Age, ageing, and the law
Age, n.
Typically conceptualised as a fixed characteristic or objective unit signifying the length of time for which someone has lived or something has existed.1
Age, v. (ageing)
Commonly understood as a linear trajectory or process towards becoming older or more mature.2
Age is considered a universal phenomenon. Characteristic of an individual’s biological and social life, it is experienced by all, even though it may neither always be identifiable as such nor the only influential identity marker. Constitutive ideas about age—both, as a characteristic (n.) and process (v.)—shape the manner in which one experiences this phenomenon in society. These ideas often emerge out of or are legitimated by law, which constructs meanings out of and about age in its organisation of society. In doing so, law’s processes of construction are themselves also marked by the very passage of time that suffuses the motion of age through the lives of individuals and communities. The pervasiveness of age as a signifier of the human experience3 that law is interested in regulating renders scholarly inquiry into the relationship between law and age imperative.
The theme of this issue of Jindal Global Law Review (JGLR) is aimed at providing a forum for interdisciplinary reflections on this meaning-making capacity of law through its stated and unstated norms at the site of age. By interrogating whether law acts as a mediating force between the abstract concept of age and its conversion into a collectively held idea that is socially wielded and lived, this issue inaugurates a series of interconnected discourses that illumine, challenge, or subvert embedded notions about and boundaries around age.
These discourses traverse a wide expanse. Considering the universality of age to be punctuated by human variability can, for instance, demonstrate the contingency of seemingly objective units of measuring age utilised by law to draw boundaries.4 Such contemplation can also aid in the examination of the rationality and linearity of these boundaries.5 Similarly, attention to the distinctiveness of context can animate the assumptions and beliefs ingrained within a legal system from which biases, stereotypes, and prejudices founded on age may flow.6 By extension, age may emerge as an identity marker that can systemically be used to ‘other’ and which does not operate in isolation of intersecting identity markers.7 The law’s re/production of language that contains certain imaginations about age is another idea that merits exploration given the valence it carries in perpetuating perceptions about role, capacity, and pace among others. These perceptions can manifest through their superimposition upon identity—individual or collective.
By ruminating about several of these ideas—while by no means being limited by or to them—the contributions in this issue reveal the multifaceted nature of the relationship between law and age as well as the manner in which it is operationalised through legal discourse. From the contributions, age emerges as a plural, complex, and layered site at which law simultaneously constructs many meanings. That law’s processes of meaning-making are, in turn, shaped and altered by the passage of time that characterises the movement of age is also animated by several contributions. Demonstrating that the relationship between law and age is not unidirectional, these contributions urge that ideas about age entrenched in law be scrutinised as law ages.
The contributions
To demonstrate these claims, I discuss the contributions to this issue by organising them under select broad and intertwined constructions of age. These constructions—namely, age as a site for the creation of the ‘Other’, age as a site for demarcation of the inside/outside, and age as a site characterised by and communicative of time—are dwelled upon by each contribution in a distinctive fashion. Despite differences in subject-matter and methodology, the contributions are unified in their treatment of age as a site at which multiple meanings are constructed by law. The coming together of these processes—which work independently and in combination—results in a site at which law (repeatedly) draws meaning out of age. As several contributions showcase, law’s own processes of meaning-making are also concurrently shaped.
Age as a site for the creation of the ‘Other’
Law’s (age-old) influence in the organisation of social life has meant that it has hegemonic power in deciding the (relative) worth of individuals.8 This has ensued through law’s construction of an ‘ideal’ subject, deviation from the norms constituting which results in the creation of the ‘Other’.9 Though the ‘Other’ differs from one context to another, her failure to fit into the image of the idealised subject results in marginalisation. The gap between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘Other’ is characterised by—and may even widen due to—negative stereotypes against the ‘Other’, negation of the rights of the ‘Other’, pressure on the ‘Other’ to conform to the ‘ideal’ (the norm) and the like. Law helps sustain this gap between the ‘ideal’ and the ‘Other’ through its processes of meaning-making. That age is a site for law’s meaning-making regarding the ‘Other’ is demonstrated by the contributions authored by Mallika Ramachandran and Qian Liu.
