Abstract
This paper examines the effectiveness of provincially enacted policies to deter the COVID-19 mortality rate during the pre-vaccine rollout pandemic in Canada. The data has been collected from Statistics Canada and other various online resources including the Blavatnik School of Government and provincial statements. Relevant information was collected for individual provinces from 11 March 2020 to 31 Jan 2021. A two-stage least squares methodology was applied by examining, by province, the cumulative number of deaths reported as due to COVID-19 before and after policy implementation. We examine the effect of each of several policies based on a 20 plus day lagged period after being put into place. Our main finding is that workplace closures and strict gathering restrictions are associated with a decrease in mortality rates of COVID-19 in Canada. We also find that the strength of the policies overall is associated with a decrease in mortality rates of COVID-19 in Canada. Using data from the Google Mobility Report we confirm that the announcements of the policies had significant behavioural effects on individuals’ movements. We interpret that social distance policies, specifically the workplace closure and strict gathering policies, have been effective factors decreasing mortality from the Coronavirus epidemic in Canada.
Keywords: Policy COVID-19 epidemic mitigation provincial
1. Introduction
As of January 1, 2022 there have been 2,234,427 confirmed cases of the novel Coronavirus or COVID-19 in Canada and 30,339 deaths reported by the Canadian Government. With additional cases and deaths being reported daily, and the numbers consistently growing, it is important to understand the effects of the policies that different provinces have implemented to mitigate the spread of the virus. COVID-19 has affected many countries and forced governments to enact aggressive policies to combat this pandemic.
The World Health Organization (WHO) declared a “pandemic” on March 11, 2020 (Canadian Public Health Association, 2020). Shortly thereafter, the Canadian Federal government urged Canadians abroad to return home on March 14, 2020; international travel restrictions were implemented March 16, 2020 (The Canadian Press Staff, 2021). An integral part of Canada's fight against COVID-19 has been shouldered by provincial governments initiating policies promoting social distancing (non-pharmaceutical social distance inducing interventions) based on the severity in their provinces. This makes a provincial policy comparison compelling to examine quantitatively. Quebec, Manitoba, and Ontario have been impacted the most by the virus as of the end of our dataset, January 31, 2021. Other provinces have not seen as adverse impacts, specifically New Brunswick, PEI and Newfoundland and Labrador. PEI has yet to confirm a death related to the novel Coronavirus as of January 31, 2021. Data from PEI has been removed from all regressions. Canada had a total of 20,030 deaths as of this date. The graphical representation of the different provinces deaths per 10,000 is shown in Fig. 1 just below.
Fig. 1.
Deaths per 10,000 across provinces over time.
It is key that we understand which policies have been effective. Using the Oxford stringency index, we find that the overall policy strength by provinces was effective in mitigating mortality rates. We then break down the various social distance measures within the index to determine which interventions are more effective than others. We discern which of the various measures that Canadian Provinces adopted were especially effective in mitigating the effects of the pandemic. We then confirm our findings through a behavioural analysis using the Google Mobility Reports showing that people altered their behaviours both immediately and long-term following a policy implementation. The measures enacted by the provinces did not occur simultaneously and there were significant differences in the rate of spread within them. This further allows us to estimate and examine effects of the policies on the virus.
Figs. 2–10 in the appendix show for each province the Oxford Stringency Index over the course of our data against the cumulative deaths per 10,000 population. Below are Fig. 2, Fig. 3 and 8 that represent Alberta, B.C., and Ontario, respectively.
Fig. 2.
Alberta Fig. 3: British Columbia.
Fig. 3.
Ontario.
These figures indicate trends; we can see declines in the index followed by large increases in deaths and we can also see that following increases in the index death rates slow significantly. This leads us to ask which restrictions being eased creates this increase in the mortality rate.
A similar study conducted for US states by Dave et al. (2020) estimate the effects of stay at home or shelter in place orders (SIPO) on the cases and deaths of COVID-19 in America. They found SIPOs resulted in a decrease in cases but no significance evidence for decreasing the number of deaths. See also Chernozhukov and Paul (2021) for a similar study where they evaluated the impact on the cases and deaths from COVID-19 using the Google Mobility Reports and a variety of state level policies designed to limit spread. Karatayev et al. (2020) uses a theoretical simulation to demonstrate that approaching the pandemic on a county-to-county bases would limit the number of closure days and the effect on people when compared to the provincial approach. A theoretical modelling study by Ogden et al. (2020) predicts that without non-pharmaceutical interventions most Canadians would have contracted COVID-19 in the first wave and overwhelmed the hospital system. Anderson et al. (2020) looks at British Columbia, Canada (in addition to a few other non-Canadian jurisdictions) using survey data. They find that physical distancing reduced contacts between people to 22% of pre-pandemic levels/interactions. This paper contributes by using policy data from the Oxford Stringency Index and statistical behavioural changes from the Google Mobility Report and finding the most effective policies to limit the spread during the pandemic. Perra (2021) conducted a literature review of 348 articles on non-pharmaceutical interventions on COVID-19. Perra (2021) finds that non-pharmaceutical interventions were important and effective at slowing the spread of COVID-19, and that implementing these policies early was the most effective at limiting spread. This paper confirms this finding through a Canadian context with additional data and contributes by specifying impactful critical policies.
