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. 2022 Dec 9;8(12):e12218. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2022.e12218

Advancing the discourse of Muslim politics in Indonesia: A study on political orientation of Kiai as religious elites in Nahdlatul Ulama

Muhammad Turhan Yani a,, Choirul Mahfud b, SAP Rangga Sa'adillah c, Mohammad Reevany Bustami d, Maskuri e, Ahmad Taufiq f
PMCID: PMC9761702  PMID: 36544840

Abstract

The present study was designed to investigate the political interactions of Kiai of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the national political arena and its current impact on the Indonesian Muslim community. The data were garnered through interviews and focus group discussions with Kiai and related parties. The results of the study suggest that the political orientation of the Kiai of NU in Indonesia is oriented to pragmatism and oriented to piety idealism in politics based on Islamic ethics. The Kiai, as a symbol of religious leaders, is expected to lead the Muslim community on a political path that is valuable and morally based. The phenomenon of Kiai interaction in practical politics is a significant leap and break that should be translated into a more comprehensive political perspective on social and historical aspects. The study findings implicate that Kiai as a religious figure, should be put on the front row for Indonesian political discourses among Nahdlatul Ulama followers.

Keywords: Muslim politics, Kiai, Political orientation, Religious elite, Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesian Muslims


Muslim politics; Kiai; Political orientation; Religious elite; Nahdlatul Ulama; Indonesian Muslims.

1. Introduction

As a religious elite, Kiai has been considered for the Indonesian Muslim political position from era to era. Kiai has been known several times as a religious figure. However, along with Indonesia's political dynamics during the reformation era, the symbols of religious actors attached to Kiai began to shift, resulting in a new term “Kiai Politik.” This term was arose because of their career in politics. The involvement of religious elites in political practice has induced debate because there are groups who want Kiai to handle religious matters only, and there are also those who want Kiai to take a role in the political aspect so that Indonesian politics can run according to ethics and can be kept away from chaos.

Among the previous studies related to the intersection between religion and state (Kiai and politics). First, Warsono contended that the relationship between Islam, mainly traditional Islam that corresponds to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and politics in Indonesia has been tightly knit. It has happened since the establishment of Islamic kingdoms in Java. The Kiai was a spiritual leader and a source of legitimacy for the king's power. The Kiai presence at the center of government is as a prayer reader and an Islamic identity (Warsono, 2003). Furthermore, Moesa, who quoted Kiai Ahmad Shiddiq (the former Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board), argues that religion and politics cannot be combined because they both have differences, and religion places politics and the state as tools to fight for religion. Meanwhile, the state is placed as a vehicle for the power process (Moesa, 2006).

In another work, Moesa also makes two important points. First, in the classical fiqh, there is an opinion that Islam gives freedom to its people to practice religious teachings wherever they are (including involvement in politics). Second, Kiai NU understands that the classical fiqh has positioned Islam as a mere religion (al-Islam hua al-din). Furthermore, fiqh has never discussed Islam as a religion and a political force (Moesa, 2012). Another researcher also notes that serious research on NU has gained momentum since the late 1970s. This momentum was generated by the growth of Indonesian intellectual generals with NU backgrounds to intellectuals and scholars who graduated from foreign universities (Fealy, 2009).

Among the most famous NU Indonesian intellectuals are Abdurrahman Wahid (the 4th President of Indonesia), Mahrus Irsyam, Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Choirul Anam, Arief Mudatsir, Masdar Mas'udi, Ali Haidar, and Kacung Marijan. Research concerns on NU politics can be traced from several Western scientists and researchers such as Sidney Jones, Martin van Bruinessen, Sabine Kuypers, and Andree Feillard. In essence, NU's political participation has also attracted many parties to understand Muslims' political role in Indonesia. In its development, it cannot be denied that Kiai's involvement in Indonesian politics has also become a distraction between agreeing and disagreeing groups because the Kiai image is seen as belonging to the whole people, not just a single sectarian. The involvement of a large number of Kiai NU in practical politics during the reformation era was a breakthrough among NU circles. Therefore, it is important to elaborate and analyze the political interactions of Kiai NU in the Indonesian national political arena and its current impact on the Indonesian Muslim community.

Continuing the recent series of events that involved NU in the political arena can also be observed in the 2019 presidential election. NU's alignment with President Joko Widodo, although not explicitly for Mietzner and Muhtadi (2020) surprised many parties. Empirically, NU is not institutionally siding with Joko Widodo because NU has a Khittah, which is the principle that NU will not go into politics. However, we cannot rashly assume that NU is not involved in politics. In fact, the NU elite Kiai Maruf Amin is aware of accompanying Joko Widodo as vice president of the Republic of Indonesia. In such a study, NU alignment in the 2019 presidential election had a major impact on the Indonesian Muslim community. Kiai Ma'ruf Amin as an NU elite not only led the voices of Nahdliyin citizens, but was also able to create interest in the Indonesian Muslim community that Kiai's involvement in the political arena should be taken into account.

2. Literature review

The term “Kiai” is a social construction given by society to someone who is considered to have a deep understanding of religion and morals. In addition, Kiai plays an essential role as a role model, moral guide, spiritual enlightener, and protector of society. Consequently, this view demands that Kiai's attitude and behavior become a good role model for the community (Hidayat, 2022). This leads to the premise that Kiai needs to grow into a public figure who can provide a good role model in all aspects of life, be it religion, economy, society, culture, politics, etc. Therefore, every time the role of Kiai in the religious aspect changes to the political realm, there will be a change in the mindset toward the image and charisma of Kiai (Chalik, 2010; Yani et al., 2018; Azra, 1999). In this regard, this kind of change in conventional political practices is not surprising for the Indonesian Muslim community (Barton et al., 2021a, Barton et al., 2021b). However, because this is what makes the Kiai a figure in religion, the Muslim community needs to understand better the Kiai's political participation.