In Ramachandran’s review of Tracey Gendron’s Ageism Unmasked: Exploring Age Bias and How to End It,10 age is conceptualised as a category undergirded by a complex infrastructure of notions that ‘other’. Though Ramachandran’s emphasis is on bias against older persons and their treatment as the ‘Other’, particularly through a systemic negation of the possible simultaneity of ‘decline, growth, and maintenance’, their review initiates a broader dialogue about the power of ageist narratives to ‘other’ individuals as un/productive and/or in/capable. Law is hardly immune to such ageist narratives. In fact, the infrastructure that ‘others’ often emanates out of and is sustained by law in its interaction with social, economic, political, and medical narratives that are prejudicial against or contain misinformation about age. Ramachandran’s critique of rights discourses in which such ageist narratives are unchallenged acts as an instantiation through its revelation of the danger of older persons being treated as objects instead of as subjects. Through her review, Ramachandran provokes the question of whether challenging these narratives can yield a community cognisant and accommodative of its differences instead of one that ‘others’.
With Liu’s article, our gaze shifts—from older persons to ‘leftover’ women, from ageist societies generally to an authoritarian state with a rapidly ageing population such as China, from systemic obscuration or belittlement to pressure to adhere to a heteronormative timeline in relation to marital and reproductive choices. Yet, much as in Ramachandran’s review, Liu’s article engages with law’s ‘othering’ force in its organisation of social life. Situating the pressure against a backdrop of state policies that have yielded a rapidly ageing population whose responsibility China wishes to shift from the state to the individual, Liu’s discussion reveals the oft-imperceptible role of law in perpetuating notions about age. These notions come alive in the daily negotiations engaged in by women in China as anxiety about not adhering to the heteronormative timeline and of consequently being ‘othered’. Equally, their embeddedness can foreclose alternative imaginations of social organisation. Through their arrangement of these seemingly disparate events and ideas into a complex web through which certain women are ‘othered’, Liu raises the crucial question of whether law has romanticised age-old traditional values that are unsuitable for present times.
Age as a site for demarcation of the inside/outside
Law’s creation of the ‘Other’ at the site of age results in the production of categories that are hierarchically situated vis-à-vis each other. As is evident from Ramachandran’s and Liu’s contributions, the demarcation results in ‘biased thoughts, feelings, and behaviors in relation to [one’s] own age and aging processes as well as in relation to the age and aging process of others.’11 Law’s ‘othering’ process need not, however, operate in isolation. Sometimes, through its treatment of certain individuals as the ‘Other’, it may create an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’.12 This results in the creation of distinct classes whose segregation is marked by law’s line-drawing authority. This line-drawing authority of law inevitably ousts and is exercised by lawmakers on the basis of a range of reasons other than one’s identity too.13 The interview with Shohini Ghosh and the contributions authored by Khagesh Gautam, Rajashree K and Chetan Singai, Avantika Tiwari, and Sharmila HS and Sunitha Abhay Jain contemplate certain ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’ embedded within law and discuss how age is implicated in or ought to impact these discourses.
Gautam’s review of Linda A. Parker’s Cannabinoids and the Brain14 argues the need for Indian lawmakers to regulate rather than prohibit the consumption of cannabis due to its medicinal value. Citing increasing support for the regulation of cannabis consumption in the United States of America, particularly as a strategy for pain relief management among the elderly, Gautam juxtaposes scientific and experiential evidence against law’s presumption of cannabis as injurious to one’s body and mind. By exhorting lawmakers to regulate cannabis primarily due to its medicinal value for the elderly, Gautam positions age as an overlooked but pivotal consideration. They argue that the inclusion of age as a consideration in decision-making about the status law should accord to cannabis can help lawmakers understand the need to transition from prohibition to regulation, thus altering law’s demarcation of the ‘inside’ from the ‘outside’.
