Teaching in the shadows: Exploring teachers’ intentions and behaviors towards private tutoring in Bangladesh

Abstract

This study applies the theory of planned behavior to predict Bangladeshi teachers’ intentions and behaviors towards private tutoring. It secured qualitative data from 18 semi-structured interviews with students, parents, and teachers. The data were analyzed using a thematic analysis procedure. The findings revealed that teachers’ behavioral intentions to engage in private tutoring were influenced by their attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. Unlike prior empirically-driven studies, this study makes a substantial contribution by establishing a theoretical foundation that can predict teachers’ intentions and behaviors within the context of shadow schooling. Additionally, the moral and professional ramifications of tutoring practice are discussed, and suggestions are made in terms of public policy to manage those ramifications.

1. Introduction

Private tutoring has been expanded globally in the past few decades [[1], [2], [3]]. It has long been extensive in East Asian societies such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China, but it has now spread in other parts of the world in a diversified manner [[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]]. Several factors, including social norms, peer pressure, test-related stress, and the low quality of mainstream education, nurture the private tutoring culture [14,15]. Private tutoring contributes significantly to students’ learning, but it also exacerbates social inequality and financial strain on families [16], and overburdens students with excessive study [17].

Private tutoring takes different forms, like one-to-one, small-group, lecture-sized, and online [11] and it is provided by regular teachers, university students, and large profit-oriented companies. In most developing countries, including Uzbekistan, Georgia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, regular teachers tutor students to supplement their official salaries [[18], [19], [20], [21], [22]]. Teachers do not simply respond to the demand for private tutoring; “they can also create or stimulate it” [23]. While mainstream teachers deliver private tutoring, it constitutes an abuse of power for personal gain [24], and as a result, they face significantly more criticism [25]. In some contexts, such aspects of corrupt behavior involve both individual teachers and entire educational institutions [17].

Private tutoring is a common practice in Bangladesh. Mainstream teachers, especially science and English teachers, frequently act as private tutors for their students [26,27]. Bangladesh lags behind South Asian countries in terms of public spending on education [28], which is reflected in teacher salaries. Some teachers behave intentionally in order to increase their income from private tutoring [[29], [30], [31]]. They consider private tutoring a flexible means of making money. The country’s National Education Policy 2010 notes that a major reason for the prevalence of private tutoring is “the erosion of moral values of a section of teaching community” [32]. In 2012, the Ministry of Education imposed a regulation prohibiting teachers from tutoring their own students, but the restrictions may not have a significant effect on their tutoring practices [33,34].

Bangladesh lacked sufficient policy documents, official statistics, and empirical research on shadow education [35]. Recently, some scholars have attempted to fill this knowledge gap, but they have so far presented only the demand-side determinants [[36], [37], [38]]. As regular teachers are the primary suppliers of private tutoring, it is essential to comprehend their tutoring practices. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, teachers’ behavioral intentions towards private tutoring have not yet been investigated in Bangladesh. Thus, the current study employs the theory of planned behavior in order to identify Bangladeshi teachers’ intention to engage in private tutoring and its subsequent behavior. The study seeks to pursue the following two research questions: (i) What are the intentions of Bangladeshi teachers to engage in private tutoring? (ii) What strategic behaviors do Bangladeshi teachers employ to promote demand for private tutoring among students? This work is significant due to the fact that it makes a nuanced analysis of the phenomenon both in Bangladesh and beyond through the theory of planned behavior. The findings will be a critical guide for education authorities and policymakers dealing with the issue of teacher-supplied private tutoring in a way that is more proactive and less reactive.

