total of 163 studies (63.2%) used RT-PCR as a test method for confirming SARS-CoV-2 positivity, while 20 studies (7.8%) exclusively investigated transmission using serology (see Table 1). In 40 studies (15.5%), both PCR and serology were used to investigate close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Thirty-seven studies (14.3%) did not report the test method used. For PCR, the timing of sample collection varied from within 24 hours to 14 days after exposure to the index or primary case; for serology, this ranged from 2–22 weeks post-exposure. In total, 118 studies (45.7%) reported the timing of sample collection. The timing of sample collection was either not reported or unclear in 141 studies (54.7%).

Twenty-six out of 163 studies (17.2%) reported Ct values for determining PCR test positivity: ≤40 (eight studies), <37 (six studies), ≤35 (three studies), <38 (three studies), one each for <25, ≤30, <32, <36 (or 39) and <39. One study (Afonso 2021) used three different Ct values: <25, 25-30, or >30. Only 12 studies (7.4%) reported the Ct values for close contacts in their results – these ranged from 16.03 to 40.

Sixty studies reported conducting serological tests to assess transmission of SARS-CoV-2 ( Table 5). There was variation in the description of the tests. Twenty-eight studies determined the antibody responses to SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins using Immunoglobulin G (IgG) and/or IgM while 22 used only IgG. In 21 studies, the threshold for serological positivity was not reported. Nine studies (Craxford 2021, Farronato 2021, Gomaa 2021, Jeewandara 2021, Kuwelker 2020, Kuwelker 2021, Ng 2020, Stich 2021, Yang 2020) performed neutralisation assays to confirm positive serologic samples. In one study (Torres 2020), study participants self-administered the serological tests.

Four studies (Ladhani 2020a, Miller 2021, Speake 2020, Yang 2020) performed viral culture, while 18 studies (Böhmer 2020, Cerami 2021, Firestone 2020, Huang 2021, Jeewandara 2021, Jiang 2020, Klompas 2021, Kolodzeij 2022, Ladhani 2020a, Lucey 2020, Pang 2022, Powell 2022, Pung 2020, Sikkema 2020, Speake 2020, Taylor 2020, Wang 2020, Zhang 2021) performed genome sequencing (GS) plus phylogenetic analysis.

Table 5. Description of Serological Tests in Included Studies Conducted in Close Contact Settings.

Study ID Serological
test
Description of test Thresholds for serological positivity
Agergaard
2020
IgG and IgM iFlash and DiaSorin iFlash SARS-CoV-2 N/S IgM/IgG cut-off:
≥12 AU/ml = positive.
DiaSorin SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 IgG cut-off:
≥15 AU/ml = positive, 12 < x < 15 AU/ml
= equivocal, and ≤12 AU/ml = negative.
Angulo-Bazán
2021
IgG and IgM Coretests ® COVID-19 IgM / IgG Ab Test (Core Technology Co. Ltd), a lateral flow
immunochromatographic test that qualitatively detects the presence of antibodies against
SARS-CoV-2, with a sensitivity and specificity reported by the manufacturer for IgM / IgG of 97.6% and
100%, respectively
Not reported
Armann 2021 IgG Diasorin LIAISON® SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 IgG Assay). All samples with a positive or equivocal LIAISON®
test result, as well as all samples from participants with a reported personal or household history
of a SARS-CoV-2 infection, were re-tested with two additional serological tests: These were a
chemiluminescent microparticle immunoassay (CMIA) intended for the qualitative detection of IgG
antibodies to the nucleocapsid protein of SARS-CoV-2 (Abbott Diagnostics® ARCHITECT SARS-CoV-2
IgG ) (an index (S/C) of < 1.4 was considered negative whereas one >/= 1.4 was considered positive)
and an ELISA detecting IgG against the S1 domain of the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein (Euroimmun®
Anti-SARS-CoV-2 ELISA) (a ratio < 0.8 was considered negative, 0.8–1.1 equivocal, > 1.1 positive)
Participants whose positive or equivocal LIAISON® test result could be confirmed by a positive test
result in at least one additional serological test were considered having antibodies against SARS-CoV2.
Antibody levels > 15.0 AU/ml were
considered positive and levels between
12.0 and 15.0 AU/ml were considered
equivocal.
Baettig 2020 IgG and IgM Used commercially available immunochromatography rapid test with SARS-CoV-2 protein-specific
IgM and IgG. This test was performed according to the manufacturers’ instructions with a reported
sensitivity and specificity of 93% and 95%, respectively.
Not reported
Basso 2020 IgG and IgM Sera were collected approximately 3 weeks following exposure for the detection of antibodies against
SARS-CoV-2. EDI Novel Coronavirus COVID-19 lgG and IgM ELISA (Epitope Diagnostics, Inc., San
Diego, CA, USA) were used for initial testing, and supplemented with tests from DiaSorin (LIAISON
SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 IgG test), Abbott (Alinity i SARS-CoV-2 IgG), Roche (Elecsys Anti-SARS-CoV-2) and
Wantai (WANTAI SARS-CoV-2 Ab ELISA).
Not reported
Bernardes-
Souza 2021
IgM or IgG Participant’s peripheral blood (3 mL) was collected by puncture of the brachiocephalic vein by a
trained nurse and then transferred to a serum-separating tube. The tube was stored between 2 °C to
8 °C and transported within 2 hours to the public laboratory of the town Department of Health, where
it was immediately centrifuged (2000xg for 10 minutes) and the separate serum was tested for SARS-
CoV-2 antibodies using a lateral flow immunoassay according to the manufacturer’s instructions.
The sample was considered positive if
IgM or IgG antibodies were detectable.
Bhatt 2022 IgG, IgA or
IgM
ELISA adapted and optimized from the assay were used to evaluate SARS-CoV-2-specific IgA, IgM and
IgG against the spike-trimer and nucleocapsid protein.
Samples were considered antibody
positive for a particular isotype (IgG, IgA
or IgM) when both antispike and anti-
nucleocapsid antibodies were detected
above the cut-off values (signal-to-cut-
off value ≥ 1) for that isotype. Samples
were considered positive for SARS-CoV-
2 antibody if they were positive for IgG
or for both IgA and IgM.
Bi 2021 IgG ELISA targeting the S1 domain of the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2; sera diluted 1:101 were processed
on a EuroLabWorkstation ELISA.
Seropositivity was defined based
on the cutoff recommended by the
manufacturer and explored a higher cut-
off of 1.5 (>1.5) in sensitivity analyses.
Brown 2020 IgG and IgM ELISA (authors referenced another study) Reciprocal titers of >400 to be positive
and reciprocal titers of >100 but <400
to be indeterminate.
Chen 2020b IgG and IgM In-house enzyme immunoassay (EIA). 96-well plates were coated with 500 ng/mL of recombinant RBD
or NP protein overnight, incubating with diluted serum samples at 1:20. Plates were incubated with
either anti-human IgM or IgG conjugated with HRP. Optical density (OD) value (450nm-620nm) was
measured.
Preliminary cut-off values were
calculated as the mean of the negative
serum OD values plus 3 standard
deviations (SD) from 90 archived
healthy individuals in 2019. A close
contact was considered seropositive if
OD of 1:20 diluted serum was above
the cut-off values for either IgM or IgG
against both RBD and NP protein
Chu 2020 IgG and IgM Serum samples were tested at CDC using a SARS-CoV-2 ELISA with a recombinant SARS-CoV-2 spike
protein (courtesy of Dr. Barney Graham, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD, USA) as an
antigen. Protein ELISA 96-well plates were coated with 0.15 μg/mL of recombinant SARS-CoV-2 spike
protein and ELISA was carried out as previously described. An optimal cutoff optical density value of
0.4 was determined for >99% specificity and 96% sensitivity. Serum samples from the case-patient
were used as a positive control and commercially available serum collected before January 2020 from
an uninfected person as a negative control.
Total SARS-CoV-2 antibody titers >400
was considered seropositive.
Craxford
2021
IgG ELISA. Serum samples were serially diluted in 3% skimmed milk powder in PBS containing
0.05% Tween 20 and 0.05% sodium azide. All assays were performed on Biotek Precision liquid
handling robots in a class II microbiological safety cabinet. For endpoint dilution ELISAs, sera were
progressively 4-fold diluted from 1:150 to 1;38,400.
Participants found to be seropositive
for SARS-CoV-2 were assessed for the
presence of neutralising antibodies.
Dattner 2020 IgG Abbott SARS-CoV-2 IgG, whose specificity was estimated as ∼100% and whose sensitivity at ≥ 21 days
was estimated as ∼85%
Not reported
de Brito 2020 IgG and IgM Chemiluminescence 4 weeks after contact with the index case Not reported
Dimcheff
2020
IgG Serum IgG to thD4:D12e nucleoprotein of SARS-CoV-2 was measured using a Federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) emergency-use–authorized chemiluminescent microparticle immunoassay
performed on an automated high throughput chemistry immunoanalyzer (Architect i2000SR, Abbott
Laboratories, Abbott Park, IL). The sensitivity of this assay is reported to be 100% with a specificity
of 99% at >14 days after symptom onset in those infected with SARS-CoV-2.1 At 5% prevalence, the
positive predictive value is 93.4% and the negative predictive value is 100%
Results are reported in a relative
light units (RLU) index; a value ≥1.4
RLU is considered a positive antibody
response.
Dub 2020 IgG IgG antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 nucleoprotein (The Native Antigen Company, United Kingdom) were
measured
with a fluorescent bead-based immunoassay (manuscript in preparation). Antigen was conjugated on
MagPlex
Microspheres and bound IgG antibodies were identified by a fluorescently labeled conjugated
antibody (RPhycoerythrin-conjugated Goat Anti-Human IgG, Jackson Immuno Research, USA). The
plate was read on
Luminex® MAGPIX® system. xPONENT software version 4.2 (Luminex®Corporation, Austin, TX) was
used to
acquire and analyze data. Median fluorescent intensity was converted to U/ml by interpolation from a
5-
parameter logistic standard curve. The specificity and sensitivity of the assay was assessed using
receiver operator curve (ROC) with 100% specificity and 97.9% sensitivity
MNT titre of ≥ 6 considered positive
FMIA titre 3·4 U/ml considered positive
Farronato
2021
IgM or IgG Rapid lateral flow chromatographic test. If the test sample contains IgM or IgG antibodies to SARS-
CoV-2, the test displays two different visible bands (test line and control line); however, if these
antibodies are absent, only the control line appears.
Participants found to be seropositive
for SARS-CoV-2 were assessed for the
presence of neutralising antibodies.
Fontanet
2021
IgG ELISA N assay, detecting antibodies binding to the nucleocapsid (N) protein; a S-Flow assay, which is a
flow-cytometry based assay detecting anti-spike (S) IgG; and a luciferase immunoprecipitation system
(LIPS) assay, which is an immunoprecipitation-based assay detecting anti-N, anti-S1 and anti-S2 IgG.
Samples were also tested for neutralisation activity using a viral pseudotype-based assay.
In the high school study, participants
were considered seropositive for
SARS-CoV-2 antibodies if any of the
serological assay tests were positive.
Galow 2021 IgG SARS-CoV-2 IgG antibodies were detected via Diasorin LIAISON® SARS-CoV-2 S1/S2 IgG Assay and
positive or equivocal results were confirmed via Abbott Diagnostics® ARCHITECT SARS-CoV-2 and
Euroimmun® Anti-SARS-CoV-2 ELISA.
Participants whose positive or equivocal
LIAISON® test result could be
confirmed by an additional serological
test were considered seropositive for
SARS-CoV-2.
Gaskell 2021 IgG Serum samples were analysed for the presence of IgG specific for SARS CoV-2 trimeric spike
protein (S), Receptor Binding Domain (RBD) and nucleocapsid (N) antigens using a multiplex
chemiluminescence immunoassay.
Not reported
Gomaa 2021 Unclear Microneutralization Assay was conducted to measure the nAb titre in human sera using Vero-E6
(ATCC, CRL-1586) cell monolayers using SARS-CoV-2/Egypt/NRC-03/2020 under biological safety level
3. The plates were then incubated for three more days at 37°C in 5% CO2 in a humidified incubator.
A virus back-titration was performed without immune serum to confirm TCID50 viral titre used.
Cytopathic effect (CPE) was observed post 72 hrs of infection.
The reciprocal of the serum dilution
that protected cells from CPE was
considered the nAb titre. Negative sera
were given a value of 1:5.
Gonçalves
2021
IgM or IgG Seropositivity was determined by a point-of-care rapid antibody test. The assays were carried out
according to the manufacturers protocol: a 10 μl sample (whole blood or serum) was applied to the
sample well, followed by the addition of 2-3 drops or 80μl of diluent. The test was developed for
15 minutes at room temperature and the results (positive or negative) were read by independent
experienced readers blinded to the sample status.
Control line threshold
Gu 2020 IgG Not described Not reported
Helsingen
2020
IgG Measurement of IgG antibodies was performed with a multiplex flow cytometric assay known as
microsphere affinity proteomics (MAP)
Not specified. Referenced
Hong 2020 IgG and IgM Qualitative colloidal gold assay (Innovita (Tangshan) Biological Technology, Co., Ltd, Tangshan, China),
following manufacturers’ instructions. The sensitivity of the assay was 87.3% (95%CI 80.4–92.0%), and
the specificity was 100% (95%CI 94.20–100%) according to the instructions of the assay.
Not reported
Jeewandara
2021
Unclear Due to the limitations in using a BSL-3 facility to carry out assays to measure neutralizing antibodies,
the Nabs were measured using a surrogate virus neutralization test (sVNT). ELISA was used to assess
antibody responses.
Inhibition percentage ≥ 25% in a
sample was considered as positive for
Nabs.
Jordan 2022 IgG Not reported Not reported
Katlama 2022 IgM or IgG ach index case and all contact individuals were tested using the rapid immunochromatographic lateral
flow assay (LFA) COVID-PRESTO manufactured by AAZ detecting total SARS-CoV-2 IgG, IgM, or both
antibodies targeting the N-protein with a sensitivity of 78.4% and 92.0% and a specificity of 100% and
92% for IgM and IgG. The presence of IgG antibodies against the nucleocapsid protein was measured
and interpreted using commercially available chemiluminescent microparticle immunoassay (CMIA)
kits.
Not specified
Kim 2021 IgM or IgG IgM and IgG and ELISA total antibody testing. The FIA IgM and IgG kit used the automated
fluorescent lateral flow immunoassay method, using the AFIAS-6 analyzer system.
FIA kit Specimens with a relative cut-off
index (COI) value ≥ 1.1 were considered
positive.
ELISA: An optical density (OD) ratio <
1.0 was interpreted as negative, ≥0.9 to
<1.0 as borderline, and ≥1.0 as positive.
Kolodziej
2022
IgG Sera were tested for the presence of immunoglobulin G antibodies reactive with the SARS-CoV-2
spike trimer, S1, and N antigens in a protein microarray, in duplicate 2-fold serial dilutions starting
at 1:20. For each antigen, a 4-parameter log logistic calibration curve was generated and effective
concentration 50, mid-point antibody titres were calculated.
Not specified
Kuwelker
2020
IgG A two-step ELISA was used for detecting SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies, initially by screening with
receptor-binding domain (RBD) and then confirming seropositivity by spike IgG. Endpoint titres were
calculated as the reciprocal of the serum dilution giving an optical density (OD) value=3 standard
deviations above the mean of historical pre-pandemic serum samples. Individuals with no antibodies
were assigned a titre of 50 for calculation purposes. Neutralisation assays were used to quantify
SARS-CoV-2-specific functional antibodies. VN titres were determined as the reciprocal of the
highest serum dilution giving no CPE. Negative titres (<20) were assigned a value of 10 for calculation
purpose.
Not specified.
Kuwelker
2021
IgG A two-step ELISA was used for detecting SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies, initially by screening with
receptor-binding domain (RBD) and then confirming seropositivity by spike IgG. The neutralisation
assays were used to quantify SARS-CoV-2-specific functional antibodies.
ELISA: Individuals with titres ≥100 were
defined as positive and those with no
antibodies were assigned a titre of 50
for calculation purposes.
Neutralisation assays: Negative titres
(<20) were assigned a value of 10 for
calculation purpose.
Lewis 2020 Not specified ELISA (authors referenced another study) Not specified
Lin 2021 IgM or IgG SARS-CoV-2 IgM and IgG antibodies were detected by Chemiluminescence and GICA. The test results
were expressed in relative light units (RLU), and the IgM or IgG levels were positively correlated with
RLU. The instrument automatically calculated IgM or IgG antibody levels (AU/mL) based on RLU and
the built-in calibration curve.
Test result ≥ 10.0 AU/mL was reported
as positive.
Luo 2020a IgG and IgM Not described Asymptomatic: Specific IgM detected
in serum.
Symptomatic: Detectable SARS-CoV-
2–specific IgM and IgG in serum, or at
least a 4-fold increase in IgG between
paired acute and convalescent sera.
Macartney
2020
IgA, IgG, IgM SARS-CoV-2-specific IgG, IgA, and IgM detection was done using an indirect immunofluorescence
assay (IFA) that has a sensitivity compared with nucleic acid testing of detecting any of SARS-CoV-2-
specific IgG, IgA, or IgM when samples were collected at least 14 days after illness onset of 91·3%
(95% CI 84·9–95·6) and specificity of 98·9% (95% CI 98·4–99·3%; MVNO, personal communication).
Not specified
Martinez-
Fierro 2020
IgG and IgM IgM and IgG against SARS-CoV-2 were determined using a total blood sample through a 2019 nCov
IgG/IgM rapid test (Genrui Biotech, Shenzen, China)
Not specified
Mercado-
Reyes 2022
IgM or IgG Prior infection by SARS-CoV2 was ascertained by measuring total antibodies (IgM+ IgG) using the
SARS-CoV-2 Total (COV2T) Advia Centaur – Siemens chemiluminescent immunoassay (CLIA). Sera from
149 patients with SARS-CoV-2 infection, confirmed by RT-PCR and obtained less than 14 days after the
onset of symptoms, were used as positive controls.
Not specified
Meylan 2021 IgG Serum samples were analysed for SARS-CoV-2 serology (IgG), using a previously described Luminex-
based assay quantifying antibody binding to the trimeric form of the SARS-CoV-2 S-protein.
This assay has shown a sensitivity and
specificity of 97% and 98%, respectively,
on hospitalised patients for the chosen
cut-off of positivity defined at a ratio
>5.90.
Miller 2021 IgG Blood samples were tested for IgG antibody to the nucleocapsid protein (NP) by a commercial NP
assay and also by an in-house ELISA that used the receptor binding domain (RBD) as antigen.
The cut-off for antibody positivity used
in the analyses were ≥0.8 for the Abbott
assay and ≥5.0 for the RBD ELISA.
Ng 2020 Not specified human ACE-2 (hACE2) protein (Genscript Biotech, New Jersey, United States) was coated at 100
ng/well in 100 mM carbonate-bicarbonate coating buffer (pH 9.6). 3ng of horseradish peroxidase
(HRP)-conjugated recombinant receptor binding domain (RBD) from the spike protein of SARS-CoV-
2 (GenScript Biotech) was pre-incubated with test serum at the final dilution of 1:20 for 1 hour at
37°C, followed by hACE2 incubation for 1 h at room temperature. Serum samples were tested with a
surrogate viral neutralising assay for detection of neutralising antibodies to SARS-CoV-2.
A positive serological test result
was concluded if the surrogate viral
neutralising assay for a particular
sample resulted in inhibition of 30% or
greater (98·9% sensitivity and 100·0%
specificity)
Ogawa 2020 IgG Abbott ® (Abbott ARCHITECT SARS-CoV-2 IgG test, Illinois, USA) Not specified
Petersen
2021
Unclear SARS-CoV-2 Ab ELISA kit was used to determine serologic status Not specified
Poletti 2020 IgG Not described Not specified
Powell 2022 Unclear Oral fluid (OF) swabs tested for antibodies against the SARS-CoV-2 Nucleoprotein using an
Immunoglobulin G capture-based enzyme immunoassay.
Not specified
Ratovoson
2022
IgM or IgG ELISA for the detection of total antibodies (including IgM and IgG) to SARS-CoV-2. Not specified
Razvi 2020 IgG and IgM Blood samples were analysed on the day of collection using the Roche Elecsys Anti-Sars-CoV-2
serology assay. This electro chemiluminescent immunoassay is designed to detect both IgM and IgG
antibodies to SARS-CoV-2 in human serum and plasma and has been shown to have a high sensitivity
and specificity
Not specified
Reukers 2021 IgM or IgG ELISA for the detection of total antibodies (including IgM and IgG) to SARS-CoV-2. Not specified
Satter 2022 IgM or IgG ELISA for the detection of total antibodies (including IgM and IgG) to SARS-CoV-2. The Receptor
Binding Domain (RBD) of the spike protein of SARS-CoV-2 was used as an antigen to detect antibody
responses
Using serum from pre-pandemic
healthy controls, the concentration of
500 ng/mL (0.5 µg/mL) was determined
as a cut-off value for seropositivity
for both RBD-specific IgG and IgM
antibodies.
Schumacher
2020
IgG and IgM SARS-CoV-2-specific antibodies were measured in serum samples using an
electrochemiluminescence immunoassay (Elecsys® Anti-SARS-CoV-2, Roche Diagnostics, Rotkreuz,
Switzerland).
Cut-off indices ≤1 reported as negative
and indices >1 as positive.
Sordo 2022 IgG Not reported 4-fold or greater increase in a
SARS-CoV-2 antibody of any subclass.
Stich 2021 IgM or IgG ELISA for the detection of total antibodies (including IgM and IgG) to SARS-CoV-2. Antibodies reactive
to the N protein were measured either with the Elecsys Anti-SARS-CoV-2 IgG/IgM ECLIA test kit.
Neutralisation assays were performed.
Serum samples with a positive reaction
in the additional assay were classified
as seropositive.
Tadesse 2021 IgM or IgG ELISA for the detection of total antibodies (including IgM and IgG) to SARS-CoV-2. Chemiluminescent
microparticle immunoassay (CMIA) was used to determine seroprevalence.
Not specified
Torres 2020 IgG and IgM Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) IgG/IgM Test Kit (Colloidal gold) from Genrui Biotech Inc. The study
nurse and/or technician viewed the photo provided by the participant along with the participant’s
self-report as to the visibility of the three bands, and determined whether the tests were IgG+, IgM+,
IgG & IgM+, Negative, Invalid, or Indeterminate. Participants were asked to attach a photo of the test
after 15 minutes had elapsed and self-report the appearance of the three lines, G (IgG), M (IgM), and
C (test control)
Colour-coded - self-administered test:
self-reporting the appearance of the
three lines, G (IgG), M (IgM), and C (test
control)
van der Hoek
2020
IgG Fluorescent bead-based multiplex-immunoassay. Referenced A cut-off concentration for seropositivity
(2.37 AU/mL; with specificity of 99% and
sensitivity of 84.4%) was determined
by ROC-analysis of 400 pre-pandemic
control samples
Wendt 2020 IgA and IgG ELISA (Euroimmun, Lübeck, Germany), following the manufacturer’s instructions. Inconclusive (≥0.8 and <1.1) or Positive
(≥1.1
Wiens 2021 IgG ELISA for IgG antibodies. This assay quantifies RBD-specific antibody concentrations (μg/mL) using
IgG-specific anti-RBD monoclonal antibodies. To help decide on an appropriate positivity threshold
and assess assay specificity, the authors measured background antibody reactivity using 104 dried
blood spot samples collected in Juba in 2015.
Seropositivity threshold (0.32 μg/mL)
that corresponded to 100% specificity
in these pre-pandemic samples (i.e.,
their highest value) and 99.7% in the
pre-pandemic samples collected from
the USA.
Yang 2020 IgA, IgG, IgM Serum immunoglobulin (Ig) antibody against the SARS-CoV-2 surface spike protein receptor-binding
domain (RBD) was measured using a chemiluminescence kit (IgM, IgG, and total antibody, Beijing
Wantai Biotech, measured by cut-off index [COI]) or ELISA kit (IgA, Beijing Hotgen Biotech, measured
by optical density at 450/630 nm [OD450/630]). The cut-off for seropositivity was set according to the
manufacturer’s instruction, verified using positive (169 serum specimens from confirmed COVID-19
patients) and negative (128 serum specimens from healthy persons) controls, and both of sensitivity
and specificity were 100%.
Virus neutralization assays were performed using SARS-CoV-2 virus strain 20SF014/vero-E6/3
(GISAID accession number EPI_ISL_403934) in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories. Neutralizing
antibody (NAb) titer was the highest dilution with 50% inhibition of cytopathic effect, and a NAb titer of
≥1:4 was considered positive.
Specimens with COI>1 (IgM, IgG, or
total antibody), OD450/630 > 0.3 (IgA)
were considered positive.
Zhang 2020b IgG and IgM SARS-CoV-2-specific IgM and IgG were tested by paramagnetic particle chemiluminescent
immunoassay using iFlash-SARS-CoV-2 IgM/IgG assay kit (Shenzhen YHLO Biotech Co., Ltd) and iFlash
Immunoassay Analyzer (Shenzhen YHLO Biotech Co., Ltd). The specificity and sensitivity of SARS-CoV-2
IgM and IgG detection were also evaluated
Not specified

