Beyond AUKUS: the emerging grand maritime alliance

Abstract

The AUKUS agreement is the first in history to allow a non-nuclear country to have nuclear-powered submarines, but not nuclear weapons. It pushes the Australia–UK–US alliance to the level of a closer military, scientific, and industrial community and outlines a prototype for a new “maritime alliance.” The closer the internal relationship of this alliance, the more it will estrange China. The alliance seeks to create a “de-Sinicized” defense industry chain and has thus become the forerunner for the restructuring of international relations. The “integrated deterrence” strategy that the alliance is building will change the strategic deterrence structure in the Indo-Pacific region and some essential features of the US alliance system’s deterrence strategy against China. China should pay great attention to the political will, strategic structure, deterrence concept, and military tactics displayed by this major agreement.

Introduction

On September 15, 2021, US President Joe Biden, then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson jointly announced the creation of the Australia–UK–US Trilateral Security Partnership, or AUKUS (White House 2021a). They declared that the first action of this security partnership would be the construction of a fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, the details of which would be released over the following 18 months. This was the first time since 1958 that the US had shared with other countries’ nuclear submarine technology. In April 2022, the three countries announced a second action: cooperation on the development of hypersonic weapons (White House 2022a).

From a global perspective, the AUKUS agreement sends three major signals: first, a new “grand maritime alliance” is about to emerge; second, the US military alliance system is becoming a military, scientific, and industrial community; third, the military, scientific, and industrial community of the US and its allies will take integrated strategic capabilities and integrated deterrence as its future development goals, marking the beginning of the division of the world into blocs.

A new “grand maritime alliance” is about to emerge

The AUKUS agreement proclaims that Australia, the UK, and the US will share naval nuclear propulsion information, including “the design, arrangement, development, manufacture, testing, operation, administration, training, maintenance, and repair of the propulsion plants of naval nuclear-powered ships and prototypes, including the associated shipboard and shore-based nuclear support facilities.” The governments of the three countries have established working groups to work on issues such as safety, design, construction, operation, maintenance, disposal, regulations, training, and environmental protection, as well as full management of installations, infrastructure, bases, manpower, force structure, etc. (House of Lords Library 2022).

In addition to naval nuclear power, AUKUS covers a wide range of fields, including military, science, technology, industry, and training. Even for military alliances, sharing high-end technical information and jointly building industrial capabilities are displays of deep trust and cooperation. UK National Security Advisor Stephen Lovegrove calls AUKUS “the most significant capability collaboration anywhere in the world in the past six decades” (Cabinet Office and Sir Stephen Lovegrove 2021).

AUKUS was built on the bones of an Australian–French submarine deal. After Australia turned its back on France and joined the US and the UK, the new trilateral agreement became more than just a submarine construction project. Due to various factors, it has become a new way for the US to connect with its allies and a new model for the US alliance system. It also serves as a bridge between two strategic regions: the Atlantic Ocean and the Indo-Pacific Ocean. This was made clear in a speech delivered by US President Biden on September 15, 2021, when he announced the trilateral agreement. He said, “This is about investing in our greatest source of strength—our alliances—and updating them to better meet the threats of today and tomorrow. It’s about connecting America’s existing allies and partners in new ways and amplifying our ability to collaborate, recognizing that there is no regional divide separating the interests of our Atlantic and Pacific partners” (White House 2021b). As a result of this, the three countries’ position offshore the Eurasian Continent has become prominent.

AUKUS connects the US’s Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theaters

AUKUS’s negotiation process was extremely confidential. However, after the agreement came out, its potential global strategic significance was soon discovered. At a press conference following the announcement of AUKUS, Biden said that the agreement concerns “the future of each of our nations—and indeed the world” (White House 2021b). On April 1, 2022, the US Congress formed the AUKUS Caucus, which is dedicated to advancing the trilateral alliance. The Caucus is chaired by Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee Joe Courtney, Republican senator Mike Gallagher, Democratic senator Derek Kilmer, and Republican representative Blake Moore. According to Gallagher, “AUKUS is a critical new partnership that should be at the forefront of our security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.” Kilmer labels the UK and Australia as “critical allies.” Moore views the AUKUS alliance as a global one to contain China (Courtney 2022). Taken together, according to this Caucus, AUKUS apparently is a global maritime alliance and maritime community which aims to contain China.

The strategic document, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power (Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, and United States Coast Guard 2020), which was released by the US in late 2020, does not discuss global cooperation that includes China. Instead, it stresses securing the US’s maritime advantage in every domain. But the strategic document leaves out two major questions. First, how will the US confront both China and Russia at the same time? Second, how should the US distribute its strength between the Atlantic theater and the Indo-Pacific theater? In other words, the challenge that confronts the US is this: does the US have a coherent global strategy or only two independent regional strategies? This gap is now filled by AUKUS. AUKUS seems to incoporate Indo-Pacific strategy into the global strategy of the US.