Similarly, Rajashree and Singai advocate that age be considered by the relevant authorities in determining the coverage of legal guarantees so as to create an inclusive society. Drawing on interviews conducted with senior citizens, civil society activists, advocates, district magistrates, and administrative officers, the authors weave a visceral, revelatory, and complex tale of the connections between the absence of legal aid for older persons and their faithlessness in a law insensitive to their vulnerabilities. By prompting a discussion about a much-needed systemic change, the authors raise difficult questions about the responsibility of the state towards older persons in particular and those disenfranchised due to certain identity markers more generally. It follows that inaccessibility of tools that empower and emancipate can relegate the elderly to the peripheries of society.
Tensions about law’s inside/outside are equally evident in instantiations of state paternalism. The interview conducted by Oishik Sircar with Ghosh and the case comment authored by Tiwari exhibit this. Contemplating whether age is treated as determinative in quantifying the harm that censorship is intended to provide protection from, Ghosh remarks that the state’s paternalism in its regulation of the public sphere through censorship is ‘compounded by protectionist impulses from a diversity of non-state players’ when it relates to minors. In the process, childhood—much like womanhood, historically—is considered a homogeneous experience without sufficient consideration for its graded character on the basis of factors such as class and gender. Law, thus, invisibilises children’s capacity to exercise moral judgement as political actors, even under conditions of paternal control exercised by guardians and the state alike.15 It, resultantly, ousts diverse experiences of childhood in favour of a ‘universal’ experience. Through censorship, law also ousts material considered ‘harmful’ for children. In doing so, it negates the unique relationship between the material and its spectator, negatively stereotyping children as ‘the vulnerable, suggestible and dangerous [who live] outside the stockade of maturity and reasonableness that the rest of “us” can take for granted’16 in the process.
These themes recur in Tiwari’s case comment on Anversinh v. State of Gujarat (2021).17 Tiwari frames the judgment as an instance of the Supreme Court of India’s negation of a young girl’s agency due to its paternalistic attitude towards her expression of desire. They argue that law rarely uses age as a carefully considered conceptual category; rather, it is often used as a bulwark against law’s erasure of the coercive social processes that shape an individual’s narrative—particularly when it encounters expressions of female desire. As law relegates the ‘desirous child’ to the realm of immaturity, age becomes a tool used to discipline and obfuscate the ‘complexity of a real human subject’ and the ‘messiness of sexuality’. The demarcation of maturity/immaturity results in an inside/outside that is only formally predicated upon age. In substance, it is an embodiment of law’s desire to discipline.
Tiwari also highlights law’s interest in presenting itself as pragmatic, objective, and neutral. Yet, though law may wish to oust affect from its realm—or, at least present itself as doing so—given that it is wielded and lived by individuals for whom the binary is not as stark implies that affect shapes at least some part of most legal processes. Sharmila and Jain’s contribution empirically analyses where age features in one such process, that of clients’ decision-making regarding their legal representation. Interestingly, given that the law tends to treat those trained in the discipline as being on the inside, the authors’ shift in gaze from lawyers to clients in their consideration of age as a criterion for lawyer-selection throws light on newer dimensions of the relationship that binds the two.
Age as a site characterised by and communicative of time
Law and age, individually and relationally, are never in stasis. Constructions of the ‘Other’ or demarcations of the inside/outside at the site of age are, thus, rarely exempt from the temporalising force of law or the movement of age. Several contributions animate this theme, by focusing on the COVID-19 pandemic as an event that reveals the vulnerabilities of age, standalone and in intersection with other identity markers as well as about states’ prolonged inattention to unique needs arising out of age.18 Deblina Dey’s contribution makes an intervention to discourses around this theme, particularly in the Indian context.
Dey’s article deliberates over the question of whether law metes out injustice or deals in violence with older prisoners through its production of ‘carceral time’. Showcasing law as neglectful and indifferent towards the unique needs of older persons, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, Dey critiques its implication about their disposability. In Dey’s analysis, law’s (convenient) omission to consider the age of a prisoner in its construction of time results in derogation of rights and normalisation of daily acts of violence. Law, thus, treats time as a march forward without sufficient regard for a parallel process of ageing in which that passage of time signals an impending end.
