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Public Opinion Quarterly logoLink to Public Opinion Quarterly
. 2023 Jan 28;86(4):968–996. doi: 10.1093/poq/nfac046

The Polls—Trends

Welfare Regimes and Support for Income Redistribution in Europe

Aleš Kudrnáč 1,, Ivan Petrúšek 2
PMCID: PMC9940779  PMID: 36814550

Abstract

Income redistribution and changes in redistributive policies are highly contested issues that often have a bearing on societal debate and electoral competition. Using European Social Survey data, we trace trends in public attitudes toward income redistribution in 18 European countries from 2002 to 2019, a time period which included the Great Recession, the 2015 migrant crisis, and an increase in income inequality. Although attitudes toward income redistribution were relatively stable, trends presented by countries grouped by welfare regime display considerable variation both among countries and among welfare regimes. We also trace trends in public support for redistribution by income groups and gauge the strength of belief in meritocracy and egalitarianism. The level of redistribution support among middle-income residents is similar to redistribution support of low-income residents, most notably in post-communist and social-democratic regimes. While egalitarianism is most widespread in the Mediterranean regime, meritocracy is most common in liberal and conservative regimes.

Introduction

Income redistribution, defined as income transfers from some individuals to others, aims to mitigate disposable income inequality in a society. Policies related to income distribution, including the level, structure, and progressivity of government taxation, and the size and structure of transfers, vary significantly among countries. Change in redistribution policies are some of the most highly contested issues, constituting a primary concern for many voters and influencing electoral competition. The Great Recession (Pontusson and Weisstanner 2018), immigration (Burgoon et al. 2012), and the increase in income inequality in most European countries over the past 20 to 30 years (OECD 2008; Bonesmo Fredriksen 2012; Blanchet, Chancel, and Gethin 2020) may have affected public support for income redistribution. However, trends in public support for income redistribution in Europe have been given little attention, and studies on this topic have focused on the United States (Weaver, Shapiro, and Jacobs 1995; Shaw and Shapiro 2002; Shaw and Gaffey 2012).

Using European Social Survey (ESS) data from 18 countries, the main aim of this paper is to identify trends in support for income redistribution in Europe between 2002 and 2019. In this heterogeneous group of countries, income redistribution is framed and contested differently depending on the level of income inequality, the actual degree of income redistribution, and the welfare regime’s broader configuration. As countries may be classified into welfare regimes based on their income redistribution policies, a secondary aim of this paper is to explore if attitudes toward income redistribution in countries having a given welfare regime follow the same trajectory, and if attitudes vary from one welfare regime to another. Apart from exploring trends by welfare regime, this paper aims to identify trends in public support for income redistribution by household income. These analyses allow us to study the extent to which income affects attitudes toward income redistribution in various welfare regimes.

Welfare regime typologies are based on broad social policy configurations. We build on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) influential typology (which distinguishes conservative, social-democratic and liberal regimes), extend it by the southern/Mediterranean regime type (Ferrera 1996) and the post-communist welfare states (Fenger 2007), and group the analyzed countries into these five regime types based on the classification of Deeming and Jones (2015). In our analysis, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are conservative welfare regimes; Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are social-democratic regimes; the United Kingdom and Ireland are liberal regimes; Spain and Portugal are Mediterranean regimes; and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia are post-communist regimes. This grouping of countries allows us to observe attitudes toward redistribution under the “regime hypothesis,” which postulates a national-level association between redistributive policies and public welfare attitudes (Jaeger 2005, 2009; Larsen 2008; Schmidt-Catran 2016).

This paper opens by presenting the overall trends in support for income redistribution by welfare regime over the past twenty years. After this, it examines trends in redistribution support by individual country, and then by income group. Finally, it identifies trends in beliefs in meritocracy and egalitarianism, values important for understanding attitudes toward income redistribution.

Overall Support for Redistribution between 2002 and 2019

ESS, a biennial cross-national survey, is the leading source of comparative data on attitudes toward income redistribution in Europe. ESS administered the same question in all participating countries for each of nine rounds. This makes ESS the most suitable dataset for analyzing trends in attitudes toward redistribution in Europe. Our analysis covers only those countries that fielded at least eight ESS rounds.

The support for redistribution is captured by reported agreement with the following statement: “The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.1 While this question is widely used, the interpretation of answers is not straightforward. Some respondents may understand it as how generous a nation's redistributive scheme ought to be (i.e., absolute redistribution support). However, other respondents may perceive it as a question about change from a current situation (i.e., relative redistribution support). Following the distinction between absolute and relative preferences formulated by the thermostatic model of public opinion responsiveness (Soroka and Wlezien 2010), the debate is to what extent this item measures absolute and relative redistribution support. We do not set out to adjudicate between these two interpretations but merely acknowledge the item as measuring “redistribution support” because the agreement with the statement represents a positive attitude toward redistribution. However, caution is required when reading the results because the answers come from a heterogeneous group of welfare regimes and countries. The answers are thus likely to be influenced by existing redistributive policies, institutions, and socio-economic context.

Starting with the general trends, figure 1 shows the total ESS average share of respondents and average shares of respondents grouped by regime affiliation who favor income redistribution between 2002 and 2019.2 Support for income redistribution is quite stable in most welfare regimes, with a slight increase between 2008–2009 and 2012–2013. The highest longitudinal redistribution support is seen in the Mediterranean regime, followed by the post-communist countries. The conservative welfare regime shows a similar trend to Mediterranean countries, only the share of respondents supporting redistribution is steadily around 17 percentage points lower. Support for income redistribution in the liberal regime dropped slightly between 2002–2003 and 2006–2007 and gradually rose to 69 percent in 2012–2013. The liberal, conservative, and post-communist regimes converged to the total European average in the last ESS round (2018–2019). This convergence highlights Mediterranean countries as outliers due to their high support for income redistribution and social-democratic countries due to their support for income redistribution being consistently lowest among all the welfare regimes considered (although Denmark, as an outlier within the social-democratic regime, drags the mean of this regime downwards).3 Liberal regime countries have the highest levels of market income inequality and, along with Mediterranean countries, also have the highest levels of disposable income inequality. On the other hand, social-democratic regime countries have the lowest inequality of disposable incomes (cf. figure A2).