Since the birth of AUKUS, the US has been greatly pushing forward integration between the Indo-Pacific theater and the Euro-Atlantic theater. The Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, which was released in February 2022, says that the US has noticed that the EU and NATO “are increasingly committing new attention to the Indo-Pacific” and that the US “will harness this opportunity to align our approaches and will implement our initiatives in coordination to multiply our effectiveness” (White House 2022b). In his China policy speech on May 26, 2022, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that even though the Russia–Ukraine war has not yet ended, the US “will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order—and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” To cope with the China challenge, the US will be “building bridges among our Indo-Pacific and European partners, including by inviting Asian allies to the NATO summit in Madrid next month” (Blinken 2022). Later, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea participated in the NATO summit in Madrid at the end of June 2022.

Australia established its pivotal position in new global geopolitics by signing up for AUKUS

Australia once hoped it could be a bridge between China and the US. In 2014, China and Australia established a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” In the same year, China, the US, and Australia conducted their first joint military exercise in Australia. In October 2015, the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement came into effect. In the same year, despite US opposition, Australia joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) advocated by China. The government of Australia’s Northern Territory also leased a terminal in Darwin Port to China’s Landbridge Group for 99 years. The level of closeness and trust between China and Australia reached a historical peak. Australia believed it did not have to choose sides between the US and China back then (Schreer 2015; Thomson 2013).

However, in 2015, the Landbridge Group’s Darwin Port lease deal unexpectedly came to the attention of the US, which made Australia aware that its relationship with China could jeopardize its relationship with its American ally (Perlez 2016). This event became the turning point in the bilateral relationship between China and Australia. Australia’s concerns about security outweighed its economic interests. In 2016, the Australian government blocked the sale of Ausgrid to Chinese holding companies. In 2017, then Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull accused foreign countries (China) of interfering in the internal affairs of Australia and even dramatically claimed that Australian people are standing up just like the Chinese people did in 1949 (Gribbin 2017). On June 28, 2018, the Australian parliament passed the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme. In August of the same year, the Australian government banned China’s Huawei and ZTE from participating in Australia's national 5G network construction under the excuse of national security. In early 2019, Australia even lobbied the Five Eyes alliance to ban Huawei technology. In April 2020, Australia took the lead in demanding an international probe into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. On July 29, 2020, Australia followed the US in submitting a report to the United Nations denying the legal basis of China’s claims in the South China Sea. The move was hailed by the US ambassador to Australia as exercising “leadership in the region” (Galloway and Bagshaw 2020). In July 2020, Australia released its Defence Strategic Update, in which it cites a sharp deterioration in its security environment and blames the rapid growth of certain forces in the Indo-Pacific region. The Australian prime minister believes the region is in the midst of an unprecedented and far-reaching strategic restructuring (Morrison 2020).

In just a few years, Australia has reassessed its regional security environment, repositioned its position between China and the US, and prepared to play a greater role in the new US strategic framework (Jennings 2019). At the press conference after the announcement of the AUKUS agreement, then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison called AUKUS a “forever partnership” 13 times. Australia has been “all-in” on the alliance with the US and the UK (Babones 2022). Whether from east to west or from south to north, Australia happens to be at the geographic hub of America’s new Indo-Pacific strategy. It is located in the center of the southern part of the Earth, with the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean as its two wings. Australia also is fairly distant from China compared to the US allies of South Korea and Japan. It can deploy long-range weapons to deter China, and it is still at the outer edge of China's long-range strike capability (Dibb 2020). Therefore, for the US, Australia can still be regarded as a relatively secure forward base with ability to conduct long-distance deterrence against China.

The US and Australia are both former colonies of the UK. The US inherited global maritime hegemony from the UK, while Australia first closely followed the UK and then went all out to the US for protection. Moreover, in the Indo-Pacific region, compared with other US allies, Australia and the US are the closest and most intimate in terms of history, culture, psychology, economy, technology, and values. If the US wants to focus on a country in the Indo-Pacific theater to cultivate as a special ally, or if we assess which country has the most potential to become a US special ally, the top candidate is undoubtedly Australia (US Department of Defense n.d.). The special relationship between Britain and the US after World War II needs no further discussion. The three countries of Australia, the US, and the UK are the most homogeneous countries in the international community in terms of their views on the world, the nature of their power, and their history and culture. In international power struggle, the three countries have the same way of thinking—that is, to maintain maritime superiority in the global maritime domain and to pursue limited intervention on land. The US and Britain have provided a large amount of military assistance to Ukraine, but they have not sent troops to intervene on land. In addition, their maritime forces have maintained vigilance in the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. This is a continuation of the traditional British and American way of using sea power. It is not difficult to predict that the US, Australia, and the UK will work together to maintain maritime superiority over China, a land–sea power with long-range strike capability and nuclear weapons.