We use an empirical strategy based on difference-in-difference regression techniques and instrumental variables to estimate the relationship between these policies and deaths across provinces in Canada. Measures to mitigate the spread of the virus may be brought in at a time when an increase in its growth is anticipated. Thus, one can expect causality running in both directions. This could lead to a positive correlation between the instigation of the measure and the number of confirmed cases and possibly even future deaths from those cases for at least some short to medium term period in the future. This does not mean the increased number of cases was caused by the measure but rather that the measure acted like an announcement of an inevitable and immediate rise in the number of infections. This rise may well have been mitigated by the measure despite the apparent positive relationship. Moreover, the size of any negative coefficient, although indicative that the measure is effective in mitigating the spread of the virus, may be due to heightened awareness of citizens created by the instigation of the measure or other information that enlightened the introduction of the measure and so the total effect of the introduction of a policy may be due to other reasons for changes in citizens’ behaviours.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Data
The data for this paper is collected from a variety of sources. The COVID-19 statistics (i.e., daily and cumulative confirmed cases of infections and number of deaths determined to be due to COVID-19) come from Statistics Canada reporting tables. The dates that policies are introduced are collected by The Blavatnik School of Government and the University of Oxford. “The Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (OxCGRT) systematically collects information on several different common policy responses that governments have taken to respond to the pandemic on 17 indicators such as school closures and travel restrictions” (Petherick et al., 2020). This paper's data takes into consideration the measures used in collecting the OxCGRT and includes school closures, workplace closures, gathering restrictions, internal travel restrictions, and the overall stringency index level of each province. The mobility trend data comes from the Google Mobility data. Hale et al., 2021 provides an in-depth analysis of the Oxford Index.
Our data begins March 11, 2020 and goes until Jan 31, 2021. We use this specific data period as provinces were easing restrictions and the first wave was ending. January 31, 2021 was chosen as the end date of our regressions because we want to capture the effect of Government policy on the spread of COVID-19 before the effect of the vaccination roll-out. The vaccine's ability to limit the spread and severity impacts the relationship between policies and number of deaths. Our model would need to be reconsidered. Therefore, this date acts as a natural cut-off point such that we can more directly examine social distance policy measures.
We use a seven-day rolling average of the total number of recovered cases to create the number of active cases. This will help to eliminate sudden jumps in recovered cases due to reporting times (early in the dataset specifically). Taking away the number of recovered cases and the total number of deaths from the total number of cumulative cases we create the number of active cases. To normalize this, we divide by the population per 10,000 in order to create the variable activeper (active cases per 10,000 population).
The Oxford Stringency Index is a weighted average of all measures in the index; it represents the percentage of policies in place out of all potential policies and policy severity the index tracks. It consists of nine policy categories: school closures, workplace closures, public event closures, gathering restrictions, public transit closures, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, international travel controls and public information campaigns. Each of these variables can take different values depending on how severe the restriction. For our main regressions we use one of non-essential workplace closures, gathering restrictions of 10 people of less, recommend closing or significant route reductions of public transit, or internal travel restrictions such as checkpoints for each regression as dummy variables in addition to the overall Stringency Index value.1 The strictest value of the variable is often the one we choose.
We do not include the cancelling of public events. Some provinces like PEI had no public event cancellations but had some gathering restrictions and some provinces like Ontario cancelled public events throughout the whole dataset and had strict gathering restrictions at times. Therefore, we feel gathering restrictions would be a better measure to use because public events can be classified as large gatherings. A list of all the components and their definitions can be found on the Blavatnik School of Government website. Stay at home orders were also not prevalent through provinces in Canada, only to the degree of recommendations and not enforcement in almost all provinces so we do not include those either. We also exclude public information campaigns as we are focusing on social distance enforcing measures not recommendations. International travelling was controlled on a federal level, not provincial so that is excluded from our analysis as well.
The baseline value for the Google Community Mobility Reports, which is the average number of visitors (in the case of residential areas this would be the average duration) during a standard weekday, is calculated from the median value from “the 5-week period Jan 3-Feb 6, 2020” (Google LLC, 2021). For example, all Mondays following this period present the percentage differences on this Monday compared to the median value of all Mondays in the baseline period. In Canada, this baseline calculation period is very cold and might have a low baseline relative to a later date when reviewing park visitors for example. Our data for the report goes until the end of 2020 and does not cover the first month of 2021 as the rest of our regressions do due to data availability. The baseline calculation is done before COVID-19 hit Canada and therefore our comparisons are versus a standard pre-COVID-19 day. Google recommends removing data for local holidays to separate the effect of COVID-19 restrictions from normal holiday differentials. As a result, for our regressions we remove federal holidays and Christmas week.
2.2. Methodology
In this paper we use both an OLS and two-stage least squares regression technique to estimate the effect of policy changes on the number of deaths (cumulative to each date) per 10,000 population. Provinces enacted legislation at different dates which allows for analysis using a difference in differences regression technique to analyze treatments across provinces.
This paper will use an instrumental variable two-stage least squares regression. This is because of an endogeneity problem that arises with the formula. The number of active cases are expected to affect the number of deaths and also provide an indicator of pandemic severity at a given point in time. There are other unobservable characteristics such as behavioural changes that may be present in the error term that also affect the number of active cases. The other dependent variables in other regressions will also affect the number of active cases. This is the bases of the endogeneity problem. To correct for this, we must find a variable that affects the number of cases but not the number of deaths directly. The variable that we determine meets this criterion is the number of COVID-19 tests reported daily. As a result, in the regression equations above we instrument the number of active cases per 10,000 with the number of tests conducted per 10,000. More tests would lead to more reported cases but testing more would not lead to more deaths caused by COVID-19.
