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The Journal of Neuroscience logoLink to The Journal of Neuroscience
. 2023 Jan 25;43(4):656–671. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1186-22.2022

Irrelevant Threats Linger and Affect Behavior in High Anxiety

Kristoffer C Aberg 1,, Ido Toren 1, Rony Paz 1
PMCID: PMC9888506  PMID: 36526373

Abstract

Threat-related information attracts attention and disrupts ongoing behavior, and particularly so for more anxious individuals. Yet, it is unknown how and to what extent threat-related information leave lingering influences on behavior (e.g., by impeding ongoing learning processes). Here, human male and female participants (N = 47) performed probabilistic reinforcement learning tasks where irrelevant distracting faces (neutral, happy, or fearful) were presented together with relevant monetary feedback. Behavioral modeling was combined with fMRI data (N = 27) to explore the neurocomputational bases of learning relevant and irrelevant information. In two separate studies, individuals with high trait anxiety showed increased avoidance of objects previously paired with the combination of neutral monetary feedback and fearful faces (but not neutral or happy faces). Behavioral modeling revealed that high anxiety increased the integration of fearful faces during feedback learning, and fMRI results (regarded as provisional, because of a relatively small sample size) further showed that variance in the prediction error signal, uniquely accounted for by fearful faces, correlated more strongly with activity in the right DLPFC for more anxious individuals. Behavioral and neuronal dissociations indicated that the threat-related distractors did not simply disrupt learning processes. By showing that irrelevant threats exert long-lasting influences on behavior, our results extend previous research that separately showed that anxiety increases learning from aversive feedbacks and distractibility by threat-related information. Our behavioral results, combined with the proposed neurocomputational mechanism, may help explain how increased exposure to irrelevant affective information contributes to the acquisition of maladaptive behaviors in more anxious individuals.

SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT In modern-day society, people are increasingly exposed to various types of irrelevant information (e.g., intruding social media announcements). Yet, the neurocomputational mechanisms influenced by irrelevant information during learning, and their interactions with increasingly distracted personality types are largely unknown. Using a reinforcement learning task, where relevant feedback is presented together with irrelevant distractors (emotional faces), we reveal an interaction between irrelevant threat-related information (fearful faces) and interindividual anxiety levels. fMRI shows provisional evidence for an interaction between anxiety levels and the coupling between activity in the DLPFC and learning signals specifically elicited by fearful faces. Our study reveals how irrelevant threat-related information may become entrenched in the anxious psyche and contribute to long-lasting abnormal behaviors.

Keywords: anxiety, distractors, dorsolateral PFC, maladaptive, prediction error, reinforcement learning

Introduction

In modern-day society, people are increasingly exposed to emotionally loaded information that is irrelevant for ongoing and prospective behaviors (e.g., via online news and social media). Moreover, efficient everyday learning requires the ability to ignore peripheral information that is not indicative of, but presented in the vicinity of, actual performance feedback (e.g., intrusive social media notifications). The ability to filter out irrelevant information is therefore important for an individual's everyday function and well-being, even when not experienced first-hand. For example, media exposure to disasters and violence relate to negative psychological outcomes (Holman et al., 2014; Hopwood and Schutte, 2017), and information regarding potential threats, obtained via social interactions, may induce maladaptive behaviors (Atlas, 2019; Lindstrom et al., 2019). Finally, distracted learning has detrimental effects on learning performance in general (for review, see Schmidt, 2020). Surprisingly, the neurocomputational mechanisms influenced by affective irrelevant information during learning, and how these interact with personality types that are more easily distracted by affective information, are largely unknown.

Threat-related distractors attract attention and disrupt ongoing behavior, and particularly so for more anxious individuals (Bishop et al., 2004; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler and Koster, 2010). While there are obvious adaptive advantages of being more attuned to potential threats (e.g., increased survivability) (Ohman, 1986; Grillon, 2002; Robinson et al., 2012), such a sensitivity may have maladaptive properties if subsequent behaviors are guided by irrelevant threat-related information. More generally, failures to ignore irrelevant aversive feedback information could compromise future decision by assigning inappropriate aversive properties to stimuli and the actions that elicited them.

Three different behavioral hypotheses were considered: (1) the null hypothesis that affective distractors have no impact on the learning; (2) affective distractors disrupt the learning (i.e., learning performance in conditions with affective distractors should be reduced); and (3) affective distractors are integrated during learning (i.e., learning performance, respectively, increases and decreases when affective distractors are congruent/incongruent with the relevant feedback). Because anxious individuals are more distracted by threat-related information, we predicted an interaction between inter-individual anxiety levels and irrelevant threat-related information during learning.

To explore the neuronal correlates, our a priori analyses focused on the DLPFC given that it has been implicated in attentional selection, such that the DLPFC is engaged when distractors consist of threat-related stimuli, or stimuli to which participants attended in a previous experimental phase (Fales et al., 2008; Browning et al., 2010). For example, Browning et al. (2010) first trained participants to attend either neutral or fearful faces, and reported increased activity in the DLPFC when the attuned stimulus types were subsequently presented as distractors in a different task. Second, converging evidence suggests that aberrant prediction error encoding in the right DLPFC is involved in the acquisition of irrelevant associations (Corlett et al., 2007, 2016), with the prediction error being the mismatch between an experienced and a predicted outcome (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Accordingly, some studies report that prediction error encoding in the R DLPFC correlated with an individual's tendency to learn associations in conditions that normally prevent the formation of stimulus-outcome associations (Corlett and Fletcher, 2012, 2015). As such, abnormal updating of stimulus-outcome contingencies in the R DLPFC may cause learning about stimuli and events that should normally be ignored, eventually leading to the formation of maladaptive beliefs and behaviors. Following reviewer suggestions, we also performed post hoc analyses to elucidate potential roles for the amygdala. This is relevant because the amygdala is activated by emotional distractors (for review, see Carretié, 2014), plays a role in emotional learning (for review, see Phelps, 2006), and has been implicated in encoding prediction errors (Averbeck and Costa, 2017; Aberg et al., 2020b). Additionally, amygdala activation during aversive learning and the presentation of irrelevant distractors has been correlated with differences in anxiety levels (for reviews, see Bishop et al., 2004; Lissek et al., 2005; Bishop, 2007; Aupperle and Paulus, 2010; Duval et al., 2015).

Materials and Methods

Participants

After having provided written consent according to the ethical regulations of the Weizmann Institute of Science, 51 participants joined the experiment (behavioral pilot study/fMRI study: 20/31). All participants were right-handed, native Hebrew speakers, and without any previous history of psychiatric or neurologic disorders. The study was performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.

To ensure sufficient power regarding the behavioral effects in the fMRI study, a power analysis was conducted using data from the behavioral pilot study. This analysis showed that 16 participants are required to detect a one-tailed Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.548 (as obtained in the pilot study) with a power (1-β) of 0.8 and error probability (α) of 0.05. However, because 16 participants are not sufficient to detect interindividual differences in fMRI activation, we recruited additional participants to be more in-line with previous fMRI studies that investigated fMRI activation as a function of trait anxiety in learning and decision-making tasks, for example, n = 31 (Browning et al., 2015), n = 32 (Bijsterbosch et al., 2015), n = 25 (Xu et al., 2013), n = 30 (Fung et al., 2019), and n = 28 (Aberg et al., 2022).

Two participants frequently fell asleep in the MRI scanner (as indicated by frequently missed trials and post-task interviews). One participant did not perform the task satisfactorily (they pressed the same button in all trials of a block), and one participant displayed excessive movement in all three blocks of learning (as indicated by translational movements in a direction larger than the relevant voxel dimension) (Wylie et al., 2014). Therefore, data from 27 participants were included in the subsequent analyses of fMRI data (20 females; average age ± SD: 25.667 ± 4.961), while data from 20 different participants were included in the behavioral pilot study (11 females; average age ± SD: 27.350 ± 4.171). Trait anxiety was estimated using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983).

Experimental design and statistical analyses

Reinforcement learning task with distracting emotional faces

Task description

In each trial, participants were presented with a pair of objects and selected the object believed to be more likely to provide Correct feedback (see Fig. 1A). The best object in each pair provided Correct feedback with a probability of 0.7 (pilot study) or 0.8 (fMRI study), while the other object provided Correct feedback with a 0.3 (pilot study) or 0.2 (fMRI study) probability.

Figure 1.

Figure 1.

