Ecosystems, strategy, and resilience: Four empirical cases in the COVID-19 crisis

Abstract

The pandemic pushed companies to rethink competitive strategies and the innovation ecosystem structure. Then, we studied four small organizations from different industries through interviews, observations, and documentation. We offer five key findings: First, the crisis affected the cases in distinct ways, benefiting those in the healthcare sector. Second, innovation ecosystems provided opportunities for digitalization to keep businesses running. Third, resilience and initiative from the ecosystem leaders were crucial in responding to the crisis. Fourth, shifts in competition and cooperation favored survival. Lastly, the competitive strategy and ecosystem goals set before the pandemic have not changed, but how to achieve them.

1. Introduction

The entire world suffered from the effects caused by the pandemic crisis, and the efforts and actions adopted to slow the virus spread resulted in “[…] tremendous pressure on large parts of a nation’s economy.” (Kuckertz et al., 2020, p. 1). The global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020 reduced by 3.9% due to COVID-19 and the measures taken to contain its transmission. Nevertheless, the forecast for 2021 showed global GDP growth of 5.8%, representing signs of global economic recovery (Szmigiera, 2021). On the one hand, lockdown and quarantines could damage businesses in the short term (Turner and Akinremi, 2020). On the other hand, this unusual situation could favor a creative economy, disruptive innovation, and labor-saving technology (Ting et al., 2020).

In a globalized world, the effects of COVID-19 went beyond fatality (Fernandes, 2020). Due to the disruptive nature of the pandemic, all businesses have been affected since the entire globe has stopped (Ting et al., 2020, Turner and Akinremi, 2020). Consequently, several supply chains quickly broke down due to interruptions in materials flow (Choi et al., 2020, Govindarajan and Bagla, 2020). Furthermore, consumption patterns and customers' needs have changed, resulting in a widespread shortage (Fernandes, 2020, Turner and Akinremi, 2020). Thus, it was urgent to comprehend how organizations and networks responded to the COVID-19 effects, considering their ecosystems.

This situation required companies to reconsider their activities and strategies (Ting et al., 2020), including competitive strategy, the focus of this research. A strategy is a group of behaviors or policies mutually reinforcing and coherent that, when followed, provides a particular competitive objective (Pisano, 2015). The core of the strategy is that it allows companies to perform different activities from rivals or similar tasks in different ways, enabling them to achieve sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1996). We focused on the level of competitive strategy to understand the strategic positioning of enterprises to respond to the COVID-19 consequences.

Evidence suggests that firms could deal with critical situations under the ecosystem regime because they have competitive edges in crises. These companies could continuously adapt their offerings to meet the needs of a changing customer basis by powering up alliances, partnerships, and investments (Greeven and Yu, 2020). Furthermore, innovation was a critical factor for companies' survival during the crisis (Hossain et al., 2022, Wang et al., 2020) and would be crucial in the recovery process of the pandemic (Chesbrough, 2020). Hence, we considered organizations within an innovation ecosystem (IE), an interdependent network comprising several participants (e.g., customers, suppliers, and complementors) that compete and cooperate to co-create value for end-users (Gomes et al., 2018, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2020).

We addressed small businesses such as small and medium-sized organizations (SMEs) and startups because evidence suggests they are less prepared to deal with crises than large ventures (Rebmann et al., 2013, Kuckertz et al., 2020, Turner and Akinremi, 2020). One of the reasons is that SMEs and startups often deal with resource constraints (Ghezzi, 2020, Turner and Akinremi, 2020). Specifically, we studied four small organizations in Brazil, which has approximately 99% of its companies as small businesses. Furthermore, small Brazilian organizations have restricted access to capital, usually lack skilled labor, and deal with high taxes (OECD, 2022, Smits et al., 2018). Hence, considering the pandemic consequences mentioned earlier, this resource scarcity tended to worsen. According to the Brazilian Micro and Small Business Support Service - SEBRAE (2021), 37% of small companies in Brazil had their lending application denied during the pandemic.

Finally, prior studies have concentrated on crises from economic or weather disasters (Ratten, 2020). Hence, previous findings of health crises' effects on businesses are scarce (Turner and Akinremi, 2020). Even so, the growing number of unexpected disruptive events made companies willing to understand why some can overcome these problems while others fail to survive. Consequently, companies focus on building systems that overwhelm these uncertainties (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). This willingness and the COVID-19 pandemic show evidence of the well-known concept of resilience, a solution to preserve business and firm networks (Chroust and Finlayson, 2016, Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020).

Therefore, the entire situation obligated firms to rethink their competitive strategies and be innovative to address their short-term needs and the demands of their ecosystems. Furthermore, this caused changes across the ecosystems to which they belong. Consequently, the following research question has arisen: how have companies reshaped their competitive strategies and managed their IEs in the context of the pandemic?

To answer the research question, we carried out a multiple and holistic case study in four small ventures from different industries. Furthermore, for each case, we presented the competitive strategy adopted, the IE structure, and the pandemic impacts on the business. After that, we compared the findings of each case with each other and with the literature to find similarities and divergences.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Competitive strategy

Competitive strategy is concerned with how a company can create competitive advantages in each business it competes with (Porter, 1987). Therefore, it is necessary to establish the boundaries of each business unit (BU) in a manner that operationally links the competitive to the corporate strategy (Wheelwright, 1984). For a competitive strategy to be effective, it must "[…] fit the business unit's resources, recognize competitors' strategies, and fit the definition of product/market/customer segments to be pursued." (Wheelwright, 1984, p. 83).

Organizations can adopt three generic competitive strategies to compete: (i) overall cost leadership, in which the goal is to minimize costs and overhead control; (ii) differentiation, in which the objective is to provide uniqueness for the market; and (iii) focus, in which the purpose is to reduce costs or achieve differentiation within a narrow market. There is also a firm that does not adopt any generic strategy, known as the stuck-in-the-middle position (Porter, 1998).

Despite the enormous recognition of Porter's contributions, there are critiques regarding its overemphasis on the external environment (Barney, 1991, Kraaijenbrink et al., 2010). Therefore, propositions such as the resource-based view (RBV) and dynamic capabilities view (DCV) add a different perspective, focusing on the internal environment.

The RBV model focuses on firms' base of resources, affirming that these resources are heterogeneous and not easily transferable to other companies. These resources enable firms to achieve a sustained competitive advantage only if they are VRIN: (i) valuable (i.e., allowing firms to improve both efficiency and effectiveness); (ii) rare (i.e., not being owned by various companies); (iii) imperfectly imitable (i.e., difficult to be imitated by rivals); and (iv) non-substitutable (i.e., the nonexistence of other resources that are valuable, rare, difficult to copy and strategic equivalent to the given resource) (Barney, 1991).