2. Existing literature

Teacher-supplied private tutoring thrives in some countries despite restrictive and even prohibitive regulations, while in others it is newer and expanding in a liberal context [39]. Private tutoring is a part of the larger system of “forced corruption,” which is linked to teachers’ low salaries [40]. Teachers’ salaries have decreased as a result of the decline in education financing. Due to financial constraints, they are forced to engage in private tutoring, which enables hidden privatization in education [18]. Many public school teachers in Myanmar work part-time as private tutors in order to supplement their income so that they can meet their living expenses [41]. Low-paid Cambodian teachers “use their authority over students to augment their income” [42]. They employ various “tricks” to secure artificial demand for private tutoring, such as slowing down regular instruction and/or postponing the official curriculum [43]. A similar “blackmail” pattern has been observed among Egyptian teachers, who artificially create demand for private tutoring by favoring tutored students or by imposing punitive measures on non-tutored students [44]. Students who have not attended private tutoring are often victims of harassment (e.g., physical assault, verbal humiliation, and threats) and expulsion by teachers in the Egyptian education system. They usually do it under the guise of inappropriate uniforms, poor class attendance, lateness, or misconduct [45].

Teachers engaged in private tutoring in Central Asia as “an income-generating activity.” Some teachers pressured their own students to receive private tutoring by giving preference to those who attended their private sessions or by threatening to give lower marks to those who refused [46]. In Bangladesh, as teachers are typically more interested in private tutoring compared to classroom teaching, students suffer significantly both academically and financially [47]. Some teachers have been accused of pressuring students to attend tutoring sessions. According to government regulations, they are not permitted to tutor their own students. But in reality, they provide tutoring services, violating the regulations [31]. As Bangladeshi teachers are significantly underpaid [16,33,48], they are “forced” to supplement their salaries by finding other means of income, like private tutoring [49].

Biswal [50] categorized teacher-supplied tutoring as a corrupt practice because “both tutoring and corruption require citizens to pay money to receive a “free” government service.” Using Kiltgaard’s [51] corruption formula (e.g., corruption ​= ​monopoly ​+ ​discretion ​− ​accountability), Biswal noted that teachers’ ability to stimulate tutoring demand is based on their monopoly over students’ learning, full discretion over student assessment, and little or no accountability for their actions. While Biswal [50] regarded tutoring practice as a form of corruption, Popa and Acedo [52] in their Romanian study interpreted it as a way of regaining teachers’ professional credibility and social status along with financial benefits. Hallak and Poisson [53] argued that “private tutoring is not an unethical practice in its own right; what makes private tutoring unethical is the condition of its operation and its impact on mainstream education.” Following this definition, Hartmann [54] characterized Egyptian teachers’ tutoring practices as corruption or at least unethical behavior. Teachers intentionally teach only a portion of the school curriculum or use other strategies to force students into tutoring sessions.

Zhang [55] in her Chinese study found that teachers’ power shaped students’ demand for private tutoring. Some aspects of teacher-supplied private tutoring may be laudable, while others may be forms of corruption. Kobakhidze [56] showed that Georgian teachers use private tutoring as a “survival strategy.” Such practice is not always a form of corruption, but it carries a high risk of corruption due to the thin line that exists between teachers’ professional ethics and misconduct. Some scholars argued that teachers are depicted as “entrepreneurial” in the neoliberal era [25,[57], [58], [59]]. They engage in tutoring practice not only for extra income but also consider it a “gold mine” [60]. They apply different marketing techniques and innovative teaching styles to allure more clients to their private sessions [25]. Governments are generally uncomfortable with providing tutoring by mainstream teachers. It allows teachers to devote less time and effort to their regular duties. If such a practice becomes common, it is difficult to eliminate.

Even though existing studies have uncovered the roots and consequences of teacher-supplied private tutoring, private tutors’ intentions and behaviors have received much less attention. Moreover, the existing findings are inconsistent and mostly empirically-driven. There is a lack of theory-based research in the field of shadow education. The current study assumes that theory-driven research is essential to better understanding the complexities of the phenomenon. It adopts a theoretical framework with three elements—attitudes towards behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control—that could help further research into teachers’ intents and actions towards engaging in private tutoring. Until recently, the majority of research on shadow education in the South Asian context was centered on the students, with the teachers receiving only peripheral attention. Thus, the current study aims to explore Bangladeshi teachers’ behavioral intentions towards private tutoring in more detail.