The UK is pursuing a “Global Britain” strategy that emphasizes AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific

It has been more than half a century since the British withdrew from the east of the Suez Canal. With Brexit and the rise of the Asia–Pacific, the UK has now adopted a “Global Britain” strategy that emphasizes the country’s global nature (British Cabinet Office 2021a). In 2018, the UK reopened the Bahrain military base it evacuated from in 1947, which is now the UK’s largest overseas naval operation base. In September 2020, the British Ministry of Defense announced the expansion of the Port of Duqm in Oman to facilitate the deployment of the British Navy to the Indian Ocean (Binnie 2020; Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP 2020). In March 2021, the UK launched the Integrated Review, which sets out a blueprint for its “Global Britain” goals. In this strategy document, the UK mentions the Indo-Pacific region more than 30 times and states that it will be deeply engaged in the Indo-Pacific as the European partner with the broadest and most integrated presence (British Cabinet Office 2021a).

Clearly, Britain is reviving its past as a great sea power. In 2020, then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson promised to make the UK Europe’s “foremost naval power.” The UK is the second largest NATO country in terms of military spending after the US (Ewing 2020). According to the Integrated Review, the new era is the most severe era in the international environment since the end of the Cold War. It is an era of maritime competition between China and the US, and the Indo-Pacific region is the center stage of global maritime strategic competition. In this new era, the UK will be “free to go its own way” and will be open to a global network of allies and partners with whom it will forge new and deeper relationships (British Cabinet Office 2021b).

In July 2021, the UK sent a fleet of unprecedented scale on a global deployment. Before the British fleet set sail, then Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said, “When our Carrier Strike Group sets sail next month, it will be flying the flag for Global Britain—projecting our influence, signaling our power, engaging with our friends and reaffirming our commitment to addressing the security challenges of today and tomorrow” (Sky News 2021). On July 6, the British “Elizabeth” aircraft carrier battle group passed through the Suez Canal, crossed the Indian Ocean, entered the South China Sea, visited South Korea and Japan, and later conducted joint exercises with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the US Navy. It also held joint exercises with the navies of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Ben Wallace MP 2021). The global deployment demonstrates the degree of US–UK integration, with US destroyers providing air and anti-submarine protection to the British fleet and ten US Marine Corps F-35B fighter jets providing the British fleet with additional air defense capabilities.

The AUKUS agreement announced on September 15, 2021 has naturally become a new signpost on this path, as well as a gateway for the UK to intervene in the Asia–Pacific. Following its signing, former UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that the UK, the US, and Australia are natural allies and that AUKUS is a concrete step toward implementing the UK’s Integrated Review, a big step toward global security, a partnership between three like-minded allies, and a new partnership for sharing technology (British Prime Minister’s Office 2021). The AUKUS agreement has undoubtedly consolidated the UK’s presence in the Indo-Pacific region; promoted the building of integrated defense capabilities among Australia, the UK, and the US; and implemented the UK’s strategic intention of leaning toward the Indo-Pacific and returning to the global ocean (Patalano 2021).

Australia, the UK, and the US are forming a division of labor to deter China through their grand maritime alliance

“An important feature of US sea power is that it regards allies as an important part of US sea power” (Shi 2012, 120). The Biden administration has repeatedly affirmed the value of allies and partners in its maintenance of its global order. Among its many allies, Australia is the gateway to the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, and the UK is the chokepoint connecting the European continent to the Atlantic Ocean. From the two flanks of the Atlantic and the Pacific to the junction of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the UK, the US, and Australia have built a huge strategic arc which spans the outer seas of the Eurasian continent. This strategic arc constitutes a line of deterrence against China and Russia.

The AUKUS agreement clearly outlines this strategic arc. From the perspective of task division, the UK can guard against Russia in the Atlantic region, and Australia can guard against China in the Indo-Pacific region. The close relationship between the US, the UK, and Australia can integrate the two strategic theaters into a single comprehensive theater.