Frequency of SARS-CoV-2 attack rates (ARs)

Twenty-four studies reported data on attack rates using RT-PCR ( Table 6). The settings included healthcare (n=3), household (n=8), public transport (n=2), educational settings (n=4). In one study of 84 children in daycare centres during the first few weeks of the pandemic (Desmet 2020), the AR was 0%; similar results were reported in another study of hospital healthcare workers (Basso 2020). The frequency of ARs in the remaining 22 studies ranged from 2.1 to 75% ( Figure 3a). The ARs were highest in weddings (69%), prison (69.5%) and households (75%). Attack rates appeared lower in healthcare settings; two healthcare settings with higher ARs (Ladhani 2020, Ladhani 2020a) included nursing home residents – the definition of SARS-CoV-2 infection in both studies did not include the full constellation of respiratory and non-respiratory symptoms. In sports settings, the AR during matches was between 4.2% and 4.7%.

Figure 3a. Primary attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 in close contacts (PCR).

Figure 3a.

Table 6. Main Results of Included Studies Investigating SARS-CoV-2 Transmission in Close Contact Settings.

Study ID Type of
transmission
Total number of
contacts
Cycle
threshold
Attack rates and/or secondary attack
rates (SAR)
Notes
Abdulrahman 2020 Community Eid Alfitr
Pre-: 71,553;
Post-: 76,384
Ashura
Pre-: 97,560;
Post-: 118,548
Not reported Eid Alfitr
Pre-: 2990 (4.2%); Post-: 4987 (6.7%); p <0.001
Ashura
Pre-: 3571 (3.7%); Post-: 7803 (6.6%); p <0.001
The rate of positive tests was significantly greater
after religious events.
Adamik 2020 Household Unclear Not reported Unclear: 3553 (AR 26.7%)
Afonso 2021 Household 267 < 25, 25–30,
or >30
19.9% (95% CI 15.5–25.1; 53/267)
Agergaard 2020 Household PCR: 5
Serology: 5
Not reported Index case plus 1 family member tested
positive-PCR
All 5 displayed a serological SARS-CoV-2 N/S
IgG response
Akaishi 2021 Household
Community
2179 Not specified 11.9% (95% CI 10.6–13.3%; 259/2179)
Angulo-Bazán 2021 Household 52 households
(n=236 people)
4.5±2.5 members
per household
Not reported Serology: Amongst cohabitants, SAR was
53.0% (125 cases): 77.6% of cases were
symptomatic
Convenience sampling, no component of
temporality, selection bias.
Armann 2021 Local
Household
2045 in Phase 1
1779 in Phase 2
N/A Serology: 12/2045 (0.6%)
Serology: 12/1779 (0.7%)
Arnedo-Pena 2020 Household 745 Not reported 11.1% (95% CI 9.0-13.6)
Atherstone 2021 Community 441 Not specified 9.3% (41/441)
Baettig 2020 Local 55 Not reported Serologic attack rates: 2/55 (3.6%) Serological testing was positive for the 2 contacts
14 days after index case
Baker 2020 Nosocomial 44 Not reported 3/44 (6.8%): 1 of these was also exposed to a
household member with COVID-19.
Recall error and bias, report is limited to a single
exposure, change in mask policy partway through
the exposure period
Bao 2020 Community 57 index cases
1895 exposed
Not reported SAR was 3.3% at the bathing pool, 20.5% in
the colleagues’ cluster and 11.8% in the family
cluster.
Delayed detection of the activity trajectory of the
primary case, reporting bias, overlap of close
contacts
Basso 2020 Nosocomial 60 HCWs - ≥106
unique high-risk
contacts
Not reported Attack rate: 0/60 (0%)
Serology: 0/60 (0%)
Delay in diagnosing index case, recall bias
Bays 2020 Nosocomial 421 HCWs Not reported 8/421 (1.9%) In all 8 cases, the staff had close contact with the
index patients without sufficient PPE. Hospital staff
developing ILI symptoms were tested for SARS-
CoV-2, regardless of whether they had contact with
an index patient
Bender 2021 Community 280 Not specified 13.3% (24/180)
Bernardes-Souza
2021
Household 112 Not specified AR 49.1% (55/112)
Bhatt 2022 Household 487 N/A 49.1% (95% CI 42.9–55.3%; 239/487)
Bi 2020 Local
Household
Community
1,296 Not reported 98/1286 (7.6%)
Bi 2021 Household 4534 Not specified 6.6% (298/4534)
Bistaraki 2021 Household
Community
64608 Not specified 17.4% (95% CI 17.0–17.8; 11232/64608).
Bjorkman 2021 Local 6408 Not specified AR 16.5% (1058/6408)
Blaisdell 2020 Community 1,022 Not reported 1.8% of camp attendees (10 staff members
and 8 campers)
Travel was assumed to be from home state, but
intermediate travel might have occurred
Böhmer 2020 Local
Household
241 Not reported 75·0% (95% CI 19·0–99·0; three of four
people) among members of a household
cluster in common isolation, 10·0% (1·2–32·0;
two of 20) among household contacts only
together until isolation of the patient, and
5·1% (2·6–8·9; 11 of 217) among non-
household, high-risk contacts.
Boscolo-Rizzo 2020 Household 296 Not reported 74/296 (25.0%, 95% CI 20.2–30.3%) The prevalence of altered sense of smell or taste
was by far lower in subjects negative to SARS-CoV-2
compared to both positives (p < 0.001) and non-
tested cases (p < 0.001).
Brown 2020 Local 21 Not reported Serologic attack rate: 2/21 (1%) Social desirability bias likely
Burke 2020 Household 445 Not reported 0.45% (95% CI = 0.12%–1.6%) among all close
contacts, and a symptomatic secondary attack
rate of 10.5% (95% CI = 2.9%–31.4%) among
household members.
2 persons who were household members of
patients with confirmed COVID-19 tested positive
for SARS-CoV-2.
Calvani 2021 Local
Household
162 children
(81 SARS-CoV-2
positive and 81
Controls)
142 contacts
Used NAAT School contacts 40% (28/70)
Family members 30.6% (95%CI 20.2–42.5;
22/72)
School contacts: 70 children, 219 family members
Canova 2020 Nosocomial 21 Not reported 0/21 (0%)
Carazo 2021 Household 9096 Not specified 29.8% (2718/9096)
Cariani 2020 Nosocomial Unclear 33.6 to 38.03 182 out of 1683 (10.8%) tested positive; 27 of
whom had close contact with COVID-positive
patients
Unclear how many HCWs had close contact;
likelihood of recall bias
Carvalho 2022 Household 182 Not specified 52.7% (96/182)
Cerami 2021 Household 103 Not specified 32% (95% CI 22%-44%; 33/103)
Charlotte 2020 Community 27 Not reported 19 of 27 (70%) tested positive High risk of selection bias: The index case-patients
were not identified. A majority of patients were not
tested for SARS-CoV-2
Chaw 2020 Local
Community
1755 Not reported Close contact: 52/1755 (29.6%)
Nonprimary attack rate: 2.9% (95% CI
2.2%–3.8%)
Potential environmental factors were not
accounted for: relative household size, time
spent at home with others, air ventilation, and
transmission from fomites.
Chen 2020 Aircraft 335 Not reported 16/335 (4.8%) Recall bias. Did not perform virus isolation and
genome sequencing of the virus, which could have
provided evidence of whether viral transmission
occurred during the flight.
Chen 2020a Local
Household
209 Not reported 0/209 (0%)
Chen 2020b Nosocomial 105 Not reported Serology: 18/105 (17.1%)
Chen 2020c Local
Community
Household
Nosocomial
2147 Not reported 110/2147 (5.12%)
Cheng 2020 Household
Nosocomial
2761 Not reported 0.70%
Chu 2020 Community 50 exposed Not reported None for antigen or antibody: 0/50 (0%) Testing was biased toward contacts who knew
the case-patient personally (office co-workers) or
provided direct care for the case-patient (HCP).
Chu 2021 Household 526 exposed Not reported 48 (9%) (CI 7-12%) Very high risk of selection bias
Contejean 2020 Nosocomial 1344 exposed Not reported 373 (28%)
Cordery 2021 Local
Household
65 Not specified Overall 12.3% (8/65)
Child bubble contacts 0% (0/13)
School contacts 10.3% (3/29)
Child household contacts 0% (0/8)
Adult household contacts 26.7% (4/15)
COVID-19 National
Emergency
Response Center
2020
Local
Household
Nosocomial
2370 Not reported 13/2370 (0.6%) There were 13 individuals who contracted COVID-
19 resulting in a secondary attack rate of 0.55%
(95% CI 0.31–0.96). There were 119 household
contacts, of which 9 individuals developed COVID-
19 resulting in a secondary attack rate of 7.56%
(95% CI 3.7–14.26).
Craxford 2021 Household 178 N/A 7.2% (13/178)
Danis 2020 Local
Household
Chalet: 16
School: 172
Not reported Attack rate: 75% in chalet
Attack rate: 0% in school
Only 73 of 172 school contacts were tested - all
tested negative
Dattner 2020 Household 3353 Not reported Attack rates: 25% in children and 44% adults
(45% overall)
Serology: 9/714 (1.3%)
de Brito 2020 Household 24 exposed Not reported RT-PCR: 6/7 (86%); Seropositivity: 18/24 (75%)
Deng 2020 Household 347 Not reported 25/347 (7.2%)
Desmet 2020 Local 84 38.8 Attack rate: 0/84 (0%) Ct reported for only one test result
Dimcheff 2020 Community
Nosocomial
Household
1476 Not reported Seroprevalence 72/1476: 4.9% (95% CI,
3.8%–6.1%)
Dong 2020 Household 259 Not reported 53/259 (20.5%)
Doung-ngern 2020 Local 211 cases plus
839 non-
matched controls
Not reported
Draper 2020 Local
Household
Nosocomial
445 Not reported 4/445 (0.9%) None of the 326 aircraft passengers or 4
healthcare workers who were being monitored
close contacts became cases.
Dub 2020 Local
Household
121 Not reported Child index case: No positive cases
Adult index case: 8/51 (16%)
Serology: 6/101 (5.9%)
Expert Taskforce
2020
Local Unclear Not reported Attack rate 20.4% Attack rates were highest in 4-person cabins
(30.0%; n = 18), followed by 3-person cabins (22.0%;
n = 27), 2-person cabins (20.6%; n = 491), and 1-
person cabins (8%; n = 6).
Farronato 2021 Household 49 N/A 16.3% (8/49)
Fateh-Moghadam
2020
Community 6690 Not reported 890/6690 (13.3%)
Firestone 2020 Local Unclear Not reported 41 (80%) interviewed patients with primary
event-associated COVID-19 reported having
close contact with others during their
infectious period, with an average of 2.5 close
contacts per patient.
36 (75%) of 48 interviewed patients with
primary event-associated cases reported
having close contact with persons in their
household while infectious, and 17 (35%)
reported having other (social/workplace)
close contacts while infectious.
Fontanet 2021 Local 2004 N/A Serology: 15.3% (306/2004)
10.4% (139/1,340) - primary schools
25.1% (167/664) - high schools
Galow 2021 Household 248 N/A 34.3% (85/248)
Gamboa Moreno
2021
Household
Community
Unclear Not specified 2.9% in preschools to 7.1% in high schools
Gan 2020 Local
Household
Community
Unclear Not reported Not reported Family clusters accounted for 86.9% (914/1 050) of
cases, followed by party dinners (1.1%)
Gaskell 2021 Household 1242 N/A AR 64.3% (95% CI 61.6-67.0%, 799/1,242).
Ge 2021 Household
Community
8852 Not specified 3.6% (95% CI 3.3%-4.0%; 327/8852)
Ghinai 2020 Community Unclear Not reported Unclear
Gold 2021 Local
Household
31 school
69 household
Not specified School: 48% (15/31)
Household: 26% (18/69)
Gomaa 2021 Household 98 Not specified AR 6.9% (95%CI: 5.8–8.3)
89.8% (95% CI: 82.2–94.3; 88/98)
AR Serology 34.8% (95% CI: 32.2–37.4;
438/1260)
Gonçalves 2021 Household 271 case-
patients and
1,396 household
controls
Not specified Not reported
Gong 2020 Household
Community
Unclear Not reported Unclear
Gu 2020 Local 14 Not reported RT-PCR - 3/14 (21.4%)
Serology - 2/14 (14.3%)
Hamner 2020 Local 60 Not reported Confirmed: 32/60 (53.3%)
Probable: 20/60 (33.3%)
Han 2020 Community 192 Not reported 7/192 (3.7%)
Hast 2022 Community 628 Not specified 9.2% (58/628)
Heavey 2020 Local 1155 Not reported 0/1155 (0%)
Helsingen 2020 Local Training arm:
1,896
Nontraining arm:
1,868
Not reported 11/1896 (0.8%) vs 27/1868 (2.4%); P=0.001
Hendrix 2020 Local 139 exposed Not reported 0% Six close contacts of stylists A and B outside of
salon A were identified: four of stylist A and two
of stylist B. All four of stylist A’s contacts later
developed symptoms and had positive PCR test
results for SARS-CoV-2. These contacts were stylist
A’s cohabitating husband and her daughter, son-in-
law, and their roommate, all of whom lived together
in another household. None of stylist B’s contacts
became symptomatic.
Hirschman 2020 Household
Community
58 Not reported 27/58 (47%)
Hobbs 2020 Local
Household
Community
397 Not reported Not reported
Hoehl 2021 Local
Community
825 children and
372 staff: 7,366
buccal mucosa
swabs and 5,907
anal swabs
Not reported 0% viral shedding in children; 2/372
(0.5%) shedding for staff. No inapparent
transmissions were observed
Study was conducted in the summer of 2020, when
activity of other respiratory pathogens was also low
Hong 2020 Household 431 tests Not reported 0/13 (0%) Index cases had lived with their family members
without personal protections for a total of 258
person-days.
Hsu 2021 Household 145 Not specified 46.2% (47/145)
Hu 2020 Community 72093 Not specified 0.32% (95%CI 0.29% –0.37%; 234/72093)
Hu 2021 Household
Community
15648 Not reported 471/15648 (3%)
Hu 2021 Local 5622 Not specified 0.6% (95% CI 0.43 - 0.84%; 34/5622)
Hua 2020 Household 835 Not reported 151/835 (18.1%)
Huang 2020 Household
Community
22 Not reported 7/22 (31.8%)
Huang 2020a Local
Household
Community
Nosocomial
3795 Not reported 32/3795 (0.84%)
Huang 2021 Nosocomial 211 Not specified 3.8% (8/211)
Islam 2020 Household
Local
Community
Nosocomial
391 Not reported The overall secondary clinical attack rate was
4.08 (95% CI 1.95-6.20)
Jashaninejad 2021 Household 989 Not specified 31.7% (95% CI: 28.8-34.7)
Jeewandara 2021 Household
Community
1093 Not specified 7.8% (85/1093) - PCR
1.7% (7/439) - antibodies
Jia 2020 Household Unclear Not reported Attack rate 44/583 (7.6%)
Jiang 2020 Household
Community
300 Not reported 6/300 (2%)
Jing 2020 Household Unclear Not reported Household contacts 13·2%
Non-household contacts 2·4%
The risk of household infection was significantly
higher in the older age group (≥60 years)
Jing 2020a Household
Community
Unclear Not reported Close contacts 17.1% to 19%
Family members 46.1% to 49.6%
Jones 2021 Local 128 Not reported 6/128 (4.7%)
Jordan 2022 Local 253 Not specified 4.7% (12/253)
Kang 2020 Local 5517 Not reported 96/5517 (1.7%)
Kant 2020 Local
Community
Nosocomial
Not reported Not reported Not reported No details on number of contacts for index case
Karumanagoundar
2021
Household
Community
15702 Not specified 4% (599/14 002)
Katlama 2022 Household 255 N/A 37.3% (95%CI 31.3–43.5%; 95/255)
Kawasuji 2020 Nosocomial 105 Not reported 14/105 (1.33%)
Khanh 2020 Community 217 Not reported 16/217 (7.4%)
Kim 2020 Household 207 17.7 to 30 1/207 (0.5%)
Kim 2020a Household
Community
4 18.7 to 32.1 N/A
Kim 2020b Nosocomial 3,091 respiratory
samples from
2,924 individuals
Not reported 3/290 (1%)
Kim 2021 Local 8 N/A 0% RT-PCR
0% Serology
Tests for anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibodies were
performed on quarantined HCWs on the 52nd day
from exposure. All serologic test results, including
FIA IgM and IgG and ELISA total antibody, were
negative.
Kitahara 2022 Household
Community
114 Not specified 15% (17/114)
Klompas 2021 Nosocomial 1457 Not specified 2.6% (38/1457)
Kolodziej 2022 Household 241 Not specified 64.3% (155/241) SAR for household was 75/85 (88.6%)
Koureas 2021 Household 286 Not specified 38.6% (95% CI: 32.50–45.01%)
Kumar 2021 Community 822 Not reported 144/822 17.5%) Spread of infection within the state was significantly
higher from symptomatic cases, p=0.02
Kuwelker 2021 Household 179 N/A 45% The elderly (>60 years old) had a significantly
higher attack rate (72%) than adults< 60years old
(46%, p=0·045)
Kuwelker 2021 Household 291 N/A AR 45% (95% CI 38–53)
Kwok 2020 Local
Household
206 Not reported 24/206 (11.7%)
Ladhani 2020 Nosocomial 254 Not reported Unclear: 53/254 (21%) tested positive. Staff working across different care homes (14/27,
52%) had a 3.0-fold (95% CI, 1.9–4.8; P<0.001)
higher risk of SARS-CoV-2 positivity than staff
working in single care homes (39/227, 17%).
Ladhani 2020a Nosocomial Residents: 264
Staff members:
254
Not specified Unclear: 105/264 (53%) residents tested
positive
Infectious virus recovery in asymptomatic staff and
residents emphasises their likely importance as
silent reservoirs and transmitters of infection and
explains the failure of infection control measures
which have been largely based on identification of
symptomatic individuals.
Laws 2020 Household 188 Not reported 55/188 (29.3%)
Laws 2021 Household 188 Not specified 29.3% (55/188);
Laxminarayan 2020 Local
Household
Community
575,071 Not reported 10.7% (10.5 to 10.9%) for high-risk contacts
4.7% (4.6 to 4.8%) for low-risk contacts
79.3% (52.9 to 97.0%) for high-risk travel
exposure
Lee 2020 Household 12 Not reported 0/12 (0%)
Lee 2020a Household 23 Not reported 1/23 (4.4%)
Lewis 2020 Household 188 Not reported RT-PCR: 55/188 (29%)
Serology: 8/52 (15%)
Li 2020 Household 5 19.66 to 26.16 4/5 (80%)
Li 2020a Household
Nosocomial
7 Not reported 7/7 (100%) During January 14–22, the authors report that
index patient had close contact with 7 persons
Li 2020b Household 14 Not reported 14/14 (100%)
Li 2020c Household Unclear Not reported Unclear In COFs, the transmission rates of respiratory
droplets in secondary and non-infected patients
were 11.9 % and 66.7 %, respectively, while
the transmission rates of respiratory droplets
with close contacts were 88.1 % and 33.3 %,
respectively. In SOFs, the proportion of respiratory
droplet and respiratory droplet transmission with
close contacts was 40 % and 60 %, respectively
Li 2020d Household 392 Not reported 64/392 (16.3%)
Li 2021a Household 52822 Not specified 16·0% (15·7–16·3; 8447/52822)
Li 2021b Household
Community
2382 Not specified 6.50%
Lin 2021 Household 5 Not specified PCR 80%
Serology 80%
Liu 2020 Household 7 Not reported 4/7 (57.1%)
Liu 2020a Nosocomial 30 Not reported N/A
Liu 2020b Household
Community
Nosocomial
11580 Not reported 515/11580 (4.4%)
Liu 2020c Unclear 1150 Not reported 47/1150 (4.1%) The 16 confirmed cases who had previously been
asymptomatic accounted for 236 close contacts,
with a second attack rate of 9.7%, while the
remaining 131 asymptomatic carriers accounted
for 914 close contacts, with a second attack rate of
2.6% (p<0.001)
Liu 2021 Household 50 Not specified 34% (95% CI: 22%–48%; 17/50)
López 2020 Local
Household
285 Not reported Facility SAR: 22/101 (21.8%)
Overall SAR: 38/184 (20.7%)
Variation in hygiene procedures across 3 facilities.
Facility A required daily temperature and
symptom screening for the 12 staff members
and children and more frequent cleaning and
disinfection; staff members were required to wear
masks. Facility B: temperatures of the five staff
members and children were checked daily, and
more frequent cleaning was conducted; only staff
members were required to wear masks. Facility
C: 84 staff members and children check their
temperature and monitor their symptoms daily;
masks were not required for staff members or
children.
López 2021 Household 229 Not specified 53.7% (123/229)
Lopez Bernal 2020 Household
Community
472 Not reported 37% (95% CI 31-43%)
Lopez Bernal 2022 Household 472 Not specified 37% (95% confidence interval (CI): 31–43)
Lucey 2020 Nosocomial Not specified N/A Not reported
Luo 2020 Community 243 Not reported 12/243 (4.9%) No viral genetic sequence data were available
from these cases to prove linkage; and some
of the secondary and tertiary cases could have
been exposed to unknown infections, especially
asymptomatic ones, before or after the bus trips.
Luo 2020a Household
Community
Nosocomial
3410 Not reported 127/3410 (3.7%)
Lyngse 2020 Household 2226 Not reported 371/2226 (16.7%)
Ma 2020 Unclear 1665 Not reported 10/1/1665 (0.6%) Only close contacts who fell ill were tested (n=10)
Macartney 2020 Local 633 Not reported 18/633 (1.2%)
Serologic attack rates: 8/171 (4.8%)
Malheiro 2020 Household 1627 Not reported Overall AR 154/1627 (9.5%)
Maltezou 2020 Household Unclear <25 (28.1%)
25-30
(26.8%)
>30 (45.1%)
Median attack rate 40% (range: 11.1%–100%)
per family.
Maltezou 2020a Household Unclear Not reported Median attack rate: 60% (range: 33.4%-100%) Adults were more likely to develop a severe clinical
course compared to children (8.8% versus 0%, p-
value=0.021)
Mao 2020 Household
Local
Unclear Not reported 6.10% Average attack rate was 8.54% (1.02–100%)
Martínez-Baz 2022 Household
Community
59900 Not specified 34.9% (20905/59900)
Martinez-Fierro
2020
Unclear 81 Not reported 34/81 (42%)
Serologic attack rates: 13/87 (14.9%)
16% of contact showed positive serology after >2
weeks
McLean 2022 Household 404 Not specified 49% (198/404)
Mercado-Reyes
2022
Household 17863 N/A AR Serology 32.3% (5811/17,863)
Metlay 2021 Household 17917 Not specified 10.1% (1809/17 917)
Meylan 2021 Nosocomial 1874 N/A AR Serology 10.0% (95%CI 8.7% to 11.5%;
188/1874)
Miller 2021 Household 431 <20 to 40 PCR 21.1% (91/431)
Serology 46.9% (180/431)
Montecucco 2021 Local 346 Not specified 9.8% (34/346)
Mponponsuo 2020 Nosocomial 38 N/A 0/38 (0%)
Musa 2021 Household 793 Not specified 17% (95%CI 14–21)
Ng 2020 Household
Local
Community
13026 Not reported 188/7770 (2.4%)
Household: 5·9%
Work contacts: 1.3%
Social contacts: 1.3%
Serology: 44/1150 (3.8%)
Serology results were positive for 29 (5·5%) of
524 household contacts, six (2·9%) of 207 work
contacts, and nine (2·1%) of 419 social contacts.
Ng 2021 Household 848 Not specified 55% (466/848)
Ning 2020 Household
Local
Community
Unclear Not reported Imported cases: 69/3435 (0.8%)
Local cases: 31/3666 (2.0%)
Njuguna 2020 Local 98 Not reported Attack rate 57% to 82%
Nsekuye 2021 Local
Household
Community
1035 Not specified 3.5% (36/1035)
Ogata 2021 Household 496 Not specified 25.2% (21.6–29.2; 125/496)
Ogawa 2020 Nosocomial 30 PCR/serology 33.53 to
36.83
0/15 (0%) for both PCR and serology
Paireau 2022 Household
Local
Nosocomial
6028 Not reported 248/6028 (4.1%) Family contacts, index case was 60-74, or older
than 75 years old were significantly associated with
increased odds of transmission. The proportion of
nosocomial transmission was significantly higher
than in contact tracing (14% vs 3%, p<0.001)
Pang 2022 Local 164 Not specified 9.8% (16/164)
Park 2020 Local
Household
Community
328 17.7 to 35 22/328 (6.7%)
Park 2020a Household
Non-
household
59,073 Not reported Household contacts: 11.8% (95% CI 11.2%–
12.4%)
Non-household contacts: 1.9% (95% CI
1.8%–2.0%)
Park 2020b Local
Household
441 Not reported Attack rate 43.5% (95% CI 36.9%–50.4%)
Secondary attack rate 16.2% (95% CI
11.6%– 22.0%)
Passarelli 2020 Nosocomial 6 Not reported 2/6 (33.3%)
Patel 2020 Household 185 Not reported 79/185 (43%) Contacts not reported as tested
Pavli 2020 Aircraft 891 Not reported 5/891 (0.6%)
Petersen 2021 Household 584 N/A 19.2% (11/584)
Pett 2021 Household
Community
392 Not specified 3.3% (13/392)
Phiriyasart 2020 Household 471 Not reported 27/471 (5.7%)
Poletti 2020 Unclear 2484 Not reported 2824/5484 (51.5%)
Powell 2022 Local 183 Not specified 8.2% (15/183)
Pung 2020 Local
Community
425 Not reported 36/425 (8.5%)
Pung 2020a Household Unclear Not reported 43/875 (4.9%)
Qian 2020 Local
Household
Community
Not reported Not reported Not reported Home‐based outbreaks were the dominant
category (254 of 318 outbreaks; 79.9%), followed by
transport‐based outbreaks (108; 34.0%)
Ratovoson 2022 Household 179 Not specified 31.3% (56/179)
Ravindran 2020 Local Not reported Not reported Attack rate 61% to 77% All attendees participated in activities resulting
in potential exposure, such as shaking hands,
kissing, dancing, sharing drinks and sharing shisha
(smoking water pipes).
Razvi 2020 Nosocomial 2521 Not reported Serologic attack rate 19.4%
Reukers 2021 Household 187 Not specified 43% (95% CI, 33%–53%)
Robles Pellitero
2021
Household Not specified Not specified 29.8% (SAR/family)
Rosenberg 2020 Household 498 Not reported 286/498 (57%)
Roxby 2020 Nosocomial 142 Not reported Attack rate in 1st round: 5/142 (3.5%) One additional positive test result was reported for
an asymptomatic resident who had negative test
results on the first round.
Sakamoto 2022 Nosocomial 517 Not specified 8.1% (42/517)
Sang 2020 Household 6 Not reported 4/6 (66.7%)
Sarti 2021 Local 5 Not specified 80% (4/5)
Satter 2022 Local
Household
684 Not specified RT-PCR 13% (87/684)
Schoeps 2021 Local 14591 (13,005
PCR-tested)
Not specified 1.51 (95% CI 1.30–1.73)
Schumacher 2021 Local Quarantine
phase: 757 tests
Match phase:
1167 tests
Unclear Quarantine phase AR: 3.6%
Match phase AR: 4.2%
Serology: 1.1%
Schwierzeck 2020 Nosocomial 48 16.03 to 32.98 9/48 (18.8%) Ct values of symptomatic cases were significantly
lower compared to asymptomatic cases 22.55 vs
29.94, p<0.007 (approximately 200-fold higher viral
load)
Semakula 2021 Household
Community
11809 Not specified Overall 1.77% (95% CI 1.55% to 2.02%;
209/11809)
SAR of households 2.93% (95% CI 1.85% to
4.60%)
Shah 2020 Household 386 Not reported 34/386 (8.8%)
Shah 2021 Household 287 Not specified 1.7% (95%CI 0.7–4%)
Shen 2020 Household
Community
480 Not reported Close contact: 2/7 (29%)
Casual contact: 3/473 (0.6%)
Sikkema 2020 Nosocomial 1796 Not
specified.
WGS for Ct
<32
Attack rate 96/1796 (5%) 46 (92%) of 50 sequences from health-care workers
in the study were grouped in three clusters. Ten
(100%) of 10 sequences from patients in the study
grouped into the same three clusters:
Son 2020 Household 3223 Not reported 8.2% (95% CI, 4.7 to 12.9)
Song 2020 Household 20 Not reported 16/20 (80%)
Sordo 2022 Household 659 Not specified 22.5% (148/659).
Soriano-Arandes
2021
Household 283 Not specified 59% (167/283)
Speake 2020 Aircraft 111 Not reported 11/111 (9.9%)
Stein-Zamir 2020 Local 1312 Not reported Attack rate 178/1312 (13.6%)
Stich 2021 Household 1,220 Not specified RT-PCR 32.8% (400/1220)
Serology 36.1% (393/1,090)
Sugano 2020 Local 72 Not reported 23/72 (31.9%)
Sun 2020 Household Unclear Not reported 34.43%
Sun 2021 Household 50 Not specified 14.0% (7/50)
Sundar 2021 Household
Community
496 Not specified 16.7% (83/496)
Tadesse 2021 Household 40 households N/A AR 3.5% (95% CI: 3.2%-3.8%)
Tanaka 2021 Household 687 Not specified 28.2% (194/687)
Tanaka 2022 Household 101 households
with 477
individuals
Not specified 77.0% (95% CI: 69.4-84.6%)
Taylor 2020 Nosocomial 600 Not reported Resident attack rate: 137/259 (52.9%) 1st round
HCW Attack rate: 114/341 (33.4%)
Teherani 2020 Household 144 Not reported 67/144 (46.5%) Of the total number of household contacts, at least
29 (20%) had known SARS-CoV2 testing.
Child-to-adult transmission was suspected in 7/67
cases (10.5%).
Thangaraj 2020 Community 26 Not reported 17/26 (65.4%)
Torres 2020 Community 1244 N/A Overall serologic attack rate: 139/1244
(11.2%)
Tsang 2022 Household
Community
3158 Not specified 3.5% (95%CI 2.9–4.3)
Tshokey 2020 Local
Community
1618 Not reported 14/1618 (0.9%) SAR: High-risk contacts was 9.0% (7/75), and that
among the primary contacts was 0.6% (7/1,095),
and none (0/448) among the secondary contacts.
Tsushita 2022 Local 23 Not specified 69.6% (16/23)
van der Hoek 2020 Household 174 25.1 to 35.1 47/174 (27%)
Serology on day 3 - family members: 43/148
(29.1%)
Vičar 2021 Household 226 Not specified 22.6% (51/226)
Wang 2020 Nosocomial
Household
43 Not reported 10/43 (23.3%)
Wang 2020a Household 155 Not reported 47/155 (30%)
Wang 2020b Household 335 Not reported 77/335 (23%)
Wee 2020 Nosocomial 298 Not reported 1/298 (0.3%)
Wendt 2020 Nosocomial 254 Not reported 0/254 (0%)
Serologic attack rates 0/23 (0%)
White 2022a Local 485 Not specified 4.1% (20/485)
White 2022b Local 859 Not specified 7% (60/859)
Wiens 2021 Household 435 households N/A AR 38.5% (32.1 - 46.8)
Wolf 2020 Household 4 Not reported 3/4 (75%) 7-month-old female who was breastfed, was
asymptomatic throughout the observation
period and never developed fevers or any other
symptoms, despite continuous exposure to her
parents and siblings. She remained SARS-CoV-2
PCR-negative in repeat testing of pharyngeal swab
and stool specimens over the entire observation
period.
Wong 2020 Nosocomial 76 tests were
performed on 52
contacts
Not reported 0/52 (0%) Findings suggest that SARS-CoV-2 is not spread
by an airborne route. Ct value for throat and
tracheal aspirate of index case were 22.8 and 26.1
respectively.
Wood 2021 Household Not reported Not reported Not reported
Wu 2020 Household
Local
Community
2994 Not reported 71/2994 (2.4%)
Wu 2020a Household 148 Not reported 48/148 (32.4%)
Wu 2021 Local
Household
Community
4214 Not specified 3.3% (140/4214)
Xie 2020 Household 56 Not reported 0/56 (0%)
Xie 2021 Household 79 Not specified 67.1% (53/79)
Xin 2020 Household 187 Not reported 19/187 (17.9%)
Yang 2020 Household
Local
1296 Not reported 0/1296 (0%)
Serologic attack rates: 0/20 (0%)
Viral cultures of 4 specimens with Ct <30 were
negative.
Yau 2020 Nosocomial 330 Not reported 22/330 (6.7%)
Ye 2020 Local
Community
1293 Not reported 39/1,293 (3.02%)
Yi 2021 Household 475 <37 42.9% (204/475)
Yoon 2020 Local 190 N/A 0/190 (0%)
Yousaf 2020 Household 198 Not reported 47/198 (23.7%)
Yu 2020 Household 1587 Not reported 150/1587 (9.5%)
Yung 2020 Household 213 Not reported Attack rate 6.1%
Zhang 2020 Aircraft 4492 Not reported Attack rate 161/4492 (3.6%) The authors report attack rate of 0.14% based on
94 flights (n=14 505); however, only 4492 people
were screened.
Zhang 2020a Household
Local
Community
369 Not reported 12/369 (3.3%, 95% CI 1.9%–5.6%)
Zhang 2020b Household 10 Not reported 0/10 (0%)
Serologic attack rates: 0/10 (0%)
Zhang 2020c Local
Household
93 Not reported 5/93 (5.4%)
Zhang 2020d Local 8437 Not reported 25/8437 (0.3%)
Zhang 2021 Local
Household
178 ≤38 7.3% (13/178)
Zhuang 2020 Household
Community
8363 Not reported 239/8363 (2.9%)

