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. 2022 Nov 16;17(11):e0268849. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0268849

Case-control study of activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population and overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in Denmark

Pernille Kold Munch 1, Laura Espenhain 1, Christian Holm Hansen 1, Tyra Grove Krause 2, Steen Ethelberg 1,3,*
Editor: Joël Mossong4
PMCID: PMC9668151  PMID: 36383627

Abstract

Measures to restrict physical inter-personal contact in the community have been widely implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. We studied determinants for infection with SARS-CoV-2 with the aim of informing future public health measures. We conducted a national matched case-control study among unvaccinated not previously infected adults aged 18–49 years. Cases were selected among those testing positive for SARS-CoV-2 by RT-PCR over a five-day period in June 2021. Controls were selected from the national population register and were individually matched on age, sex and municipality of residence. Cases and controls were interviewed via telephone about contact with other persons and exposures in the community. We determined matched odds ratios (mORs) and 95% confidence intervals (95%CIs) by conditional logistical regression with adjustment for household size and immigration status. For reference, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions in place in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022. We included 500 cases and 529 controls. We found that having had contact with another individual with a known infection was the main determinant for SARS-CoV-2 infection: reporting close contact with an infected person who either had or did not have symptoms resulted in mORs of 20 (95%CI:9.8–39) and 8.5 (95%CI 4.5–16) respectively. Community exposures were generally not associated with disease; several exposures were negatively associated. Consumption of alcohol in restaurants or cafés, aOR = 2.3 (95%CI:1.3–4.2) and possibly attending fitness centers, mOR = 1.4 (95%CI:1.0–2.0) were weakly associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Apart from these two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases under the community restrictions in place during the study. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person. Results were in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier.

Introduction

During the COVID-19 pandemic, most countries have made use of widespread restrictions affecting normal social life. The purpose has been to limit physical inter-personal interaction, in order to limit transmission of SARS-CoV-2. A wide range of measures, sometimes referred to as non-pharmaceutical interventions, have been implemented at varying time points throughout the pandemic [1]. In 2020 and 2021, a plethora of public health recommendations, and restrictions have been introduced and re-adjusted on a continuous basis. In Denmark, as in many other European countries, restrictions have involved public gatherings, the level of working from home, mandatory use of face masks, and regulations and lockdowns of restaurant/café, bar, nightclubs, sport activities, cultural events and more [2]. However, the impact these societal restrictions have had to reduce SARS-CoV-2 infection have rarely been subject to study and restrictions have commonly been introduced without a defined evidence base; potentially leading to mixed reactions in the populations they are applied to. This has been done for good reasons, obviously in a crisis situation, implementation of measures can often not await the results of scientific studies, nevertheless there is a need for more knowledge about how these regulations function in preventing SARS-CoV-2 infection under real life community settings.

By use of a case-control design, researchers all over the world have aimed to identify determinants, private and societal, for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Risk factors reported from previous studies include household overcrowding [3, 4], work in senior/health care [3, 5], work on-site [3, 4, 6, 7], foreign citizenship [3] and low education [3]. At the societal level, only few studies have been performed. When investigating activities such as use of public transport, frequenting restaurants/other dining spaces or bars, participating in indoor sports activities or buying food in stores, such studies have shown conflicting results [36, 8, 9].

Towards the end of 2020, we investigated societal activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Denmark by use of a case-control study design. This was done in a period where society was partially open with public gathering restrictions and mandatory face mask use indoors in public places, the original wild type (Index) strain of SARS-CoV-2 was the dominant strain in circulation and the COVID-19 vaccine rollout had not yet begun. We found that having had contact, in particular close contact, to another person with a known SARS-CoV-2 infection was strongly associated with infection. In contrast, only few community exposures were found to be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. They were participation in events where people sang, attending fitness centers and related to consumption of alcohol in bars. Other community exposures appeared not to be associated with infection e.g. supermarkets, public transport, and restaurants [10].

In June 2021, the COVID-19 situation had changed. The number of infected persons was declining, approximately 35% of the Danish population had received the first vaccination dose and approximately 20% the second. Society was gradually reopening, with now only societal restrictions in place for those individuals who were not vaccinated, or protected from previous infection and for those who did not have a recently negative SARS-CoV-2 test. Moreover, the Alpha SARS-CoV-2 variant was now circulating. In this situation, we again sought to identify societal activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Denmark. Here we present the results of a second national case-control study of risk factors for infection. For context and reference, we further created an overview of the official restrictions that have been in place in Denmark throughout the COVID-19 epidemic.

Methods

Officially imposed societal restrictions

We mapped public health measures and restrictions introduced in Denmark, in the period from February 2020 to March 2022. We covered measures within the following areas: public gathering restrictions (indoor, outdoor and at home); schools; workplaces; public spaces: grocery shops, non-essential shops, shopping malls, restaurants, bars/nightclubs, indoor cultural events, libraries, church/religious communities, public transport and sport activities. We categorized them into three different levels (open without restrictions, open with restrictions and fully locked down). The information was retrieved from relevant Danish government ministries and from the national COVID-19 communication partnership (coronasmitte.dk).

During the period of the case-control study, societal restrictions were mainly in place for those adults who were unvaccinated, had not previously recovered from SARS-CoV-2 infection or who had not recently tested negative for SARS-CoV-2. This status could be documented by use of a digital ‘corona passport’ (accessible via a smart phone app) first introduced in May 2021, or as a printable PDF with a QR code. The particular requirements for a valid corona passport within the study period was: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines), or 14 days after dose one with Johnson & Johnson. After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 8 months [11]. II) Negative official RT-PCR SARS-CoV-2 test: Taken within the past 72 hours [12]. III) Recovered after SARS-CoV-2 infection: Previously infected with COVID-19 documented by positive PCT test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 8 months prior [11].

Case-control study design

To identify societal activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Denmark, at a fixed point in time during the pandemic, we conducted a national, individually matched, case-control study. The study methods were largely as those previously described [10], however with minor modifications. Eligible cases were unvaccinated individuals between 18–49 years old, not previously infected by 8 June 2021, with an address in Denmark, and an RT-PCR confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection in the period from 8 to 12 June 2021. We listed eligible cases in random order and aimed to include the first 500 cases, who had not been hospitalized or traveled outside of Denmark during the exposure period. Controls were matched to cases by year of birth, sex (2 levels) and municipality (98 levels) and were extracted from the Danish Civil Registration System [13]. Only controls unvaccinated and not previously infected by 12 June 2021 were included to match the risk of the infection profile of the cases.

Date sources

In Denmark, an extensive test system was built during 2020 and the first part of 2021. In addition to the clinical test system, RT-PCR tests were provided for all, without indication, through widely available, free-for-all public test stations. Information on SARS-CoV-2 tests was obtained at person-level format from the Danish Microbiology Database [1416]. Controls were sampled from the Danish Civil Registration System from which information on age, sex, vital status, area of residence and country of birth was also obtained [17]. Information on vaccines administered against SARS-CoV-2 in Denmark are registered in the Danish Vaccination Registry [18]. Through this, person level information on vaccinations given, including the date of administration, was obtained. Information from other data sources were linked to by use of the unique civil registry number assigned to all Danish residents [17].

Data collection

Cases and controls were interviewed via telephone between 15 June and 24 June, 2021, by a sub-contracted private polling institute. At least two attempts were made to call each eligible case and control per day. Controls were sought interviewed after their matched case had been interviewed. We aimed to include one matched control per case. We sampled 10 controls per case, but sampled an additional 10 controls in the instances where none of the first 10 had been reached within two days.

Compared to the study performed in November 2020, the period that our questions concerned was shortened from a 14-day to a 6-day period. The 6-day period ran from eight to two days prior to symptom onset (or test date if asymptomatic) for cases and the same 6-day period for their matched controls. We refer to this as the exposure period. Further, the questions related to contact exposures were updated due to changes in the national guideline set by the Danish Health Authority and therefore had a slightly different wording. Contact exposures included close contact/other contact with a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection, with or without symptoms. The close contact definition was: Exposure to a household member, direct physical contact (for example hugging), unprotected and direct contact with secretions from an infected person, having been within a distance of less than 1 meter for more than 15 minutes, or caring for COVID-19 patients where the prescribed protective equipment had not been used. Other contact was defined as contact with a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection. The community exposures inquired about were the same as in our first study, and included activities such as dining at restaurants, going to bars, shopping, participating in sport activities, and religious events or events involving singing etc. along with questions of if these activities took place indoors or outdoors, or involved consumption of alcohol. In contrast to the first study, we did not include questions on protective behavior and adherence with measures. For further information, please refer to [10].

The study was performed as a national disease surveillance project, registered with the Danish Data Protection Agency (reg no 21/04112) and specifically approved regarding legal, ethical and cyber-security issues. According to Danish legislation, approval from an ethical committee is not needed for medical studies not involving biological material.

Statistical analyses and power calculation

The required sample size was calculated based on an expected bar visit frequency of 10% among controls [10]. With a power of 80%, an alpha-level of 0.05 and an odds ratio to detect at 2, we needed 566 participants following standard sample size formulae for unmatched case-control studies [19]. We assumed that 30% of all cases would be infected within the household and the required sample size was then calculated to be 810 (405 cases and 405 controls). We aimed to include a total of 1000 participants.

We compared basic demographic characteristics (country of origin, household size, number of contacts and employment status) of cases and controls. We used Chi-Square to test for overall differences and matched logistic regression to test for intergroup differences. We compared exposures reported by cases with those of controls using conditional logistic regression taking matching into account. For answers to secondary questions where matched analyses were not possible, logistic regression with adjustment for the matching variables was performed. We additionally adjusted for household size and migration background. For analyses concerning community exposures, we excluded cases (and their matched control) who reported to be infected in their household. As a sensitivity analysis, in order to assess self-isolation, we excluded cases and controls (and their respective matches) who reported having been close contact to an infected person during the exposure period. If such persons already during the exposure period were aware that they were close contacts, they could have self-isolated, as recommended, or modified their behavior and thus would have been less likely to participate in activities in the community.

Results

Official COVID-19 counter measures in Denmark

The first public health measures were introduced in March 2020. During the following two years, a complex series of public health measures and restrictions were put in place, lifted and/or reintroduced in response to the development of the epidemic. A detailed overview of these is given in Fig 1.

Fig 1. Public health measures and restrictions (February 2020 to March 2022).