Figure 1.

Figure 1.

Average percent support for income redistribution in Europe by welfare regime. EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.) The vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents who agree strongly or agree with the statement. Regime-round means are unweighted averages based on redistribution support in the corresponding countries. The percentages in the legend represent the average support for income redistribution within the given welfare regime, that is, each of these means is calculated from the nine available observations (ESS rounds).

As mentioned above, some respondents may understand the item as a question regarding a change in redistribution from the status quo, which may be reflected by between-welfare regime differences. For example, the social-democratic regime has the lowest average agreement with the statement presented by this item. At the same time, disposable income inequalities are relatively low, and public social expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) are the highest among all welfare regimes (cf. figure A3). On the other hand, the post-communist countries are highly pro-redistributive, while the size of the welfare state is relatively small. In other words, welfare regimes that redistribute a high proportion of national incomes via tax and transfer systems are characterized by low relative redistribution support. In contrast, regimes with low redistribution are characterized by high relative redistribution support.

Figure 2 shows that levels of redistribution support vary among countries within some welfare regimes more than others. Denmark consistently has the lowest levels of support for government redistribution, which makes it an outlier within the social-democratic regime. Denmark’s low support for redistribution may be explained by the already existing high level of redistribution (cf. figure A3). In the vast majority of European countries, redistribution support is stable. The starkest deviations from this stable trend are the growth in redistribution support in Germany over time and the significant fluctuation of this support in the Czech Republic and Estonia. The Czech Republic is also the post-communist country with the lowest proportion of respondents supporting redistribution. In the Czech Republic, where disposable income inequality is very low, aggregate redistribution support negatively correlates with the business cycle, as redistribution support is the highest in periods of declining GDP and high unemployment (Linek and Petrúšek 2020). Along with Portugal, redistribution support is also very high in Hungary and Slovenia. On the other hand, respondents in the Netherlands and United Kingdom show relatively low redistribution support.

Figure 2.

Figure 2.

Percent support for income redistribution in Europe (by five welfare regime types). The vertical axis reports the proportion of respondents who agree strongly or agree with the statement. The percentages in the legend represent the average support for income redistribution within the given country, that is, each of these means is calculated from the eight or nine available observations.

Support for Redistribution by Income Group

Figures 3 – 7 present the proportions of respondents who support income redistribution within three income categories. In gray are the percentage-point differences in redistribution support between the low-income and high-income groups, which may be used as an indicator of the strength of the relationship between income and redistribution support. Theories of welfare attitudes centered on economic self-interest (i.e., the median-voter hypothesis, the theory of homo economicus, social exchange theory) predict a negative relationship between income and support for redistribution (Fong 2001; Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Schmidt-Catran 2016; Kevins et al. 2018). The results presented in figure 3 – 7 show that the differences in support between low-income and high-income residents are positive, and the strength of these relationships varies across countries, and within some welfare regimes more than others.

Figure 3.

Figure 3.

Percent support for income redistribution by income group: conservative regime. The gray numbers are percentage-point differences in redistribution support between the low-income and high-income groups (i.e., % low income - % high income). This note also applies to figures 4 – 7.

With their almost unanimous public support for redistribution, Portugal and Hungary exhibit almost no differences in pro-redistributive attitudes among income categories. On the other hand, the differences in redistribution support between the low-income and high-income groups amount to up to 30 percentage points in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic. The remaining countries are situated between these two extremes.

The lowest redistribution support among respondents from the top income quintile is in Denmark (around 30 percent), the Netherlands and the Czech Republic (varying around 40 percent), and Switzerland and the United Kingdom (around 45 percent). After 2008, support for income redistribution by top-income residents grew in Germany, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.

Given the theoretical argument that the relative income distance between middle-income people and the poor, on the one hand, and middle-income people and the rich, on the other hand, influences redistribution support among middle-income classes (Lupu and Pontusson 2011), we also examine whether those with middle income tend to align with those with low income in their support for redistribution or are more in line with those with high income. In most of the countries analyzed, those with middle income have very similar levels of redistribution support as those with low income. This tendency is most pronounced in post-communist countries (except for the Czech Republic) and social-democratic countries. After discounting countries where public support for redistribution is unanimous, the data suggest that in no European country do those with middle income align with those with high income in their lower levels of redistribution support.

Beliefs about Distributive Justice and Inequality

Attitudes toward redistribution are also driven by individual beliefs and societal norms (Rehm 2016, pp. 13–17). Accordingly, this section focuses on survey measures of beliefs about distributive justice and inequality. We are constrained by data availability, as items concerning these key concepts were only part of the ESS Welfare Attitudes module fielded in 2008–2009 and 2016–2017.

Meritocracy justifies unequal income distribution by arguing that income should reflect individual efforts, contributions, and merits. At the individual level, people believing in meritocracy are expected to hold negative views about government income redistribution. Consequently, countries with a higher proportion of people who believe in meritocracy should tend to have lower levels of support for redistribution.

