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. 2023 Mar 4;66:101894. doi: 10.1016/j.najef.2023.101894

A description of the COVID-19 outbreak role in financial risk forecasting

Fernanda Maria Müller 1,, Samuel Solgon Santos 1, Marcelo Brutti Righi 1
PMCID: PMC9985442

Abstract

This study aims to describe the risk of the system composed on the market indexes of the countries that were more affected by COVID-19. Our sample encompasses the thirty-five countries with more cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. As a second contribution, we describe the risk of each market index individually. As a general pattern, we note that losses and individual and systemic risks peaked in March 2020. We verify that countries that were epicenters of the COVID-19 pandemic experienced critical levels of risk, which is partially explained by more stringent confinement measures since these are the ones whose labor markets will suffer more in the medium and long run. We perceived a market recovery, arguably due to the low-interest rates and expansive actions taken by central banks. Nonetheless, we also observed that the systemic risk returned to pre-pandemic levels at the end of 2020.

Keywords: Single-index risk, Systemic risk, COVID-19

1. Introduction

With the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, economies worldwide have entered an unprecedented, sour chapter. According to the data collected by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2021), three European economies stand out among the worst gross domestic product (GDP) results in 2020: France (−8.2%), United Kingdom (−9.9%), and Spain (−11%). The decline of the United States GDP, −3.5%, is the worst since the Second World War (Crutsinger, 2021). Although more encouraging, the positive result of China (GDP of 2.3%) is the lowest since 1976 (Trading Economics, 2021). At the aggregated level, the global economy shrank by 3.3% in 2020 (International Monetary Fund, 2021). The pandemic period was also accompanied by a sharp increase in wage inequality and unemployment rate and loss of full-time jobs (Aspachs et al., 2021, International Monetary Fund, 2020, Mazur et al., 2021). Moreover, extreme poverty increased for the first time since 1988 (World Bank, 2020). The shortage of demand, the disruption of production chains, and social distancing measures are often pointed to as the mechanism through which COVID-19 affected the real economy (Baker et al., 2020, Carlsson-Szlezak et al., 2020a, Carlsson-Szlezak et al., 2020b). Baldwin and Di Mauro (2020) also comment that panic among consumers and businesses has distorted usual consumption patterns and created market anomalies, contributing to negative effects on economies.

Global financial markets were also severely hit. In March 2020, the slump in stock exchanges was deep and synchronous across several countries, with circuit breaks and bans on short sales being widespread triggered (Kodres, 2020, Nunn and Kulam, 2021). The United States, for instance, hit the circuit break level four times in ten days, the first occurring on March 9, 2020 (Zhang, Hu, & Ji, 2020). The day before it, the escalating Saudi-Russian oil price war facilitated a quarterly drop of 65% on the oil price (Jacobs, 2020). This shock resonated on a stressed market, leading the S&P 500 to drop by 7.6% on March 9, 2020, which triggered the circuit breaker (Jason, 2020). Before this date, the circuit breaker had only ever been triggered once. This fateful day, dubbed Black Monday, was followed by daily price rebounds in various international markets, reflecting their skyrocketing volatility (Abuzayed, Bouri, Al-Fayoumi, & Jalkh, 2021). The VIX index recorded its all-time high on March 16, 2020 (Wagner, 2020), and the volatility of the S&P 500 in March 2020 was the third-highest since 1900 (Baker et al., 2020). The stock market collapse due to the pandemic is already similar to that faced during the Subprime crisis (Rout, Das, & Inamdar, 2020). It is undoubtedly the biggest due to infectious diseases (Baker et al., 2020, Velde, 2020). Studies of the impact of previous epidemics on the economic and financial sectors are, for instance, Chen et al., 2007, Chen et al., 2018, Del Giudice and Paltrinieri, 2017, Ichev and Marinč, 2018, Lee et al., 2004.