Fernández-Villaverde and Jones (2020) indicate that as a result of different testing availability and parameters, number of deaths reported due to COVID-19 is the most accurate measure to use as an indicator of the spread of the virus. Comparing the experience of British Columbia to that in Alberta provides a convincing example of this claim. Cumulative number of deaths per 10,000 as of May 19, 2020 was 0.307 compared to Alberta's 0.314. However, the confirmed cases in B.C. is roughly one third of Alberta's (6683 in Alberta and 2444 in B.C.). The difference was a direct result of the different amounts of testing done (Cardoso, 2020). To deal with this concern this paper will focus on the measure of deaths as our dependent variable.
The OLS regression for deaths based on the Oxford Stringency Index is as follows:
| Yi,t = β0 + β1*X1i,t + β2∗ X2i,t + αp∗X3i + ei,t | (1) |
Where Yi,t is the deaths per 10,000 of province i at time t, X1i,t is the number of active cases per 10,000 population in province i at time t, X2i,t is the 20 day lag of the stringency index of province i at time t and X3i is a dummy variable for each province. This paper will attempt to then break down the various social distance policies in order to determine which policies appear to be more effective. That regression will be as follows. For simplicity, we replace X2i,t as 20 plus days following a policy implementation. For example if we are talking about non-essential workplace closures, X2i,t is 20 plus days following the implementation of non-essential workplace closures in province i at time t. Lastly, e is our error term. We will present a separate regression for each of our social distance policies.
Since their effects may not be immediate, we lag policy variables by twenty plus days following the policy implementation. The average number of days between contact with COVID-19 to death varies greatly in the literature. The Government of Canada states the range of incubation is 1–14 days with a 5–6 day median onset. The Canadian Institute for Health Information determined that the average hospital stay was 12.2 days. However, they also state that the average stay of a patient with at least one comorbidity is 19 days compared with 9 days of those who do not (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2022). Faes et al. (2020) find that the median incubation time is 3–10.4 days, and the median ICU stay is 6.4 days for the working age and 7.6 days for the elderly. They also find that a quarter of the stays for the working age are longer than 13 days and 15.6 days for the 60–80-year-old group in Belgium. Due to the average incubation phase and potential days in the hospital we feel the effect would be most prominent twenty days or more on the number of deaths in the province. Therefore, our policy dummy will be set to one 20 days after the policy is implemented and go back to zero 20 days after it is altered or cancelled until the end of the period, Jan 31, 2021. We also take into effect timing of policies and only utilize policies which lasted at least seven days. We will examine one policy at a time and present both an OLS and 2SLS regression.
The above variables represent the policies used in the regression to analyze the relationship on mitigating the spread of the virus. Provincial dummies are included in the regressions to account for any relevant idiosyncratic provincial factors not included in the set of regressors. They will not be presented with tables but are available upon request. Additional factors are many and include differences in the operation of long-term care residences, degree and effectiveness of testing strategies, et cetera. This compounds the possible endogeneity problem for active cases as well.
A standard method for our 2SLS regression is applied. We need an over-identifying restriction. The first stage of our 2SLS regression will regress the number of active cases per 10,000 on the number of tests and a vector of our OLS regression variables as seen in equation (1). The fitted values will then be used in the second stage of our regression which will be the same as our first stage but now using the fitted values for active cases per 10,000 population.
To provide more evidence on the effectiveness of these policies we run OLS regressions using the Google Mobility Report on the variables we find negative and significant from our 2SLS instrumental variable regressions. These will be simple OLS regressions as shown below:
| Yi,t = β0 + β1*Xji,1-14 + β2∗ Xji,15-19 + β3∗ Xji,20+ + αp∗Xi + ei,t | (2) |
Where Yi,t is a Google Mobility Report indicator as shown in Table 1 for province i at time t. Xji is social distance policy j (we find negative and significant in our 2SLS regressions) for province i. Xji,1-14 represents 1–14 days after the policy has been implemented in province i, Xji,15-19 represents 15–19 days and Xji,20+ represents 20 plus days (same as our 2SLS regression). Earlier lags are included due to the incubation stage as mentioned above. One can expect immediate behavioural changes following the policy implementation to affect deaths in the longer term. We use these regressions to show an immediate and long-term change in baseline mobility created from the implementation of these policies that would promote social distancing and hence limit spread and prevent deaths.
To check the robustness of the results, some provinces with low case and death totals have been dropped from the regressions to ensure that their inclusion does not affect the qualitative nature of the results. We find that results are robust to these changes. To further check robustness of our results, we ran a negative binomial regression that is identical in variables to our OLS regression and obtain the same significance in our non-essential workplace closures and the 20-day lag of the Oxford Stringency Index. The significance on gathering restrictions less than 10 people is no longer evident. We also ran the negative binomial regression on the number of deaths in province t on day i (to match Dave et al., 2020) and obtain statistically similar results as our negative binomial on cumulative deaths per 10000. Those regression tables available upon request.
A Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity was applied to each regression to examine the potential correlation of the number of active cases per 10,000 on the error term in our OLS regression. We found that OLS was not consistent. Therefore, we conclude that there is an endogeneity problem from the correlation between the number of active cases and the error term. As a result, the 2SLS regressions are more econometrically sound. We will focus on results from these regressions for that reason.