Figure 8 shows the proportion of people believing in meritocracy for each country grouped by welfare regime. As expected, in the liberal regime, emphasizing equal opportunity and equity (Arts and Gelissen 2001), belief in meritocracy is most widely held and relatively stable. Meritocracy is also a widely held belief in the conservative regime, and there is very low variation among the conservative countries and the two ESS rounds. The Mediterranean regime shows a slightly lower average level of belief in meritocracy in the fourth ESS round than the conservative regime. However, both Spain and Portugal witnessed a significant drop in belief in meritocracy between the two waves. The two remaining regimes are characterized by significant variation among countries within these regimes. Denmark, with its very high level of belief in meritocracy, and Finland, with its very low level of belief in meritocracy, represent the borderline cases in the social-democratic regime. The Czech Republic, Estonia, and Poland have very high levels of belief in rewarding talents and efforts in economic outcomes. On the other hand, the narrative of individual effort justifying large income differences has very low support in Slovenia and Hungary.

Figure 8.

Figure 8.

Percent endorse belief in meritocracy in Europe (by five welfare regime types). EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts.) The number at the top of a bar is the percentage of respondents who agree strongly or agree with the statement.

Economic egalitarianism advocates that economic outcomes should be distributed equally among members of society. Therefore, people with egalitarian beliefs are expected to hold positive views about government redistribution. Figure 9 shows, for each country grouped by regime type, the proportion of respondents who believe that a fair society is egalitarian. Overall, the liberal regime, that is, the regime for which belief in meritocracy is most widely held, has a relatively low proportion of egalitarians. On the other hand, the Mediterranean regime has the highest proportion of egalitarians among all five welfare regimes. This inverse ranking of the Mediterranean regime on beliefs in meritocracy and egalitarianism is in line with its highest support for redistribution among all five welfare regimes. The three remaining regimes have similar average proportions (between 57 percent and 59 percent) of egalitarians. With only a third of the population supporting the equal distribution of economic outcomes, Denmark represents a significant outlier within the social-democratic regime. With its exceptionally high tax revenue, high redistribution, and resulting low inequality of disposable incomes, Danes seem to crave less government redistribution and more meritocracy in determining the distribution of disposable income.

Figure 9.

Figure 9.

Percent endorse belief in egalitarianism in Europe (by five welfare regime types). EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small.) The number at the top of a bar is the percentage of respondents who agree strongly or agree with the statement.

Conclusion

Analysis of ESS data from the period 2002–2019 shows relatively stable support for income redistribution. Grouping countries by their broad social policy configurations helped us analyze the levels and trends in support for income redistribution within the framework of the “regime hypothesis,” which argues that regime membership should explain between-country differences in attitudes. While we observe relatively stable aggregate support for income redistribution in most welfare regimes, with a slight increase between 2008–2009 and 2012–2013, there is considerable variation among welfare regimes.

Additionally, support for income redistribution was analyzed by income group. The strength of this association varies between countries and within welfare regimes. The data provide very little support for the structure of inequality argument of Lupu and Pontusson (2011), since in no country does the level of redistribution support among those with a middle income align with the lower level of redistribution support among those with a high income. Middle-income residents show a similar level of redistribution support to that of low-income residents, most evidently in post-communist and social-democratic regimes. Furthermore, our findings have implications for cross-national research because the data suggest that analysts should consider including random slopes for income when modeling redistribution support in Europe.

The final section of this paper shows that belief in meritocracy is most widespread among countries of liberal and conservative regimes. While having the highest proportion of egalitarians, the proportion of meritocrats in Spain and Portugal dropped significantly between the two waves (2008–2009 and 2016–2017), which may have been a consequence of the Great Recession in 2009.

Appendix

Data Sources, Sampling, and Response Rates

Response rates for the main questionnaire and other information were retrieved from national survey documentation reports. European Social Surveys involved national samples of persons aged 15 and over resident within private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status. The surveys involved random probability sampling with a minimum target response rate of 70 percent. Surveys were conducted via face-to-face CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) or PAPI (paper and pencil interview). Appropriate national languages based on rigorous translation protocols were used. For some country-rounds, fieldwork dates span several months and cross two calendar years. For these country-rounds, the year reported in the figures is the year in which most interviews were conducted.

European Social Survey Round 1 (2002–2003): Belgium (ISPO, Department of Sociology and Leuven and CLEO—University of Liege, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 01.08.03—30.09.03: PAPI, 59.2 percent; Czech Republic (STEM, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic), 24.11.02—09.03.03: PAPI, 43.3 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, Danish Social Science Research Council), 28.10.02—19.06.03: CAPI, 67.6 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 09.09.02—10.12.02: CAPI, 73.2 percent; France (Institut de Sondage Lavialle, Ministère de la Recherche), 15.09.03—15.12.03: CAPI, 43.1 percent; Germany (infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 20.11.02—16.05.03, CAPI: 55.7 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Centre, Hungarian Academy of Sciences), 29.10.02—26.11.02, PAPI: 69.9 percent; Ireland (Economic and Social Research Institute, Higher Education Authority and Institute for the Study of Social Change), 11.12.02—12.04.03, PAPI: 64.5 percent; Netherlands (Gfk Panel Services, Dutch Science Foundation, Social and Cultural Planning Office), 01.09.02—24.02.03, CAPI: 67.9 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 16.09.02—17.01.03, CAPI: 65.0 percent; Poland (Center for Social Survey Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences Polish Committee for Scientific Research (KBN) Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences Foundation), 30.09.02—19.12.02, PAPI: 73.2 percent; Portugal (TNS Euroteste, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) 26.09.02—20.01.03, PAPI: 68.8 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Ministry of Education Science and Sport, Ministry of Labour Family and Social Affairs, Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, and Government Office for European Affairs), 17.10.02—30.11.02, PAPI: 70.5 percent; Spain (DEMOSCOPIA, Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and Departament d'Universitats Recerca i Societat de la Informació de la Generalitat de Catalunya), 19.11.02—20.02.03, PAPI: 53.2 percent; Sweden (Statistics Sweden, SCB Vetenskapsrådet, Riksbankens jubileumsfond, FAS), 23.09.02 - 20.12.02, CAPI: 69.5 percent; Switzerland (M.I.S. Trend SA, Lusanne, Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung), 09.09.02—08.02.03, CAPI: 33.5 percent; United Kingdom (National Centre for Social Research (NatCen), Central Survey Unit of the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Economic and Social Research Council), 24.09.02—04.02.03, CAPI: 55.5 percent.