When economic downturns and financial distresses are combined, the usual result is that both the real (economic) sector as well as the financial sector take longer to recover (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). In the long-run, adverse economic consequences of COVID-19 will be felt, for instance, in the form of losses of human capital accumulation. For instance, Fuchs-Schündeln, Krueger, Ludwig, and Popova (2020) used a structural life-cycle model to assess the long-term consequences of school closures due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They found that younger children could be more affected by school closures because of the self-productive component of human capital accumulation. Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2020) found a direct association between the early adoption of confinement measures and citizens’ pessimism about economic performance in the short and long-run. Through a survey with more than 10,000 respondents, they found that, to the households’ eyes, a V-shape recovery is unlikely. The heterogeneous aspect of the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic was recognized, for instance, in Fana, Pérez, and Fernández-Macías (2020), that argued that countries and economic sectors that underwent more stringent confinement measures would possibly be the ones whose labor markets will suffer more in the medium and long run. In this regard, see also Breugem, Corvino, Marfè, and Schoenleber (2020). On the macro-financial side, the accentuated increase of the sovereign debt risk in countries with small fiscal space is a recurrent concern. For instance, Andrieś, Ongena, and Sprincean (2021) found that economies with small fiscal space have a limited capacity to issue new debt and, therefore, a small capacity to adopt fiscal and monetary responses to the economic downturn. Therefore, small fiscal capacity makes economies more vulnerable (Augustin, Sokolovski, Subrahmanyam, & Tomio, 2022). A theoretical discussion focused on the incentives of emerging economies in repaying their debts is carried out in Rogoff (2022). On the financial side, the long-term impact of the COVID-19 crisis was reflected by a sharp increase in the premiums required by long-term investors. By analyzing the yield of European corporate bonds of several maturities (financial and non-financial sectors), Ettmeier, Kim, and Kriwoluzky (2020) observed that the premium for long-term bonds increased much more than that of short-term bonds.

Given this background, the objective of this study is twofold. Our first goal is to assess the single-index risk1 of thirty-five of the countries most exposed to COVID-19: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czechia, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom (UK), and United States of America (USA). We selected these countries because they had the highest total number of confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. We use both variables to select countries because (Al-Awadhi, Alsaifi, Al-Awadhi, & Alhammadi, 2020) found that they exert a significant adverse effect on stock market returns. We quantify the single-index risk using the following single component risk measures2 : Value at Risk (VaR), Expected Shortfall (ES), Expected Loss (EL), Expectile Value at Risk (EVaR), Mean plus Semi-Deviation (MSD), and Maximum Loss (ML). We use each country’s daily stock market index data from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021.

As a second and main task, we analyze the risk of the system composed of the thirty-five countries investigated in this work. The theoretical foundation of the systemic risk measures we use was developed in Chen, Iyengar, and Moallemi (2013) and extended by Kromer, Overbeck, and Zilch (2016). A systemic risk measure is determined by two fundamental elements: an aggregation function and a single component risk measure. The aggregation function uses data from the individual indexes to create a new series representing the whole system. Then, we quantify the systemic risk by applying the single component risk measures to the aggregate indexes.

We consider three aggregation functions; each one is a weighted mean of the returns of the individual indexes and provides a different picture of the system. We use a naive aggregation function that gives equal weights to each index as a benchmark. This aggregation function, applied to returns, is equivalent to the sum aggregation function of the profits and losses suggested by Chen et al. (2013). We also use two aggregation functions that weigh the individual indexes according to the number of cases and deaths from coronavirus (COVID-19) in each country. We use both indexes because previous studies show that the market has reacted negatively to the number of cases (Ashraf, 2020, Xu, 2021) and to the number of cases and deaths by COVID-19 (Al-Awadhi et al., 2020, Andrieś et al., 2021). As a byproduct, these aggregation functions provide three dynamic pictures of the global financial system during the time of our sample. We provide descriptive statistics of the aggregate indexes series and explore the relationship between them and the descriptive statistics of the individual indexes.

We consider six single component risk measures, whence reflect six alternative views on the financial risk of the system. VaR, ES, EVaR, and ML are tail risk measures focusing on extreme losses. The EL is a measure of the central tendency of the loss, and the MSD adds to the EL a variability component, which is specially adequate in our context of high variability due to the COVID-19 crisis. Therefore, we study both dimensions of the risk (loss and variability) (Righi, 2019, Righi and Borenstein, 2018).

On the methodological side, we contribute to the literature by taking a view on the systemic risk that was not previously employed to measure risk during the pandemic period. Within the framework of Chen et al. (2013), we considered a total of 18 systemic risk measures,3 therefore providing the literature with a fairly comprehensible application of the general theory (as far as we are aware of, no previous work has considered such diversity of systemic risk measures to analyze the pandemic period). This theory is based on the idea of “aggregating the components of the system, and then measuring the risk of the aggregate index”. This is one possible manner of measuring the risk of a system. For instance, a concurrent approach would be to “measure the risk of each of the system components, and then aggregating the risks”. The difference between these two approaches is discussed thoroughly in Doldi and Frittelli (2021) and Biagini, Fouque, Frittelli, and Meyer-Brandis (2019). Both approaches can be viewed as extensions of the basic theory developed in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, and Heath (1999). As such, they can be used by supervisory authorities interested in assessing systemic risk and by risk managers interested in controlling the risk of portfolios of global stock market indexes.