3. Results
Table 2, Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 provide the results of the OLS and 2SLS IV (two-stage least squares instrumental variable) regressions on deaths per 10,000 for varying contact limiting social distance policies. The Google Mobility Report regressions are in Table 10, Table 11, Table 13 . For reasons discussed in the introduction, inferring causality from regression coefficients is not straightforward. However, in the case of negative and significant coefficients, we proceed with such statements inferring causality recognizing that caution must be applied when considering these interpretations. We find significant support for social distance policies lowering the number of deaths across Canada.
Table 2.
Non-Essential workplace Closure Regressions.
| (OLS) |
(2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0547*** | 0.141*** |
| (0.00211) | (0.00439) | |
| 20+ days after | −0.173** | −0.531*** |
| Non-essential work closures | (0.0600) | (0.0764) |
| _cons |
0.371*** | −0.0833 |
| (0.0687) |
(0.0878) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, *p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 3.
Some sectors workplace restrictions regressions.
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| Activeper | 0.0516*** | 0.138*** |
| (0.00205) | (0.00450) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.612*** | 0.414*** |
| Closing requirement for some sectors | (0.0515) | (0.0658) |
| _cons |
0.0425 | −0.371*** |
| (0.0715) |
(0.0922) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.
Gathering Restrictions between 11 and 100 people.
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0539*** | 0.149*** |
| (0.00223) | (0.00484) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.00752 | 0.759*** |
| 11-100 person gathering restrictions | (0.0508) | (0.0716) |
| _cons |
0.342*** | −0.740*** |
| (0.0789) |
(0.110) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 5.
Gathering restrictions on less than 10 people.
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0408*** | 0.167*** |
| (0.00243) | (0.00660) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.586*** | −1.027*** |
| 10 people or less gathering restrictions | (0.0582) | (0.108) |
| _cons |
0.285*** | −0.0842 |
| (0.0675) |
(0.0949) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 6.
Internal travel restrictions.
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0555*** | 0.143*** |
| (0.00211) | (0.00451) | |
| 20+ Days | −0.397*** | −0.853*** |
| After Travel Restrictions | (0.0736) | (0.0946) |
| _cons |
0.454*** | 0.0646 |
| (0.0708) |
(0.0906) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 7.
Overall Stringency Index lagged.
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0562*** | 0.142*** |
| (0.00215) | (0.00441) | |
| 20 day lag of | −0.0106*** | −0.0332*** |
| Stringency Index | (0.00235) | (0.00306) |
| _cons |
1.013*** | 1.947*** |
| (0.163) |
(0.205) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 8.
Non-essential workplace closure Google mobility regressions.
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −32.04*** | −20.37*** | −81.62*** | −21.55*** | −20.95*** | 10.19*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (1.158) | (1.021) | (6.715) | (1.076) | (1.301) | (0.457) |
| 15–19days | −32.40*** | −20.92*** | −80.58*** | −22.58*** | −22.78*** | 10.54*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (1.877) | (1.654) | (10.90) | (1.741) | (2.108) | (0.741) |
| 20+ days | −20.86*** | −11.34*** | −31.00*** | −15.77*** | −16.19*** | 7.062*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (0.728) | (0.642) | (4.287) | (0.680) | (0.818) | (0.287) |
| _cons |
−18.14*** | 3.843*** | 84.72*** | −40.10*** | −29.17*** | 8.903*** |
| (0.826) |
(0.728) |
(4.748) |
(0.765) |
(0.927) |
(0.326) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request. retail_and_recreation_percent_ch is Percent change from baseline in retail areas. grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha is the Percent change in the number of visitors to grocery and pharmacy stores from baseline. parks_percent_change_from_baseli is the Percentage change in park visitors from baseline. transit_stations_percent_change_ is the Percent change in the number of visitors to public transit areas from baseline. workplaces_percent_change_from_b is the Percent change in workplace visitors from baseline. residential_percent_change_from_ is the Percentage change in duration in places of residence compared to baseline.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 9.
Less than 10 people Gathering Restrictions Google Mobility Regressions.
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −23.49*** | −14.04*** | −98.81*** | −18.63*** | −10.59*** | 7.354*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (1.200) | (1.000) | (5.969) | (1.016) | (1.293) | (0.453) |
| 15–19days | −24.05*** | −15.37*** | −102.9*** | −21.01*** | −13.05*** | 8.233*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (1.895) | (1.578) | (9.345) | (1.600) | (2.041) | (0.715) |
| 20+ days | −14.21*** | −7.241*** | −43.77*** | −14.05*** | −8.545*** | 5.336*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (0.754) | (0.628) | (3.856) | (0.643) | (0.812) | (0.285) |
| _cons |
−20.71*** | 2.276** | 86.08*** | −41.34*** | −31.75*** | 9.690*** |
| (0.926) |
(0.771) |
(4.550) |
(0.781) |
(0.997) |
(0.349) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request. retail_and_recreation_percent_ch is Percent change from baseline in retail areas. grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha is the Percent change in the number of visitors to grocery and pharmacy stores from baseline. parks_percent_change_from_baseli is the Percentage change in park visitors from baseline. transit_stations_percent_change_ is the Percent change in the number of visitors to public transit areas from baseline. workplaces_percent_change_from_b is the Percent change in workplace visitors from baseline. residential_percent_change_from_ is the Percentage change in duration in places of residence compared to baseline.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
We can see from the regressions that the most effective method in reducing deaths is non-essential workplace closures. In Table 2 below we can see that in our 2SLS regression 20 plus days following non-essential workplace closures are correlated with a 0.531 per 10000 population decrease in deaths.