Thirty-seven studies reported data on ARs using serology ( Table 6). The settings included educational (n=4), households (n=11) and healthcare (n=4). In eight studies, the frequency of attack was 0%. The frequency of attacks in the remaining 29 studies ranged from 0.7% to 75% ( Figure 3b). The frequency of attacks was highest in households but lower in educational settings - especially daycare centres.

Figure 3b. Primary attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 in close contacts (serology).

Figure 3b.

Frequency of SARS-CoV-2 secondary ARs

Overall, 204 studies (79.1%) reported data on secondary ARs ( Table 6). The studies reported the rates based on RT-PCR tests, except for one study (Angulo-Bazán 2020) that used serology, and another (Calvani 2021) that used rapid antigen test. In 16 of these studies, the SAR was 0%. The secondary ARs in the remaining 188 studies ranged from 0.3 to 100% (see Figure 4). The highest frequencies of secondary ARs (75–100%) occurred in household or quarantine settings; similar findings were observed when studies with higher reporting quality were examined. In the three studies of index or primary cases with recurrent infections, there was no positive case amongst the 1518 close contacts across the studies. Across geographical regions, the median secondary ARs were 5.4% in Asia (IQR 16.585, n=77), 16.7% in Europe (IQR 37.4), n=24), 6.8% in N. America (IQR 34.8, n=17), and 47.5% (IQR 31.9, n=4) in S. America. We were unable to compute the data for Africa and Australasia because of insufficient information.

Figure 4. Frequency of secondary attack rates of SARS-CoV-2 with Close Contacts.

Figure 4.

Risk of infection

One hundred and twelve studies (43.4%) reported results on the risk of infection ( Table 7). One study of airline passengers (Khanh 2020) showed that seating proximity was significantly associated with the risk of contracting SARS-CoV-2 (RR 7.3, 95% CI 1.2–46.2); a second study (Speake 2020) reported that not sitting by the window was associated with a significantly increased risk of infection (RR 5.2; 95% CI 1.6–16.4; p<0.007), and a third (White 2022b) reported that flights with longer duration significantly increased the risk of infection (P=0.0008). The results of nine studies (Chen 2020b, Doung-ngern 2020, Gonçalves 2021, Hast 2022, Hobbs 2020, Montecucco 2021, Robles Pellitero 2021, Wang 2020b, Wu 2020) showed that use of face covering during close contact with infected cases was associated with significantly lower risks of infection compared with no face covering; findings from one of these studies (Doung-ngern 2020) showed that wearing masks all the time during contact was not significantly different from wearing masks sometimes. Findings from six studies (Bjorkman 2021, Katlama 2022, Koureas 2021, López 2021, Lopez Bernal 2022, Mercado-Reyes 2022) showed that higher number of household occupants was significantly associated with increased risk of infection. The results of three studies (Poletti 2020, Rosenberg 2020, Zhang 2020a) showed that the risk of infection was significantly increased in older population groups. One study (Zhang 2020a) reported that elderly close contacts (≥60 years) had a higher SAR compared with younger age groups. Findings from nine studies (Bi 2020, Hu 2020a, Islam 2020, Luo 2020a, Petersen 2021, Pett 2021, Sundar 2021, Tsang 2022, Wu 2020, Zhang 2020a) showed that household contact settings had significantly higher risks of infection compared with other types of contact settings, e.g., social, healthcare, workplace, and public transport. Seven studies (Akaishi 2021, Bi 2021, Galow 2021, Laws 2021, Liu 2021, Reukers 2021, Stich 2021) showed that the risk of infection was significantly lower in children compared to adults. One study (Lewis 2020) showed that the risk of infection was significantly increased amongst household contacts who were immunocompromised (OR 15.9, 95% CI 2.4–106.9). Finally, three studies (Bi 2020a, Wu 2020, Zhang 2020a) showed that more frequent contacts with the index case significantly increased the risk of infection.

Table 7. Risk of Infection with SARS-CoV-2 in Close Contact Settings.

