Diversionary Words: Trump, China and the COVID-19 Pandemic

Abstract

Diversionary War Theory (DWT) posits that leaders engulfed in a domestic crisis will attempt to divert the attention of citizens by initiating an armed conflict against an external actor. War, under this logic, is a mechanism designed to distract, boost the leader’s popularity, or relegate the responsibility for the crisis to an outside scapegoat. In this article, I apply a discursive variation of DWT to account for and describe the shift in Donald Trump’s approach to China during the COVID-19 crisis. This analysis concludes the domestic political and economic difficulties Trump was grappling with during the 2020 presidential election motivated him to blame the Chinese government for the detrimental effects the pandemic had on the United States. Trump’s strategic use of novel social media platforms was instrumental in his campaign to name, shame, and scapegoat China to divert attention from the domestic crisis as well as to boost his popularity.

Introduction

What would embattled leaders do when diversionary war is needed to distract the general public but military conflict is not a feasible option? In this article, I advance the proposition that “naming and shaming” is a policy not only used to entice greater compliance with international human rights norms and laws by exposing countries or individuals that violate them. Used jointly with scapegoating, a naming and shaming strategy is a diversionary approach designed to draw the attention of domestic audiences away from troublesome internal circumstances, bolster the image of leaders in the eyes of their allies as well as political base, and pin the blame for such woes on another actor. Unlike traditional diversionary wars, where leaders initiate militarily, politically, and economically costly armed conflicts, a diversionary war of words that utilizes naming, shaming, and scapegoating is a nonviolent, low-cost, low-risk, and limited-scope policy designed to help embattled leaders overcome detrimental internal circumstances that are perceived to pose a threat to their political rule.1

This discursive strategy is especially pertinent in the digital age of social media and advanced communication technologies which enable unconventional yet direct and unfiltered interaction between leaders that countless people are exposed to through platforms such as Facebook or Twitter. Furthermore, an improved understanding of diversionary wars of words is valuable, because severe rhetorical skirmishes, even if exclusively taking place online, may deliberately or inadvertently escalate preexisting tensions, spiral out of control and lead to overt armed conflict.2 As Chad Freeman (1997, 39) noted, “when states or organizations indulge in rhetoric or behavior that is offensive to other states, they may expect retribution.” A rhetorical spat does not necessarily constitute the root cause of armed conflict in and of itself, yet it can certainly accentuate preexisting tensions, trigger new hostility and escalate into overt armed conflict. For example, after North Korea threatened it would consider preemptive nuclear strikes against South Korea and the United States (US) in early 2016, the Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Pyongyang’s bellicose rhetoric might “create international legal grounds for using military force against itself in accordance with the right of a state to self-defense enshrined in the United Nations Charter” (O’Carroll 2016).

The oftentimes caustic nature of language patterns on social media makes such platforms ideal for political squabbles that are enhanced by online hate speech and may quickly escalate into physical violence (Castano-Pulgarín et al. 2021). According to Karina Korostelina (2014, 7), political insults can play a key role in intergroup conflict, and “[W]hile the meaning of insults is fluid and constantly redefined in different cultural and historical contexts, insults can result in disproportionate reactions, from aggressive and violent behavior to social revolutions.” Employing language that is perceived to be disrespectful, provocative, or offensive can potentially undercut national honor and shame leaders, especially in honor-based societies, making peaceful conflict resolution significantly harder (Beersma et al. 2003). Similarly, challenging or tarnishing an actor’s status, and particularly their integrity, determination, or ability to firmly defend national interests when these are threatened, deliberately or not, oftentimes results in lengthier and more frequent violent conflicts. The reason, as Allan Dafoe and Devin Caughey (2016, 344) explained, is “[A] leader or state that permits its reputation for resolve to come into question risks losing honor, status, prestige, glory, and respect in the eyes of others.”

To make the case for a discursive subcategory of diversionary wars, the article proceeds as follows: the first section describes the role of naming and shaming, and the theoretical origins and functionality of diversionary war. It then presents a conceptual framework for a variant of diversionary war that revolves around leaders’ attempts to launch a discoursive attack to deflect the public’s attention away from internal crises and bolster their image as competent and successful. The second section examines the efforts of Donald Trump to name, shame, and scapegoat China during the spread of the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic in the US, especially in the spring of 2020, and in the months leading to the presidential elections. The final section reviews the main theoretical and empirical findings. A discursive diversionary war is likely to be pursued when a leader faces growing political challenges domestically, armed conflict is not a viable option and there is a readily available unpopular and possibly adversarial target to exploit.

Verbal Attacks as Diversionary Warfare

The concept of naming and shaming is most commonly associated with exposing countries, non-state actors, or individual leaders who extensively and systematically violate human rights and international norms. As James Franklin (2015, 44) aptly noted “naming… is the public identification by some actor of evidence of human rights violations by some target,” whereas shaming “refers to the strategic purpose behind the naming—the possibility that naming will convince the target to desist such widely condemned actions.” This well-established practice is based on the assumption the wrongdoer is sensitive to its international reputation and concerned that such negative exposure will produce criticism, condemnation, and possibly sanctions (Katzenstein 2013, 1084). Campaigns to identify, name, and “mobilize shame” against such wrongdoers may be initiated and led by governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), individuals, and the media (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23).

Functionally, naming and shaming campaigns are designed to purposefully draw attention to, and disseminate implicating information about, violations of human rights and international law across as many platforms as possible to instigate behavioral change. As Alison Brysk (2013, 5) asserted, “Facts do not speak for themselves—there is a learned discursive strategy that makes information effective.” What is critical for the success of such efforts is the way the topic is framed and delivered to target audiences such as the general public, politicians, policymakers, pertinent organizations, and individual activists. Indeed, according to one group of scholars, “frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (Snow et al. 1986, 464). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 17) argued the effectiveness of such framing efforts increases as initiating actors identify “innovative ways” and seek “hospitable venues” to spread their message.