European Social Survey Round 2 (2004–2005): Belgium (ISPO, Department of Sociology and Leuven and CLEO—University of Liege, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 04.10.04—31.01.05, CAPI: 61.2 percent; Czech Republic (SC&C, Grant Agency of the Czech Republic), 01.10.04—13.12.04, PAPI: 55.3 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, Danish Social Science Research Council, 09.10.04—31.01.05, CAPI: 64.2 percent; Estonia (Statistical Office of Estonia, Estonian Science Foundation, Tartu University), 30.09.04—19.01.05, PAPI: 79.1 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland (Suomen Akatemia), 20.09.04—17.12.04, CAPI: 70.7 percent; France (Institut de Sondage Lavialle, ACI ‘Terrains, Techniques et Théories’, Minsitère de la Recherche, PPF de l'Université de Caen), 27.11.04—04.03.05, CAPI: 43.6 percent; Germany (infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 26.08.04—16.01.05, CAPI: 51.0 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Centre, Hungarian Academy of Sciences—Institute of Political Science), 02.04.05—31.05.05, PAPI: 65.9 percent; Ireland (Economic and Social Research Institute, Irish Research Council for the Humanities & Social Sciences), 18.01.05—20.06.05, PAPI: 62.5 percent; Netherlands (Gfk Panel Services, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands), 11.09.04—19.02.05, CAPI: 64.3 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 15.09.04—15.01.05, CAPI: 66.2 percent; Poland (Center for Social Survey Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, State Committee for Scientific Research), 10.10.04—22.12.04, PAPI: 73.7 percent; Portugal (TNS Euroteste, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 15.10.04—17.03.05, PAPI: 71.2 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Ministry of Education Science and Sport, Ministry of Labour Family and Social Affairs, Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, and Government Office for European Affairs), 18.10.04—30.11.04, PAPI: 70.2 percent; Spain (TNS DEMOSCOPIA, Madrid Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, 27.09.04—31.01.05, CAPI: 54.9 percent; Sweden (SCB, Vetenskapsrådet, Riksbankens jubileumsfond, FAS), 29.09.04—19.01.05, CAPI: 65.4 percent; Switzerland (M.I.S. Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 15.09.04—28.02.05, CAPI: 48.6 percent; United Kingdom (BMRB Economic and Social Research Council), 27.09.04—16.03.05, CAPI: 50.6 percent.

European Social Survey Round 3 (2006–2007): Belgium (TNS Dimarso, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 23.10.06—19.02.07, CAPI: 61.0 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, Danish Social Science Research Council),19.09.06—02.05.07, CAPI: 50.8 percent; Estonia (Saar Poll OÜ, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Social Affairs), 25.10.06—21.05.07, PAPI: 65.0 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 18.09.06—20.12.06, CAPI: 64.4 percent); France (Institut de Sondage Lavialle, Comité de concertation pour les données en sciences sociales, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 19.09.06—07.04.07, CAPI: 46.0 percent; Germany (infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 01.09.06—15.01.07, CAPI: 54.5 percent; Hungary (The Gallup Organization Hungary, Hungarian Academy of Sciences), 21.11.06—28.01.07, PAPI: 66.1 percent; Ireland (Economic and Social Research InstituteIrish Research Council for the Humanities & Social Sciences), 14.09.06—31.08.07, PAPI: 56.8 percent; Netherlands (GFK Panel Services Benelux, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 16.09.06—18.03.07, CAPI: 59.8 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 21.08.06—19.12.06, CAPI: 65.5 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences Ministry of the Education and Science), 02.10.06—13.12.06, PAPI: 70.2 percent; Portugal (TNS Euroteste, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 12.10.06—28.02.07, PAPI: 72.8 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency, Government Office for European Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs), 18.10.06—04.12.06, PAPI: 65.1 percent; Spain (Metroscopia, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia), 25.10.06—04.03.07, CAPI: 65.9 percent; Sweden (SCB, Vetenskapsrådet, Riksbankens jubileumsfond, FAS), 21.09.06 - 03.02.07, CAPI: 65.9 percent; Switzerland (M.I.S. Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 24.08.06—02.04.07, CAPI: 51.5 percent; United Kingdom (BMRB, Economic and Social Research Council), 05.09.06—14.01.07, CAPI: 54.6 percent.