Fig 1

a: As of 16 March 2020, all schoolchildren and students were sent home. As of 15 April 2020, schoolchildren in grades 0–5 and final year students in upper secondary school returned to in–person learning. As of 18 May 2020, schoolchildren in grades 6–10 and all students in upper secondary school returned to in–person learning. As of 27 May 2020, institutions for higher education reopened for in–person learning when physical attendance were essential. As of 22 June 2020, academic institutions facilities for higher education students were allowed to open. As of 29 October 2020, primary school staff were allowed to wear face masks. Within upper secondary school and higher education, face masks were partially mandatory. As of 16 December 2020, all schoolchildren from grade 5, upper secondary and higher education underwent remote learning. Staff for grades 0–4 were allowed to wear face masks. As of 21 December 2021, schoolchildren and students not already on holiday were sent home. As of 8 February 2021, schoolchildren in grades 0–4 returned to in–person learning. As of 1 March 2021, final year students were allowed to return to 50% in–person learning in North–and West Jutland and all students at all education levels in Bornholm were allowed to return to 100% in–person learning. As of 15 March 2021, schoolchildren in grades 5–8 and graduating students who had not returned to 50% in–person learning in were allowed to attend outdoor classes once a week. Final year students were allowed to return to 50% in–person learning in Jutland, Funen, Vest and South Zealand and offshore islands. In offshore islands, primary and lower secondary school students returned 100% to in–person learning. For staff and students over 12 years of age, biweekly tests were recommended. For upper secondary schools and higher education, testing twice a week for students and staff was mandatory. As of 22 March 2021, students in the Capital Region were allowed to return to in–person learning in line with the rest of Denmark. As of 6 April 2021, schoolchildren in grades 5–8 were allowed to return to 50% in–person learning. Students within higher education with practical components to their studies were allowed return to 50% in–person learning and all other students were allowed return to 20% in–person learning. It was mandatory to get tested two times a week. As of 21 April 2021, 80% of learning was in–person for final year students and 30% for students in higher education (with the exception of the Capital Region) and there was the option for outdoor learning. Teaching for grades 5–8 was allowed to resume in–person if held outdoors during the weeks were in–person learning could not take place indoors. As of 6 May 2021, final year students and grades 5–8 returned to 100% in–person learning. Higher education in the Capital Region was allowed to take place in–person outdoors. As of 21 May 2021, all students were allowed to return to 100% learning in–person with the condition of getting tested twice a week. As of 29 November 2021, a valid coronapas was required within upper secondary and higher education. As of 15 December 2021, all schoolchildren in primary and lower secondary school underwent online learning. As of 19 December 2021, it was mandatory to wear face masks in upper secondary and higher education. As of 3 January 2022, it was recommended that those in upper secondary and higher education get tested twice a week. As of 5 January 2022, primary and lower secondary schools were allowed to return to 100% in–person learning, with the condition of students and staff getting tested twice a week. As of 1 February 2022, all restrictions were lifted. Primary and lower secondary school: 0–3 grade (schoolchildren age 5 to 10 years), 4–5 grade (schoolchildren age 9 to 13 years) 6–10 grade (schoolchildren in the age of 12 to 17 years). b: As of 13 March 2020, all employees were sent home. As of 14 April 2020, employees of private workplaces were allowed to return to work in–person. However, it was recommended that employees of private workplaces worked from home if possible. As of 27 May 2020, public workplaces in Jutland and Funen were allowed to return to office. As of 15 June 2020, public workplaces in Zealand were allowed to return to office. However, working from home and staggered working hours were recommended. As of 19 September 2020, employees of private and public workplaces were encouraged to work from home. As of 21 May 2021, 20% of the workforce from both public and private workplaces were allowed to return to office. As of 14 June 2021, 20% of the workforce from both public and private workplaces were allowed to return to office, with the recommendation of weekly testing. As of 1 August 2021, 100% of public and private* employees were allowed to return to office. As of 26 November 2021, valid coronapas was mandatory at public workplaces. As of 10 December 2021, employees of private and public workplaces were encouraged to work from home. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. Recommendations, rather than restrictions, were provided for all private workplaces. For public workplaces, restrictions were provided for non–essential employees. c Shops: As of 18 March 2020, shopping malls and non–essential shops were required to close. As of 11 May 2020, shopping malls were allowed to reopen with guidelines about space requirements. As of 29 October 2020, the use of face masks when shopping was mandatory, the sale of alcohol was prohibited after 10 PM, and shops larger than 2.000 m2 had space requirements and supervisory guards. As of 17 December 2020, shopping malls and non–essentials shops larger than 5 000 m2 had to close. As of 25 December 2020, all non–essential shops were required to close. As of 1 March 2021, non–essential shops were allowed to reopen with restrictions (booking and space requirements). As of 13 April 2021, shopping malls smaller than 15.000 m2 were allowed to reopen. As of 21 April 2021, all shopping malls and non–essential shops were allowed to reopen. As of 14 June 2021, face masks were no longer mandatory in shopping malls or non–essential shops. As of 29 November 2021, use of face masks was mandatory for customers (not employees) when shopping. As of 19 December 2021, the use of face masks was mandatory for employees and valid coronapas and further space requirements were introduced. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. Restaurants and bar/night clubs: As of 18 March 2020, restaurants and bar/night clubs were required to close. As of 18 May 2020, restaurants and bars were allowed to reopen (restrictions on space requirements and opening hours). As of August 2020 opening hours for restaurants and bars were extended. As of 19 August 2020 opening hours were limited and the use of face masks was mandatory (except when seated). As of 16 December 2020, restaurants and bars were required to close. As of 21 April 2021, restaurants and bars were allowed to reopen (05 AM to 11 PM), with restrictions (booking, valid corona pas and space requirements). As of 11 June 2021, opening hours at restaurants were extended to 12 AM. As of 14 June 2021, no longer mandatory to use face masks indoor. As of 15 July 2021, opening hours were extended to 2 AM. As of 1 September 2021, all restrictions for restaurants were lifted and night clubs were allowed to reopen with valid coronapas. As of 12 November 2021, a valid coronapas was required at restaurants and bars. As of 10 December 2021, night clubs were required to close and restrictions on opening hours (12 AM) and mandatory use of face masks (only for customers) at restaurants were put in place. As of 19 December 2021, further restrictions were put in place regarding opening hours (11 PM) and mandatory use of face masks for employees and space requirements. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. Public transport: As of 16 March 2020, limited use of public transport was recommended and seat reservation was required (regional trains). As of 31 July 2020, the Danish Health Authority recommended face masks during rush hour. As of 22 August 2020, it was mandatory to use face masks on public transport. As of 14 June 2021, it was mandatory to use face masks while standing in public transport. As of 1 September 2021, it was no longer mandatory to use face masks in public transport. As of 29 November 2021, it was mandatory to use face masks on public transport. As of 19 December 2021, it was mandatory for passengers to have a valid coronapas on long–distance buses and trains. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. Library, cultural activities, church and other religious communities: As of 13 March 2020, the lockdown suspended all public cultural and religious activities. As of 18 May 2020, libraries were allowed to open for the loan of books and churches were allowed to reopen. As of 1 March 2021, outdoor cultural activities were allowed to resume. As of 22 March 2021, a maximum of 50 persons were allowed to gather at religious activities. As of 19 December 2021, restrictions on space requirements and face masks were implemented. As of 24 December 2021, a valid coronapas was required to attend public cultural activities. As of 16 January 2022, indoor cultural facilities were allowed to resume with mandatory use of face masks. No space requirements within the church and other religious communities. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. d As of 18 March 2020, the lockdown suspended all indoor and outdoor sport activities. As of 18 May 2020, outdoor sport activities were allowed to resume. As of 8 June 2020, indoor sport activities were allowed to resume. As of 26 October 2020, a maximum of 10 persons were allowed to gather. As of 16 December 2020, the lockdown suspended all indoor and outdoor sport activities. As of 1 March 2021, a maximum of 25 persons were allowed to gather outside for sport activities. As of 22 March 2021, a maximum of 50 persons were allowed to gather outside for sport activities. As of 21 May 2021, sport activities were allowed to resume with valid coronapas. As of 10 August 2021, all restrictions were lifted. As of 19 December 2021, mandatory to use face masks inside. Valid coronapas was required. As of 1 February 2022, all COVID–19 restrictions were lifted. Travel restrictions: During this period, travel restrictions were also in place. Some of the restrictions enacted by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised against all non–essential travel worldwide, quarantine, coronapas etc. However, these restrictions were not mapped because the restrictions depended on the travel destination. Coronapas: As of 6 April 2021, coronapas was implemented as a part of the reopening of society. A valid coronapas was either: I) Completed primary vaccination. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 or antigen test: Taken within the past 72 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 12 weeks prior. As of 21 April 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Completed primary vaccination. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 or antigen test: Taken within the past 72 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 6 months prior. As of 21 May 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 7 months. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 or antigen test: Taken within the past 72 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 8 months prior. As of 28 May 2021, the Danish ‘coronapas app’ was introduced. As of 1 July 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 7 months. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 test: Taken within the past 96 hours or negative official antigen test: Taken within the past 72 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 8 months prior. As of 7 July 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 12 months. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 test: Taken within the past 96 hours or Negative official antigen test: Taken within the past 72 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 12 months prior. As of 29 November 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 12 months. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 test: Taken within the past 72 hours or negative official antigen test: Taken within the past 48 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 12 months prior. As of 8 December 2021, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 7 months. After revaccination, the corona passport is valid. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 test: Taken within the past 72 hours or negative official antigen test: Taken within the past 48 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 14 days and maximum 12 months prior. As of 16 January 2022, a valid coronapas was either: I) Vaccination: from 14 days to 42 days after the first dose, or after the second dose (mRNA vaccines). After vaccination, the corona passport was valid for 5 months. After revaccination, the corona passport is valid. II) Negative official RT–PCR SARS–CoV–2 test: Taken within the past 72 hours or Negative official antigen test: Taken within the past 48 hours. III) Recovered after SARS–CoV–2 infection: Previously infected with SARS–CoV–2 documented by positive PCR test, performed at least 11 days and maximum 5 months prior.

For the case-control study period in early June 2021, the following restrictions were imposed: Restaurants, cafes, bars etc. had to close at 11 pm with last servings at 10 pm. Use of face masks was mandatory for those aged 12 years or older, in indoor public spaces, including shops and public transport, except when seated at a table to eat or drink. Nightclubs were closed. At cultural, sport and religious events, a maximum of 500 seated people could gather, facing the same direction. Further, a valid corona passport was required for access to all public spaces, except pharmacies and shops selling foods. The maximum number of people allowed for spontaneous or private gatherings was 50 inside and 100 outdoor [20].

Case-control study

In the inclusion period 1,565 unvaccinated adults aged 18–49 years, were diagnosed with SARS-CoV-2 and eligible for inclusion. A valid phone number was available for 1,148 (72%) cases, 829 were attempted contacted before 500 were included in the study and enrolment ended. A total of 529 matched controls were included in the study (Fig 2). Eligible and included cases were similar regarding age, sex and geographic region of residence. Compared to eligible cases diagnosed during the period, the recruited cases were less likely to have migrant background. Included cases and controls had similar household sizes, but the groups differed regarding migrant background and number of contacts (Table 1).

Fig 2. Flow diagram illustrating inclusion of cases and control.

Fig 2

Table 1. Number and proportion of included cases and controls by demographic characteristics and p–value of test for deviations, Denmark, June 2021.

Demographic characteristics Included cases (n = 500), n (%) Matched controls (n = 529), n (%) P value1
Age group na
 18–24 years 199 (40) 212 (40)
 25–34 years 159 (32) 170 (32)
 35–44 years 85 (17) 88 (17)
 45–49 years 57 (11) 59 (11)
Sex na
 Male 263 (53) 283 (54)
 Female 237 (47) 246 (47)
Region na
 Capital Region of Denmark 195 (39) 200 (38)
 Region Zealand 56 (11) 62 (12)
 Region of Southern Denmark 61 (12) 66 (12)
 Central Denmark Region 117 (23) 128 (24)
 North Denmark Region 71 (14) 73 (14)
Migration background 2 <0.05
 Denmark 403 (81) 462 (87) Ref.
 Western country 26 (5.2) 23 (4.3) 0.34
 Non-western country 71 (14) 44 (8.3) <0.05
Household size 3 0.64
 1 78 (16) 91 (17) Ref.
 2 141 (28) 165 (31) 0.92
 3 109 (22) 100 (19) 0.22
 4 105 (21) 108 (20) 0.46
 ≥5 67 (13) 65 (12) 0.39
Number of contacts <0.05
 0–5 290 (58) 208 (39) Ref.
 6–10 88 (18) 156 (29) <0.05
 11–15 47 (9.4) 51 (9.6) 0.06
 16–20 27 (5.4) 30 (5.7) 0.07
 21–49 30 (6.0) 52 (9.8) <0.05
 Over 50 18 (3.6) 32 (6.0) <0.05
Employment status 0.34
 Employed 307 (61) 339 (64) Ref.
 Student 150 (30) 138 (26) 0.06
 Other 43 (8.6) 52 (9.8) 0.62

1 P–value for Chi–Square–test for deviation between included cases and matched controls (italic). P–value for mOR (non–italic)

2 Non–Danish migration background was defined as first or second generation immigrants from either Western countries (primarily neighboring European countries) or from non–Western countries (the five most frequent being Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia).

3 Number of registered persons on the same address.

In total, 80% of cases reported knowing where they had been infected. This was primarily reported to have happened in the household (20%), at the workplace (16%), or among friends or family members (other than the household,16%). Cases further reported education facilities (5.4%), leisure activity (5.2%), other events (2.5%) or ‘other place/exposure’ (13%) as places of likely infection (Table 2). In total, 87% of the cases reported to have experienced symptoms of COVID-19.