Study ID Type of
transmission
Risk of infection
Abdulrahman 2020 Community Eid Alfitr: Pre-: 2990 (4.2%); Post-: 4987 (6.7%); p <0.001; Ashura: Pre-: 3571 (3.7%); Post-: 7803 (6.6%); p <0.001
Afonso 2021 Household SAR in families that had more than one infected adult, in addition to the index case, it was 1.50 times higher than those without
this feature (RR: 1.50; 95.0% CI: 1.55–4.06). SAR in symptomatic contacts was 4.87 times higher when compared to that of the
nonsymptomatic group (RR: 4.87; 95.0% CI: 2.49–9.53).
Akaishi 2021 Household
Community
The rate of RT-PCR test positivity was significantly higher in those with a close contact than in those with a lower risk contact
(p<0.0001). Household secondary transmission rate was significantly similar lower in children aged <10 years compared to other
groups (7.3% vs. 13.5%, p=0.02).
Arnedo-Pena 2020 Household The health profession of index case was a significant protective factor (p<0.007). Older age of secondary cases, two household
members, and higher age of index case were significantly associated with elevated risk of infection: p<0.001 in each case
Atherstone 2021 Community The odds of receiving a positive test result were highest among household contacts (odds ratio = 2.7; 95% confidence interval =
1.2–6.0)
Bender 2021 Household There was no significant difference in the SARs between household contacts of presymptomatic versus asymptomatic cases (P=0.23).
Presymptomatic transmission was more frequent than symptomatic transmission.
Bernardes-Souza 2021 Household Being a logistics worker (OR 18.0, 95%CI 8.4-38.7), living with a logistics worker (OR 6.9, 95%CI 3.3-14.5), close contact with a
confirmed COVID-19 case (OR 13.4, 6.6-27.3), living with four or more people (OR 2.7, 95% CI 1.4-5.4), and being a current smoker
(OR 0.2, 0.1-0.7) were significantly associated with an increased risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection.
Bhatt 2022 Household Adults were more likely than children to transmit SARS-CoV-2 (OR 2.2, 95% CI 1.3–3.6).
Bi 2020 Local
Household
Community
Household contact (OR 6·3; 95% CI 1·5–26·3) and travelling together (OR 7·1; 1·4–34·9) were significantly associated with infection.
Reporting contact that occurred often was also associated with increased risk of infection compared with moderate-frequency
contact (OR 8·8; 95% CI 2·6–30·1)
Bi 2021 Household The risk of being infected by a household member was the lowest among 5–9 years old and highest among those 65 years and
older, with teenagers and working age adults sharing similar risks. Compared with 5–9-year-olds, 65 years and older had nearly
three times the odds (OR=2.7, 95%CrI 0.9–7.9)
Bistaraki 2021 Household
Community
The odds of infection [95% CI] were higher in contacts exposed within the household (1.71 [1.59–1.85] vs. other) and in cases with
cough (1.17 [1.11–1.25] vs. no cough).
Bjorkman 2021 Local Students in multiple occupancy rooms were significantly twice as likely to be infected compared to students in single rooms (19.1%
vs 10.3%). Higher viral load significantly increased the risk of infection (P<0.0001)
Calvani 2021 Local
Household
The probability of being positive to SARS-CoV-2 was significantly lower in children who had school contacts or who had flu symptoms
compared to children who had household contacts (56.8% vs 2.5%, P<0.0001)
Carvalho 2022 Household The odds of SARS-CoV-2 transmission when the index case was an adult were 13.98 (4.09 to 47.77) and 11.25 (1.91 to 66.4) times
higher when compared to HCW and children as index cases, respectively
Cerami 2021 Household Households with non-white index cases were significantly more likely to experience incident transmission in the household, 51% vs
19% (p=0.008)
Chen 2020b Nosocomial In multivariate analysis, there existed higher risk of seroconversion for close contacts with patient 2 (OR, 6.605, 95% CI, 1.123,
38.830) and doctors exposed to their patient (OR, 346.837, 95% CI 8.924, 13479.434), while the lower risk of seroconversion was
closely related to direct contact with COVID-19 patients wearing face mask (OR, 0.127, 95% CI 0.017, 0.968).
Chen 2020c Local
Community
Household
Nosocomial
Infection rate is highest when living with the case (13.26%), followed by taking the same means of transportation (11.91%). After
removing the influence factors of the "super spreader" incident, the infection rate of vehicle contact dropped to 1.80%. The infection
rate (7.18%) of entertainment activities such as gatherings, meeting guests, and playing cards was also relatively high, as was short-
term face-to-face unprotected conversations or doing errands (6.02%).
There was a statistically significant difference in the infection rate among the four categories of life contact, transportation contact,
medical contact, and other contact (p<0.005). Participation in Buddhist gatherings caused transmission. A total of 28 people were
diagnosed as confirmed cases of new coronavirus pneumonia, 4 were asymptomatic infections, and the infection rate of close
contacts reached 32.99% (32/97), which was much higher than the average infection rate (6.15). %), the difference is statistically
significant (p<0.005).
Cheng 2020 Household
Nosocomial
The overall secondary clinical attack rate was 0.7% (95% CI, 0.4%-1.0%). The attack rate was higher among the 1818 contacts whose
exposure to index cases started within 5 days of symptom onset (1.0% [95% CI, 0.6%-1.6%]) compared with those who were exposed
later (0 cases from 852 contacts; 95% CI, 0%-0.4%). The 299 contacts with exclusive presymptomatic exposures were also at risk
(attack rate, 0.7% [95% CI, 0.2%-2.4%]). The attack rate was higher among household (4.6% [95% CI, 2.3%-9.3%]) and nonhousehold
(5.3% [95% CI, 2.1%-12.8%]) family contacts than that in health care or other settings. The attack rates were higher among those
aged 40 to 59 years (1.1% [95% CI, 0.6%-2.1%]) and those aged 60 years and older (0.9% [95% CI, 0.3%-2.6%]).
Chu 2021 Household Five (10%) of 48 secondary cases compared with 130 (33%) of 398 non-case household contacts reported potential community
exposures: unadjusted OR 0.24 (95%CI 0.09 to 0.62), p=0.003
Craxford 2021 Household Cohabitees of seropositive HCW had a seropositive rate of 16%, compared to 2.5% of cohabitees without a seropositive HCW
(P=0.003)
Dattner 2020 Household PCR: 44% of adults were infected compared to 25% of the children (n=3353: 1809 children and 1544 adults)
Serology: 34% of these children and 48% of the adults tested serologically positive (n=705: 417 children and 288 adults
Dimcheff 2020 Community
Nosocomial
Household
HCWs exposed to a known COVID-19 case outside work had a significantly higher seroprevalence at 14.8% (23 of 155) compared to
those who did not 3.7% (48 of 1,296; OR, 4.53; 95% CI, 2.67–7.68; P < 0.0001)
Doung-ngern 2020 Local Wearing masks all the time during contact was independently associated with lower risk of COVID-19 infection compared to
not wearing masks (aOR 0.23, 95% CI 0.09–45 0.60), while wearing masks sometimes during contact was not (aOR 0.87, 95% CI
0.41–1.84).
Maintaining at least 1m distance from a COVID patient (aOR 0.15, 95% CI 0.04–0.63) and duration of close contact ≤15 minutes
versus longer (aOR 0.24, 95% CI 0.07–0.90) were significantly associated with lower risk of infection transmission
Farronato 2021 Household Subjects tested more than 73 days after the adult negativization showed a lower probability of receiving a positive result (p = 0.059)
Fateh-Moghadam
2020
Community Workplace exposure was associated with higher risk of becoming a case than cohabiting with a case or having a non-cohabiting
family member or friend who was a case.
The greatest risk of transmission to contacts was found for the 14 cases <15 years of age (22.4%); 8 of the 14, who ranged in age
from <1 to 11 years) infected 11 of 49 contacts.
Fontanet 2021 Local Infection rates were significantly lower amongst school pupils, teachers, non-teaching staff compared to pupils' parents and relatives
(P<0.001)
Galow 2021 Household The SAR of the 17 index-cases <18 years was significantly lower compared to the 126 adult index-cases: 15% vs 38% p=0.004).
Gaskell 2021 Household The seroprevalence varied by age between 27.6% (95%CI 20.8 - 35.6%) for children aged under 5 years of age to 74% (95%CI 70.0
-77.6%) in adults
Ge 2021 Household
Community
Attack rates were highest among household members of index patients (260 of 2565 [10.1%; 95% CI, 9.0%-11.4%]) and contacts
exposed in multiple settings to the same index patient (3 of 44 [6.8%; 95% CI, 1.4%-18.7%])
Gonçalves 2021 Household Mask use reduced odds of infection by 87% (OR 0.13, 95%CI 0.04–0.36). Persons who reported they were practically isolated from
everyone were 59% (OR 0.41, 95% CI 0.24–0.70) less likely to become infected.
Hast 2022 Local Participation in school sports was significantly associated with increased risks of infection: P=0.0004 and P=0.007 for elementary and
middle/high school students respectively.
Use of masks during sports activities was associated with significant reduction in risk of infection: P=0.005 and P=0.001 for
elementary and middle/high school students respectively.
Helsingen 2020 Local 11 individuals in the training arm (0.8% of those tested) and 27 in the non-training arm (2.4% of those tested) tested positive for
SARS-CoV-2 antibodies (p=0.001)
Hobbs 2020 Local
Household
Community
Case-patients were significantly more likely to have had close contact with a person with known COVID-19 than control participants
(aOR = 3.2, 95% CI = 2.0–5.0)
Case-patients were significantly more likely to have attended gatherings with persons outside their household, including social
functions (aOR = 2.4, 95% CI = 1.1–5.5), activities with children (aOR = 3.3, 95% CI = 1.3–8.4), or to have had visitors at home (aOR =
1.9, 95% CI = 1.2–2.9) during the 14 days before the SARS-CoV-2 test.
Parents of 64% of case-patients and 76% of control participants reported that their child and all staff members wore masks inside
the facility (aOR = 0.4, 95% CI = 0.2–0.8).
Hu 2020 Household
Community
Household contacts were associated with a significantly larger risk of SARS-CoV-2 infection than other types of contact (P<0.001).
The transmission risk in the first generation was significantly higher than the later generations (p<0.001), possibly due to improved
case isolation and contacts quarantine that deplete the number of susceptible individuals in the cluster.
Hu 2020 Local Travelers adjacent to the index patient had the highest attack rate (3.5% [95% CI, 2.9%-4.3%]) of COVID-19 infection (RR, 18.0 [95%
CI, 13.9-23.4]) among all seats.
Hu 2021 Local There was no significant difference between the estimated upper and lower bounds of ARs (p=0.06)
Hua 2020 Household Incidence of infection in child close contacts was significantly lower than that in adult contacts: 13.2% vs 21.2%, p=0.004
Islam 2020 Household
Local
Community
Nosocomial
The secondary attack rate among household contacts was at the highest risk of attack (13.04%, 95% CI 9.67-16.41) followed by
funeral ceremonies (8.33%, 95% CI 3.99-12.66) and family contacts (6.52%, 95% CI 4.02-9.02). The attack rate was higher in age
groups 50-59 (10.89%, 95% CI 7.05-14.66) and 60-69 (9.09%, 95% CI 5.08-13.09)
Jashaninejad 2021 Household Contacts who had more than one-hour daily contact with the index case, before the diagnosis of the disease in index cases had a
higher risk of infection (adjusted OR=2.44, 95% CI: 1.52, 3.93), compared to contacts who had one-hour and less close contact
Jordan 2022 Local Frequent hand washing was the only variable that was associated with a lower SAR, P=0.02.
Karumanagoundar
2021
Household
Community
Of the 599 contacts who tested positive, more than three-fourths (78%) were household contacts.
Being a household contact of a primary case with congregation exposure had a fourfold increased risk of getting COVID-19 (RR:
16.4; 95% CI: 13 to 20) than contact of primary case without congregation exposure.
Katlama 2022 Household Independent predictors of virus transmission from index to contacts were housing surface area < 60 m2 (OR: 5.6 [1.1; 28.2] and a
four-member family compared to five (OR: 3.6 [1.2; 10.3]).
Kawasuji 2020 Nosocomial Among symptomatic patients (n =18), the estimated viral load at onset was higher in the index than in the non-index patients
(median [95% confidence interval]: 6.6 [5.2–8.2] vs. 3.1 [1.5–4.8]. In adult (symptomatic and asymptomatic) patients (n = 21), median
viral load at the initial sample collection was significantly higher in the index than in the non-index patients (p = 0.02)
Khanh 2020 Community Seating proximity was strongly associated with increased infection risk (RR 7.3, 95% CI 1.2–46.2).
Kitahara 2022 Household
Community
Attack rates peaked 1 day before symptom onset: 26% (95%CI 10-48)
Klompas 2021 Nosocomial Potential contributing factors included high viral loads, nebulization, and positive pressure in the index patient's room. Risk factors
for transmission to staff included presence during nebulization, caring for patients with dyspnea or cough, lack of eye protection, at
least 15 minutes of exposure to case patients, and interactions with SARS-CoV-2–positive staff in clinical areas.
Koureas 2021 Household Household size was significantly associated with the risk of infection (OR: 2.65, 95% CI: 1.00–7.07).
Kuwelker 2021 Household The risk of household transmission was higher when the index patient had fever (aOR 3.31 [95% CI 1.52–7.24]; p = 0.003) or
dyspnoea (aOR 2.25 [95% CI 1.80–4.62]; p = 0.027) during acute illness.
Laws 2020 Household There were no significant differences in secondary infection rates between adult and paediatric contacts among all households (OR:
1.11; 95% CI: 0.56 to 2.21) or among households with children (OR: 0.99; 95% CI: 0.51 to 1.90).
Laws 2021 Household Children of primary patients had increased odds of acquiring infection compared with children in households in which the primary
patient was not their parent (OR: 17.28; 95% CI: 2.36 to 126.8).
Laxminarayan 2020 Local
Household
Community
Secondary attack rate estimates ranged from 1.2% (0.0 to 5.1%) in health care settings to 2.6% (1.6 to 3.9%) in the community and
9.0% (7.5 to 10.5%) in the household.
Lewis 2020 Household Household contacts to COVID-19 patients with immunocompromised conditions and household contacts who themselves had
diabetes mellitus had increased odds of infection with ORs 15.9 (95% CI, 2.4–106.9) and 7.1 (95% CI: 1.2–42.5).
Household contacts of a male primary patient were more likely to have secondary infection than those of a female primary patient
(SIR, 36% vs 18%; OR, 2.4; 95% CI, 1.1–5.3).
Li 2020d Household The secondary attack rate to children (aged <18 years) was 4% compared with 20.5% for adult members (odds ratio [OR], .18;
95% confidence interval [CI], .06–.54; P = 0.002). The secondary attack rate to the contacts in the household with index patients
quarantined at home immediately since onset of symptoms was 0% compared with 18.3% for the contacts in the households
without index patients quarantined during the period between initiation of symptoms and hospitalization (OR, 0; 95% CI, .00–.00;
p=0.000).
The secondary transmission rate for individuals who were spouses of index cases was 27.8% compared with 17.3% for other
members in the households (OR, 2.27; 95% CI, 1.22–4.22; p=0.010).
Li 2021a Household Children and adolescents younger than 20 years of age were more likely to infect others than were adults aged 60 years or older
(1·58, 1·28–1·95). Asymptomatic individuals were much less likely to infect others than were symptomatic cases (0·21, 0·14–0·31).
Symptomatic cases were more likely to infect others before symptom onset than after (1·42, 1·30–1·55).
Li 2021b Household
Community
Factors associated with significantly increased SAR were living together (P<0.01), being a spouse (P<0.01), and being >60 years of
age (P=0.01).
Liu 2020b Household
Community
Nosocomial
Compared to young adults aged 20–29 years, the infected risk was higher in children (RR: 2.59, 95%CI: 1.79–3.76), and old people
aged 60–69 years (RR: 5.29, 95%CI: 3.76–7.46). People having close relationship with index cases encountered higher infected risk
(RR for spouse: 20.68, 95%CI: 14.28–29.95; RR for non-spouse family members: 9.55, 95%CI: 6.73–13.55; RR for close relatives: 5.90,
95%CI: 4.06–8.59). Moreover, contacts exposed to index case in symptomatic period (RR: 2.15, 95%CI: 1.67–2.79), with critically
severe symptoms (RR: 1.61, 95%CI: 1.00–2.57)
Liu 2021 Household SAR among paediatric household contacts was significantly lower than among adult household contacts (P = 0.04).
Transmission was significantly lower in households with 4+ bedrooms compared with those with 3 or fewer [17% (95% CI: 7–36%)
vs. 47% (95% CI: 32–68%), P = 0.03], for contacts where the index case was masked compared with those unmasked [17% (7–37%)
vs. 48% (31–66%), P = 0.02] and with increased hand washing or use of hand sanitizer compared with those who did not report
increased use [19% (9–36%) vs. 58% (36–77%), P = 0.01].
López 2021 Household Higher risk of infection was found in the household members of domicile-isolated patients isolated and in those reporting
overcrowding at home, (odds ratio [OR] 1.67, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.89–3.12) and (OR 1.44, 95% CI 0.81; 2.56), respectively.
Lopez Bernal 2020 Household
Community
Secondary attack rates were highest where the primary case was aged <18 years with a significantly higher odds of secondary
infection (OR 61, 95% CI 3.3-1133).
Where the primary case was admitted to hospital there was a significantly lower odds of secondary infection in the household (OR
0.5, 95% CI 0.2-0.8).
Secondary attack rates were lower in larger households.
Lopez Bernal 2022 Household There was an inverse relationship between household size and SAR, with the highest SAR in households with two people
(SAR = 0.48; 95% CI: 0.36–0.60) and the lowest in households of five or more (SAR = 0.22; 95% CI: 0.11–0.33).
Luo 2020a Household
Community
Nosocomial
Household contacts had a significantly higher risk for secondary infection than did persons who were exposed in health care
settings (OR, 0.09, 95%CI 0.04 to 0.20) or those who were exposed on public transportation (OR, 0.01, 95%CI, 0.00 to 0.08).
Macartney 2020 Local The rate of staff member to child transmission was lower (1·5%) than staff to staff transmission (4·4%).
Malheiro 2020 Household Among the intervention cohort,16 of 132 close contacts tested positive during the follow-up period (attack rate:12.1%, 95%
confidence interval [CI]: 7.1-18.9). In the control cohort,138 of 1495 participants tested positive (attack rate: 9.2%, 95% CI:7.8-10.8)
Martínez-Baz 2022 Household
Community
The infectivity of the index case was lower in those aged 5–14 years and increased with age up to those aged 70 years or older (aOR
2.81, 95% CI 2.56–3.08). Infectivity was higher from immigrants (aOR 1.44, 95% CI 1.36–1.52) and from symptomatic index cases
(aOR 1.50, 95% CI 1.43–1.58).
McLean 2022 Household Compared to when the primary case was age 18 to 49 years, SIR in household contacts was significantly lower when the primary
case was age 12 to 17 years (RR, 0.42; 95% CI, 0.19–0.91)
Mercado-Reyes 2022 Household The number of rooms per household and the number of people per household were significantly associated with risks of
seropositivity
Metlay 2021 Household Independent factors significantly associated with higher transmission risk included age greater than 18 years (eg, adjusted odds
ratio [OR] for those aged 50-64 years, 3.66; 95% CI, 2.92-3.66; P<0.001) and multiple comorbid conditions (eg, adjusted OR for
individuals with hypertension, 1.93; 95% CI, 1.58-2.44; P<0.001)
Miller 2021 Household SARs from index cases with respiratory or systemic symptoms were significantly higher than in those without such symptoms.
Montecucco 2021 Local
Household
Community
Wearing respiratory protections by both the case and the close contact resulted an effective measure compared with no use (IRR =
0.08; 95% CI: 0.03-0.2; P<0.0001).
Fatigue (IRR= 17.1; 95% CI: 5.2-55.8; P<0.001), gastrointestinal symptoms (IRR= 6.6; 95% CI: 2.9-15.2; P<0.001) and cough (IRR= 8.2;
95% CI: 3.7-18.2; P<0.001) were found to be significantly associated with transmission of infection.
Musa 2021 Household Contacts were at a significantly higher risk for infection if the primary case had both cough and runny nose (OR 4.31, 95% CI
1.60–11.63), if the contact was aged 18–49 years (OR 4.67, 95% CI 1.83–11.93), if the contact kissed the primary case (OR 3.16, 95%
CI 1.19–8.43), or if the contact shared a meal with the primary case (OR 3.10, 95% CI 1.17–8.27).
Ng 2021 Household Independent risk factors that were significantly associated with higher transmission risk in the household included an index case
who was symptomatic (aOR 1.5; 95% CI 1.1–2.2), and household index aged greater than 18 years (aOR 7.0; 95% CI 4.4–11.3)
Ogata 2021 Household Spouses of index patients were significantly more likely to be infected compared to other household contacts: OR 2.85 (95%CI
1.25–6.5)
Park 2020a Household
Non-
household
With index patients 30–39 years of age as reference, detection of COVID-19 contacts was significantly higher for index patients >40
years of age in nonhousehold settings.
Petersen 2021 Household The risk for seropositivity was significantly higher for household contacts compared with other contacts (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]
5.4, 95% CI 1.9–15.2).
Pett 2021 Household
Community
SAR among household contacts (15.9%, 95% CI 6.6%–30.1%) was more than 6 times higher compared to high-risk contacts (2.5%,
95% CI 0.9%–5.4%)
Phiriyasart 2020 Household Locally religious and household contacts of confirmed cases had significantly higher risks of SARS-CoV-2 infection than other
community members.
Poletti 2020 Unclear Individuals younger than 70 years were at a significantly lower risk of death after infection than older patients (p<0.001). The risk of
death was 62% lower (95% CI: 31–80%; p<0.001) during the second phase of the epidemic.
Ratovoson 2022 Household In both the univariate and multivariate analyses, there was a relationship between the age of contacts and SAR, with the highest SAR
in contacts aged 35 years old or more.
Razvi 2020 Nosocomial HCWs in patient facing roles had a significantly higher frequency of positive COVID-19 antibody tests (295/1302 [22.7%]) than those
in non-patient facing roles (88/669 [13.2%]), p<0.0001)
Reukers 2021 Household Being a child was strongly associated with decreased probability of infection (P=0.006)
Robles Pellitero 2021 Household Wearing a mask during quarantine was significantly associated with reduced risk of infection: 30.5% vs 45.7% P<0.001).
Rosenberg 2020 Household Prevalence significantly increased with age, ranging from 23% among those aged <5 years to 68% among those 65 years or older
(p<0.0001)
Satter 2022 Household
Community
People living in high-density areas with high SES had significantly higher levels of SARS-CoV-2-specific IgG antibodies on both study
day 1 (P=0.011) and study day 28 (P=0.005) compared to the people with low SES.
Schoeps 2021 Local Teacher index cases caused on average more secondary cases (169/157, risk=1·08) than students/children (145/591, risk=0·25;
IRR 4·39, p<0·001). The average number of student/child-to-teacher transmission was 0·04 (corresponding to about one teacher
secondary case in 25 student/child index cases) compared to 0.56 for teacher-to-teacher transmission (one teacher secondary case
in 2 teacher index cases, IRR 13·25, p<0.0001).
Shah 2021 Household The family size of the index cases causing secondary infection was comparatively larger than index cases without secondary
household infection (6.75 ± 2.3 versus 4.9 ± 1.9; P=0.03).
Sordo 2022 Household The odds of secondary transmission were lower in primary cases who were asymptomatic at diagnosis than in symptomatic cases
(odds ratio, OR: 0.13; 95% 0.04-0.48); and higher in primary cases aged 60 years and over than in those aged 19-39 years (OR: 3.45;
95%CI: 1.53- 7.75). Being a spouse of the primary case was also associated with increased transmission compared to non-spouses
(OR: 1.93; 95% CI: 1.24-3.02).
Soriano-Arandes 2021 Household The SAR was significantly lower in households with COVID-19 paediatric index cases during the school period relative to summer
(P=0.02) and compared to adults (P=0.006).
Speake 2020 Aircraft The risk for secondary infections among passengers seated in the mid cabin was significantly greater than for those seated in the aft
cabin (p<0.005). The SAR among mid-cabin passengers in window seats was significantly greater than among those not in window
seats (RR 5.2; 95% CI 1.6–16.4; p<0.007).
Stich 2021 Household The overall secondary attack rate was was significantly higher in exposed adults (37.5%) than in children (24.6%-29.2%; P<0.015). The
risk of infection was also significantly higher when the index case-patient was >60 years of age (72.9%; P=0.04)
Sun 2020 Household The family recurrence rate of spouses who introduced cases from the family was 63.87%, which was higher than the recurrence rate
of children (30.53%), parents (28.37%) and other family members (20.93%), and the difference was statistically significant ( P <0.001) .
Sundar 2021 Household
Community
The risk of infection was significantly higher in household contacts compared to open environmental work contacts (RR 30.9, 95%CI
9.7-98.3, P<0.001), or closed environmental work contacts (RR1.68, 95%CI 1.15-2.44, P=0.006). The risk was significantly higher
among closed environmental work contacts compared to open environmental work contacts (RR 18.3, 95%CI 5.8-58.2, P<0.001).
Tadesse 2021 Household Persons aged 41–65 years were significantly more likely to be infected than people above the age of 65 years: OR 2.5 (95%CI 1.1-
5.5). Employed population groups have increased risk for infection by compared to unemployed groups: OR 1.3 (95% CI 1.0-1.6).
Tanaka 2021 Household SARS-CoV-2 Alpha variant had an approximately 1.9–2.3-fold higher transmissibility than the pre-existing virus (P<0.001)
Tanaka 2022 Household Fewer children were symptomatic compared with adults [91 (51.4%) vs. 142 (65.7%), P=0.004]. Children index cases were associated
with periods of lower community case rates while adult index cases were associated with periods of high community transmission
and rapid incidence rise of COVID-19 cases (P=0.006).
Torres 2020 Community Antibody positivity rates were 9.9% (95%CI: 8.2-11.8) for 1,009 students and 16.6% (95%CI: 12.1-21.9) for 235 staff. Among students,
positivity was significantly associated with history of contact with a confirmed case (p<0.0001).
The greater the number of contacts, the greater the probability that a child was antibody positive (p=0.05).
Tsang 2022 Household
Community
Compared to within households, the odds of infection was much lower during air travel, OR= 0.08 (95% CrI: 0.01, 0.34), and in other
settings, OR= 0.04 (95% CrI: 0.01, 0.09).
van der Hoek 2020 Household In families of a confirmed COVID-19 patient, children between 1 and 11 years were less often positive in PCR and serology than older
children and adults.
Vičar 2021 Household There was no significantly higher SAR in families with an adult primary case compared to those with children (77.1% vs. 65.8%,
P=0.05).
Wang 2020b Household Face mask use by the primary case and family contacts before the primary case developed symptoms was 79% effective in reducing
transmission (OR=0.21, 95% CI 0.06 to 0.79). Daily use of chlorine or ethanol-based disinfectant in households was 77% effective
(OR=0.23, 95% CI 0.07 to 0.84). Wearing a mask after illness onset of the primary case was not significantly protective. The risk
of household transmission was 18 times higher with frequent daily close contact with the primary case (OR=18.26, 95% CI 3.93
to 84.79), and four times higher if the primary case had diarrhoea (OR=4.10, 95% CI 1.08 to 15.60). Household crowding was not
significant.
White 2022b Local The SAR in flights of ≥5 h duration was significantly higher than shorter flights (P=0.008)
Wiens 2021 Household The risk of seropositivity was lowest among participants 20 to 49 years old
Wood 2020 Household Households without children had a significantly lower rate of COVID-19: HR per child 0.89; 95% CI 0.84-0.95. Households with
children had higher rates of COVID-19 tests (9.2% vs 6.1%)
Compared to those in households without children, the risk of COVID-19 requiring hospitalisation was lower in those with one child
and lower still in those with two or more children: HR 0.72 per child (95% CI 0.60-0.85, p<0.001); adjusted for age - HR 0.83 per child
(95% CI 0.70-0.99)
Wu 2020 Household
Local
Community
Contacts living in the same household as the index case had significantly higher risk of infection vs those who had only had brief
contact with the index case: RR 41.7 (17.7–98.5), p<0.001).
Contacts who had visited, or had contact with the index case in a medical institution had significantly higher risk of acquiring
infection vs brief contact with the index case: RR 3.6 (1.42–8.98), p=0.004.
Family members who had contact with an index case had significantly higher risk of infection vs healthcare providers or other
patients who had been exposed to an index case: RR 31.6 (7.69–130.01), p<0.001.
Those who had contact with the index case through work, through study, or in a place of entertainment had a significantly higher
risk of infection vs those who had contact with the index case in a medical institution: RR 6.7 (1.34–33.25), p=0.01.
Those who had contact with the index case in or near his/her home had a significantly higher risk of infection vs those who had
contact with the index case in a medical institution: RR 17.3 (4.20–70.77), p<0.001.
The incidence rate among those who wore face masks was significantly lower than that among those who did not use protective
measures (0.3% vs. 4.7%, respectively, p<0.001).
The incidence rate of contacts with data collected by field investigation was significantly higher than that of contacts with data
collected by big data (5.35% versus 0.07%, p<0.001).
Wu 2020a Household Contacts with >72 hours of exposure (SIR, 41.7%; [95% CI: 26.8%–58.3%]) had a higher SIR compared with those without (SIR, 23.2%;
[95% CI: 11.4%–41.5%]). One household-level factor was significantly associated with SIR: household members without protective
measures after illness onset of the index patient (odds ratio [OR], 4.43; [95% CI: 1.37–14.34]).
Wu 2021 Local
Household
Community
The SARs among close contacts of symptomatic and asymptomatic index cases were 4.1% (128 of 3136) and 1.1% (12 of 1078),
respectively, corresponding to a significantly higher transmission risk from symptomatic cases (OR 3.79; 95%CI 2.06-6.95).
Xie 2021 Household Handwashing ≥ 5 times/day was associated with significantly reduced infection risk (52.8% vs. 76.9%, P=0.04).
Xin 2020 Household Increasing risk of infection among household contacts with female index patients (adjusted hazard ratio [aHR] = 3.84, 95% CI =
1.07–13.78), critical disease index patients (aHR = 7.58, 95% CI = 1.66–34.66), effective contact duration with index patients > 2 days
(aHR = 4.21, 95% CI = 1.29–13.73), and effective contact duration > 11 days (aHR = 17.88, 95% CI = 3.26–98.01)
Yi 2021 Household The frequency of exposure to positively SARS-CoV-2 cases was significantly higher in index patients (20.7% vs. 6.8%, P=0.01).
Yu 2020 Household Family members, colleagues/classmates/travel companions, and doctors-patients accounted for 88.1% (1398), 10.7% (170), and 0.3%
(5), respectively. Following this order, the infection rate was 10.2%, 1.8% and 40.0%, respectively.
Yung 2020 Household Young children <5 years old were at lowest risk of infection (1.3%). Children were most likely to be infected if the household index
case was the mother.
Zhang 2020a Household
Local
Community
SAR among household contacts was 16.1% vs 1.1% for social contacts, and 0% for workplace contacts.
Older close contacts had the highest SAR compared with other age groups; 8.0% in persons >60 years of age compared with
1.4%–5.6% in persons <60 years of age.
Close contacts that lived with an index case-patient had 12 times the risk for infection and those who had frequent contact with an
index case-patient, >5 contacts during 2 days before the index case was confirmed, had 29 times the risk for infection.
Zhuang 2020 Household
Community
The main sources of secondary infection were family exposure (74.5%, 178 cases), transportation exposure accounted for 8.4% (20
cases), friend/colleague meal exposure accounted for 5.9% (14 cases). Shopping malls, markets, pharmacies, and other public place
exposure accounted for 5.0% (12 cases), workplace exposure accounted for 3.8% (9 cases), and community exposure accounted for
2.5% (6 cases).