The DCV assesses how companies create and maintain competitive advantages in environments with fast technological change (i.e., dynamic environments). The word "dynamic" shows the capacity of a firm to renew competencies and harmonize itself with the transforming business environment. The term "capabilities" means to address the needs of a changing business environment by strategically managing adaptation, reconfiguration, and integration of internal and external organizational skills, functional competencies, and resources (Teece et al., 1997). Then, DCV reflects the organizational and strategic routines to obtain new resource configurations as markets change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).

2.2. Innovation ecosystems

Similar to business ecosystems, IEs: (i) represent an interdependent and interconnected network comprising the focal firm, suppliers, buyers, and complementors; (ii) use platforms; (iii) may have a keystone or platform leader; (iv) have competition and cooperation; and (v) have a life cycle following a co-evolutionary process (Gomes et al., 2018).

This network has an extensive list of stakeholders. The leadership roles are responsible for defining the role of other participants, coordinating the interactions between them, fostering partnerships, and managing the platform (Dedehayir et al., 2018). These keystones "[.] aim to improve the overall health of their ecosystems by providing a stable and predictable set of common assets […] that other organizations use to build their own offerings." (Iansiti and Levien, 2004, p. 6).

Actors such as suppliers, complementors, customers, and assemblers (Dedehayir et al., 2018, Iansiti and Levien, 2004) comprise the direct value chain roles. Customers use the focal offer and propose ideas based on data provided by the keystone. Suppliers provide core inputs used by other IE members, while assemblers can process information provided by other IE participants or assemble materials or components. Complementors have complementary products or services that are somehow compatible with the IE value proposition. Furthermore, they can use the ecosystem value proposition for their purposes.

Ecosystem members such as universities and public research institutions can provide consultancies and advice, assist technology transfers, and generate knowledge from research (known as the expert role). Participants such as entrepreneurs can assist by creating links and alliances between actors and facilitate access to markets (known as the champion role). There are also entities or individuals responsible for providing resources and financial assistance to the ecosystem (known as the sponsor role) and creating feasible economic, regulatory, and political conditions (known as the regulator role) (Dedehayir et al., 2018). Furthermore, social pressure groups (Jacobides et al., 2018) exert stress on the ecosystem according to their favoring or conflicting interests to the value proposition.

A platform is an asset in tools, services, or technologies that offer solutions to actors within the ecosystem. It can be an intellectual (e.g., the Windows software) or physical asset (e.g., efficient manufacturing capabilities offered by a given company to partners for developing their products) (Iansiti and Levien, 2004).

In theory, IEs emphasize value creation (or innovation issues), while business ecosystems focus on value capture (or competitive and economic issues) (Gomes et al., 2018). Therefore, following the ecosystem life cycle with four co-evolutionary processes known as birth, expansion, leadership, and self-renewal (or death) (Moore, 1993), IEs represent birth and self-renewal phases. These stages have high levels of instability and uncertainties regarding ecosystem development (Ikenami, 2016). This affirmation makes sense considering that IEs in the birth and renewal stages may involve high levels of value creation and low levels of value capture (Sant'Ana et al., 2020).

2.3. Crisis and resilience

A crisis is an event that is not frequent but has high uncertainty and causes disturbance in society. Consequently, it demands an urgent countermeasure (Ratten, 2020). Crises could arise from internal and external sources (Kumar et al., 2010, Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). For example, these internal disorders are related to uncertainties emerging from the companies' interaction in the ecosystem, ruptures in material, financial, and information flow, and supplier bankruptcy. Furthermore, external disruptions are related to natural disasters, political risks, such as war and embargoes, policy risks, for instance regulatory and bureaucracy issues, and economic risks from a recession and high bank interest rates (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020).

Resilience represents a system's capability to overcome a disruptive phenomenon and keep running, but probably at different stability than before this disturbance (Asbjørnslett and Rausand, 1999, Chroust and Finlayson, 2016). This stability may represent an advance to a more suitable level to face future disasters (Dahlberg, 2015). There is an extensive list of capabilities that allow ecosystems to achieve resilience. Some of these capabilities are: (i) agility, (i.e., rapid response to the unexpected); (ii) adaptability (i.e., modifying operations to deal with disruptions); (iii) diversity (i.e., multiple talents and work methods that allow innovation to be a response to crisis); (iv) organizational capability (i.e., benchmarking, human resources, experience, culture, and skills); and (v) market position (i.e., product differentiation, market share, and customer relationships) (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020).

2.4. Connecting the dots

The pandemic resulted in an unprecedented crisis that challenges the survival of companies and ecosystems (Kuckertz et al., 2020, Verma and Gustafsson, 2020). Unlike other crises, this one resulted in a global economic shakeout never seen before, making some label it a black swan event (Verma and Gustafsson, 2020). Then, considering the pandemic's uniqueness, prior findings tend to be inconclusive when compared. Consequently, we still need to understand the pandemic effects and organizational responses to them (Hossain et al., 2022, Khlystova et al., 2022).

Scholars argued that companies have mainly adopted reactive responses due to short-term needs (Wade and Bjerkan, 2020). In small organizations, one of the reasons is the highly uncertain nature of the crisis, in which managers could only envision the next steps a couple of months ahead (Bhattacharyya and Thakre, 2021). In general, scholars observed that small companies have been creative by coming up with several digital solutions to keep businesses running (Bhattacharyya and Ankur, 2022, Hossain et al., 2022, Kuckertz et al., 2020). Then, these organizations have been attentive to the resources they may need to overcome the crisis (Bhattacharyya and Thakre, 2021). By doing so, they reshape their resource base according to environmental changes and avoid more damage from cash flow shortages and network disruptions (Bhattacharyya and Thakre, 2021, Hossain et al., 2022). However, the problem varies based on the context that these organizations belong, such as business nature, economic condition, and the geographic location of their region. Therefore, empirical investigations are more than welcome in the literature, especially from developing regions (Hossain et al., 2022).

3. Materials and methods

3.1. Research methodology

We adopted a holistic (i.e., a single unit of analysis in each case) and a multiple case study approach (Yin, 2018) to examine four cases. Case studies allow researchers to investigate an actual and not well-known phenomenon with details and within its natural environment of occurrence. Therefore, this approach provides valuable insights and is ideal to answer adequately "how" research questions (Yin, 2018).

Considering that the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are not fully comprehended, this research also relied on exploratory and qualitative approaches. The former is well-suited for observing a relatively new subject study, enabling researchers to deeply understand the phenomenon and verify the need for further studies (Babbie, 2014). The latter describes the investigated phenomenon through transcribing people's experiences via an interview with open-ended questions and observation (Yilmaz, 2013).

3.2. Selection of cases and brief presentation

We selected four small companies ( Table 1) to observe the pandemic consequences in ventures' competitive strategy and IEs. Between four and ten cases is the best choice for multiple case studies, especially for theory building. It is hard to generate a robust theory with less than four cases. Furthermore, it is arduous to deal with many data with more than ten cases (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Table 1.

Studied companies.