Table 2. Number and proportion of likely place of infection as indicated by cases (n = 500)1.

Likely place of infection n (%)
Household 105 (21)
Friends/other family than household 80 (16)
Workplace 84 (17)
Education 28 (5.6)
Leisure activities 27 (5.4)
Other events 13 (2.6)
Public transport 8 (1.6)
Other place/exposure 68 (14)
Don’t know 103 (21)

1It was possible to indicate more than one likely place of infection (516 answers included from 500 cases).

Overall, 47% of the cases and 8% of the controls reported that they had been in contact with an infected person in the exposure period. Most reported ‘close contact’. ‘Other contact’ with an infected person with symptoms was reported by 2.9% of the cases and 1.2% of the controls, resulting in a matched odds ratio (mOR) estimate of 3.3 (95% CI: 1.2–9.2). Close contact with an infected person without symptoms was reported by 15% of cases and 3.1% of controls had, resulting in a mOR of 8.5 (95% CI: 4.5–16). Close contact with an infected person with symptoms was reported by 27% of cases and 2.3% of controls, mOR: 20 (95% CI: 9.8–40, Table 3).

Table 3. Number, proportion and matched odds ratios (mOR) related to type of contact with a person with known SARS–CoV–2 infection (with/without symptoms), Denmark, June 2021.

Type of contact with infected person with/without symptoms Cases (n = 483), n (%) Controls (n = 512), n (%) mOR (95% CI)
No contact with infected person 256 (53) 472 (92) Ref.
Other contact, without symptoms 10 (2.1) 6 (1.2) 3.04 (0.93–9.99)
Other contact, with symptoms 14 (2.9) 6 (1.2) 3.25 (1.15–9.19)
Close contact, without symptoms 73 (15) 16 (3.1) 8.53 (4.52–16.11)
Close contact, with symptoms 130 (27) 12 (2.3) 20 (9.80–39.49)
Migration background
  Denmark 391 (81) 448 (88) Ref.
  Western country 25 (5.2) 23 (4.5) 1.13 (0.52–2.43)
  Non-western country 67 (14) 41 (8.0) 2.17 (1.28–3.68)
Household size
  1 75 (16) 86 (17) Ref.
  2 135 (28) 159 (31) 0.93 (0.56–1.54)
  3 105 (22) 98 (19) 1.07 (0.63–1.79)
  4 102 (21) 106 (21) 1.25 (0.72–2.18)
≥5 66 (14) 63 (12) 0.88 (0.47–1.64)

Note mOR estimates were adjusted for type of contact with/without symptoms, migration background and household size.

All ‘do not know’ responds were excluded in the analysis.

Community determinants of SARS-CoV-2 infection

Controls were more likely to report having been to restaurants than cases, mOR: 0.66 (95% CI: 0.49–0.90). However, cases were more likely than controls to report, that they or others in their company had consumed alcohol during the restaurant visit, adjusted odds ratio (aOR): 2.3 (95% CI: 1.3–4.2). The same trend was seen for bar and indoor cultural events, where more controls than cases reported to have visited a bar and participated in indoor cultural events, but more cases than controls reported alcohol consumption (non-significant, Table 4).

Table 4. Number, proportion and odds ratios related to community exposures without household transmission, Denmark, June 2021.

Community exposures1 Cases (n = 395), n (%) Controls (n = 421),n (%) OR (95% CI)
Restaurant or café 126 (32) 176 (42) 0.66 (0.49–0.90)
  Alcohol vs. no alcohol 35 (28) 26 (15) 2.33 (1.29–4.21)
Bar 78 (20) 102 (24) 0.76 (0.53–1.09)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 65 (83) 80 (78) 1.31 (0.57–3.01)
Indoor cultural events 23 (5.8) 44 (10) 0.58 (0.34–0.98)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 5 (22) 7 (16) 1.65 (0.34–7.87)
Spectator at sport events 21 (5.3) 33 (7.8) 0.69 (0.39–1.22)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 6 (29) 10 (30) 0.59 (0.14–2.45)
Indoor fitness center 95 (24) 82 (19) 1.40 (0.98–2.01)
Indoor sport activities 24 (6.1) 41 (9.7) 0.57 (0.32–1.01)
Outdoor sport activities 68 (17) 94 (22) 0.71 (0.49–1.03)
Shopping (grocery) 299 (76) 379 (90) 0.36 (0.24–0.54)
Shopping (other) 119 (30) 205 (49) 0.45 (0.33–0.61)
Private social events <10 persons 125 (32) 212 (50) 0.46 (0.34–0.63)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 57 (46) 93 (44) 1.06 (0.65–1.72)
Private social events 10–20 persons 48 (12) 80 (19) 0.61 (0.41–0.90)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 30 (63) 49 (61) 1.05 (0.45–2.46)
Private social events >20 persons 34 (8.6) 36 (8.5) 1.05 (0.62–1.78)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 23 (68) 25 (69) 1.13 (0.32–4.03)
Public transport 123 (31) 179 (43) 0.56 (0.41–0.78)
 During rush hour 43 (35) 83 (46) 0.59 (0.36–0.96)
Religious events 5 (1.3) 18 (4.3) 0.29 (0.11–0.79)
Events with singing 46 (12) 51 (12) 1.04 (0.65–1.65)

For analyses on exposure mOR adjusted for migration background and household size are shown (italic). For sub–analyses on details within an exposure unmatched OR adjusted for sex, age, region, migration background and household size are shown (non italic).

1Never versus at least once in the period.

In total, 24% of cases and 19% of controls had used a fitness centre at least once during the 6-day exposure period, mOR: 1.4 (95% CI: 0.98–2.00), this trend was not seen for indoor sport activities, mOR: 0.57 (95% CI: 0.32–1.0), nor for outdoor sport activities, mOR: 0.71 (95% CI: 0.49–1.0). For private social events, a higher proportion of controls than cases reported to have participated in small or medium-sized private social events, while there was no difference among the proportion participating in large private social events (Table 4). Finally, a higher proportion of controls than cases had visited shops/supermarkets, used public transport, or participated in religious events in the period. For participation in events, which involved singing, no difference was observed (Table 4).

In the sensitivity analysis, excluding cases and controls (and their matched case or control) who reported to have been close contacts to an infected person during the exposure period, we obtained largely similar results, showing the same trends (Table 5).

Table 5. Number, proportion and odds ratios related to community exposures without close contact cases and controls, Denmark, June 2021.

Community exposures (n cases/n controls)1 Cases (n = 267), n (%) Controls (n = 277), n (%) OR (95% CI)
Restaurant or café 78 (29) 108 (39) 0.59 (0.39–0.89)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 17 (22) 14 (13) 1.72 (0.75–3.94)
Bar 55 (21) 72 (26) 0.78 (0.50–1.22)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 44 (80) 56 (78) 1.00 (0.38–2.68)
Indoor cultural events 12 (4.5) 28 (10) 0.48 (0.24–0.96)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 2 (17) 8 (29) 1.25 (0.04–41.13)
Spectator at sport events 14 (5.2) 23 (8.3) 0.55 (0.27–1.10)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 4 (29) 6 (26) 0.36 (0.03–4.50)
Indoor fitness center 61 (23) 51 (18) 1.58 (0.92–2.37)
Indoor sport activities 19 (7.1) 26 (9.4) 0.84 (0.42–1.66)
Outdoor sport activities 44 (16) 59 (21) 0.74 (0.46–1.20)
Shopping (grocery) 202 (76) 253 (91) 0.36 (0.22–0.60)
Shopping (other) 80 (30) 142 (51) 0.42 (0.29–0.63)
Private social events <10 persons 85 (32) 148 (53) 0.40 (0.27–0.59)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 34 (40) 74 (50) 0.74 (0.40–1.35)
Private social events 10–20 persons 30 (11) 54 (19) 0.53 (0.32–0.87)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 15 (50) 33 (61) 0.40 (0.12–1.30)
Private social events >20 persons 15 (5.6) 23 (8.3) 0.64 (0.31–1.33)
 Alcohol vs. no alcohol 10 (67) 16 (70) 0.65 (0.07–5.64)
Public transport 84 (31) 118 (43) 0.57 (0.38–0.86)
 During rush hour 29 (35) 58 (49) 0.48 (0.26–0.90)
Religious events 1 (0.37) 8 (2.9) 0.13 (0.02–1.07)
Events with singing 25 (9.4) 35 (13) 0.70 (0.38–1.30)

For analyses on exposure mOR adjusted for migration background and household size are shown (italic). For sub–analyses on details within an exposure unmatched OR adjusted for sex, age, region, migration background and household size are shown (non italic).

1Never versus at least once in the period.

Discussion

In this case-control study performed in June 2021, we found that known contact to an infected person was the most important risk factor for infection. For transmission in the community, outside the household, we identified only weak or no associations. Cases were more likely to have consumed alcohol while being on a restaurant or café and to have been at a fitness center than controls, the latter not being statistical significant. A large series of other societal activities were not found to be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection; some were even found to be negatively associated with infection.

We prepared and present a detailed account of the officially imposed restrictions to free movement that were in place during the epidemic period from February 2020 to March 2022. Because of the possibility to perform population register–based studies and because of the particularly high number of SARS-CoV-2 tests that were performed in the country, Danish data has become a focus of interest in COVID-19 research [14, 16, 18, 2127]. Besides its relevance for the current study, we hope with this account of the official restrictions imposed to be able to provide context to studies of the epidemiology of COVID-19 being based on Danish SARS-CoV-2 data. For comparison of restrictive measures that were implemented in individual countries in the European Union, including Denmark, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has published reports hereof [2].

This study is the second in a series of two. Six month prior to the current study, we performed a first case-control study using similar methodology [10]. The main difference in set-up between the two studies related to the study size, the current was based on inclusion of 1000 cases and controls, the first study on 600 only, and the fact that the exposure period inquired about was shortened from two weeks to six days, with the aim of increasing the specificity. Apart from that, the main changes concerned external factors: the differences in restrictions in place, society this time being far more open, the Alpha rather than the original wild type SARS-CoV-2 viral strain being dominant and, importantly, the older population segments and other risk groups having been vaccinated and therefore excluded from the study population. The pattern of risk factors seen in the current study was remarkably similar to what we found in our previous study, where also, apart from contact to infected persons, fitness centers and alcohol consumption in bars and in addition participation in events which involved singing, were identified as being associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. This second study may therefore be seen as corroborating the findings of the first and it would appear that besides direct contact with infected individuals, under the restrictive measures in place in Denmark, social activity involving alcohol and possibly the use of fitness centers constituted actual risk factors. As also speculated previously [10], activities potentially involving heavy breathing, excretions of aerosols, close interaction and touching of multiple surfaces in a closed indoor environment could constitute an environment prone to SARS-CoV-2 transmission, compared to outdoor sport activities. In the same line is the association with alcohol when present at restaurants or cafés, where alcohol may be a proxy for reduced awareness of protective behavior and adherence to IPC recommendations, increasing the likelihood of closer interactions and with that SARS-CoV-2 transmission. On the other hand, many other investigated activities, notably use of public transportation, supermarkets and cultural and sports gatherings were as common in cases than amongst controls.

Several other case-control studies of community determinants have been published. Early in the pandemic (May to June 2020), a case-control study conducted in Ohio and Florida, found no association between infection with SARS-CoV-2 and attending private or public gatherings or use of public transport [6]. Another study from July 2020 in the USA among outpatients also did not indicate an association between SARS-CoV-2 infection and use of public transport, shopping or visiting friends and family. However, cases were more likely to have been dining at restaurants and visiting bars/coffee shops than controls [9]. In Portugal, in September to October 2020, no association was found with use of public transport, restaurant visits, mall/supermarket visits, attending gym or sports activities and being infected with SARS-CoV-2 [3]. A large case-control study from France (October and November 2020), in a period with broad-reaching public health and social measures, found an increased risk of infection associated with bar and restaurant visits, but no association with attending cultural gatherings [4]. Later in the pandemic, in a period with Delta circulation in France, another case-control study was performed (May to August 2021). Here people under 40 years of age attending bars, nightclubs or private parties were found to be at increased risk of infection. For public transport, cases were more likely to have used the subway, but not buses, trams or trains. For private gatherings, there was an association with ceremonies, but no association with other private gatherings, cultural events nor shopping (except from convenience stores). No association was seen for outdoor sports activities, but for indoor sport activities [8]. Another Danish case-control study, performed in October to December 2020 found associations similar to those seen in our studies [5]. The most important risk factor identified was contact to an infected person. Moreover, this study also found an association with fitness centers but not with shopping, use of public transport and participating in outdoor sport activities. Contrary to our findings, participation in indoor sport activities, larger events, and restaurant and bar visits were identified as risk factors [5].

Taken together, the available literature has not been able to show an association between SARS-CoV-2 infection or hospital admission and potential risk factors such as: supermarkets, outdoor sport activities or use of public transport in situations where basic preventive measures–mask use, keeping a distance–have been in place. Certain other activities have been found to be associated with infection, such as indoor sport activities or restaurant and bar visits. However, this appeared to vary, depending on the setting of the particular study.

Methodological strengths and limitation outlined in our previous 2020-study also apply for the current study. Among the limitations of the first study was the small sample size, therefore we went from 600 to 1000 participants to strengthen the power of the present study. We did not find any high mOR with wide confidence intervals, which could indicate risk of type II errors, and therefore we consider our sample size to have been sufficient to identify associations had they existed. Compared to our first study, we also shortened the exposure period inquired about, aiming to provide more specific estimates of associations. The use of the Danish Vaccination Registry enabled us to swiftly and objectively exclude those who had been vaccinated by the time of the study and used the Danish Microbiology Database to exclude those previously infected.

A potential bias would arise from systematic differences in behavior between cases and controls. Persons who recently had been in close contact with a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection, would, if they were aware of the exposure at the time, likely have been in self-isolation and would therefore not be active in the community. Because we for many activities found controls to be more exposed than cases (resulting in OR estimates below 1), we were suspicious of such a bias being at play. To explore this further, we performed a sensitivity analysis, in which we excluded all participants who reported to have been close contacts to infected persons. This did not change the results. We were able to exclude cases exposed in their household, which allowed us to produce a more specific estimate to risk associated to activities in the community. Unfortunately we did not have detailed enough information about the setting of the close contacts not part of the household, to include only those occurring during activities in the community. This means that we may have included cases which may have been infected at home or during non-community activities, which may have weakened the associations. Another potential systematic difference between cases and controls is their ability to recall activities in the period in question, if cases already during contact tracing had been asked to recall relevant activities, they may have been more likely to report such activities adequately, which could have influenced the results. Another potential concern relates to the selection of controls. We used matched controls sampled from the general population, which was made possible because of our access to the Danish Civil Registration System. A different approach, which we did not opt for, would have been control selection with recruitment from the pool of persons testing negative in PCR test in the same period as the pool of cases tested positive. This option has been used by others, and we cannot say how it would have influenced on our results [5, 9]. In the study period, participation in societal activities generally required regular testing regardless of symptoms as part of the corona passport strategy in our unvaccinated, not previously infected study population. Persons who had had contact with a SARS-CoV-2 infected person or had symptoms of COVID-19 were recommended one or more tests and additionally recommendations or regular screening tests existed for certain professions [28, 29]. During the period around 11,000–26,000 RT-PCR tests were performed per 100,000 population [30] and seroprevalence studies based on blood donors showed that a low proportion the adult healthy population of Denmark had been infected [31]. Therefore, we believe that controls were unlikely to have been positive without knowing.

In conclusion, we show results of a study of risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection and compare with a similar study done six month earlier. Under the constraints of the methodology of case-control studies, no major community determinants for infection were identified with the exception of alcohol consumption and possibly use of fitness centers. We conclude that transmission in the general community was of little importance, while instead, the major risk factor for transmission was contact to a known infected person and that transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members. Our study could not directly measure the effect of the societal restrictions in place but it is not unreasonable to expect that these had an effect in reducing any potential risks associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation. Finally, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions that were implemented in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022.

Acknowledgments

We thank the participants of this study for taking their time to answer questions. We thank Caroline Eves for critical reading of the manuscript.

Data Availability

This study was performed as a national disease surveillance project and for legal reasons data are not available in the public domain nor in databases accessible for researchers. However, the interview data from this study may be made available in a de-identifiable format to other researchers upon reasonable request. For such, please contact Statens Serum Institut directly (email: serum@ssi.dk).

Funding Statement

The author(s) received no specific funding for this work.

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Decision Letter 0

Joël Mossong

17 Jun 2022

PONE-D-22-13314Societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures and activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population – a case-control study in Denmark, June 2021PLOS ONE

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Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

1. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

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Reviewer #1: Partly

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Partly

Reviewer #4: Partly

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2. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: No

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3. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: Yes

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4. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: Yes

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5. Review Comments to the Author

Please use the space provided to explain your answers to the questions above. You may also include additional comments for the author, including concerns about dual publication, research ethics, or publication ethics. (Please upload your review as an attachment if it exceeds 20,000 characters)

Reviewer #1: The study is a case-control study done in Denmark to elucidate factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Findings from this paper may be context-specific (in the setting of the situation in Denmark, in the setting of the alpha-dominant period, etc.). Still, the study is methodologically sound and provides important insights into controlling SARS-CoV-2. There are several points the authors should address. A couple of other minor points suggested to improve the paper further are also included.

1. The author’s conclusion in the abstract and the main text should be modified so that it is directly supported by the data. Specifically, the following statement is not supported directly by the data: “Transmission of disease through involvement in community activities appeared to occur only rarely, suggesting that community restrictions in place were efficient.” According to Table 2, at least based on the self-reported place of infection, over half of the cases are infected in the community activities. Also, even if the community restrictions in place were efficient, behaviors that are truly high-risk would have been identified as such in the present study design.

2. In the abstract, “confined space” and “contact to known persons” should be separated. “Contact to known persons” should be reworded to “contact to infected individuals.”

3. In the abstract, the sentence “For reference, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions in place in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022” should be in the earlier part of the abstract to flow better.

4. In the abstract, the citation should not be included and should be removed.

5. If there are any missing data, they should be elaborated on in the tables and provide information on how they were addressed. If not, please ignore this comment.

6. This is a suggestion, but authors should reconsider whether there is a need to do the analysis excluding cases who reported to be infected in their household (Table 4) when the authors are doing an analysis excluding individuals with close contact (Table 5)? I understand that the former data provided some factors that are statistically significant while the latter did not, but it seems arbitrary.

7. The reason to exclude cases who are close contact is partly that cases most likely acquired the virus through this specific contact rather than other community exposures you are asking about in the questionnaire. This can also be mentioned in the manuscript.

Reviewer #2: The manuscript "Societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures and activities associated with SARSCoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population – a case-control study in Denmark, June 2021" is a valuable contribution. Although it does not providing ground-breaking or surprising results, it adds evidence to a steep learning curve from COVID-19 pandemic for epidemiologists, social scientists and policymakers. This contribution is a good example of robust and rapid evidence for policy that can be immediately applied during the crisis and build evidence to better prepare for future pandemics.

General suggestions on methods:

- Since the outcome of interest is tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, could the authors elaborate on the national criteria for testing that were used during the study period? It is relevant for the international audience, since in every country a "case" could have a slightly different probability of being identified. It is mentioned in the discussion that there was massive testing, possibly including asymptomatic people without any indications, in the occupational setting. In such a case, it is worth introducing this context, and addressing the issue of RT-PCR validity and reliability in the limitation section.

- Could the authors explain a bit more why they applied individual matching? With such massive exposures and such common infection, it would be perhaps better to use unmatched design and check for the effect of age and sex on the infection risk? The purpose of the control group is to represent exposures in the source population and matching is a way to prevent confounding. If age and sex are not confounders in a given scenario, matching can actually introduce confounding. I recommend adding to the Methods section a short explanation/rationale to apply individual matching.

- Could the authors explain the rationale behind excluding residents previously vaccinated and previously tested positive by RT-PCR? We know now that previous infection or vaccination does not prevent new infections. If one wants to investigate the effect of community exposures on disease risk, maybe it would be a better idea to not exclude infections occuring >6 months previously, for example. Maybe the authors just assumed that with a new disease circulating for a short time, it is safe to assume that all were recently vaccinated and all infected to date were "recently" infected and thus were immune to SARS-CoV-2 infections... These assumptions should be however better explained and addressed in the limitations section.

- I recommend using the term matched odds ratios (mOR) instead of odds ratios, to reflect the methodological approach. It should be updated in the entire manuscript, including the abstract.

- As mentioned in previous comments, the study has several limitations, not thoroughly revised by the authors. I recommend to be a bit more comprehensive in this matter!

Minor corrections:

- Abstract line 10: Please move the numbers to the results

- Abstract lines 20-21: Do not include citations in the abstract.

- Introduction line 39: Why to refer to case-control studies? Do authors refer to studies in Denmark? It would be good to be more precise...

- Methods line 70: typo in "ministries"

- Results line 163: did the authors mean: "Compared to eligible cases, eligible controls [...]"?

- Discussion 279: "conducting" not "conduction"

Reviewer #3: This is a case-control study attempting to identify individual and contextual risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection in Denmark. The study is well written and has a sound methodology. However, I have a few questions that I believe should be addressed:

- In the abstract (line 4) the authors mention they aim at testing the efficiency of such measures - however efficiency requires a resources dimension - do the authors believe they have addressed this?

- At the end of introduction (lines 60-61) authors mention the "present an overview of the official restrictions". This seems a bit misleading as the authors actually prepare one as part of their work. I suggest this to be rephrased.

- Authors have excluded hospitalized and vaccinated patients. Can they comment on how this might have influenced the results and how this can affect results generalizability?

- Data collection: The exposure period ranged from eight to two days before the symptom onset (or test for asymptomatic) for cases. However I could not identify what was the index date for controls - what was the 6-day refer to? Can the authors clarify?

- Some of the analysis reported in Table 1 and not described in the methods. I suggest this to be added.

- The authors emphasize the alcohol consumption in their results. However this has not been given an in-depth consideration in the discussion. Why the authors believe they have identified this results? Is it really related with the alcohol consumption or it this a proxy for other types of behaviours?

- There are negative results in for a series of contexts. Have the authors explored these results in more depth? They raise an hypothesis is the discussion (lines 261 onwards) which has not been corroborated by the sensitivity analysis. Do you see any alternative reasons for these results. Could remote work play a role here?

- The authors claim their results support the "efficiency" of existing measures. However I am not entirely convinced here. In fact there is no counterfactual to assess the effectiveness (which I believe is what in fact authors intended to assess) or the impact of those measures. Please comment.

Reviewer #4: The authors aim to identify determinants of Sars-COV2 infection in the Denmark in June 2021 using a case –control study. They compare exposure to determinants among

1) 500 cases unvaccinated; 18-49 years old, residents in Denmark, with a RT-PCR test positive result between 8-12 June that were not hospitalized; had not travelled abroad

2) With 529 controls matched on year of birth, sex and municipality with the cases (1 to 1 match).

The 6 days (from Day -8 to Day -2 prior to symptom or test +) exposure to determinants was measures by telephone interviews between 15 and 24 June. Conditional logistic regression is correctly use for the analysis.

The population from which cases and controls are coming from does not look identical concerning previous infection which is an exclusion criteria for controls but no clear info is provided about the cases. For the community transmission, given the restrictions in place, it means that we could have only controls with a recent negative test but we could have cases with a previous infection or a recent negative test who access public spaces. A subgroup analysis could be performed excluding cases with previous infection and their matched controls, to account for that.

In order to understand the results without the need to consult other articles a more detailed description of the questionnaire used is necessary.

The conclusion that Contact with another individual with a known infection as the main determinant for SARS-CoV-2 infection is based on sound methodology and nicely reflected in the different sections. Given the strength of the association even adjusting for other determinants will not modify the findings and or conclusions.

Sub-group analysis for the community transmission section.

The analysis for each determinant is performed separately adjusted for migration back ground, household size and the matching variables. There is no analysis performed by adjusting for all determinants, or for determinants associated with risk of infection in the bivariate analysis.

Based on the results from table 4 some of the interpretations about differences between cases and controls are not fully correct. In the results section it states that cases are more likely than controls to have consumed alcohol in a bar. By looking at table 4, the CI95% of the OR for alcohol consumption in a Bar includes the 1 meaning that the difference is not statistically significant. The same logic applies for the indoor sport activities, indoor fitness center and outdoor sport activities. The difference between cases and controls is not statistically significant. The results and discussion sections are to be updated accordingly concerning the community transmission part. (no significant difference for indoor fitness centers, indoor sport activities, alcohol consumption in bars )

It seems that the study is underpowered to detect community determinants of SARS-COV2 infection. Considering a matched 2 controls 1 case design could partially resolve that problem. In the multivariate model, only determinants associated with outcome in the bivariate analysis could be entered.

Other

Page 4 line 56 (Introduction section) Please rephrase

Society was gradually reopening, with now only societal restrictions in place for those individuals who were vaccinated, had recovered from infection or recently tested negative

In contradiction with Line 71-72 (methods section)

Table 1 Please provide OR for non matching variables. From the bivariate analysis it looks like the migration background and the number of contacts are associated with the risk of becoming a case.

In table 2 there is a total of 516 cases reported whereas in the results section only 500 cases are reported as included, please double-check or clarify

Table 3 Please provide adjusted OR for migration background and household size as well.

General Feedback

Please standardize the reporting of OR and CI95% by using everywhere 2 decimals (1,01 instead of 1,0 or 39,00 instead of 39).

Inclusive tables with absolute numbers and proportions as well as OR(CI95%) of both bivariate and multivariate analysis would be more easy to read and interpret.

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Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #2: Yes: Pawel Stefanoff

Reviewer #3: Yes: Andreia Leite

Reviewer #4: No

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PLoS One. 2022 Nov 16;17(11):e0268849. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0268849.r002

Author response to Decision Letter 0


7 Aug 2022

Reviewer #1: The study is a case-control study done in Denmark to elucidate factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Findings from this paper may be context-specific (in the setting of the situation in Denmark, in the setting of the alpha-dominant period, etc.). Still, the study is methodologically sound and provides important insights into controlling SARS-CoV-2. There are several points the authors should address. A couple of other minor points suggested to improve the paper further are also included.

1. The author’s conclusion in the abstract and the main text should be modified so that it is directly supported by the data. Specifically, the following statement is not supported directly by the data: “Transmission of disease through involvement in community activities appeared to occur only rarely, suggesting that community restrictions in place were efficient.” According to Table 2, at least based on the self-reported place of infection, over half of the cases are infected in the community activities. Also, even if the community restrictions in place were efficient, behaviors that are truly high-risk would have been identified as such in the present study design.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. The abstract and the conclusion in the main text have been modified, so the conclusion is supported by our results. We have included that, as we found no single determination to be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection and because transmission appeared to primarily take place via contact to a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection, community restrictions in place were adequate to reduce risk to a level where we could not find a difference between cases and controls.

Abstract (Lines 20-23): Alcohol consumption and fitness centers were weakly associated with infection, in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier. Apart from the two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person.

Conclusion (Line 296-304): In conclusion, we show results of a study of risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection and compare with a similar study done six month earlier. Under the constraints of the methodology of case-control studies, no major determinants for infection were identified. Since no determinants for infection were identified, we conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation; exceptions being fitness centers and alcohol consumption. Instead, a major risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person and transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members. Finally, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions that were implemented in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022.

2. In the abstract, “confined space” and “contact to known persons” should be separated. “Contact to known persons” should be reworded to “contact to infected individuals.”

Answer: Thank you for this. The abstract has been rephrased. Confined space is deleted and “Contact to known persons” is reworded to “contact to a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection”, matching the wording performed through the entire manuscript.

Abstract (Lines 20-23): Alcohol consumption and fitness centers were weakly associated with infection, in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier. Apart from the two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person.

3. In the abstract, the sentence “For reference, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions in place in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022” should be in the earlier part of the abstract to flow better.

Answer: Thank you for this suggestion, the sentence have been moved to an earlier part of the abstract (lines 12-13). The title of the manuscript have also been update, to include ‘overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in Denmark’ for a better flow and understanding.

4. In the abstract, the citation should not be included and should be removed.

Answer: The citation has been deleted.

5. If there are any missing data, they should be elaborated on in the tables and provide information on how they were addressed. If not, please ignore this comment.

Answer: There was no missing data. In the analysis presented in table 3, all ‘do not know’ responses were excluded (stated in the footnote under the table).

6. This is a suggestion, but authors should reconsider whether there is a need to do the analysis excluding cases who reported to be infected in their household (Table 4) when the authors are doing an analysis excluding individuals with close contact (Table 5)? I understand that the former data provided some factors that are statistically significant while the latter did not, but it seems arbitrary.

Answer: Thank you for this relevant suggestion. The purpose of Table 5 was to see if self-isolation could explain why more controls were often exposed than cases (resulting in OR estimates below 1). Persons who recently had been in close contact with an infected person would self-isolate, as recommended, and would therefore not be having activities in the community (if they had this information during their exposure period!). Removing those with known contact to an infected person did not change the results.

The intension with Table 4, excluding household transmission, is to remove those exposed at home, i.e. those not relevant for assessing risk associated with activities in the community.

We do not have detailed information about the setting of the close contact (those excluded in Table 5), and could thus be excluding transmission occurring during community activities if implementing your suggestion. No changes have been made to the manuscript.

7. The reason to exclude cases who are close contact is partly that cases most likely acquired the virus through this specific contact rather than other community exposures you are asking about in the questionnaire. This can also be mentioned in the manuscript.

Answer: Thank you this valid point. We unfortunately do not have detailed information about the setting of the close contact that would allow us to tease out which close contact occurred during community activities and which occurred at home or during non-community activity. We have mentioned this limitation in the manuscript.

Line 283-288 We were able to exclude cases exposed in their household, which allowed us to produce a more specific estimate to risk associated to activities in the community. Unfortunately we did not have detailed enough information about the setting of the close contacts not part of the household, to include only those occurring during activities in the community. This means that we may have included cases which may have been infected during home or during non-community activities, which may have weakened the associations.

Reviewer #2: The manuscript "Societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures and activities associated with SARSCoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population – a case-control study in Denmark, June 2021" is a valuable contribution. Although it does not providing ground-breaking or surprising results, it adds evidence to a steep learning curve from COVID-19 pandemic for epidemiologists, social scientists and policymakers. This contribution is a good example of robust and rapid evidence for policy that can be immediately applied during the crisis and build evidence to better prepare for future pandemics.

General suggestions on methods:

- Since the outcome of interest is tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, could the authors elaborate on the national criteria for testing that were used during the study period? It is relevant for the international audience, since in every country a "case" could have a slightly different probability of being identified. It is mentioned in the discussion that there was massive testing, possibly including asymptomatic people without any indications, in the occupational setting. In such a case, it is worth introducing this context, and addressing the issue of RT-PCR validity and reliability in the limitation section.

Answer: Thank you for this comment, additional information on the testing recommendations and references have been added to the discussion.

Lines 294-301: In the study period, participation in societal activities generally required regular testing regardless of symptoms as part of the corona passport strategy in our unvaccinated, not previously infected study population. Persons who had had contact with a SARS-CoV-2 infected person or had symptoms of COVID-19 were recommended one or more tests and additionally recommendations or regular screening tests existed for certain professions [28, 29]. During the period around 11,000-26,000 tests were performed per 100,000 population [30] and seroprevalence studies based on blood donors showed that a low proportion the adult healthy population of Denmark had been infected [31]. Therefore, we believe that controls were unlikely to have been positive without knowing.

- Could the authors explain a bit more why they applied individual matching? With such massive exposures and such common infection, it would be perhaps better to use unmatched design and check for the effect of age and sex on the infection risk? The purpose of the control group is to represent exposures in the source population and matching is a way to prevent confounding. If age and sex are not confounders in a given scenario, matching can actually introduce confounding. I recommend adding to the Methods section a short explanation/rationale to apply individual matching.

Answer: Thank you for this question, we applied individual matching as we assume that the matching variables were confounders. We assume that age, sex and place of residence affect your behaviour (how often you are dinning at a restaurant, visiting bars, drinking alcohol, going to fitness, but also adherence to official guidelines), number of contacts and the local reproduction rate. No adjustment have been made to the manuscript.

- Could the authors explain the rationale behind excluding residents previously vaccinated and previously tested positive by RT-PCR? We know now that previous infection or vaccination does not prevent new infections. If one wants to investigate the effect of community exposures on disease risk, maybe it would be a better idea to not exclude infections occuring >6 months previously, for example. Maybe the authors just assumed that with a new disease circulating for a short time, it is safe to assume that all were recently vaccinated and all infected to date were "recently" infected and thus were immune to SARS-CoV-2 infections... These assumptions should be however better explained and addressed in the limitations section.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. Michlmary et al. 2022, investigated the observed protection against SARS-CoV-2 reinfection following a primary infection. The study was performed in Denmark, in the same period as our study was performed. They showed that SARS-CoV-2 infection and vaccination offered a high level of protection against reinfection. Based on this, we assumed that the risk of infection/reinfection was not the same for those previously SARS-CoV-2 positive, not previous infected and those vaccinated against SARS-CoV-2. In order not to include people with different risk of infection, the study was performed among people who had not previously tested positive. The following adjustment have been made:

Lines 91-92: Only controls unvaccinated and not previously infected by 12 June 2021 were included to match the risk of infection profile of the cases.

Reference: Michlmayr, D., Hansen, C. H., Gubbels, S. M., Valentiner-Branth, P., Bager, P., Obel, N., Drewes, B., Møller, C. H., Møller, F. T., Legarth, R., Mølbak, K., & Ethelberg, S. (2022). Observed protection against SARS-CoV-2 reinfection following a primary infection: A Danish cohort study among unvaccinated using two years of nationwide PCR-test data. The Lancet regional health. Europe, 20, 100452. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lanepe.2022.100452

- I recommend using the term matched odds ratios (mOR) instead of odds ratios, to reflect the methodological approach. It should be updated in the entire manuscript, including the abstract.

Answer: Thank you. We have now specified the type of odds ratios where the specification lacked.

Lines 9-11: We determined matched odds ratios (mORs) and 95% confidence intervals (95%CIs) by conditional logistical regression with adjustment for household size and immigration status.

Lines 15-19: Reporting close contact with an infected person who either had or did not have symptoms resulted in mORs of 20 (95%CI:9.8-39) and 8.5 (95%CI 4.5-16) respectively. In contrast, community exposures were generally not associated with disease; several exposures were negatively associated. Exceptions were: attending fitness centers, mOR=1.4 (95%CI:1.0-2.0) and consumption of alcohol in restaurants or cafés, aOR=2.3 (95%CI:1.3–4.2).

- As mentioned in previous comments, the study has several limitations, not thoroughly revised by the authors. I recommend to be a bit more comprehensive in this matter!

Answer: Thank you for this recommendation. In order to accommodate, the section in the discussion covering the methodological strengths and limitation have been revised. The section now includes concerns about recall bias and parts have been rephrased to improve readability.

Lines 267-301: Methodological strengths and limitation outlined in our previous 2020-study also apply for the current study. Among the limitations of the first study was the small sample size, therefore we went from 600 to 1000 participants to strengthen the power of the present study. We did not find any high mOR with wide confidence intervals, indicating type I errors, and therefore we consider our sample size to have been sufficient to identify associations had they existed. Compared to our first study, we also shortened the exposure period inquired about, aiming to provide more specific estimates of associations. The use of the Danish Vaccination Registry enabled us to swiftly and objectively exclude those who had been vaccinated by the time of the study and used the Danish Microbiology Database to exclude those previously infected.