Viral culture

Four studies (Ladhani 2020a, Miller 2021, Speake 2020, Yang 2020) performed viral culture ( Table 8). Three studies utilised Vero E6 cells for viral culture; one study (Miller) did not describe the methods used for culture. In Ladhani 2020a (a study of elderly nursing home residents), positive samples with a Ct of <35 were incubated on Vero E6 cells and confirmed by cytopathic effect (CPE) up to 14 days post-inoculation. Positive culture results were obtained for symptomatic, post-symptomatic, pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic cases (21 residents and 12 staff); higher Ct values was significantly associated with decreasing ability to recover the virus (p<0.001). Among residents the virus was isolated 12 days before symptom onset and up to 13 days after and in staff up to 6 days before and 7 days after symptom onset. In Miller 2021 (household contacts of index cases), 9/48 (19%) of samples were culture positive – none of the samples collected after seven days of symptom-onset yielded positive cultures. In Speake 2020, specimens were inoculated in Vero-E6 cells and inspected for CPE daily for up to 10 days with identity confirmed using “in-house” PCRs. The primary cases had boarded the flight from a cruise ship and had SARS-CoV-2 with the strain A2-Ruby Princess (A2-RP). Nine of 17 (53%) of PCR-positive samples grew SARS-CoV-2 in culture. Eight secondary cases who were in the same flight cabin with the infected travellers from the cruise ship all had viruses of the A2-RP strain (3 by full and 1 by partial sequence) ( Table 8). In the Yang 2020 study of index patients with recurrent infection, swab specimens were also inoculated on Vero cells and monitored for CPE daily for 10 days. All four viral cultures were negative (0%).

Table 8. Results of Viral Culture.

Study ID Types of participants Method used for viral culture Results of viral culture
Ladhani 2020a Staff and residents of 6
London care homes
All SARS-CoV-2 positive samples with a Ct
value of <35 were incubated on Vero E6
mammalian cells and virus detection was
confirmed by cytopathic effect (CPE) up to 14
days post-inoculation
87 samples with Ct values <35 were cultured and infectious virus was
recovered from all (21 residents and 12 staff).
Live virus was isolated up to 13 days after and 12 days before symptom onset
among residents and up to 6 days before and 7 days after symptom onset
among staff.
Higher Ct values was significantly associated with decreasing ability to recover
infectious virus (p<0.001).
There were no significant differences in virus recovery rates between
symptomatic and asymptomatic residents (5/17 [29.4%] vs. 14/33 [42.4%];
P=0.37) and staff (2/6 [33.3%] vs. 10/31 [32.3%]; P=0.96) at the time of testing.
Miller 2021 Household contact of PCR-
positive index cases
Not described Virus culture was carried out for 48 PCR positive swabs.

9 samples were culture positive (6/8 with a Ct value <25, 2/10 with a Ct value
25-<32 and 1/30 with a higher Ct value >32); no PCR positive swabs taken
more than 7 days after symptom onset yielded viable virus.
Speake 2020 241 airline passengers
some of whom had
disembarked from 1
of 3 cruise ships that had
recently docked in Sydney
Harbour. 6 primary cases
initially
Virus culture was attempted for primary
samples. Clinical specimens were inoculated
in triplicate wells with Vero-E6 cells at 80%
confluency, incubated at 37°C in 5% CO2, and
inspected for cytopathic effect daily for up to
10 days. Identity was confirmed by in-house
PCRs as described for previous sequences.
9/17 of PCR positive samples grew SARS-CoV-2 on viral culture. Sufficient
viral RNA was available to generate an adequate sequence for 25 of the 29
samples positive by PCR.
11 passengers had PCR-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection and symptom onset
within 48 hours of the flight. All 11 passengers had been in the same cabin
with symptomatic persons who had culture-positive A2-RP virus strain.
Yang 2020 Home quarantine: 93
recurrent-positive patients;
96 close contacts and
1,200 candidate contacts
Vero-E6 cells were used for virus isolation in
a BSL-3 laboratory.
Viral cultures of 4 specimens with Ct <30 were negative

Genome sequencing (GS) and phylogenetic analysis

Eighteen studies (Böhmer 2020, Cerami 2021, Firestone 2020, Huang 2021, Jeewandara 2021, Jiang 2020, Klompas 2021, Kolodziej 2022, Ladhani 2020a, Lucey 2020, Pang 2022, Powell 2022, Pung 2020, Sikkema 2020, Speake 2020, Taylor 2020, Wang 2020, Zhang 2021) performed GS and phylogenetic analysis ( Table 9). The studies were primarily conducted in outbreak clusters and methods used for performing these investigations were essentially similar across the studies. The completeness of genomic similarity ranged from 77–100% across 10 studies (Cerami 2021, Firestone 2020, Huang 2021, Jiang 2020, Lucey 2020, Pang 2022, Sikkema 2020, Speake 2020, Wang 2020, Zhang 2021). Transmission from one case to a contact was demonstrated by nonsynonymous nucleotide polymorphism in SARS-CoV-2 from these two cases onwards, but not in any cases detected prior to this instance (Böhmer 2020). Genomic sequencing of viral isolates confirmed household transmission in two studies (Cerami 2021, Kolodziej 2022). In one study of skilled nursing home facilities (Taylor 2020), samples from 75 residents and five healthcare staff shared genetically related strains. In another study of care homes (Ladhani 2020a), reported nine separate introductions of SARS-CoV-2 into care homes by healthcare staff. In one study which used multiple settings (Pung 2020), the viral genomic sequences for four cases in one cluster shared identical sequences over the full genome length and shared a common base difference relative to the earlier sequences (see Table 9).

Table 9. Results of Genome Sequencing and Phylogenetic Analyses.

Study ID Study Setting Method used for WGS Phylogenetic analysis Results
Böhmer 2020 Home,
workplace
Whole genome sequencing involved Roche KAPA
HyperPlus library preparation and sequencing on Illumina
NextSeq and MiSeq instruments as well as RT-PCR product
sequencing on Oxford Nanopore MinION using the
primers described in Corman and colleagues. Patient 1
was sequenced on all three platforms; patients 2–7 were
sequenced on Illumina NextSeq, both with and without RT-
PCR product sequencing with primers as in Corman and
colleagues; and patients 8–11, 14, and 16 were sequenced
on Oxford Nanopore MinION. Sequencing of patient 15
was not successful. Sequence gaps were filled by Sanger
sequencing.
Not reported Presymptomatic transmission from patient 4 to patient
5 was strongly supported by virus sequence analysis: a
nonsynonymous nucleotide polymorphism (a G6446A
substitution) was found in the virus from patients 4 and 5
onwards but not in any cases detected before this point
(patients 1–3). Later cases with available specimens, all
containing this same substitution, were all traced back to
patient 5. The possibility that patient 4 could have been
infected by patient 5 was excluded by detailed sequence
analysis: patient 4 had the novel G6446A virus detected
in a throat swab and the original 6446G virus detected in
her sputum, whereas patient 5 had a homogeneous virus
population containing the novel G6446A substitution in
the throat swab.
Cerami 2021 Household cDNA libraries were generated using ARTIC Network
amplicons to generate cDNA followed by library
construction with a QIAGEN® (Hilden, Germany) QIAseq
FX kit. Paired-end libraries were sequenced on an Illumina
MiSeq at the UNC High-Throughput Sequencing Facility.
Following demultiplexing, libraries underwent adapter
and quality trimming according to default parameters for
paired-end reads in Trim Galore!. Trimmed fastq files were
converted to unaligned BAM format, trimmed of primer
sequences, aligned to the Wuhan reference sequence,
and assembled into fasta format using the Broad Institute
viral NGS pipelines implemented in Docker Desktop.
The resulting fasta files were aligned via MAFFT v7.450
implemented in Geneious Prime® 2021.
Relatedness between viral sequences was
assessed via phylogenomic analysis in
MrBayes v3.2.6 implemented in Geneious
Prime® 2021 using default parameters
and setting the Wuhan reference sequence
as the outgroup. Samples from the same
household were considered to be related
if they were assigned to the same larger
clade by Nextclade as well as the same clade
in MrBayes. All sequences included in this
analysis are available on GISAID under the
accession numbers EPI_ISL_3088340 to
EPI_ISL_3088373.
High density amplicon sequencing of viral isolates from
these late secondary cases and others in their household
confirmed that 4/5 were indeed due to household
transmission
Firestone 2020 Motorcycle
rally
WGS was conducted at the MDH Public Health Laboratory
on 38 specimens using previously described methods.
Phylogenetic relationships, including distinct
clustering of viral whole genome sequences,
were inferred based on nucleotide
differences via IQ-TREE using general time
reversible substitution models as a part of
the Nextstrain workflow.
38 (73%) specimens (23 [61%] from primary and 15 [39%]
from secondary and tertiary cases) were successfully
sequenced, covering at least 98% of the SARS-CoV-2
genome. Six genetically similar clusters with known
epidemiologic links were identified (i.e., cases in patients
who were close contacts or who had common exposures
at the rally), five of which demonstrated secondary or
secondary and tertiary transmission.
Huang 2021 Local Not described Not described WGS revealed that all 5 isolates belong to the same
clade, with only four nucleotide changes in two, while the
remaining three showing identical viral genome
Jeewandara
2021
Household
Community
Library preparation was attempted using the AmpliSeq
for Illumina SARS-CoV-2 Community Panel, in combination
with AmpliSeq for Illumina library prep, index, and
accessories (Illumina, San Diego, USA) and targeted
RNA/cDNA amplicon assay was used. The representative
lineage sequences were downloaded from https://github.
com/cov-lineages/lineages (anonymised.encrypted.aln.
safe.fasta)
Sequence lineage, nucleotide mutations and
amino acid replacements were generated
using the CoV-GLUE graphical user interface.
GISAID database used.
Two viruses (only 2/89 samples had RT-qPCR Ct values
<25) were sequenced from this cohort which revealed
that they were of clades B.4 and B.1, suggesting that
many different virus strains were circulating within the
Bandaranayaka watta during this time. One of the viruses
had the D614G mutation.
Jiang 2020 Home Positive samples were sequenced directly from the
original specimens as previously described.
*Reference virus genomes were obtained from GenBank
using Blastn with 2019-nCoV as a query. The open reading
frames of the verified genome sequences were predicted
using Geneious (version 11.1.5) and annotated using the
Conserved Domain Database. Pairwise sequence identities
were also calculated using Geneious. Potential genetic
recombination was investigated using SimPlot software
and phylogenetic analysis.
The maximum likelihood phylogenetic tree
of the complete genomes was conducted by
using RAxML software with 1000 bootstrap
replicates, employing the general time-
reversible nucleotide substitution model.
The full genome of 8 patients were >99.9% identical
across the whole genome. Phylogenetic analysis showed
that viruses from patients were clustered in the same
clade and genetically similar to other SARS-CoV-2
sequences reported in other countries.
Klompas 2021 Local Total nucleic acid from respiratory specimens was
extracted using the Roche MagNA Pure 96 DNA and
Viral NA Small Volume Pack. Presence and abundance
estimates of SARS-CoV-2 RNA were evaluated by the CDC
2019-Novel Coronavirus Real-Time RT-PCR Diagnostic
Panel. Tiled, whole-genome amplicon sequencing was
performed using an adapted ARTIC V3 SARS-CoV-2
protocol and a common protocol developed by a
collaborative group of state public health laboratories,
and the CDC. The samples were combined after PCR tiling,
screened, and quantified for Illumina DNA Prep.
The Cecret pipeline ( https://github.com/
UPHL-BioNGS/Cecret) was used, with minor
modifications for our local environment,
to generate consensus genomes for each
sample. To ensure accuracy of results, we
only considered highly complete (≥95%
coverage) genomes in downstream
analyses. These sequences were aligned
and computed pairwise distances between
sample genomes. Resultant SNP distances
were discussed within the context of
epidemiologic linkage to rule in or rule out
individuals from this particular cluster.
Whole-genome sequencing confirmed that 2 staff
members were infected despite wearing surgical masks
and eye protection.
Kolodziej 2022 Household Sequences were obtained from saliva samples with
the highest viral load and are labelled per household.
Amplicon-based SARS-CoV-2 sequencing for was
performed on the positive saliva sample with the highest
viral load for each individual using the Nanopore protocol
“PCR tiling of COVID-19 virus (Version: PTC_9096_v109_
revE_06FEB2020)” which is based on the ARTIC v3
amplicon sequencing protocol. Several modifications
were made to the protocol as primer concentrations were
increased from 0.125 to 1 pmol for the following amplicon
primer pairs. AMPure XP beads purification was only
performed on clinical samples with an initial Cp-value <32.
Both libraries were generated using native barcode kits
from Nanopore SQK-LSK109 (EXP-NBD104, EXP-NBD114
and EXP-NBD196) and sequencing was performed on a
R9.4.1 flow cell multiplexing 48–96 samples per sequence
run.
Not described Each household shows a distinct cluster in phylogenetic
analyses with minimal sequence differences indicative of
a single introduction within each household. For certain
households only a single genome could be determined,
for which no conclusions could be drawn.
Ladhani 2020a Care homes Whole genome sequencing (WGS) was performed on all
RT-PCR positive samples. Viral amplicons were sequenced
using Illumina library preparation kits (Nextera) and
sequenced on Illumina short-read sequencing machines.
Raw sequence data was trimmed and aligned against
a SARS-CoV-2 reference genome (NC_045512.2). A
consensus sequence representing each genome base was
derived from the reference alignment.
Consensus sequences were assessed for
quality, aligned using MAFFT (Multiple
Alignment using Fast Fourier Transform,
version 7.310), manually curated and
maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees
derived using IQtree (version 2.04).
All 158 PCR positive samples underwent WGS analysis
and 99 (68 residents, 31 staff) distributed across all the
care homes yielded sequence sufficient for WGS analysis.
Phylogenetic analysis identified informal clusters, with
evidence for multiple introductions of the virus into care
home settings. All care home clusters of SARS-CoV-2
genomes included at least one staff member, apart
from care home B with no PCR positive staff and high
rates of staff self-isolation. Care home A exhibited three
distinct sequence clusters and six singletons, potentially
representing up to nine separate introductions. Genomic
analysis did not identify any differences between
asymptomatic/symptomatic residents/staff. The 10
sequences from residents who died were distributed
across the lineages identified and were closely matched
to sequences derived from non-fatal cases in the same
care homes.
Lucey 2020 Hospital Complementary DNA was obtained from isolated
RNA through reverse transcription and multiplex PCR
according to the protocol provided by the Artic Network
initiative. Libraries were prepared using the NEBNext
Ultra II kit (New England Biolabs) and sequenced on an
Illumina MiSeq using 300-cycle v2 reagent kits (Illumina).
Bowtie 2 was used for aligning the sequencing reads
to the reference genome for SARS-CoV-2 (GenBank
number, MN908947.3) and SAMtools for manipulating the
alignments.
SNPs were used to define clusters and a
median-joining network was generated
including these data from this study and
an additional 1,000 strains collected from
GISAID available on May 22nd. Clade
annotation was included for the Pangolin,
GISAID and NextStrain systems.
WvGS identified six clusters of nosocomial SARS-CoV-2
transmission. The average sequence quality per samples
was > 99% for 46 samples, and between 92 and 94% for 4
samples. Phylogenetic analysis identified six independent
groups of which clusters 1–3 were related to 39 patients.
Pang 2022 Local Three specific real-time RT-PCR methods targeting the
N, S, and ORF1ab genes were designed to detect the
presence of SARS-CoV-2 in clinical samples. Thermal
cycling for N gene real-time RT-PCR assays was performed
at 50°C for 20 min for reverse transcription, 95°C for 15
min, 50 cycles of 94°C for 5 s, 55°C for 1 min.
Residual RNA was subjected to tiled
amplicon PCR using ARTIC nCoV-2019
version 3 panel, where One-Step RT-PCR
was performed using the SuperScript™ III
One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum™
Taq DNA Polymerase (Thermo Fisher
Scientific, MA, USA). Sequencing libraries
were prepared using the Nextera XT and
sequenced on MiSeq (Illumina, CA, USA)
to generate 300 bp paired-end reads. The
reads were subjected to a hard-trim of 50
bp on each side to remove primer artifacts
using BBMap prior to consensus sequence
generation. The generated consensus
sequences were shared via a global initiative
on sharing avian flu data (GISAID). Closely
related representative strains from other
countries (99.99% identity and matching the
time window) were identified in the GISAID
database using BLASTN.
With the exception of sequence, phylogenetic analysis of
SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences obtained from all cases
(13/14; 92.9%), including H1, was grouped into a single
cluster. This cluster was supported by a single mutation
(T27588A) not found in other sequences in the database
before the nursing home outbreak.
Powell 2022 Local Not described Not described Whole genome sequencing was successful in two of
five index cases (the initial confirmed case that led to
the bubble self-isolating) and all nine positive direct
contacts. Overall, four of the nine sequences available
for comparison identified different SARS-CoV-2 strains,
therefore, ruling out transmission between affected
individuals.
Pung 2020 Multiple:
Company
conference,
church, tour
group.
Strain names, GISAID EpiCoV accession numbers used for
genomic sequencing
Phylogenetic tree utilised the Neighbor-
Joining method and confirmed using
Maximum Likelihood approaches. Replicate
trees with bootstrap used. All ambiguous
positions were removed for each sequence
pair (pairwise deletion option). Evolutionary
analyses were conducted in MEGA X. Strain
names, GISAID EpiCoV accession numbers
and collection dates are shown, followed by
the case number if available.
Cluster A: Viral genomic sequences were available for
four cases (AH1, AH2, AH3, and AT1) and phylogenetic
analysis confirmed their linkage, as suggested by the
epidemiological data.
Sikkema 2020 Hospital Samples were selected based on a Ct <32. A SARS-CoV-2-
specific multiplex PCR for nanopore sequencing was done.
The resulting raw sequence data were demultiplexed
using qcat. Primers were trimmed using cutadapt,17
after which a reference-based alignment to the GISAID
(Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data) sequence
EPI_ISL_412973 was done using minimap2. The consensus
genome was extracted and positions with a coverage less
than 30 reads were replaced with N using a custom script
using biopython software (version 1.74) and the python
module pysam (version 0.15.3). Mutations in the genome
were confirmed by manually checking the alignment,
and homopolymeric regions were manually checked and
resolved, consulting the reference genome. Genomes
were included when having greater than 90% genome
coverage.