3. Theoretical background

Ajzen’s [61] theory of planned behavior (TPB) postulates that behavior is a product of intentions [62]. It identifies three conceptual determinants of behavioral intention: (i) attitudes towards behavior, (ii) subjective norms, and (iii) perceived behavioral control [[63], [64], [65]]. Specifically, attitude is a person’s “beliefs about performing certain behaviors” [66]. In this study, teachers’ attitudes refer to their positive or negative perceptions towards private tutoring practices. Subjective norms are the perceived social pressures “to perform or not to perform the behavior” [67]. Subjective norms in the current context represent pressure or support from significant others, such as colleagues, relatives, and family members, in relation to teachers’ involvement in private tutoring. Perceived behavioral control reflects the “perceived ease or difficulty associated with the behavior” [68]. In the present study, it can be defined as teachers’ confidence in engaging in tutoring practices in a specific context.

All these TPB constructs, which are conceptually independent of each other, can contribute to forming teachers’ intentions to engage in private tutoring and its subsequent behavior, such as engagement in private tutoring and stimulating its demand among the students. The TPB is depicted in Figure 1. While TPB has been extensively used by education scholars to guide their research [66,67,[69], [70], [71], [72]], it has not yet been employed in the field of shadow education. The current study, for the first time, applied this theory to this area. Three reasons were considered in choosing TPB as the study’s theoretical foundation. First, empirical support was required to validate this theory within the field of shadow education. Second, the theory’s behavioral, normative, and control beliefs appeared to be relevant in the Bangladeshi educational context. Third, the theory seemed to be reliable in predicting teachers’ intentions and behaviors towards private tutoring practices.

Figure 1.

The theory of planned behavior in teachers’ tutoring engagement context (Source: Adapted from [61].

4. The research context

Bangladesh’s education system follows a 5 ​+ ​3 + 2 ​+ ​2 structure, with five years of primary (Grades 1–5, ages 6–10), three years of junior secondary (Grades 6–8, ages 11–13), two years of secondary (Grades 9 and 10, ages 14–15), and two years of higher secondary (Grades 11 and 12, ages 16–17) schooling [73]. In 2018, there were 4,495 colleges offering higher secondary education, with only 673 (14.97%) being publicly-managed government colleges and 3,822 (85.03%) being privately-managed non-government colleges. Higher secondary education enrolled 2.3 million students, with 1.16 million (50.46%) females. The student enrollment rate at this level was very low (26.26%) [74]. Students who pass the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) or equivalent examinations are eligible to enroll in Grade 11. They sit for the Higher Secondary Certificate (HSC) examination at the end of Grade 12.

The Public Service Commission (PSC) is responsible for recruiting teachers for government colleges through the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) examination, while the Non-Government Teacher Registration and Certification Authority (NTRCA) recruits teachers for non-government colleges through a preliminary test and a subject-related written test [75]. The government colleges are fully funded by the state, while the non-government colleges are mostly subsidized. Bangladesh spends a lower percentage of its budget on education. In 2016, the share of education was 11.42% of the national budget (1.54% of GDP) [74], which was far from the international benchmarks. The lion’s share of the education revenue budget is spent on paying the salaries and allowances of the teachers and employees [76].

Both government and non-government teachers enjoy the same basic salary, but there is a huge disparity in house rent and allowances. The state provides full-fledged house rent and other allowances to government teachers. Non-government teachers receive limited house rent and allowances (see Table 1). The government teachers get promotions according to the following steps: lecturer, assistant professor, associate professor, and professor [77]. In contrast, non-government teachers have one scope of promotion, from lecturer to assistant professor. Only two out of every five teachers get this opportunity due to the ratio system [78].

Table 1.