In Indonesia, the Kiai figure in social and political aspects is quite attractive because it does not stand alone. Instead, Kiai stood as the people's representative and is equal to a magnet that can attract or influence other people in making political decisions. Therefore, when the General Election (PEMILU) both the Legislative and the Executive (Presidential Election) were held, many parties tried to visit the pesantren, including the Kiai, to support him so that the legislative candidates could increase their electability.

As a large religious organization in the world, NU has colored various democratic parties in Indonesia. Fealy (2009) notes that from 1952 to 1967 NU was active in politics. During this period, NU participated more in political activities to achieve its religious, social, and economic goals. During this period, NU firmly joined Masyumi, and during this period, NU declared itself to leave Masyumi and then declared the Nahdlatul Ulama party under the command of Kiai Wahab Chasbullah.

NU's involvement in politics can practically be understood as part of Kiai's participation in politics. From era to era, NU's participation in politics was found in the Old and the New Order era. Hambali stated that NU's involvement in practical political activity was seen when NU supported the United Development Party (PPP), which had a significant influence (Hambali, 2018). However, the phase of NU's involvement in politics began to recede in 1984. In that same year, NU declared a khittah, a commitment to return to socio-religious organizations, not politics. Although the khittah declaration officially revoked NU's involvement in politics, it did not mean that Kiai NU would leave politics. However, that period marked the political movement of Kiai NU, intellectually and culturally. NU's commitment to the khittah by keeping a distance from the world of politics makes NU a distinctive religious organization. It does not mean that NU is indifferent and does not want to know about politics, but NU is an intellectual organization inhabited by Kiai who cares about the state's substance. NU has unique ideas about the relationship between Islam and the state (Anam, 2010).

According to Moesa (2012), NU's thoughts on the relationship between Islamic law and the state began to be conceptualized and formed during the preparatory period of Indonesian independence. Kiai Wahid Hasyim, who is part of the constitutional committee, proposed the formula that the state religion is Islam, while still guaranteeing that adherents of other religions can worship according to their respective religions. Kiai Wahid Hasyim also suggested that the president and his deputy should be Muslims. His proposal was touted as NU's aspiration among Muhammadiyah and nationalist figures. Even on 16 July 1954, Soekarno appealed to the nationalists to accept NU's proposal. Perhaps Andree Feilard's analysis of Kyai's idea is correct. Wahid Hasyim is a middle way for the two poles that are mutually hardening. However, if viewed from the classical fiqh side, these ideas stand alone and have nothing to do with the middle way or maybe happen to be positioned as a middle way. Because in the classical fiqh literature, it is widespread to discuss criteria, norms, value limits, and the like without being equipped with the formulation of these norms (Moesa, 2012).

Complementing the opinion of Moesa (2012), there is another side that causes interference in favor of politics. NU as an organization that is membered by Kiai-kiai, actually acts more as an organization that guards the aqidah ahlussunnah wal jama'ah, or more commonly known as Sunni. The organizational goal of NU is to protect the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia from radical, scripturalist, intolerant, and even Shiite Islamic groups (Kayane, 2020). The elite Kiai NU who are involved in the political arena serve as political and intellectual figures to protect the Indonesian Muslim community from dark ideologies such as radical Islamic groups, scripturalists, intolerance, and even Shia (Niam, 2017).

According to Warsono (2016), the shift in the Kiai's role and position in the political field was caused by the NU policy to return to the 1926 khittah and the government policy that stated Pancasila as the only principle in political and social organizations. This policy caused a break in religious relations between Kiai and political parties. This policy led to some Kiai being coopted by the government and channeling their political aspirations to Golkar as the government party (Warsono, 2016).

In its development, the role, contribution and participation of Kiai in the socio-political aspects of post-reformation in Indonesia have been increasingly wide open. In this context, Suprayogo (1997) differentiates Kiai based on their orientation in the Indonesian Muslim community into three groups, namely (1) Spiritual Kiai, (2) Political Kiai, and (3) Advocative Kiai. Spiritual Kiai is Kiai, who develops the spiritual aspect by maintaining Islamic boarding school education with the salaf model. Political Kiai is a Kiai who is concerned with the political aspect by being involved in executive and legislative elections. Meanwhile, advocate Kiai is a Kiai who translates religious teachings to mobilize and empower the community, in economic, social and educational aspects for the future of people and the contribution of Islam to Indonesia.

In this context, Kiai's role has shifted from a spiritual aspect to a political one, thus triggering the Indonesian Muslim community's pros and cons. The group agrees that the need for ethics is crucial so that the Kiai's role in politics is significant to prevent fraudulent political practices. Meanwhile, the disagree group states that Kiai's involvement in politics can affect his positive image and identity as a religious and spiritual figure. This view is based on the understanding that politics is related to competition and power struggles, not suitable for any Kiai (Warsono, 2016; Yani et al., 2018; Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2020). In this context, this article focuses on looking further at the political orientation of the Kiai in the Muslim community of NU in Indonesia and its impact on Muslims' political future in Indonesia, which requires continuous comprehension.

3. Method

3.1. Design

The present study used a case study design within a qualitative approach. This design is used to understand the phenomena that occur naturally. This research focused on the orientation of the participation of Kiai NU in practical politics with different variants, such as candidates for legislative members, candidates for executive officials, and supporters of different political parties or certain politicians.

The presentation of the data in this study was carried out with a narrative in the form of descriptive data from the results of qualitative research, namely the political orientation of Kiai NU in Indonesian politics in the reform era. Various views, both from primary sources such as the opinions of lecturers/academics who are concerned with the study of Islamic politics and secondary sources such as the views of experts published in the media, are presented for further verification in accordance with the main research issues.