All available full-length SARS-CoV-2 genomes were
retrieved from GISAID20 on March 20, 2020 (appendix 1
pp 8–65), and aligned with the newly obtained SARS-CoV-2
sequences in this study using the multiple sequence
alignment software MUSCLE (version 3.8.1551). Sequences
with more than 10% of N position replacements were
excluded. The alignment was manually checked for
discrepancies, after which the phylogenomic software IQ-TREE (version 1.6.8) was used to do a maximum-
likelihood phylogenetic analysis, with the generalised
time reversible substitution model GTR+F+I+G4 as best
predicted model.The ultrafast bootstrap option was used
with 1000 replicates. Clusters were ascertained based on
visual clustering and lineage designations.
The code to generate the minimum
spanning phylogenetic tree was written in
the R programming language. Ape24 and
igraph software packages were used to write
the code to generate the minimum spanning
tree, and the visNetwork software package
was used to generate the visualisation.
Pairwise sequence distance (used to
generate the network) was calculated by
adding up the absolute nucleotide distance
and indel-block distance. Unambiguous
positions were dealt with in a pairwise
manner. Sequences that were mistakenly
identified as identical, because of transient
connections with sequences containing
missing data, were resolved.
46 (92%) of 50 sequences from health-care workers in the
study were grouped in three clusters. Ten (100%) of 10
sequences from patients in the study grouped into the
same three clusters:
Speake 2020 Aircraft Processed reads were mapped to the SARS-CoV-2
reference genome (GenBank accession no. MN908947).
Primer-clipped alignment files were imported into
Geneious Prime version 2020.1.1 for coverage analysis
before consensus calling, and consensus sequences were
generated by using iVar version 1.2.2.
Genome sequences of SARS-CoV-2
from Western Australia were assigned
to lineages by using the Phylogenetic
Assignment of Named Global Outbreak
LINeages (PANGOLIN) tool ( https://github.
com/cov-lineages/pangolinExternal Link).
On July 17, 2020, we retrieved SARS-CoV-2
complete genomes with corresponding
metadata from the GISAID database. The
final dataset contained 540 GISAID whole-
genome sequences that were aligned with
the sequences from Western Australia
generated in this study by using MAFFT
version 7.467. Phylogenetic trees were
visualized in iTOL (Interactive Tree Of Life,
https://itol.embl.deExternal Link) and MEGA
version 7.014.
100% coverage was obtained for 21 and partial coverage
(81%–99%) for 4 samples. The phylogenetic tree for the
21 complete genomes belonged to either the A.2 (n = 17)
or B.1 (n = 4) sublineages of SARS-CoV-2
Taylor 2020 Skilled nursing
facilities
WGS was conducted by MDH-PHL on available specimens
using previously described methods.
Phylogenetic relationships, including distinct
clustering of viral whole genome sequences,
were inferred based on nucleotide
differences via IQ-TREE, using general time
reversible substitution models
Specimens from 18 (35%) residents and seven (18%) HCP
at facility A were sequenced - Strains from 17 residents
and five HCP were genetically similar. At facility B, 75 (66%)
resident specimens and five (7%) HCP specimens were
sequenced, all of which were genetically similar.
Wang 2020 Home Full genomes were sequenced using the BioelectronSeq
4000. WGS integrated information from 60 published
genomic sequences of SARS-CoV-2. Full-length genomes
were combined with published SARS-CoV-2 genomes
and other coronaviruses and aligned using the FFT-NS-2
model by MAFFT.
Maximum-likelihood phylogenies were
inferred under a generalised-time-reversal
(GTR)+ gamma substitution model and
bootstrapped 1000 times to assess
confidence using RAxML.
The phylogenetic tree of full-length genomes showed
that SARS-CoV-2 strains form a monophyletic clade with a
bootstrap support of 100%. Sequences from six HCWs in
the Department of Neurosurgery and one family member
were closely related in the phylogenetic tree.
33 family members of the HCWs were not secondarily
infected, due to the strict self-quarantine strategies taken
by the HCWs immediately after their onset of illness,
including wearing a facial mask when they came home,
living alone in a separated room, never eating together
with their families.
Zhang 2021 Local
Household
Sequencing raw reads were trimmed to remove
sequencing adaptors and low-quality bases. Clean reads
were aligned to the reference genome of the SARS-CoV-2
(GenBank: NC_045512.2) using the Bowtie2 v.2.2.537 with
default parameters. Duplicate reads were removed with
Picard Tools. Samtools (v.1.10) “mpileup” was used to call
SNPs using mpileup files as input with parameter -Q 20.
Each site was re-calculated, and variants were screened
using perl script with the following parameters: (ia) depth
of alternate allele ≥ 5, (ii) alternate allele frequency ≥70%,
and (iii) discarding the sites only supported by a single
strand. The C337T variant in P4 were also considered as
an SNP that was supported by sequencing reads (with
67% frequency) and validated by Sanger sequencing.
Consensus sequences were called using BCFtools based
on reference sequence.
Phylogenomic analysis of 13 high-quality
(coverage: ≥70%) viral genomes was
performed together with 72 strains
circulating in Beijing during the same period,
including 33 public viral genomes (from
global initiative on sharing all influenza data
[GISAID]) and 39 viral genomes from local
centre. Viral genome was obtained from all
14 patients.

72 viral genomes were obtained, 33 were
from the GISAID ( https://gisaid.org), 39
were from Beijing Ditan Hospital (GenBank:
PRJNA667180). Consensus sequences were
trimmed to 5ʹ and 3ʹ untranslated regions
due to their poor quality. Multiple sequence
alignment was conducted with parameters
--auto --keeplength --addfragments
using MAFFT v.7.45324.39. The maximum
likelihood tree was constructed using IQ-
TREE v.1.6.12 with 1000 bootstrap replicates.
The substitution model GTR+F+R2 was
selected based on Bayesian information
criteria score. TreeTime v.0.7.6 was used
for time-resolved phylogenomic analysis.41
iTOL (itol.embl.de) was applied for displaying
topology of phylogenomic tree.

The nucleotide frequency of each
genomic locus was calculated with the
85 viral genomes of circulating strains in
Beijing, including 13 genomes (P1–P13)
from the outbreak cluster and 72 local
genomes mentioned above (Figure S1). A
median joining network was constructed
using NETWORK v.10.1.0.0 on the Fluxus
Technology website ( https://www.fluxus-
engineering.com/).
Twelve viral genomes from this outbreak were tightly
clustered into two clades with bootstrap values of at least
77%.

Discussion

Summary of main findings

We identified 258 primary studies and 20 systematic reviews assessing the role of close contact in transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The evidence from primary studies suggest that the risk of transmission is significantly increased through close contact with an infected case - the greater the frequency of contact, the greater the risk. Household contact setting is significantly more likely to result in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 compared to other types of contact settings. This risk of transmission appears to decrease with use of face masks (by index cases only or by both index cases and close contacts) and in cases where the index or primary cases are in the paediatric age group. The risk of close contact transmission is significantly increased in the elderly. Enclosed environments and social gatherings appear to increase the likelihood of close contact transmission. Close contact with persons having recurrent infection with SARS-CoV-2 is unlikely to result in transmission of the virus. There is wide heterogeneity in study designs and methods and the overall quality of evidence from published primary studies is low to moderate. The results of systematic reviews also suggest that household contact setting increases the risk of transmission, and the risk of transmission appears greater with symptomatics and presymptomatics compared to asymptomatics.

The positive results of viral cultures observed in two studies support the results of PCR and serologic tests showing that close contact setting was associated with transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The failure to successfully isolate the virus in the third study supports the view that individuals who are re-infected are unlikely to transmit the virus in close contact settings. The positive findings from studies that performed GS and phylogenetic analysis with identical strains supports the hypothesis that SARS-CoV-2 transmission occurs in close contact settings. The routes of transmission are unclear but may include direct and indirect contact and/or large droplet or short-range aerosol transmission as possible explanations for the identified identical strains in close contacts 35 . The failure of the majority of studies to report Ct values casts doubts on the strengths of any reported associations because of the likelihood of false positives, as is the lack of (and variation in) reporting of the timelines for sample collections. The variations observed in the definitions of close contacts also cast further doubts on the validity of overall results.

Comparison with the existing literature

The results of our review are consistent with several guidelines suggesting that close contact with index cases can result in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 1012 . However, these guidelines could change as more evidence emerges. The results from nine primary studies suggesting that face masks may reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission support the findings from a systematic review which concluded that face masks are effective as adjuncts for preventing transmission of respiratory viruses 13 . However, several confounders make the strengths of the association unclear, e.g., type of face mask, setting, severity of illness, and duration of exposure. However, our review contains a greater number of studies compared to each of the included individual reviews and shows evidence demonstrating positive culture of virus as well as genomic evidence of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in close contact settings. This differs from the findings from our reviews of fomite, orofecal and airborne transmission that failed to show evidence of either positive culture or genomic sequences demonstrating SARS-CoV-2 transmission 1416 .

Strengths and limitations

To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive review to date investigating the role of close contact in the transmission of SARS-CoV-2. We extensively searched the literature for eligible studies, accounted for the quality of included studies and have reported outcomes (viral culture and GS) that were previously unreported in previous reviews. However, we recognize some limitations. We may not have identified all relevant studies examining the role of close contact in transmission - this is especially true for unpublished studies. The QUADAS-2 checklist we adapted to assess the quality of included primary studies has not been validated for all types of study designs included in our review. The variation in the definition of close contact across the studies could also have resulted in identification of secondary cases in the included primary studies. Furthermore, we did not assess the impact of seasonality on the risk of transmission – it has been shown that humidity and temperature can affect the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 17, 18 . We did not assess the quality of the included reviews; however, we documented the overall reporting quality of primary studies as reported by the review authors. We included results from non-peer reviewed studies which may affect the reliability of our results. However, such studies could potentially be of research benefit because of the ongoing pandemic; in addition, we performed forward citation search of relevant studies.

Implications for research

Viral load measures should be linked to symptoms and epidemiological chain of transmission and should be repeated in multiple time windows in relation to the course of illness thus providing evidence of changing infectiousness. Future studies should endeavour to include Ct values (or preferably convert the Ct values to number of genome copies using standard curves) when reporting research results and should describe the timing and methods of sample collection. Details surrounding the proximity, timing, and activities within the context of close contact need to be described. In studies of elderly subjects, more detailed description of baseline demographics should be reported. Further studies showing virus isolation in close contact settings should be conducted to strengthen the current evidence base; this could include performing serial cultures. Similarly, more research examining genomic sequences and phylogenetic trees in suspected close contact transmissions should be conducted - this should also extend to research examining other modes of transmission. The variation in methods and thresholds of the serological tests add to the confusion about diagnostic accuracy of testing; indeed, some authors have questioned the value of serological tests for diagnosing SARS-CoV-2 19 . To overcome the challenge of interpreting antibody responses, guidelines for better reporting of serological tests and results should be developed; this has previously been emphasized by other authors. Internationally recognized research dictionary of terms defining and describing close contact settings should be developed. Standardized guidelines for reporting research results should be a priority. Local, national, and international health organisations should promote good hygiene measures including hand hygiene and avoidance of overcrowded spaces. Interventions to improve the uptake of vaccinations should be encouraged 20 . In addition, the use of PPE in high-risk settings (e.g., ICU, COVID-19 wards) should be a priority.

Conclusion

The evidence from published observational studies and systematic reviews indicate that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted in close contact settings. Household contact and increased frequency of contact with infected cases are associated with significantly increased risks of transmission. The reporting quality of published primary studies is low-to-moderate. Variations in study designs and methodology restrict the comparability of findings across studies. Standardized guidelines for the reporting of future research (and including the definitions of close contact) should be developed.

Acknowledgements

This work was commissioned and paid for by the World Health Organization (WHO). Copyright on the original work on which this article is based belongs to WHO. The authors have been given permission to publish this article. The author(s) alone is/are responsible for the views expressed in the publication. They do not necessarily represent views, decisions, or policies of the World Health Organization.

Funding Statement

The review was funded by the World Health Organization: Living rapid review on the modes of transmission of SARs-CoV-2 reference WHO registration No2020/1077093. CH and ES also receive funding support from the NIHR SPCR Evidence Synthesis Working Group project 390.

The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

[version 3; peer review: 2 approved

Data availability

Underlying data

All data underlying the results are available as part of the article and no additional source data are required.

Extended data

Figshare: Extended data: SARS-CoV-2 and the Role of Close Contact in Transmission: A Systematic Review, https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14312630.v1 8 .

This project contains the following extended data:

  • Updated Protocol

  • Revised Search Strategy

  • Revised List of Referenced to Excluded Studies

  • Revised List of References to Included Studies

Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC-BY 4.0).

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F1000Res. 2022 Nov 18. doi: 10.5256/f1000research.140982.r156032

Reviewer response for version 3

Tetsuya Akaishi 1

I confirm that the authors have precisely answered my comments and concerns.

Are the rationale for, and objectives of, the Systematic Review clearly stated?

Partly

Is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are sufficient details of the methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

Partly

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results presented in the review?

Partly

Reviewer Expertise:

Infectious diseases, neurological disorders

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.

F1000Res. 2022 Nov 4. doi: 10.5256/f1000research.135682.r153259

Reviewer response for version 2

Gary Lin 1,2

Summary

The study attempts to understand the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in close settings. The study was conducted using a systematic review that examined the role of close contact and assessed the evidence in the current literature. Studies were assessed based on various factors, including the risk of bias (QUADAS-2 criteria), definition of close contact, population characteristics, sampling procedures, and PCR cycle thresholds. Studies up to 4/30/2022 have been updated in the latest version. The studies' quality was examined, including factors such as reporting and biases. Due to the heterogeneity of the study, a metanalysis was not conducted. Study settings include educational settings, hospitals, social and religious gatherings, public transport, care homes, professional sports events, households, and quarantine.

Notable study outcomes include higher attack rates in household and quarantine settings. Settings with high primary attack rates include weddings, karaoke, prison, and households. Home/community, hospital, and social gatherings (concerts and rehearsals) had high secondary attack rates—lower frequency of attacks include educational settings, such as daycare centers. Face masks decreased transmission risk. Symptomatic had a higher risk of transmission. Children had fewer transmission risks compared to the elderly, who had the most transmission risks. Among all studies reported, the definition of close contacts varied. The risk of bias was prevalent in many studies.

General Comments

I applaud the authors for starting and continuing this systematic review up to April 2022 around the growing body of literature on close contact transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The study, from my perspective, is comprehensive and does an excellent job of assessing study bias using the QUADAS-2 methodology. It is also interesting to see a thorough examination of clinical sampling methods, such as PCR Ct and serological threshold values – relevant to the study's strength. This systematic review was a robust study that addressed previous reviewers’ comments thoroughly and rigorously. However, I have a few clarifications that I would like to see:

  • Examining each study’s definition of close contact can be useful in determining practical policy recommendations on transmission prevention. However, in studies that examined the frequency, duration, and/or proximity of contacts, how was the data reported, i.e., observation versus self-reported? The reporting methods could be useful in determining the study's strength. Also, in households, did studies consider the household attempts at quarantining the infected individuals?

  • Did the studies consider the timing in which they collected data? Were most of these studies done during large-scale NPIs and other social distancing measures? I believe results could be potentially confounded when community prevalence is low. Additionally, the seasonality of community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and other meteorological factors (e.g. humidity and temperature) can potentially play a factor in mediating transmission (see Lin et al., 2022 1 ). Hence, data collection timing is an issue – especially during the winter versus summer.

  • Since environmental and population factors can be a factor in transmission, are there any trends in terms of countries where the studies were conducted?

  • Besides age, what other types of demographic factors were considered in studies? You mentioned population characteristics as an examined factor, but you only mention age as a factor that contributed to transmission.

Minor Issues

  • Figure 3A: Why is “prison” mentioned twice in the legend?

Are the rationale for, and objectives of, the Systematic Review clearly stated?

Yes

Is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are sufficient details of the methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

Yes

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results presented in the review?

Yes

Reviewer Expertise:

Computational Epidemiology; Systems Science

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard.

References

  • 1. : Investigating the effects of absolute humidity and movement on COVID-19 seasonality in the United States. Sci Rep .2022;12(1) : 10.1038/s41598-022-19898-8 16729 10.1038/s41598-022-19898-8 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
F1000Res. 2022 Nov 9.
IGHO ONAKPOYA 1

Reviewer's Comment: The study attempts to understand the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in close settings. The study was conducted using a systematic review that examined the role of close contact and assessed the evidence in the current literature. Studies were assessed based on various factors, including the risk of bias (QUADAS-2 criteria), definition of close contact, population characteristics, sampling procedures, and PCR cycle thresholds. Studies up to 4/30/2022 have been updated in the latest version. The studies' quality was examined, including factors such as reporting and biases. Due to the heterogeneity of the study, a metanalysis was not conducted. Study settings include educational settings, hospitals, social and religious gatherings, public transport, care homes, professional sports events, households, and quarantine.

Notable study outcomes include higher attack rates in household and quarantine settings. Settings with high primary attack rates include weddings, karaoke, prison, and households. Home/community, hospital, and social gatherings (concerts and rehearsals) had high secondary attack rates—lower frequency of attacks include educational settings, such as daycare centers. Face masks decreased transmission risk. Symptomatic had a higher risk of transmission. Children had fewer transmission risks compared to the elderly, who had the most transmission risks. Among all studies reported, the definition of close contacts varied. The risk of bias was prevalent in many studies.

Authors' Response: Thank you. The heterogeneity across the included studies was a main drawback to our findings. This latter point has been mentioned in the Discussion.

Reviewer's Comment: General Comments

I applaud the authors for starting and continuing this systematic review up to April 2022 around the growing body of literature on close contact transmission of SARS-CoV-2. The study, from my perspective, is comprehensive and does an excellent job of assessing study bias using the QUADAS-2 methodology. It is also interesting to see a thorough examination of clinical sampling methods, such as PCR Ct and serological threshold values – relevant to the study's strength. This systematic review was a robust study that addressed previous reviewers’ comments thoroughly and rigorously. However, I have a few clarifications that I would like to see:

Authors' Response: We thank the reviewer for these comments. We have made efforts to address the concerns raised.

Reviewer's Comment: 

  • Examining each study’s definition of close contact can be useful in determining practical policy recommendations on transmission prevention. However, in studies that examined the frequency, duration, and/or proximity of contacts, how was the data reported, i.e., observation versus self-reported? The reporting methods could be useful in determining the study's strength. Also, in households, did studies consider the household attempts at quarantining the infected individuals?

  • Did the studies consider the timing in which they collected data? Were most of these studies done during large-scale NPIs and other social distancing measures? I believe results could be potentially confounded when community prevalence is low. Additionally, the seasonality of community transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and other meteorological factors (e.g. humidity and temperature) can potentially play a factor in mediating transmission (see Lin  et al., 2022 1 ). Hence, data collection timing is an issue – especially during the winter versus summer.

  • Since environmental and population factors can be a factor in transmission, are there any trends in terms of countries where the studies were conducted?

  • Besides age, what other types of demographic factors were considered in studies? You mentioned population characteristics as an examined factor, but you only mention age as a factor that contributed to transmission.

Authors' Response:

  • We agree with the reviewer that assessing whether the data was observational or self-reported is useful in determining study quality. However, this domain is not included in the QUADAS-2 criteria that we used to assess quality. In households, there was paucity of data on attempts to quarantine infected individuals.

  • Most of the studies were done during large scale implementation of NPI interventions. However, not all the studies employed social distancing measures. Although we reported the dates of the included studies when conducted, we did not examine the effect of seasonality in the transmission dynamics. We note the relevance of seasonality on transmission and have added a caveat on this to the limitations section with references (1,2).

  • We did not consider trends in transmission per country. However, we reported overall trends in transmission based on settings. However, we have now reported data on the overall SARs across continents. 

  • We reported data from 112 studies that addressed the risk of transmission (Table 7). The factors reported in the studies included age, compromised immunity, number of individuals in households, frequency of contacts with infected cases, etc.

Reviewer's Comment:

Minor Issues

Figure 3A: Why is “prison” mentioned twice in the legend?

Authors' Response: Thanks. We have corrected the error.

Added References

1. Lin G, Hamilton A, Gatalo O, et al. Investigating the effects of absolute humidity and movement on COVID-19 seasonality in the United States. Sci Rep. 2022 Oct 6;12(1):16729. doi: 10.1038/s41598-022-19898-8. PMID: 36202875; PMCID: PMC9537426

2. Landier J, Paireau J, Rebaudet S, et al. Cold and dry winter conditions are associated with greater SARS-CoV-2 transmission at regional level in western countries during the first epidemic wave. Sci Rep. 2021 Jun 17;11(1):12756. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-91798-9. PMID: 34140557; PMCID: PMC8211690

F1000Res. 2022 Oct 11. doi: 10.5256/f1000research.135682.r152964

Reviewer response for version 2

Tetsuya Akaishi 1

I think that the authors vigorously and extensively screened and reviewed the scientific articles regarding secondary transmission rate after a close contact in miscellaneous places. I agree with the authors and other reviewers about the varied criteria of close contact, different seasons of studies, and different implemented infection prevention measures in the localities, between the evaluated articles.

I suggest the authors to consider stratifications by some essential baseline factors, such as the following variables:

  1. Difference in criteria of close contact.

  2. Seasons with different prevalent variant strains.

  3. Different geographic regions (i.e., Europe, North America, Asia, Africa, etc).

I also recommend the authors to include the information about the types and combinations of the used terms in the primary step for screening the relevant literatures through the databases.

I agree with the authors about their conclusion that standardized guidelines for (i) judging the closeness of contact (especially the wearing of face masks) and (ii) reporting the estimated sample viral load with cycle threshold will be needed in future studies. This study delineated this issue by comprehensively evaluating a large amount of reported scientific articles, and may benefit future researches in this field.

Are the rationale for, and objectives of, the Systematic Review clearly stated?

Partly

Is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are sufficient details of the methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

Partly

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results presented in the review?

Partly

Reviewer Expertise:

Infectious diseases, neurological disorders

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.

F1000Res. 2022 Nov 9.
IGHO ONAKPOYA 1

Reviewer's Comment: I think that the authors vigorously and extensively screened and reviewed the scientific articles regarding secondary transmission rate after a close contact in miscellaneous places. I agree with the authors and other reviewers about the varied criteria of close contact, different seasons of studies, and different implemented infection prevention measures in the localities, between the evaluated articles.