Moreover, the new “grand maritime alliance” may expand. AUKUS has sparked Japan’s imagination. Former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Japanese Ambassador to Australia Shingo Yamagami have both said that Japan is willing to participate in AI and cybersecurity cooperation under the AUKUS framework. Although limited by its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Japan still expects to cooperate with AUKUS through some kind of “AUKUS + Forum.” On January 6, 2022, the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement came into force (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2022), making Australia the first country after the US to sign a visiting force status agreement with Japan. This is of great significance for the enhancement of interoperability and coordination capabilities between Japanese and Australian forces. Both Japan and Australia are big purchasers of US arms, and the importance of the improvement of their synergistic capability to the overall strength of the US alliance system is self-evident. After developments over the past few years, Japan and Australia have become each other’s closest military partner aside from the US (Wilkins 2022). This provides reason to be optimistic for the prospect of closer Japan–Australia–US trilateral security cooperation. If Japan joins AUKUS in some way, then the “grand maritime alliance” will expand to Northeast Asia.

At the same time, the Russian–Ukrainian war has resulted in a new European security posture in favor of the US: the UK has shown an unexpected toughness, and the newly appointed British Prime Minister Liz Truss (who was then foreign secretary) has called for the “reboot, recast and remodel” of the Western approach to deterrence (Cameron-Chileshe 2022). The UK’s role as “offshore balancer” is back. Germany, which used to be very cautious and hesitant in the use of force overseas, has also made changes and will be more actively involved in European defense (Economist 2022), and it is starting to provide Ukraine with heavy weapons. As of present, all former Warsaw Pact member states, aside from Ukraine and Belarus, have joined NATO. Sweden and Finland, which did not join NATO during the whole Cold War era, will soon join NATO (Reuters 2022). Finland and Estonia plan to jointly guard the Gulf of Finland, which could cut off Russia’s access to the Baltic Sea in times of war (Häggblom 2022). The present Russia–Ukraine war “has altered the political, strategic and economic framework conditions for European regional cooperation and transatlantic relations” (Reuters 2022). At the NATO summit held in Madrid, Spain from June 29 to 30 this year, members decided that NATO will expand its troops and prepare for war and that NATO troops will be deployed on the territory of former Warsaw Pact countries. NATO has become stronger and more united (Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid 2022).

Europe and NATO have invested more and become more united and active on defense issues. Further, Russia is in a defensive position because of its failure on the battlefield. The balance of power between NATO and Russia has dispelled some people’s initial fear of the Atlantic and Indo-Pacific competing for US resources. On the contrary, with the support of AUKUS, the intent of the US and its allies to divide labor to contain China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in the Euro-Atlantic relatively is becoming a reality.

Closer and deeper than a military alliance: toward a military–science–industrial community

On September 15, 2021, at the video conference that announced the AUKUS trilateral security partnership agreement, then Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison said that the trilateral security agreement is not only a combination of defense forces, but also a combination of technical and scientific cooperation, industrial capabilities, and supply chain integration. It will be a combination of Australian, British, and American technology, scientists, industry, and defense forces (Prime Minister of Australia 2021). It can be seen that the ambition of AUKUS is not limited to an arms sales contract. In explaining why Australia did not build a nuclear-powered submarine fleet from the start in 2016 (the year Australia signed a submarine construction contract with France), Morrison revealed, “That wasn’t on the table. It wasn’t on the table for a range of reasons.” But a nuclear-powered submarine fleet is now “a feasible option for Australia,” and “We now have the support and expertise of the United States and the United Kingdom” (ABC News 2021). Obviously, the decisive factor was the US agreeing to supply nuclear technology to Australia. This shows that the US plays the role of an enabler in the alliance system, a change from the traditional simple cooperation model in which the US provides and its allies receive capabilities and its allies receive capabilities. The US alliance system is closer and more integrated.

The “weapon system community” is an important means for the US alliance system to consolidate and enhance the overall power of the alliance in international relations after World War II

Since World War II, the US has always regarded international equipment cooperation as a symbol of alliance unity as well as an important means of coordinating alliance military strategy and foreign policy goals. The US has never forgotten the international strategic significance of the planning and layout of the defense industry (Hartley 2006). The military and industrial cooperation between the US and its allies has gone through roughly five stages: the sale of US military equipment through intergovernmental procurement agreements; the issuance of licenses to allow allies to produce or co-produce; allies’ imitation of the production of US-made weapons; the US and its allies’ joint development of the next generation of existing weapon systems; and now, the execution of joint research, development, and investment. The F-35 fighter jet program is a typical example of this most recent stage. This project includes eight founding countries, including Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the US. The total amount spent on this project is in the trillions, and a full life estimate of this spending is about $1.45 trillion. This is the largest weapons project in modern history and is known as the “project of the century” (Shalal-Esa 2012).

Such joint R&D, investment, production, and sales are motivated both strategically and economically. Economically, unit costs can be reduced through co-production, hedging R&D spending, and increasing exports. But in such cooperation, there is also competition. This competition is largely centered on technology sharing. Such cooperation is very asymmetric and the US holds the source code. Thus, the US’s allies try their best to gain some control. The UK once demanded special treatment on the grounds of its special relationship with the US and even threatened to withdraw from the project to obtain source code and other key technologies (Vucetic 2013).