European Social Survey Round 4 (2008–2009): Belgium (TNS Dimarso, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 13.11.08—20.03.09, CAPI: 58.9 percent; Czech Republic (Factum Invenio, Institute of Sociology AS CR), 08.06.09—08.07.09, PAPI: 69.5 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, Danish Social Science Research Council), 01.09.08—11.01.09, CAPI: 53.9 percent); Estonia (Turu—uuringute AS, Ministry of Education and Science, Office of the Minister of Population Affairs), 05.11.08—11.03.09, PAPI: 57.4 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 19.09.08—05.02.09, CAPI: 68.4 percent; France (Institut de Sondages Lasvialle—GFK, Plan pluriannuel de formation of the University of Caen, Sciences Po), 28.09.08—31.01.09, CAPI: 49.4 percent; Germany (infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 27.08.08—31.01.09, CAPI: 48.0 percent; Hungary (Gallup Hungary OTKA—Hungarian Scientific Research Fund), 20.02.09—20.04.09, PAPI: 61.3 percent; Ireland (Ipsos—MORI, Irish Research Council for the Humanities & Social Sciences), 11.09.09—12.03.10, CAPI: 51.6 percent; Netherlands (GFK Panel Services Benelux, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 08.09.08—28.06.09, CAPI: 49.8 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 25.08.08—20.01.09, CAPI: 60.4 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Higher Education), 03.11.08—15.02.09, PAPI: 71.2 percent; Portugal (TNS Euroteste Marketing e Opinião S.A., Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 09.10.08—08.03.09, CAPI: 75.7 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency), 20.10.08—20.01.09, PAPI: 59.1 percent; Spain (Metroscopia, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, Direcció General de Participació Ciutadana de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, Escola Galega de Administración Pública), 05.09.08—31.01.09, CAPI: 66.8 percent; Sweden (SCB, Vetenskapsrådet, Riksbankens jubileumsfond, FAS), 15.09.08—03.02.09, CAPI: 62.2 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend, Swiss National Science Foundation), 30.08.08—17.04.09, CAPI: 49.9 percent; United Kingdom (NatCen and NISRA, Economic & Social Research Council), 01.09.08—19.01.09, CAPI: 55.8 percent.

European Social Survey Round 5 (2010–2011): Belgium (Significant GfK, Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique, Fonds voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 11.10.10—06.05.11, CAPI: 53.4 percent; Czech Republic (Factum Invenio, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports), 20.01.11—08.03.11, PAPI: 70.2 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, The Danish Council for Independent Research, Social Sciences), 20.09.10—31.01.11, CAPI: 55.4 percent; Estonia (GfK Custom Research Baltic Eesti filiaal, Ministry of Science and Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Justice), 10.10.10—28.05.11, CAPI: 56.2 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 13.09.10—30.12.10, CAPI: 59.5 percent; France (Institut de Sondages Lasvialle—GFK, GIS Quételet, EHESS, PPF de l'Université de Caen, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), 15.10.10—06.04.11, CAPI: 47.1 percent; Germany (TNS Infratest Sozialforschung GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 15.09.10—03.02.11, CAPI: 30.5 percent; Hungary (Gallup Hungary, OTKA—Hungarian Scientific Research Fund), 19.10.10—10.12.10, PAPI: 49.2 percent; Ireland (Amárach Research, Irish Research Council for the Humanities & Social Sciences), 20.09.11—31.01.12, CAPI: 65.2 percent; Netherlands (GFK Panel Services Benelux, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 27.09.10—02.04.11, CAPI: 60.0 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 09.09.10—15.02.11, CAPI: 58.0 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Science and Higher Education), 01.10.10—06.02.11, PAPI: 70.3 percent; Portugal (TNS, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 11.10.10—23.03.11, CAPI: 67.1 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency), 20.10.10—31.01.11, PAPI: 64.4 percent; Spain (Metroscopia, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación & Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), 11.04.11—24.07.11, CAPI: 68.5 percent; Sweden (SCB, Vetenskapsrådet, Riksbankens jubileumsfond, FAS), 27.09.10—01.03.11, CAPI: 51.0 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 02.10.10—23.03.11, CAPI: 53.3 percent; United Kingdom (Ipsos MORI, Economic & Social Research Council), 31.08.10—28.02.11, CAPI: 56.3 percent.

European Social Survey Round 6 (2012–2013): Belgium (TNS Dimarso, Hercules Fonds & FNRS), 10.09.12—24.12.12, CAPI: 58.7 percent; Czech Republic (MEDIAN, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports),09.01.13—11.03.13, PAPI: 68.4 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, The Danish Council for Independent Research, Social Sciences), 10.01.13—24.04.13, CAPI: 49.1 percent; Estonia (Saar Poll OÜ, University of Tartu, Ministry of Science and Education), 01.09.12—28.01.13, CAPI: 67.8 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 03.09.12—02.02.13, CAPI: 67.3 percent; France (GfK ISL Custom Research France, Centre national de la recherche scientifique—Très grande infrastructure PROGEDO), 08.02.13—30.06.13, CAPI: 52.1 percent; Germany (Infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 06.09.12—22.01.13, CAPI: 33.8 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Institute OTKA—Hungarian Scientific Research Fund), 10.11.12—17.02.13, CAPI: 64.5 percent; Ireland (Amárach Research, Irish Research Council), 15.10.12—09.02.13, CAPI: 67.9 percent; Netherlands (GFK Panel Services Benelux, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 28.08.12—30.03.13, CAPI: 55.1 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 14.08.12—08.02.13, CAPI: 54.9 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, The National Science Centre), 19.09.12—08.01.13, PAPI: 74.9 percent; Portugal (TNS, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 24.10.12—20.03.13, CAPI: 77.1 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency), 01.10.12—31.12.12, CAPI: 57.7 percent; Spain (TYPSA Estadística y Servicios S.L., Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación & Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), 23.01.13—14.05.13, CAPI: 70.3 percent; Sweden (Ipsos Observer Sweden, Vetenskapsrådet), 01.10.12—05.05.13, CAPI: 52.4 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 01.09.12—22.04.13, CAPI: 51.7 percent; United Kingdom (Ipsos MORI, Economic & Social Research Council), 01.09.12—07.02.13, CAPI: 53.1 percent.