Firm´s generic name	Alpha	Beta	Gamma	Omega
Founded	2019	2017	2009	2018
Location (state, country)	São Paulo, Brazil	São Paulo, Brazil	São Paulo, Brazil	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Product/Service	Event management	Nanotechnology solutions	Consultancy and development of information systems	Online occupational health and safety care
Interviewees	Chief marketing officer (CMO) and co-founder Chief executive officer (CEO) and co-founder	Research and development (R&D) manager and co-founder Financial manager and co-founder	Co-founders	CEO and co-founder Chief information officer (CIO) and co-founder
Interviewees generic name	CMO → A1 CEO → A2	R&D manager → B1 Financial manager → B2	First co-founder → G1 Second co-founder → G2	CEO → O1 CIO → O2
Other data sources	Direct observation Company’s website	Direct observation Institutional presentation Online folder Company’s website	Institutional presentations Registration of deployment or installation of the system Company’s website	Direct observation Business plan Company’s website
Number of visits	One	One	-	One

It is relevant to mention that smaller organizations were more accessible to us. To identify smaller enterprises, we used the SEBRAE typology based on the number of employees.2 SEBRAE is an entity that helps entrepreneurs to create or improve their small businesses.

We had help from business incubators, science parks, and other ecosystem champions to establish an initial interaction with these companies. Moreover, we chose ventures from different sectors to carve out as many elements and features as possible from the investigated phenomenon. Therefore, there was no limitation regarding the enterprises' geographic location since we initially considered every small company a potential case study.

Alpha is a startup that provides individual contractors with the complete event management service. The organization is responsible for managing their social events (e.g., weddings), including finding the ideal service providers to carry out each project.

Beta is a startup that provides nanotechnology solutions to develop biocompatible and intelligent asset release systems using completely natural ingredients. The venture focuses on R&D to develop formulations (e.g., Vitamin D and Coenzyme Q₁₀) for pharmaceutical, cosmetic, food, and veterinary industries. The company also has a manufacturing plant to supply the cosmetic and food industries on a large scale.

Gamma is a micro-enterprise that offers consultancy in business management and process improvement for large and emerging companies (i.e., mid-sized and downwards firms). The company also provides generic and customized integrated information systems to these customers.

Omega is a startup offering online occupational healthcare for the marketplace. The enterprise developed an application/platform to connect patients and doctors at any time in a practical and fast way. The idea is to make the patient feel satisfied with the care provided and the doctor with the data confidentiality.

3.3. Data gathering

We developed the research protocol for guiding the investigation. We used different data sources such as semi-structured interviews, direct observations when possible, and available archival data to collect the necessary information. During the interviews, we addressed nine topics ranging from general questions about innovation to the pandemic impacts in the strategy and IEs ( Table 2).

Table 2.

Interview script overview.

General inquiries about innovation	Introductory questions to make respondents feel comfortable with the interview Questions that helped us understand what the value proposition was Examples of questions: Considering your current business, could you explain how innovation occurs in your company? Could you tell me about how the commitment to innovation is disseminated across the company?
General inquiries about strategy	Questions aiming to identify the competitive strategy adopted and its constituents Examples of questions: How would you describe the company's competitive strategy? What factors impact the adoption of this strategy?
Pandemic and strategy	Inquiries that allowed us to understand the pandemic effects in competitive strategy Identified the differences in that topic from the period before the pandemic Example of question: How has the pandemic affected the company's strategy?
Components of the innovation ecosystem	Questions that enabled us to understand the IEs' composition Questions that introduced the relationship between the IEs' participants Examples of questions: With what players does your company relate to putting innovation into practice? Could you tell me how the relationship(s) works? Do you identify the influence of regulators, the media, etc., in your business? If so, who are they? And how do they influence?
Maturity of the ecosystem	We identified the IEs' goals and stages in the ecosystem life cycle Examples of questions: What is the main goal? Introduce innovations in the market or seek returns and benefits from the developed ones?
Interaction within the innovation ecosystem	In-depth questions that enabled us to comprehend the relationship between the IEs' members Identified the interaction process within the studied IEs Example of question: In what manner do you co-work and share information with other players?
Competition, cooperation, coopetition, and the innovation ecosystem	More questions concerning the relationship between IEs' members Inquiries about the relationship with other networks Examples of questions: What are your perceptions about competition in the ecosystem? And about cooperation? What are your perceptions of competition against rival ecosystems? And about cooperation?
Pandemic and the innovation ecosystem	Questions that allowed us to understand the pandemic effects in IEs Identified the differences in that subject from the period before the crisis Examples of questions: How has the pandemic affected the ecosystem? How has the pandemic affected competition in the ecosystem? And cooperation? How has the pandemic affected competition against rival ecosystems? And cooperation?
Relationship between the strategy and the ecosystem	Questions concerning the IEs' influence on the studied enterprises and vice-versa Example of question: Could you elaborate on how the ecosystem impacts your company's strategy?
Concluding inquiries	Obtain any information not provided by the previous questions Identify which points or questions should be improved or addressed in future interviews Example of question: Would you like to add any information that you think is relevant?

Initially, we used the Alpha case as a pre-test for the interview script. Their results helped to improve the questions to enhance the respondents' understanding of the subsequent cases. However, it is worth noting that the purpose of each question remained the same. What changed was the framing of the questions to increase the flow of conversations. Furthermore, we excluded repetitive questions because they did not add new information.

In all cases, we interviewed the founders of each venture to gather information regarding the companies' strategy, IEs, and the pandemic effects at the firm and ecosystem levels. The respondents had the necessary knowledge to cover the topics approached. The interviews lasted from one to two hours. It is worth noting that we conducted online interviews for health and safety measures.

Concerning the direct observations, Gamma did not have a physical space (e.g., office) and carry any activity possible to observe during the data gathering. Therefore, direct observation, in that case, was impracticable. In the others, we followed the local health protocols.

3.4. Data analysis

We first transcribed the answers from the recorded interviews to compare them with the notes taken during the interviews, direct observations, and archival data for data analysis. The information of these sources allowed us to write a draft (Voss et al., 2002) and a descriptive write-up (Barratt et al., 2011, Eisenhardt, 1989) for each case. We sent these drafts in the first moment to one of the respondents to verify the consistency of the findings. Afterward, we wrote these write-ups, which enabled the iteration between cases and further, among findings and theory. These write-ups followed a pattern to facilitate these comparisons and the readers’ understanding.

The iteration between cases helped to explore similarities and divergences among them. For example, by doing so, we followed Eisenhardt’s (1989) recommendations and defined the categories for the pandemic effects ( Table 6) based on the research problem and data. Then, we created tables for the categories that emerged from our data and excerpts from the write-ups that support them. For example, consider the category “Corporate events cancelation”. We used excerpts such as “2020 began as a promising year in the event business [.] we thought about expanding (the business) to corporate events, we had that planned, but they all got canceled, not even delayed [.] Then, we needed to adapt ourselves.” (A1) to define it. Since we did not find any similar situation in the other cases, that category solely belongs to Alpha.

Table 6.

The pandemic consequences in each case.