Closing offices and other workplaces is relatively easier to confirm than other restrictions affecting workforce aged people. Consistent with our intuition, our results suggest that eliminating workplace contact which would otherwise be unavoidable is the most effective measure for preventing the spread of the virus and lowering deaths.
Table 3 shows that workplace restrictions that were short of a non-essential lockdown were not correlated with a decrease in deaths but have a positive and significant correlation for OLS and a positive and significant coefficient past 20 days for 2SLS. There is an important side note that should be taken into consideration when looking at the work 1 variable. Running these regressions on an earlier dataset (pre-workplace restriction easing) our result was negative and significant. This significance disappears likely due to the number of deaths not increasing following the loosening of the restrictions. Recall that most provinces eased restrictions, likely going from non-essential closures to only some sectors closing which may affect our results. This could be an indicator that the mask policy a lot of places have and the attitude by people during the opening has successfully helped to reduce the number of deaths.
Data analysis from the Toronto Star finds 65 per cent of workers in the GTA are doing what is considered ‘essential work.’ This amounts to over 2 million people” (Ranger, 2021). Different areas across Canada would vary in this number of course. That would mean a non-essential workplace closure would keep 35% of employees approximately at home in Toronto. This is a significant percentage of the population not going into work. If we assume this number is relatively similar across big cities throughout Canada, then a workplace restriction that only covers some sectors could affect such a small percentage of workers and social distancing that we may not see as strong as effect on COVID-19 deaths causing our regression to not be negative as we theorized. We see this in our mobility regressions as there is an immediate decrease below the baseline but that dissipates after 20 days to show no effect. Again, this differs from the non-essential workplace closures for which there is a long term and significant negative correlation.
Larger gathering restrictions (11–100 people restrictions) have a strong positive correlation with the number of deaths as seen in Table 4 in the appendix. We argue that this may be influenced for the same reason as discussed above with workplace restrictions that are short of non-essential closures. This could also be a result of the difficulty of provincial governments to enforce the restrictions and/or the general time trend of cases when these were put into effect.
Table 5 shows that stricter gathering restrictions have a negative and significant coefficient for our 2SLS regressions for twenty plus days following the policy being placed into effect. We are inferring causality from our negative and significant coefficients so we can also conclude in addition to workplace closures that strict gathering restrictions have led to a decrease in the number of deaths.
An internal travel restriction (i.e., a ban of non-essential travel between provinces and in the case of Quebec between high-risk areas in the province) produced a robust negative result in the 2SLS regression (Table 6) which is an expected result. This indicates that the travel ban was successful in lowering the number of deaths. There were long duration travel bans within smaller, Atlantic Canadian provinces with limited entry ways compared to the rest of Canada (NFL, NB, PEI). The travel dummy may capture a geographical advantage for such a policy that the Atlantic provinces may have due to limited provincial entryways.
Overall social distance policies or containment policies (as defined by The Blavatnik School of Government) appear to be effective in mitigating the number of deaths in Canada. This is confirmed in Table 7 where we can see a negative and significant coefficient in both our OLS and 2SLS regressions. For every unit increase in the stringency index (recall this is a weighted average of all the policies out of all possible restrictions) we find a reduction in deaths per 10000 of 0.0332.
School closures and public transit route restrictions show no negative coefficients in our 2SLS regressions. The effect of school closures disappears from our OLS regression. It is likely that this shutdown was immediate in our data and COVID-19 had not yet been spread through schools as we are seeing with the Omicron variant and outbreaks withing schools, and most provinces returned with virtual schooling only during our timeframe. Therefore, it is likely that schools were not a large transmitter of COVID-19 during our dataset and therefore closing schools may have been effective, but the effect was not seen as the measure was preventative rather than reactionary. It could also be the case that schools were not important sources of transmission leading to deaths.
In order to further provide evidence for our results we examine the immediate and long-term effects of non-essential workplace closures, 10 people of less gathering restrictions and the overall stringency index level on the Google Community Mobility Reports as defined above. If these policies were in fact effective at reducing deaths, one would expect them to have affected mobility. Table 8 below shows us the percentage change in visitation after 1–14, 15–19 days and longer term 20 plus days following non-essential workplace closures compared to baseline. We would expect to see immediate results hence the immediate lag. A large portion of these policies were implemented for multiple months at a time hence a long term effect in mobility would be needed to keep the significance towards the end of each policy.
For Workplace restrictions we are primarily looking at columns 5 and 6. We can see an immediate decrease in workplace visitors of 20.95% (1–14 days after the policy is introduced) and a long term decrease of 16% (from 20 days after the policy is introduced until it is discontinued) from our baseline levels in Canada. We also see a percentage increase in duration in residential areas both immediately and longer term following this implementation. As the baseline is determined before COVID-19 there is potential that this change is an attitude change and not caused by the policy. If we examine Table 11 on gathering restrictions equal to or less than 10 people in Table 9, column 5 we can see around half of the effect on workplaces compared to baseline. As a result, we conclude that this effect is greater than the effect the overall pandemic has had on workplace visitations and as a result show that this policy has reduced visitors, therefore contact and prevented spread of the virus.
Table 11.
Stringency index Google mobility regressions.