To better contextualize the place of our methodological choices within the literature, we should notice that, in addition to the axiomatic approaches mentioned in the last paragraph, there is a vast literature of specific measures designed to explore specific aspects of systemic risk. Notably, the CoVaR proposed in Tobias and Brunnermeier (2016) allows us to measure the influence of each of the systems’ components on systemic risk. Conversely, the Systemic expected shortfall proposed in Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017) gives us a measure of how each institution in the system is affected by the system. Following an alternative strategy, Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2012) propose an index of systemic risk based on the (hypothetical) risk-neutral premium against systemic financial distress.

Our empirical analysis shows that the stock markets in the countries more exposed to COVID-19 presented synchronous dynamics following March 9, 2020, when several markets presented their minimum returns. We divided our sample into a pre-COVID-19 sub-sample and a second sub-sample representing the pandemic period. The contrast between the stability of the pre-pandemic period and the meltdown of March 2020 provides an opportunity to evaluate the behavior of our measures to quantify systemic risk in two very different scenarios (a similar strategy was employed, for instance, in Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, Nguyen, and Rahman (2022) and Abuzayed et al. (2021)). In addition to the large losses, the variability of the returns during the pandemic sub-sample is consistently higher for all countries. Fortunately, the markets have recovered after the March shock, so the mean return for the second sub-sample was not considerably smaller than that of the pre-COVID sub-sample. The increase of the single-indexes’ losses and variability was previously reported in several papers (see, for instance, Al-Awadhi et al., 2020, Ashraf, 2020, Li et al., 2021, Vasileiou et al., 2021, Xu, 2021 and Zhang et al., 2020). Therefore, in what losses and variability are regarded, our contribution is limited to providing information about losses and variability during the COVID-19 period for a larger set of countries.

On the practical side, our main contribution is to the growing literature analyzing the impact of COVID-19 on the single-index and systemic risk of the financial system. We observed a sharp increase in the risk in the individual markets during March 2020, with a posterior recovery. However, as a general trend, the market risks did not retract to pre-pandemic levels until near the end of 2020. Our results indicate a similar pattern for systemic risk. For most systemic risk measures we used, the systemic risk peaked around March 2020 and remained above the pre-pandemic level for most of 2020. Quantifying the effect of pandemics on systemic risk is an elementary task that any regulatory agency should perform. We compare the systemic risk before and after the shock of March 9 through several lenses, providing support for regulatory agencies and financial agents to get better informed about the possible financial consequences of COVID-19 variants. These findings are directly applicable and useful for distinct agents, such as market investors, policymakers, and regulatory agencies, for monitoring and managing both single-market and systemic risk in times of huge distress, as is the case for the COVID-19 pandemic.

Our empirical findings relate closely to Abuzayed et al. (2021)Lai and Hu (2021)Akhtaruzzaman, Benkraiem, et al., 2022, Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, et al., 2022 and Zhang et al. (2020). However, different from ours, much of this literature is focused on studying contagion among countries (Akhtaruzzaman, Benkraiem, et al., 2022), cryptocurrencies (Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, et al., 2022), or financial institutions (Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, and Sensoy, 2021, Baumöhl et al., 2020, Borri and Di Giorgio, 2021, Rizwan et al., 2020). For instance, Abuzayed et al. (2021) studied the tail-risk spillovers from the financial system and each of the fourteen countries most exposed to COVID-19. They found that the spillovers were considerably higher in their sample of the pandemic period (February 2020 to July 2020) than in their stable period (January 2016 to February 2020). In particular, they noticed that the increase of risk spillover was remarkably high for the European countries more exposed to the pandemic. We complement their findings by showing that, for the several risk measures we considered, the single-index risk of the most affected European countries increased dramatically, especially in the week of March 9, 2020. Also, we consider a larger set of countries and provide more up-to-date information since our sample goes until October 2021.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical background of single component risk measures and summarizes the approach of Chen et al. (2013) and Kromer et al. (2016) to measure systemic risk; Section 3 describes the data and the methodology, including descriptive data analysis, models, and risk estimation procedures. Section 4 presents single-index and systemic risk results, and Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper. The study also has an Appendix that describes additional results.