Salary structure of college-level teachers in Bangladesh.

Government Colleges				Non-government Colleges
Designation	Starting salary (Tk)			Designation	Starting salary (Tk)
	BP∗	HR∗∗ (% of BP)	MA (Fixed)		BP∗	HR (Fixed)	MA (Fixed)
Professor	50,000	35–50	1,500	–	–	–	–
Associate Professor	43,000	35–50	1,500	–	–	–	–
Assistant Professor	35,500	40–55	1,500	Assistant Professor	35,500	1,000	500
Lecturer	22,000	40–55	1,500	Lecturer	22,000	1,000	500

Note: BP = Basic Pay, HR = House Rent, MA ​= ​Medical Allowance, and 84.47 Tk ​= ​1 US$. ∗BP changes annually with an increment. ∗∗HR varies by BP and location; BP Tk 35,500 ​≤ ​HR 40–55%; BP Tk 35,501 ​≥ ​HR 35–50%.

The study selected Sylhet and Sreemangal as the research sites. Both urban centers are located in the northeastern part of the country. The total area of Sylhet city is 41.85 sq. km., and the estimated population is 5,31,663 with a density of 12,704 people per sq. km. The total area of Sreemangal town is about 6.80 sq. km. The estimated population is 39,757 [79]. Private tutoring is being done on an alarming scale in both cities. Teachers from different colleges are offering private tutoring in their homes. Besides, numerous coaching centers have sprung up in the alleys of the cities.

5. Materials and methods

The data used in this study were gathered between October 2018 and August 2019. To achieve a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon being studied, the researchers adopted a qualitative methodology. Two public colleges (A and B) in two different urban centers were selected as study sites considering the maximum variation sampling procedure [80]. Both colleges were information-rich and understudied. The study recruited 18 participants from three distinct target groups (6 × 3 = 18)—students, parents, and teachers—in order to increase its trustworthiness. All the participants were selected using purposeful sampling. The study looked for balances between students in Grades 11 and 12 as well as between males and females. The names used for the participants were pseudonyms to ensure anonymity. Table 2 summarized the socio-demographic information about the participants. The study employed a semi-structured interview technique to gather data. This technique was well suited for this study because it allowed the participants to answer preset open-ended questions and enabled the researchers to grasp in-depth and thoughtful responses [81].

Table 2.

Socio-demographic characterstics of participants.

No	Interviewee	Position	Gender	Education	Study site
1	S1	Student	Male	Grade 11	A
2	S2	Student	Male	Grade 12	A
3	S3	Student	Male	Grade 11	A
4	S4	Student	Female	Grade 12	B
5	S5	Student	Female	Grade 11	B
6	S6	Student	Male	Grade 12	B
7	P1	Parent	Male	Master	A
8	P2	Parent	Female	Bachelor	A
9	P3	Parent	Female	HSC	A
10	P4	Parent	Male	Bachelor	B
11	P5	Parent	Male	Bachelor	B
12	P6	Parent	Male	Bachelor	B
13	T1	Teacher	Male	Master	A
14	T2	Teacher	Male	Master	A
15	T3	Teacher	Male	Master	A
16	T4	Teacher	Male	Master	B
17	T5	Teacher	Male	Master	B
18	T6	Teacher	Male	Master	B

Interviews were scheduled at a time and place convenient to the participants [82]. Each interview was conducted in Bengali, the native language of both the participants and the interviewer, to ensure the accurate expression of ideas. The interview protocol guided the interviewer to conduct the interview as a “flowing conversation” [83]. The participants were asked to sign a consent form, which indicated their right to withdraw their participation from the study at any time without any penalty. Each interview lasted 1 hour at the most. The researchers worked on data collection and analysis simultaneously [84]. All the interviews were audio-recorded prior to the participants’ permission. The researchers transcribed data, read this data repeatedly, and noted down initial ideas in the margins. The data were coded and then thematized. This study was ethically approved by the Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, China.