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| Stringency | −1.114*** | −0.700*** | −1.517*** | −0.968*** | −0.941*** | 0.377*** |
| Index | (0.0251) | (0.0223) | (0.156) | (0.0210) | (0.0273) | (0.00989) |
| _cons |
47.51*** | 45.39*** | 171.1*** | 17.75*** | 26.89*** | −13.32*** |
| (1.791) |
(1.591) |
(11.10) |
(1.498) |
(1.945) |
(0.706) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request. retail_and_recreation_percent_ch is Percent change from baseline in retail areas. grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha is the Percent change in the number of visitors to grocery and pharmacy stores from baseline. parks_percent_change_from_baseli is the Percentage change in park visitors from baseline. transit_stations_percent_change_ is the Percent change in the number of visitors to public transit areas from baseline. workplaces_percent_change_from_b is the Percent change in workplace visitors from baseline. residential_percent_change_from_ is the Percentage change in duration in places of residence compared to baseline.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
From both Table 9, Table 10 we can see behaviour directly following the implementation and long term sustained negatives that would reduce of spread of COVID-19 following gathering restrictions and travel restrictions. Interestingly travel restrictions have no long-term effect on the number of park visitors. This is likely a result of people transferring from long vacations towards their closest available park within the internal restriction limit. We also see the lowest positive increase in duration spent in residential areas.
Table 10.
Internal travel restrictions Google mobility regressions.
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −24.62*** | −15.70*** | −39.83*** | −14.95*** | −19.55*** | 7.206*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (1.741) | (1.389) | (8.767) | (1.521) | (1.751) | (0.657) |
| 15–19days | −21.99*** | −14.88*** | −36.83** | −13.62*** | −15.78*** | 6.282*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (2.616) | (2.087) | (12.85) | (2.283) | (2.630) | (0.987) |
| 20+ days | −7.129*** | −5.586*** | 10.41 | −5.246*** | −6.936*** | 2.620*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (1.101) | (0.878) | (5.512) | (0.961) | (1.107) | (0.415) |
| _cons |
−18.66*** | 4.253*** | 75.16*** | −40.85*** | −28.88*** | 9.125*** |
| (1.096) |
(0.875) |
(5.393) |
(0.957) |
(1.102) |
(0.414) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request. retail_and_recreation_percent_ch is Percent change from baseline in retail areas. grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha is the Percent change in the number of visitors to grocery and pharmacy stores from baseline. parks_percent_change_from_baseli is the Percentage change in park visitors from baseline. transit_stations_percent_change_ is the Percent change in the number of visitors to public transit areas from baseline. workplaces_percent_change_from_b is the Percent change in workplace visitors from baseline. residential_percent_change_from_ is the Percentage change in duration in places of residence compared to baseline.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
We can see that for every unit increase in the stringency index from the provinces there is an appropriate contact reducing response that would lower contacts between people. In Table 11 below, we can see fewer retail and grocery visits compared to the baseline which is likely attributed individuals purchasing in bulk in order to reduce the number of trips to the store. We also see a decrease in workplace visits, transit stations visits and an increase in the duration of time spent in residential areas. Again, all of which can lead to a decrease in COVID-19 spread and therefore a reduction in deaths.
Therefore, we present both an overall conclusion on the effectiveness of social distance policies and a breakdown on the two most effective measures statistically; the closures of non-essential workplaces and the tight gathering restrictions of less than or equal to 10 people.
4. Conclusion
Provincial governments in Canada implemented strict restrictions and guidelines during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in order to combat the spread of the disease. These restrictions varied by province carrying forward to future waves. Through extensive research by collecting data through Statistics Canada, provincial reports, and use of the Oxford Stringency Index we have provided an overview of the timing between policies and COVID-19 deaths in Canada at the provincial level. Due to the different provincial testing policies, it is important to note that we treat deaths rather than the cumulative confirmed cases of COVID-19 to be a more reliable statistical indicator, albeit reflecting past experience, of the severity of the pandemic. Therefore, studying the relationship between this variable and provincially enacted measures to mitigate the spread of the coronavirus provides a more accurate foundation from which to work.
Using a two-stage least squares difference in differences regression, we examined the effect of the various provincially enacted policies on the mortality of COVID-19 in Canada. It is important to emphasize again that inferring causality from regression coefficients is not straightforward in this empirical exercise. Based on the regression results on social distance policies, we estimate that for every one percent increase in the stringency index, more than 0.03 deaths per 10,000 people across Canada could be prevented. This equates to over 12,000 deaths prevented by social distance policies from the first wave if every possible measure was enacted compared to if no policies were put into place. With 20,030 deaths in Canada as of Jan 31, 2021, this number is quite substantial. We feel comfortable to conclude that the workplace closure policy and strict gathering restrictions have been particularly effective factors in decreasing mortality of the Coronavirus epidemic in Canada. The estimated coefficient on many of the other variables, such as school closures or public transit closures, do not display statistically significant negative values. This may be due to factors such as timing: that is, it is clear that some policies were implemented during a period in which there was an expected growth in cases. This could lead to a positive coefficient estimate even though growth could have been higher if these policies had not been adopted. For this reason, the estimated impact on reducing deaths that we find for the adopted measures is likely to be an underestimate and so quite probably provides a lower bound on policy effectiveness. Our policy recommendation for the next pandemic would be to quickly enact both gathering restrictions and close non-essential workplaces in order to limit spread.
Dave et al. (2020) show that stay at home orders (SIPO) are associated with a drop in cases but perhaps not a drop in deaths due to the age group most affected by the SIPO being at a lower risk of death. We show that there are policies implemented that do decrease deaths from COVID-19 using policies that could affect at risk groups more proportionally than SIPO orders.