Case	Alpha	Beta	Gamma	Omega
The pandemic effects	Corporate events cancelation Cease in IE’s core activities Business model review New solutions to the market Uninterrupted sales Marketing increase Modification in IE composition Changes in interaction within the IE Changes in the IE value proposition Competition within the IE	Reduction of orders and work rate Problems in receiving raw materials New business opportunities Changes in interaction within the IE	Physical distance from customers Marketing increase Increased adoption of cloud servers Changes in organizational routines Improvement in meetings Increased focus on emerging companies Modifications in IE composition Changes in interaction within the IE Competition and cooperation within the IE Competition with rival systems	Anticipated launch of the value proposition Market segmentation reinforcement Modifications in IE composition Changes in interaction within the IE Competition with rival systems
Evidence	"Our B2B customers, they stopped running events […]" (A1)	"There was a decrease in [.] requesting services and [.] products." (B1)	"The pandemic has driven us away from our customers. [.] it affected, uh, in terms of us keeping in touch with them […]" (G1)	"Dude, pandemic, uh, coronavirus, uh, everything has got faster. We had to speed up everything we were doing because of that." (O2)

We followed the same rationale for mapping the competitive strategy (Table 4) and IEs (Table 5). However, we used the data and existing literature to categorize the competitive strategy adopted and each IE participant's role. For example, consider the category "Focus on emerging companies’ market niche" (Table 4). We used excerpts such as "We realized within this market niche (large companies) it is very competitive with traditional brands. So, we […] decided that our system should cater for smaller companies." (G1) to define it. Furthermore, we compared those excerpts with existing literature on competitive strategy to define the strategy followed by the case. The excerpt presented here matches, for instance, the generic focus strategy because Gamma narrowed its market.

Table 4.

Organizations’ strategic behavior.

Case	Alpha	Beta	Gamma	Omega
Competitive strategy	Focus-differentiation	Focus-differentiation	Focus-differentiation-cost leadership	Focus-differentiation
Strategic pillars	Security Management support for service providers Networking	Nanotechnology Natural raw materials Critical window Solutions with lower dosages Flexibility Supplementary activities	The product’s simplicity Focus on generic systems Focus on emerging companies’ market niche	Demand-oriented business model Platform simplicity Geolocation system Online and continuous training Conflict mediation
Evidence	"[.] 99% are brides, girls, you know, brides who interact. So, [.] the main thing is marriage." (A1) "The company also offers support. management, which we see as a huge problem for event companies [.]" (A1)	"[.] a very close relationship with customers, right? In this case, B2B. [.] for now, it is our core, our focus." (B2) "[.] differentials like that, which we try to add in our products that nobody else does. For example, tests that few people, uh, few companies do to ensure absorption, ensure permeation of a given substance [.]" (B2)	"We realized within this market niche (large companies) it is very competitive with traditional brands. So, we […] decided that our system should cater for smaller companies.” (G1) "[.] Since 2009, 2008, we´ve been keeping an eye on Company A (generic name), Company B (generic name), and these systems were very large and complex. So, our proposal was to develop a system that never becomes complex." (G2) "[.] we are focusing on generic products, not on customized ones because this one is expensive." (G1)	"[.] there are many big players in the market, [.] people with money, investing in it. So, as we are a startup, we had to focus on a market niche […]" (O1) "The main differential of the platform/app is to look for the provider by geolocation […]" (Business plan)

Table 5.

Innovation ecosystems’ architecture.

Case	Alpha	Beta	Gamma	Omega
Keystone	Alpha	Beta Customers	Gamma	Omega
Customer	Contractors Service providers	Pharmaceutical organizations Veterinary companies Cosmetic companies Food enterprises	Large firms Emerging companies	Doctors Patients
Supplier	Service providers	Pharmaceutical companies Chemical ventures	Data centers Electronic document providers	Doctors Data centers Internet providers Streaming services Telephone services
Assembler	-	Specific laboratories	Consultancy companies and freelancer	Big Data managers Application (App) developers
Complementor	-	Nutritionists Doctors from clinical nutrition Gyms	Application programming interface (API) developers	Medical clinics Computer manufacturer
Expert	SEBRAE Financial consultancy Marketing consultancy Legal consultancy	Federal University of São Paulo (UNIFESP) University of São Paulo (USP) Companies running tests Legal consultancy	SEBRAE	Financial consultancy Legal consultancy Mentor
Champion	Business Network International (BNI) Sorocaba Trade Association SEBRAE	Business incubator Science park	SEBRAE	UFRJ Business incubator Science park
Sponsor	-	Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (FINEP) São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP) Investment funds Banks	-	-
Regulator	-	Brazilian Health Regulatory Agency (Anvisa)	Secretariat of Finance (SEFAZ) International Organization for Standardization (ISO)	National Agency of Supplementary Health (ANS) Federal and regional medicine and nutrition councils State or municipal regulatory body National Data Protection Authority (ANPD)
Social pressure group	-	The media Social media influencers	The media	The media Doctors against telehealth
Evidence	"We actually have two types of sup… of customers within Alpha. We have the final customer, the contractors, and we have the companies (service providers). They are all our customers." (A2)	"From pharmaceutical, food, and. cosmetic sectors, right? Then, Company A (generic name), Company B (generic name), and Company C (generic name) [.] They are the main ones." (B1)	"We´ve got our service providers, which are data centers and so on." (G1)	"[.] our supplier and our customer are doctors, who will offer medical appointments and tests, and the customers are patients who need this service." (O2)

To conclude, we later iterated all the findings with theory to discover supporting and contrasting points for the former. This iterative process helped write the discussion section and led to insights for future studies.

3.5. Research validity and reliability

Case studies need rigor to provide reliable results (Gibbert et al., 2008, Voss et al., 2002). Exploratory case studies must have: (i) construct validity, the correct measures for the studied concepts (Voss et al., 2002); (ii) external validity, representing the generalization of the findings to circumstances beyond the analyzed situation (Gibbert et al., 2008, Yin, 2018); and (iii) reliability, guaranteeing that other researchers may reproduce the same case study and obtain the same findings (Gibbert et al., 2008, Yin, 2018). Table 3 shows how we achieved reliability and validity in this research.

Table 3.

Case study validity and reliability.

Construct validity	Multiple sources of evidence Maintenance of gross data Drafts reviewed by key informants Research protocol reviewed by experienced researchers Consistent conceptual background Chain of evidence (i.e., showing how the findings derived from data)
External validity	Answering the research question Generalization Iteration between results and theory
Reliability	Establishing a research protocol Developing a case study database Maintaining the chain of evidence Recording and taking notes during interviews

4. Findings

4.1. Competitive strategy adopted

Table 4 illustrates the results related to the cases' competitive strategy. It shows each studied case's competitive strategy adopted, strategic pillars (i.e., how to achieve the established strategy), and some evidence from gross data to support the findings.