Interviews and group discussions were conducted 2–3 times with academicians, students, and Kiai. Lecturers who are concerned with Islamic and Political studies and students who are members of the Islamic Spiritual Activity Unit are the right choice to be a source of information and views on the orientation of Kiai NU's involvement in politics in Indonesia in the reform era. The Islamic Spiritual Activity Unit is a student organization on campus that focuses on activities in the religious aspect, such as in the spiritual development units for students such as the Surabaya State University (UNESA), 10 November Institute of Technology (ITS), Malang Islamic University (UNISMA), and Taswirul Afkar College Surabaya (STAI Taswirul Afkar Surabaya). Observations related to Kiai NU in practical politics were carried out during the reform era, especially at the time of the general election, both for national executive positions, regional heads, and members of the legislature in the 2014–2018 period.

3.2. Data collection

The research data was collected through interviews, focus group discussions, and various relevant data sources from news, opinions, journals, books, etc. In this study, interviews and focus group discussions with experts and various related parties were conducted to obtain more detailed and comprehensive information. These processes involved many experts and related elements, including Kiai, students, observers, and Islamic lecturers with Islamic and political perspectives. Through focus group discussions with these experts, various inputs and more complete insights about the research's focus were obtained. In this case, we involved 44 people consisting of academics (9 people), students (25 people) and Kiai (10 people). We collected data on these 44 people with 3 FGD combined with unstructured interviews. In this study, the informed consent was obtained from all participants for interviews. Furthermore, the ethical approval for this study was obtained from Komite Etik Penelitian Kesehatan Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan Hafshawaty Pesantren Zainul Hasan with approval number KEPK/178/STIKes-HPZH/VI/2019.

We also reviewed literature reviews from various books, journals, and mass media related to Kiai and politics. Literature studies were carried out using available documents to complement the analysis. These types of literature could be in newspapers or magazine clippings, books, documents, and research reports related to the background being studied. This literature study was used to obtain an overview of the research subject's background. After the data was collected, the sources were triangulated, with both primary sources, secondary sources, and expert opinions regarding the orientation of Kiai NU's involvement in practical politics in the reformation era. Source triangulation is a data-testing technique that checks data obtained through several sources (Denzim and Lincoln, 2009; Sugiyono, 2016). This triangulation was carried out to ensure validity and reliability (Miles and Huberman, 1992). Similarly, experts' opinions found in journals, books, and the media were collected and analyzed to obtain data reinforcement and opinions on the orientation of Kiai NU involvement in politics in Indonesia. From the books in particular written by NU observers from inside and outside the country as outlined in the discussion section of this article, it becomes interesting data to be studied continuously.

3.3. Data analysis

It is realized that data collection in this study was limited to 44 subjects consisting of 9 academics, 25 students, and 10 clerics through 3 FGDs at once, this is an acknowledgment of the limitations of the data in this study. But in data analysis in qualitative research does not lie in the amount of data or subjects involved. Purposive data collection and participation of research subjects is even more necessary in data analysis in this kind of qualitative research. Therefore, the process of data analysis is further explained as follows:

The data were analyzed using a qualitative approach to understand and find a conclusion about the contribution, position, and orientation of Kiai's involvement in Indonesia's politics during the reformation era. In this article, data analysis was carried out following an interactive analysis model, namely data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and data verification (Creswell, 2016, 2017). In this qualitative research, data on the orientation of Kiai NU in practical politics in Indonesia during the reform era were described with different variants of participation according to the capacity and level of influence of Kiai. Ahead of the general election, both for the election of legislative and executive candidates, in which a candidate was supported by Kiai or even the candidate was Kiai himself, had become the main attraction in the debate.

Data derived from primary sources (e.g., interviews and focus group discussion with informants from NU clerics and academicians) and secondary sources (e.g., mass media, articles in journals as many, and books as listed in the bibliography) in this research were carried out during the reform era, especially between the 2014–2018 ranges at the time of the Regional Head Election. In East Java, we believe that it is sufficient to draw conclusions about the orientation of Kiai NU's involvement in politics according to the topic of this research, so that the study developed in this research can be said to be adequate, although not perfect, to be further research material, either by us and other researchers.

4. Findings

4.1. Kiai as religious elites and their duties

The religious elites in the sociopolitical tradition of Indonesian Muslims, mostly known as Kiai, have been recognized as responsible for providing mental and spiritual guidance to both Muslim students (santri) and the general Muslim. Meanwhile, according to Keddie and Smith in Warsono (2003), Kiai acts as a religious elite who attempts to interpret religious values, teaches them to the public, and becomes a human being with superior knowledge and morals.

Regardless of the views of experts on Kiai, people generally see that although Kiai is usually assigned to teach religious matters in Islamic boarding schools, Kiai is also allowed to enter politics during "critical" situations. However, a problem appears when many politicians are Kiai who are active in politics but ignore their obligations to teach at Islamic boarding schools or madrasas. In essence, Kiai needs to position himself in the community with various understandings about political parties. There is a dilemma about politics, which is often associated with something terrible, but, on the other hand, bad things should not continue. Thus, Kiai's involvement in politics is expected to provide spiritual enlightenment so that Indonesian politics can run better. On the other hand, when the Kiai direct involvement in politics can be understood from the steps and ways to support a particular candidate from a political party, run for chairman of a political party, or take political positions as president, governor, regent, mayor, council member, and other political positions. In that context, the Kiai is considered to have changed roles and have specific political or even sectarian affiliations.

Some Kiai are interested in plunging into the practice of politics in post-reformation Indonesia, such as Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Kiai Hasyim Muzadi, Kiai Yusuf Hasyim, and Kiai Ma'ruf Amin. Until now, many Kiai have directly supported certain political parties and candidates, both in the regional election and the general election. This shows that politics has its magnetism, especially for Kiai. The novelty presented in this study lies in people commonly constructing the image of the Kiai as a central figure of the religious elite it is common, but this study focuses on the Kiai, who also played a role in politics in general. The phenomenon of Kiai interaction in practical politics in the reform era is a significant leap and break that needs to be realized in a more comprehensive political perspective in social, historical, and other related aspects.