2. Background

In this section, we present the theoretical framework underlying the systemic risk measures that we adopt. This section’s main goal is to show that the systemic risk measures we use reflect systemic risk in a meaningful manner. We also introduce the single component risk measures that we use and present a general form for the aggregation functions.

The return of a financial position is represented by a random variable X, which is defined on a probability space (Ω,F,P). Accordingly, X(ω)>0 represents a gain (when the state ωΩ occurs) and X(ω)<0 a loss. Kromer et al. (2016) generalized the approach of Chen et al. (2013) to the very general setting of locally convex solid Riesz spaces. On the other hand, our goal is to provide a more direct presentation. Therefore, we consider the special case where XL2(Ω,F,P), that is, we work with random variables satisfying ΩX2dP<. We denote vectors and random vectors as x(x1,,xn)Rn and X(X1,,Xn)Xn, respectively. All equalities and inequalities between random variables should be understood in the P-a.s. sense. We identify P-a.s. constant random variables (vectors, respectively) with real numbers (vectors, respectively), i.e., we adopt the identities RcR{XX:X=c} and RncRn{XXn:X=c}, where c=(c1,,cn). The positive and negative parts, the expected value, the cumulative distribution function, and the left quantile of a random variable XX are defined, respectively, as X+max{X,0}, Xmax{X,0}, E[X]ΩXdP, FX(x)P(Xx) for xR and, FX1(α)=inf{xR:FX(x)α} for α[0,1], respectively.

We measure systemic risk by first aggregating the system’s components and then applying a single component risk measure to the aggregate index. Accordingly, we begin by presenting the aggregation functions and, after that, the risk measures.

Our system is defined as a collection of nN market indexes. The system is represented by a random vector X=(X1,X2,,Xn)Xn. Notice that each ωΩ defines a cross-sectional profile X(w)=(X1(ω),X2(ω),,Xn(ω)) of gains and losses across the components of the system. In what follows, XY means that XiYi for all i{1,2,,n}, and 1Xn is defined (with a slight abuse of notation) as 1(1,1,,1).

Definition 1

An aggregation function is a map Λ:RnR. For two cross-sectional profiles X(ω) and X(ω), consider the following useful properties that Λ might satisfy:

  • (Monotonicity) Λ is monotone if X(ω)X(ω) implies Λ(X(ω))Λ(X(ω)).

  • (Concavity) Λ is concave if for all 0α1 we have that Λ(αX(ω)+(1α)X(ω))αΛ(X(ω))+(1α)Λ(X(ω)).

  • (Surjectivity) Λ(Rn)=R.

  • (X-restricted) Λ(Xn)=X.

Aggregation functions reflect – or can be thought of as reflecting – a regulator’s view of the system. In this sense, the monotonicity property can be interpreted as saying that if all system components are better off on the state ω than on the state ω, then the regulator would also prefer the state ω to ω. The property of concavity can be thought of as reflecting the regulator’s risk aversion: it prefers the average of the cross-sectional profiles X(ω) and X(ω) than to bet on one of them. Aggregation functions satisfying monotonicity, concavity, and surjectivity are named concave aggregation functions. For the property of X-restrictedness, notice that, for XXn, the term Λ(X) is a random variable. With this in mind, the property of X-restrictedness tells us that the function Λ is, on the one hand, rich enough to generate all random variables in X, i.e., Λ(Xn)X and; on the other hand, it maintains the square-integrability of the random variables, i.e., Λ(Xn)X.

As we explain in Section 3, the aggregation functions we use are weighted means of the individual market indexes, that is, for x=(x1,,xn) they take the form Λ(x)=i=1nθixi, where (θ1,θ2,,θn)[0,1]n and i=1nθi=1. Presenting the specific functional forms of the aggregation functions we use requires first a description of our data-set structure. Therefore we postpone the presentation of the specific aggregation functions to Section 3. These weighted-means aggregation functions allow the regulator to weigh the components of the system differently. Yet, they satisfy monotonicity, concavity, and surjectivity, i.e., they are concave aggregation functions. To see that weighted means also satisfy X-restrictedness (for X=L2(Ω,F,P)), see Lemma 1 of Kromer et al. (2016).

Definition 2

A single component risk measure is a functional ρ0:XR{+}, which might fulfill the following proprieties4 :

  • (Monotonicity) If XY, then ρ0(X)ρ0(Y), X,YX.

  • (Convexity) ρ0(λX+(1λ)Y)λρ0(X)+(1λ)ρ0(Y), λ[0,1] and X,YX.

  • (Constancy) ρ0(a)=a for aR.