European Social Survey Round 7 (2014–2015): Belgium (TNS Dimarso, Hercules Fonds & FNRS),10.09.14—01.02.15, CAPI: 57.0 percent; Czech Republic (MEDIAN, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports), 24.11.14—09.02.15, CAPI + PAPI: 67.9 percent; Denmark (SFI—Survey, The Danish Council for Independent Research, Social Sciences), 12.09.14—17.02.15, CAPI: 51.9 percent; Estonia (Saar Poll OÜ, Ministry of Science and Education, international program), 07.09.14—29.12.14, CAPI: 59.9 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 03.09.14—09.02.15, CAPI: 62.7 percent; France (IPSOS, UMS Progedo and Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales), 31.10.14—03.03.15, CAPI: 50.9 percent; Germany (Infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft), 18.08.14—05.02.15, CAPI: 31.4 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences), 24.04.15—26.06.15, CAPI: 52.7 percent; Ireland (Amárach Research, Irish Research Council), 04.09.14—31.01.15, CAPI: 60.7 percent; Netherlands (TNS NIPO/Veldkamp, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 08.09.14—15.01.15, CAPI: 58.6 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway—Division for sample surveys, The Research Council of Norway), 20.08.14—08.01.15, CAPI: 53.9 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, The Ministry of Science and Higher Education), 17.04.15—14.09.15, PAPI: 65.8 percent; Portugal (Consulmark2 - Estudos de Mercado e Trabalho de Campo, Lda. and Institute of Social Sciences—University of Lisbon, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 02.02.15—30.11.15, CAPI: 43.0 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency, Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, 09.10.14—01.02.15, CAPI: 52.3 percent; Spain (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), 22.01.15—25.06.15, PAPI: 67.9 percent; Sweden (Ipsos Observer Sweden, Vetenskapsrådet, 01.08.14—30.01.15, CAPI: 50.1 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 29.08.14—20.02.15, CAPI: 52.7 percent; United Kingdom (National Centre for Social Research, Economic & Social Research Council, 01.09.14—25.02.15; 02.10.15 - 07.12.15, CAPI: 43.6 percent.

European Social Survey Round 8 (2016–2017): Belgium (Kantar TNS, FWO and FNRS), 14.09.16—31.01.17, CAPI: 56.8 percent; Czech Republic (ppm factum research, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports), 24.10.16—19.12.16, CAPI: 68.5 percent; Estonia (Statistics Estonia, Ministry of Education and Research), 01.10.16—31.01.17, CAPI: 68.4 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 15.09.16—08.03.17, CAPI: 57.7 percent; France (GfK-ISL CRF, Large National Research Infrastructure PROGEDO and National Centre for Scientific Research), 10.11.16—11.03.17, CAPI: 52.4 percent; Germany (Infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung), 23.08.16—26.03.17, CAPI: 30.6 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences), 14.05.17—16.09.17, CAPI: 42.7 percent; Ireland (Amárach Research, Irish Research Council), 25.11.16—08.05.17, CAPI: 64.5 percent; Netherlands (KANTAR, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 01.09.16—31.01.17, CAPI: 53.0 percent; Norway (Statistics Norway, The Research Council of Norway), 22.08.16—17.01.17, CAPI: 52.8 percent; Poland (Centre of Sociological Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, The Ministry of Science and Higher Education), 07.11.16—22.02.17, PAPI: 69.6 percent; Portugal (Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia), 20.10.16—15.06.17, CAPI: 45.0 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency, Ministry of Education, Science and Sport), 21.09.16—11.01.17, CAPI: 55.9 percent; Spain (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas), 16.02.17—23.06.17, PAPI: 67.7 percent; Sweden (Ipsos Observer, Sweden Vetenskapsrådet), 26.08.16—10.02.17, CAPI: 43.0 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 01.09.16—02.03.17, CAPI: 52.2 percent; United Kingdom (National Centre for Social Research, Economic & Social Research Council), 01.09.16 - 20.03.17, CAPI: 42.8 percent.

European Social Survey Round 9 (2018–2019): Belgium (Kantar TNS Belgium, Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), 20.09.18—28.01.19, CAPI: 57.6 percent; Czech Republic (ppm factum research, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports), 17.11.18—06.02.19, CAPI: 67.4 percent; Denmark (VIVE, Statistics Denmark—DST Survey, Carlsberg Foundation), 13.09.18—08.01.19, CAPI: 48.8 percent; Estonia (Statistics Estonia, Ministry of Education and Research), 01.10.18—02.03.19, CAPI: 62.7 percent; Finland (Statistics Finland, Academy of Finland), 03.09.18—18.02.19, CAPI: 51.8 percent; France (IPSOS, Large National Research Infrastructure PROGEDO and National Centre for Scientific Research), 19.10.18—01.04.19, CAPI: 48.1 percent; Germany (Infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaft GmbH, Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung), 29.08.18—04.03.19, CAPI: 27.6 percent; Hungary (TÁRKI Social Research Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre for Social Sciences), 31.01.19—22.05.19, CAPI: 40.7 percent; Ireland (Behaviour & Attitudes, Irish Research Council), 05.11.18—05.04.19, CAPI: 62.0 percent; Netherlands (I& O Research, Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), 28.08.18—22.01.19, CAPI: 49.6 percent; Norway (Ipsos Norway, The Research Council of Norway), 04.10.18 - 16.05.19, CAPI: 43.3 percent; Poland (A consortium of two companies: Realizacja sp. z o.o. and Kantar Polska S.A., The Ministry of Science and Higher Education), 26.10.18—20.03.19, CAPI: 60.4 percent; Portugal (Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon Programa Operacional Regional de Lisboa, National Science Foundation), 26.11.18—25.12.19, CAPI: 34.9 percent; Slovenia (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Center, Slovenian Research Agency, Ministry of Education, Science and Sport), 24.09.18—01.02.19, CAPI: 64.1 percent; Spain (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas/Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación), 08.11.19—27.01.20, CAPI: 53.8 percent; Sweden (Ipsos Observer Sweden, Vetenskapsrådet), 30.08.18—23.05.19, CAPI: 39.0 percent; Switzerland (MIS Trend SA, Swiss National Science Foundation), 01.09.18—11.02.19, CAPI: 51.8 percent; United Kingdom (National Centre for Social Research, Economic & Social Research Council), 31.08.18 - 22.02.19, CAPI: 41.0 percent.