In a sense, through the F-35 program, the US and its allies have formed an “F-35 community.” Such a community greatly improves the common training and combat capability of its members. At present, Australia, the UK, and Japan are the largest buyers of the US’s F-35, with orders of 100, 138, and 147, respectively (Hoehn 2022). NATO is to have four hundred F-35s by 2030 (Lockheed Martin n.d.). F-35 fighter jets of all countries can take off and land on the aircraft carriers of other allies (Shelbourne 2021). In the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war, we clearly see the importance of interoperability in weaponry and training in warfare. To rapidly facilitate Ukraine’s combat power, the US and NATO countries have provided weapon systems to former Eastern Bloc countries, replacing their former Soviet weapon systems in order to provide them to Ukraine (Ismay and Schmitt 2022).

At the global political and strategic level, the “weapon system community” represented by the F-35 program also has flagship significance. Energizing global deterrence through interoperability and synergy among global allies was one of the original motivations for the project (Lockheed Martin n.d.). At the same time, because of the high cost, the opportunity cost is also high. Once committed, it is very difficult for politicians to withdraw from the program. This strengthens the alliance and makes it more durable. In addition, due to the substantial increase in the opportunities for and depth of interaction among all parties, the relevant departments within each country—from scientific research to technology departments and from industry to personnel departments, and even departments that provide support and security in related areas—will deepen their mutual familiarity and sense of intimacy. Cohesion among allies is strengthening from government to society. Such psychological and cultural familiarity and connection also has positive implications for the overall power of alliances in international relations.

Despite occasional tense relations among participants during the development process, these “weapon systems communities” ultimately tighten interdependence among the US and its allies. Taking a high-tech weapon system such as the F-35 as an example, the key to improving combat effectiveness lies in the continuous upgrade of software systems. However, the US firmly keeps these key technologies in its own hands, leading to dissatisfaction among allies (Vucetic 2013). To assuage its allies’ dissatisfaction with US control of core technology, the US has agreed to waive export licenses from Australia and the UK on some weapons projects. In 2007, the US signed Defense Trade Cooperation Treaties with Australia and the UK, allowing the two countries to provide certain weapons and equipment for several activities, including “agreed combined military or counterterrorism operations; cooperative security and defense research, development, production, and support programs; security and defense projects where the Government of Australia is the end user; and for US government end-use” (Australian Department of Defence n.d.).

The US alliance system is developing from a “weapon system community” to a “military science, and industry community”

There is a mutual push within the US alliance for cooperation on a deeper level. In 2017, the US Congress expanded its National Technology and Industry Base (NTIB) Act to include Australia and Japan as bases, after Canada in 1994. The US’s goal is to establish some kind of “defense free trade area” to achieve further integration among member states in R&D, production, and operations.

AUKUS is a new advancement from the established “weapon system community” and the “defense free trade zone.” It is an integrated military, technology, industry, experiment, training, and operating community. The 2021 statement of the annual Australia–US 2 + 2 ministerial talks listed cooperation on an extremely wide range of issues: Australia’s procurement of nuclear-powered submarines; enhanced force posture cooperation and alliance integration; strategic capabilities cooperation; and industry, technology, innovation, and other security issues. Australia will receive all types of US Air Force fighter aircraft, which will be deployed on its land; increase integrated cooperation between the US army and the Australian army; and improve its capabilities to maintain, repair, overhaul, and upgrade US military platforms and components on Australian land. The two sides also signed a secret agreement to improve their integration in science and technology as well as in their strategic capabilities and defense industrial base, strengthen Australia’s industrial capabilities. The US allows Australia to assume the role of a US industrial base, and ensure that Australia can sustain the Indo-Pacific defense supply chain (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2021).

Obviously, in addition to the international R&D cooperation between Australia, the UK, and the US on high-tech weapon systems, Australia has increasingly become a key ally for the US to extend its capabilities, providing not only cooperation in the usual sense, but also bases, industrial capabilities, and key supplies. On April 5, 2022, the three countries of Australia, the UK, and the US issued another statement announcing their intent to cooperate on the development of hypersonic, anti-hypersonic, and electronic warfare capabilities and to expand cooperation in information sharing and defense innovation. This is a new collaboration that follows cooperation on cyberspace capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technology, and deep-sea technologies. In the statement, the three countries also state that they will seek to engage with other allies and partners (White House 2022a).