A potential bias would arise from systematic differences in behavior between cases and controls. Persons who recently had been in close contact with a person with SARS-CoV-2 infection, would, if they were aware of the exposure at the time, likely have been in self-isolation and would therefore not be active in the community. Because we for many activities found controls to be more exposed than cases (resulting in OR estimates below 1), we were suspicious of such a bias being at play. To explore this further, we performed a sensitivity analysis, in which we excluded all participants who reported to have been close contacts to infected persons. This did not change the results. We were able to exclude cases exposed in their household, which allowed us to produce a more specific estimate to risk associated to activities in the community. Unfortunately we did not have detailed enough information about the setting of the close contacts not part of the household, to include only those occurring during activities in the community. This means that we may have included cases which may have been infected at home or during non-community activities, which may have weakened the associations. Another potential systematic difference between cases and controls is their ability to recall activities in the period in question, if cases already during contact tracing had been asked to recall relevant activities, they may have been more likely to report such activities adequately, which could have influenced the results. Another potential concern relates to the selection of controls. We used matched controls sampled from the general population, which was made possible because of our access to the Danish Civil Registration System. A different approach, which we did not opt for, would have been control selection with recruitment from the pool of persons testing negative in PCR test in the same period as the pool of cases tested positive. This option has been used by others, and we cannot say how it would have influenced on our results [5, 9]. In the study period, participation in societal activities generally required regular testing regardless of symptoms as part of the corona passport strategy in our unvaccinated, not previously infected study population. Persons who had had contact with a SARS-CoV-2 infected person or had symptoms of COVID-19 were recommended one or more tests and additionally recommendations or regular screening tests existed for certain professions [28, 29]. During the period around 11,000-26,000 tests were performed per 100,000 population [30] and seroprevalence studies based on blood donors showed that a low proportion the adult healthy population of Denmark had been infected [31]. Therefore, we believe that controls were unlikely to have been positive without knowing.

Minor corrections:

- Abstract line 10: Please move the numbers to the results

Answer: The number of included cases and controls have been removed to the results.

- Abstract lines 20-21: Do not include citations in the abstract.

Answer: The reference have been deleted from the abstract.

- Introduction line 39: Why to refer to case-control studies? Do authors refer to studies in Denmark? It would be good to be more precise...

Answer: The sentence have been updated.

Line 44: By use of a case-control design, researchers all over the world have aimed to identify determinants, private and societal, for SARS-CoV-2 infection.

- Methods line 70: typo in "ministries".

Answer: Thank you for noticing this. It has been corrected.

Line 75-76: The information was retrieved from relevant Danish government ministries and from the national COVID-19 communication partnership (coronasmitte.dk).

- Results line 163: did the authors mean: "Compared to eligible cases, eligible controls [...]"?

Answer: Thank you for making us aware that this sentence might be misunderstood. We refer to the difference between eligible cases (unvaccinated individuals between 18–49 years old, with an address in Denmark, and an RT-PCR confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection in the period from 8 to 12 June 2021) and included cases in the study. We have made minor adjustments to the manuscript to make the point clearer.

Lines 174-175: Compared to eligible cases diagnosed during the period, the recruited cases were less likely to have migrant background (data not shown).

- Discussion 279: "conducting" not "conduction"

Answer: thanks, the spelling mistake have been corrected.

Lines 298-303: Since no determinants for infection were identified, we conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation; exceptions being fitness centers and alcohol consumption. Instead, a major risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person and transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members.

Reviewer #3: This is a case-control study attempting to identify individual and contextual risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection in Denmark. The study is well written and has a sound methodology. However, I have a few questions that I believe should be addressed:

- In the abstract (line 4) the authors mention they aim at testing the efficiency of such measures - however efficiency requires a resources dimension - do the authors believe they have addressed this?

Answer: Thank you for this comment. We have revised the first part of the abstract and the conclusion so that it is more clear.

Lines 2-4: Measures to restrict physical inter-personal contact in the community have been widely implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. We studied determinants for infection with SARS-CoV-2 with the aim of informing future public health measures.

Lines 20-23: Alcohol consumption and fitness centers were weakly associated with infection, in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier. Apart from the two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person.

- At the end of introduction (lines 60-61) authors mention the "present an overview of the official restrictions". This seems a bit misleading as the authors actually prepare one as part of their work. I suggest this to be rephrased.

Answer: The sentence have been rephrased.

Lines 59-61: Here we present the results of a second national case-control study of risk factors for infection. For context and reference, we further created an overview of the official restrictions that have been in place in Denmark throughout the COVID-19 epidemic.

- Authors have excluded hospitalized and vaccinated patients. Can they comment on how this might have influenced the results and how this can affect results generalizability?

Answer: .We studied determinants for infection with SARS-CoV-2 and were primarily interested in community exposures, and therefore we excluded cases and controls who had been hospitalized for more than 12 hours in the period of interest.

Cases and controls who have been vaccinated before the 8 of June 2021 was also excluded. Michlmary et al. 2022, investigated the observed protection against SARS-CoV-2 reinfection following a primary infection. The study was performed in Denmark, in the same period as our study was performed. They showed that SARS-CoV-2 infection and vaccination offered a high level of protection against reinfection. Based on this, we assumed that the risk of infection was not the same for vaccinated and non-vaccinated persons. In order not to include people with different risk of infection, the study was performed among people who had not previously tested positive. That the study population were unvaccinated not previously infected persons limits the generalizability to the vaccinated – at the time older – population. Conclusions generalizable to the vaccinated population would have required a different design, for example with two or more case and control groups. No adjustment have been made to the manuscript.

Reference: Michlmayr, D., Hansen, C. H., Gubbels, S. M., Valentiner-Branth, P., Bager, P., Obel, N., Drewes, B., Møller, C. H., Møller, F. T., Legarth, R., Mølbak, K., & Ethelberg, S. (2022). Observed protection against SARS-CoV-2 reinfection following a primary infection: A Danish cohort study among unvaccinated using two years of nationwide PCR-test data. The Lancet regional health. Europe, 20, 100452. doi:10.1016/j.lanepe.2022.100452

- Data collection: The exposure period ranged from eight to two days before the symptom onset (or test for asymptomatic) for cases. However I could not identify what was the index date for controls - what was the 6-day refer to? Can the authors clarify?

Answer: The 6-day period for controls, were the same as for their matched case. We have made minor adjustments to the text, and hope it is clearer now:

Lines 113-114: The 6-day period ran from eight to two days prior to symptom onset (or test date if asymptomatic) for cases and the same 6-day period for the matched control.

- Some of the analysis reported in Table 1 and not described in the methods. I suggest this to be added.

Answer: Thank you for this suggestion, the methods section have been updated accordingly.

Lines 139-141: We compared basic demographic characteristics (country of origin, household size, number of contacts and employment status) of cases and controls. We used Chi-Square to test for overall differences and matched logistic regression to test for intergroup differences.

- The authors emphasize the alcohol consumption in their results. However this has not been given an in-depth consideration in the discussion. Why the authors believe they have identified this results? Is it really related with the alcohol consumption or it this a proxy for other types of behaviours?

Answer: Thanks for this point. The following have been added to the discussion:

Lines 229-237: As also speculated previously [10], activities potentially involving heavy breathing, excretions of aerosols, close interaction and touching of multiple surfaces in a closed indoor environment could constitute an environment prone to SARS-CoV-2 transmission, compared to outdoor sport activities. In the same line is the association with alcohol when present at restaurants or cafés, where alcohol may be a proxy for reduced awareness of protective behavior and adherence to IPC recommendations, increasing the likelihood of closer interactions and with that SARS-CoV-2 transmission. On the other hand, many other investigated activities, notably use of public transportation, supermarkets and cultural and sports gatherings were as common in cases than amongst controls.

- There are negative results in for a series of contexts. Have the authors explored these results in more depth? They raise an hypothesis is the discussion (lines 261 onwards) which has not been corroborated by the sensitivity analysis. Do you see any alternative reasons for these results. Could remote work play a role here?

Answer: Recall bias have been added as a potential systematic bias between cases and controls. However, it has not been possible to investigate this potential bias. Unfortunately we do not have information on remote work.

Lines 280-283: Another potential systematic difference between cases and controls is their ability to recall activities in the period in question, if cases already during contact tracing had been asked to recall relevant activities, they may have been more likely to report adequately, which can have influenced the results.

- The authors claim their results support the "efficiency" of existing measures. However I am not entirely convinced here. In fact there is no counterfactual to assess the effectiveness (which I believe is what in fact authors intended to assess) or the impact of those measures. Please comment.

Answer: We have updated the main text and conclusion to make the message we wanted to convey clearer. We interpret our finding that we, with the exception of alcohol and fitness, did not identify any risk associated with community activities, as that the measures in place were adequate to reduce any potential risk to a level where we could not find a difference between cases and controls. Yes, transmission have happened in those settings, but not to an extent where we would be able to predict where such a transmission would be more likely to occur. Contact to an infected person was, not surprisingly, by far the strongest risk factor for infection. So is state that as we found no single determination to be associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection and because transmission appeared to primarily take place via contact to a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection, community restrictions in place were efficient.

Abstract (Lines 20-23): Alcohol consumption and fitness centers were weakly associated with infection, in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier. Apart from the two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person.

Conclusion (Lines 296-304): In conclusion, we show results of a study of risk factors for SARS-CoV-2 infection and compare with a similar study done six month earlier. Under the constraints of the methodology of case-control studies, no major determinants for infection were identified. Since no determinants for infection were identified, we conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation; exceptions being fitness centers and alcohol consumption. Instead, a major risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person and transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members. Finally, we provide a timeline of non-pharmaceutical interventions that were implemented in Denmark from February 2020 to March 2022.

Reviewer #4: The authors aim to identify determinants of Sars-COV2 infection in the Denmark in June 2021 using a case –control study. They compare exposure to determinants among

1) 500 cases unvaccinated; 18-49 years old, residents in Denmark, with a RT-PCR test positive result between 8-12 June that were not hospitalized; had not travelled abroad

2) With 529 controls matched on year of birth, sex and municipality with the cases (1 to 1 match).

The 6 days (from Day -8 to Day -2 prior to symptom or test +) exposure to determinants was measures by telephone interviews between 15 and 24 June. Conditional logistic regression is correctly use for the analysis.

- The population from which cases and controls are coming from does not look identical concerning previous infection which is an exclusion criteria for controls but no clear info is provided about the cases. For the community transmission, given the restrictions in place, it means that we could have only controls with a recent negative test but we could have cases with a previous infection or a recent negative test who access public spaces. A subgroup analysis could be performed excluding cases with previous infection and their matched controls, to account for that.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. We apologise that it was not clearly described in the methods, but cases previously infected by 8 June 2021 were not included. Meaning that, cases and controls was similar concerning previous infection status. This have been added to the methods and adjusted in the abstract.

Lines 5-6: We conducted a national matched case-control study among unvaccinated not previously infected adults aged 18-49 years

Lines 89-91: Eligible cases were unvaccinated individuals between 18–49 years old, not previously infected by 8 June 2021, with an address in Denmark, and an RT-PCR confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection in the period from 8 to 12 June 2021.

- In order to understand the results without the need to consult other articles a more detailed description of the questionnaire used is necessary.

Answer: Thank you for this suggestion. A description of the included community exposures have been included.

Lines 122-126: The community exposures inquired about were same as in our first study, and included activities as dining at restaurants, going to bars, shopping, participating in sport activities, and religious events or events involving singing etc. along with questions on if these activities took place indoors or outdoors, or involved consumption of alcohol. In contrast to the first study, we did not include questions on protective behavior and adherence with measures.

-The conclusion that Contact with another individual with a known infection as the main determinant for SARS-CoV-2 infection is based on sound methodology and nicely reflected in the different sections. Given the strength of the association even adjusting for other determinants will not modify the findings and or conclusions.

Sub-group analysis for the community transmission section.

The analysis for each determinant is performed separately adjusted for migration back ground, household size and the matching variables. There is no analysis performed by adjusting for all determinants, or for determinants associated with risk of infection in the bivariate analysis.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. As we do not identify any strong associations, data does not give rise to additional analyses. We fear that any multivariable (apart from the confounding factors adjusted for) analyses will strain our data to a point not meaningful.