With Priyanka Tripathi and Debashrita Dey’s contribution, we shift our focus from law’s linear construction of time in negation of its implications for age to films as receptacles of ‘fictive microjurisprudences’19 that offer an alternative imagination—the non-linear experience of time passing through the body. Writing about the potential of films such as Mai and Maine Gandhi Ko Nahin Mara to shape perceptions, Tripathi and Dey explore the intersection between old age and disability (cognitive degeneration, more specifically) as marking a return to childhood. Intergenerational networks of caregiving are, by extension, implicated, with the adult daughter emerging as the primary caregiver. In contemplating these themes, Tripathi and Dey’s article presents ageing as a process in which the inversion of the parent-child relationship results in responsibilities that are rarely independent of gendered asymmetries. Through their treatment of films as texts that can subvert the prevalent ‘youth-centric, ableist gaze’, the authors position cinema as a medium through which our understanding of certain elderly subjects can be redefined.
It is therefore evident that age is characterised by the passage of time through the human body. Given that time inevitably moves, movement—regardless of its direction—is unavoidably bound with age. Tripathi and Dey analogise this process at the site of an individual’s body to bodies of thought foundational to a society. However, unlike the association of age with the mortality of life in its passage through the human body, the enduring quality of law necessitates engagement with the innumerable mutations law undergoes as it ages. The contribution by Shivangi Gangwar and Aishwarya Pagedar dwells upon law’s visibilisation of this quality through legal metaphors, despite its (frequent) invisibilisation of age as an identity marker meriting attention.
Tracing the ‘living’ metaphor in Indian constitutional discourse from the early 20th century into the present, Gangwar and Pagedar illustrate its frequent use by the Supreme Court to describe the evolutive capacity of the Constitution. In doing so, the authors offer an analysis of an idea that imbues meaning into the common understanding that law is alive and shapes our understanding of the realities we inhabit. The authors’ account is, however, not uncritical of the operationalisation of this metaphor in Indian constitutional discourse. Comparing its use in India with that in Canada, United States of America, and Australia, they attend to the inconsistency in the semantic reference to the metaphor across a set of judgments and its undertheorisation despite a ubiquitous presence. With the provocation that despite its repeated usage over a long span of time, the metaphor may yet be quite vacuous and foment illiberal results, the authors contemplate the maturation of the metaphor into a doctrine that can better guard against illiberal outcomes and yield greater certainty.
Unified by their treatment of age as a site for understanding law’s meaning-making practices, the contributions in this issue reveal the criticality of an engagement with the relationship between law and age. Though no one can definitively foresee the future, it is likely that (some) ‘therapeutic outcomes’20 will ensue through careful attention to the imbrication between law and age. This is highlighted in the interview conducted by Ankita Gandhi with Israel (Issi) Doron. Conceptualising age as a site ripe for social change achieved through law, Doron urges action arising out of and in response to constructions of age (n., v.). From their experience as an academic and activist in the field of ‘elder law’, Doron discusses the many forms such action can take. These include theorisation, human rights’ movements predicated on age, and strategic litigation. Through their interrogation of common conceptions associated with age (n., v.), implications for the development of discourses around the relationship between law and age, and demonstration of the intersection of age with other identity markers, such action can yield social change.
Footnotes
See, for instance, ‘age, n’ (Cambridge Dictionary). https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘the period of time someone has been alive or something has existed’; ‘age, n’ (Collins Dictionary). https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘the number of years that you have lived’; ‘age, n’ (Merriam-Webster). https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘the length of an existence extending from the beginning to any given time’, ‘the time of life at which some particular qualification, power, or capacity arises or rests’, and ‘an individual’s development measured in terms of the years requisite for like development of an average individual’; ‘age, n’ (Macmillan Dictionary). https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/age_1. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘the number of years that someone has lived’; ‘age, n’ (Britannica Dictionary). https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘the amount of time during which a person or animal has lived [or] the amount of time during which a thing has existed’ and ‘the time of life when a person does something or becomes legally able to do something’.
See, for instance, ‘age, v’ (Merriam-Webster). https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘to become old: show the effects or the characteristics of increasing age’ and ‘to bring to a state fit for use or to maturity’; ‘age, v’ (Britannica Dictionary). https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/age. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘to become old or older’; ‘age, v’ (Cambridge Dictionary). https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/ageing. Accessed 13 November 2022, which defines ‘age’ as ‘relating to getting older’ and ‘used to describe a person or thing that is getting old’.