In addition to cooperation on the nuclear-powered submarine project and hypersonic weapons, there is another area of cooperation between Australia, the UK, and the US that deserves more attention: cyberspace cooperation. In the information age, allies use cloud collaboration to carry out encrypted communication, rapid information transfer, and precise targeting to facilitate alliance operations. But in cyberspace, alliance capabilities may be determined not by the strongest members, but by the weakest. This is different from the land, sea, and air domains. Node states on cloud platforms are critical. The US attaches great importance to improving the “capacity package”—i.e., the ability to integrate weapons systems, components, logistics, training, professional military education, and exercises—of its allies in this area. These capabilities reside in computer projects, databases, and algorithms (Hooper 2021).

The US is exploring how to share or co-build such capabilities with Australia. In March 2022, Admiral Aquilino, the commander of US Indo-Pacific Command, visited the Darwin and Amberley bases in Australia to implement the agenda of the 2021 2 + 2 joint statement. The two sides have agreed to cooperate and share technologies in all domains, including cyber and space, and to deepen military alliances, training, and deployment to advance collective security and integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The Australian Department of Defense press release also revealed that interoperability exercises and training between Australia and the US include complex US B-2 Spirit strategic bombers operating in concert with the Australian Air Force (Australian Department of Defence 2022).

The construction of this military science, and industry community is a way for the US to neutralize China’s influence and rebuild its defense industry chain

In September 2018, amid the US-initiated trade war against China, then US President Donald Trump signed Executive Order 13806 to establish an interagency task force to assess and suggest improvements for the US’s manufacturing, defense industrial base and supply chain resilience (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy 2018). Because the US has listed China as a strategic competitor (US Department of Defense 2018), it has begun to pay more attention to the security of its industrial chain and tried to remove China from the US defense supply chain.

On February 24, 2022, in accordance with US Presidential Executive Order 14017, the US Department of Defense released a roadmap for addressing vulnerabilities in the US’s defense industrial base supply chain. In this document, titled Securing Defense-Critical Supply Chains, the Department of Defense incorporates opinions from the National Security Council and the National Economic Council and emphasizes that defense supply chain resilience should first focus on key areas critical to readiness. The document lays out China’s position in the US defense industrial chain. It holds that in the energy storage technology and battery supply chain industry, which is the second most important industry to US security, the US’s dependence on China poses a threat to US national security.

In order to exclude China from the US defense supply chain, DoD makes the following recommendations: first, build domestic production capacity; second, engage with partners and allies to improve supply chain resilience; and third, mitigate foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI) and safeguard markets. To improve supply chain resilience, DoD and its partners, “through Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreements, bi-lateral engagements, and continued dialogue…have identified opportunities to collaborate and share information” and over the next year will pursue “strengthening channels of information sharing through bilateral agreements and establishing working groups to pursue joint actions.” In addition, the Department will conduct a front-end assessment of defense programs and mitigate FOCI concerns through early identification (US Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense 2022).

Australia, the UK, and the US have moved toward the establishment of a military, scientific, and industrial community, a defense supply chain that excludes China, and an intragroup supply chain. This has made the US alliance system more closed and its relationship with China more hostile. Further, the alliance system has transcended wartime cooperation and mutual assistance and sought close interdependence in peacetime, turning international relations into a confrontation between blocks and casting a shadow of global division.

From “extended nuclear deterrence” to “integrated deterrence”

Providing extended nuclear protection for some allies has always been an important pillar of the US alliance system. But with the US’s expectations for its allies increasing, the US is planning to implement a new strategy of US ally “integrated deterrence.” The new strategy no longer emphasizes the traditional one-way relationship in which the US provides protection to allies. Rather, it requires all allies, strategic assets, and postures to be organized around the central goal of “deterring opponents from acting rashly.” This is the idea of “total deterrence.”

AUKUS is part of the US’s new extended strategic deterrence. It is “new” because nuclear-powered submarines do not have nuclear strike capability, as they are not equipped with nuclear weapons. However, these submarines do have strategic projection capability. Their nuclear power allows them to quietly travel long distances and approach the enemy’s coast to deliver strikes, and thus contributes to strategic deterrence. This is a kind of non-nuclear but nuclear-powered strategic deterrence. Its crossover nature to some extent has blurred the distinction between nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence, which is exactly in line with the current strategic thinking of the US, which integrates nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence, allies, and global capabilities.