- Based on the results from table 4 some of the interpretations about differences between cases and controls are not fully correct. In the results section it states that cases are more likely than controls to have consumed alcohol in a bar. By looking at table 4, the CI95% of the OR for alcohol consumption in a Bar includes the 1 meaning that the difference is not statistically significant. The same logic applies for the indoor sport activities, indoor fitness center and outdoor sport activities. The difference between cases and controls is not statistically significant. The results and discussion sections are to be updated accordingly concerning the community transmission part. (no significant difference for indoor fitness centers, indoor sport activities, alcohol consumption in bars )

Answer: Thank you for this point. We have added that the trends we found, that more cases than controls consume alcohol at bar and indoor cultural events are not significant.

Lines 183-188: Controls were more likely to report having been to restaurants than cases, mOR: 0.66 (95% CI: 0.49-0.90). However, cases were more likely than controls to report, that they or others in their company had consumed alcohol during the restaurant visit, adjusted odds ratio (aOR): 2.3 (95% CI: 1.3-4.2). The same trend was seen for bar and indoor cultural events, where more controls than cases reported to have visited a bar and participated in indoor cultural events, but more cases than controls reported alcohol consumption (non-significant) (Table 4).

- It seems that the study is underpowered to detect community determinants of SARS-COV2 infection. Considering a matched 2 controls 1 case design could partially resolve that problem. In the multivariate model, only determinants associated with outcome in the bivariate analysis could be entered.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. We did not find any high mOR with wide confidence intervals (except within the sensitivity analysis), which could be a sign of a type I error, and we therefore believe the sample size would be sufficient to identify associations if they existed. Also, we had beforehand performed a power estimation; this is described in the MS. We have added a comment on this in the limitation section.

We did not find several community exposures to be associated with SARS-CoV-2, and therefore we did not find a multivariate model relevant.

Lines 268-270: We did not find any high mOR with wide confidence intervals, indicating type I errors, and therefore we consider out sample size to be sufficient to identify associations if they existed.

- Other

Page 4 line 56 (Introduction section) Please rephrase

Society was gradually reopening, with now only societal restrictions in place for those individuals who were vaccinated, had recovered from infection or recently tested negative

In contradiction with Line 71-72 (methods section)

Answer: Thank you for this comment. The introduction have been corrected.

Lines 56-58: Society was gradually reopening, with now only societal restrictions in place for those individuals who were not vaccinated or protected from previous infection and for those who did not have a recently negative SARS-CoV-2 test.

- Table 1 Please provide OR for non matching variables. From the bivariate analysis it looks like the migration background and the number of contacts are associated with the risk of becoming a case.

Answer: Table 1 have been updated and now the table includes the p-value for the Chi-Square test for overall difference between cases and controls, as well the p-values for the matched odds ratios have been included. The methods section have also been updated

Lines 139-141: We compared basic demographic characteristics (country of origin, household size, number of contacts and employment status) of cases and controls. We used Chi-Square to test for overall differences and matched logistic regression to test for intergroup differences.

Table 1. Number and proportion of included cases and controls by demographic characteristics and p-value of test for deviations, Denmark, June 2021.

Demographic characteristics Included cases

(n=500), n (%) Matched controls

(n=529), n (%)

P value1

Age group na

18-24 years 199 (40) 212 (40)

25-34 years 159 (32) 170 (32)

35-44 years 85 (17) 88 (17)

45-49 years 57 (11) 59 (11)

Sex na

Male 263 (53) 283 (54)

Female 237 (47) 246 (47)

Region na

Capital Region of Denmark 195 (39) 200 (38)

Region Zealand 56 (11) 62 (12)

Region of Southern Denmark 61 (12) 66 (12)

Central Denmark Region 117 (23) 128 (24)

North Denmark Region 71 (14) 73 (14)

Migration background2 <0.05

Denmark 403 (81) 462 (87) Ref.

Western country 26 (5.2) 23 (4.3) 0.34

Non-western country 71 (14) 44 (8.3) <0.05

Household size3 0.64

1 78 (16) 91 (17) Ref.

2 141 (28) 165 (31) 0.92

3 109 (22) 100 (19) 0.22

4 105 (21) 108 (20) 0.46

≥5 67 (13) 65 (12) 0.39

Number of contacts <0.05

0-5 290 (58) 208 (39) Ref.

6-10 88 (18) 156 (29) <0.05

11-15 47 (9.4) 51 (9.6) 0.06

16-20 27 (5.4) 30 (5.7) 0.07

21-49 30 (6.0) 52 (9.8) <0.05

Over 50 18 (3.6) 32 (6.0) <0.05

Employment status 0.34

Employed 307 (61) 339 (64) Ref.

Student 150 (30) 138 (26) 0.06

Other 43 (8.6) 52 (9.8) 0.62

1 P-value for Chi-Square test for deviation between included cases and matched controls (italic). P-value for mOR (non-italic)

2 Non-Danish migration background was defined as first or second generation immigrants from either Western countries (primarily neighboring European countries) or from non-Western countries (the five most frequent being Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Somalia).

3 Number of registered persons on the same address.

In table 2 there is a total of 516 cases reported whereas in the results section only 500 cases are reported as included, please double-check or clarify

Answer: Thank you for noting this.

In table 2, 500 cases were included and the 500 cases indicated 516 likely places of infection. The denominator in the table have been changed to 500 instead of 516. This is stated under the table. Additional, the 1, have been moved to the title, so make it more clear.

Table 2. Number and proportion of likely place of infection as indicated by cases (n=500)1.

Likely place of infection n (%)

Household 105 (21)

Friends/other family than household 80 (16)

Workplace 84 (17)

Education 28 (5.6)

Leisure activities 27 (5.4)

Other events 13 (2.6)

Public transport 8 (1.6)

Other place/exposure 68 (14)

Don’t know 103 (21)

1It was possible to indicate more than one likely place of infection (516 answers included from 500 cases).

Table 3 Please provide adjusted OR for migration background and household size as well.

Answer: Thank you for this suggestion, we have added the OR for migration and household size from the type of contact model in table 3:

Table 3:

Table 3. Number, proportion and matched odds ratios (mOR) related to type of contact with a person with known SARS-CoV-2 infection (with/without symptoms), Denmark, June 2021.

Type of contact with infected person with/without symptoms Cases (n=483), n (%) Controls (n=512), n (%) mOR (95% CI)

No contact with infected person 256 (53) 472 (92) Ref.

Other contact, without symptoms 10 (2.1) 6 (1.2) 3.04 (0.93-9.99)

Other contact, with symptoms 14 (2.9) 6 (1.2) 3.25 (1.15-9.19)

Close contact, without symptoms 73 (15) 16 (3.1) 8.53 (4.52-16.11)

Close contact, with symptoms 130 (27) 12 (2.3) 20 (9.80-39.49)

Migration background

Denmark 391 (81) 448 (88) Ref.

Western country 25 (5.2) 23 (4.5) 1.13 (0.52-2.43)

Non-western country 67 (14) 41 (8.0) 2.17 (1.28-3.68)

Household size

1 75 (16) 86 (17) Ref.

2 135 (28) 159 (31) 0.93 (0.56-1.54)

3 105 (22) 98 (19) 1.07 (0.63-1.79)

4 102 (21) 106 (21) 1.25 (0.72-2.18)

≥5 66 (14) 63 (12) 0.88 (0.47-1.64)

Note mOR estimates were adjusted for type of contact with/without symptoms, migration background and household size.

All ‘do not know’ responds were excluded in the analysis.

General Feedback

Please standardize the reporting of OR and CI95% by using everywhere 2 decimals (1,01 instead of 1,0 or 39,00 instead of 39).

Inclusive tables with absolute numbers and proportions as well as OR(CI95%) of both bivariate and multivariate analysis would be more easy to read and interpret.

Answer: Thank you for this comment. We would be sad to report more than two significant digits on percentages and in the text, as we believe having only two significant digits improves readability and does not compromise the interpretation of the results. If the editor of PLOS ONE insist, we will of course adjust.

Additional revisions:

Cajar et al., 2022 have been published meanwhile, so the reference have been updated.

Lines 255-259: Another Danish case-control study, performed in October to December 2020 found associations similar to those seen in our studies [5]. The most important risk factor identified was contact to an infected person. Moreover, this study also found an association with fitness centers but not with shopping, use of public transport and participating in outdoor sport activities. Contrary to our findings, participation in indoor sport activities, larger events, and restaurant and bar visits were identified as risk factors [5]

Reference: Cajar MD, Tan FCC, Boisen MK, Krog SM, Nolsoee R, Collatz Christensen H, et al. Behavioral factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. Results from a web-based case-control survey in the Capital Region of Denmark. BMJ Open. 2022;12(6):e056393. doi: 10.1136/bmjopen-2021-056393

The link in reference [11] have been updated.

Reference: The Danish Ministry of Health. Orientering om ændringer i regler vedr. coronapasset pr. 21. maj 2021. https://sum.dk/Media/637571404984193343/Orientering%20om%20%C3%A6ndringer%20i%20regler%20vedr.%20coronapas%20pr.%20215.pdf.

Attachment

Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers_.docx

Decision Letter 1

Joël Mossong

21 Sep 2022

PONE-D-22-13314R1Case-control study of activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population and overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in DenmarkPLOS ONE

Dear Dr. Ethelberg,

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to PLOS ONE. After careful consideration, we feel that it has merit but does not fully meet PLOS ONE’s publication criteria as it currently stands. Therefore, we invite you to submit a revised version of the manuscript that addresses the points raised during the review process.

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All the reviewers agreed that your revision is much improved. Two reviewers still have some minor requests for changes/clarifications.   ​

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Please review your reference list to ensure that it is complete and correct. If you have cited papers that have been retracted, please include the rationale for doing so in the manuscript text, or remove these references and replace them with relevant current references. Any changes to the reference list should be mentioned in the rebuttal letter that accompanies your revised manuscript. If you need to cite a retracted article, indicate the article’s retracted status in the References list and also include a citation and full reference for the retraction notice.

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Reviewers' comments:

Reviewer's Responses to Questions

Comments to the Author

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Reviewer #1: (No Response)

Reviewer #2: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #3: All comments have been addressed

Reviewer #4: (No Response)

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Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: Partly

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Reviewer #1: Yes

Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: Yes

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Reviewer #2: Yes

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Reviewer #4: No

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Reviewer #2: Yes

Reviewer #3: Yes

Reviewer #4: Yes

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Reviewer #1: The authors addressed most of my comments in a sufficient manner. However, I am still not convinced about the validity of their conclusion, which is critical for this paper. As I mentioned before, even if the community restrictions in place were efficient, behaviors that are truly high-risk would have been identified as such in the present study design. For example, individuals who were positive would be more likely to have history of going to bars and restaurant (resulting in higher odds) if this specific activity is indeed a high-risk behavior in the context of the study population. This should be the case regardless of what type of community restriction is in place. Conversely, as observed in this study, if we do not see any association between a specific behavior and infection, then it would not be possible to conclude that “community restrictions in place were efficient” as authors have done. If history of going to bars and restaurant is really high-risk, then we would see higher ORs. If the policy implemented includes restricting the opening hours at bars and restaurants and if we see that there is a good association between going to bars and restaurants, then we can infer that the policy is appropriately targeting high-risk individuals and high-risk behaviors. Below paper illustrated this exact point: Behavioral factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Japan. Influenza Other Respir Viruses. 2022;16(5):952-961.

Reviewer #2: The authors have carefully considered all comments of reviewers. Therefore, I recommend to accept in the current form.

Reviewer #3: Many thanks for fully considering the comments submitted and having provided satisfactory replies. While my comments were fully addressed I have 2 questions from replies from other reviewers:

- Authors have mentioned type I errors while refering to issues with power (R#2 and R#4). However I believe they intended to refer to type II erros (failure to reject a null hypothesis when it is false). Please review.

- Authors have mentioned in response to R#2 - "During the period around 11,000-26,000 tests were performed per 100,000 population [30]". I suggest to clarify whether these include only PCR or also Rapid Antigen Tests.