We provide further evidence by analyzing mobility trends. We show that following these policy adoptions there are significant decreases in the percentage of visitors in geographic areas like workplaces, retail areas, grocery stores, etc. that would be conducive to spread of COVID-19. Non-essential workplace closures show a 16% drop in workplace visitors 20 plus days following a closure which supports the decrease of potential contacts and therefore helps prevent deaths.
Moreover, ascertaining the precise channels of measures' effects requires substantially more work with more detailed data. For example, any policy is likely to affect the spread differently through institutional outbreaks in hospitals, seniors’ residences, and long-term care facilities than in the community in general. Nonetheless, the exercise in this paper, which does not break down specific environmental settings of infections, provides a useful overview that can be helpful in drilling down to obtain a better understanding of the effectiveness of various measures taken to mitigate the impact of this pandemic. We believe that our results will help indicate what additional data and research needs to be undertaken in order to better understand the factors that affect the rates of spread of COVID-19 and what measures will be effective in mitigating the future spread of this virus as well as other future epidemics. The results also offer some quantitative estimates on the effectiveness of restrictions used during the pre-vaccination sections of the pandemic and so offer guidance for policy adoption for future consideration.
Canada had successfully flattened the curve for the first wave without the benefit of vaccinations. It is important to review the effectiveness of policies from COVID-19 before vaccines were available for future waves and viral outbreaks we might encounter, specifically if the future outbreaks are connected to a respiratory virus.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Alexander Meek: The author confirms sole responsibility for the following.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. No funding was received for this work.
Footnotes
See Table 1 in the appendix for all variable descriptions and descriptive statistics.
Appendix.
Fig. 1.
Deaths per 10,000 Across Provinces Over Time.
Fig. 2.
Alberta Stringency index vs. deathsper10000.
Fig. 3.
B.C. Stringency Index vs. Deathsper100000.
Fig. 4.
Manitoba Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 5.
N.B. Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 6.
Newfoundland Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 7.
Nova Scotia Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 8.
Ontario Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 9.
Quebec Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Fig. 10.
Saskatchewan Stringency Index vs. Deathsper10000.
Table 1.
Variables, Descriptions & Descriptive Statistics
| Variable Name | Brief Description | Mean | Min Value | Max Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deathsper10000 | cumulative number of deaths per 10,000 population by province | 1.222193 (2.223835) |
0 | 11.99604 |
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | Percent change from baseline in retail areas such as malls, restaurants, theme parks, etc. | −18.49352 (19.96068) |
−90 | 65 |
| grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | Percent change in the number of visitors to grocery and pharmacy stores from baseline | −2.214408 (15.58345) |
−87 | 69 |
| parks_percent_change_from_baseli | Percentage change in park visitors from baseline | 67.02819 (83.51918) |
−68 | 407 |
| transit_stations_percent_change_ | Percent change in the number of visitors to public transit areas from baseline (subway, bus, train, etc.) | −42.30322 (17.67749) |
−84 | 48 |
| workplaces_percent_change_from_b | Percent change in workplace visitors from baseline | −30.32091 (18.74058) |
−86 | 29 |
| residential_percent_change_from_ | Percentage change in duration in places of residence compared to baseline | 9.655196 (6.913145) |
−10 | 36 |
| Independent Variables | ||||
| Stringency Index | Percent of contact limiting provincial policies in place and public information campaign as defined by the Oxford Index | 63.37434 (11.43394) |
11.11 | 90.74 |
| Activeper | Number of active cases per 10,000 population | 6.471294 (11.69082) |
0 | 72.43627 |
| 20+ Days after School Closings | Provincially declared school closures for all levels | 0.3565749 (0.479061) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Some sectors workplace restrictions |
Work closure short of non-essential/workplace regulations (i.e. limited occupations) | 0.4507645 (0.4976461) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Non-Essential workplace closures |
Only essential business allowed open unless in a work from home scenario | 0.1782875 (0.3828131) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Lighter gathering restrictions |
Gathering size restriction in the range of 11–100 people | 0.5250765 (0.4994471) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Strict gathering restrictions |
Gathering size restrictions on 10 people or less | 0.3587156 (0.4796969) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Internal travel restrictions |
Internal movement restrictions such as checkpoints and border closing in place | 0.4899083 (0.4999746) |
0 | 1 |
| 20+ Days after Public transit closures |
Closing requirement on some public transportation or Route reductions | 0.2672783 (0.4426065) |
0 | 1 |
| Provincial Dummies | Accounting for unidentified provincial effects | N/A | 0 | 1 |
*Standard Errors in parenthesis.
Table 2.
Non-Essential workplace Closure Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0547*** | 0.141*** |
| (0.00211) | (0.00439) | |
| 20+ days after | −0.173** | −0.531*** |
| Non-essential work closures | (0.0600) | (0.0764) |
| _cons |
0.371*** | −0.0833 |
| (0.0687) |
(0.0878) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 3.
Some Sectors Workplace Restrictions Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0516*** | 0.138*** |
| (0.00205) | (0.00450) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.612*** | 0.414*** |
| Closing requirement for some sectors | (0.0515) | (0.0658) |
| _cons |
0.0425 | −0.371*** |
| (0.0715) |
(0.0922) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4.
Gathering Restrictions between 11 and 100 people
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0539*** | 0.149*** |
| (0.00223) | (0.00484) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.00752 | 0.759*** |
| 11-100 person gathering restrictions | (0.0508) | (0.0716) |
| _cons |
0.342*** | −0.740*** |
| (0.0789) |
(0.110) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 5.