Both “old” and “new” media are vital for all current naming and shaming efforts because they synergically enable the framed message to be amplified and shared with broader audiences. In addition to performing the passive role of a mere intermediary relaying information received from naming and shaming campaigners, media outlets oftentimes play a more active and involved part as they also independently “investigate, publicize, and sometimes explicitly denounce these atrocities” (Krain 2012). The growing use of social media by human rights advocates to share information, encourage political activism and target policymakers shows how valuable and effective such novel platforms have become in recent years (Pruce and Budabin 2016).

To a large extent, naming and shaming campaigns have become easier to devise and implement in the social media era, requiring relatively modest technological or financial resources to reach wider audiences as well as targeting particular actors (McPherson 2017). Moreover, traditional media outlets such as talk radio, network television, and daily newspapers increasingly rely on and feed off content originally produced through social media (Paulussen and Harder 2014). The availability of numerous and diverse media and their symbiotic relationship makes social campaigns, including naming and shaming, more far-reaching and relatively more effective in accessing and mobilizing public opinion than ever before (Tufekci 2017).

Still, the identity or the origin of such information is also important, because it may have a significant effect on its local or international proliferation. Human rights organizations (HROs), for example, benefit from their reputation as credible, experienced, and unbiased conduits of evidence concerning human rights violations. Celebrities utilize their prominent public profiles to advocate for myriad social, environmental, or political causes, and they take advantage of their unique status as influencers to spread their message and propel political action (Budabin 2015). Heads of state, senior politicians, and government officials—especially presiding but also veterans—are considered particularly qualified opinion leaders who enjoy preferential treatment. Given their present or previous formal position, authority, and gravitas, the content they produce and disseminate is considered especially consequential and, therefore, receives greater attention from both traditional and new media outlets as well as the general public and other political figures (Weimann 1994, chap. 9).

The efficacy of naming and shaming efforts in eradicating human rights violations has been repeatedly challenged (e.g. Hafner-Burton 2008).3 Yet, as the former founder of Human Rights Watch (HRW) Aryeh Neier (2018) noted, it “remains what it has been for a long time: probably the most effective weapon available to the international human rights movement in promoting its cause.” Neier’s reference to naming and shaming as a weapon is telling given this approach can certainly be stripped of its focus on violations of human rights and international law and, instead, weaponized by leaders as part of a politically motivated strategy designed to distract and shift the blame for domestic difficulties towards an external scapegoat in a way which reflects a nonviolent form of diversionary war.

Diversionary wars, according to Amy Oakes (2012, 14), are “interstate wars initiated in large part to bolster the government against growing domestic opposition, rather than simply promote the national interest.” Greg Cashman (2013, 200) similarly asserted that “when states are beset by increasing political opposition and civil strife or by deteriorating economic conditions, their leaders will seek to solve these internal woes by initiating conflict with an external foe.” Jaroslav Tir (2010, 413) also argued that “under conditions such as economic adversity or political unrest, the country’s leader may attempt to generate a foreign policy crisis in order both to divert domestic discontent and bolster their political fortunes through a rally around the flag effect.” Thus, diversionary wars are multifunctional: they can distract from domestic woes, boost popularity, shift blame or demonstrate competence when leaders face challenging domestic circumstances (Oakes 2012, 14–15).4

Furthermore, Jaroslav Tir and Michael Jasinski (2008) have successfully shown that embattled leaders may also direct their diversionary tactics against domestic audiences, especially against minorities and other vulnerable communities. Given their role as intermestic figures who make decisions in both the international and the national domains, leaders can try and mobilize domestic support by embarking on an armed conflict abroad and uniting the political base (in-group) against those elements within society the leader had shown political, ideological, ethnic or cultural dislike or hostility towards (out-group).5 Thus, waging a diversionary war abroad, and targeting or suppressing the outgroup at home, are not mutually exclusive policies; leaders can pursue such policies simultaneously depending on the degree of duress they are experiencing as well as the availability of opportunities to leverage. As Jung (2014, 566) aptly stated, “diversionary action is a rational decision made by domestically vulnerable leaders whose primary concern is for personal political survival”.6

As the theory evolved over the years, especially in response to various critiques of its empirical applicability, scholars began exploring nonviolent diversionary policies leaders may pursue including socioeconomic interventions (Kisangani and Pickering 2007) and rhetorical threats (Ala’ Alrababa’h and Lisa Blaydes 2021; Carter 2020; Li et al. 2009). These works suggested that given domestic unrest and the degree of threat it poses to leaders varies in intensity, diversionary armed conflict is not necessarily the most appealing response. Whereas the greater the threat domestic unrest constitutes for leaders, the more prone they will be to launch an armed conflict, lower levels may entice either a short-of-war or an entirely nonviolent diversionary approach (Hagan 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992, 32). Furthermore, armed conflict is an extremely costly and risky endeavor and leaders may neither possess the legitimacy nor resources necessary to embark on a diversionary armed conflict, either limited or large-scale.7 Considering the fluctuating degree of threat and/or capacity, Oakes (2012, 17) correctly recognized several alternative diversionary policies that leaders may consider when facing a domestic crisis in addition to warfare: diversionary spectacle, repression, political and economic reforms, foreign intervention, and muddling through.

The identification of additional responses embattled leaders may pursue in face of a domestic crisis should be applauded but the incorporation of a rhetorical variant is still underdeveloped in the literature, although it can serve the same diversionary function without the application of military force and with significantly less risk as well as cost. Therefore, the existing menu of diversionary policy options should be expanded to include it (see Fig. 1). Unlike the violent militarized variant of diversionary war which utilizes foreign interventions to achieve a diversionary objective, a communicative nonviolent diversionary approach is essentially discursive, and it pertains to oral or written statements as well as other forms of messaging through traditional and/or novel platforms such as social media which play a significant role in any deflection efforts.8 In other words, the diversionary use of physical military force is substituted by the diversionary use of rhetorical exchanges.

Fig. 1.