Authors' Response: We thank the reviewer for the positive comments.

Reviewer's Comment: I suggest the authors to consider stratifications by some essential baseline factors, such as the following variables: 

  1. Difference in criteria of close contact.

  2. Seasons with different prevalent variant strains.

  3. Different geographic regions (i.e., Europe, North America, Asia, Africa, etc).

Authors' Response: 

  1. We already reported the data on definitions of close contact. Only 28/258 (11%) studies defined close contact based on distance and 163 studies (63%) did not report definitions of close contact. The paucity of suitable information makes it challenging to present the data in this respect. We have highlighted the need for international guidelines on definitions to be developed.

  2. We see the reviewer’s point. However, this was not one of our a priori outcome measures. Answering this question would require a separate research endeavour.

  3. We have already reported the number of studies for some continents. We have now reported data on the frequencies of SARs by continent based on available data.

Reviewer's Comment: I also recommend the authors to include the information about the types and combinations of the used terms in the primary step for screening the relevant literatures through the databases.

Authors' Response: Thank you. We have included statements about the screening of abstracts for inclusion

Reviewer's Comment: I agree with the authors about their conclusion that standardized guidelines for (i) judging the closeness of contact (especially the wearing of face masks) and (ii) reporting the estimated sample viral load with cycle threshold will be needed in future studies. This study delineated this issue by comprehensively evaluating a large amount of reported scientific articles, and may benefit future researches in this field.

Authors' Response: We thank the reviewer for this comment.

F1000Res. 2022 Apr 5. doi: 10.5256/f1000research.55716.r123867

Reviewer response for version 1

Richard Wamai 1

I have read this manuscript with keen interest and over several weeks during which COVID-19 has continued to evolve with new studies coming out and policy changes across countries I have been traveling in (Kenya and US). This manuscript deals with the question of availability of evidence for role of close contact in COVID-19 transmission. This question seems obvious now given 2+ years of generalized policy around the world for physical or social distancing. A lay observation would be to say that there is unequivocal evidence that close proximity has a role in the transmission of COVID (after all we have been told to distance). The authors of the present manuscript deal with the question of availability of scientific evidence for this generalized policy.

Clearly, a lot (if not all) of the NPIs (non-pharmaceutical interventions) have been implemented without evidence whether they work (Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al. (2021) 1 - I am a co-author in this study. The current manuscript shows just how murky the state of evidence of these NPIs is. Consider the state of evidence of mask-wearing; just the Bangladeshi study is the only RCT we have, and the evidence that masks work from this trial is not that great (Abaluck J, Kwong LH, Styczynski A, et al., 2022 2 )

In my view, assessment of the merits of this manuscript should center on two things. The first is whether the authors have identified all the evidence available as published in scientific literature. The second is whether the authors make good-faith representation of the studies they have reviewed. I say “good-faith” because there are questions raised by the existing reviews and comments of this manuscript. Additionally, “good-faith” means to me that the authors have not omitted results from the studies. On these two accounts I write my recommendation. A systematic/scoping review is a unique type of study because authors should be presenting in good faith the information from the studies reviewed.

1. Have the authors examined all of the available evidence (=published studies) on the question?

The authors both say they have and have documented and included the method of their search for the literature reviewed (Appendix 2). The only problem I see with this is that studies reviewed were only those published as of December 20, 2020. That was the first full year of the pandemic. Publications from 2021 are not included. One would presume that it is more likely that more studies on the effect of distancing could have been conducted in 2021. Those studies are not included in this manuscript, and that is a shortcoming. One – and at the minimum necessary – revision that could be made is to add the timeframe of the review in the Title of the manuscript. In my view, it is not necessary for the authors to begin including the studies from 2021 as that would require a full new search and a re-write of large potions of the manuscript.

2. Have the authors presented truthfully and good-faith the evidence from the studies?

This is the central question for this manuscript, and it appears more so the case given the extensive comments by the readers. In my view, all of the criticism is not warranted. Criticism is due where the authors have not presented results from the studies reviewed truthfully and in good-faith. Criticism is also due where gaps in evidence is not acknowledged or are pertaining. I do not think the readers present counter evidence, i.e., show that the authors have summarized results from a specific study or set of studies erroneously. In the same vein I am not convinced that readers demonstrate that the authors have misinterpreted results from the studies they have reviewed; such misinterpretation would be strong grounds for Not Approving this manuscript or calling for its revisions, of course. If the readers are presenting evidence to counter the evidence from the studies presented by the authors from other studies that is acceptable. But that should also be weighed against my point 1 above. For instance, could the initial search have missed such studies raised by the readers?

Also, I would not engage in some of the debates presented. For instance, I do not think the manuscript should be criticized because “these authors may lack key expertise in their team”. I have read through the contributors’ listed expertise. I do not think any special expertise above and beyond what the author team has is needed to conduct a systematic review or truthfully and in good-faith summarize the evidence from the reviewed studies. In addition, I do not think that simply because persons in the author team are members of a decision-making body like the WHO that disqualifies them from objectivity or removes their training in science and scholarship. On the contrary, I think there is great value when decision-makers also participate in science. The obvious problem, of course, is where there are conflicts of interests, or where such persons are compromised. However, we have to take the consideration that in a multi-authored manuscript not one of the authors influences the entire narrative of the manuscript or results presented. Persons whose employment or affiliation positions may – or may be perceived to – compromise any perspectives presented in a manuscript they have co-authored should of course declare the conflicts of interests. Declaration of conflicts of interests is a standard protocol required in journal standards.

Having said the above, I have a few other observations or questions of my own.

Q1: On table 5, many studies are of no assessed quality, i.e., miss the quality measures specified in this table. What if studies missing all (or even just 2) of these measures are excluded in the analysis? So, if only those applicable as judged in Fig 2 are included.

Q2: On page 46, “Risk of Infection”. Is not ‘risk of infection’ similar to AR (attack rate) in the sense that AR reports risk of infection? In this section too (with Fig 3a) we would expect AR and SAR results to indicate risk of infection. Where, correspondingly, ARs and SARs are higher than risk of infection is high. Thus, risk of infection analysis do not present different results. Is this not how this should be understood?

Q3: “Implications for Research”, page 58. The text, "Local, national, and international health organisations should promote good hygiene measures including advising against close contact with SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals; use of medical masks should be encouraged in circumstances where close contact with infected cases is likely. Activities in enclosed settings should be discouraged and social distancing in close contact settings should be encouraged." -  To me, and objectively assessing the timing of the pandemic where we are today (April 1 st 2022), this text is mostly ‘water under the bridge’ and should thus be updated – if this manuscript is to be indexed. See discussions, e.g., in Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al. (2021) 1 .

Additionally, I am not convinced the authors have presented compelling evidence here to warrant prompting such measures this text I highlight here include. The authors should strictly adhere to the evidence of their manuscript; it is wrong for the authors to echo the chorus of songs we have heard about these NPIs when there is no or limited evidence they work. Thirdly, as a further reason to exclude this concluding text, in this manuscript there is no discussion about hygiene. Evidence presented does not show close contact be avoided whatever the case. For instance, relevant studies reviewed show no transmission from (index) persons with previous repeated infection. Given this and the fact that by now many (if not most) people will have been infected (i.e., generalized spread) even multiple times (e.g., CDC. Nov. 16, 2021. Estimated COVID-19 Burden, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/burden.html), should we still be advocating for quarantine and masking? We argue for adherence to evidence (Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al., 2021 1 .

Finally, there will be a few grammatical errors that should be checked.

I am grateful for the opportunity to read this manuscript and share my observations which I hope will help guide the authors in determining merit worthiness for indexing as well as contribute to continued discussions.

Are the rationale for, and objectives of, the Systematic Review clearly stated?

Yes

Is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Not applicable

Are sufficient details of the methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

Yes

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results presented in the review?

Yes

Reviewer Expertise:

Global public health

I confirm that I have read this submission and believe that I have an appropriate level of expertise to confirm that it is of an acceptable scientific standard, however I have significant reservations, as outlined above.

References

  • 1. : Revisiting COVID-19 policies: 10 evidence-based recommendations for where to go from here. BMC Public Health .2021;21(1) : 10.1186/s12889-021-12082-z 10.1186/s12889-021-12082-z [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
  • 2. : Impact of community masking on COVID-19: A cluster-randomized trial in Bangladesh. Science .2022;375(6577) : 10.1126/science.abi9069 eabi9069 10.1126/science.abi9069 [DOI] [PMC free article] [PubMed] [Google Scholar]
F1000Res. 2022 Jun 29.
IGHO ONAKPOYA 1

Peer reviewer's comment: I have read this manuscript with keen interest and over several weeks during which COVID-19 has continued to evolve with new studies coming out and policy changes across countries I have been traveling in (Kenya and US). This manuscript deals with the question of availability of evidence for role of close contact in COVID-19 transmission. This question seems obvious now given 2+ years of generalized policy around the world for physical or social distancing. A lay observation would be to say that there is unequivocal evidence that close proximity has a role in the transmission of COVID (after all we have been told to distance). The authors of the present manuscript deal with the question of availability of scientific evidence for this generalized policy.

Authors' response: Thank you.

Peer reviewer's comment: Clearly, a lot (if not all) of the NPIs (non-pharmaceutical interventions) have been implemented without evidence whether they work (Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al. (2021) 1 - I am a co-author in this study. The current manuscript shows just how murky the state of evidence of these NPIs is. Consider the state of evidence of mask-wearing; just the Bangladeshi study is the only RCT we have, and the evidence that masks work from this trial is not that great (Abaluck J, Kwong LH, Styczynski A, et al., 2022 2)

Authors' response: Thank you for this observation. As at the time we conducted the initial review, the evidence base was poor.

Peer reviewer's comment: In my view, assessment of the merits of this manuscript should center on two things. The first is whether the authors have identified all the evidence available as published in scientific literature. The second is whether the authors make good-faith representation of the studies they have reviewed. I say “good-faith” because there are questions raised by the existing reviews and comments of this manuscript. Additionally, “good-faith” means to me that the authors have not omitted results from the studies. On these two accounts I write my recommendation. A systematic/scoping review is a unique type of study because authors should be presenting in good faith the information from the studies reviewed.

Authors' response: Thank you for focusing your peer review on the evidence as presented in the manuscript.

Peer reviewer's comment: 1. Have the authors examined all of the available evidence (=published studies) on the question?

The authors both say they have and have documented and included the method of their search for the literature reviewed (Appendix 2). The only problem I see with this is that studies reviewed were only those published as of December 20, 2020. That was the first full year of the pandemic. Publications from 2021 are not included. One would presume that it is more likely that more studies on the effect of distancing could have been conducted in 2021. Those studies are not included in this manuscript, and that is a shortcoming. One – and at the minimum necessary – revision that could be made is to add the timeframe of the review in the Title of the manuscript. In my view, it is not necessary for the authors to begin including the studies from 2021 as that would require a full new search and a re-write of large potions of the manuscript.

Authors' response: We have updated the electronic searches up till 30/04/2022 because of the comments from reviewer #1 and re-written several aspects of the manuscript to reflect this update.

Peer reviewer's comment: 2. Have the authors presented truthfully and good-faith the evidence from the studies?

This is the central question for this manuscript, and it appears more so the case given the extensive comments by the readers. In my view, all of the criticism is not warranted. Criticism is due where the authors have not presented results from the studies reviewed truthfully and in good-faith. Criticism is also due where gaps in evidence is not acknowledged or are pertaining. I do not think the readers present counter evidence, i.e., show that the authors have summarized results from a specific study or set of studies erroneously. In the same vein I am not convinced that readers demonstrate that the authors have misinterpreted results from the studies they have reviewed; such misinterpretation would be strong grounds for Not Approving this manuscript or calling for its revisions, of course. If the readers are presenting evidence to counter the evidence from the studies presented by the authors from other studies that is acceptable. But that should also be weighed against my point 1 above. For instance, could the initial search have missed such studies raised by the readers?

Authors' response: We thank the reviewer for making this point. We agree with you that the criticisms were not justified. We searched, identified, and analyzed the available evidence at that time point.

Peer reviewer's comment: Also, I would not engage in some of the debates presented. For instance, I do not think the manuscript should be criticized because “these authors may lack key expertise in their team”. I have read through the contributors’ listed expertise. I do not think any special expertise above and beyond what the author team has is needed to conduct a systematic review or truthfully and in good-faith summarize the evidence from the reviewed studies. In addition, I do not think that simply because persons in the author team are members of a decision-making body like the WHO that disqualifies them from objectivity or removes their training in science and scholarship. On the contrary, I think there is great value when decision-makers also participate in science. The obvious problem, of course, is where there are conflicts of interests, or where such persons are compromised. However, we have to take the consideration that in a multi-authored manuscript not one of the authors influences the entire narrative of the manuscript or results presented. Persons whose employment or affiliation positions may – or may be perceived to – compromise any perspectives presented in a manuscript they have co-authored should of course declare the conflicts of interests. Declaration of conflicts of interests is a standard protocol required in journal standards.

Authors' response: Again, we agree with the reviewer. We have enough expertise in our team and have co-authored hundreds of systematic reviews.

Peer reviewer's comment: Having said the above, I have a few other observations or questions of my own.

Authors' response: Thank you. We have responded to each observation.

Peer reviewer's comment:  Q1: On table 5, many studies are of no assessed quality, i.e., miss the quality measures specified in this table. What if studies missing all (or even just 2) of these measures are excluded in the analysis? So, if only those applicable as judged in Fig 2 are included.

Authors' response: If we removed studies missing all or even 2 domains, we think the overall quality would still be low to moderate. Only 9 studies adequately dealt with bias.

Peer reviewer's comment:  Q2: On page 46, “Risk of Infection”. Is not ‘risk of infection’ similar to AR (attack rate) in the sense that AR reports risk of infection? In this section too (with Fig 3a) we would expect AR and SAR results to indicate risk of infection. Where, correspondingly, ARs and SARs are higher than risk of infection is high. Thus, risk of infection analysis do not present different results. Is this not how this should be understood?

Authors' response: The AR is a crude measure of the rate of infection in a group. The risk of infection compares the rate of attacks between or across groups, based on other variables, e.g., seating proximity. (See Box 1).

Peer reviewer's comment:  Q3: “Implications for Research”, page 58. The text, "Local, national, and international health organisations should promote good hygiene measures including advising against close contact with SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals; use of medical masks should be encouraged in circumstances where close contact with infected cases is likely. Activities in enclosed settings should be discouraged and social distancing in close contact settings should be encouraged." -  To me, and objectively assessing the timing of the pandemic where we are today (April 1st 2022), this text is mostly ‘water under the bridge’ and should thus be updated – if this manuscript is to be indexed. See discussions, e.g., in Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al. (2021) 1.

Authors' response: We understand the point the reviewer makes. These statements were based on our understanding at that time. We have revised this section with the updated evidence. We have included the suggested reference.

Peer reviewer's comment: Additionally, I am not convinced the authors have presented compelling evidence here to warrant prompting such measures this text I highlight here include. The authors should strictly adhere to the evidence of their manuscript; it is wrong for the authors to echo the chorus of songs we have heard about these NPIs when there is no or limited evidence they work. Thirdly, as a further reason to exclude this concluding text, in this manuscript there is no discussion about hygiene. Evidence presented does not show close contact be avoided whatever the case. For instance, relevant studies reviewed show no transmission from (index) persons with previous repeated infection. Given this and the fact that by now many (if not most) people will have been infected (i.e., generalized spread) even multiple times (e.g., CDC. Nov. 16, 2021. Estimated COVID-19 Burden, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/burden.html), should we still be advocating for quarantine and masking? We argue for adherence to evidence (Halperin DT, Hearst N, Hodgins S, et al., 2021 1.

Authors' response: Thank you for raising this issue and we agree that we should stay focused on the evidence found in our review. We have accordingly revised the text as above.

Peer reviewer's comment: Finally, there will be a few grammatical errors that should be checked.

Authors' response: Thanks. We have re-checked the manuscript for grammatical errors.

Peer reviewer's comment: I am grateful for the opportunity to read this manuscript and share my observations which I hope will help guide the authors in determining merit worthiness for indexing as well as contribute to continued discussions.

Authors' response: Thank you for your helpful feedback which we believe has helped to improve the quality of the manuscript.

F1000Res. 2022 Mar 7. doi: 10.5256/f1000research.55716.r121151

Reviewer response for version 1

Kevin Escandón 1, Angela K Ulrich 2,3

General comments

We commend the authors for attempting to conduct a systematic review on one of the most controversial topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic: SARS-CoV-2 transmission. This is an important effort that required much dedication and careful analysis. Unfortunately, we think this manuscript falls short of scientific quality and utility due to major methodologic and conceptual flaws.

First, this systematic review in its current version fails to provide an accurate and updated picture of the existing evidence. We reviewed this manuscript in February 2022, two years into the pandemic, and while SARS-CoV-2 transmission remains a topic of great relevance, the picture regarding the modes of transmission is much clearer now than one year ago due to numerous epidemiologic and lab-based studies. Given this evidence, the WHO and the general scientific community agree that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted via droplet, short-range aerosol, long-range aerosol, and less frequently via fomites. This systematic review should be updated to reflect the most recent evidence. 

Second, and most importantly, there are methodological flaws, conceptual concerns, and unsupported conclusions, as detailed below. Systematic reviews are designed to summarize evidence on specific questions or focused problems with pre-defined criteria to bring understanding and clarity through insightful analyses (even if no meta-analyses are conducted) of existing evidence. Close contact is not only poorly defined in most articles, but is actually addressed in less than a half of the articles included. Importantly, close contact is not a transmission mechanism itself, rather a feature of transmission mechanism(s). The authors erroneously conclude that studies that identified identical strains in close contacts using genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis support transmission via respiratory droplets. The authors do not acknowledge that short-range aerosol transmission is also a possible (and a likely one) explanation.

Note that given the absence of line numbers, we are not providing numbered comments.

Introduction

  • The introduction should be updated as statistics are over one year old (March 2021).

  • The authors mention that the “spread of the virus appears to be slowing”. This statement is not necessarily true considering the recent, recurring, and constantly evolving waves of infection attributed to increasingly transmissible variants of SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, no citation is provided for this statement.

  • "Current evidence from epidemiologic and virologic studies suggest SARS-CoV-2 is primarily transmitted via respiratory droplets and direct and indirect contact". This sentence is not properly supported by current data; the authors rather cited two WHO 2021 resources. The authors must acknowledge airborne transmission – a route of transmission accepted by both WHO and CDC. Note that respiratory transmission of inhalable particles is the dominant mode of transmission, especially short-range. Indirect droplet / contact / fomite transmission is estimated to be minor.
    • Recommended references: Zhang & Duchaine 2020 1 and Leung 2021 2 .
  • The aim of this study is to assess the evidence from primary studies and existing systematic reviews investigating the role of close contact on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. This is aligned with the manuscript title ("SARS-CoV-2 and the role of close contact in transmission..."), the introduction, the methods, and figure and table titles. However, one major challenge is that the "close contact" framework is neither clearly defined in the literature nor is it often standardized in methods of primary studies. Authors address several aspects of transmission, from settings to distance, populations, testing/lab methods (PCR, serology, viral culture, GS and phylogenetic analysis), attack rates, risk of infection, etc. We agree that all of these are variables that influence or describe transmission. But close contact is only defined in 46.8% of included studies which causes concern over the use of consistently applied inclusion criteria. This systematic review seems to evaluate different aims and ends providing general descriptions of different subtopics related to transmission, not only to close contact. It is not appropriate for this study on the role of close contact to make such inference on the interaction between an infector and an infectee if not explicitly stated in the primary study.

Terminology

  • The authors seem to be using the CDC criteria but this is not clarified in the box definition and the citation link seems to be inadequate.

  • It should be "2 days prior to positive test" instead of "2 days prior to test specimen collection".

  • Some of the references are textbooks or web resources not easy to navigate or links are not active. Authors are encouraged to use the most relevant scientific articles on COVID-19 wherever possible.

  • Synonyms often used to close contact are close/short range and close proximity. The latter could be more beneficial since the word “contact” is often understood as physical and conspicuous encounters.

  • While it's understandable that definitions are needed to assess evidence, it is equally important to mention their limitations from the outset. For example, close contact is arbitrary for purposes of contact tracing—we know that the definition results in missing cases of exposure and infection at longer ranges.

Methods

  • The inclusion of articles identified via preprint servers is justifiable if the search criteria include very recent dates in an attempt to capture the most recent research. However, this systematic review only includes articles up to December 20th 2020 – if the authors choose to use this date or a recent one, articles on preprint servers should not be included.

  • The search strategy is not reproducible and more detail is required. For example, a detailed search strategy for the WHO COVID-19 database, LitCovid, medRxiv, and Google Scholar are not included in the Appendix 2. Nor is it clear exactly which keywords were used in the PubMed search, for example, were other terms used to capture the concept of duration and proximity of exposure?

  • It is not clear if authors defined “close contact” for inclusion in their systematic review.

Analyses of primary studies

  • Although authors have included extended data containing the protocol and references to included and excluded studies, this remains outdated (March 2021). Several features are discussed and while some of them could suggest close contact transmission, there is quite a bit of heterogeneity in how these studies of transmission inform the role of close contact.

  • While we agree that close-contact transmission is a dominant feature of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through the inhalation of respiratory particles, this systematic review does not help advance the aim mentioned - understanding the role of close contact. The authors could revise this work so it separately addresses features of transmission using standardized or limited definitions for each one. Attribution of such analyses to close contact (i.e., its potential role) should result from the interpretation of such findings altogether rather than from "direct assessment of the impact of close contact in transmission" since most studies do not define or measure close contact systematically.

Analyses of reviews

  • The authors included 10 systematic reviews allegedly investigating close-contact SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Some concerns make questionable the inclusion of such heterogeneous publications for an analysis that at best describes these almost individually without advancing the understanding of the role of close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, which is the ultimate purpose of the authors' systematic review. It is expected that studies included in such publications are primarily observational, since randomized designs are complex and it remains unclear how research should ideally address gaps in our understanding of transmission. Findings of some of the included reviews (Li, Ludvigsson, Zhu) are not described with regard to close contact, but only to population groups; others are only mentioned with regard to asymptomatic infection or attack rates. We find this analysis in general unhelpful.