The significance of AUKUS is that it allows the US to extend a form of nuclear deterrence protection to Australia. As a result, the extended strategic deterrence protection of the US will extend from Northeast Asia to the southern Pacific Ocean. Unlike the US’s assurances to Japan and NATO, Washington has never explicitly and publicly offered Australia “extended nuclear deterrence.” Before the AUKUS deal, the US’s security guarantee to Australia was only that the two would assist each other in times of crisis. In the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty, or ANZUS Treaty, which was signed in 1951, Article IV states that “each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” In Australia’s Strategic Policy, which was issued in 1997, Australia interpreted its alliance with the US as an obligation to come to one another’s aid in a crisis—an obligation to “act to meet the common danger,” as Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty puts it. “These undertakings do not amount to a guarantee by the US of Australia’s security. Indeed, the Treaty specifically requires each party to attend to its own capabilities. Nor does it amount to a promise to send armed forces in a crisis. But it provides a sound basis for us to plan on the expectation of substantial and vital non-combat support from the United States in a crisis.” Moreover, “we do not assume that such help would be provided. Indeed, such an assumption would be inconsistent with our self-reliant posture and our alliance obligations” (Australian Department of Defence 1997).

The ANZUS Treaty does not contain an obligation to provide extended nuclear deterrence, and there is currently no public information that can prove the US in fact provides extended nuclear protection to Australia (Hood and Cormier 2021). But Australia has long had such expectations, and its defense policy has made clear its reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence. According to Australia’s Strategic Policy, “In one specific respect the alliance does provide a clearer expectation of US support—that is, defence against nuclear attack. While the risk of nuclear attack on Australia remains very low, the possibility cannot entirely be ruled out. In those circumstances we would rely on the extended deterrence provided by the United States to deter such an attack” (Australian Department of Defence 1997). Australia: Defence 2000 reiterates that the Australia–US alliance should not be a relationship of dependency, but rather one of mutual help. But there is one important exception to this principle of self-reliance: Australia relies on the extended deterrence provided by US nuclear forces to deter the remote possibility of any nuclear attack on Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 2000, 36).

However, even though the US said it will continue to strengthen extended deterrence with South Korea and Japan in the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, which was issued in February 2022, it still did not mention Australia (White House 2022b). Australia’s demand for extended nuclear protection from the US has never been openly satisfied. In Australia’s past judgments, the probability of a nuclear attack on it was low, so Canberra was not concerned too much about the prospect of not having the US’s nuclear protection. But with China’s rise in recent years, Australia believes the strategic environment of the region which it is located in has significantly changed: there is no mature arms control regime in the Indo-Pacific, and in a period of rapid technological development, the boundary between conventional and nuclear deterrence has become blurred. The Australian strategic circle has explored three possible ways to acquire credible nuclear deterrence: first, the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Australian territory; second, the agreement of a nuclear sharing arrangement with the UK; and third, the development of its own nuclear capabilities (Ogilvie-White 2020).

The AUKUS deal tactfully combines US strategic considerations with Australia’s strategic demands. The US does not need to directly deploy or transfer nuclear weapons to Australia, which would constitute evading its obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, by signing a nuclear power technology cooperation agreement, Australia’s long-range strike capability has been greatly enhanced. Nuclear-powered submarines can travel much longer, quieter, and faster than conventional ones. They are more difficult to detect, have stronger firepower, are stealthier, and have a larger payload capacity, which provides Australia with non-nuclear-weapon strategic deterrence. Australia’s acquisition of strategic deterrence capability will also help the US, Britain, and Australia redistribute their work at sea.

From another perspective, Australia will possess nuclear-powered ships but not nuclear weapons, leading to a new situation: while the US is transferring extended strategic deterrence capability to Australia, the US cannot call it so in the traditional sense. With this new extended strategic deterrence capability, the US and Australia are moving toward an “integrated deterrence” strategy that combines nuclear and conventional deterrence.

On April 30, 2021, at a US Indo-Pacific Command change of command ceremony, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in his speech that “the cornerstone of America’s defense is still deterrence.” Lloyd also pointed out that the US would seek to utilize new and existing capabilities, hand in hand with US allies, to extend deterrence across multiple realms (Austin 2021).

In June 2021, when the AUKUS deal was still being negotiated, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl gave an explanation for “integrated deterrence,” saying that integrated deterrence is a cornerstone of the US’s new national defense strategy. He said, “deterrence is at its heart an active dissuasion,” adding, “The classic in the nuclear domain is deterrence by punishment… But you also need to think carefully about deterrence by denial. That is, how can you deny the benefits of aggression through some mix of defense and resilience, or casting doubt on the effectiveness of the other side’s attacks” (Kahl 2021).