Alpha also attempted to provide a value proposition with lower prices. A2 highlighted that Alpha's services were cheaper than those provided by independent event consultants. Regarding strategic pillars, the interviewees affirmed that Alpha provided security through a safe payment method, guaranteed the execution of the contracted events, and carefully chose reliable and credible providers to join the IE. A1 asserted that financial, legal, and marketing consultants provided management support for service providers. These consultants also provided services for Alpha. The IE also had networking. These face-to-face meetings increased the relationship between providers, especially those involved in the same project.

Beta offered differentiated products, regardless of resulting in higher selling prices or costs. B2 emphasized that, usually, Beta's products were more expensive than its concurrency. Concerning strategic pillars, data revealed that nanotechnology was the basis for Beta to develop unique products and meet the different needs of diverse customers. B2 asserted that though more expensive, natural raw materials enabled Beta to develop healthier and higher-quality products than the concurrence. B1 highlighted that Beta continuously studied national and international market trends to find a critical window (i.e., market possibilities to exploit). Data also showed that solutions with lower dosages were more expensive, but they had a differential. B1 declared that Beta had enough flexibility to adjust itself to meet the customer's requirements. For example, the venture could produce input for the customer or even formulate the final product. Supplementary activities were those tests mentioned in Table 4.

Regarding Gamma’s strategic pillars, G2 highlighted the product's simplicity. G2 affirmed that Gamma's system was more general, smaller, and more uncomplicated than the competitors. Hence, they brought more dynamism and possibilities for end-users, resulting in a grand differential (e.g., adoption of cloud servers). As shown in Table 4, the firm preferred to focus on generic systems to reduce costs and price. As G2 stated, "[.] we, uh, really work with customers that do not have much to spend [.]".

G1 highlighted that Gamma initially served only manufacturing firms with more than 100 employees. However, as the evidence in Table 4 showed, Gamma faced high competition levels with traditional organizations within this market niche. Therefore, the firm modified the business scope to focus on emerging companies' market niche. G2 affirmed that competitors had difficulties in meeting the needs of this market niche. Thus, G1 highlighted that they deactivated Gamma's office to give employees enough autonomy and mobility to be wherever the customer was. The goal was to consolidate within that market niche. Data revealed that Gamma continued to serve the larger customers but stopped attracting new clients with that profile.

Data revealed that Omega also focused on providing a value proposition with lower prices. O2 revealed that the main idea was to force competition between doctors to reduce prices for patients. Concerning strategic pillars, data revealed that Omega established a demand-oriented business model. O1 revealed that the venture defined the value proposition and the focus on occupational medicine after attending to the need of a company at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro's (UFRJ) science park. Data showed that this organization was looking for a solution to bring doctors into their work environment at lower costs.

Data also showed that platform simplicity was a goal for Omega: "The main concern is the development of a user-friendly product for both patients and doctors [.]" (Business plan). The evidence in Table 4 showed the strategic relevance of the geolocation system. Online and continuous training were essential elements in Omega's business. O1 revealed that the former consisted of preparing medics to use the platform and how to serve the patient virtually. The latter represented financial incentives for doctors to acquire knowledge and competence regularly. Data showed that conflict mediation was a functionality provided by Omega to solve problems related to the doctor-patient complex relationship.

4.2. Innovation ecosystem composition

Table 5 illustrates the IE structure for each studied case. As in Table 4, there is some evidence from gross data that support the findings.

Both interviewees affirmed that Alpha's IE focused on creating value and ecosystem building. Data revealed that Alpha, as a keystone, was responsible for attracting new (e.g., customers), identifying potential (e.g., complementors) IE members, and nurturing the ecosystem's growth. "We would also like to have partnerships with [.] construction companies. We have an old project, an idea [.] but we are still small." (A2).

Both respondents highlighted the importance of SEBRAE for Alpha’s IE as an expert and champion. As an expert, this entity assisted the venture in structuring its business, process, and activities, besides identifying market opportunities. As a champion, SEBRAE provided networking with several entrepreneurs, promoted the IE value proposition, and helped to increase credibility in the market.

B1 and B2 stated that Beta's IE focused on creating and capturing value and ecosystem development. As B1 highlighted: "It still needs consolidation (the IE). There is much progress, but we need better structuring, better communication between actors through shared facilities." Data revealed that, as a keystone, Beta and customers defined the IE value proposition. Furthermore, Beta also attracted new ecosystem members (e.g., assemblers, suppliers, and sponsors). "So, we always look for suppliers with that focus, right? With a focus on differentiating [.]" (B2).

It is worth noting that the pharmaceutical companies in the group of suppliers were different from those in the customer's group. B2 highlighted that the first two IE complementors in Table 5 only recommended the IE product to their patients. B2 also affirmed that gyms suggested IE products to their customers to improve performance in physical exercises. Data revealed that the specific companies providing support by running tests mentioned in the previous section were the IE expert. Concerning the social pressure group, B2 highlighted that they benefited the IE by encouraging the population to adopt healthier habits.

G1 and G2 asserted that Gamma's IE was undergoing a renewal process, focused on creating and capturing value and structuring the ecosystem. Data showed that Gamma, as a keystone, had to align the IE members with adapting the value proposition to emerging companies' needs. Furthermore, the firm attracted (e.g., complementors) and identified potential (e.g., universities) ecosystem participants. "I have solutions suitable for large companies but not for our new market. [.] We are adapting those new technologies to become adherent (to emerging companies)." (G1).

SEBRAE appeared again as a vital entity within an IE by assuming expert and champion roles. Both interviewees affirmed that SEBRAE helped Gamma’s IE as an expert by offering courses in the most varied areas correlated to entrepreneurship. As a champion, it promoted networking with other entrepreneurs. Regarding the social pressure group, G1 asserted that the media influenced the behavior of specific market components by propagating a pessimistic scenario, which affected the IE growth.

O1 and O2 asserted that Omega's IE focused on value creation and ecosystem building. Data showed that Omega, as a keystone, defined the IE value proposition, the paths taken by the IE, and attracted new ecosystem participants (e.g., complementors). "I will give you an example of one of our proposals. We are going to distribute our app inside the Company A equipment (a computer manufacturer generic name), which Company A will sell to customers." (O1).

Within the assembler group, O1 highlighted that Big Data managers processed information for the IE for electronic health reports development. Regarding the app developers, O1 affirmed that they assembled and improved Omega's IE platform operational part. As a social pressure group, the media and doctors against telehealth practices influenced the population's perception of telehealth. According to O1, the former reinforced the positive side of such practice during the COVID-19 outbreak context. However, they emphasized the negative points before that period. The latter also had unfavorable arguments concerning that practice.

4.3. The pandemic consequences

Table 6 presents the COVID-19 crisis effects on each studied case. As in the previous tables, there is some evidence from gross data that supports the results.