This is captured well in Jeff Hearn and Wendy Parkin, Age at Work: Ambiguous Boundaries of Organizations, Organizing and Ageing (SAGE 2021) 31, ‘age [is] something that (potentially) affects all people, whether in terms of time and/or biography, and is a profound social and societal relation and social division.’ At 36-37, Hearn and Parkin discuss the many ‘meanings’ of age. These are particularly telling about the pervasiveness of age as a signifier of the human experience and include ‘calendar age, apparent age, social age, emotional age, perceived age or felt age and [] working, organizational, occupational, professional and even academic age.’
See, for instance, Israel Issi Doron, ‘Chronological? Functional? or Subjective? The Legal Search for the Definition of Age’ in Yuval Palgi, Amit Shrira, and Manfred Diehl (eds), Subjective Views of Aging: Theory, Research, and Practice (Springer 2022) 365, 365: ‘Age can be defined “objectively,” through objective units of measurement (e.g., “chronological age,” using time units; “functional age,” using the ability to execute certain daily activities; or “biological time,” using biological and clinical indicators), or “subjectively,” through personal feelings or social norms and cultures...’; Ashton Applewhite, This Chair Rocks: A Manifesto Against Ageism (Celadon Books 2016) 62-63: ‘Human variability makes chronological age an increasingly unreliable benchmark of pretty much anything about a person...Age is real, but it is not a fixed characteristic...Age is an observation used to place ourselves relative to others.’
See, for instance, Israel Doron and Asaf Hoffman, ‘Time for Law: Legal Literacy and Gerontological Education’ (2006) 31(8) Educational Gerontology 627, 630-631: ‘From the sociological point of view, law is not only a mirror, passively reflecting social reality. It is also an active tool which takes a dynamic part in the definition of social borders and the structuring of fundamental values. In this context, “old age” and “the elderly” may be seen as artificial constructs of social structuring rooted in the laws.’; RC Morgan, ‘The Future of Elder Law’ in Israel Doron (ed), Theories on Law and Ageing: The Jurisprudence of Elder Law (Springer 2009) 145, 153: ‘Aging is a great universal—everyone does it—every day, but everyone does it differently.’
See, for instance, Liat Ayalon and Clemens Tesch-Römer, ‘Introduction to the Section: Ageism—Concept and Origins’ in Liat Ayalon and Clemens Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism (Springer 2018) 1, 1: ‘Human ageing is not solely the biological process of senescence... Human ageing is embedded in social contexts...’.
See, for instance, Applewhite, This Chair Rocks (n 4) 15-16: ‘Like all discrimination, ageism legitimizes and sustains inequalities between groups...Different kinds of discrimination—including racism, sexism, ageism, ableism, and homophobia—interact, creating layers of oppression in the lives of individuals and groups. The oppression is reflected in and reinforced by society through the economic, legal, medical, commercial, and other systems that each of us navigates in daily life...Like racism and sexism, ageism is not about how we look. It’s about what people in power want our appearance to mean.’
See, generally, Henrique Carvalho, ‘Concept: Hegemony’ in Illan rua Wall et al. (eds), The Critical Legal Pocketbook (Counterpress 2021) 72. Law’s hegemonic power in deciding the relative worth of individuals on the basis of certain identity markers has been discussed by numerous scholars. See, for instance, Fiona Kumari Campbell, Contours of Ableism: The Production of Disability and Abledness (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 34; Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (Routledge 1989). It often extends to ‘deviant’ choices made by individuals too. See, for instance, Cheshire Calhoun, Feminism, The Family, and The Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement (Oxford University Press 2000) 153.