Figure A1.

Figure A1.

Average percent support for income redistribution in Europe by welfare regime, without two outlying countries (the Czech Republic and Denmark). EUROPEAN SOCIAL SURVEY (Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.) The vertical axis reports the percentage of respondents who agree strongly or agree with the statement. Regime-round means are unweighted averages based on redistribution support in the corresponding countries. The percentages in the legend represent the average support for income redistribution within the given welfare regime, that is, each of these means is calculated from the nine available observations (ESS rounds). The Czech Republic (i.e., post-communist regime) and Denmark (i.e., social-democratic regime) are not part of this figure. The average redistribution support in the corresponding welfare regime increased after excluding these two countries with extremely low redistribution support levels (cf. figure 1).

Figure A2.

Figure A2.

Market income and disposable income inequality by country, 2002–2018/19. Source: Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), Version 9.1 (available at: https://fsolt.org/swiid/). The difference between the two Gini coefficients (market income and disposable income) represents a measure of redistribution in these countries (i.e., how much market income inequality is reduced by taxes and transfers).

Figure A3.

Figure A3.

Public social spending (% of GDP) by five welfare regime types, 2002–2018/19. Source: OECD Social Spending, 2022 (available at: https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-spending.htm). This indicator is measured as a percentage of a country GDP. Regime averages (bottom-right figure) are unweighted means based on public social expenditures in corresponding countries. Social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. Benefits may be targeted at low-income households, the elderly, disabled, sick, unemployed, or young persons. To be considered “social,” programs have to involve either redistribution of resources across households or compulsory participation.

Table A1.

Survey sample sizes (by country and ESS round).

2002/03 2004/05 2006/07 2008/09 2010/11 2012/13 2014/15 2016/17 2018/19
Belgium 1899 1778 1798 1760 1704 1869 1769 1766 1767
Czech Republic 1360 3026 na 2018 2386 2009 2148 2269 2398
Germany 2919 2870 2916 2751 3031 2958 3045 2852 2358
Denmark 1506 1487 1505 1610 1576 1650 1502 na 1572
Estonia na 1989 1517 1661 1793 2380 2051 2019 1904
Spain 1729 1663 1876 2576 1885 1889 1925 1958 1668
Finland 2000 2022 1896 2195 1878 2197 2087 1925 1755
France 1503 1806 1986 2073 1728 1968 1917 2070 2010
United Kingdom 2052 1897 2394 2352 2422 2286 2264 1959 2204
Hungary 1685 1498 1518 1544 1561 2014 1698 1614 1661
Switzerland 2040 2141 1804 1819 1506 1493 1532 1525 1542
Ireland 2046 2286 1800 1764 2576 2628 2390 2757 2216
Netherlands 2364 1881 1889 1778 1829 1845 1919 1681 1673
Norway 2036 1760 1750 1549 1548 1624 1436 1545 1406
Poland 2110 1716 1721 1619 1751 1898 1615 1694 1500
Portugal 1511 2052 2222 2367 2150 2151 1265 1270 1055
Sweden 1999 1948 1927 1830 1497 1847 1791 1551 1539
Slovenia 1519 1442 1476 1286 1403 1257 1224 1307 1318

Note: na = ESS Round was not fielded in the country in the given year.

Table A2.

Question wording of used variables and notes.

Using this card, please say to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 (Refusal)
8 (Don’t know)

Note: The levels of support for redistribution reported in figures 1–7 represent respondents who selected answers “1 Agree strongly” and “2 Agree” on this item. The answer “8 (Don’t know)” is part of the analyses in these figures (i.e., this answer category is part of the base from which the reported proportions are computed). Refusals (answer code 7), which only amounted to 0.1 percent of the entire dataset, were excluded from the reported analyses.
Using this card, if you add up the income from all sources, which letter describes your household's total net income? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.
  • J 01

  • R 02

  • C 03

  • M 04

  • F 05

  • S 06

  • K 07

  • P 08

  • D 09

  • H 10

  • U 11

  • N 12

77 (Refused)
88 (Don’t know)
Note: This question wording with 12 income categories was used in ESS rounds 1 through 3 (corresponding variable name in the cumulative ESS data: hinctnt). The harmonized income variable for the first three ESS rounds was constructed based on this variable. This harmonized variable (presented in figures 3–7) was computed so that the sum of absolute deviations from the expected counts (20 percent, 60 percent and 20 percent) was minimized. See Table A3 for the relative proportions of the three resulting income categories.
Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you know best: weekly, monthly or annual income.
1 J
2 R
3 C
4 M
5 F
6 S
7 K
8 P
9 D
10 H
77 (Refusal)
88 (Don’t know)