A1 highlighted that corporate events cancelation in Alpha's IE occurred when Alpha tried to expand the business to corporate events. These potential customers canceled their contracts due to the pandemic. The evidence in Table 6 showed that the cease in IE's core activities occurred because the service providers stopped theirs. Consequently, according to both interviewees, Alpha had not had revenues from monthly fees paid by each of these providers since May 2020 (service providers needed to pay monthly fees to be part of the IE). Furthermore, A1 stated that the lack of financial resources caused several contracted services to be canceled or temporarily interrupted. "We had a marketing company as a partner, and. we had to stop some activities to, uh, to review everything [.]" (A1).

Therefore, Alpha had time to review the business model. As mentioned in the previous section, SEBRAE was a crucial IE participant in this process. Both interviewees highlighted that SEBRAE helped define new sales strategies such as the complete party project. Before that period, A1 affirmed that Alpha did not take the lead to manage the events. Alpha's responsibility was to connect contractors and service providers, which resulted in several problems (e.g., revenue with cashback got compromised due to the lack of issuing from providers, who did not perceive value in such practice).

The respondents stated that the crisis allowed Alpha to present new solutions to the market, such as the elopement wedding. In this event, the guests would watch the ceremony through online transmission. Besides avoiding the business being at a standstill, it was a viable solution to avoid crowds. According to A1, uninterrupted sales maintained the cash flow. Social events sales (mainly weddings) continued during the cease of IE's core activities, in which the contracted events were for subsequent years. The interviewees affirmed that Alpha took advantage of this period to increase the marketing and publicize the value proposition digitally. Alpha heavily used social media (e.g., Instagram and Facebook) for that. "[.] we made two wedding sweepstakes, which the ceremony had only the couples [.]" (A1).

As in all cases, Alpha's IE had modifications in IE composition. According to A2, Alpha initially halved the fees charged to service providers as a measure to keep them in the IE. However, some providers could not pay this reduced fee, and consequently, they would leave the IE. Thus, Alpha suspended the monthly fee and allowed new service providers to join the IE at no cost. Data revealed that changes in interaction within the IE occurred because all face-to-face events had to go online. It is worth noting that the IE already used intellectual platforms such as WhatsApp, Facebook, and Instagram even before the pandemic. A1 affirmed that these online meetings did not have the same effect that face-to-face ones would have. While replacing face-to-face events with remote ones was detrimental to the IE, the possibility of holding virtual meetings with contractors was a positive point. For example, questions could be answered much more quickly. "So, we are talking to someone on WhatsApp and then 'Oh, I have a question', 'Let us have an online meeting to sort some things out´ [.]" (A1).

Changes in the IE value proposition represented the complete party project proposal and cashback principles. Data showed that the pandemic indirectly stopped Alpha’s IE from offering cashback through the complete party project. According to the respondents, Alpha centralized the event management with the new business model and then decided to stop offering cashback until finding the best way to include it again in the IE value proposition. Competition within the IE had decreased. A2 observed fierce competition between service providers from the same segment before the pandemic, which hindered the IE development process. The IE would have lost several providers if it did not decrease.

Data showed that Beta had a reduction of orders and work rate. B1 affirmed that the request for new formulations decreased within Beta's IE, which had affected the routines in the factory and R&D area. According to A1, as there was an immense dependency on the plant and laboratory, the daily activities became very limited. Therefore, Beta reduced working hours and partially changed to work from home (WFH). Data showed that the IE faced problems in receiving raw materials. B1 affirmed that the pandemic caused delays and even failure to receive some raw materials. Such problems hindered the IE activities flow. "Raw materials supply is an extremely important issue [.] So, sometimes it is delayed (the deliver) [.] So, with the pandemic, this was quite complicated." (B1).

Beta's IE had new business opportunities. B2 affirmed that the population's concern about well-being and health increased. Hence, new projects emerged, and Beta could join them due to its high flexibility and adaptability. As in the other cases, Beta's IE had changes in interaction within the IE. Data showed that intellectual platforms such as Google Meet and Microsoft Teams emerged due to the pandemic and surpassed face-to-face solutions. The respondents highlighted that the adherence to these online tools improved meetings and communication processes, although the need to observe a given product still required face-to-face encounters. According to the interviewees, face-to-face interactions prevailed through business incubator facilities, seminars, and product fairs before the pandemic.

According to G2, the pandemic increased the adoption of cloud servers from customers. Perhaps such a spike resulted in the consolidation of this functionality within the IE. Gamma also changed organizational routines. G2 affirmed that by adhering to remote technologies, source codes became stored in the cloud. Before the pandemic, Gamma stored them in physical components. Remote technologies also improved the internal and across IE meetings. All meetings became more valuable, frequent, and optimized. As stated G1: " [.] before the pandemic, we had face-to-face meetings there (inside a specific customer facility) [.] once a month. With the pandemic, today we have a weekly meeting by remote tech".

The pandemic made Gamma's IE increase the focus on emerging companies. G1 perceived that emerging companies sustained themselves better than large ones because large firms had a higher burden. Similar to Alpha's IE, Gamma had modifications in IE composition. G1 affirmed that two large clients could not keep their operations running and closed the doors. However, G1 continued stating that the IE attached seven new emerging customers, and a new data center offered services at a lower price and then joined the IE. Besides, two API developers entered the IE because they offered better solutions to integrate Gamma and emerging companies' needs. There were no major losses because Gamma took the initiative to renegotiate prices with the IE members. Furthermore, G2 also advised Gamma's IE participants to save financial resources before the first effect of the COVID-19 crisis in Brazil. "[.] in the same way that we renegotiated prices with suppliers, [.] we started to renegotiate with our customers." (G2).

Gamma faced changes in interaction within the IE. G1 stated that the modifications were more drastic to the customers since they were used to the presence of Gamma in their facilities. Therefore, although they were familiar with intellectual platforms such as WhatsApp and Google Meet, it was a novelty for them to use such solutions in these circumstances. Regarding the other IE members, G1 affirmed that the crisis just intensified the use of the mentioned platforms.

Competition and cooperation within the IE had changed. Data revealed that the competition had decreased while cooperation had increased. The respondents asserted that the competitive relationship occurred between data centers, while cooperation involved all IE members. G1 observed that customers were more likely to accept help due to high levels of uncertainty, especially smaller organizations. G1 also revealed that competition with rival systems decreased due to the concern of going bankrupt. This relationship involved rival systems providing similar and cheaper offers.

Data showed that Omega's IE anticipated the value proposition launch because large organizations started to present their products and services to the market. According to O1, telehealth was illegal in Brazil until a month before the pandemic. Nevertheless, regulators approved such a practice on an emergency basis for the market surprise. Data also revealed that the pandemic was also a factor that indirectly reinforced the market segmentation. Allied to the market opportunity initially found, O1 asserted that the venture perceived that traditional organizations continuously failed to embrace this market niche, which gave Omega a tremendous advantage.

Omega also had modifications in the IE composition. The respondents affirmed that the IE had received several doctors since the pandemic beginning and approval of telehealth. Moreover, Omega also had attached to the IE medical clinics and the computer manufacturer mentioned in Table 5.