See, for instance, Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Postcolonialism, Subjects and Rights (Glasshouse Press 2005); Dipika Jain and Kavya Kartik, ‘Unjust Citizenship: The Law that Isn’t’ (2020) 13(2) NUJS Law Review 3; Corey Rayburn, ‘To Catch a Sex Thief: The Burden of Performance in Rape and Sexual Assault Trials’ (2006) 15(2) Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 436; Bill Hughes, ‘Invalidating Emotions in the Non-disabled Imaginary: Fear, Pity and Disgust’ in Nick Watson and Simo Vehmas (eds), Routledge Handbook of Disability Studies (2nd edn, Routledge 2020) 89. In the context of age, discourses about ‘othering’ are prominent in research pertaining to prejudices against older persons. Though these are not legal discourses, they represent narratives law interacts with. See, for instance, Ateret Gewirtz-Meydan et al., ‘Ageism and Sexuality’ in Ayalon and Tesch-Römer (eds), Contemporary Perspectives on Ageism (n 6) 149, 151: ‘The dominant, idealized notion of remaining young-looking, physically attractive and sexually active was highlighted [by an analysis of how Canadian newspapers and magazines portray and construct older people’s sexuality], which marginalized older people who chose not to conform to that ideal or were unable to do so’ and at 152: ‘The gaps between the idealized images of ageing and the subjective experience can harm older people’s self-image’; Martha C Nussbaum and Paul Levmore, Aging Thoughtfully: Conversations about Retirement, Romance, Wrinkles, and Regret (Oxford University Press 2017) 101: ‘We know of societies that glorify age, but ours has a strong preference for youth and therefore, individually, for bodily interventions that preserve the appearance of youth.’
Tracey Gendron, Ageism Unmasked: Exploring Age Bias and How to End It (Penguin Random House 2022).
Liat Ayalon, ‘Ageism Towards Oneself vs. Ageism Towards Others in the Context of Views of Aging’ in Palgi, Shrira, and Diehl (eds), Subjective Views of Aging (n 4) 41, 41.
See, for instance, Cathryn Costello, ‘Migrants and Forced Labour: A Labour Law Response’ in Alan Bogg et al., The Autonomy of Labour Law (Hart Publishing 2015) 189, 227: ‘The increasingly punitive and carceral aspects of migration control focused on “outsiders” are politically coherent with the insecurity of economic life for “insiders”’; Donna J Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium. FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM (Routledge 1997) 269: ‘Valid witness depends not only on modesty but also on nurturing and acknowledging alliances with a lively array of others, who are like and unlike, human and not, inside and outside what have been the defended boundaries of hegemonic selves and powerful places.’
Campbell, Contours of Ableism (n 8) 11: ‘For every outside there is an inside that demands differentiation...’.
Linda A Parker, Cannabinoids and the Brain (MIT Press 2018).
See, generally, Oishik Sircar and Debolina Dutta, ‘Beyond Compassion: Children of Sex Workers in Kolkata’s Sonagachi’ (2011) 18(3) Childhood 333 and Debolina Dutta and Oishik Sircar, ‘Notes on Unlearning: Our Feminisms, Their Childhoods’ in Rachel Rosen and Katherine Twamley (eds), Feminism and the Politics of Childhood: Friends or Foes? (UCL Press 2018) 83 for an account of how state and non-state actors instrumentalise the law to create and sustain the essentialist image of the vulnerable child—in this case, children of sex workers—in the name of compassion, to effectively depoliticise and flatten diverse forms of childhoods.
Graham Murdoch, ‘Reservoirs of Dogma: An Archaeology of Popular Anxieties’ in Martin Baker and Julian Petley (eds), Ill Effects: The Media Violence Debate (Routledge 1997) 83. Ghosh cites Murdoch in their interview with Sircar.
Anversinh v State of Gujarat AIR 2021 SC 477.
See, Applewhite, This Chair Rocks (n 4) 17, where age bias is termed the ‘last socially sanctioned prejudice’.
Leslie J Moran et al., ‘Introduction’ in Leslie J Moran et al. (eds), Law’s Moving Image (Cavendish Publishing 2004) xiv. The authors refer to films as a medium that can be utilised to challenge concepts constructed by law or embedded in it due to the alternative imagination they can offer of these concepts.
Doron and Hoffman, ‘Time for Law’ (n 5) 634, citing David B Wexler and Bruce J Winick, Law in a Therapeutic Key: Developments in Therapeutic Jurisprudence (Carolina Academic Press 1996) and Robert G Madden and Raymie H Wayne, ‘Social Work and the Law: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective’ (2003) 48(3) Social Work 338.
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