Note: This question wording with 10 income categories was used in ESS rounds 4 through 9 (corresponding variable name in the cumulative ESS data: hinctnta). The harmonized income variable for the last six ESS rounds was constructed based on this variable. This harmonized variable (presented in figures 3−7) was computed so that the sum of absolute deviations from the expected counts (20 percent, 60 percent and 20 percent) was minimized. See Table A3 for the relative proportions of the three resulting income categories.
Using this card, please say how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts. 1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 (Refusal)
8 (Don’t know)
Note: The beliefs in meritocracy reported in figure 8 represent respondents who selected answers “1 Agree strongly” and “2 Agree” on this item. The answer “8 (Don’t know)” is part of the analysis in figure 8 (i.e., this answer category is part of the base from which the reported proportions are computed). Refusals (answer code 7), which only amounted to 0.1 percent of the dataset in ESS rounds 4 and 8, were excluded from the figure.
For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small.
1 Agree strongly
2 Agree
3 Neither agree nor disagree
4 Disagree
5 Disagree strongly
7 (Refusal)
8 (Don’t know)
Note: The beliefs in egalitarianism reported in figure 9 represent respondents who selected answers “1 Agree strongly” and “2 Agree” on this item. The answer “8 (Don’t know)” is also part of the analysis in figure 9 (i.e., this answer category is part of the base from which the reported proportions are computed). Refusals (answer code 7), which only amounted to 0.1 percent of the dataset in ESS rounds 4 and 8, were excluded from the figure.
Figure 4.

Figure 4.

Percent support for income redistribution by income group: social-democratic regime.

Figure 5.

Figure 5.

Percent support for income redistribution by income group: liberal regime.

Figure 6.

Figure 6.

Percent support for income redistribution by income group: Mediterranean regime.

Figure 7.

Figure 7.

Percent support for income redistribution by income group: post-communist regime.

Table A3.

Relative frequencies of the three household income categories (by country and ESS round).

Round 1: 2002/03
Round 2: 2004/05
Round 3: 2006/07
Round 4: 2008/09
Round 5: 2010/11
Round 6: 2012/13
Round 7: 2014/15
Round 8: 2016/17
Round 9: 2018/19
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
Income quintile
1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th 1st 2nd, 3rd, 4th 5th
Belgium 18 65 18 16 63 21 12 61 27 17 59 23 21 63 16 24 51 25 23 62 16 22 54 23 23 52 25
Germany 14 62 24 15 61 24 15 63 22 24 60 16 18 65 18 18 64 18 16 62 22 17 63 20 16 62 22
France ina ina ina 17 58 25 13 62 24 24 53 23 26 53 21 28 53 19 20 54 26 20 55 25 27 53 20
Switzerland 20 67 13 19 70 11 19 67 13 25 60 16 25 58 17 16 69 15 17 60 23 15 61 24 19 65 17
Netherlands 22 65 12 22 66 12 22 67 10 16 68 16 19 59 22 17 56 27 20 56 24 16 58 26 19 65 16
Denmark 20 66 15 20 64 16 17 65 18 19 59 21 19 56 25 20 62 19 21 59 20 na na na 22 62 16
Finland 18 60 22 17 57 25 14 77 9 24 54 22 18 66 16 24 57 19 17 67 17 17 67 16 23 54 23
Norway 23 52 26 20 51 30 18 67 14 17 57 25 22 57 21 21 56 24 22 62 17 20 56 23 17 59 24
Sweden 24 48 27 21 49 30 20 71 9 17 69 15 23 60 17 24 62 13 22 62 16 23 62 15 18 61 21
United Kingdom 17 64 19 17 64 18 24 52 25 21 56 23 25 56 19 22 56 23 23 56 22 21 56 23 20 59 21
Ireland ina ina ina 18 61 21 20 56 24 20 60 20 22 61 17 12 70 17 14 71 15 22 58 21 21 64 16
Spain 15 65 20 25 60 16 25 60 15 17 63 20 18 65 18 13 65 22 21 57 23 25 55 20 17 61 22
Portugal 29 56 15 28 54 19 24 58 18 27 59 15 ina ina ina 30 61 9 24 54 22 21 63 16 19 63 18
Czech Republic 15 72 13 12 71 17 na na na 21 66 13 20 64 16 23 53 23 22 54 25 21 60 19 23 58 19
Estonia na na na ina ina ina ina ina ina 22 55 23 23 55 22 25 48 27 ina ina ina 19 57 24 22 60 18
Hungary ina ina ina ina ina ina ina ina ina 28 50 21 21 60 19 18 57 25 19 63 18 14 63 23 20 63 17
Poland 32 55 12 30 58 13 25 61 14 22 51 26 21 55 24 20 57 23 20 64 16 18 58 24 16 61 24
Slovenia 24 56 19 18 66 15 13 67 20 16 69 15 26 56 18 23 61 16 23 58 18 18 61 21 17 60 23

Note: na = ESS Round was not fielded in the given year, ina = income variable not available in the given country-round.

Footnotes

1

Since we use a single questionnaire item to measure support for income redistribution, the aggregate redistribution support may be confounded (to a varying degree, depending on the country) with acquiescence response bias. A multi-item measure, not available in the analyzed ESS data, would be more suitable and account for this confounding effect.

2

All outputs presented in this article are based on weighted ESS data (weighted by post-stratified design weight, which controls for design effects and distributions concerning cross-classifications of age group, gender, education, and region).

3

The same effect applies to the Czech Republic within the post-communist regime. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows average support for income redistribution in Europe by welfare regime without the outlying Denmark and Czech Republic.

Contributor Information

Aleš Kudrnáč, Senior Research Assistant, Department of Sociology, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden.

Ivan Petrúšek, PhD Candidate, Department of Political Sociology, Institute of Sociology of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic.

Funding

Research was supported by the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare, project: The Evolution of Prejudice, DR. 2016-07177 to Mikael Hjerm; by the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic, project no. LTT20011, ESS-CZ LM2018139 to Klára Plecitá; and by the ECSR Visitor Grant to I.P.

Data Availability

Replication data and documentation are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S2EF8R.

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Associated Data

This section collects any data citations, data availability statements, or supplementary materials included in this article.

Data Availability Statement

Replication data and documentation are available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/S2EF8R.


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