Omega also had modifications in IE composition. The respondents affirmed that the IE had received several doctors since the pandemic beginning and approval of telehealth. Moreover, Omega had attached to the IE medical clinics and the computer manufacturer mentioned in Table 5. As the other IEs, Omega had changes in interaction within the IE. Omega's IE adopted online platforms such as Zoom and Skype. O1 observed that these platforms brought flexibility in meetings but made UFRJ and the business incubator distance themselves from the IE. The interviewees highlighted that before the pandemic, the interaction, information exchange, and platform development occurred essentially within the business incubator dependencies and through the IE platform (value proposition), mainly between doctors, Omega, and patients.

Competition with rival systems had increased in Omega's IE. According to O2, telehealth practice approval and the pandemic rose concurrence from six to 20 or more. Such a relationship occurred with systems offering similar platforms. "[.] when we started our development, we had six competitors. Today, we must have more than 20 competitors, right? [.] these competitors sought innovation, you know, due to the pandemic." (O2).

5. Discussion

5.1. COVID-19 consequences

The results reveal that the enterprise and IE approached in Alpha's case seems to be the most damaged by the pandemic in comparison to the others. Alpha and its IE was the only case that had entirely ceased their activities for a while. Such consequences align with Dillette and Ponting (2020) and Seraphin (2021) regarding the pandemic impacts in the event industry.

Nevertheless, the findings show that Alpha and the IE also capitalized and innovated from that situation by optimizing the cash flow, reviewing and modifying the business model, creating value by innovating in safety protocol through new value proposition (i.e., elopement wedding), and publicizing through digital solutions. These results align with Bhattacharyya and Ankur (2022), Bhattacharyya and Thakre (2021), Dillette and Ponting (2020), Khlystova et al. (2022), and Kuckertz et al. (2020) regarding companies' strategic and innovative measures to overcome the COVID-19 disruption.

The results reveal that although Beta has faced negative consequences, the pandemic boosted its business. On the one hand, Beta and the IE had a decrease in orders requisition and raw materials receive. The literature has several papers (Choi et al., 2020, Govindarajan and Bagla, 2020, Turner and Akinremi, 2020) addressing the collapse of materials flow during the pandemic. On the other hand, several opportunities naturally emerged due to the crisis, which had resulted in new projects. The literature (Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020) supports these results by affirming that organizations that develop medication performed well in the pandemic.

The results reveal that the pandemic also damaged Gamma and its IE in several ways. However, they remained operational. The literature contradicts these findings and shows that consultancies' organizations stopped their activities due to the pandemic (Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020). Therefore, Gamma appears to be an exception to this pattern.

Gamma also capitalized and innovated by publicizing the offer digitally, enhancing the digitization process, and developing new competencies. Research regarding resource redeployment (Kaur, 2020), the building of new competencies (Bhattacharyya and Thakre, 2021), and the adoption of digital solutions (Bhattacharyya and Ankur, 2022, Khlystova et al., 2022, Kuckertz et al., 2020) to overcome the pandemic crisis support these findings.

Similar to Beta's case, Omega's findings reveal that the pandemic crisis boosted its business. Although anticipating the IE value proposition launch to the market, the venture could establish an IE in a narrow market that traditional companies struggled and failed to serve. In addition, organizations from the healthcare area, including telehealth, also performed well in the COVID-19 pandemic (Donthu and Gustafsson, 2020, Moore and Hawarden, 2020).

The findings show that only Beta's IE did not have changes in IE composition. Alpha and Gamma had to adopt measures to avoid losing participants and the dissolution of their respective IEs. In Omega's case, considering that the leader built the entire IE for the market opportunity provided by digital healthcare, the IE just needed to add new customers and suppliers due to the boom in demand. Therefore, the cases show that the IE boosted by the pandemic did not experience negative impacts on their compositions.

The results (especially in Alpha and Gamma's cases) show the responsibility of keystones for keeping the networks running and overwhelm disruptions, which align with Iansiti and Levien (2004). Furthermore, ecosystems represent multiple actors progressing together (Gomes et al., 2018, Granstrand and Holgersson, 2020, Jacobides et al., 2018). The success of leaders heavily depends on the success of the other participants (Adner, 2006).

The findings reveal that all approached IEs had modifications in the interaction process. Beta and Omega's cases show that their IEs implemented intellectual platforms due to the health crisis. In Alpha and Gamma's cases, the pandemic just intensified their use. Moreover, face-to-face meetings have stopped for a period in all cases. Nevertheless, the results show that this mandatory migration to a digital environment represented a paradigm shift, resulting in a mix of positive and negative points.

On the one hand, all cases show that the companies and IEs have not maintained the same effectiveness level when increasing or adopting digital platforms. The activities still needed face-to-face interactions to deliver their value proposition. On the other hand, this migration allowed the studied ventures and IEs to keep running. In general, the pandemic forced companies of all sizes to increase or adopt digital solutions (Apedo-Amah et al., 2020). Furthermore, small ventures tend to adopt digital solutions to maximize their results with fewer resources (Bhattacharyya and Ankur, 2022, Greeven and Yu, 2020, Rashid and Ratten, 2021).

The findings show that the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the competitive-cooperative relationships within IEs and against rival networks differently, except in Beta's case. The decrease in competition within Alpha and Gamma's IEs should indicate a positive point that did not prejudice the efforts to maintain these networks running. The increase in cooperation and decrease in competition against other networks also favored this point in Gamma's IE. Furthermore, these situations could also support Gamma's revamp process. The increase in competition in Omega's case forced the IE to deliver high-quality value to customers. However, consolidation within the marketplace became challenging.

Despite examples showing the development of coopetition due to COVID-19 (e.g., competing pharmaceutical companies co-creating a vaccine) (Crick and Crick, 2020), this relationship has not developed within the cases discussed. Increased cooperative efforts within IEs and with rival systems in Alpha and Omega's cases could benefit the respective IEs and their whole marketplace. Alpha's business requires such a relationship to warm up the event market, while Omega needs this relationship to develop this new telehealth market.

5.2. Resilience

The findings also reveal that the studied enterprises and IEs were resilient. The studied cases shared the following capabilities: agility, adaptability, cohesiveness, financial strength, market position, and organizational capability (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). Each case had the necessary agility to respond to this health crisis and showed adaptability by rearranging routines. Furthermore, they were cohesive to maintain the ventures and IEs operating, had sufficient monetary power to surpass cash flow fluctuations, and had market awareness by finding a place in the market for their value proposals. Finally, they had the necessary resource base, skills, and competencies to achieve resilience.

Beta's case also reveals a specific resilience capability: resistance (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). The IE maintained the same structure as before the pandemic disruption. The other IEs had to evolve and innovate (especially Alpha and Gamma) to adapt to the pandemic circumstances. Hence, they had evolvability capability (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020). Gamma's findings also show the observability capability (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020) by alerting IE participants regarding the cash flow fluctuations posed by the crisis. Additionally, Alpha's (through the elopement wedding) and Gamma's (by attending to customers online) results show enough flexibility (Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020) to deliver value to IE customers.