Another finding that can be put forward in this study is that Kiai's involvement in politics in Indonesia is based more on national politics, not pragmatic politics for power. National politics which motivates the Kiai to engage in politics is oriented towards the welfare of the people and to build the country by holding the principle that political office in all fields is a mandate or belief that must be accounted for before God and also humans. Even though the Kiai's national political motivation is not fully understood by some people, there are still those who portray the Kiai as having ambitions for power.

This fact cannot be denied because people who hold this opinion see the Kiai from a pragmatic side of power, but from the results of interviews and discussions. It is stated that Kiai's political orientation is very noble, namely aiming to build good politics, ethical politics, and politics to build his beloved country, Indonesia. for the realization of a country that is good, prosperous just, prosperous, and in God's forgiveness (Baldatun Thoiyyibatun Warobbun Ghofur).

4.2. The political orientation of Kiai

The pros and cons of Kiai's political participation in NU have always been a never-ending topic of discussion. Of course, this has many factors, one of which is Kiai's political orientation and motivation. The orientation of the Kiai who is involved in political practice by becoming party members or executive officers is to examine the national politics and to democracy and eliminate political power or political interests. However, the Kiai intention regarding its orientation is not in the least viewed as a shift in the Kiai's paradigm, which is more politically motivated than for a more noble goal. In fact, institutionally, NU as a da'wah and community organization since the 1984 congress in Situbondo, which was later reaffirmed at a conference in Lirboyo in 1999, has outlined an agreement to maintain distance from all political parties and have no structural relationship with any party, including the National Awakening Party (PKB). This does not mean that NU is indifferent to Indonesia's political developments. NU remains committed to participating in developing ethical-political systems through culture rather than being directly involved in political practice or becoming a political party.

Furthermore, according to Haidar (1994), although NU is an organization of Kiai and Ulama that is not directly involved in political practice, the NU community may have proper performance through Golkar, PPP, and perhaps PDI, in the reform era, and many other political parties, in recent days. A forum for political expression, including the Kiai NU (Haidar, 1994). Thus, according to Haidar, NU will play an active role in developing a political culture as a moral force to help elections run better, fair, and democratic. This role can prevent NU from practical political clashes because NU is not directly involved in these practical political interests.

Referring to the khittah (outline of NU's political course), institutionally, NU's political views and orientation are national politics or political democracy, not political power or political interests. In Indonesian politics, especially in the reformation era, which provided a breath of fresh air for everyone to exercise their political rights, some Kiai were interested in going directly into politics. However, its identity is closely related to the structural Kiai of NU (NU committee). According to the provisions of the PBNU, if a NU official is involved in politics, he must immediately resign from his position at NU (Ismail, 2011).

The emergence of a political elite with a NU background nominated as vice president in the 2004 elections, for example, made some NU people confused about determining the vice-presidential candidate who was entitled to become NU's representative. This, of course, has an impact. Actions of support among Kiai NU were inevitable at that time. Likewise, in the 2019 election, there was also a vice-presidential candidate from the NU Ulama, namely Kiai Ma'ruf Amin. This Kiai NU figure is considered a magnet that can provide significant voting support to presidential candidates. However, there are opinions from some observers that Kiai Ma'ruf Amin is not an institutional representation of NU, but a personal figure with a Kiai background or a religious figure who is considered to have appeal to voters in the presidential election.

In this context, Rahman, a lecturer at IAIN Jember, explained that the political power process is a dynamic entity filled with uncertainty. However, the election of Kiai Ma'ruf Amin as Jokowi's running mate was a political show that was quite surprising for many circles. According to Rahman, Kiai Ma'ruf Amin represents a typical Ulama who should not be involved in the power struggle, let alone as a vice president. The proportions are as a referee, caretaker of political morality, and unifier of nations that may fight in the process of seizing power. However, according to him, that is the political reality in the country today. A few days after that, 1,000 officials from various parts of the country gathered for the national remembrance ceremony on the courtyard of the Merdeka Palace, Jakarta, in 2019. These political events are understood to be part of Indonesia's Muslim political processes that are close to religious symbols. Religion is deliberately used as a magnetic entity to be used as political attribution and power.

4.3. The impact of NU's religious elites on Indonesian Muslim communities

Responding to Indonesia's political developments from the reform era to the present, several Ulamas in the NU organizations took the initiative to hold Ulama meetings. This was done to discuss Indonesia's political conditions and what the Ulama (Kiai) can do. They also discussed where the political aspirations of Muslims in Indonesia should be conveyed. This is always carried out annually before every general election. In every meeting, there is always a heated debate about these issues. A glimpse of the history leading up to the 2004 General Election, such as NU Ulama meetings, was held at Pondok Pesantren Buntet-Cirebon, Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo-Kediri, and Pondok Pesantren Tebuireng-Jombang in order to discuss the political development of Indonesia and Muslims. At that time, the political aspirations of the Ulama or Kiai NU continued to roll and shake the political forces that were fighting in the 2004 general elections. Before every general election, several politicians and political parties returned to visit the Pondok Pesantren.

For example, the Buntet-Cirebon Pondok Pesantren was visited by Taufik Kiemas. All districts of Cirebon undoubtedly welcomed his visit. He intended to ask for the blessing of Kiai Abdullah Abbas. In another place, Mbak Tutut was also visiting the Ulama around Jabotabek a few days before the campaign. The events happened in several Islamic boarding schools in East Java, such as in the Langitan-Tuban Islamic Boarding School, where Wiranto and Sholahudin Wahid (presidential and vice-presidential candidates) visited them to seek the blessing of Kiai Abdullah Faqih. Furthermore, the Lirboyo-Kediri Islamic Boarding School was visited by Hasyim Muzadi, the then-candidate for Vice President Megawati, to ask Kiai Idris Marzuki's blessing.

The event happened in the run-up to the 2018 East Java election. All candidates for the governor-Deputy Governor came to the influential Kiais and their supporters to ask for blessings and political support. At its peak, in the last presidential election in 2019, political visits or safaris were also carried out by candidates for President and Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia. Why do politicians do it on the eve of every general election? One of the answers is that the Indonesians consider that the Kiai still have considerable sociopolitical power.

This portrait is a situation in the political development in post-reformation Indonesia, which affects the Kiai's political relations and the Muslim community in Indonesia. In Indonesian political tradition, Ulama (Kiai) are still considered influential figures to provide political support to any prospective leader because many people are still willing to follow in Kiai's footsteps. Therefore, the tradition of sowan, or asking for blessings from Kiai, who have a significant influence on society, is always carried out by prospective leaders or politicians before they compete.

Kiai of NU in Indonesian politics has a significant sociological influence, especially those who have high charisma and prestige. Although the political significance in Indonesian political dynamics has ebbed and flowed, the Kiai's voice is still heard and is still used as a weapon in politics, either simply to give blessings or to support certain candidates. This reality can be seen from the NU environment, which is very obedient to Kiai. The Kiai's political affiliation will generally be followed by his congregation or their respective followers. This indicates that the political identity is not sociologically independent but is followed by the congregation or the masses.

Ulama's (Kiai) involvement in politics raises a question mark for some Muslim communities. On the one hand, the involvement of Ulama (Kiai) in politics is seen as part of political ijtihad, which aims to solve the ummah's problems. On the other hand, some see it as an act to meet the needs of the Kiai group or gain specific political power. Few political observers believe and consider Kiai's interest in power as human nature in the context of citizens who have political rights, either to vote or to be elected.

Regardless of all these opinions, anyone who takes part in politics to take political action and must do so with high responsibility is responsible to God, man, and history. Not a few Kiai also advised that political practice must also be carried out with morality al-karimah (polite and praiseworthy behavior), with the essence of truth, honesty, and justice. Especially for Kiai, who is a role model for society and society. Joining politics is considered trading by some Kiai. When it comes to choosing whether, to be honest, or fraudulent, politics is also full of the temptation to cheat, pretend, and commit crimes. Kiai Muchit Muzadi was sent through the Duta newspaper, a newspaper owned by NU residents.

In this context, it can be understood that within the Kiai or NU internal environment, there are differences in political discourse between Kiai and other Kiai, even though they come from the same culture. According to Warsono, NU was good as a jam'iyyah, apart from limiting it and providing opportunities (allowing) for each Kiais to determine their political actions. NU as a religious and cultural organization binds its members (Kiai) with the same culture, namely Ahl al-sunnahwal-jamaah, but in the political aspect, NU gives freedom to every citizen (including Kiai) to share aspirations through political parties.

Interestingly, as a religious elite, Kiai has autonomy in politics. This can be seen from the links between Kiai, NU, and Islamic-based parties such as PKB, PPP, etc. Although the PKB, for example, was handed over by the Kiai NU and was intended as a political "vehicle" for NU members. However, NU cannot force Kiai to convey his political aspirations to PKB. Political freedom is the right of all citizens, including Kiai. According to Warsono, being involved in practical politics for everyone is a human right, including the Kiai. According to him, the Kiai figure belongs to the people, there will be a group of people who think that the Kiai should be ‘an umbrella’ for all.

An example of Kiai's involvement in political practice in the reformation era is that Kiai Hasyim Muzadi (then Chairman of the NU, 1999–2009) was willing to become Megawati's vice-presidential candidate in the 2004 elections through the PDI-Perjuangan. Another example is Kiai Zainuddin MZ's involvement in political practice as Chairman of the Reform Star Party (PBR), which had created a feeling of distrust in him since he was previously known as the Kiai of all circles. On the other hand, nowadays, Kiai belongs to individual constituents or supporters who fight for it, they no longer belong to everyone, or Kiai, who are politically sectarian among the ummah.

In this case, Muslims in Indonesia feel the impact of Kiai's participation and political orientation. Not only the involvement of pros and cons of the Kiai NU, but a number of NU elites also argued with each other. One of them was Rozy Munir (then Chairman of the NU). He believes that in practice, depoliticizing personnel management is not easy. Many parties, especially among the non-cultural Nahdliyin elite, consider illogical boundaries to act outside NU as a logical consequence if NU is rooted in the government, legislature, and other institutions.

The involvement of Ulama (Kiai) in political practice as chair of political parties and running for president, vice president, governor, deputy governor, regent, mayor, or others has reduced unity among the people. It can be seen clearly that the Muslim community in the NU organization is divided into groups of supporters of specific candidates. Public respect for Kiai was also felt to decrease when a Kiai was nominated and then failed. Public respect for the Kiai may also fade, and the Kiai influence can diminish in the community view.

The decline in the value of the Kiai's influence in society can be reflected in the community's indifferent actions towards some who are involved in political practices such as Kiai Hasyim Muzadi and Kiai Zainuddin MZ, who were running for the general election. Therefore, this can be a supporting statement that Kiai's role in politics will influence his followers, as illustrated in Endang Turmudi's 1990 study, which took Jombang as the research sample. It was argued that people have more trust pesantren and tarekat than "shady" religious organizations or political parties. The tarekat in this article are interpreted as: the institution of the shufi association, which consists of many variants such as Qadiriyah wa Naqsyabandiyah, Tijaniyah, Syathariyah, and many others. The second meaning of tarekat is sacred religious behavior related to rituals of getting closer to God, such as remembrance, prayer, and ways of socially relating to the community. This fact also creates tension due to the conflict between Kiai and his opponent, who is fighting for power.

On the one hand, Kiai's involvement in politics is expected to provide spiritual enlightenment on Indonesian political dynamics and trigger political actors to democratically and adequately carry out political affairs. They are also expected to carry out the community's mandate as comfortably and as possible. On the other hand, Kiai's challenges in facing pragmatism in politics need to be answered in a more apparent orientation.

4.4. The influence of NU on rural and urban societies, intellectual and non-intelligent communities

Culturally, NU has a great influence on rural communities. NU is a community organization engaged in the religious field. NU's closeness to the community is also inseparable, it can even be called that the community itself is part of NU. The religious rituals of the community, especially villages, cannot be separated from NU practices, such as tahlilan, the commemoration of death for up to 1000 days, and lailatul ijtima (religious gatherings at the village level that are held every 15th day of the qomariyah month). Tahlilan comes from the root word tahlil (Arabic, which means reading Lailaha Illa Allah). Tahlil is a religious ritual carried out by the NU community by reading Lailaha Illa Allah and other readings by gathering with neighbors and relatives and usually done at night, especially on Friday nights. NU became the driving force for these religious rituals until the religious rituals became ingrained and became part of the community traditions. Like tahlilan, a religious ritual is carried out on Friday nights by reading tahlil until it is familiar to the people's tongue as tahlilan.

Clearly, NU has a political influence on rural communities. NU is indeed an organization that operates in the religious field, but structurally it cannot be underestimated when analyzing the structural aspects of politics. Politics is an intriguing object for NU elites, and it is possible that NU elites have a passion for the political world. NU has great organizational power because NU has a management structure from the central level to the subdistrict (village) level. In addition, NU also has subsidiary organizations such as the Autonomous Body to Institutions. The management of NU at the village level is called the Branch Management as well as autonomous bodies such as Ansor (youth movement is one of the NU autonomous departments that is engaged in youth and social affairs), Nahdlatul Ulama Women's Student Association (Ikatan Pelajar Putri Nahdlatul Ulama/IPPNU), Nahdlatul Ulama Student Association (Ikatan Pelajar Nahdlatul Ulama/IPNU) and institutions such as Ma'arif Educational Institution (Lembaga Pendidikan Maarif/LP Ma'arif), Islamic boarding school association (Rabithah Ma'ahid Islamiyah/RMI), and so on – the great organizational strength is accompanied by great sympathizers. The NU organizational command lies with the Kiai, who is so obeyed by the village community because for the village community “al-Ulama waratsatul anbiya'” Ulama or Kiai are heirs of the Prophet. Village communities are so obedient to Kiai figures, such as Lamongan or Madura. Kiai figures are role models, and the Kiai's choice of fatwa can affect the electability of rural communities in the view of political parties.

NU's organizational power that reaches the grassroots seems to be the capital for the misuse of political vehicles. It is like forcing NU sympathizers to choose one candidate in the village head election contest. The strength of the NU autonomous body, such as Ansor as a representative of the NU organization at the youth level, can be a driving force for the village head election campaign. Likewise, the power of NU's religious rituals that reach the grassroots if misused will become political power. The example of Lailatul Ijtima' where the village community gathers can be a forum for the village head election campaign. In this case, Kiai NU is able to bring political intervention to the village community.

Urban society is a society that tends to have individual and heterogeneous characteristics with modern life. In urban society there are many social groups distinguished by profession. The presence of NU in the NU community is different from the village community, which tends to be homogeneous; political electability is determined by the figure of the Kiai. The city community is not like that. They are an educated society, prioritizing rationality rather than a Fatwas just a Kiai figure.

In politics, NU has the influence of spiritualism. NU acts as a forum that is able to appear soothing; the figure of a polite Kiai in conveying a fatwa seems to be able to provide a (moderate) middle ground. This momentum is the reason NU can be accepted or even become a forum that attracts political electability. Likewise, the influence of the Kiai on the non-educated community (the common people) is also very strong; the people in this category actually give up completely what the Kiai says (sendiko dawuh), even to the point that their political choices are left entirely to the Kiai; for example, the Kiai directs to choice A, then the public. This layman (non-educated) will fully follow what Kiai says. In the political context of Indonesia, the Kiai is a source of full power among the people. Therefore, when Kiai is close to certain officials or politicians, the general public will tend to follow Kiai's orientation.

The influence of Kiai NU on educated and uneducated people. In the context of the dynamics of Indonesian people's life, Kiai NU has a strong and great influence among the educated community (college leaders, academics, and so on). The source of the power of Kiai NU's influence is related not only to Kiai's scholarship, but also to Kiai's charisma. For example, many officials or leaders of political parties often visit Kiai, both cultural Kiai who have a strong influence in society and structural Kiai for the purpose of asking for advice, suggestions, and prayers (hoping for blessings) so that they are given convenience in carrying out their assigned tasks. More specifically, as the political year approaches, Kiai NU and also Pesantren are visited by many officials and politicians. The visit of officials and politicians to Kiai has an important meaning; first, the official or politician will get an image from the public as people who are close to the Kiai (Ulama). Second, the official or politician seems to have the blessing of Kiai, and this image affects the public perception that Kiai seems to have given his blessing. Third, officials or politicians receive the blessing of prayer from the Kiai, and this becomes a very expensive value for the sustainability of the official or politician's journey.

Kiai is an informal leader, believed and believed to have superiority both morally and as a pious person. The influence of Kiai is taken into account both national officials, regional officials, entrepreneurs and by the general public (Husamah, 2012). According to Yanto in his dissertation research at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (2019), the influence of the Kiai was very broad, especially with respect to his political steps that were often followed by the community. Islam. Kiai is able to influence and move the actions of his followers through the power of charisma attached to him. Kiai is a figure who has strong roots in the religious and socio-political life of Muslims, does not prioritize political passions at the expense of universal and moral values.

The influence of Kiai NU on society in Indonesia can be understood from several points of view. First, the influence of socioreligious fatwas. The fatwa of NU clerics for the Muslim community in Indonesia is very important in determining choices and actions (Hasyim, 2020; Pelletier, 2021). The influence of the Kiai NU fatwa on this aspect in its development has a major impact on socio-religious life but also in political life ahead of general elections (elections) both at the national and local levels. The fatwa of NU clerics is also a pull factor as well as a driving force for the community to be more enthusiastic in the relationship between society and the state. Second, the influence of culture and community traditions. Gus Dur revealed that the role of Kiai NU as a cultural broker is really felt by the community at the village level, which is now also extending to the city along with the dynamics of the times and the role of Kiai NU, who have entered in various positions and contributions in the city and center of power, including being an official in the government. Automatically, there is a movement and expansion or dynamism of culture and traditions that are influenced by the Kiai (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2020; Kayane, 2020).

5. Discussion

In this study, there are exciting findings related to the phenomenon of Kiai NU participation in practical politics in the reform era. First, some Kiai NU in the reformation era have made essential breakthroughs by no longer considering their charismatics to fade along with their involvement in practical politics. People have different political choices. Second, Kiai NU, who plunged into practical politics in the reformation era is like birds coming out of their cages, meaning that when political freedom in the reform era is wide open, many Kiai are also interested in establishing political parties, running for legislative and executive candidates with the motivation to participate in fixing the politics in Indonesia. This is a sign that there has been a shift in Kiai's paradigm from traditional to modern. Third, the opinion of charismatic Kiai among NU during the reformation era was no longer followed massively and totally by the ummah, along with the phenomenon of transactional politics. Fourth, religion and politics in the reformation era are more attractive to combine than separating religion and politics, because a combination of religion and politics will be social capital in people's hegemony to seize power. In the view of the Kiai, power is a means of devotion to God to achieve prosperity. Fifth, politics in the reformation era, in the view of Kiai, who has political instincts, is like a beautiful girl who deserves to be approached, so many Kiai has entered the world of politics in the reformation era.

The involvement of Kiai NU or Ulama in Indonesia's national political arena, which was directly expressed in the reformation era, was a right as citizens protected by the Indonesian Constitution (UUD, 1945) and other laws intended to fight for Muslims to achieve prosperity. Kiai's involvement in politics is also based on the view that Islamic teachings cannot be separated from politics, both theologically and sociologically. In this connection, Abdullah (1996) noted three crucial parts related to Indonesian Muslims' political history. First, Islam is a concept that does not separate religious communities from the state. Second, historically, Islam's experience and role as the first symbol have been very consistent in fighting colonialism through its call for jihad. The third quantitative fact is that most of Indonesia's population is Muslim, and this belief is emphasized to shape the behavior of the population. So this is where the transformation into a 'political myth' and sociologically can function as a paradigm in understanding and assessing reality and as a benchmark in determining action (Abdullah, 1996).

From the three notes above, it can be understood that the participation of Kiai NU or Ulama in the Indonesian political arena cannot be seen only pragmatically, but needs to be seen comprehensively, both theologically and historically sociologically. With such a perspective, the reason behind direct involvement in politics will be identified.

Here, Islamic teachings cannot be separated from politics. In the verses of the Koran, including Surah Ali Imran verse 159 relating to deliberation, as studied or explored by Salim (2016), Islamic politics begins with politics carried out by Muslims, in the form of political parties, scheduling Islam in state regulations, and using Islam for personal, party, and group political interests. One of the arguments and political policies of Islam is prioritized in the Koran. This interpretation even mentions Prophet Muhammad as the leader of the Muslim community when often taken from friends as a collective decision, not a decision that comes from oneself (historical-sociological). This shows that one of the values and political principles of Islam in the Qur'an is a suggestion to conduct deliberations in decision-making related to society that involve many people (Salim, 2016; Mahfud, 2019b; Muyasaroh et al., 2020).

In the context of the Indonesian nation's history, the Kiai's involvement in politics during the Old Order period was also shown and understood from their contributions from Islamic political parties such as Masyumi and NU. Seeing these historical facts, in the current reformation era, when Kiai plunged into practical politics, became a legislative and executive candidate, or even founded a political party, it was a reunion and nostalgia during the old-order era of Soekarno (the first President of Indonesia).

Regarding Islam and politics, it is interesting to see the thoughts of the Indonesian Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid, who built the theological foundation of Islam as a humanitarian religion, which later underlay Islamic political ideas based on the theory of the Koran. For all the needs of sociopolitical life, according to him, humans must return to their nature. He also formulated the basic principles of Islam that would support civil society (Madjid, 1999; Rahmawati et al., 2018).

As explained above, Kiai or Ulama's involvement in politics can be seen from the positive and negative sides. The nation's journey does not always go smoothly when Muslims, who are the majority of Indonesia's population, experience a downturn and have not felt prosperous for the country. So, as a community and national figure, Kiai is expected to find solutions, one of which is through practical politics, because with politics, there will be changes.

According to Kuntowijoyo, there must be a change from power politics to substantive politics, that is, politics that concretely considers economic, social, cultural, and social issues (Kuntowijoyo, 1997; Mahfud, 2019a). Such a political orientation is what the Kiai/Ulama strive for when they enter politics, regardless of the pros and cons. In connection with the notion of Ulama when looking at the problems of the nation so that they are called directly to politics, Hiroko Horikoshi explains that instability in politics and national government has caused various local groups to unite under the leadership of one Kiai (Horikoshi, 1987). This shows that Kiai or Ulama plays an essential role in politics in Indonesia. This is the political magnitude of the Kiai; especially before the General Election, the Kiai or Ulama will be the ones who are approached for support, or at least for approval.