6. Findings

6.1. Teachers’ intentions to engage in private tutoring

Teachers’ engagement in private tutoring was connected with their financial conditions. Their official salaries were not enough to cover family expenses. They needed alternative routes of income, and private tutoring was the most viable choice to improve their financial capabilities. All student participants reflected that teachers tutored them to supplement their income and to be financially self-sufficient. One student reported:

Teachers finish college by 2:00 p.m. and then provide private lessons at home in the afternoon. I personally asked my teachers why they tutor students at home … In reply, they said that … Tutoring helps provide some extra income (S6).

Most parent participants blamed teachers’ “luxurious mentality” for their engagement in private tutoring. They claimed that teachers’ salaries had been significantly increased. They were no longer in a financial crisis. They actually offered tutoring only for money. Two parents remarked:

In the past, teachers’ salary structures were poor. Then teachers offered tutoring mainly to meet their family expenses. Now their salaries have increased considerably as compared to the past. But spending has become a matter of habit for them. Hence, they are still offering tutoring (P3).

I think teachers’ luxurious mentality is responsible for private tutoring. There is no end to their needs. Teachers are rushing to private tutoring to meet their infinite needs. We also notice exceptions (P5).

Some teachers claimed that their salaries were inadequate. Moreover, the prices of essential commodities reached levels that went beyond their purchasing power. They were having difficulty covering family expenses. If their salaries were satisfactory, they would not be involved in private tutoring. They supplemented their official income by tutoring in order to live decently. One teacher elaborated:

There can be five or six members in the family … They may have social demands. Keeping balance with the market price, if a teacher wants to maintain his family, then imagine how much money he needs to maintain a six-member family … If he has hunger in his stomach, what will he teach in the classroom (T3)?

Some teachers added that they were barely recognized by the state and enjoyed insufficient amenities. They offered private tutoring to be more affluent, wealthy, and hedonistic. One teacher remarked, “My neighbor built a shiny house, bought a shiny car, and always did good shopping. He can, but I, the teacher, cannot. These issues may drive a teacher toward private tutoring (T4).” Another teacher noted that his wife often asked him, “Why do you not tutor students when everyone else is doing it?” When his father-in-law visited his house, he asked, “English teachers own houses and cars of their own, but what you are doing, we do not understand.” He claimed that many of his colleagues aimed at not touching their official salaries. Their target was to maintain their families on the money earned from private tutoring. He remarked:

Many teachers’ target is not to touch the official salary. Many of my senior colleagues have also advised me, “Do not touch the salary. Tutor students and run the family with that money. Deposit the salary in the provident fund and receive interest at the highest rate (T2).”

Teachers’ salaries and social status were still inadequate. Moreover, they were discriminated against in terms of promotion and other service benefits compared to other professions. They could hardly cope with the flow of society with their official salaries. Therefore, they became tutors to earn extra money to live decently.

6.2. Teachers’ strategic behaviors to stimulate tutoring demand

Teacher-supplied private tutoring paved the way for corruption in education. Teachers could blackmail their students, or students could be threatened by the teachers. Such practices technically forced students to attend the tutoring classes. The participants reflected that teachers employed various strategies in order to generate tutoring demand among the students. One parent interviewee remarked:

Actually, I haven’t faced such a situation as a guardian. There are many teachers who try to attract students indirectly to come to them for private tutoring. I have heard of such teachers and their activities. But I haven’t sent my son to those teachers (P3).

Private tutors became skilled at teaching as they taught the same subject repeatedly. Whenever they took better classes in college, students requested them for private tutoring. They took a few excellent classes at the beginning of the academic session. After seeing their performance, presentation, and efficiency in the classroom, the students came to them for tutoring. Some teachers wrote their own cell phone numbers on the board so that interested students could contact them. Some teachers tried to draw attention to how well the tutored students perform in the classroom, as one student opined:

Some teachers would write their cell phone number on the board and instruct students to call them if they needed tutoring … Some teachers only ask questions of students who are being taught privately by them. By doing so, they would prove that those students’ performances are good because of the tutoring they received from them (S4).