Monotonicity indicates that if the value of a financial position X is always greater or equal to the value of Y, then the risk of X must be smaller than or equal to the risk of Y. Convexity captures the notion that diversification does not create additional risk. The constancy property gives a single component risk measure a monetary facet related to the axiomatic formulation of Artzner et al. (1999). Notice that if ρ0 fulfills constancy, then the risk of a certain loss, let us say a real number a<0, is represented by the size of the loss, i.e., |a|=a. As proposed in Kromer et al. (2016), single component risk measures satisfying monotonicity, convexity, and constancy are called convex single component risk measures. This is the case for all single component risk measures we use, except the Value at Risk, which is not convex.

  • Value at Risk (VaR): This measure is defined as VaRα(X)=FX1(α),α[0,1). The significance level α can be thought of as an (inverse) security level. This measure represents the maximum loss for a given period and significance level. It is the most common in the financial industry and academy.

  • Expected Loss (EL): This risk measure is defined as EL(X)=E[X]. It is the most parsimonious one, indicating a loss’s expected value (mean).

  • Mean plus Semi-Deviation (MSD): This risk measure is defined as MSDβ(X)=E[X]+βE[((XE[X]))2],0β1. It has the advantage of reflecting the losses explicitly (with EL) and the variability for values below E[X].

  • Expected Shortfall (ES): This risk measure is defined as ESα(X)=1α0αFX1(s)ds,0<α1. It quantifies the expected value of losses given that they are larger than VaRα.

  • Expectile Value at Risk (EVaR): This measure links to the concept of an expectile, given by EVaRα(X)=arg minxRE[α((Xx)+)2+(1α)((Xx))2],0<α0.5.  Bellini and Di Bernardino (2017) points out that according to EVaR, the position is acceptable when the ratio of expected gain to expected loss is sufficiently high.

  • Maximum loss (ML): This is an extreme risk measure that can be defined as ML(X)=ess infX=sup{mR:P(X<m)=0}. Such a risk measure leads to more protective situations. In fact, for any single component risk measure ρ0 satisfying monotonicity, constancy and such that ρ0(0)=0, it follows that ρ0(X)ML(X) for all XX. We adopt here the convention that sup=, so it follows that ML() takes values on R{+}.

The reader will find mathematical and conceptual discussions about the above risk measures in Acerbi and Tasche, 2002, Bellini and Di Bernardino, 2017, Föllmer and Schied, 2016 and Righi (2019). Making use of the convention RncRn{XXn:X=c}, we denote the restriction of a functional ρ:XnR{+} to the set of P-a.s. constant random vectors as ρ|Rn. Therefore, it holds that ρ|Rn:RnR is defined as ρ|Rn(x)=ρ(x) for all xRn.

Definition 3

A systemic risk measure is a functional ρ:XnR{+}, which might satisfy some or all of the following properties:

  • (Monotonicity) If XY, then ρ(X)ρ(Y), X,YXn.

  • (Preference Consistency) If ρ(X(w))ρ(Y(w)) for almost all wΩ, then ρ(X)ρ(Y), X,YXn.

  • (Outcome Convexity) For a system Z=λX+(1λ)Y, where λ[0,1], we have ρ(Z)λρ(X)+(1λ)ρ(Y), ,X,Y,ZXn.

  • (Risk Convexity) Let X,Y,ZXn. Suppose ρ(Z(w))=λρ(X(w))+(1λ)ρ(Y(w)) for a given scalar λ[0,1] and almost all wΩ. Then ρ(Z)λρ(X)+(1λ)ρ(Y).

  • (Surjectivity) ρ(Rn)=R.

  • (Magnitude Preserving) ρ|Rn(Xn)X.

The monotonicity property for ρ has the same intuition as that for ρ0. The property of preference consistency says that, if X and Y are two systems such that, for almost all ωΩ, the risk of the constant systems satisfy ρ((X1(ω),,Xn(ω)))ρ((Y1(ω),,Yn(ω))), then the risk ρ(X) of the random system X must be not greater than ρ(Y). Outcome convexity is the natural extension of convexity for risk measures. Risk convexity was proposed initially by Chen et al. (2013). To gain intuition, take ZXn and look at ρ(Z(ω)) as the ex-post risk, that is, the risk of the system after the state ωΩ had been revealed. Now, if the ex-post risk of the system Z is always the same convex combination of the ex-post risk of the systems X and Y, then the ex-ante risk of Z must be given by this same convex combination, that is, ρ(Z)=λρ(X)+(1λ)ρ(Y). Of course, this would be stronger than risk convexity. This interpretation for risk convexity is related to the axiom of time consistency for dynamic risk measures and is different from the interpretations provided in Chen et al. (2013) and Kromer et al. (2016). The properties of surjectivity and magnitude preserving are important for Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. All of the mentioned properties are used in Kromer et al. (2016), and systemic risk measures satisfying them are called convex systemic risk measures.

The following Theorem 1 of Kromer et al. (2016) guarantees that by combining concave aggregation functions with convex single component risk measures, one obtains convex systemic risk measures.

Theorem 1

(Kromer et al., 2016 ). A functional ρ:XnR{+} is a convex systemic risk measure if, and only if, there is a convex single component risk measure ρ0:XR{+} and a concave aggregation function Λ:RnR , such that ρ(X)=(ρ0Λ)(X),XXn .

This theorem guarantees that the functionals we use to measure the systemic risk consistently, except when VaR is used as a single component risk measure. Chen et al. (2013) proved an analog theorem for positive homogeneous single component risk measures, which are not convex, as the VaR. However, our application does not fit their theorem because the aggregation functions we use do not satisfy their normalization property, which requires Λ(1)=n. This fact, however, poses no conflict between, on the one hand, systemic risk measures with desirable properties and, on the other hand, compositions of the form VaRα(Λ()), where Λ is a weighted mean. First, as VaR is not convex, it is natural that it generates nonconvex systemic risk measures. Second, compositions in the form VaRα(Λ()), where Λ is a weighted mean, satisfy all the desirable properties of Definition 3, except outcome and risk convexity, and yet, they are positive homogeneous in the sense of the following proposition.

Proposition 1

Fix α[0,1) and consider a vector θ=(θ1,,θn)Rn satisfying i=1nθi=1 and θi0 for all 1in . Let ρ:XnR{+} be defined as ρ(X)=VaRα(Λ(X)) , where Λ:RnR is an aggregation function defined as Λ(x)=i=1nxiθi for all xRn . Then ρ satisfies monotonicity, preference consistency, surjectivity, and magnitude preserving. Moreover, it is positive homogeneous, that is, ρ(λX)=λρ(X) for λ0 and all XXn .

Proof

For monotonicity, notice that if XY, then Λ(X)Λ(Y). Since VaR is a monotonic single component risk measure, it follows that VaRα(Λ(X))VaRα(Λ(Y)).

For preference consistency, take X and Y such that VaRα(i=1nθiXi(ω))VaRα(i=1nθiYi(ω)) P-a.s. Notice that VaR satisfies constancy, therefore we have i=1nθiXi(ω)i=1nθiYi(ω) P-a.s. This implies that Λ(X)Λ(Y), whence we have VaRα(Λ(X))VaRα(Λ(Y)).

The property of positive homogeneity for the systemic risk measure ρ()=VaRα(Λ()) follows from the fact that, for XXn and λ0, we have Λ(λX)=λΛ(X) and that, in addition, it holds that VaRα(λX)=λVaRα(X), for all λ0 and for all XX. Therefore it holds that VaRα(Λ(λX))=VaRα(λΛ(X))=λVaRα(Λ(X)) for all λ0 and XXn.

The property of surjectivity requires ρ() to cover all the real line using only vectors with non-random components (see item 5 of Definition 3). But this is the case for VaRα(Λ()) because VaRα(Λ((x,x,,x)))=x, for all xR and, therefore, VaRα(Λ(Rn))=R.

For magnitude preserving, recall that ρ|Rn:RnR is defined as ρ|Rn(x)=ρ(x) for all xRn. If a systemic risk measure is of the form ρ()=ρ0(Λ()), where ρ0 is a single component risk measure satisfying constancy, then ρ|Rn(x)=ρ0(Λ(x))=Λ(x) for all xRn. In particular, for the case of ρ()=VaRα(Λ()) we have that VaR|Rnα(x)=VaRα(Λ(x))=Λ(x) for all xRn.

Now, notice that, when ρ|Rn is applied to a random vector XXn, we have that ρ|Rn(X) is a random variable. Similarly, ρ0|Rn goes from Rn to R, so that ρ0|Rn(X) is a random variable for all XXn. In the case that ρ()=ρ0(Λ()), it holds that, ρ|Rn(X)=ρ0|Rn(Λ(X)) for all XXn. It is easy to verify that, if ρ0 fulfills constancy, then the same holds for ρ0|Rn. This implies, in view of the last paragraph, that if ρ0 fulfills constancy, then ρ0|Rn(Λ(X))=Λ(X) for all XXn. Since VaRα fulfills constancy, we can apply the equality ρ0|Rn(Λ())=Λ() to the systemic risk measure ρ()=VaRα(Λ()). By proceeding in this manner, we conclude that VaR|Rnα(Λ(X))=Λ(X) for all XXn. But Λ() is X-restricted and, therefore, we conclude that VaR|Rnα(Λ(Xn))=Λ(Xn)X. □

3. Data and methodology

This section describes the data, the aggregation functions, and the risk estimation procedures.