A, Principle of the learning task in the pilot study. In each trial, participants select one object in a pair of objects. The best and worst object in each pair, respectively, provides correct feedback with a probability of 0.7 and 0.3. Each pair is presented 30 times, allowing participants to learn which the best object is by trial and error. B, Illustration of a trial progression. C, Schematic of the outcomes provided in each pair type in the pilot study. In total, four different pair types were presented: Contradictory Loss, Affirmative Loss, Contradictory Gain, and Affirmative Gain. D, E, The average change in performance across participants for the different pair types in Gain (D) and Loss (E) conditions. A hit is defined as the selection of the best object in a pair. The error bars show the standard error of the mean. F–I, Correlations between Trait anxiety and the average learning performance for Trials 16-20 in Affirmative and Contradictory pair types. Trait anxiety correlated significantly with learning performance in Contradictory Loss pairs only (I). *p < 0.05; ns not significant (p > 0.05). r = Pearson's correlation coefficient. ρ = Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient.

A schematic of a trial progression is shown in Figure 1B. If no response was made within 2.5 s after the presentation of the objects, the letters “Too slow” appeared on the screen and one shekel was deducted. The jittered durations were drawn from a truncated exponential distribution (Dale, 1999), with an average duration of 3 s and a maximum duration of 10 s. To prevent difficulties in identifying the numerical feedback, the location of the feedback number on the screen was identical to the location of the preceding fixation cross.

The different feedback types provided in the experiment are shown in Figure 1C (pilot study) and Figure 2A (fMRI study). To test for learning differences between appetitive and aversive conditions, the Correct and Incorrect feedbacks were, respectively, +1₪ (a gain of one shekel) or 0₪ (no shekel gained) in a Gain condition, while in a Loss condition the Correct and Incorrect feedbacks were, respectively, 0₪ (no shekel lost) or −1₪ (one shekel lost). The accumulated sum of shekels corresponded to a monetary bonus provided at the end of the experiment. To assess the impact of affective distractors on associative learning, the numerical feedbacks were superimposed on fearful, neutral, or happy faces (see Figs. 1C, 2A). In Affirmative pairs, the facial expression was matched with the feedback type (e.g., a positive face was presented together with Correct feedback), while in Contradictory pairs the contingencies were reversed (e.g., a positive faces was presented with Incorrect feedback). There were slight differences in the different feedback types presented in the pilot and in the fMRI study. Specifically, in the fMRI study, only emotional faces were presented in the Affirmative and Contradictory conditions because we wanted to add a control condition (Neutral pairs) with only neutral faces to provide a baseline of learning performance without affective distractors.

Figure 2.

Figure 2.

A, Schematic of the outcomes provided in each pair type in the fMRI study. Neutral pairs acted as control conditions by presenting Neutral faces for both Correct and Incorrect outcomes. In total, six different pair types were presented: Contradictory Loss, Affirmative Loss, Neutral Loss, Contradictory Gain, Affirmative Gain, and Neutral Gain. B, The average change in performance across participants for the different pair types in Gain and Loss conditions. A hit is defined as the selection of the best object in a pair. Learning was statistically assessed via the average performance in Trials 16-20. The error bars show the standard error of the mean. C–F, Learning in Affirmative and Contradictory pair types relative the Neutral control condition. Trait anxiety significantly improved/impaired learning in Affirmative Gain pairs (C)/Contradictory Loss pairs (F). G–J, Win-stay and Lose-shift decisions in Affirmative and Contradictory pair types relative their Neutral counterparts. Trait anxiety significantly increased behavioral switching in Affirmative Gain pairs (G) and in Contradictory Loss pairs (J). *p < 0.05; ***p < 0.001; ns not significant (p > 0.05).

The learning task was divided into three separate blocks, each consisting of four (pilot) or six (fMRI study) different types of pairs: Affirmative Gain, Affirmative Loss, Contradictory Gain, and Contradictory Loss (as well as Neutral Gain and Neutral Loss for the fMRI study). In total, 12 of 18 different pairs of objects were used, and participants performed 120 trials per block (30 trials per pair in the pilot, and 20 trials per pair in the fMRI study) for a total of 360 trials. Participants were allowed a break between each block. Pairs were presented in an interleaved fashion, such that each pair was presented once before any other pair was repeated. Moreover, the object pairs were randomly assigned to a condition for each participant, and each object was presented equally many times to the left and to the right. Finally, no facial identity was repeated until all facial identities has been presented. For more information regarding the stimuli, see Stimulus selection, below.

To get familiarized with the task and the different facial identities, all participants performed one block of the task outside the scanner. Here, two pairs of objects were presented in one Loss and one Gain pair for a total of 40 trials. These two objects were not used for the main task. Critically, to ensure that all participants understood the goal of the task, they were explicitly instructed that they should try to collect as many shekels as possible and that the faces, including their emotional expression, were irrelevant for performing the task well.

Statistical analyses

Learning performance was defined as the average proportion of selections of the best object in each pair for Trials 16-20 (as well as Trials 26-30 for the pilot study). Correlations with trait anxiety were conducted using Pearson's correlation coefficient, as well as Spearman's rank-order correlation. Tests were one-tailed when testing directed predictions (i.e., positive or negative correlations), while two-tailed tests were used when no direction was predicted. The Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was applied where required.

Categorization task

To provide a functional localization of the right DLPFC and the amygdala, participants performed a categorization task before the learning task. This task was inspired by a previous task in which participants categorized attended neutral and fearful faces, and which showed increased DLPFC activation for neutral (vs fearful) faces for participants that had been previously been attuned to fearful faces compared with participants that had been attuned to neutral faces (see Fig. 4B, Face Attended condition in the study by Browning et al., 2010). Furthermore, the amygdala is robustly engaged by faces, suggesting it should be activated more strongly by faces than by numbers (Todorov, 2012). We selected a task in which participants attended the faces, rather than presenting them as distractors, because we wanted to prevent any task-related perceived difficulty to confound the results. For example, a differential brain activity between distracting fearful and neutral faces could be wrongly attributed to increased task difficulty caused by, for example, a disruptive attentional bias toward fearful faces. Because it is hard to disentangle these processes, we took advantage of previous reports of differential brain activation when faces were in attentional focus.

Figure 4.

Figure 4.

A, Schematic of the functional localizer task. In each trial, a number (−1, 0, +1) or face (Fearful, Neutral, Happy) was presented for 2.5 s. Participants indicated whether the stimulus was perceived as negative, neutral, or positive. No feedback was presented, and participants were not given any particular instructions regarding how stimuli should be categorized. B, The contrast between Neutral and Fearful faces revealed a region in the a priori R DLPFC mask that was significantly more activated by Neutral versus Fearful faces. C, For visualization purposes, the average β parameter estimates for Neutral and Fearful faces were extracted for all voxels within the R DLPFC cluster shown in B. D, Trait anxiety correlated negatively with the contrast between Fearful and Neutral faces for the R DLPFC cluster. E, The contrast between Faces and Numbers revealed bilateral regions in the a priori amygdala mask that was significantly more activated by Faces versus Numbers. F, For visualization purposes, the average β parameter estimates for Faces and Numbers were extracted for all voxels within the bilateral amygdala cluster shown in E. G, Trait anxiety did not correlate significantly with the contrast between Faces and Numbers for the amygdala cluster.

Task description

Stimuli were classified as negative, neutral, or positive (see Fig. 4A). In each trial, one stimulus was presented from one of six different stimulus types, which could be either a number (−1, 0, or +1) or an emotional face (fearful, neutral, or happy). The classification was performed in the absence of feedback and no specific instructions about the “correct” classification was provided. The six different stimulus types were presented pseudorandomly interleaved in 15 blocks of six trials each, where one stimulus from each category was presented in each block. The emotional and the neutral faces were exactly those used for the learning task (see Stimulus selection). A schematic of trial progressions is shown in Figure 4A. The intertrial interval durations were drawn from a truncated exponential distribution (Dale, 1999), with an average duration of 3 s and a maximum duration of 10 s. In total, 90 trials were performed (15 trials for each stimulus type). Each facial identity was presented once in each of the fearful, neutral, and happy categories. Of note, the position of the numbers and the faces directly overlapped with the positions of the same stimuli used in the learning task.

Data analysis

The R DLPFC was defined by contrasting fearful and neutral faces (Browning et al., 2010), while the amygdala was defined by contrasting faces and numbers. After defining the ROI on a group level, the average activity within the identified R DLPFC and amygdala clusters was correlated with trait anxiety scores. Because the ROI selections were blind to trait anxiety scores, this procedure conforms to recommendations on how to correlate fMRI data with interindividual factors (Vul et al., 2009).

Stimulus selection

Objects

Eighteen different pairs of objects were created from a colored version of the Snoddgrass and Vanderbilt object dataset, and only familiar objects were selected, as determined by a familiarity rating > 4.0 (Rossion and Pourtois, 2004). All pairs of objects used in the reinforcement learning experiment are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Object pairs used in the reinforcement learning task

Pair Object descriptions Object numbers
1 Pen, pencil 167, 168
2 Glasses, book 105, 30
3 Chair, table 53, 226
4 Candle, light bulb 44, 138
5 Key, door 128, 76
6 Tree, flower 241, 91
7 Belt, pants 26, 162
8 Carrot, onion 48, 157
9 Apple, pear 6, 166
10 Cat, dog 49, 73
11 Car, bus 47, 39
12 Lamp, light switch 132, 139
13 Water glass, wine glass 104, 258
14 Shoe, socks 204, 211
15 Telephone, television 227, 228
16 Moon, sun 146, 222
17 Pot, pan 179, 101
18 Fork, spoon 97, 215

Faces

Fearful, neutral, and happy faces from 15 different identities (7 males and 8 females) were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) dataset (Lundquist et al., 1998). To ensure that the different facial expressions could be easily identified, only facial identities with a high degree of correspondence between the expressed and the rated emotion were selected. Specifically, only identities with a correct identification > 85% for all of the three facial expressions (Neutral, Fearful, and Happy) were selected (Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008). This resulted in 7 male and 8 female identities (AF01, AF02, AF09, AF16, AF19, AF20, AF29, AF31, AM08, AM10, AM11, AM13, AM17, AM31, AM35). All face stimuli were normalized by rotating and changing the size of each face in accordance with a template image that ensured that the relative locations of the eyes and the tip of the nose were aligned across identities and facial expressions. Finally, the faces were cropped using a rectangular mask which allowed part of the hair to be included in the image.

Behavioral modeling

Q-learning

Following standard reinforcement learning theory, each object i in a pair was assigned an expected value Qi which represents the expected outcome if that object is selected in a trial. Qi is updated when object i has been selected and there is a mismatch between the expected outcome (Qi) and the actual feedback received (φ), i.e., the so-called prediction error (δ). The update of Qi is regulated by a learning rate α as follows:

Q(t+1)i=Q(t)i + αδ(t)iδ(t)i=φQ(t)i

The probability of selecting object i in a given trial t can be estimated by a soft-max choice probability function (Sutton and Barto, 1998) as follows:

p(t)i=eQ(t)iβ/(eQ(t)iβ + eQ(t)jβ)

The β parameter estimates the trade-off between exploration and exploration/randomness of choice.

Modeling the influence of distractor type

To include distractor types in the model, it was presumed that emotional faces alter the subjective value of the received feedback. For example, happy faces may increase the subjective value of any feedback type, or fearful faces could specifically reduce the subjective value of neutral feedback, etc. To test these notions, the subjective value of the feedback term ϕ was fitted separately for different types of feedback.

In the 12ϕ model, 12 different ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ for each type of face for +1₪ feedback (3 ϕ's), −1₪ feedback (3 ϕ's), 0₪ feedback in Gain pairs (3 ϕ's), and 0₪ feedback in Loss pairs (3 ϕ's).

In the 9ϕ model, 9 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ for each type of face for +1₪ feedback (3 ϕ's), −1₪ feedback (3 ϕ's), and for 0₪ feedback across Gain and Loss pairs (3 ϕ's).

In the 6ϕ0 model, 8 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ collapsed across faces for +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ) and −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), and one ϕ for each type of face separately for 0₪ feedback in Gain (3 ϕ's) and Loss pairs (3 ϕ's).

In the 3ϕ0 model, 5 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ collapsed across faces for +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ) and −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), and one ϕ for each type of face for 0₪ collapsed across Gain and Loss pairs (3 ϕ's).

In the ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH model, 4 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ collapsed across faces for +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ) and −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), one ϕFF for fearful faces paired with 0₪ feedback, and one ϕNH for neutral/happy faces paired with 0₪ feedback.

In the ϕ0FFG, ϕ0FFL, ϕ0NH model, 5 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ collapsed across faces for +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ) and −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), one ϕFFG for fearful faces paired with 0₪ feedback in Gain pairs, one ϕFFL for fearful faces paired with 0₪ feedback in Loss pairs, and one ϕNH for neutral/happy faces paired with 0₪ feedback.

In the ϕ+1−1 model, 5 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ collapsed across faces for 0₪ feedback (1 ϕ), one ϕ for happy faces paired with +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), one ϕ for happy faces paired with −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), one ϕ for fearful/neutral faces paired with +1₪ feedback (1 ϕ), and one ϕ for fearful/neutral faces paired with −1₪ feedback (1 ϕ).

We also tested another set of models which fit separate subjective values for each numerical feedback (−1, 0, +1) independent of face type. The impact of irrelevant affect is then added via constant “bias” terms (ε's).

In the 3ϕ, 3ε model, 3 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ for each numerical feedback type (−1, 0, +1; 3 ϕ's), and one ε for each emotional face type (fearful, neutral, happy; 3 ε's).

In the 3ϕ, εFF, εNH model, 3 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ for each numerical feedback type (−1, 0, +1; 3 ϕ's), one εFF for fearful faces (1 ε), and one εNH for neutral/happy faces combined (1 ε).

Finally, in the 3ϕ, ε0FF, ε0NH model, 3 ϕ's were fitted: one ϕ for each numerical feedback type (−1, 0, +1; 3 ϕ's), one ε0FF for fearful faces paired with 0₪ feedback (1 ε), and one ε0NH for neutral/happy faces combined and paired with 0₪ feedback (1 ε).

Model fitting and model selection procedures

For each model, the free parameters were fitted individually to each participant's learning behavior by minimizing the negative log-likelihood estimate as follows:

LLE=ln(1np(t)i)

Given n trials, p(t)i is the soft-max choice probability of selecting object i in trial t. To avoid local minima, each fit was repeated 10,000 times with different random starting points for each free parameter. All model fits were compared by calculating the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Schwarz, 1978), which penalizes model fits based on their complexity as follows:

BIC=2LLEm + kln(n)

LLEm is the minimal log-likelihood estimate, k is the number of fitted parameters, and n is the total number of trials. The most parsimonious model is the model with the lowest BIC.

To further validate the selection of the most parsimonious model, a protected exceedance probability for each model being the best model was calculated using a Bayesian model selection procedure (Rigoux et al., 2014).

Model simulations

Two different model-simulations of behavior were performed to validate the most parsimonious model.

First, a model-derived probability for selecting the best object in each trial was calculated using each participant's fitted parameters and the history of previous actions and outcomes (Palminteri et al., 2017). To confirm that these model-simulated behaviors reproduce the observed effects of interest, we calculated the same correlations between trait anxiety and learning performance in the different conditions.

Second, to determine whether specific computational parameters drive the observed effects of interest, another set of simulations were performed. These simulations first set all fitted parameters to their average value across participants. Next, the value of the parameter of interest is gradually changed to see whether there are associated changes in the simulated behavioral effect of interest. Performance improvements in all conditions were simulated, and 1000 simulations were conducted for each data point.

MRI data

Image acquisition

MRI images were acquired using a 3T whole-body MRI scanner (Prisma, Siemens) with a 20-channel head coil. Standard structural images were acquired with a T1-weighted 3D sequence (MPRAGE, TR/inversion delay time (TI)/TE = 2300/900/2.32 ms, flip angle = 8 degrees, voxel dimensions = 0.9 mm isotropic, 192 slices). Functional images were acquired with a susceptibility weighted EPI sequence (TR = 2000, TE = 30 ms, flip angle = 75 degrees, voxel dimensions = 3 × 3 × 3.5 mm, 32 slices). The phase-encoding direction was anterior-posterior, the slice order was all even (2-32) followed by all odd (1-31), with a 0% distance factor. No acceleration technique was applied. The MRI scanner was stopped between each block of the learning task (each block lasted ∼15 min), while the functional localizer task lasted ∼7 min.

Preprocessing

fMRI data were preprocessed and then analyzed using the GLM for event-related designs in SPM12 (Welcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). During preprocessing, all functional volumes were realigned to the mean image (with auto-masking applied), coregistered to the structural T1 image, corrected for slice timing, resampled to 2 × 2 × 2 mm voxel size (upsampling of the voxel size to these dimensions has been suggested to increase the sensitivity of fMRI analyses) (Hopfinger et al., 2000), normalized to the MNI EPI-template, and smoothed using a 6 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. Please observe that the resampling of voxels is mainly relevant for ROI identification in the functional localizer task.

First-level analyses

General procedure

At the first level, individual event types (e.g., feedbacks, stimuli, or button presses; depending on task, see below) were modeled by a standard synthetic HRF. A 24-parameter model was used to regress out head motion effects from the realigned data (i.e., six head motion parameters, six head motion parameters calculated as the difference between time points t and t – 1, and the 12 corresponding squared items) (Friston et al., 1996). Statistical analyses were performed on a voxel-wise basis across the whole brain.

First-level analysis of the categorization task

An event-related design was created with two different event types (stimulus onset and response onset) for each of the six stimulus types (the numbers −1, 0, and +1, and fearful faces, neutral faces, and happy faces). In total, 12 different event types were created, together with a regressor of no interest which included the onset of trials in which no response was made.

ROI

To test the a priori hypothesis regarding an involvement of the DLPFC in the present study, an initial R DLPFC mask was created by intersecting the union of Broadmann areas 9 and 46 with the middle frontal gyrus in the right hemisphere. The resulting ROI was then dilated by a factor of 1. All of these steps were performed using the WFU PickAtlas toolbox which also provided predefined ROIs for Broadmann areas 9, 46, and the middle frontal gyrus (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002; Maldjian et al., 2003, 2004). For the post hoc analysis regarding amygdala involvement, an initial amygdala mask was obtained by including all available amygdala subregions provided by the SPM Anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et al., 2005).

Statistical analyses

To localize the R DLPFC, we contrasted the BOLD signal evoked by neutral and fearful faces, while the amygdala was localized by contrasting BOLD signal evoked by faces and numbers. Significant differential activations within the initial R DLPFC and amygdala masks were tested via t tests implemented in SPM using an initial search threshold of p = 0.001, and small volume correction (SVC) using a threshold of p < 0.05 family-wise error rate (FWE) to correct for multiple comparisons. For display purposes and follow-up analyses (e.g., correlation with individual anxiety levels), β parameter estimates were extracted and averaged from all voxels within significant clusters of activation.

First-level analysis of the learning task

An event-related fMRI design was created with three different event types (stimulus onset, response onset, and feedback onset) for each of four trial types (Gain Correct feedback, Gain Incorrect feedback, Loss Correct feedback, and Loss Incorrect feedback). In addition to these 12 event types for each of three blocks, trials in which no response was made during the picture display were included as a regressor of no interest. To isolate the contribution of the distractors to the prediction error signal, the prediction error term for the selected model (δFull) was separated into two parts (for similar procedures, see Wittmann et al., 2008; Eldar and Niv, 2015). In brief, a “basic” prediction error term (δBasic) accounted for variance in the prediction error signal when there is no differential modulation by distractor type (i.e., the values of parameters of interest are set to be equal). Next, a prediction error “boost” term (δBoost) was created to account for variance above and beyond variance the δBasic term; the δBasic term was subtracted from δFull in each trial t, i.e., δBoost(t) = δFull(t) – δBasic(t). To study the fMRI correlates of the two prediction error types δBasic and δBoost, their respective values were added as parametric modulators to the feedback onsets. Critically, to elucidate unique variance explained by δBoost, the values of δBoost werer orthogonalized with respect to the values of δBasic (Mumford et al., 2015).

ROIs

The R DLPFC and amygdala ROIs identified in the separate categorization task.

Statistical analyses

Correlations between prediction errors and BOLD signal in the ROIs were tested using an ROI approach where the average β parameter estimates for each type of prediction error (δBasic, δBoost) were extracted from all voxels within the ROIs. These β parameters were then entered into two separate repeated-measures ANOVAs (i.e., one for each prediction error type) with factors Gain/Loss (Gain, Loss pairs) and Feedback (Correct, Incorrect), and Trait anxiety as continuous covariate. Follow-up analyses were conducted using paired t tests and Pearson correlations.

Results

Behavior

Behavioral pilot study

An initial pilot study was conducted with 20 participants to explore interactions between trait anxiety and affective distractors during learning. Learning performance was assessed as the average proportion of correct choices in Trials 16-20 and in Trials 26-30. Furthermore, we tested the relationship between anxiety and learning performance separately in each of the four conditions (i.e., Affirmative Loss, Affirmative Gain, Contradictory Loss, and Contradictory Gain). The average learning curve for each condition is shown in Figure 1D,E. Trait anxiety scores correlated negatively with the average performance only in the Contradictory Loss condition (Trials 16-20: Pearson's r = −0.548, p = 0.0125, Trials 26-30: Pearson's r = −0.438, p = 0.053, two-tailed tests), but not in any other condition (all p values > 0.08; see Table 2). To replicate these results, we conducted a follow-up study where participants also underwent fMRI scanning to provide initial insights into the neurocomputational correlates of the behavioral effects.

Table 2.

Correlations between trait anxiety and learning performance in the pilot studya

Condition Trials 16-20
Trials 26-30
r p r p
Affirmative Gain 0.241 0.305 0.160 0.501
Affirmative Loss −0.393 0.086 −0.090 0.705
Contradictory Gain 0.179 0.451 0.288 0.219
Contradictory Loss −0.548 0.013 −0.438 0.053

ar: two-tailed uncorrected Pearson's correlation coefficient.

fMRI study

The behavioral paradigm of the fMRI study was similar to the one used in the pilot study, with the main addition of a control condition used to normalize learning performance by subtracting the learning performance in the absence of affective distractors (i.e., with neutral faces; Fig. 2A). Learning curves are shown in Figure 2B, and normalized average learning performances are shown in Figure 2C–F.

First, we replicated the main result of the pilot study, namely, a negative correlation between trait anxiety and learning performance in the Contradictory (vs Neutral) Loss condition (Fig. 2F; r = −0.394, p = 0.021, one-tailed Pearson correlation). Because anxiety increases the tendency to display behavioral switching following aversive feedbacks (Aberg and Paz, 2022), we tested whether anxious participants displayed a reduced proportion of win-stay decisions for the Correct feedback in the Contradictory Loss condition (i.e., because the fearful faces were paired with the neutral 0₪ feedback). As predicted, the proportion of win-stay decisions correlated negatively with trait anxiety in Contradictory (vs Neutral) Loss pairs (Fig. 2J; r = −0.420, p = 0.015, one-tailed Pearson correlation). A similar trend was observed in the Contradictory Loss condition of the pilot study (r = −0.359, p = 0.060, one-tailed Pearson correlation).

In contrast to the pilot study, we observed a positive correlation between anxiety and learning performance in Affirmative (vs Neutral) Gain pairs (Fig. 2C; r = 0.640, p = 0.001, two-tailed Pearson correlation, p value was corrected for three unplanned comparisons). Notably, in the fMRI study (but not the pilot study), the neutral 0₪ feedback in Affirmative Gain pairs was presented together with a fearful face, therefore providing another opportunity to test whether fearful faces increase the averseness of the neutral 0₪ feedback. Indeed, trait anxiety correlated positively with the proportion of lose-shift decisions in Affirmative (vs Neutral) Gain pairs (r = 0.343, p = 0.040, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 2G).

Finally, trait anxiety did not correlate significantly with learning performance in the remaining two conditions (Fig. 2D,E, all uncorrected p values > 0.05, two-tailed Pearson correlations; Table 3), nor with the behavioral switching for neutral 0₪ feedbacks paired with happy faces (Fig. 2H,I; all uncorrected p values > 0.05, two-tailed Pearson correlations; Table 4).

Table 3.

Correlations between trait anxiety and learning performance in the fMRI studya

Condition Trials 16-20
r p
Affirmative Gain 0.640 <0.001
Affirmative Loss 0.049 0.810
Contradictory Gain 0.351 0.073
Contradictory Loss −0.394 0.042

aData were normalized based on the neutral condition. r: two-tailed uncorrected Pearson's correlation coefficient.

Table 4.

Correlations between trait anxiety and the proportion of win-stay/lose-shift responses following neutral feedback in the fMRI studya

Condition Win-stay
Lose-shift
r p r p
Affirmative Gain x x 0.343 0.080
Affirmative Loss x x 0.108 0.591
Contradictory Gain −0.134 0.505 x x
Contradictory Loss −0.420 0.029 x x

aData were normalized based on the neutral condition. r: two-tailed uncorrected Pearson's correlation coefficient. x indicates that no such action was available for the neutral feedback in this condition.

In summary, the behavioral results from the pilot and the fMRI study suggest that distracting fearful faces increases the averseness of the neutral 0₪ feedback for more anxious individuals. This was demonstrated by increased behavioral switching following this feedback combination, both when it signaled a Correct and when it signaled an Incorrect outcome, which, respectively, caused reduced and improved learning performance.

Behavioral modeling

To explain how anxiety interacts with the distractors, several different behavioral models were designed. To support the aforementioned behavioral result, different subjective feedback values ϕ were fitted for different feedback combinations (for details about the different models and the model-fitting procedures, see Materials and Methods).

A fixed-effect analysis showed an overall lower BIC for the ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH model (Fig. 3A), indicating a better fit to behavior on average. Additionally, a random-effects analysis indicated a protected exceedance probability of 1.0 for the same model (Fig. 3A, inset), a result that suggests that the selected model is the most likely model to generate the observed behavior (Stephan et al., 2009). Together, these two complementary ways of comparing model indicate the ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH model as being the most parsimonious model.

Figure 3.

Figure 3.

A, Difference in BIC relative the most parsimonious model (highlighted in red). Inset, The protected exceedance probability (XPp) for these models. The most parsimonious model was the most likely model, as evidenced by an exceedance probability of 1.0. B, The average model-simulated change in performance for the different conditions in Gain and Loss pairs. The error bars show the standard error of the mean. C–F, Model-simulated learning in Affirmative and Contradictory pair types relative their Neutral control conditions. Trait anxiety significantly improved/impaired learning in Affirmative Gain pairs (C)/Contradictory Loss pairs (F). G, Trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference in the model-fitted subjective values of the neutral 0₪ outcome paired with fearful faces (ϕ0FF) versus neutral/happy faces (ϕ0NH). H, I, Model-simulated performance improvements for gradual changes in the difference between ϕ0FF and ϕ0NH. Smaller values of ϕ0FF (vs ϕ0NH) improve performance in Affirmative Gain pairs (H), but impair performance in Contradictory Loss pairs (I). For illustration purposes, the performance improvements for when ϕ0FF is equal to ϕ0NH are subtracted from all data points, the x axis shows ϕ0NH0FF, and the separate lines for Neutral and Contradictory pairs (relative Affirmative pairs) in H were merged into one line, and similarly were the lines for Neutral and Affirmative pairs (relative Contradictory pairs) in I. J, K, For a model that estimates separate values for the neutral 0₪ outcome paired with fearful faces in Gain (ϕ0FFH) and Loss (ϕ0FFL) conditions, trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference in the fitted subjective value between the neutral 0₪feedback paired with fearful faces in both Loss (J) and Gain (K) pairs compared with neutral/happy faces. L, M, For a model that estimates separate values for the neutral 0₪ outcome paired with neutral (ϕ0N) or happy (ϕ0H) faces, trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference in the fitted subjective value between the neutral 0₪feedback paired with fearful faces compared with both neutral (L) and happy (M) faces. *p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001.

The selected ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH model contains six free parameters: one learning rate α, one randomness of choice/exploration parameter β, and four feedback parameters (ϕ+1, ϕ−1, ϕ0FF, and ϕ0NH). To clarify, ϕ+1 and ϕ−1, respectively, estimate the subjective value of +1₪ and −1₪ feedbacks and are independent of the distracting faces, while ϕ0FF and ϕ0NH, respectively, estimates the subjective value of the neutral 0₪ feedback paired with fearful (ϕ0FF) and neutral/happy (ϕ0NH) faces. Average fitted model parameters for all models are displayed in Table 5.

Table 5.

Model fits and parametersa

Parameters Models
12ϕ 0 0 ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH ϕ0FFG, ϕ0FFL,ϕ0NH ϕ+1H, ϕ-1H 3ϕ, 3ε 3ϕ, εFF, εNH 3ϕ, ε0FF, ε0NH
Negative LLE 110.8 (7.8) 113.6 (7.8) 113.9 (7.8) 117.8 (7.8) 118.7 (7.8) 117.8 (7.7) 117.3 (7.7) 117.7(7.8) 118.5(7.8) 118.6 (7.8)
BIC 303.9 (15.6) 291.9 (15.6) 286.8 (15.5) 276.9 (15.5) 272.8 (15.6) 276.8 (15.5) 275.9(15.5) 282.4 (15.6) 278.3 (15.5) 278.5 (15.5)
α 0.22 (0.04) 0.21 (0.04) 0.25 (0.04) 0.23 (0.04) 0.21 (0.03) 0.24 (0.04) 0.23 (0.04) 0.23 (0.04) 0.24 (0.04) 0.24 (0.04)
β 0.07 (0.01) 0.07 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02) 0.12 (0.01) 0.12 (0.02) 0.10 (0.02) 0.19 (0.04) 0.19 (0.03) 0.14 (0.03)
ϕ−1 −0.25 (0.06) −0.27 (0.07) −0.23 (0.06) −0.21 (0.06) −0.77 (0.05) −0.78 (0.05) −0.26 (0.07)
ϕ0 0.21 (0.06) 0.05 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) 0.26 (0.12)
ϕ+1 0.70 (0.06) 0.81 (0.06) 0.87 (0.04) 0.76 (0.07) 0.80 (0.06) 0.74 (0.06) 0.82 (0.06)
ϕ0NH 0.37 (0.06)
ϕ-1FFL −0.40 (0.08) −0.23 (0.07)
ϕ-1NL −0.25 (0.08) −0.15 (0.06)
ϕ-1HL −0.26 (0.08) −0.25 (0.07) −0.25 (0.08)
ϕ0FFL 0.15 (0.03) 0.21 (0.05) 0.27 (0.07)
ϕ0NL 0.20 (0.06) 0.26 (0.06)
ϕ0HL 0.16 (0.07) 0.22 (0.05)
ϕ+1FFG 0.59 (0.06) 0.50 (0.06)
ϕ+1NG 0.69 (0.06) 0.59 (0.07)
ϕ+1HG 0.62 (0.06) 0.53 (0.07) 0.71 (0.07)
ϕ0FFG 0.08 (0.09) 0.15 (0.09) 0.14 (0.12)
ϕ0NG 0.10 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09)
ϕ0HG 0.26 (0.08) 0.30 (0.09)
ϕ0FF 0.09 (0.05) 0.29 (0.07) 0.35 (0.06)
ϕ0N 0.15 (0.04) 0.33 (0.06) 0.29 (0.06)
ϕ0H 0.14 (0.05) 0.32 (0.07)
ϕ-1FF,NL −0.18 (0.07)
ϕ+1FF,NL 0.59 (0.07)
εFF 0.40 (0.09) 0.45 (0.06)
εN 0.48 (0.08)
εH 0.44 (0.09)
εNH 0.49 (0.06)
ε0FF 0.04 (0.12)
ε0NH 0.07 (0.11)

aData are mean (SEM). LLE, log-likelihood estimate; α, learning rate. β determines the trade-off between exploration and exploitation. ϕX is the subjective value for feedback combination X. For example, ϕ+1 is the subjective value for −1₪ feedback, ϕ+1 is the subjective value for +1₪ feedback, ϕ0FF is the subjective value for the feedback combining 0₪ and fearful faces, and ϕ0NH is the subjective value for 0₪ + happy or fearful face. εX is the bias added for feedback combination X. For example, ε0FF is the bias term for neutral 0₪ feedback presented together with fearful faces, and εH is the bias term for happy faces.

To validate the model, and to conform to recent recommendations that effects of interest need to be recovered using model-simulated performance data (Palminteri et al., 2017), the performance of the selected model was simulated using each participant's fitted model parameters. For visualization purposes, the fitted learning curves of the selected model are shown in Figure 3B. More importantly, the model successfully reproduced the behavioral effects of interest (Fig. 3C–F; compare Fig. 2C–F).

One possible explanation for the behavioral results is that the interaction between fearful faces and anxiety reduces the subjective value of the neutral 0₪ feedback. Corroborating this notion, trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference in the fitted subjective values of the 0₪ feedback paired with fearful and neutral/happy faces (ϕ0FF0NH, r = −0.467, p = 0.007, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 3G). These parameters do not correlate significantly with trait anxiety individually (ϕ0FF: r = −0.242, p = 0.223; ϕ0NH: r = 0.051, p = 0.802, two-tailed Pearson correlations).

Additional model simulations were performed to ensure that the impact of the interaction between distractor type and anxiety on learning can actually be attributed to the differential subjective values of ϕ0FF and ϕ0NH. In these simulations, all model parameters are initially set to the average values of the fitted parameters across participants' values (i.e., α = 0.25, ϕ+1 = −0.25, ϕ0FF = 0.35, ϕ0NH = 0.35, ϕ+1 = 0.80, and β = 0.15). The values are held constant, except for the values of ϕ0FF and ϕ0NH, which are gradually decreased and increased, respectively, to simulate the modulation by trait anxiety (Fig. 3G). Simulated performance improvements are calculated for all conditions, and visualized as a comparison between conditions (for further details, see Materials and Methods). As would be expected, decreases in the difference between ϕ0FF and ϕ0NH improved performance in Affirmative Gain pairs (relative Contradictory and Neutral Gain pairs; Fig. 3H) while reducing performance in Contradictory Loss pairs (relative Affirmative and Neutral Loss pairs; Fig. 3I).

Finally, to illustrate the robustness of the main modeling result, we demonstrate that the negative correlation between trait anxiety and the relative difference between fitted 0₪ feedback values for fearful (vs neutral and happy) faces are present across different behavioral models. First, the ϕ0FFG, ϕ0FFG, ϕ0NH model differs from the most parsimonious model by estimating separate ϕ0FF's in Gain and Loss pairs (i.e., ϕ0FF was separated into two parameters, ϕ0FFL and ϕ0FFG). Trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference between ϕ0FFL and ϕNH (r = −0.426, p = 0.013, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 3J), and with the difference between ϕ0FFG and ϕNH (r = −0.448, p = 0.010, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 3K), with a positive correlation between ϕ0FFL and ϕ0FFG (r = 0.412, p = 0.016, one-tailed Pearson correlation). Second, the 3ϕ0 model differs from the most parsimonious model by separating the ϕ0NH term into two terms: one term corresponding to the combination of 0₪ feedback paired with neutral faces (ϕ0N) and one term for happy faces (ϕ0H). Trait anxiety correlated negatively with the difference between ϕ0FF and ϕ0N (r = −0.535, p = 0.002, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 3L), as well as for the difference between ϕ0FF and ϕ0H (r = −0.335, p = 0.044, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 3M), and ϕ0N and ϕ0H were positively correlated (r = 0.816, p < 0.001).

In summary, the selected ϕ0FF, ϕ0NH model provides the most parsimonious fit to behavior and provides a plausible and robust explanation for how anxiety interacts with threat-related distractors to modulate learning performance, namely, via a reduced subjective value of neutral 0₪ feedbacks.

Functional neuroimaging

A priori, we hypothesized that atypical prediction error encoding in the R DLPFC, caused by the presence of threat-related distractors, contributes to the learning bias displayed by more anxious individuals. Based on reviewer suggestions, we also conducted a post hoc analysis with focus on the amygdala. To this end, we first used a separate task to functionally define the ROIs to be used when analyzing the learning task. Notably, by selecting ROIs in a separate task, we avoid issues of double-dipping (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009), and by selecting ROIs based on group-level data, we minimize the possibility of inflated effect sizes when analyzing interindividual differences in brain activation (Vul et al., 2009).

Functional localization of the R DLPFC and the amygdala via the categorization task

In the functional localizer task, participants categorized numbers (−1, 0, +1) and faces (fearful, neutral, happy) as negative, neutral, or positive (Fig. 4A). The contrast between neutral and fearful faces revealed a region within an initial a priori defined R DLPFC mask which responded more strongly to neutral (vs fearful) faces (peak voxel coordinate: x = 46 year = 44 z = 18, T(25) = 5.151, pFWE,SVC = 0.013; one-tailed paired t test, Fig. 4B,C). A negative correlation with trait anxiety shows that the difference in DLPFC BOLD signal between fearful and neutral faces is larger for more anxious individuals (Fig. 4D; r = −0.514, p = 0.006, two-tailed Pearson correlation).

The contrast between faces and numbers revealed bilateral activation within an initial a priori defined amygdala mask, which responded more strongly to faces (vs numbers) (peak voxel coordinates: x = −20 y = −6 z = −14, T(25) = 6.025, pFWE,SVC = 0.001; x = 20 y = −4 z = −14, T(25) = 6.833, pFWE,SVC < 0.001; one-tailed paired t tests, Fig. 4E,F). The collapsed activity within this bilateral ROI showed no correlation with trait anxiety (Fig. 4G; r = −0.005, p = 0.981, two-tailed Pearson correlation).

The obtained R DLPFC cluster and the bilateral amygdala cluster are subsequently used as ROIs in the analyses of prediction error encoding in the learning task.

Neural correlates of prediction errors

To assess the neural correlates of the unique contribution of ϕ0FF (vs ϕ0NH) to the prediction error signal, the prediction error term of the full model (δFull) is separated into two terms, δBoost and δBasic (see Materials and Methods). To assess their neuronal correlates, the β parameter estimates of the δBoost and the δBasic terms were extracted from all voxels within the functionally defined R DLPFC and amygdala ROIs. The resulting average β parameters for each ROI were entered into two separate repeated-measures ANOVAs, one for each prediction error type, with factors Gain/Loss (Gain, Loss) and Feedback type (Correct, Incorrect), and Trait anxiety as continuous covariate.

R DLPFC activity correlates with the “basic” prediction error

For the δBasic term, a repeated-measures ANOVA showed a significant intercept term (F(1,25) = 18.39, p < 0.001, ANOVA), but no significant main effects or interactions (all p values > 0.16, ANOVA; Table 6). To illustrate this effect, the individual β parameters for the δBasic term collapsed across the four feedback conditions for the R DLPFC ROI are shown in Figure 5B.

Table 6.

Repeated-measures ANOVAa

Predictor Sum of Squares df Mean of Squares F p ηp2
(Intercept) 3.449 1 3.449 18.393 < 0.001
TrAnx 0.386 1 0.386 2.056 0.164 0.076
Error 4.688 25 0.1875
GaLo 0.0005 1 0.0005 0.001 0.972 <0.001
TrAnx × GaLo 0.003 1 0.003 0.008 0.927 <0.001
Error(GaLo) 10.02 25 0.401
Feedback 0.024 1 0.024 0.185 0.671 0.007
TrAnx × Feedback 0.227 1 0.227 1.776 0.195 0.066
Error(Feedback) 3.196 25 0.128
GaLo × Feedback 0.26061 1 0.261 1.357 0.255 0.051
TrAnx × GaLo × Feedback 0.001 1 0.001 0.004 0.951 <0.001
Error(GaLo × Feedback) 4.801 25 0.192

aR DLPFC β parameter estimates for the “basic” prediction error term. TrAnx, Continuous covariate Trait anxiety; GaLo, factor gain/loss (gain or loss pair); Feedback, factor feedback (good, bad); ηp2, partial η-squared.

Figure 5.

Figure 5.

A, The R DLPFC ROI used to analyze prediction error encoding in the learning task. B, The average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameters for the “basic” prediction error term, δBasic, averaged across voxels within the R DLPFC ROI for the four different feedback types. On average, activity in the R DLPFC ROI correlated significantly with the “basic” prediction error term independent of Feedback type and Trait anxiety. C, The average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameters for the prediction error “boost” term, δBoost, averaged across voxels within the R DLPFC ROI for the four different feedback types. On average, activity in the R DLPFC ROI did not correlate with δBoost across the four feedback types but showed significant interactions with trait anxiety and feedback types (see main text and D–G). D–G, Correlations between trait anxiety and δBoost within the four different feedback types. Trait anxiety correlated positively with δBoost for Incorrect feedback in Gain pairs (D) and negatively with δBoost for Correct feedback in Loss pairs (G). The different feedbacks presented in each feedback type is shown above the corresponding plot. The fitted subjective values for the 0₪ feedbacks differed between fearful and happy/neutral faces. H, The amygdala ROI used to analyze prediction error encoding in the learning task. I, The average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameters for the “basic” prediction error term, δBasic, averaged across voxels within amygdala for the four different feedback types. On average, activity in the amygdala ROI did not correlate with the “basic” prediction error term, nor was there any interaction with trait anxiety or feedback types. J, The average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameters for the prediction error “boost” term, δBoost, averaged across voxels within the amygdala ROI for the four different feedback types. On average, activity in the amygdala ROI did not correlate with δBoost, nor were there any interactions with trait anxiety or feedback types. K–N, For visualization purposes, correlations between trait anxiety and δBoost for the four different feedback types are displayed. **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, ns = not significant (p > 0.05).

This result shows that BOLD signal in the R DLPFC correlates significantly with the magnitude of the “basic” prediction error signal.

R DLPFC activity correlates with the prediction error “boost” in anxious individuals

For the δBoost term, a repeated-measures ANOVA revealed significant interactions between Trait anxiety × Gain/Loss (F(1,25) = 6.04, p = 0.021, ANOVA), and Trait anxiety × Feedback (F(1,25) = 4.68, p = 0.040, ANOVA), but no significant Trait anxiety × Gain/Loss × Feedback interaction (F(1,25) = 0.62, p = 0.438, ANOVA). Individual β parameters for the δBoost term in the four feedback conditions are shown in Figure 5C. Importantly, the two a priori hypotheses were confirmed via a positive correlation between trait anxiety and the β parameters of δBoost in the Gain Incorrect feedback condition (r = 0.468, p = 0.007, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 5D), and a negative correlation in the Loss Incorrect feedback condition (r = −0.697, p < 0.001, one-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 5G). By contrast, trait anxiety did not correlate with the β parameters of δBoost in the Gain Correct feedback condition (r = −0.147, p = 0.463, two-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 5E) nor in the Loss Incorrect feedback condition (r = −0.107, p = 0.594, two-tailed Pearson correlation; Fig. 5F). In addition to a significant Gain/Loss × Feedback interaction (F(1,25) = 5.74, p = 0.024), no other effects or interactions are significant (all p values > 0.24; for a full ANOVA table, see Table 7).

Table 7.

Repeated-measures ANOVAa

Predictor Sum of squares df Mean of squares F p ηp2
(Intercept) 0.131 1 0.131 1.389 0.250
TrAnx 0.055 1 0.055 0.584 0.452 0.023
Error 2.365 25 0.095
GaLo 0.009 1 0.009 0.067 0.798 0.003
TrAnx × GaLo 0.763 1 0.763 6.041 0.021 0.195
Error(GaLo) 3.158 25 0.126
Feedback 0.027 1 0.027 0.171 0.683 0.007
TrAnx × Feedback 0.737 1 0.737 4.676 0.040 0.158
Error(Feedback) 3.939 25 0.158
GaLo × Feedback 0.802 1 0.802 5.742 0.024 0.187
TrAnx × GaLo × Feedback 0.087 1 0.087 0.622 0.438 0.024
Error(GaLo × Feedback) 3.492 25 0.140

aR DLPFC β parameter estimates for the “boost” prediction error term. TrAnx, Continuous covariate Trait anxiety; GaLo, factor gain/loss (gain or loss pair); Feedback, factor feedback (good, bad); pGG, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p value; ηp2, partial η-squared.

In summary, these results confirm that threat-related distractors contribute to altered prediction error encoding in the R DLPFC for anxious individuals, and specifically so in conditions where anxiety correlated with learning performance.

Prediction error coding in the amygdala

As in the previous analysis, the β parameter estimates corresponding to the two prediction error terms, δBoost and δBasic, were extracted from all voxels within the amygdala ROI. The resulting average β parameters were entered into the same ANOVAs used for the R DLPFC ROI analysis.

Amygdala activity does not correlate with the “basic” prediction error

For the δBasic term, the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all p values > 0.14, ANOVA; Table 8). The intercept term, collapsed across conditions and anxiety levels, is shown in Figure 5I for visualization purposes.

Table 8.

Repeated-measures ANOVAa

Predictor Sum of squares df Mean of squares F p ηp2
(Intercept) 0.168 1 0.168 2.311 0.141
TrAnx 0.009 1 0.009 0.122 0.730 0.005
Error 1.819 25 0.073
GaLo 0.051 1 0.051 0.731 0.401 0.028
TrAnx × GaLo 0.002 1 0.002 0.026 0.874 0.001
Error(GaLo) 1.757 25 0.070
Feedback 0.068 1 0.068 1.122 0.300 0.043
TrAnx × Feedback 0.004 1 0.004 0.069 0.795 0.003
Error(Feedback) 1.525 25 0.061
GaLo × Feedback 0.014 1 0.014 0.256 0.617 0.010
TrAnx × GaLo × Feedback 0.007 1 0.007 0.133 0.718 0.005
Error(GaLo × Feedback) 1.341 25 0.054

aAmygdala β parameter estimates for the “basic” prediction error term. TrAnx, Continuous covariate Trait anxiety; GaLo, factor gain/loss (gain or loss pair); Feedback, factor feedback (good, bad); pGG, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p value; ηp2, partial η-squared.

Amygdala activity does not correlate with the prediction error “boost”

For the δBoost term, the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all p values > 0.17, ANOVA; Table 9). For visualization purposes, the β parameters for each condition are shown in Figure 5J, and correlations with trait anxiety are shown in Figure 5K–N.

Table 9.

Repeated-measures ANOVAa

Predictor Sum of squares df Mean of squares F p ηp2
(Intercept) 0.013 1 0.013 0.190 0.667
TrAnx 0.116 1 0.116 1.698 0.205 0.064
Error 1.706 25 0.068
GaLo 0.116 1 0.116 1.911 0.179 0.071
TrAnx × GaLo 0.041 1 0.041 0.671 0.420 0.026
Error(GaLo) 1.512 25 0.061
Feedback 0.012 1 0.012 0.274 0.605 0.011
TrAnx × Feedback 0.027 1 0.027 0.615 0.440 0.024
Error(Feedback) 1.082 25 0.043
0.547 0.466 0.021
TrAnx × GaLo × Feedback 0.077 1 0.077 0.944 0.341 0.036
Error(GaLo × Feedback) 2.034 25 0.081

aAmygdala β parameter estimates for the “boost” prediction error term. TrAnx, Continuous covariate Trait anxiety; GaLo, factor gain/loss (gain or loss pair); Feedback, factor feedback (good, bad); pGG, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p value; ηp2, partial η-squared.

In summary, no evidence supported a role for the amygdala in prediction error coding.

Whole-brain correlates of the “basic” prediction error

To validate our model-based fMRI procedure, we tested whether activity in the VTA, a region well known for its role in encoding different aspects of reward, including prediction errors (D'Ardenne et al., 2008; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Aberg et al., 2015, 2020a; Schultz, 2016), correlated with the δBasic term. This analysis was performed by averaging the β parameters related to the δBasic term for all voxels within a recently developed probabilistic in vivo atlas of the VTA (Fig. 6A) (Pauli et al., 2018). Indeed, the average β parameters of this VTA ROI were significantly larger than 0.0 (mean ± SEM: 0.068 ± 0.021), t(26) = 3.291, p = 0.001, one-tailed t test, Fig. 6B). Next, correlations with the δBasic term were tested across the whole-brain using an FWE-corrected threshold of 0.05. A full list of regions correlating with δBasic, surviving a threshold of an FWE-corrected threshold of 0.05, is reported in Table 10. In short, significant activation was observed in a midbrain region close to the previously used VTA mask (Fig. 6C,D), in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex/dorsomedial PFC (Fig. 6D), in the bilateral striatum (Fig. 6E,F), and in the bilateral anterior insula (Fig. 6G,H). These regions have previously been implicated in the neuronal coding of prediction errors (Garrison et al., 2013).

Figure 6.

Figure 6.

A, Schematic of the VTA ROI. B, Average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameter estimates for the “basic” prediction error term, δBasic, within the VTA ROI. On average, BOLD signal in the VTA ROI correlated significantly with δBasic (p = 0.001, one-tailed t test). C–H, BOLD signal in the midbrain, dorsomedial PFC, bilateral striatum, and bilateral anterior insula correlated significantly with δBasic after applying familywise error rate correction for the whole brain. For visualization purposes, average (solid line) and individual (dots) β parameter estimates were extracted from the peak voxels within each respective cluster. **p < 0.01.

Table 10.

Brain regions showing significantly positive correlations between BOLD signal and the basic prediction error terma

Brain region Hemisphere MNI peak coordinate
T PFWE
x y z
Thalamus Right 12 −6 12 8.517 <0.001
Superior frontal gyrus Left −6 26 54 8.498 <0.001
Supplemental motor area Left −8 20 44 8.325 0.001
Medial frontal gyrus Left −4 28 38 8.282 0.002
Caudate Right 18 12 12 8.396 0.001
Supplemental motor area Left −6 8 62 8.347 0.001
Superior frontal gyrus Left −28 56 20 8.343 0.001
Putamen Left −22 4 8 8.293 0.001
Caudate Left −18 12 12 6.897 0.034
Putamen Left −32 −12 −4 8.205 0.002
Putamen Left −26 −10 2 7.283 0.015
Superior frontal gyrus Left −28 56 0 8.093 0.002
Supramarginal gyrus Left −54 −46 36 7.899 0.004
Insula Right 28 20 −10 7.796 0.004
Insula Left −30 26 −4 7.609 0.007
Insula Left −34 18 −10 7.397 0.011
Superior frontal gyrus Right 22 58 28 7.544 0.008
Medial frontal gyrus Left / Right 0 36 46 7.390 0.011
Supramarginal gyrus Right 54 −50 38 7.330 0.013
White matter Left −12 −8 4 7.252 0.016
Midbrain Left −8 −24 −16 7.131 0.021

apFWE indicates familywise error rate (FWEr) corrected p values for peak voxel activities across the whole brain. T statistics were obtained from t tests. Initial search threshold: p = 0.001; minimum cluster size: 5 voxels.

Discussion

An increased sensitivity to threat-related information is advantageous in the context of immediate and actual threat avoidance (e.g., when hearing a threatening growl in the forest) (Ohman, 1986). However, it is maladaptive if neutral/safe cues in the environment acquire aversive associations based on irrelevant threat-related information, and these associations subsequently guide behavior.

Here, we report that anxious individuals avoided a neutral stimulus following its pairing with the feedback combination of relevant 0₪ neutral feedback and irrelevant fearful faces, although participants were explicitly instructed that the faces are unrelated to task performance. By showing that exposure to irrelevant affective information lingers and affects behavior beyond the immediate situation, our study extends previous research which focused on the immediate impact of affective distractors, such as alterations in response times, hit rates, or brain activations (e.g., within the same trial) (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).

Importantly, the threat-related distractors did not simply disrupt the learning process, as would be indicated by an overall reduced learning performance in conditions with the feedback combination of fearful faces and neutral 0₪ feedback. By contrast, anxious individuals displayed, respectively, reduced or improved performance in conditions where this feedback combination represented the Correct or the Incorrect outcome. In support, behavioral modeling further showed that high anxiety was associated with a reduced subjective value of the neutral 0₪ feedback when paired with fearful faces both when it signaled Correct and Incorrect outcomes (compared with happy and neutral faces). A third dissociation was observed in the fMRI data, with a stronger/weaker coupling between the prediction error signal, uniquely accounted for by fearful faces, and R DLPFC BOLD signal for feedbacks where anxious individuals showed increased/decreased learning performance. Together, these results indicate that anxiety is associated with an increased integration of irrelevant threat-related information during feedback processing (and not just disrupted learning processes). From an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense that information related to potential threats is integrated during learning, rather than disrupting it. However, this ability comes at the cost of increased avoidance of beneficial situations in which a potential treat was occasionally detected.

It has been suggested that anxiety disorders develop from abnormal learning processes, for example, amplified fear learning (Lissek et al., 2005) and overgeneralization (i.e., the transfer of aversive properties from a fear-conditioned neutral stimulus to other perceptually and conceptually similar neutral stimuli) (Lissek et al., 2014). Additionally, trait anxiety (e.g., the general tendency to experience distress in everyday life situations) may indicate a vulnerability to develop a mental illness (Chambers et al., 2004; Weger and Sandi, 2018). The identification of abnormal learning processes in trait anxiety could therefore help understand external factors and internal mechanisms that contribute to the development of dysfunctional behaviors and mental illness. Based on the present results, we propose that this includes the maladaptive formation of associations between neutral stimuli/events and irrelevant threat-related information, as these may result in inappropriate avoidance behaviors.

Anxious individuals showed increased integration of fearful faces with the neutral 0₪ feedback, but not with +1₪ and −1₪ feedbacks. One potential explanation for this result could be that anxious individuals call on additional, salient sources of information to resolve uncertain feedbacks. To clarify, in the present study, the −1₪ and +1₪ feedbacks always indicated the worst and best possible outcomes, while the 0₪ feedback signaled either a correct (in Loss conditions) or an incorrect (in Gain conditions) outcome, causing it to be more uncertain. This interpretation is in line with findings that anxiety increases aversion to uncertainty (Hartley and Phelps, 2012; Grupe and Nitschke, 2013), the motivation to reduce uncertainty (Aberg et al., 2022), and distractibility by threat-related information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Future research may profit from looking at how irrelevant salient information guides the processing of uncertain feedback in high anxiety.

The present study used a between-subject design to study the interaction between anxiety and threat-related distractors during learning. A complementary way to assess behavioral interactions with anxiety is via alterations of stress and state anxiety, something which could be accomplished by, for example threat-of-shock manipulations (Schmitz and Grillon, 2012; Robinson et al., 2013). This approach is beneficial because it could be used to combine a powerful within-subject design (i.e., conditions with and without stress, or induced anxiety) with a between-subject design (e.g., trait anxiety measures, or patient vs control groups). This approach may be particularly fruitful to further research on findings that individuals with anxious predispositions respond differently in stressful situations (Meijer, 2001; Indovina et al., 2011; Aberg and Paz, 2022).

In accord with previous studies (for review, see Garrison et al., 2013), a number of brain regions in the present study, including the VTA, the striatum, anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula, and the R DLPFC, encoded a “basic” prediction error signal. However, only the R DLPFC of anxious individuals correlated with additional variance in the prediction error signal that was uniquely attributed to the fearful faces. This correlation was positive in conditions where anxiety improved performance, but negative when anxiety show impaired performance. These results are in accordance with previous research showing that the strength of neuronal prediction error encoding correlates with the amount of learning (Schönberg et al., 2007; Aberg et al., 2015, 2016a), and complement behavioral and physiological reports of links between personality traits and reinforcement learning biases (Browning et al., 2015; Aberg et al., 2016b, 2017). These results also bridge separate reports of an involvement of the DLPFC in attentional bias to threat (Bishop, 2009), prediction error encoding (Fletcher et al., 2001; Corlett et al., 2004), and the acquisition of irrelevant associations via altered prediction error encoding (Corlett and Fletcher, 2012, 2015). Indeed, similar and converging pieces of evidence support a theory in which aberrant prediction error encoding in the R DLPFC is believed to enable maladaptive learning about stimuli, events, and outcomes that are not related (Corlett et al., 2007, 2016). The present study adds to this theory by suggesting that one source of “aberrancy” stems from failures in suppressing attention to irrelevant sources of threat-related information; that is, these stimuli may grab attention and engage learning processes like any other (relevant) stimulus, and particularly so with high anxiety.

By contrast, we did not observe any involvement of the amygdala in coding prediction errors, nor any interaction with trait anxiety. Although the amygdala plays a prominent role in fear learning and anxiety (Phelps, 2006; Duval et al., 2015; Tovote et al., 2015), only scarce evidence report correlations between amygdala activity and prediction errors (McHugh et al., 2014; Meffert et al., 2015; Aberg et al., 2020b). One possibility is that the amygdala codes for other features related to learning and the prediction error signal, such as surprise, sometimes defined as the unsigned prediction error signal (Li et al., 2011; Klavir et al., 2013). Further, although the amygdala is activated by affective distractors, and particularly so for more anxious individuals (Bishop et al., 2004; Bishop, 2009), it has to our best knowledge not been implicated in the learning of irrelevant information.

Limitations

Anxiety was estimated using the standard Spielberger's Trait-Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983), which provides a gradual scale for the normal (subclinical) range of anxiety. Using a continuous scale has the benefit of correlating behavior across a distribution of anxiety scores, rather than just comparing performance across two somewhat arbitrarily divided populations (patients vs controls). Additionally, by studying anxiety within the normal range, we can determine how maladaptive decisions are mediated by irrelevant distractors even in healthy individuals. Because such maladaptive decision may have a huge impact on daily-life in all individuals, and definitely on societies and industry, we actually believe that more studies should use gradual scales over non-clinical populations (Browning et al., 2015; Fung et al., 2019; Gagne et al., 2020). That said, Spielberger's Trait-Anxiety Inventory has been debated for its lack of convergent and discriminant validity, suggesting that it estimates “negative affectivity” rather than proneness to anxiety per-SE (Balsamo et al., 2013). Yet, because negative affectivity is closely linked to psychopathology (Kotov et al., 2010; Stanton and Watson, 2014), and has been noted as a vulnerability factor for developing anxiety and depression (Clark et al., 1994), our results still bear significant relevance.

Our main behavioral results were replicated between two separate groups of participants (i.e., negative correlations between trait anxiety and learning performance in the Contradictory Loss condition was observed in both the pilot and in the fMRI study), and were replicated within another condition in the fMRI study (i.e., the feedback combination of fearful faces + neutral 0₪ feedback increased behavioral switching in both the Contradictory Loss and the Affirmative Gain condition). Furthermore, these latter results were associated with two dissociations in the fMRI results, namely, opposite correlations with trait anxiety and the coupling between R DLPFC activity and the prediction error signal associated with fearful faces. Being able to replicate results across- and within-groups speaks in favor of the robustness of our results.

Importantly, we would like to stress that our fMRI findings were obtained with a relatively small sample size (N = 27), and therefore needs to be regarded as provisional. In particular, although many factors may contribute to the reliability of brain-behavior correlations in fMRI data, including behavioral task, amount of data per participant, targeted brain regions, and method of analysis, recent efforts suggest “… that with sample sizes in the range of those often used in fMRI studies (i.e., 20-30 participants), one cannot be confident that all of the regions appearing to correlate with individual differences in behavior are reliable, or that other regions have not been missed altogether” (Grady et al., 2021). Future studies should therefore expand on the issue and validate the robustness of the present fMRI results.

In conclusion, the present study displays a learning bias for individuals with high trait anxiety caused by an entanglement between threat-related distractors and ongoing learning processes. This bias may be particularly unhealthy in modern society, where exposure to irrelevant threat-related information is increasingly prevalent via online news reporting and social networking sites. The present study describes a new pathway for how threat-related information may become entrenched in the anxious psyche.

Footnotes

K.C.A. was supported by Swiss Society of Friends of the Weizmann Institute Postdoctoral Fellowship Grant, and is the incumbent of the Sam and Frances Belzberg Research Fellow Chair in Memory and Learning. This work was supported by a Joy-Ventures Grant, International Science Foundation 2352/19, and ERC-2016-CoG Grant 724910 to R.P. We thank Dr. Edna Furman-Haran and Fanny Attar for MRI procedures.

The authors declare no competing financial interests.

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