The menu of diversionary policies for leaders facing domestic unrest (This typology heavily builds on Oakes (2012, 17) although it organizes the policy options in a different sequence based on the severity of the diversionary strategies)

Previous studies have largely focused on the more traditional mass media such as newspapers, television, or radio (e.g. Ala’ Alrababa’h and Lisa Blaydes 2021 or Li et al. 2009). However, this study integrates into its analysis nontraditional media platforms that have become a new and dynamic domain for diversionary discursive policies, because the proliferation of social media transformed the way leaders engage their peers and various domestic and international audiences. First, leaders frequently and effectively utilize novel and popular platforms such as Twitter or Facebook to directly communicate with other heads of state by using either their personal or official accounts. Second, these messages are also made in the online public domain and as such are accessible to millions of people alongside the targeted actor. Third, social media has become one of the most effective coordinating tools for political and social mobilization because leaders can elicit both collective identification with a certain cause and the necessary action toward realizing it (Zeitzoff 2017, 1972). These idiosyncratic traits of social media become especially important when leaders face domestic unrest, because social media can be used strategically as a major instrument of political communication designed to deal with the looming crisis (Barberá and Zeitzoff 2018).

In the process, leaders can employ different naming, shaming, and scapegoating rhetorical frames to advance their diversionary objectives such as boosting domestic support, deflecting responsibility to another actor, or demonstrating their competence and determination as leaders. One particularly prevalent and supplementary method involves securitizing the target of leaders’ naming, shaming, and scapegoating efforts.9 Addressing something as a threat that endangers a state’s assets or ideals and, therefore, must be confronted is one of the most effective methods to unify the political base, divert attention, endow leaders with more latitude to promote policies that otherwise would lack domestic or international legitimacy, and showcase their competency (Ala’ Alrababa’h and Lisa Blaydes 2021).

Securitization theorists have long focused on discourse or “speech act” as the vehicle through which leaders securitize an issue or an actor, and transform them into a threat that advances their preferred policy: “by depicting a threat the securitizing agent often says someone cannot be dealt with in the normal way… by labeling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan et al. 1998, 26). An effective securitized diversionary strategy is contingent on the availability of “fear-producing targets”, especially the existence of powerful opponents that are already embroiled in a protracted adversarial relationship with the targeting actor or pose an ontological threat to the leader’s reference group (Jung and Sung 2014). It also depends on the availability of a receptive audience that can be easily persuaded and mobilized to endorse the new frame, a situational context that lends itself to such a new formulation of the threat, and leaders’ ability to make a compelling case to win the support of their target audience so they can translate it into political legitimacy and capital (Balzacq 2005).

The limited and relatively low-cost nature of a “war of words” strategy allows leaders to divert attention, produce a “rally around the flag” effect, and an opportunity to exhibit their adroitness and vigilance by verbally attacking a powerful adversarial target.10 Oake’s (2012, 17–18) substitutability model suggests that a selection of a diversionary strategy reflects the reconciliation of leaders’ preferences and the environmental factors they must deal with. As a result of broadening the scope of diversionary policies to include naming, shaming, and scapegoating, it is possible to identify four key factors that, taken together, make diversionary rhetoric exceedingly appealing: (1) the existence of a domestic crisis which is perceived by the leader as potentially detrimental to their political future; (2) insufficient political support for, or the disproportionally and unacceptably high cost of, a diversionary armed conflict (Ala’ Alrababa’h and Lisa Blaydes 2021, 693); (3) the identification of a clear and effective target for a low-cost naming, shaming and scapegoating campaign to distract and divert attention from the internal crisis and/or demonstrate the leader’s competence (Kanat 2014, 26); and (4) the leader’s expectation the diversionary campaign can be contained and remain nonviolent.

The following section applies this conceptual framework to account for Donald Trump’s naming, shaming, and scapegoating efforts against China as a diversionary war of words employed during the spring of 2020, and the months leading to the presidential elections. Given the American president’s preponderance of power when it comes to the making of US foreign policy, and considering Trump’s highly centralized yet impulsive leadership style, the shift in the policy towards China should be treated primarily as the function of his personal preferences and needs rather than the output of a meticulous decision-making process (Da Vinha 2019 and Siniver and Featherstone 2020).

The Making of the “Chinese Virus”

The Creeping Crisis

The origin of all diversionary policies is the emergence of a domestic challenge that can potentially undermine the leader’s political rule. In the case of Trump’s altered approach to China, the triggering event was the spread of the Coronavirus to the US. The first case of COVID-19 in the US was documented on January 20, 2020. A 35-year-old man who recently returned from a family visit to Wuhan went to an urgent care facility in Snohomish County, Washington. The man reported he had a fever and was coughing for the past 4 days, and given he noticed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued warnings about the spread of COVID-19 in China and his condition, he thought it would be sensible to consult a physician. In China, the authorities had already moved quickly to put Wuhan and other cities under complete lockdown. Despite strong opposition from cabinet members and senior advisors (Leonnig and Rucker 2021, 35–36), President Trump (2020a) tweeted: “China has been working very hard to contain the Coronavirus. The United States greatly appreciates their efforts and transparency. It will all work out well. In particular, on behalf of the American People, I want to thank President Xi!”.

Ten days later, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a global health emergency following the spread of COVID-19 well beyond China. The number of cases skyrocketed, reaching nearly 10,000 confirmed cases worldwide, and the professional health community was widely in agreement there were irrefutable indications of human-to-human transmission of the virus. The US State Department promptly issued a travel advisory warning against traveling to China and recommended that all American nationals who were already in China make the necessary arrangement to leave the country expeditiously (Wee et al. 2020). Several American airlines declared plans to halt flights to and from China until the situation clears, and the Trump Administration announced the pandemic “a public health emergency in the United States” and imposed a travel ban prohibiting foreign nationals from entering the US if they recently visited China as well as require American nationals who traveled to China to self-quarantine upon their arrival in the US (Corkery and Karni 2020). Only a few hours after this unprecedented travel ban was announced, Trump expressed confidence in China’s handling of the spread of COVID-19, as he told workers in a Michigan factory:

Now we’re working very strongly with China on the coronavirus—that’s a new thing that a lot of people are talking about. Hopefully, it won’t be as bad as some people think it could be. But we’re working very closely with them and with a lot of other people and a lot of other countries. And we think we have it very well under control… we’re working very closely with China and other countries, and we think it’s going to have a very good ending for it. So that I can assure you (White House 2020a).

On Twitter, Trump (2020b) announced to his followers:

Just had a long and very good conversation by phone with President Xi of China. He is strong, sharp and powerfully focused on leading the counterattack on the Coronavirus. He feels they are doing very well, even building hospitals in a matter of only days… Great discipline is taking place in China, as President Xi strongly leads what will be a very successful operation. We are working closely with China to help!

Before his departure to an event in North Carolina, Trump told reporters:

China is working very hard. Late last night, I had a very good talk with President Xi, and we talked about—mostly about the coronavirus. They’re working really hard, and I think they are doing a very professional job… I had a great conversation last night with President Xi. It’s a tough situation. I think they’re doing a very good job (White House 2020b).

And during the event in North Carolina, Trump told the audience:

I just spoke to President Xi last night, and, you know, we’re working on the—the problem, the virus. It’s a —it’s a very tough situation. But I think he’s going to handle it. I think he’s handled it really well. We’re helping wherever we can. But we have a great relationship. It’s incredible. They respect us again. They didn’t even respect us. What they were doing to us—they didn’t even respect us… They respect us again and we respect them (White House 2020c).

Two weeks later, when asked if President Xi should do something differently to help contain and eradicate the pandemic, Trump told reporters “President Xi is working very, very hard. I spoke to him. He’s working very hard. I think he’s doing a very good job. It’s a big problem. But President Xi loves his country. He’s working very hard to solve the problem and he will solve the problem” (White House 2020d). During a press conference three days later, the White House announced the formation of a special COVID-19 Task Force led by Vice President Mike Pence. Once again Trump applauded the Chinese government’s handling of the situation, and the Chinese President, in particular: “I spoke with President Xi. We had a great talk. He’s working very hard, I have to say. He’s working very, very hard. And if you can count on the reports coming out of China, that spread has gone down quite a bit” (White House 2020e).

The first COVID-related death in the US was confirmed in late February and testing became vital to better assess the severity of the spread of COVID-19 across the US, crafting effective policies to contain its spread, and, in the longer run, enable the differential lifting of some of the restrictions imposed on the American public once the necessary conditions emerge. Yet the US government’s performance appeared underwhelming compared to other countries. Throughout the period between mid-February and mid-March, for example, South Korea tested over 290,000 people, whereas the number of tests in the US was about 60,000 people (Terhune et al. 2020). During the Democratic Party’s presidential primary debate held in late February, all the contenders criticized the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic and warned against its impact on the American economy (Vigdor 2020). Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer fervently attacked the president and declared on the Senate floor “the Trump administration has shown towering and dangerous incompetence when it comes to the coronavirus” (US Congress 2020). To deflect the growing criticism, Trump began attacking the previous administration:

The Obama administration made a decision on testing that turned out to be very detrimental to what we’re doing, and we undid that decision a few days ago so that the testing can take place in a much more accurate and rapid fashion. That was a decision we disagreed with. I don’t think we would have made it, but for some reason it was made. But we’ve undone that decision (Quoted in Baker and Kaplan (2020)).

In an attempt to uproot any impression he was shirking responsibility, and that the public health crisis is bungled by his administration, Trump visited the CDC headquarters in Atlanta. He confidently told reporters “anybody that needs a test can have a test. They’re all set. They have them out there.” However, Alex Azar, Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), had to clarify immediately: “You may not get a test unless a doctor or public health official prescribes a test” (Weiland 2020). According to one report, the main problem was that the testing kits the US government circulated in February were faulty and yielded inconclusive results, then the CDC could not effectively fix the already distributed kits, and, finally, there were not enough functioning test kits to perform the necessary number of test nationwide (Johnson and McGinley 2020). Trump was noticeably agitated by the growing criticism against him and complained on Twitter “The Fake News Media and their partner, the Democrat Party, is doing everything within its semi-considerable power (it used to be greater!) to inflame the CoronaVirus situation, far beyond what the facts would warrant” (Trump 2020c).

Trump made the first official address to the American people from the Oval Office on March 11, 2020. He expanded the travel ban, this time preventing travel from Europe given the spread of COVID-19 across the continent. Trump also stated “We are at a critical time in the fight against the virus… If we are vigilant—and we can reduce the chance of infection, which we will—we will significantly impede the transmission of the virus. The virus will not have a chance against us” (White House 2020f). Following the address, however, one columnist argued that “Trump now seems to understand that coronavirus isn’t going away anytime soon. But he also seems to view it mostly as a public-relations emergency for himself rather than a public-health emergency for the country” (Leonhardt 2020).

The next day, the head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), Dr. Anthony Fauci, told the House Committee on Oversight and Reform in a public hearing “The [testing] system does not, is not, really geared to what we need right now, to what you are asking for. That is a failing… It is a failing. Let’s admit it. The idea of anybody getting it [the test] easily the way people in other countries are doing it, we are not set up for that” (Burton et al. 2020). When asked about Fauci’s testimony, and whether he assumes responsibility for the administration’s COVID-19 testing policies, Trump again shifted the blame to the previous administration: “No, I don’t take responsibility at all, because we were given a—a set of circumstances and we were given rules, regulations, and specifications from a different time. It wasn’t meant for this kind of an event with the kind of numbers that we’re talking about.” (White House 2020g). The health crisis posed a political challenge to the Trump administration in light of the looming presidential elections in November, and things seemed even grimmer on the financial front which he considered crucial for his reelection. As the global economy was undergoing a catastrophe, in mid-March Wall Street lost ten percent in a single day, the worst plunge since the 1987 financial crisis (Samson et al. 2020).

The US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported a substantial decline across key economic indicators; gross domestic product (GDP) decreased by 4.8 percent in the first quarter of 2020, personal income decreased by 2 percent, and wages and salaries decreased by 3.1 percent in March (US Bureau of Economic Analysis 2020). Growingly fearing a recession would have a detrimental effect on his political future, and grasping the pandemic’s negative economic impact, Trump demanded during an extremely tense meeting in the White House, for example, that Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin force the Chair of the Federal Reserve, Jerome Powell, to do more to stimulate the economy, primarily through additional interest rate cuts, in what one report called an “explosive tirade” (Costa et al. 2020).

In the afternoon of March 16, during a press briefing in the White House, Trump revealed the administration’s social distancing guidelines that, in effect, called for the shutdown of the entire country to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. Moreover, Trump securitized the pandemic when, for the first time, he referred to the virus as “an invisible enemy” (White House 2020h), a term the President used multiple times thereafter. A week later, Trump told reporters: “I’m a wartime president. This is a war. This is a war. A different kind of war than we’ve ever had.” He also wanted to project confidence and aptitude as the commander-in-chief when he said: “I want to assure the American people that we’re doing everything we can each day to confront and ultimately defeat this horrible, invisible enemy. We’re at war. In a true sense, we’re at war. And we’re fighting an invisible enemy” (White House 2020o).

In Search of a Scapegoat

To effectively divert attention away from internal challenges, boost popularity, or demonstrate competence, leaders must identify a wrongdoer—a foreign or domestic actor that can fulfill these different functions. In light of the mounting criticism against Trump and his administration, the skyrocketing number of deaths across the country, and the economic crisis in the US, Trump needed a diversion and a scapegoat which he was able to find in China. In a rally held during the 2016 presidential race, Trump accused China of the economic hardships Americans have been experiencing since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO): “We can't continue to allow China to rape our country, and that's what we're doing… We're going to turn it around, and we have the cards, don't forget it… We have a lot of power with China” (Gass 2016).

There were many friction points in Sino-American relations since Trump took office, including a major trade war between the two countries that started in 2018 (Swanson 2018). China’s geopolitical expansionism in East Asia and beyond, as reflected in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, for example, was perceived by Trump and his advisors as a major security concern (Shah 2021). Furthermore, attitudes toward China among the American public had already deteriorated dramatically in the last few years. A Gallup poll conducted in mid-February 2020 found that only 33 percent of Americans expressed a favorable opinion of China, a 20 percent decline since 2018. Particularly relevant to the Trump Administration was the fact that Republicans expressed a less favorable perception of China compared to Democrats, 23 and 35 percent respectively. Republicans also believed China was a greater threat to the US than Russia compared to Democrats, 31 percent and 12 percent correspondingly. Partisan divisions notwithstanding, the poll concluded that overall “Americans' views of China have rarely been positive over the past four decades, but they have never held the country in lower regard than they do today” (Jones 2020).

Throughout his presidential campaign, Trump emphasized China’s responsibility for the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs as well as the systemic theft of American intellectual property (IP) and advocated for greater economic protectionism and anti-multilateralism under the slogan “America First”. Trump’s campaign circulated a plan to reform Sino-American trade relations and pledged to “cut a better deal with China that helps American businesses and workers compete” (Trump 2015). In his inaugural speech, Trump avoided explicitly naming China, but it was clear he was talking about Beijing when he said: “We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength” (White House 2017). This duality continued well into Trump’s presidency, and in August 2018 the administration labeled China a currency manipulator. Peter Navarro (2018), Trump’s top advisor on trade with China, expressed the rationale for the administration’s trade policy toward China in an op-ed he published in April: “Nothing less than the US’s economic future is at risk from China’s assault on American technology and IP, and its mercantilist bid to capture emerging high-tech industries.”

On the other hand, China was also instrumental in Trump’s efforts to boost US economic performance and improve the trade deficit between the two countries which he considered a major cause for many of America’s economic woes. For example, according to then-National Security Advisor John Bolton (2020, 301), Trump told President Xi in a telephone call held in June 2019 that “the most popular thing he had ever been involved with was making a trade deal with China, which would be a big plus politically.” Further linking Sino-American trade relations and his political vulnerability, Trump “turned the conversation to the coming US presidential election, alluding to China’s economic capability to affect the ongoing campaigns, pleading with Xi to ensure he’d win. He [Trump] stressed the importance of farmers, and increased Chinese purchase of soybean and wheat in the electoral outcome.”

After an intensive trade war between China and the US that lasted a year and a half, where both sides threatened and often imposed reciprocal tariffs, the two countries negotiated and signed a trade deal in January 2020. According to this preliminary agreement, the US will terminate some tariffs on Chinese goods whereas China will purchase $200 billion worth of American goods and services by 2021 and will also ease some of the tariffs it has placed on American products. The overall objective, from the US standpoint, was to open Chinese markets to more American companies, increase American export to China, and provide better protection to American IP (Swanson and Rappeport 2020). Trump considered this to be a major political victory and personal vindication for his economic policy, and leadership skills as well as a major step in rectifying Sino-American trade relations: “Today, we take a momentous step—one that has never been taken before with China—toward a future of fair and reciprocal trade, as we sign phase one of the historic trade deal between the United States and China. Together, we are righting the wrongs of the past and delivering a future of economic justice and security for American workers, farmers, and families” (White House 2020i).

The internal crisis Trump was facing by the spring of 2020 forced him to strike a delicate balance and reconcile the availability of China as the convenient scapegoat given its already tarnished reputation in the eyes of many Americans, its role in the global spread of COVID-19, and in particular, the economic impact the pandemic had on the US (Jaworsky and Qiaoan 2021). Simultaneously, Trump wanted to avoid escalating Sino-American relations to a degree that would jeopardize the trade deal he had just signed with Bejing and, from his vantage point, could land him a second term as president. Trump’s solution to this political predicament was to embark on a targeted anti-Chinese naming, shaming, and scapegoating rhetorical campaign designed to both shift the blame for the pandemic and its outcomes toward Beijing as well as to showcase his aptitude and tough stance. As the former White House Press Secretary Stephanie Grisham (2021, 297) observed, “To Trump… there is nothing worse than being made to look ‘weak’.” An avid social media user, and an opponent of mainstream media, Trump heavily relied on Twitter as the key platform to communicate with world leaders as well as nearly ninety million followers, manage his unfiltered messaging, and change the conversation about him when necessary, making it an ideal diversionary tool (Lewandowsky et al. 2020; Monahan and Maratea 2021).

The Making of the "China Virus"

Considering the designated role China was to play in Trump’s diversionary strategy, and given its discoursive nature, social media was the most effective and easily available platform for a war of words. As noted, Trump was an exceptionally active social media actor, and his comments on Twitter or Facebook were widely covered by all mainstream media outlets and then reverberated beyond the blogosphere dominating both domestic and international discourse. Although he previously employed neutral terms when referring to COVID-19, the President began using the more controversial expression “Chinese virus”. According to Yasmeen Abutaleb and Damian Paletta (2021, 192), “Trump loved engaging in a war of words with his adversaries. It was one of his greatest skills.” Only a few hours after the press briefing where he recommended the American people adopt a set of stricter social distancing practices and acknowledged people are scared and anxious, Trump (2020d) twitted in mid-March: “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus. We will be stronger than ever before!”.

Trump expected this strategy will help him domestically and was quite confident the rhetorical assault on Beijing would not undermine trade relations between the two countries. During a press conference at the White House, he asserted the Chinese “need our product very badly… We have a good relationship with China…. we have a signed agreement. They’re going to be buying and they have been buying a lot of product.” Responding to Chinese parallel efforts to distract and deflect the blame by circulating unfounded claims the US military was responsible for the outbreak in Wuhan (Myers 2020), Trump justified the use of the term “Chinese Virus”: “China was putting out information, which was false, that our military gave this to them… And rather than having an argument, I said I have to call it where it came from; it did come from China. So I think it’s a very accurate term” (White House 2020j).

A couple of days later, during one of Trump’s press briefings, a photographer captured the President’s prepared written remarks. Where originally the pandemic was referred to as the “Corona Virus”, there was a strikethrough made with a Sharpie over the word “Corona” and the insertion of the word “Chinese” in what appeared to be his handwriting instead to read as “the Chinese Virus.” One reporter directly connected this new approach to Trump’s political predicament and argued this was a deliberate decision on behalf of the president: “Trump’s shift to more fully blame China coincides with widening devastation from the virus in the United States and increasing criticism that his administration missed opportunities to prepare and respond” (Gearan 2020). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo translated the President’s rhetorical strategy into policy when he refused a week later to agree to a joint communique on behalf of the G-7 foreign ministers because it did not refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan Virus” (Hudson and Mekhennet 2020).

By the end of March, Trump declared he will no longer use the term “the Chinese Virus” when referring to COVID-19 amid heavy criticism the expression is racist and offensive to Asian Americans. He called for unity and protection of the Asian American community but also said during a television interview: “Look, everyone knows it came out of China” (Holland 2020). In mid-April, the New York Times published a report documenting various mistakes the Trump administration made, especially how the president was personally downplaying the danger COVID-19 posed to the American people despite multiple warnings sounded by officials inside and outside the White House (Lipton et al. 2020). In response to this comprehensive reporting, which relied on leaked internal emails and memos, the President felt the pressure mounting and again was eager to rebuff the negative portrayal and display a more flattering narrative. The following day, during his daily briefing session, Trump showed a clip of his administration’s achievements in fighting COVID-19 that numerous media outlets dubbed a “campaign-style video” and led the Democratic National Committee (DNC) to issue a statement saying the president “commandeered the briefing to run campaign propaganda to soothe his small ego and pathetically try to cover up for his own failed response” (Shear and Karni 2020).

Ostensibly, the President’s efforts did not yield the result he was hoping for. According to several polls, a majority of Americans disapproved of the way he was handling the pandemic (Shepard 2020). From Trump’s perspective, it was time to name, shame, and scapegoat another major key actor, which attracted considerable attention at the time for the way it performed in response to the pandemic and could also be used to attack China indirectly—the WHO. Trump began arguing the WHO was collaborating with Beijing and enabling the Chinese government in deceiving the US and other countries. In a special press conference, Trump declared his intention to defund the organization “while a review is conducted to assess the World Health Organization’s role in severely mismanaging and covering up the spread of the coronavirus. Everybody knows what’s going on there” (White House 2020k).

Unwilling to let China off the hook, however, Trump moved again to blame Beijing for the pandemic telling reporters during his daily press briefing that “It could have been stopped in China before it started and it wasn’t, and the whole world is suffering because of it.” In fact, the President decided to escalate his rhetoric when he warned Beijing that “If it was a mistake, a mistake is a mistake. But if they [the Chinese] were knowingly responsible, yeah, I mean, then sure there should be consequences” (Mason and Spetalnick 2020(. Moreover, as multiple news reports documenting the White House’s response to the pandemic were circulating across all media platforms, Trump insisted his administration had COVID-19 under control. During one press briefing, for example, Trump praised his performance and insistently told reporters:

The number of new positive cases continues to decline nationwide. Recent hotspots appear to be stabilizing… These trends demonstrate that our aggressive strategy to battle the virus is working and that more states will soon be in a position to gradually and safely reopen. It’s very exciting. It was very exciting, even today, watching and seeing what’s happening. And people are getting ready and they’re all excited (White House 2020l).

Still, a joint survey conducted by Harvard, Northeastern, and Rutgers Universities in late April found that “in every state in the union, residents approve of their own governor’s handling of the COVID crisis… more highly than they rate that of President Trump. The average gap across the 50 states was 22 percentage points (66% for governors compared to 44% for Trump)”.11 In early May, the unemployment rate was nearly 15 percent, the worst since the Great Depression, after in April alone more than twenty million people lost their jobs, twice as much as throughout the entirety of the 2007–2009 financial crisis (Long and Van Dam 2020). Another poll conducted a couple of weeks later indicated Trump was unable to effectively change the public’s negative perceptions of his performance, and his approval rating was still significantly inferior compared to governors and mayors across the US. 73 percent of Americans felt their state governor had a “good” or “excellent” response to the pandemic compared to only 46 percent of Americans who felt the same about Trump (Walker 2020).

Concerned about these unfavorable reports and hoping that shifting the blame outward might improve his approval rating, Trump (2020f) resumed his attacks against China and tweeted: “We just made a great Trade Deal, the ink was barely dry, and the World was hit by the Plague from China. 100 Trade Deals wouldn’t make up the difference—and all those innocent lives lost!” Almost simultaneously, former US President and one of Trump’s greatest archnemesis, Barack Obama, was quoted criticizing the Trump administration during a conference call with supporters. The former president said the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic was “anemic and spotty” and added “It would have been bad even with the best of governments. It has been an absolute chaotic disaster when that mind-set—of ‘what’s in it for me’ and ‘to heck with everybody else’—when that mind-set is operationalized in our government” (Thrush and Crowley 2020). Grisham (2021, 32) noted in her memoirs that “any unfavorable comparison to Obama… was at the top of the [President Trump’s] trigger list.” A few days later Trump (2020g) responded by attempting to rally his political base and suggested via Twitter that Obama be subpoenaed to testify in Congress about the way the previous administration supposedly sabotaged Trump’s presidential campaign by launching baseless investigations and inquiries: “If I were a Senator or Congressman, the first person I would call to testify about the biggest political crime and scandal in the history of the USA, by FAR, is former President Obama. He knew EVERYTHING.”

By the end of April, the Trump Administration began contemplating a form of socio-economic intervention by possibly seeking economic compensation from the Chinese government for its handling of the pandemic and the catastrophic effects it had on the US. The Chinese response was swift and challenged what they deemed Trump’s overt diversionary strategy. Geng Shuang, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, declared during a press conference “We advise American politicians to reflect on their own problems and try their best to control the epidemic as soon as possible, instead of continuing to play tricks to deflect blame” (Cave and Qin 2020). After the White House began publically arguing the virus originated in the Wuhan Institute of Virology, another Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman told reporters “[T]he huge drama of blame-shifting in the United States has already been heavily spoiled, and continuing the drama is meaningless… I advise those people in the United States absolutely not to become enthralled by their own act” (Zhao 2020). Finally, it was Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself who openly warned that “Some U.S. political forces are taking hostage of China-U.S. relations, attempting to push the ties to the brink of so-called ‘new Cold War’… This is dangerous and will endanger global peace” (Time 2020).

As Sino-American relations worsened, Trump told reporters in a special briefing that his administration would prefer to establish friendly and constructive relations between the two countries. However, he then turned to accuse China of its role in the global spread of COVID-19 and openly claimed Beijing, in league with the WHO, was accountable for more than 100,000 fatalities in the US: “Chinese officials ignored their reporting obligations to the World Health Organization and pressured the World Health Organization to mislead the world when the virus was first discovered by Chinese authorities. Countless lives have been taken, and profound economic hardship has been inflicted all around the globe.” Leveraging the Chinese government’s decision to legislate a new national security law to be implanted in Hong Kong, and designed to quash anti-Chinese protests, Trump also moved to convert his anti-Chinese rhetoric into policy and declare his intention to revisit several preexisting bilateral financial, trade, legal and technological agreements the US had signed with Hong Kong as well as to target particular Chinese officials. The President’s tone was especially belligerent when he asserted “Our actions will be strong. Our actions will be meaningful” (White House 2020m). Navarro said in an interview that Beijing had engaged in “biological aggression”, and added, “the Chinese Communist Party is not a friend of America and when push comes to shove, they're going to try to hurt us rather than help us” (Burke 2020).

According to some reports, Beijing had considered instructing key state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to refrain from purchasing soybean from US growers, a significant item on the menu of American agricultural export to China. Nonetheless, these SOEs continued purchasing soybean from the US, apparently because the demand in China was still high and the prices in the US were the most competitive, indicating that Sino-American economic interdependence was stronger than Trump’s rhetoric (Plume et al. 2020). Trump rightfully estimated Beijing would not retaliate against his anti-Chinese “war of words” and prefer, instead, to contain the situation rather than escalate it. Indeed, several senior economic advisors to the Chinese government expressed confidence the trade deal will endure the recent discord (Wang and Bermingham 2020). Similarly, one American expert argued Trump is “going to keep whipping China. But at the same time, he has a fragile economic recovery, and is scared of a negative market reaction to a resumption of the trade war, so he’s likely to feel constrained. There’s likely to be lots of talk, which will work politically, but less action, which could hurt economically” (Quoted in Johnson 2020).

In need of further deflecting blame and diverting attention as well as demonstrating to his political base the uncompromising position the administration has been pursuing vis-à-vis Beijing, Trump continued playing the China card and securitizing it. During a commencement speech he delivered in West Point by mid-June, the president took advantage of the setting and framed the administration's actions against the spread of the pandemic as a security threat when he said: “I want to take this opportunity to thank all members of America’s armed forces―in every branch, active duty National Guard and reserve―who stepped forward to help battle the invisible enemy, the new virus that came to our shores from a distant land called China” (White House 2020n). A week later, amid growing social unrest, the release of several polls that suggested Democratic candidate Joe Biden was leading in the presidential race, and a critical portrayal of his leadership and ethics in a tell-all book written by former National Security Advisor John Bolton (2020), Trump spoke in a political rally in Tulsa Oklahoma. The President complained the term COVID-19 obfuscates its Chinese origin: “That name gets further and further away from China, as opposed to calling it the Chinese virus” and then he also called it the “Kung Flu”. Trump went on to argue that under his leadership the US enjoyed its greatest economic growth and that it stopped only after “China sent us the plague” (Papenfuss 2020).