According to Kahl (2021),

…there’s also what some people call defense by entanglement, which is creating a normative and rule-based order around which the benefits of maintaining the status quo are elevated, and if actors step out and commit aggression, they can be assured that they will meet an international community which imposes diplomatic costs, economic costs, and military costs on them. So when the Secretary of Defense talks about integrated deterrence, he’s talking about deterrence integrated across a number of different categories. Integrated across domains, so deterrence that is integrated across nuclear, conventional, space, cyber, informational. Deterrence across the spectrum of conflict. So everything from high-end nuclear and conventional conflict scenarios on one end, to hybrid and gray zone competition on the other end. He means integrated across the instruments of national power. Since many of the things the US needs to be doing to deter don’t necessarily fall in the military domain, it may be elements of US diplomacy or economic state craft or intelligence and information operations. And then lastly, integrated across US’ allies and partners.

Kahl also said that the Biden administration is “inclined to look for a way to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy…because there are a huge number of threats that nuclear weapons do not address.” Compared to its predecessor, the Biden administration has paid special attention to allies in Europe and Asia, and it wants to ensure that its deterrence-related commitments to them are seen as credible (Kahl 2021).

Several months later, Kahl stated again that the whole alliance system is crucial to integrated deterrence. “We have to work alongside our allies and partners so that our adversaries know that they’re not just taking on the United States, they’re taking on a coalition of countries who are committed to upholding a rules-based international order,” he said (US Department of Defense 2021a). On September 16, 2021, the day after the announcement of the AUKUS deal, Austin talked about the concept of “integrated deterrence” again. He said it refers to “the ability for the United States military to work more effectively with our allies and partners” (US Department of Defense 2021b).

In February 2022, the US released the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. The strategy document states that the US will continue its military presence and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region with an “integrated deterrence” approach: the US “will more tightly integrate our efforts across warfighting domains and the spectrum of conflict to ensure that the United States, alongside our allies and partners, can dissuade or defeat aggression in any form or domain.” Deepening joint strategic, diplomatic, and military planning between the US and Australia is critical to a collective deterrence strategy. The alliance should make plans for high-end deterrence scenarios and expand Australia’s ability to operate forward in the Indo-Pacific (White House 2022b). It also states that the US network of security alliances and partnerships is the greatest asymmetric strength of the US.

On March 8, 2022, the US Department of Defense submitted a classified version of the new National Defense Strategy to Congress, with the declassified version expected to soon follow. At the core of the US’s national defense strategy will be “integrated deterrence,” which Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Sasha Baker says “is a framework for working across warfighting domains, theaters and the spectrum of conflict, in collaboration with all instruments of national power, as well as with US allies and our partners” (US Department of Defense 2022a). For the first time, the Department conducted its strategic reviews in a fully integrated way, incorporating the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review into the National Defense Strategy. The new National Defense Strategy lists four priorities: “defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC; deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe; [and] building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.” The National Defense Strategy says the Department of Defense “will incorporate ally and partner perspectives, competencies, and advantages at every stage of defense planning” and advance the US’s goals through integrated deterrence. According to the Department, “Integrated deterrence entails developing and combining US’s strengths to maximum effect, by working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of US national power, and its unmatched network of Alliances and partnerships. Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces, backstopped by a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent” (US Department of Defense 2022b).

Judging from various statements of the US, “integrated deterrence” contains everything. In terms of guiding ideology, “integrated deterrence” is like some kind of philosophy that clearly delineates a camp in which all countries, assets, and capabilities exist in a state of total deterrence. It sounds like a “total cold war.” The key feature of “integrated deterrence” is its network of assets, capabilities, and allies. As far as AUKUS itself is concerned, it has all military, diplomatic, scientific, as well as economic elements of total deterrence. Australia’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet can be seen as an experiment of “integrated deterrence.”

Conclusion

The AUKUS deal is the first agreement in history to allow a non-nuclear-weapon state to have nuclear-powered submarines but not nuclear weapons. It will push the Australia–UK–US alliance to the level of a closer military, scientific and industrial community, lay out the beginning of a new grand alliance on the ocean, and change both the strategic deterrence layout in the Indo-Pacific region and some features of the US alliance system’s deterrence strategy against China. China should pay great attention to the political will, strategic layout, and deterrence concept displayed by this major development.

At the global strategic level, the Russia–Ukraine conflict that started in February 2022 and the Taiwan Strait crisis in August 2022 pushed the international landscape in one direction: toward the convergence and interaction of the US’s Atlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies. A new NATO strategic document for the first time listed “intensifying cooperation between China and Russia” as a focus (Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid 2022). This is a wake-up call.

At present, the new global strategic structure of the US alliance system has taken shape. A “maritime grand alliance” now targets Russia and China. Its strategic goal is to “offshore balance” in Europe and maintain “integrated deterrence” against China in the Asia-Pacific. Its long-term objective is to stabilize Europe and engage in a stable competition with China.

Funding

Funding was provided by National Social Science Fund of China, 20VHQ003.

Declarations

Conflict of interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper.