Optimism, pessimism, and perceptions of the Jordanian government's COVID‐19 response

Abstract

This study aims to examine people's optimistic and pessimistic perceptions of the government's capacity, intention, and performance during and after the lockdowns declared in response to the COVID‐19 pandemic. An online survey was administered in Jordan and responses were collected from a convenience sample of 1245 citizens during April and May 2020. Descriptive statistics, factor analysis, and multiple regression reveal the following findings: (a) people expressed high levels of pessimism and low levels of trust and satisfaction concerning the government's intention, capacity, and performance, (b) people perceived the government to be a complex, multi‐faceted entity rather than a homogeneous entity, and (c) in assessing government performance, people considered the following dimensions: totality of government, institutions of public administration, high‐ranking public officials, and ordinary, public sector employees.

1. INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (COVID‐19 or coronavirus) to be a global health threat (World Health Organization [WHO], 2020). Although the virus originated in Wuhan, China, it quickly spread to many countries across the globe, including Jordan (Worldometer, n.d.). The Jordanian government took quick, decisive measures to reduce the spread of the virus and incidence of death (“Al‐'urdun yoshadid ejraatih,” 2020; Abdel Hadi, 2020; Sowaidan, 2020). These policies directly affected the lives of all citizens. Over a 4‐month period, citizens personally experienced several lockdown measures, including quarantines, curfews, restricted mobility, temporary businesses shutdowns, and the closure of educational institutions (“Bada fasil mowathafeen,” 2020; Suleiman et al., 2020).

Witnessing the government's rapid coronavirus response, some observers evaluated Jordan as a “high capacity” nation that “effectively” utilized public resources to contain the virus (“Al‐had min al‐tada'iat,” 2020; Ajarmeh, 2020; AlQutob, Moonesar, et al., 2020; Hartnett et al., 2020; Lynch, 2020; Sowaidan, 2020). However, critics also argued that the success of containment efforts was limited because public resources were not effectively utilized to help people during and after the lockdown. Specifically, some commentators criticized the government for failing to look after people's psychological, economic, and social well‐being. The Arab Barometer asserted that between September 2020 to March 2021, Jordanians' trust in government has declined from 63% to 43% and satisfaction with government's performance has also declined from 78% to 48% (Arab Barometer, 2021, p.3). Critics additionally asserted the state had neglected its responsibility to ensure the people's satisfaction, earn their trust, and encourage optimistic outlooks during and after the peak of the pandemic (AlQutob, Al Nsour, et al., 2020; Arab Barometer, 2021; Jensehaugen, 2020). Some observers commented that the compliance of Jordanians with COVID‐19 policies was not simply a reflection of public trust in the government, public officials, or institutions, but rather resulted from people's rational skepticism concerning the sincerity of the government's commitment to using public resources and implementing policies that would actually help citizens (AlQutob, Al Nsour, et al., 2020; AlQutob, Moonesar, et al., 2020; Balog‐Way & McComas, 2020; Hartnett et al., 2020; Sibley et al., 2020). Some commentators argued that Jordanians held unrealistic expectations about the government's response. Indeed, officials have limited resources at their disposal and decision makers struggle to optimize the containment of coronavirus while also dealing with a host of other challenges, such as the Syrian refugee crisis, the contraction of the global economy, and regional political unrest (Oxford Analytica, 2020; World Bank, 2017; Yaghi & Al‐Jenaibi, 2018).

Therefore, in contrast to other countries, the relationship between Jordanian citizens and the government is complex: although Jordanians partially cooperated with the government to contain the virus, they also expressed skepticism concerning the government's intentions and capacity to help them overcome this health crisis. Unfortunately, a lack of empirical research on this topic hinders researchers' ability to adequately describe Jordanians' perceptions about their government, its performance during the COVID‐19 pandemic, their level of optimism about government, and their satisfaction with virus containment measures (Gozgor, 2020; Greyling et al., 2020). This study attempts to fill in this lacuna in the research.

Previous research suggests that the factors influencing Jordanians' perceptions of the government's performance during the COVID‐19 pandemic are various and complex (Hartnett et al., 2020). In particular, it is expected that Jordanians, motivated by self‐interest, will unfavorably evaluate their government's performance during the pandemic. Considering that Jordanians are highly educated and politically aware (Suleiman et al., 2020), this study argues that people do not assess the government as a single, homogeneous entity, but rather recognize its complexity and its many layers of institutions and people. While Jordanians are generally skeptical of their government (“Al‐‘urdun: qararat iqtisadiyyat,” 2020; “Al‐‘urdun yarfaa kaffat,” 2020), levels of optimism and pessimism vary according to each layer of the government. The remainder of this paper will first present a conceptual framework and a review of relevant literature, followed by a methods section, a discussion of the findings, and a conclusion.

1.1. Conceptual framework and relevant literature

In various countries around the world, people's trust in their governments has been declining (Gozgor, 2020; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Rieger & Wang, 2022; C. Wang, 1997). Also, satisfaction with government policies remains low and varies both over time and by policy. Khosravi (2020) as well as Fetzer et al. (2020) report that the COVID‐19 pandemic has exacerbated people's skepticism about the intentions of governments and their ability to improve the lives of citizens during and after the pandemic (i.e., capacity). People's distrust and dissatisfaction with government usually results from the accumulation the government's failure to adequately serve its people and meet their expectations (Al‐Shakhanbeh & Habes, 2022; Rieger & Wang, 2022). Hence, the pandemic does not produce new public grievances, but rather exacerbates existing skepticism and frustration (Parker‐Magyar, 2020). Conforming to global trends describing the relationship between governments and the public, the scant literature from Jordan also suggests that government practices, coupled with highly publicized cases of corruption, lack of accountability, and meritocracy, have led people to be skeptical of government (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2014; Catterberg & Moreno, 2006; Hartnett et al., 2020; Hetherington, 2005). However, despite this skepticism, some studies assert that Jordanians are optimistic about their futures after COVID‐19 (AlQutob, Moonesar, et al., 2020; Al‐Shakhanbeh & Habes, 2022).

The Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies (2014) reports that the poor performance of legislative institutions has resulted in low confidence in all government institutions, leading people to become critical of poor government oversight, weak monitoring of public spending, and the government's inability to pass laws that protect people's interests. Moreover, the study found that the public distrusted the government for the following reasons: administrative and financial corruption (91%), favoritism in applying law (21%), and disadvantaging the poor and middle class when implementing policies (53%). However, Yaghi and Antwi‐Boateng (2016) assert that although the adoption of democracy has been rather recent in the Arab world, Arabs are optimistic about the future as well as about the ability of government to improve its policies. Hartnett et al. (2020) claim that 91% of Jordanians are optimistic about the capacity of their government to successfully use public resources and mobilize people to mitigate the negative impact of COVID‐19. The study demonstrates that due to pervasive distrust in the government, Jordanians express inconsistent support for government policies, including those targeting COVID‐19. Interestingly, Hartnett et al. (2020) assert that 33% of Jordanians are dissatisfied with the government's failure to protect them from being laid off during the pandemic. In addition, 38% of Jordanians believe that public sector institutions have failed to impartially enforce COVID‐19 measures and treat all violators equally under the law. Perceptions of favoritism and corruption therefore have likely fueled skepticism, distrust, and dissatisfaction among citizens (AlQutob, Al Nsour, et al., 2020; AlQutob, Moonesar, et al., 2020; Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016; Hartnett et al., 2020; Lynch, 2020).

Public choice theory provides a plausible interpretive frame for understanding the complexity of people's perceptions of government, its performance, and its institutional dimensions. This theory posits that as people attempt to optimize self‐interest, they carefully calculate the potential personal gains resulting from each action, policy, or decision made by the government (Rasmusen, 1998). Optimistic or pessimistic outlooks can therefore be linked to the process of an individual comparing their expectations of a particular governmental action with the actual gains he or she experiences (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Pessimism and dissatisfaction are believed to reflect the government's failure to satisfy people's expectations, and consequently, may induce unfavorable assessments of government performance, particularly during a pandemic when stressed citizens perceive the government as responsible for their misery (Ajarmeh, 2020; Yaghi, 2022). Moreover, ambiguity concerning lockdown outcomes and the long‐term impacts of containment policies create uncertain environments that exacerbate pessimism (Abdel Hadi, 2020; Ajarmeh, 2020).

Previous studies have identified links between people's subjective assessment of the government and their perceived trust, optimism, and pessimism. While previous experiences, outlooks on life, and various other factors may influence people's states of mind (i.e., optimism and pessimism), optimistic perceptions correspond with citizens' positive expectations concerning public policies and their outcomes (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Pessimism, on the other hand, reflects citizens' distrust, lack of confidence, and dissatisfaction with government performance (“Al‐‘urdun wal‐athar al‐iqtisadiyyat,” 2020; “Ayyohoma akhtar: Corona am tadaeyat,” 2020; Ajarmeh, 2020). According to Coleman (1990), the relationship between a government and its people is a function of a continuous rational calculation of individual gains and losses. Since this process differs from one government action to the next, a citizen may perceive a particular action as advantageous and another as disadvantageous. Consequently, citizens may express optimistic views when personal gains exceed losses and vice versa (Hillman, 2003). Therefore, using utility as a standard of measure, people's perception of government performance, broadly defined, may range from positive (e.g., optimistic, satisfactory, or trusting) to negative (e.g., pessimism, unsatisfactory, or distrustful) depending on certain factors, including age, gender, educational level, values, political affiliation, and income (Christensen & Lægreid, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Shi, 2001). As rational actors seeking optimal outcomes (e.g., legitimacy, cooperation, compliance, and support), effective governments seek to build trust with the public, knowing that a trusting relationship will be beneficial in the future (Zorn & Martin, 1986). Contrarily, ineffective governments not only fail to build a trusting relationship with the public, but also tolerate corruption and partisanship, leading people to lose confidence in state institutions, officials, and employees (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Yaghi, 2017). Motivated by self‐interest, citizens expect governments to be efficient, effective, responsive, and ethical, as they are aware that only under such conditions can they receive the maximum benefit from public policies (Seligson, 2002).

Some researchers argue that pessimism is an inevitable outcome of unrealistic expectations about the government's capacity and intentions. Indeed, such unrealistic expectations can cause frustration, dissatisfaction, and skepticism. Chamlee‐Wright and Storr (2010) argue that people naively and irrationally expect the government to use its valuable financial and human resources to help them. Put differently, the government is a rational actor that seeks to optimize gains (legitimacy, authority, and power). In this context, satisfying people may not always serve this interest. Downs (1957) explains that citizens' unsophisticated understanding of governmental processes leads them to falsely seek comfort and confidence from their government; citizens purposely deceive themselves into believing in the goodness of their government to minimize psychological costs. Caplan (2011) explains that rational irrationality occurs when people knowingly form irrational expectations and naively avoid pessimism because they think that optimism will allow them to better cope with the unpleasant outcomes of public policies. According to Zorn and Martin (1986), people comply with public policies to feel good and reduce costs associated with feelings of depression and dissatisfaction. People choose to be optimistic to reduce uncertainty and discomfort, and they choose to be pessimistic when the benefits of complying with public policies are ambiguous (Yaghi & Alibeli, 2017). Optimism and pessimism concerning government, therefore, are states of mind that can be willfully manipulated by an individual to optimize personal gains (Alhawamdeh & Maharmeh, 1998; Samsudin et al., 2011; Yaghi & Antwi‐Boateng, 2016). This study, however, seeks to identify and explain the linkages between the different indicators of the people‐government relationship, such as trust, satisfaction, optimism, and pessimism. Based on the above discussion of existing research, it can be proposed that Jordanians will be inconsistent in their perceptions of the capacity and intentions of their government during and after the pandemic (proposition 1).

In Figure 1 below, Chamlee‐Wright and Storr (2010, p. 257) present a typology which categorizes people according to the following four quadrants: (1) people who are optimistic about the government's intentions but pessimistic about its capacity to help them, (2) people who are pessimistic about the government's intentions and capacity (in this scenario, distrust seems to dominate the relationships as governments that fail to meet people's expectations), (3) people who are optimistic about the capacity of the government but not about its intentions (such a scenario may occur when people do not trust public officials), and (4) people who are optimistic both about the government's intentions and capacity to help them.

Figure 1.

Typology of perceptions about government's capacity and intention (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010, p. 257).

Although some scholars argue that when the government is truthful about its intentions people will tolerate negative policy outcomes (e.g., curfew), other scholars insist that people only accept such tradeoffs when the government has a well‐established, trusting relationship with its citizens (Ajarmeh, 2020; Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010; Rawashdeh, 2020). Therefore, many governments maintain trusting relationships with citizens to build up public faith in the government that can be used to respond to future national disasters, such as the current COVID‐19 pandemic (Elsheikh, 2017; Yaghi, 2008). It is easy for people to maintain optimistic outlooks when they trust that their government will fulfill their expectations and reduce the cost of policy compliance (Atkeson, 2020; Gunnell et al., 2020). Studies on Jordan claim that although trust in government exists, this trust can be put in peril when people are pressured to pay high prices for policies that produce only a modest benefit for people (Kawohl & Nordt, 2020). These studies suggest that the outlook of Jordanian citizens corresponds to quadrant OC‐PI, indicating that people are optimistic about the capacity of government but pessimistic about its intentions. However, cases of corruption and previous tensions between citizens and the government may suggest otherwise. When considering their own self‐interests, Jordanians are likely to be pessimistic about both the government's capacity and intentions, especially after the COVID‐19 outbreak. People are expected to factor in costs suffered both during and after the lockdown, including unemployment, restricted freedoms, loss of income sources, increased rates of poverty, and deteriorating psychological health. Even if Jordanians trust the government, disasters such as the COVID‐19 pandemic can weaken public confidence in the government (Abdel Hadi, 2020; Gunnell et al., 2020; Yaghi, 2008). Therefore, it can be proposed that people's optimism and pessimism cannot be neatly explained according to the typology suggested by Figure 1. Instead, people motivated by self‐interests are expected to express a complex view of government that perceives it not as a homogeneous entity, but rather as a complex phenomenon with multiple layers and dimensions. Indeed, as the Jordanian government's COVID‐19 response has been multi‐faceted, public assessment of the response will likely be influenced by multiple factors related to perceived capacity, intention, trust, optimism, pessimism, as well as an individual's educational level, socioeconomic status, and income (proposition 2). The following section explains the methods used to examine these issues in the present study.

2. METHODS

In April 2020, a large research project was launched to examine different aspects of the COVID‐19 pandemic. To examine the two propositions presented in this study, first‐hand data were gathered through online questionnaires. Existing literature on the topic guided the design of the questionnaire, and its validity was assessed by five university specialists in public policy, management, psychology, and sociology. Two waves of pilot studies (86 and 119 participants, respectively) helped improve the design of the questionnaire, which demonstrated an average reliability of 86% for the two studies (Cronbach α = .863). Subsequently, a link to on online version of the questionnaire was sent to 1736 different email, WhatsApp, and Facebook account holders who were invited to complete the online questionnaire. This method was more suitable to the nature of the study compared to other methods such as telephone‐based survey. Compared to specialized institutions (e.g., Arab Barometer or Arab Center for Research), previous experiences showed that the author did not have sufficient resources such as budget and research assistants to conduct phone interviews. A total of 1245 completed questionnaires were deemed valid for analysis, resulting in a 72% return rate. The reliability of questionnaire responses was found to be acceptable at a level of α = .83 (Babbie, 2013). The questionnaire included 108 items, including two open‐ended questions, 16 close‐ended and dichotomous questions (yes or no), 82 Likert‐type questions with positive wording (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree), and 8 demographic questions (age, gender, marital status, work, education, income, number of people in household, and type of residence). The questionnaire was distributed using Google Forms between April 22 and May 20, 2020. Although some questionnaire items were incorporated into other studies that are part of a larger COVID‐19 research project, the focus of each study is different, as are the studies' propositions and goals. One limitation of the present study is that only those with valid email addresses were able to complete the study questionnaire. This limitation, however, did not affect the validity of the analysis or findings.

The main concepts of the study were borrowed and operationalized based on the following previous literature; “government performance” and “capacity” from Chamlee‐Wright and Storr (2010), “trust in government” from Lind (2018), Blind (2007), Salminen and Mäntysalo (2013), Fitzgerald and Wolak (2016), and Ulbig (2002), “government intention” from Schneider (2005), Parker‐Megyar (2020), and Chamlee‐Wright and Storr (2010), “optimism and pessimism” from Garcia (2013) and Zorn and Martin (1986), and “satisfaction with government's performance” from Grönlund and Setälä (2007).

Assessment of government performance was operationalized as “people's perceptions of the overall performance of the government in dealing with COVID‐19 and related issues that concern people.” As the main variable (dependent) in this study, it was measured by a construct of six survey items using a 5‐point Likert scale, which asked people to respond to the following statements: “I believe the government is doing its best to help people in my community return to normal life after lockdown measures were lifted (mean = 2.89). I believe the government has done its best to help people in my community during the coronavirus lockdown (mean = 2.07). I believe the government has performed satisfactorily while helping people in my community cope with difficulties inflected on them during lockdown (mean = 2.63). I believe the government performed satisfactorily while helping me, my family, or loved ones during the lockdown (mean = 2.11). I believe the government is performing satisfactorily to help me, my family, or loved ones regain our normal lives after lockdown was gradually lifted (mean = 2.23). I believe the government has generally succeeded in handling the coronavirus health crisis (mean = 2.42).” On a five‐point Likert scale, the overall mean value for responses to the previous six items was 2.39 with a standard deviation 1.75, suggesting an assessment of government performance as poor. Other concepts were operationalized as follow: government capacity was defined as the perceived ability of the government to help people during and after coronavirus lockdown by effectively identifying infected cases, enforcing lockdowns, overseeing testing, feeding the population, keeping people healthy, communicating effectively with the public, regularly informing the public of new information, preventing the spread of false coronavirus information, and impartially enforcing the rule of law (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010; Lynch, 2020; Schneider, 2005). The government's intention was defined as the government's perceived desire and sincere intention to execute policies to help all citizens during and after lockdown (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010; Parker‐Magyar, 2020; Schneider, 2005). Trust in government was defined as the government's earnest and continuous care for people and communities, as well as the government reflecting the will of the people in the decision‐making process and ensuring that policies are trustworthy (Blind, 2007; Lind, 2018; Salminen & Mäntysalo, 2013; Ulbig, 2002). Using the expectancy perspective, optimism was operationalized as people's tendency to have positive expectations about the government's capacity to help people during and after the lockdown. Pessimism was operationalized as people's tendency to have negative expectations about the government's capacity to help people during and after the lockdown (Garcia, 2013; Zorn & Martin, 1986). While questionnaire items related to optimism focused on positive aspects of government, pessimism items focused on negative aspects. Lastly, satisfaction was operationalized as the perception that the government's performance and policy outcomes operate according to generally accepted norms (Grönlund & Setälä, 2007).

Sample questions for the main constructs in the study contained the following statements. Statements regarding capacity: “The government has the financial resources it needs to contain the coronavirus. The government has all the human capital necessary, such as employees, experts, and leaders, to successfully help people during the COVID‐19 pandemic.” Statements regarding intentions: “The government sincerely intends to help people. I trust public officials to help everyone.” Statements regarding trust: “I trust the government to do the best for me. I trust that the measures taken by the government will contain coronavirus.” Statements regarding optimism: “The government's policies will protect me and my family. Public officials will do what it takes to make my life better.” Statements regarding pessimism: “Government policies will not make my life better. Public officials do not care about people.” Statements regarding good governance: “I feel that Government decisions are transparent. The government has responded well to the needs of the people.” Statements regarding economic and social impacts: “Coronavirus is making my life miserable. Government policies are not sufficient to reduce unemployment in society.”

As indicated earlier, the main concepts and their operationalization in the survey were adopted from previous studies that were written in English, thus functional translation was conducted by five university professors specialized in public policy, management, psychology, and sociology. Unlike word‐by‐word translation, functional translation (contextual) emphasizes social and cultural aspects of the targeted society (Hatim & Munday, 2004). Therefore, the survey items were translated, separately, from English into Arabic by two bilingual professors (i.e., forward translation). Then, the translated versions were given to two other bilingual professors to translate them, separately, from Arabic into English (i.e., backward translation; see, Abu‐Mahfouz, 2008; Yaghi & Bates, 2021). A fifth bilingual professor was then asked to compare the four translations and to produce a combined version that reflected the most accurate translation of the original items. The panel of translators has assessed the validity of the survey items before it was finalized (see, Yaghi & Alabed, 2021). The study sample is composed of males (55%) and females (45%). The majority of respondents held either a bachelor's degree (73%), master's degree (14%), or another type of education (13%). Over 33% of respondents work in the public sector, 32% work in the private sector, 15% work in family or personal businesses, 12% do not perform paid‐work, and 8% are students. The majority of the respondents (49%) reported earning a middle‐class monthly income (JD 700 to JD 3400), whereas a minority reported earning either a high income (12%) or low income (36%). A small number (3%) gave no response. Over 83% of respondents live with family members, 13% live alone, and 4% provided no answer. Among respondents, 67% are married and 33% are unmarried. Approximately 40% of respondents are renters while 60% own their homes. Among respondents, 84% reported having a stable income before the COVID‐19 crisis, while 64% responded that they currently have stable income. Meanwhile, 86% reported that they have the same job they had before the COVID‐19 crisis.

3. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The first proposition predicted that Jordanian's perceptions of the government's overall capacity and intentions would be inconsistent. Due to a lack of existing literature, it was necessary to utilize exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to test the first proposition (Table 1). EFA involves grouping similar variables into distinguished dimensions of a particular phenomenon. To assess whether EFA was suitable to analyze the gathered data, sample adequacy was tested using two criteria: (a) minimum number of valid questionnaires of 300 or more (Williams et al., 2010), and (b) a certain ratio of the number of respondents who completed valid questionnaires (i.e., sample size) to number of items or questions in the questionnaire, expressed as N:p (Hogarty et al., 2005). Both of these criteria were satisfied, as the sample size is 1,245 and the ratio of sample size to instrument items is 1:14. As such, factor analysis is appropriate for analyzing the study data. To assess the proportion of variance among the instrument items in the study, the Kaiser‐Meyer‐Olkin (KMO) test value was calculated at 0.74, falling within the acceptable KMO range, which is 0 to 1.0 (Cerny & Kaiser, 1977). Lastly, to ensure that factor analysis is acceptable for analyzing patterns of generated statistical correlations among the different variables of the study, this study performed Bartlett's test of sphericity, yielding the following results: approximate χ ² value of 87,916.297 and p < .05, indicating the validity of utilizing EFA (Snedecor & Cochran, 1989). Table 1 summarizes the results of the EFA using Principal Component Analysis, showing that 11 factors emerged explaining 0.746 of the total variance in the dependent variable (Abdi & Williams, 2010). The consistent emphasis of the items loading on each factor lead to labeling each factor according to its contextual emphasis.

Table 1.

Results of rotated components matrix for exploratory factor analysis^*

Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Trust in government overall, α = 0.703 (mean = 2.68, St.D. = 1.07)
	0.704
	0.729
	0.614
	0.863
	0.832
Trust in public officials, α = 0.845 (mean = 1.17, St.D. = 1.12)
		0.748
		0.789
		0.702
		0.818
		0.673
Satisfaction with the government's performance, α = 0.809 (mean = 2.07; St.D. = 1.33)
			0.829
			0.777
			0.689
			0.809
Optimism about capacity of government overall, α = 0.862 (mean = 1.89; St.D. = 1.40)
				0.727
				0.739
				0.761
				0.699
				0.852
Optimism about intentions of government overall, α = 0.847 (mean = 1.73; St.D. = 1.86)
					0.631
					0.887
					0.805
Pessimism about intentions of government overall, α = 0.785 (mean = 3.86; St.D. = 1.29)
						0.646
						0.890
						0.787
						0.773
Pessimism about intentions of institutions, α = 0.837 (mean = 4.09; St.D. = 1.03)
							0.825
							0.775
							0.819
							0.787
							0.834
Pessimism about intentions of public officials, α = 0.849 (mean = 4.39; St.D. = 1.47)
								0.694
								0.863
								0.811
Pessimism about intentions of ordinary employees, α = 0.819 (mean = 2.41; St.D. = 1.16)
									0.743
									0.761
									0.836
									0.684
									0.855
Perceived economic and social impacts, α = 0.749 (mean = 4.69; St.D. = 1.79)
										0.799
										0.815
										0.823
										0.891
										0.776
										0.850
Perceived psychological impact, α = 0.881 (mean = 4.83; St.D. = 1.13)
											0.707
											0.821
											0.844
											0.769
											0.699
											0.843

^*(Mean; St. Deviation); N = 1245; Principal Component Analysis was utilized; loading limit is ≥0.45 with Eigen value > 10.

After the 11 factors were produced, a simple descriptive analysis was conducted to produce the mean value for all survey items that loaded on each factor to easily describe the factors. The mean values in Table 1 suggest a modest to low level of optimism, trust, and satisfaction in addition to indicating that COVID‐19 has had economic, social, and psychological impacts on people's lives. The findings show that Jordanians are highly pessimistic about the government, institutions, and civil servants. These findings partially agree with previous studies on Jordan (Hartnett et al., 2020) and other countries (Bouckaert & Van de Walle, 2003; Fetzer et al., 2020; Ulbig, 2002); however, there are three significant issues worth highlighting.

First, contrary to the premises present in the typology of Chamlee‐Wright and Storr (2010), Jordanians' perceptions clearly differ according to each sector of government. Indeed, Jordanians perceive the government as a complex phenomenon, not an undifferentiated entity. Specifically, in their assessments and expectations of government, people differentiated between the following dimensions of government: a collective entity, institutions of public administration, public officials who make decisions, and ordinary civil servants (Yaghi et al., 2007). Second, similar to previous studies about Jordan (e.g., AlQutob, Moonesar, et al., 2020; Hartnett et al., 2020), Jordanians have unfavorable perceptions of main political indicators, namely trust, satisfaction, and assessment of overall performance. These findings are in line with findings by Hartnett et al. (2020), who asserted that 33% of Jordanians were dissatisfied with the government's performance, and that 38% of Jordanians believed that public sector institutions have failed to impartially enforce COVID‐19 policies. These results also agree with reports of negative perceptions about government in other countries (Koirala & Acharya, 2020; Roy et al., 2020; Wise, 2006). However, future research is needed to explain the cause of Jordanians' modest trust in government (mean = 2.68) yet extremely low satisfaction with the government's performance during the pandemic (mean = 2.07). Poor trust is not the only indicator of the fragile relationship between the government and citizens, as confidence in the government's capacity was moderate (mean = 1.89) and confidence in the government's intentions was poor (mean = 1.73).

Third, people's poor satisfaction and trust are strong indicators of a general pessimism amount Jordanians concerning the capacity and intentions of the government to help them during and after the pandemic. Indeed, people seem to be concerned about the high price they continue to pay by accepting lockdown policies and the accompanying economic, social, and psychological consequences. Therefore, the government's poor performance and failure to meet people's expectations has resulted in pessimism (Blind, 2007; Eikenberry et al., 2007). These findings contradict previous assertions that Jordanians were optimistic about the government's capacity (Hartnett et al., 2020). However, differences in the timing, sampling, and scope of this study and Hartnett et al. (2020) may explain these discrepancies. Future research should address the following questions: What expectations may Jordanians have? Are they reasonable expectations? Are these expectations legitimate, or are people unrealistic and are they over‐estimating the government's capacity (Caplan, 2011; Downs, 1957)?

The typology of Chamlee‐Wright and Storr assumes that people assess the government as a homogeneous entity rather than a multifaceted phenomenon, and it is therefore a limited in its analytical utility. Moreover, this typology limits assessments of people's optimism and pessimism to the aspects of capacity and intent. The empirical findings of the present study provide support to some aspects of the typology while complicating others. In particular, the loading pattern of the optimism and pessimism factors confirms that perceptions of optimism and pessimism are crucial elements influencing the people–government relationship and the assessment of government performance by the public. However, people also held differing perceptions of government according to each sector of government and the level of government employee. These findings imply that optimism and pessimism concerning government are more complex than previous literature has suggested (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010; Yaghi, 2017). As reported in some previous studies, complexity of government reflects people's rational assessment of each independent dimension of government based on what a person gains from each dimension (Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016; Salminen & Mäntysalo, 2013). Consequently, Jordanians assessed the capacity of government slightly more optimistically (mean = 1.89) than government intentions (mean = 1.73). People also expressed less pessimism concerning ordinary employees (mean = 2.41) than high‐ranking officials (mean = 4.39). Concerning the impacts of virus containment policies, people reported experiencing psychological, social, and economic suffering. As indicated in Table 1, psychological impacts were assessed separately from social and economic impacts, which were combined as one factor.

The second proposition predicted that several factors would likely affect people's assessment of the overall success of the government's pandemic response (dependent variable). To clarify these factors and the extent to which they predict the dependent variable, all 11 factors that emerged from the EFA as well as demographic variables were regressed on the dependent variable. On a five‐point Likert scale, the overall mean value for responses to the six items that measured the dependent variable was 2.39, with a standard deviation 1.75, suggesting a poor assessment of overall government performance during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Although these numbers confirm people's unfavorable assessment of government performance, multiple regression analysis provides valuable information about the major predictors of the assessment of government performance (Blind, 2007; Muniz, 2006).

Table 2 presents the results of a full regression model with 15 predictors. Only predictors significantly correlated with the dependent variable were included in the table. Regression findings confirm the proposition that people's perceptions about government performance are sophisticated. In line with findings in Table 1, Jordanians unfavorably assessed the government's performance during the pandemic and reported a poor level of satisfaction. Moreover, only the following four demographical factors were significant predictors of people's perceptions: owning a house (B = −0.229), educational level (B = 0.383), and having stable income before (B = −0.251) and after lockdown (B = −0.302). It can be speculated that people with higher levels of education may perceive the government's performance less favorably than those with lower educational levels. Income has frequently been shown to be an important predictor of behavior (Yaghi & Antwi‐Boateng, 2016). Previous studies have identified the devastating economic and social impacts that COVID‐19 has had on people's daily lives (Jensehaugen, 2020). In this context, owning a house likely eliminates the stress of paying monthly rent or the threat of being evicted. Table 2 indicates that homeowners are more likely to express positive views of the government's performance (B = 0.229). The regression model shows that evaluations of government performance become more negative among people who did not have stable income before the pandemic (B = −0.251) and after it (B = −0.302). It can be speculated that people without stable income faced additional challenges during the lockdown compared to those who had stable income. Therefore, people who used to have income before the pandemic may have felt disadvantaged by COVID‐19 measures and thus evaluated the government's performance more unfavorably.

Table 2.

Results of multiple regression

	Predictor variables	Unstandardized coefficient B	Standard error
1.	Perceived trust in government as whole	0.362*	0.283
2.	Perceived trust in public officials	0.307*	0.185
3.	Perceived satisfaction with government's performance during COVID‐19	0.368*	0.242
4.	Perceived optimism about intentions of government as whole	0.291*	0.311
5.	Perceived optimism about capacity of government as whole	0.425*	0.301
6.	Perceived pessimism about government as whole	−0.397*	0.219
7.	Perceived pessimism about intentions of institutions	−0.315*	0.263
8.	Perceived pessimism about intentions of public officials	−0.298*	0.207
9.	Perceived pessimism about intentions of ordinary employees	−0.183*	0.540
10.	Perceived economic and social impact	−0.369*	0.362
11.	Perceived psychological impact	−0.328*	0.199
12.	Educational level	0.383*	0.217
13.	House ownership	−0.229*	0.289
14.	Having a stable income before coronavirus	−0.251*	0.384
15.	Having a stable income after coronavirus	−0.302*	0.213

Note: Constant = 31.649; R ² = 0.462; adjusted R ² = 0.386; F(18, 59) = 75.114

^* p > .10.

In addition to demographic factors above, strongest predictors of people's assessment of the government's performance are optimism about government capacity (0.425) satisfaction with government (0.368), trust in government (0.307), pessimism concerning overall intentions of institutions (−0.315), pessimism about intentions of ordinary employees (−0.183), and pessimism about intentions of public officials (−0.298). These findings confirm the significant linkages between trust, satisfaction, optimism and people's assessments of government performance. Corresponding with existing literature, the findings show that as these predictors improve, people's evaluations of the government's performance also improve (Fitzgerald & Wolak, 2016; Lind, 2018; Ulbig, 2002). Moreover, optimism seems crucial in the performance equation, as all levels of optimism are significantly correlated with the dependent variable. The more negative one's perception of the government's capacity and intentions, the more optimistic they are concerning government performance and their assessment of government actions. The negative correlation between pessimism and the dependent variable (B = −0.397) confirms the previous analogy, as more pessimism seems to lead to more negative assessments of the government's performance assessment.

4. CONCLUSION

The aim of this study was to explore optimism and pessimism among the public in Jordan in relation to their government, as well as to identify factors that influence public perceptions of the government's COVID‐19 response. The statistical analyses confirmed the two propositions of the study, demonstrating that people's perceptions of the government are complex and multi‐dimensional. Similar to findings reported by Salminen and Mäntysalo (2013), Fetzer et al. (2020), and Eikenberry et al. (2007), people do not view the government as a homogeneous entity, but rather differentiate between four main layers of government: the government as a whole, government institutions (public administration), public officials (decision makers), and ordinary civil servants. Consequently, optimism and pessimism vary according to assessments of each sector. People expressed optimism regarding the capacity and intention of the government overall while expressing pessimism concerning other sectors of government. The study also found that several factors influence people's assessment of the government's performance during the pandemic. Among the factors studied, optimism concerning capacity, pessimism concerning the government as a whole, and pessimism concerning public officials were most strongly correlated with the dependent variable.

Theoretically, the findings confirm the interrelationship between trust, satisfaction, optimism, pessimism, and assessment of government performance (Lind, 2018; Schneider, 2005; Ulbig, 2002). However, the study challenges the assumption that people perceive the government as a homogeneous entity (Chamlee‐Wright & Storr, 2010). Still, it is not clear whether people will continue to differentiate between sectors of government after the COVID‐19 pandemic. Furthermore, the study advances conceptual understandings of optimism and pessimism and calls for additional research to verify the findings of this study, particularly under normal, non‐pandemic circumstances.

From a practical perspective, the study reveals a similar trend that was reported by the Arab Barometer (2021), as trust and satisfaction were relatively high in the early stages of the pandemic before they declined a few months later. The study strongly suggests that decision makers should invest in building trusting relationship with citizens to effectively contain future pandemics, as suppression measures can be contingent upon people's trust in and compliance with government policies. The findings highlight the importance of capacity and intentions as determinants of people's trust, satisfaction, and assessment of the outcomes of public policies. To garner support for and compliance with government policies during times of crisis and uncertainty, governments should strive to portray an image of competence and sincerity to compel self‐interested people to recognize the complexity of government operations. Nevertheless, the present study was unable to examine other reasons that may influence the government's perceived failure at mitigating the impact of pandemic policies on people's well‐being. Future studies should expand this analysis to include other countries. Other factors may also be useful for understanding perceptions of government, such as emergency laws (Parker‐Magyar, 2020), inadequate structures of government (Wise, 2006), lack of authority, bureaucratic red‐tape, and a lack of diversity of methods (Muniz, 2006). The peculiar conditions brought about by the COVID‐19 crisis are unique from other forms of national disaster, and are worthy of additional analysis by researchers in public administration and public policy.

5. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

While the current study has succeeded in achieving its goals, there were limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the study relied on online survey which meant that the study population was limited to citizens with social media and email accounts. This group of people might have a better socioeconomic status compared to other groups in the society and therefore their attitudes could be different from those of the rest of the society. Second, the study used quantitative methods to analyze people's responses, while open‐ended questions and qualitative analysis could produce valuable findings and in‐depth insights into the subject matter. The findings of the study should, therefore, be understood within the actual scope of the study and by acknowledging the abovementioned limitations.

ETHICS STATEMENT

IRB Ethical Approval # ERS_2020_6124.

Yaghi, A. (2023). Optimism, pessimism, and perceptions of the Jordanian government's COVID‐19 response. Digest of Middle East Studies, 32, 21–39. 10.1111/dome.12284