Reviewer #4: The majority of the comments have been addressed. However there are still few remaining issues to be addressed

General Comment :

Please consistently report two decimals for OR CI95% throughout the text.

In the Results Section /

Community determinants of SARS-CoV-2 infection

Lines 212-214

Apart from this,controls were more likely to participate in indoor sport activities, mOR: 0.57 (95% CI: 0.32-1.0), and outdoor sport activities, mOR: 0.71 (95% CI: 2130.49-1.0).

Comment :

Please consistently report two decimals for OR CI95% throughout the text.

In the table 4 for in indoor sport activities , mOR: 0.57 (95% CI: 0.32-1.01), and for outdoor sport activities

mOR: 0.71 (95% CI: 0.49-1.03) does not support the conclusion that controls were more likely to participate in indoor sport and outdoor sport activities.

Discussion :

Lines 247-252

The pattern of risk factors seen in the current study was remarkably similar to what we found in our previous study, where also, apart from contact to infected persons with known infections, fitness centers and alcohol consumption in bars and in addition participation in events which involved singing, were identified as being associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. This second study may therefore be seen as corroborating the findings of the first and it would appear that besides direct contact with infected individuals, under the restrictive measures in place in Denmark, use of fitness centers and social activity involving alcohol constituted actual risk factors.

Comment : Use of fitness centers and participation in events which involved singing are not significantly related to the risk of infection in the second study. Please rephrase.

Lines 334 -338

We therefore conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were in fact adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shoppings and public transportation; exceptions being fitness centers and alcohol consumption. which did constitute risks.

Comment : Use of fitness center is not significantly related to the risk of infection in the second study. Please rephrase.

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Reviewer #1: No

Reviewer #2: No

Reviewer #3: Yes: Andreia Leite

Reviewer #4: No

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PLoS One. 2022 Nov 16;17(11):e0268849. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0268849.r004

Author response to Decision Letter 1


20 Oct 2022

Rebuttal letter, 'Response to Reviewers'. Revision no 2.

PONE-D-22-13314R1

Case-control study of activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population and overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in Denmark

Please note: Changes to the reference list are mentioned at the end of this doc.

****

Reviewer #1: The authors addressed most of my comments in a sufficient manner. However, I am still not convinced about the validity of their conclusion, which is critical for this paper. As I mentioned before, even if the community restrictions in place were efficient, behaviors that are truly high-risk would have been identified as such in the present study design. For example, individuals who were positive would be more likely to have history of going to bars and restaurant (resulting in higher odds) if this specific activity is indeed a high-risk behavior in the context of the study population. This should be the case regardless of what type of community restriction is in place. Conversely, as observed in this study, if we do not see any association between a specific behavior and infection, then it would not be possible to conclude that “community restrictions in place were efficient” as authors have done. If history of going to bars and restaurant is really high-risk, then we would see higher ORs. If the policy implemented includes restricting the opening hours at bars and restaurants and if we see that there is a good association between going to bars and restaurants, then we can infer that the policy is appropriately targeting high-risk individuals and high-risk behaviors. Below paper illustrated this exact point: Behavioral factors associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in Japan. Influenza Other Respir Viruses. 2022;16(5):952-961.

Author reply: Thank you for raising this important point. We only partly agree. The study was done while restrictions concerning eg restaurants and bars were in place. They for instance involved restricted opening times, restrictions in the number of patrons present and use of masks. It is possible that we’d have seen restaurants appear as risk factors in a (hypothetical) un-restricted scenario but that the risk was lowered by the restrictions in place, resulting in no excess risk (measured as an odds ratio here) being identified. It is true of course that we cannot know this. It is also possible that the restrictions were redundant or simply had no effect and that we’d have obtained identical results had they not been in place. For this reasons we previously used to word ‘suggesting’.

However, we would agree that we might have stretched our conclusion too far and have therefore now changed the wording in the abstract and in the last conclusion paragraph of the MS. We now no longer say that the restrictions may have been adequate, rather that we cannot know this.

In the Abstract, the lines “Apart from these two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate.”

Have now been changed to: “Apart from these two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases under the community restrictions in place during the study” (lines 18-19).

In the Conclusion, the revised text now reads:

“We conclude that transmission in the general community was of little importance, while instead, the major risk factor for transmission was contact to a known infected person and that transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members. Our study could not directly measure the effect of the societal restrictions in place but it is not unreasonable to expect that these had an effect in reducing any potential risks associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation.” (lines 307-312).

**

Reviewer #2: The authors have carefully considered all comments of reviewers. Therefore, I recommend to accept in the current form.

Author reply: Thank you. No changes made to the manuscript.

**

Reviewer #3: Many thanks for fully considering the comments submitted and having provided satisfactory replies. While my comments were fully addressed I have 2 questions from replies from other reviewers:

- Authors have mentioned type I errors while refering to issues with power (R#2 and R#4). However I believe they intended to refer to type II erros (failure to reject a null hypothesis when it is false). Please review.

Author reply: Thank for you noticing this mistake. We have now rephrased the section:

Line 273: We did not find any high mOR with wide confidence intervals, which could indicating risk of type II errors, and therefore we consider our sample size to have been sufficient to identify associations had they existed

- Authors have mentioned in response to R#2 - "During the period around 11,000-26,000 tests were performed per 100,000 population [30]". I suggest to clarify whether these include only PCR or also Rapid Antigen Tests.

Author reply: Thank you for this comment. The number refers to PCR tests. This have now been added to the manuscript.

Lines 300-301: During the period around 11,000-26,000 RT-PCR tests were performed per 100,000 population

**

Reviewer #4: The majority of the comments have been addressed. However there are still few remaining issues to be addressed

- General Comment :

Please consistently report two decimals for OR CI95% throughout the text.

Author reply: Thanks for this. We’ve tried to consistently report two significant figures for OR’s and CI’s. Reporting two decimals would not be correct as it would imply precision in measurements that is not present. We for instance report “mOR: 20 (95% CI: 9.8-40)”. Here the number of significant figures are two for all three reported numbers. It would not have been correct to report, eg: “mOR: 19.89 (95% CI: 9.81-40.01), or [as a more extreme example]: “mOR: 163,12 (95% CI: 9.81-1936.23)”. (Please, if interested, see also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Significant_figures). We note that reporting of decimals is a matter of precision but also journal style and that the journal will decide given acceptance of the MS.

- In the table 4 for in indoor sport activities, mOR: 0.57 (95% CI: 0.32-1.01), and for outdoor sport activities mOR: 0.71 (95% CI: 0.49-1.03) does not support the conclusion that controls were more likely to participate in indoor sport and outdoor sport activities.

Author reply: Thank you for this comment. We have now have been rephrased the following four sections:

Lines 17-19: “Consumption of alcohol in restaurants or cafés, aOR=2.3 (95%CI:1.3–4.2) and possibly attending fitness centers, mOR=1.4 (95%CI:1.0-2.0) were weakly associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection, in agreement with findings of our similar study conducted six month earlier. Apart from these two factors, no community activities were more common amongst cases, suggesting that community restrictions in place were adequate. The strongest risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person.”

Lines 192-195: “In total, 24% of cases and 19% of controls had used a fitness centre at least once during the 6-day exposure period, mOR: 1.40 (95% CI: 0.98-2.0), this trend was not seen for indoor sport activities, mOR: 0.57 (95% CI: 0.32-1.0), nor for outdoor sport activities, mOR: 0.71 (95% CI: 0.49-1.0).”

Lines 232-238: “This second study may therefore be seen as corroborating the findings of the first and it would appear that besides direct contact with infected individuals, under the restrictive measures in place in Denmark, social activity involving alcohol and possibly the use of fitness centers constituted actual risk factors. As also speculated previously [10], activities potentially involving heavy breathing, excretions of aerosols, close interaction and touching of multiple surfaces in a closed indoor environment could constitute an environment prone to SARS-CoV-2 transmission, compared to outdoor sport activities.”

Lines 309-314: “We therefore conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation; exceptions being alcohol consumption and possibly use of fitness centers. Instead, a major risk factor for transmission was contact to an infected person and transmission primarily took place via infected colleagues or family members.”

- Discussion:

Lines 247-252

The pattern of risk factors seen in the current study was remarkably similar to what we found in our previous study, where also, apart from contact to infected persons with known infections, fitness centers and alcohol consumption in bars and in addition participation in events which involved singing, were identified as being associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. This second study may therefore be seen as corroborating the findings of the first and it would appear that besides direct contact with infected individuals, under the restrictive measures in place in Denmark, use of fitness centers and social activity involving alcohol constituted actual risk factors.

Comment: Use of fitness centers and participation in events which involved singing are not significantly related to the risk of infection in the second study. Please rephrase.

Author reply: Thank you for this comment. We have modified the text accordingly:

Lines 228-235: “The pattern of risk factors seen in the current study was remarkably similar to what we found in our previous study, where also, apart from contact to infected persons, fitness centers and alcohol consumption in bars and in addition participation in events which involved singing, were identified as being associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection. This second study may therefore be seen as corroborating the findings of the first and it would appear that besides direct contact with infected individuals, under the restrictive measures in place in Denmark, social activity involving alcohol and possibly the use of fitness centers constituted actual risk factors.”

- Lines 334 -338

We therefore conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were in fact adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shoppings and public transportation; exceptions being fitness centers and alcohol consumption. which did constitute risks.

Comment: Use of fitness center is not significantly related to the risk of infection in the second study. Please rephrase.

Author reply: Thank you for this comment. We have now modified the text accordingly:

Lines 309-312: “We therefore conclude that overall societal restrictions in use in the spring of 2021 were adequate to reducing any potential risk associated with community activities such as participating in cultural events, dining at restaurants, shopping and public transportation; exceptions being alcohol consumption and possibly use of fitness centers.”

*****

Author: This concludes our responses to the reviewer comments. Please not that in addition we have also made changes, as per Journal Requirements, to the reference list:

References:

The following changes were made to the reference list:

Ref. 12: The link in the reference list have been updated, as the original link wasn’t online anymore.

The updated reference is:

The Danish Ministry of Health Ministry of Industry Business and Financial Affairs and The Ministry of Employment. Retningslinjer om ansvarlig indretning af liberale serviceerhverv og køreskoler i lyset af udbruddet af COVID-19. https://em.dk/media/14213/retningslinjer-for-liberale-serviceerhverv-af-14-juni.pdf

Ref. 20: The link in the reference list have been updated, as the original link wasn’t online anymore.

The updated reference is:

Aftale om yderligere genåbning pr. 21 maj 2021

https://coronasmitte.dk/nyt-fra-myndighederne/pressemoeder/aftale-om-yderligere-genaabning

Ref 23: The link in the reference has been deleted.

Ref 30: The link to Statens Serum Instituts dashboard has been updated.

Attachment

Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers.docx

Decision Letter 2

Joël Mossong

25 Oct 2022

Case-control study of activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population and overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in Denmark

PONE-D-22-13314R2

Dear Dr. Ethelberg,

We’re pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it meets all outstanding technical requirements.

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Joël Mossong, PhD

Academic Editor

PLOS ONE

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

Reviewers' comments:

Acceptance letter

Joël Mossong

8 Nov 2022

PONE-D-22-13314R2

Case-control study of activities associated with SARS-CoV-2 infection in an adult unvaccinated population and overview of societal COVID-19 epidemic counter measures in Denmark

Dear Dr. Ethelberg:

I'm pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been deemed suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. Congratulations! Your manuscript is now with our production department.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please let them know about your upcoming paper now to help maximize its impact. If they'll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team within the next 48 hours. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information please contact onepress@plos.org.

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on behalf of

Dr. Joël Mossong

Academic Editor

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Associated Data

    This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

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    Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers_.docx

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    Submitted filename: Response to Reviewers.docx

    Data Availability Statement

    This study was performed as a national disease surveillance project and for legal reasons data are not available in the public domain nor in databases accessible for researchers. However, the interview data from this study may be made available in a de-identifiable format to other researchers upon reasonable request. For such, please contact Statens Serum Institut directly (email: serum@ssi.dk).


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