Kyai NU or Ulama who have participated in politics have personal rights as citizens and, at the same time, NU citizens who want to fight for the people's aspirations. However, it is challenging to separate Kiai NU or Ulama from the existence of the parent organization. According to Kiai Abdurrahman Wahid, NU's position as a socio-political force is due to its large population. This power manifests itself in two ways. First, passively by supporting the organization's political activities and providing NU political involvement to each individual to create a good situation and balance in national life. Second, NU actively voices the interests of people who have not been accommodated in the nation's agenda, maybe the government because of its institutionalization, so that community life aspects are forgotten. This is what is being fought for (Wahid, 1999; Mahfud, 2019b).

The instinct of the Kiai NU or Ulama is undoubtedly to fight for ummah, especially Indonesian Muslims. However, negative perceptions cannot be avoided when Kiai or Ulama go into practical politics, let alone Ulama or politicians. Based on observations and interviews, many Kiai or Ulama are involved in politics, and people feel that they have lost confidence in the figure of a Kiai or Ulama because Ulama will intersect with power or the government. Even the Kiai will become a government stronghold if they get criticism from the public.

According to Thoha Hamim, when Ulama enter the power structure, they usually only function as a means of religious justification for a regime whose power is experiencing a legitimacy crisis. In the social structure of the Muslim community, Ulama has a very strong influence because of their position as par excellence leaders in the Muslim community. A privileged position is given to mark the sanctity of the sharia whose interpretive authority rests in their hands. From the perspective of Muslims, the behavior of scholars is a representation of teachings and models. With such high social capital, it is not surprising that the Ulama's support for a regime will end the crisis of legitimacy facing the regime (Thoha, 2004; Astari et al., 2020).

Social capital, in the form of authority and charisma, is guarded by the community. In the view of the majority of the ummah, the involvement of Kiai in politics has implications for the waning of social capital owned by Kiai. Furthermore, it became a reality during the reform era. People are no longer interested in following directions, fatwas, or Ulama's studies when they are different from political parties or different political choices. Being believed as a community leader with excellent leadership characteristics is not easy. Moreover, Kiai is also involved in practical politics, yet should remain honest and has integrity. According to Mark Miller, a good leader's character is to have integrity, honesty, and loyalty (Miller, 2018; Mahfud, 2018). So far, this is the character embedded in a private Kiai or Ulama. Although there is an opinion from some circles that social capital has slumped along with the power or practical politics practiced. The aim of some Kiai NU who are involved in political practice is to realize NU's political orientation and views, namely, national politics or political democracy, rather than political power or political interests. However, for some people, this orientation is seen as a paradigm shift for the current Kiai, who prefer to be more involved in politics than in socioreligious organizations.

In Indonesian Muslim politics, the politics of Kiai NU has significant influence, especially Ulama or Kiai, who have great charisma. Although Kiai's political significance in Indonesian political dynamics has experienced ups and downs, Kiai's voice is still heard. It is a powerful weapon in politics to give blessings or support to candidates for leadership and individual parties. This cannot be separated from the socioempirical fact that Indonesian citizens are still oriented toward respected figures in their communities. Moreover, Kiai is a figure who has a group of followers who can be invited to follow the political trend of his Kiai. However, along with the changing times that have an impact on paradigm shifts, including the involvement of Kiai in the practical politics of the reformation era, which is directly proportional to the freedom guaranteed by the constitution, Kiai who enter the world of politics are like birds that have just come out of their cages, looking for fresh and comprehensive air. The extent of the opportunity to fly. In this case, Kiai's politics have opportunities, and at the same time, have challenges in achieving lofty ideals in realizing a just and prosperous country. Practical politics in the reformation era for Kiai is also like a beautiful girl, which is attractive to approach, and the approach taken by Kiai is an approach based on noble values or political ethics.

6. Conclusion

This study concludes that the involvement and political orientation of Kiai NU in the national political arena in the reformation era and its current impact on the Indonesian Muslim community are very significant. First, NU, as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, even in the world, until 2019 had more than 108 million followers. Second, NU is an Islamic-based community organization that is moderate and tends to head to a modern direction, which can be understood from the participation of Kiai as a religious elite and a political elite. Indicators of NU modernity include modernization in education, both in Islamic boarding schools and schools owned by NU, in addition to NU's efforts to accelerate human resource development in various fields, including politics, as well as adaptive NU in digital transformation. Third, the Kiai has become a magnet for Muslim politics in Indonesia, who always attracts his followers' attention, such as the routine before the regional head elections to the national level elections which often ask for the blessing of Kiai NU in order to get great support from the community. Fourth, the influence of Kiai's participation and political orientation on his followers or constituents affects the dynamics, conflicts, and peace of the Muslim political community in Indonesia. In this context, the Kiai's political orientation is always expected by the most Muslim community in Indonesia to be more toward a political value and political ethics by Islamic teachings.

Declarations

Author contribution statement

Muhammad Turhan Yani: Conceived and designed the experiments; Analyzed and interpreted the data; Wrote the paper.

Choirul Mahfud and Rangga Sa'adillah S.A.P: Performed the experiments; Contributed reagents, materials, analysis tools or data.

Mohammad Reevany Bustami and Maskuri: Conceived and designed the experiments; Analyzed and interpreted the data.

Ahmad Taufiq: Analyzed and interpreted the data; Wrote the paper.

Funding statement

This work was partially funded by the Universitas Negeri Surabaya (UNESA) for MTY.

Data availability statement

Data will be made available on request.

Declaration of interest's statement

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Additional information

No additional information is available for this paper.

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Data Availability Statement

Data will be made available on request.


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