3.1. Data and descriptive analysis

We selected two sets of countries: the top 40 with the highest number of COVID-19 cases until November 11, 2020, and the top 40 with the highest number of death by COVID-19 until November 11, 2020 (COVID-19 Coronavirus, 2020).5 Only four countries do not belong to both sets. This selection criterion was motivated by the evidence showing that stock markets react negatively to the number of cases and deaths caused by COVID-19. For instance, Al-Awadhi et al. (2020), and Xu (2021) found that market returns decreased in response to new cases and deaths by COVID-19, while Andrieś et al. (2021) and Zhang et al. (2020) showed that cases and deaths by COVID-19 are associated with the increase of financial risk. Also, other studies analyzing the impact of the pandemic on financial markets have considered cases and deaths caused by COVID-19 as the criterion for selecting the countries to be studied. See, for example, Zhang et al. (2020). We excluded from our sample the countries that do not have the price available in Quandl (Dotson, McTaggart, Daroczi, & Leung, 2019), or quantmod (Ryan et al., 2020).6 Our dataset contains data from 35 countries, which are among the top 40 with the highest number of COVID-19 cases and/or deaths.

In Table 1, we describe the countries and market indexes considered in the study. We selected the market indexes by their representativeness in the country and the available data in the databases consulted. We also report the absolute number of COVID-19 cases and deaths per country and the percentage of COVID-19 cases and deaths. Notice that our dataset contains the countries with the largest stock exchanges in the world, including, for example, the United States, China, India, 16 of the G20 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK, and the USA), and Spain that is a guest member of G20.7 The representativeness of these economies, and the pandemic’s severe impact on them, justifies the study of the system they compose and, in particular, how COVID-19 affected the risk of the system. Moreover, the analysis of the systemic and single-index risk of the markets considered allows us to have a rough idea of the financial risk on a global scale.

Table 1.

Market index, the absolute number of COVID-19 cases (Abs. Cases), and deaths (Abs. Deaths) until November 11, 2020, per country. Besides, this table describes the percentage of COVID-19 cases (ci (%) ) and deaths (di (%)), by country.

Countries Market index Abs. Cases ci (%) Abs. Deaths di (%)
Argentina MERVAL 1262476 2.858 34183 3.167
Austria ATX 172380 0.390 1564 0.145
Bangladesh DSEX 425353 0.963 6127 0.568
Belgium BEL 20 507475 1.149 13561 1.256
Brazil IBOVESPA 5701283 12.908 162842 15.087
Canada S&P/TSX 273037 0.618 10632 0.985
Chile IPSA 523907 1.186 14611 1.354
China SSE 86284 0.195 4634 0.429
Czechia PX 429880 0.973 5323 0.493
Egypt EGX 30 109654 0.248 6394 0.592
France CAC 40 1829659 4.142 42207 3.911
Germany DAX 707550 1.602 11881 1.101
India S&P BSE Sensex 8636974 19.554 127630 11.825
Indonesia IDX 448118 1.015 14836 1.375
Iraq ISX60 508508 1.151 11482 1.064
Israel TA-100 320912 0.727 2684 0.249
Italy FTSE MIB 995463 2.254 42330 3.922
Mexico IPC 978531 2.215 95842 8.880
Morocco MASI 265165 0.600 4425 0.410
Nepal NEPSE 202329 0.458 1174 0.109
Netherlands AEX 424819 0.962 8215 0.761
Pakistan KSE 100 348184 0.788 7021 0.651
Philippines PSEI 401416 0.909 7710 0.714
Poland WIG 618813 1.401 8805 0.816
Portugal PSI-20 187237 0.424 3021 0.280
Romania BET 324094 0.734 8389 0.777
Russia MOEX 1836960 4.159 31593 2.927
Saudi Arabia TASI 351849 0.797 5590 0.518
South Africa FTSE/JSE Top 40 740254 1.676 19951 1.848
Spain IBEX 35 1443997 3.269 39756 3.683
Sweden OMX-S30 166707 0.377 6082 0.564
Switzerland SMI 243472 0.551 3087 0.286
Turkey BIST 100 399360 0.904 11059 1.025
UK FTSE 250 1233775 2.793 49770 4.611
USA S&P 500 10573090 23.938 245963 22.789