Gathering restrictions on less than 10 people
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0408*** | 0.167*** |
| (0.00243) | (0.00660) | |
| 20+ days after | 0.586*** | −1.027*** |
| 10 people or less gathering restrictions | (0.0582) | (0.108) |
| _cons |
0.285*** | −0.0842 |
| (0.0675) |
(0.0949) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 6.
Internal Travel Restrictions
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0555*** | 0.143*** |
| (0.00211) | (0.00451) | |
| 20+ Days | −0.397*** | −0.853*** |
| After Travel Restrictions | (0.0736) | (0.0946) |
| _cons |
0.454*** | 0.0646 |
| (0.0708) |
(0.0906) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 7.
Public Transit Closures
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0546*** | 0.150*** |
| (0.00212) | (0.00483) | |
| 20+ Days | 0.207* | 0.822*** |
| Since public transit closures | (0.0865) | (0.115) |
| _cons |
0.343*** | −0.225* |
| (0.0683) |
(0.0918) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 8.
School Closures
| (1) |
(2) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0514*** | 0.146*** |
| (0.00211) | (0.00481) | |
| 20+ Days after | −0.344*** | 0.0854 |
| Complete School Closures | (0.0538) | (0.0719) |
| _cons |
0.539*** | −0.244* |
| (0.0741) |
(0.101) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 9.
Overall Stringency Index lagged
| (OLS) |
(IV 2SLS) |
|
|---|---|---|
| deathsper10000 | deathsper10000 | |
| activeper | 0.0562*** | 0.142*** |
| (0.00215) | (0.00441) | |
| 20-day lag of | −0.0106*** | −0.0332*** |
| Stringency Index | (0.00235) | (0.00306) |
| _cons |
1.013*** | 1.947*** |
| (0.163) |
(0.205) |
|
| N | 2931 | 2931 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 10.
Non-essential Workplace Closure Google Mobility Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −32.04*** | −20.37*** | −81.62*** | −21.55*** | −20.95*** | 10.19*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (1.158) | (1.021) | (6.715) | (1.076) | (1.301) | (0.457) |
| 15–19days | −32.40*** | −20.92*** | −80.58*** | −22.58*** | −22.78*** | 10.54*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (1.877) | (1.654) | (10.90) | (1.741) | (2.108) | (0.741) |
| 20+ days | −20.86*** | −11.34*** | −31.00*** | −15.77*** | −16.19*** | 7.062*** |
| Since non- essential workplace closures | (0.728) | (0.642) | (4.287) | (0.680) | (0.818) | (0.287) |
| _cons |
−18.14*** | 3.843*** | 84.72*** | −40.10*** | −29.17*** | 8.903*** |
| (0.826) |
(0.728) |
(4.748) |
(0.765) |
(0.927) |
(0.326) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 11.
Less than 10 people Gathering Restrictions Google Mobility Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −23.49*** | −14.04*** | −98.81*** | −18.63*** | −10.59*** | 7.354*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (1.200) | (1.000) | (5.969) | (1.016) | (1.293) | (0.453) |
| 15–19days | −24.05*** | −15.37*** | −102.9*** | −21.01*** | −13.05*** | 8.233*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (1.895) | (1.578) | (9.345) | (1.600) | (2.041) | (0.715) |
| 20+ days | −14.21*** | −7.241*** | −43.77*** | −14.05*** | −8.545*** | 5.336*** |
| Since 10 people or less gathering restriction | (0.754) | (0.628) | (3.856) | (0.643) | (0.812) | (0.285) |
| _cons |
−20.71*** | 2.276** | 86.08*** | −41.34*** | −31.75*** | 9.690*** |
| (0.926) |
(0.771) |
(4.550) |
(0.781) |
(0.997) |
(0.349) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 12.
Internal Travel Restrictions Google Mobility Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| 1–14 days | −24.62*** | −15.70*** | −39.83*** | −14.95*** | −19.55*** | 7.206*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (1.741) | (1.389) | (8.767) | (1.521) | (1.751) | (0.657) |
| 15–19days | −21.99*** | −14.88*** | −36.83** | −13.62*** | −15.78*** | 6.282*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (2.616) | (2.087) | (12.85) | (2.283) | (2.630) | (0.987) |
| 20+ days | −7.129*** | −5.586*** | 10.41 | −5.246*** | −6.936*** | 2.620*** |
| Since internal travel restriction | (1.101) | (0.878) | (5.512) | (0.961) | (1.107) | (0.415) |
| _cons |
−18.66*** | 4.253*** | 75.16*** | −40.85*** | −28.88*** | 9.125*** |
| (1.096) |
(0.875) |
(5.393) |
(0.957) |
(1.102) |
(0.414) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 13.
Stringency Index Google Mobility Regressions
| (1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
(6) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| retail_and_recreation_percent_ch | grocery_and_pharmacy_percent_cha | parks_percent_change_from_baseli | transit_stations_percent_change_ | workplaces_percent_change_from_b | residential_percent_change_from_ | |
| Stringency | −1.114*** | −0.700*** | −1.517*** | −0.968*** | −0.941*** | 0.377*** |
| Index | (0.0251) | (0.0223) | (0.156) | (0.0210) | (0.0273) | (0.00989) |
| _cons |
47.51*** | 45.39*** | 171.1*** | 17.75*** | 26.89*** | −13.32*** |
| (1.791) |
(1.591) |
(11.10) |
(1.498) |
(1.945) |
(0.706) |
|
| N | 2562 | 2546 | 2354 | 2484 | 2562 | 2562 |
Standard errors in parentheses. Provincial Dummies Available upon request.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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