The President remained confident the trade deal with China will not be abrogated and tweeted: “The China Trade Deal is fully intact. Hopefully they will continue to live up to the terms of the Agreement!” (Trump 2020h). On its part, Beijing signaled that the trade deal, the status of Hong Kong, Taiwan, or American sanctions against Chinese officials were infinitely more important than any offensive comment Trump made or tweeted. Still, the war of words Trump launched against China had soured the relations between the two countries to the extent it was very difficult for the Chinese government to exhibit any flexibility and willingness to compromise on pressing strategic matters (Wei and Davis 2020).

By mid-September, the US House of Representatives passed a resolution condemning all forms of racism directed at Asian Americans in the context of the pandemic. While the text of the resolution did not mention the President by name, it did specify several controversial terms Trump had commonly used (Jalonick 2020). Indeed, during the first presidential debate a few days later, Trump resumed his attacks against China. “It’s China’s fault,” the President said and added, “[W]e built the greatest economy in history. We closed it down because of the China plague.” Trump made similar comments during the second presidential debate in October when he identified China as the culprit for the dire situation in the US: “It’s China’s fault. They kept it from going into the rest of China, for the most part, but they didn’t keep it from coming out to the world including Europe and ourselves” (Commission on Presidential Debates 2020a; b).

Following the presidential elections where he failed to get re-elected, Trump’s focus had shifted away from China towards challenging the election’s results through multiple legal and political initiatives designed to prevent the inauguration of Joe Biden as the forty-sixth President. One report found that between November 3 and December 16, 2020, Trump tweeted 729 times, and nearly seventy percent of these post-election tweets focused on the various attempts to reverse the election results whereas only six percent dealt with the pandemic or vaccines (Gilson 2020). Ostensibly, once the elections took place and Trump lost, there was no need to play the China card to deflect, distract and scapegoat as he did throughout the preceding months. Trump’s anti-Chinese diversionary rhetoric was no longer pertinent to his new political challenge—reversing the election’s outcome which required a new target and a different diversionary frame.

Conclusions

On the face of it, there is nothing Diversionary Wars and naming and shaming campaigns have in common. The former involves launching armed conflict to distract from a domestic crisis or bolster leaders’ perceived competence whereas the latter relates to exposing violations of human rights and international law and their perpetrators. A closer look, however, reveals leaders may weaponize naming and shaming practices to scapegoat and deflect attention away from internal challenges, boost their popularity, and display competence while avoiding the costly and risky use of military force. In fact, such a discursive diversionary war of words serves the same functions as the traditional diversionary war but without using military power, and with substantially less cost and risk (Carter 2020).

This study calls for the widening of the policy menu embattled leaders may choose from when facing domestic unrest as well as the inclusion of deflective rhetorical and discursive forms of public diplomacy such as speeches, written statements, and messaging through social media to shift the public’s attention away from the crisis and bolster the appearance of leaders’ competence. Integrating nonviolent practices into the Diversionary War theory’s analytical framework not only enables a better understanding of leaders’ deflective policy menu but can also account for the first step in an escalating interaction that may eventually lead to armed conflict. As such, we should conceptualize diversionary measures as an escalating range of strategies available to leaders when facing domestic unrest which builds on the existing menu but supplements it with the communicative war of words option (see Fig. 1).

Donald Trump did not choose to engage in armed conflict against China to distract attention from the crisis COVID-19 posed to his administration, or to boost his prospects to win the upcoming presidential elections given the potential risk and cost in blood and treasure. Furthermore, he did not want to endanger the Sino-American trade agreement signed in early 2020 which was considered critical for American economic prosperity and his reelection prospects. Less dramatic options such as domestic political repression, foreign intervention, and muddling through were either excessive or irrelevant. Reflecting the logic of the discursive war of words framework, Trump needed to engage in China-bashing to rally his base and blame Beijing for American hardships as well as to exhibit his competence as the commander-in-chief for political self-preservation purposes. The rhetorical naming, shaming, and scapegoating of China was adequate given the level of domestic unrest Trump was facing amid the pandemic and its devastating socio-economic effects; his forceful removal from office was not imminent, and no military or civilian takeover was in the making.

It was a political concern of a magnitude that only necessitated a low-risk and low-cost diversionary rhetorical campaign, and the widespread use of social media proved to be a crucial part of this strategy. Considering the trajectory of current socio-technological trends, novel social media platforms will play an even greater strategic role in leaders’ efforts to achieve domestic and international political objectives when facing challenges at home and abroad. These new global public squares will eventually take over traditional media platforms, remake the toolbox and playbook of public diplomacy, and transform the diversionary war of words into an even more appealing option for embattled leaders who are unable or unwilling to use military force.

Trump’s diversionary policies did not get him reelected but they were certainly used as distractive, galvanizing, and performative mechanisms throughout the presidential campaign. Despite the lack of success in this particular case, the theoretical merit of incorporating a discursive form of diversionary war into the menu of policy responses to domestic unrest should not be impacted. What matters is the explanatory power and external validity of this model, as also evident from China’s war of words against the Trump administration which suggests this is a prevalent practice. French journalist Émile de Girardin once remarked “the power of words is immense. A well-chosen word has often sufficed to stop a flying army, to change defeat into victory, and to save an empire.” Words can also be used to name, shame, and scapegoat an easily available patsy to deflect criticism, bolster public support, and show the competence of an embattled leader.

Dr. Ilai Z. Saltzman

is the Director of the Gildenhorn Institute for Israel Studies at the University of Maryland at College Park. His scholarship and teaching focus on international security, Israeli foreign and security policy, US foreign policy, and political psychology. Dr. Saltzman is the author of Securitizing Balance of Power Theory: A Polymorphic Reconceptualization (2012). He is also the author of numerous scholarly articles and book chapters and of commentaries in the Los Angeles Times, Ha’aretz, The Jerusalem Post, and other prominent outlets. Dr. Saltzman earned his Ph.D. in International Relations in 2010 from the University of Haifa and was a postdoctoral research fellow at the International Security Program (ISP), Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2010–2011).

Declarations

Conflict of interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.