These findings align with several papers (Brunet et al., 2020, Castro and Zermeño, 2020, Hossain et al., 2022, Kuckertz et al., 2020, Ramezani and Camarinha-Matos, 2020) that highlighted the importance of resilience to keep going forward and overcome the obstacles imposed by disruptions. Each case's results showed evidence of how important the resource base and its adjustment were to respond to the threats imposed by the COVID-19 crisis. These results align with RBV assumptions (Barney, 1991) and premises about adaptation to a changing ecosystem environment (Teece, 2007).

The results also reveal the importance of the entrepreneur figure (part of the companies’ resource base) to overcome the COVID-19 crisis. The entrepreneurs had unique abilities, backgrounds, and perceptions (e.g., financial advice concerning the cash flow fluctuation in Gamma's case) that enabled them to observe the market, prepare, and react to surpass the pandemic. Such findings meet the literature concerning entrepreneur resilience (Castro and Zermeño, 2020), their importance for the sensing-seizing-reconfiguring DCV cycle (Bhattacharyya and Thakre, 2021, Teece, 2012, Teece, 2007), and RBV (Bhattacharyya and Ankur, 2022, Barney, 1991).

6. Conclusion

6.1. Concluding remarks

The COVID-19 crisis unquestionably brought consequences for different businesses. Organizations and ecosystems have felt the pandemic effects at distinct levels, which led to different responses against the crisis. Hence, a question that emerged and motivated this research was: how have companies reshaped their competitive strategies and managed their IEs in the context of the pandemic? The organizations rebuilt their strategies by mobilizing resources and readjusting competencies to remain competitive. However, to succeed, they managed to find opportunities within their IEs brought by the crisis and organize them to keep moving forward.

It is necessary to emphasize that the ventures and their respective IEs did not change the goals set before the pandemic. Concerning the competitive strategy, the enterprises kept pursuing a focus strategy, but in different manners. They modified the means (i.e., activities and processes) to achieve this competitive strategy to continue providing differentiation (in all cases), low prices (in Alpha's and Omega's cases), and reducing costs (in Gamma's case).

Regarding IEs, the ventures kept fostering the ecosystem establishment and balancing value co-creation (in all cases) and capture (in Beta's and Gamma's cases). Nevertheless, the means to achieve these objectives had changed at different levels. Beta's and Omega's cases reveal that they had mild modifications. The circumstances evolved in a way that the pandemic ended up boosting their business. On the contrary, Alpha's and Gamma's findings show that they demanded radical changes, especially the former. The reason is that their outputs demand face-to-face interactions, especially in Alpha’s case. Consequently, the pandemic was detrimental to their business. Thus, the business context is a critical element that enhances the crisis's negative and positive impacts.

Besides being organizations and IEs from different industries and with different maturity levels, those most damaged by the pandemic (i.e., Alpha and Gamma) needed to develop innovative solutions to respond to the pandemic effects. Such alternatives (e.g., elopement wedding in Alpha's case and online consultancies and systems maintenance in Gamma's) enabled them to keep running. Hence, these cases suggest that innovation is crucial to react against the crisis. Concerning those not so negatively affected by the pandemic (i.e., Beta and Omega), they could concentrate on opportunities to exploit and innovate brought by the disruption. Therefore, these cases suggest that innovation opportunities naturally emerge in IEs less affected by the pandemic. Those IEs had time to analyze those opportunities carefully because the COVID-19 crisis was not a severe threat to them.

Due to the restrictions imposed to contain the virus spread, all enterprises had to go online to do business. The results appointed problems related to intellectual platform adoption, but they allowed the studied organizations and IEs to keep moving forward. Therefore, the cases suggest that digital solutions are necessary to surpass the COVID-19 pandemic, despite adverse impacts.

Those IEs most affected by the COVID-19 disruption required efforts and solutions from the leadership to avoid more severe consequences (e.g., the ecosystem disappearance). Thus, ecosystem leadership guidance seems to be another essential factor for damaged IEs responding to the pandemic.

The results and discussion concerning the competitive and cooperative relationships show that the decrease in competition (in Alpha's and Gamma's cases), the increase in competition (in Omega's case), and the increase in cooperation (in Gamma's case) helped to surpass the crisis. Nevertheless, the competitive and cooperative relationships remained the same in Beta's case. Thus, the cases show that the shift in these relations can be necessary against the COVID-19 pandemic. The business context seems to play an essential role when observing relationships within the pandemic crisis.

Irrespective of the pandemic having severe impacts on the approached ventures and IEs or not, they were all resilient. Their resource base and competencies enabled them to develop the reported resilience capabilities. Then, they were able to adopt different crisis responses. Hence, the cases suggest that the resource base, competencies, and resilience are crucial factors in developing responses against the COVID-19 disruption.

It is worth noting that the enterprises' diversity evidenced heterogeneous outcomes and conclusions considering the four IEs. Therefore, the particularities of each case make this research relevant and contribute to facing disruptions such as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

6.2. Managerial implications, research limitations, and directions for future studies

As managerial implications, we revealed how enterprises rebuilt their strategies and managed their IEs through a detailed description of the pandemic effects at the firm and ecosystem levels. Organizations need to look internally without ignoring the external environment if they wish to surpass the health crisis. Managers should reflect on the possessed resources and what is possible to do with them after analyzing the opportunities found in the marketplace. It is also crucial to dialog and cooperates with other IE players to ensure business continuity. Concerning theoretical implications, we added to the theory building concerning IEs, competitive strategy, and crisis by investigating a new phenomenon in which the consequences are not well-known.

Our work has limitations that future studies should bypass. First, we only considered small companies in an emerging economy, in which the reality could be different from developed regions and larger organizations in both emerging and developed places. Therefore, although the study highlighted specific strategic and innovative features, the findings' generalization could be restricted to small businesses in emerging economies. Second, the studied IEs considered only the keystone's perceptions. Hence, addressing other participants should show elements not revealed by this research.

Concerning the suggestions for future investigations, further studies are necessary to understand the building blocks related to resilience and competitive strategy for companies and ecosystems to surpass the COVID-19 crisis and prepare for future disruptions. Studies should also focus on mitigating the side effects of the forced migration to the online environment. Future investigations should observe the government's role in supporting businesses and ecosystems to overcome the crisis, a topic not addressed by this research. Moreover, recognizing the need to understand the relationship between stakeholders within innovative networks (including government's support), addressing technology transfer processes in the COVID-19 context should present essential contributions. Further research is also necessary to understand why companies such as Gamma are an exception to the pattern found by prior research (i.e., previous papers found that consultancy companies had to cease their activities).

Directly related to the study limitations previously mentioned, further studies should focus on medium and large-sized organizations in emerging and developed regions. Moreover, studies in small businesses should consider a developed economy. Both proposals shall extend this research by providing results comparable with our findings. Furthermore, future studies should look forward and indicate how companies and IEs prepared themselves for the recovery process from the crisis.

Declarations of Competing interest

None.