To widen the tutoring demand, teachers also resorted to other techniques such as being friendly with students, remaining soft-minded in the classroom, supplying notes and suggestions, bringing the best students to their house, giving free tutoring, arranging parties for them, and helping students unethically in the examination hall. Moreover, they intentionally kept some mastering unsolved while teaching in the classroom. One student remarked:

We are attracted to him [teachers] by seeing his performance in the classroom … the teacher, who is a little greedy by nature, adopts different strategies in the classroom to persuade the students. Students who take tutoring get extra facilities in the classroom and in the examination script (S6).

The participants also noted that teachers tried to undermine each other in the classroom, presented themselves from a commercial point of view, and allured students indirectly with notes and suggestions. One teacher claimed that he had fewer students in his private tutoring because he did not apply the above mechanisms. He remarked:

Private tutors try to teach effectively, beautifully, nicely, and smartly. But students may not come even if the tutors teach well. Students will come if they apply business policies. Hence, they treat students very well, remain very cooperative, and even help unethically (T5).

Science teachers sometimes use practical examination marks as a trap. They provided separate hand-notes for practical examinations. Students who did not receive tutoring were deprived of these benefits and were given fewer marks. Many students are, therefore, forced to receive tutoring to ensure full marks in the examinations. There was still scope for cheating for marks in practical examinations, despite changing the examination venue. One student claimed:

I wanted to get tutoring for one or two months from a physics teacher at the college where we had our examination center, so that I could get good marks in practical examinations. It is very natural that the teacher from whom I take tutoring would recognize my face. When he would ask me questions in the viva voce, he would compromise for me (S2).

The teachers who did not have high morals forced their own students to receive tutoring by promising full marks in practical examinations. When asked how teachers trapped the students despite the change of venue, two teachers replied:

Even after the change of examination center, some students think that their teacher has a deep connection with the teachers at that center. If his teacher requests those from the center, they will get more marks. Actually, the teacher who entraps the students, indirectly indicates that even if the center is changed, he still has some influence there (T4).

Yet teachers have some influence over practical examinations. The external examiners listen to what the present teacher says. They are also given some money from the center … But in the case of science subjects, they are bound to study with their own college teachers … as they want to ensure their practical examination marks (T5).

Many teachers had a network of colleagues and former students. The teachers within the network exchanged students among themselves. For example, the mathematics teacher sent his students to the English teacher for private tutoring. In exchange, the English teacher did the same. Meanwhile, they asked their former students to send their acquaintances for tutoring. The respondents’ perceptions of teachers’ tricks are summarized in Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Teachers’ tricks for attracting students in private chambers.

7. Discussion

This study applied Ajzen’s [61] TPB framework to predict Bangladeshi teachers’ intentions and behaviors towards practicing private tutoring. The findings revealed that teachers’ behavioral intentions to engage in private tutoring were influenced by their attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. To be more specific, teachers’ own financial conditions and their “luxurious mentality” have resulted in a favorable attitude towards private tutoring, making them more eager to engage in it. Actually, they considered private tutoring as a way to augment their income. Such types of behavioral attitudes were also observed in Georgia [19], Uzbekistan [18], Cambodia [85], and Myanmar [21].

Subjective norms also influenced teachers’ behavioral intentions. The current findings implied that significant others’ (e.g., colleagues, relatives, and family members) expectations encouraged teachers’ desires to engage in private tutoring. They developed the subjective norm that private tutoring was a normal practice and figured out the benefits of private tutoring based on their significant others’ experiences and comments. Furthermore, compared to other professions, teaching has a lower social and economic status in Bangladeshi society [48,86], which has forced teachers to engage in private tutoring to earn more money to cope with the flow of society.