  • The authors analyze features different from close contact in the sections following "Primary studies". All these analyses are related to primary studies, so this should be reorganized for clarity. Again, there is a detailed description of studies that do not address close contact, e.g., "The result of one study (Rosenberg 2020) showed that the incidence of infection significantly increased with age (p<0.0001), while those from another study (Poletti 2020) showed that being 70 years or older was associated with a significantly increased risk of SARS-CoV-2-related death (p<0.001),"

Discussion

  • Authors should be careful in interpreting what their systematic review found, for instance that many studies report household transmission suggests that transmission occurs in indoor environments with higher exposure. Exposure results from concentration and time of contact with infectious respiratory particles. It, therefore, depends on a mix of frequency of contacts, range of contact, and infectiousness of index cases. But household transmission may perfectly encompass risk of infection beyond 3 m, 6 m, or any other definition of close contact. We do expect that the risk of infection is greatest with the longest contact, though, but the definition of a close contact remains nebulous and the associated risk could vary depending on the environmental conditions that favor transmission. Because the purpose of this systematic review is to address transmission, the authors must discuss at least generally the interplay of these factors. SARS-CoV-2 transmission is a complex phenomenon that depends on the interaction between viral properties (infectious dose and infectivity correlates), the host and their features (breathing rate, respiratory tract morphology, target tissues, receptor distribution, host barriers, immune responses), and the environment (temperature, humidity, salinity, pH, the medium or materials of the contaminated objects or surfaces, ventilation/airflow, ultraviolet radiation). Authors also should acknowledge that existing evidence suggests that transmission in close-contact settings is likely to be dominated by short-range respiratory inhalation of infectious virions.

  • The authors superficially mention the role of face masks in decreasing the risk of transmission from the pediatric population. This is a dangerous misinterpretation of evidence of two things that should be analyzed separately, i.e., 1) the efficacy of respiratory protection and 2) the risk of transmissibility from different populations. Certainly, this review was not designed to assess either of these aspects as a research question. As for respiratory protection, not all masks (or respirators) are expected to provide the same degree of protection. And if not correctly/consistently worn, they may not reduce risk. As for the usually overclaimed risk of children to transmit SARS-CoV-2, many potential confounders easily make this group appear highly contagious but it is unlikely this is due to intrinsic features of that population. Therefore, claims about it should be carefully framed to avoid stigmatization or unfair focalization and perceived efficacy of preventive strategies.

  • Discussion unrelated to close contact is seen, e.g., "being elderly is also associated with increased risks of transmission and mortality".

  • "The positive results of viral cultures observed in two studies support the results of PCR and serologic tests showing that close contact setting was associated with transmission of SARS-CoV-2".
    • We are unsure how this manuscript supports this conclusion. Similarly, this conclusion is not supported by the data "The positive findings from all 10 studies that performed GS and phylogenetic analysis with identical strains supports the hypothesis that close contact setting is associated with SARS-CoV-2 transmission through respiratory droplets or direct contact."
  • We agree with the authors on the high heterogeneity of existing studies and that "The variations observed in the definitions of close contacts also cast further doubts on the validity of overall results."

  • "The results of our review are consistent with several guidelines suggesting that close contact with index cases can result in transmission of SARS-CoV-2"
    • The authors acknowledge that the evidence for close contact transmission is only low-to-moderate quality, thus, it is a stretch to say that close contact is consistently demonstrated as a risk factor. Guidelines have been evolving throughout the pandemic and while close contact may be associated with increased risk of transmission, this study could provide much stronger evidence if transmission properties were assessed in a clearly defined, systematic, and reproducible way.
  • "Our findings are also consistent with those of a systematic review which concluded that face masks are effective for preventing transmission of respiratory viruses."
    • It is unclear how this systematic review regarding the role of close contract on transmission events contributes to the discussion regarding the role of face masks – more description is needed to make this link explicit. Furthermore, the efficacy of face masks is a complex topic and confounded by a number of factors.

Necessary updates

  • Several of the preprints included in the systematic review and/or cited in the manuscript have been published; given that this manuscript is outdated and an update is needed, authors should take that opportunity to update preprints that have been published and make sure their findings remain unchanged and adjust accordingly. Some of the preprints now published are:

    Helsingen 2020 3  

    Paireau 2020 4

    Kuwelker 2020 5  

    Lyngse 2020 6  

    Jones 2020 7  

    Chen 2020 8  

    Fontanet 2020 9

    Armann 2020 10  

    Charlotte 2020 11  

    Angulo-Bazan 2020 12  

Are the rationale for, and objectives of, the Systematic Review clearly stated?

Partly

Is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?

Partly

Are sufficient details of the methods and analysis provided to allow replication by others?

No

Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results presented in the review?

No

Reviewer Expertise:

Infectious diseases epidemiology, virology, public health.

We confirm that we have read this submission and believe that we have an appropriate level of expertise to state that we do not consider it to be of an acceptable scientific standard, for reasons outlined above.

References

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F1000Res. 2022 Jun 29.
IGHO ONAKPOYA 1

Peer reviewers, comment: We commend the authors for attempting to conduct a systematic review on one of the most controversial topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic: SARS-CoV-2 transmission. This is an important effort that required much dedication and careful analysis. Unfortunately, we think this manuscript falls short of scientific quality and utility due to major methodologic and conceptual flaws.

Authors' response: We thank the reviewers for their positive comments and constructive criticisms. We have extensively revised the manuscript to address their concerns.

Peer reviewers' comment: First, this systematic review in its current version fails to provide an accurate and updated picture of the existing evidence. We reviewed this manuscript in February 2022, two years into the pandemic, and while SARS-CoV-2 transmission remains a topic of great relevance, the picture regarding the modes of transmission is much clearer now than one year ago due to numerous epidemiologic and lab-based studies. Given this evidence, the WHO and the general scientific community agree that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted via droplet, short-range aerosol, long-range aerosol, and less frequently via fomites. This systematic review should be updated to reflect the most recent evidence.

Authors' response: The review was submitted in March last year at the start of the pandemic; however, it took a long time before undergoing peer review. We have now updated the review to reflect the most recent evidence focused on the transmission associated with close contact. We updated our searches up till 30/04/2022.

Peer reviewers' comment: Second, and most importantly, there are methodological flaws, conceptual concerns, and unsupported conclusions, as detailed below. Systematic reviews are designed to summarize evidence on specific questions or focused problems with pre-defined criteria to bring understanding and clarity through insightful analyses (even if no meta-analyses are conducted) of existing evidence. Close contact is not only poorly defined in most articles, but is actually addressed in less than a half of the articles included. Importantly, close contact is not a transmission mechanism itself, rather a feature of transmission mechanism(s). The authors erroneously conclude that studies that identified identical strains in close contacts using genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis support transmission via respiratory droplets. The authors do not acknowledge that short-range aerosol transmission is also a possible (and a likely one) explanation.

Authors' response: We used the term “close contact settings” for our review, and we acknowledge variations in the definitions of close contact across the studies included in our review (see Table 3). We do not make any claims that close contact is a transmission mechanism but is associated with transmission from any of a number of mechanisms. We have added (with reference) that short-range aerosol transmission is a possible explanation for the identified identical strains in close contacts.

Peer reviewers' comment: Note that given the absence of line numbers, we are not providing numbered comments.

Authors' response: OK

Introduction

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The introduction should be updated as statistics are over one year old (March 2021).

The authors mention that the “spread of the virus appears to be slowing”. This statement is not necessarily true considering the recent, recurring, and constantly evolving waves of infection attributed to increasingly transmissible variants of SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, no citation is provided for this statement.

Authors' response: We have updated the searches to April 2022.

We have provided a citation to show that the infection rate is decreasing ( https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/conditionsanddiseases/articles/coronaviruscovid19/latestinsights), and have also noted that the virus continues to evolve.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • "Current evidence from epidemiologic and virologic studies suggest SARS-CoV-2 is primarily transmitted via respiratory droplets and direct and indirect contact". This sentence is not properly supported by current data; the authors rather cited two WHO 2021 resources. The authors must acknowledge airborne transmission – a route of transmission accepted by both WHO and CDC. Note that respiratory transmission of inhalable particles is the dominant mode of transmission, especially short-range. Indirect droplet / contact / fomite transmission is estimated to be minor.
    • Recommended references: Zhang & Duchaine 2020 1 and Leung 2021 2.

Authors' response: We wish to thank the reviewer for this comment. We have updated the information and referenced the CDC and the WHO. The CDC statement suggests that exposure with infection occurs in 3 principal ways including inhalation of fine respiratory droplets, deposition of respiratory droplets and particles on exposed mucous membranes, splashes and sprays ‘and touching mucous membranes with hands soiled by virus contained in respiratory fluids” ( Scientific Brief: SARS-CoV-2 Transmission | CDC). They openly acknowledge the relative contributions of the modes of transmission outlined are unquantified and difficult to establish. We have revised the statement to state that the virus is primarily transmitted through exposure to infectious respiratory fluids such as fine aerosols, respiratory droplets, and added a further reference ( https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/science/science-briefs/sars-cov-2-transmission.html). The WHO states “available evidence continues to suggest that SARS-CoV-2 can spread from an infected person’s mouth or nose in small liquid particles when the person coughs, sneezes, sings, breathes or talks, by inhalation or inoculation through the mouth, nose or eyes. These liquid particles are different sizes, ranging from larger ‘respiratory droplets’ to smaller ‘aerosols." Current evidence suggests that the virus spreads mainly between people who are in close contact with each other, typically within 1 metre, They also indicate that “the virus can also spread to others through aerosols at longer (beyond the typical 1 metre distance) distances. The risk of long-distance aerosol transmission is higher in poorly ventilated and/or crowded indoor settings” and further discuss transmission through fomites but acknowledge data is limited. Similar to the CDC they indicate the many challenges in working out the presence and transmission of infectious viruses. Rather than state the respiratory transmission of inhalable particles is the dominant mode of transmission we would prefer a more cautious scientifically based response and acknowledge the gap in knowledge in this area. Infection prevention and control during health care when coronavirus disease (‎COVID-19)‎ is suspected or confirmed (who.int)

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The aim of this study is to assess the evidence from primary studies and existing systematic reviews investigating the role of close contact on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. This is aligned with the manuscript title ("SARS-CoV-2 and the role of close contact in transmission..."), the introduction, the methods, and figure and table titles. However, one major challenge is that the "close contact" framework is neither clearly defined in the literature nor is it often standardized in methods of primary studies. Authors address several aspects of transmission, from settings to distance, populations, testing/lab methods (PCR, serology, viral culture, GS and phylogenetic analysis), attack rates, risk of infection, etc. We agree that all of these are variables that influence or describe transmission. But close contact is only defined in 46.8% of included studies which causes concern over the use of consistently applied inclusion criteria. This systematic review seems to evaluate different aims and ends providing general descriptions of different subtopics related to transmission, not only to close contact. It is not appropriate for this study on the role of close contact to make such inference on the interaction between an infector and an infectee if not explicitly stated in the primary study.

Authors' response: We thank the reviewer for this comment to which we have thought a great deal. We can respond by stating that although only 46.8% (now 39.1%) defined close contact, the authors in the other included studies reported within their studies that they were investigating close contact. We acknowledge that not all studies provided precise definitions and that is a limitation. We set out to summarize the evidence from published studies that assess the association with close contact transmission in COVID-19.

As stated earlier, we have used the term “close contact settings” for our review.

Terminology

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The authors seem to be using the CDC criteria but this is not clarified in the box definition and the citation link seems to be inadequate.

Authors' response: Thanks. We have revised the definition.

Peer reviewers' comment: It should be "2 days prior to positive test" instead of "2 days prior to test specimen collection"

Authors' response: Thanks. We have revised the text accordingly.

Peer reviewers' comment: Some of the references are textbooks or web resources not easy to navigate or links are not active. Authors are encouraged to use the most relevant scientific articles on COVID-19 wherever possible

Authors' response: We have used the updated citations for the relevant articles.

Peer reviewers' comment: Synonyms often used to close contact are close/short range and close proximity. The latter could be more beneficial since the word “contact” is often understood as physical and conspicuous encounters.

Authors' response: We have broadly used “close contact setting” to allow us to capture the range of studies assessing transmission characteristics of SARS-CoV-2. We appreciate the reviewers’ suggestions of close proximity/range. However, these may be more useful for more focused review questions as they also have their limitations, e.g., direct contact would not be covered by these; however, direct contact has been described as a subset of close contact in some studies.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • While it's understandable that definitions are needed to assess evidence, it is equally important to mention their limitations from the outset. For example, close contact is arbitrary for purposes of contact tracing—we know that the definition results in missing cases of exposure and infection at longer ranges.

Authors' response: Thank you for this suggestion. We have noted this in the limitations section.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The inclusion of articles identified via preprint servers is justifiable if the search criteria include very recent dates in an attempt to capture the most recent research. However, this systematic review only includes articles up to December 20th 2020 – if the authors choose to use this date or a recent one, articles on preprint servers should not be included.

Authors' response: We have updated the searches and used the most up-to-date citations for the included studies.

Peer reviewers' comment: The search strategy is not reproducible and more detail is required. For example, a detailed search strategy for the WHO COVID-19 database, LitCovid, medRxiv, and Google Scholar are not included in the Appendix 2. Nor is it clear exactly which keywords were used in the PubMed search, for example, were other terms used to capture the concept of duration and proximity of exposure?

Authors' response: Thank you. We have included the full search strategy.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • It is not clear if authors defined “close contact” for inclusion in their systematic review.

Authors' response: We used the CDC and WHO definitions (see Box 1).

Peer reviewers' comment: Additional detail is required to explain how the QUADAS-2 tool was adapted for this study and if or how it was validated for this purpose. https://figshare.com/articles/figure/Extended_data_SARS-CoV-2_and_the_Role_of_Close_Contact_in_Transmission_A_Systematic_Review/14312630/1?file=27243050

Authors' response: We did not use all the domains in QUADAS-2 and have clarified this in the manuscript methods section. We did not validate the checklist, and have noted this in our limitations.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The QUADAS-2 tool was designed for studies primarily designed as diagnostic accuracy studies and its use is likely to fall short to assess the quality of studies for this systematic review.

Authors' response: QUADAS-2 is used to assess reporting quality in diagnostic reviews. See https://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-library/sites/quadas/migrated/documents/quadas2reportv4.pdf. As noted in our methods, we adapted the checklist for the review.

Analyses of primary studies

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • Although authors have included extended data containing the protocol and references to included and excluded studies, this remains outdated (March 2021). Several features are discussed and while some of them could suggest close contact transmission, there is quite a bit of heterogeneity in how these studies of transmission inform the role of close contact.

Authors' response: We have updated the searches and included the most up-to-date citations.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • While we agree that close-contact transmission is a dominant feature of SARS-CoV-2 transmission through the inhalation of respiratory particles, this systematic review does not help advance the aim mentioned - understanding the role of close contact. The authors could revise this work so it separately addresses features of transmission using standardized or limited definitions for each one. Attribution of such analyses to close contact (i.e., its potential role) should result from the interpretation of such findings altogether rather than from "direct assessment of the impact of close contact in transmission" since most studies do not define or measure close contact systematically.

Authors' response: We included a table showing how the included studies defined close contact. Our objective was to identify, appraise and summarise the evidence from studies investigating transmission in close contact settings. It is equally possible that with close contact there may be transmission via large respiratory droplets and direct physical contact as well as the possibility of short-range fine aerosol and in all fairness, it should be stated as such and not that inhalation is the dominant route as this reviewer contends. It is best to be consistent with all possibilities as suggested by the CDC and WHO and many other publications.

Analyses of reviews

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The authors included 10 systematic reviews allegedly investigating close-contact SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Some concerns make questionable the inclusion of such heterogeneous publications for an analysis that at best describes these almost individually without advancing the understanding of the role of close contact in SARS-CoV-2 transmission, which is the ultimate purpose of the authors' systematic review. It is expected that studies included in such publications are primarily observational, since randomized designs are complex and it remains unclear how research should ideally address gaps in our understanding of transmission. Findings of some of the included reviews (Li, Ludvigsson, Zhu) are not described with regard to close contact, but only to population groups; others are only mentioned with regard to asymptomatic infection or attack rates. We find this analysis in general unhelpful.

Authors' response: Thanks for this comment. The included systematic reviews are considered appropriate since they do fit the definition of close contact based on our original protocol - this relates to structural and population settings. We can discuss the limitations of these reviews and the included studies. Li, Ludvigsson and Zhu fit the definitions. See https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19/surveillance/surveillance-definitions. Some of the findings from the reviews are helpful. Indeed at least 2 reviews included only studies with high reporting quality.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The authors analyze features different from close contact in the sections following "Primary studies". All these analyses are related to primary studies, so this should be reorganized for clarity. Again, there is a detailed description of studies that do not address close contact, e.g., "The result of one study (Rosenberg 2020) showed that the incidence of infection significantly increased with age (p<0.0001), while those from another study (Poletti 2020) showed that being 70 years or older was associated with a significantly increased risk of SARS-CoV-2-related death (p<0.001),"

Authors' response: Thank you for pointing this out and we have revised the section on primary studies. We have enumerated the definitions of close contacts in the included studies in Table 3 and reported that several studies did not report a definition). Several studies showed that being elderly was significantly associated with increased risk of infection. Rosenberg 2020 included household contacts. We have revised the statement.

Discussion

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • Authors should be careful in interpreting what their systematic review found, for instance that many studies report household transmission suggests that transmission occurs in indoor environments with higher exposure. Exposure results from concentration and time of contact with infectious respiratory particles. It, therefore, depends on a mix of frequency of contacts, range of contact, and infectiousness of index cases. But household transmission may perfectly encompass risk of infection beyond 3 m, 6 m, or any other definition of close contact. We do expect that the risk of infection is greatest with the longest contact, though, but the definition of a close contact remains nebulous and the associated risk could vary depending on the environmental conditions that favor transmission. Because the purpose of this systematic review is to address transmission, the authors must discuss at least generally the interplay of these factors. SARS-CoV-2 transmission is a complex phenomenon that depends on the interaction between viral properties (infectious dose and infectivity correlates), the host and their features (breathing rate, respiratory tract morphology, target tissues, receptor distribution, host barriers, immune responses), and the environment (temperature, humidity, salinity, pH, the medium or materials of the contaminated objects or surfaces, ventilation/airflow, ultraviolet radiation). Authors also should acknowledge that existing evidence suggests that transmission in close-contact settings is likely to be dominated by short-range respiratory inhalation of infectious virions.

Authors' response: Thank you. We have enumerated the complex range of factors at play and the epidemiologic associations in relation to close contact transmission (with references) and have acknowledged the various potential modes of transmission. We agree that transmission is a complex phenomenon and indeed is poorly understood. Musing about issues surrounding the biology of virus particles is beyond the scope of our review which focuses on epidemiologic associations.

Peer reviewers' comment: The authors superficially mention the role of face masks in decreasing the risk of transmission from the pediatric population. This is a dangerous misinterpretation of evidence of two things that should be analyzed separately, i.e., 1) the efficacy of respiratory protection and 2) the risk of transmissibility from different populations. Certainly, this review was not designed to assess either of these aspects as a research question. As for respiratory protection, not all masks (or respirators) are expected to provide the same degree of protection. And if not correctly/consistently worn, they may not reduce risk. As for the usually overclaimed risk of children to transmit SARS-CoV-2, many potential confounders easily make this group appear highly contagious but it is unlikely this is due to intrinsic features of that population. Therefore, claims about it should be carefully framed to avoid stigmatization or unfair focalization and perceived efficacy of preventive strategies.

Authors' response: We do not believe we are being superficial but rather trying to stay true to the findings. Our statements regarding the effectiveness of face masks are based on the findings from the included studies and we need to stay focused on the findings and avoid making speculative statements. We have added a caveat that there is uncertainty about the extent to which the different types of masks influence the risk of transmission.

Peer reviewers' comment: Discussion unrelated to close contact is seen, e.g., "being elderly is also associated with increased risks of transmission and mortality".

Authors' response: Thank you for pointing this out. We have removed the statement.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • The positive results of viral cultures observed in two studies support the results of PCR and serologic tests showing that close contact setting was associated with transmission of SARS-CoV-2".
    • We are unsure how this manuscript supports this conclusion. Similarly, this conclusion is not supported by the data "The positive findings from all 10 studies that performed GS and phylogenetic analysis with identical strains supports the hypothesis that close contact setting is associated with SARS-CoV-2 transmission through respiratory droplets or direct contact."

Authors' response: We have revised the statement to indicate that transmission can occur in close contact settings.

Peer reviewers' comment: We agree with the authors on the high heterogeneity of existing studies and that "The variations observed in the definitions of close contacts also cast further doubts on the validity of overall results."

Authors' response: Thank you.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • "The results of our review are consistent with several guidelines suggesting that close contact with index cases can result in transmission of SARS-CoV-2"
    • The authors acknowledge that the evidence for close contact transmission is only low-to-moderate quality, thus, it is a stretch to say that close contact is consistently demonstrated as a risk factor. Guidelines have been evolving throughout the pandemic and while close contact may be associated with increased risk of transmission, this study could provide much stronger evidence if transmission properties were assessed in a clearly defined, systematic, and reproducible way.

Authors' response: Thank you for this comment. We have revised the sentence to discuss the “association” with transmission as opposed to "can result in transmission”. We have added a caveat to note that guidelines keep evolving based on emerging evidence.

Peer reviewers' comment: 

  • "Our findings are also consistent with those of a systematic review which concluded that face masks are effective for preventing transmission of respiratory viruses."

It is unclear how this systematic review regarding the role of close contract on transmission events contributes to the discussion regarding the role of face masks – more description is needed to make this link explicit. Furthermore, the efficacy of face masks is a complex topic and confounded by a number of factors.

Authors' response: We have revised the statements. We have deleted the texts relating to mortality in the elderly.

Peer reviewers' comment:  Necessary updates

  • Several of the preprints included in the systematic review and/or cited in the manuscript have been published; given that this manuscript is outdated and an update is needed, authors should take that opportunity to update preprints that have been published and make sure their findings remain unchanged and adjust accordingly. Some of the preprints now published are:

    Helsingen 2020 3

    Paireau 2020 4

    Kuwelker 2020 5

    Lyngse 2020 6

    Jones 2020 7

    Chen 2020 8

    Fontanet 2020 9

    Armann 2020 10

    Charlotte 2020 11

    Angulo-Bazan 2020 12

Authors' response: Thank you. We have now updated the citations for the references.

Associated Data

    This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

    Data Availability Statement

    Underlying data

    All data underlying the results are available as part of the article and no additional source data are required.

    Extended data

    Figshare: Extended data: SARS-CoV-2 and the Role of Close Contact in Transmission: A Systematic Review, https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.14312630.v1 8 .

    This project contains the following extended data:

    • Updated Protocol

    • Revised Search Strategy

    • Revised List of Referenced to Excluded Studies

    • Revised List of References to Included Studies

    Data are available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license (CC-BY 4.0).


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