Teachers’ perceived behavioral control compelled them to work as private tutors. When they perceived that they were poorly paid, they required additional income. Meanwhile, they faced difficulties covering their living expenses with their official salaries due to the incoherent market prices. Private tutoring was, therefore, viewed as a viable option for many of them to survive. Teachers also perceived that they were in a position to promote the demand for private tutoring. They directly or indirectly forced their students to take private lessons from them, despite the policy restrictions. This finding is aligned with prior studies [43,[87], [88], [89], [90]], indicating teachers’ “blackmail” and “forced tutoring.”

Teachers’ strategic behavior generated moral hazard in society. Teachers who offer tutoring are reported to be less dedicated to their official duties [30,91], and therefore, they become the creators of low quality education [92]. Teachers’ negative manifestations have a crucial impact on their overall professional credibility [25]. A Bangladeshi study reported that two-thirds of secondary students did not perceive teachers as their role models in ethical and moral conduct. Surprisingly, nearly half of the teachers felt they were not role models for their students [93].

7.1. Theoretical and practical implications

The current study has both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, the findings offered empirical support for the viability of Ajzen’s [61] TPB as an appropriate framework for predicting Bangladeshi teachers’ intentions and behaviors towards private tutoring. The findings revealed that three TPB constructs taken together can explain teachers’ intentions and subsequent behaviors. The earlier studies had rarely been driven by a recognized theoretical framework. In contrast, the TPB, a well-recognized social psychological theory, served as the theoretical lens of the current study. TPB would be a beneficial paradigm for further studies, providing additional evidence for mapping certain behaviors in the context of shadow education.

Practically, the current findings can assist policymakers, educational authorities, and teachers in outlining behavioral prohibitions and moral standards. However, preventing teachers from tutoring their own students may not be an effective strategy in the low-paying Bangladeshi education system, although it can be regulated to avoid corruption risks. Teachers are encouraged to uphold the highest standards of professionalism and work ethics. The heads of the institutions can take vital measures to guarantee that teachers adhere to professional ethics. The dignity of the teaching profession, teachers’ salaries, and other benefits should be raised so that they can concentrate on classroom instruction. Furthermore, the country requires a comprehensive education law, effective control mechanisms over teachers, and a stricter accountability system.

7.2. Limitations and future directions

Three potential limitations should be considered while interpreting the findings. First, the study’s sample size of only 18 participants from two colleges may not accurately reflect the entire population of Bangladeshi teachers. A large sample size can be used in future research to obtain more significant data. Second, the study used the three specific TPB constructs to predict Bangladeshi teachers’ behavioral intentions in the context of shadow education. One’s behavioral intentions can also be influenced by moral obligation. Future studies might be able to incorporate moral obligation into this framework, thereby avoiding this limitation. Third, allowing teachers to self-report involvement in private tutoring always carries the possibility of underreporting since they may prefer to preserve a favorable self-concept. Thus, future studies should be carried out by adopting other data collection methods.

8. Conclusion

Private tutoring exists in society as a result of its demand and supply, but the studies largely ignored the supply side. Although regular teachers were the primary suppliers of private tutoring, they were subject to much more criticism. Using Ajzen’s TPB, this study investigated Bangladeshi teachers’ intentions and behaviors with respect to practicing private tutoring. It is concluded that teachers’ intentions and subsequent behaviors were influenced by their attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. Even though the TPB adequately explained and predicted teachers’ behavioral intentions about private tutoring in Bangladesh, it may be tested in other contexts in the future to get a fuller picture of the phenomenon.

Declarations

Author contribution statement

All authors listed have significantly contributed to the development and the writing of this article.

Funding statement

This work was supported by the curriculum reform based on project-based learning (BNU00306-227900003) at Beijing Normal University, China.

Data availability statement

Data will be made available on request.

Declaration of interest’s statement

The authors declare no competing interests.

Additional information

No additional information is available for this paper.