Note: Abs. Cases, ci, Abs. Deaths and di refer to the absolute number of COVID-19 cases, percentage of COVID-19 cases, the absolute number of COVID-19 deaths, and the percentage of COVID-19 deaths, respectively. The percentage of COVID-19 cases (ci (%)) and deaths (di (%)), by country, are computed based on the total number of cases and deaths from COVID-19 registered by the countries that make up our sample.

The sample period analyzed comprises November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. We selected this period because it contains a pre-pandemic period, which comprises the beginning of the sample until the first case of COVID-19 registered in Wuhan, China, on November 17, 2019, and an extended period of the pandemic.8 Throughout the text, the complete sample will be named as full sample. To compare risk behavior before and after the beginning of the pandemic, we divided the sample into two periods. The first period goes from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019, and it is named sub-sample 1. The second period goes from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021, and it is named sub-sample 2. Our choice of the breakpoint generates a sub-sample 1, which is free of any influence from the COVID-19 pandemic, and a sub-sample 2 reflects this influence from the beginning of the pandemic until the end of the sample. Therefore, by choosing the first case of COVID-19 as the breakpoint, we can describe how the systemic risk – and the risk of individual countries – evolved during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The market indexes of each country considered in the study are indexed as I{1,,n} and the periods are denoted by T{1,,T}. For each market index, we computed log-returns using close-to-close daily prices,9 which are defined as Xt,i=lnPt+1,ilnPt,i, where Pt,i refers to the price of the market index iI at period tT. For days when the market has not opened, we replaced the market index price with the value of the previous trading day. It is noteworthy that closing times vary between countries because international stock markets have different trading hours. However, given the variety of existing financial data synchronization methods (Bühlmann and Audrino, 2007, Burns et al., 1998), we chose to use close-to-close log-returns, as performed by Silva Filho, Ziegelmann, and Dueker (2014). We have postponed the investigation of different synchronization methods to estimate single-index and systemic risk for future work.

For descriptive analysis of log-returns of the market indexes, we computed the average (Mean), minimum (Min), maximum (Max), standard deviation (SD), asymmetry (Skew), and kurtosis (Kurt)10 of the full sample and sub-samples. These descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. We observed that most markets underwent similar changes between sub-samples 1 and 2. The only descriptive statistic that did not change systematically between the sub-samples was the mean of the log-returns, which is close to zero for all market indexes and samples. This result was expected for sub-sample 1 because near-zero average returns are a common feature of financial series, and sub-sample 1 is a period of relative stability. For sub-sample 2, the near-zero mean return for most countries is explained by the recovery that followed the shock of March 2020 (this is illustrated in Fig. 1). We employed a bi-tailed and the right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test to verify if there are differences in the average ranks of both sub-samples. We consider the Mann–Whitney test because it is a non-parametric test, i.e., a distribution-free test. The results of the tests are in Appendix. Overall, the tests do not reject the null hypothesis at a 10% significance level, i.e., the median return of both sub-samples is equal. This finding corroborates our descriptive analysis of average returns.

Table 2.

Descriptive statistics of the log-returns (in %) of market indexes of thirty-five countries with most cases and/or deaths by COVID-19. The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 0.114 −47.692 9.773 2.893 −5.241 82.438 0.008 −47.692 9.731 3.618 −7.393 95.280 0.169 −15.629 9.773 2.442 −0.792 7.005
Austria 0.021 −14.675 10.206 1.420 −1.679 24.113 0.006 −3.338 3.092 0.893 −0.218 1.442 0.028 −14.675 10.206 1.626 −1.683 20.688
Bangladesh 0.030 −6.737 9.798 0.890 1.065 23.763 −0.034 −1.908 2.315 0.623 0.592 2.023 0.062 −6.737 9.798 0.999 1.007 22.037
Belgium 0.019 −15.328 7.361 1.291 −2.248 26.882 0.031 −3.481 2.923 0.847 −0.700 1.966 0.013 −15.328 7.361 1.468 −2.235 23.723
Brazil 0.022 −15.994 13.023 1.724 −1.831 24.173 0.059 −3.810 3.494 1.046 −0.301 1.649 0.003 −15.994 13.023 1.984 −1.774 20.183
Canada 0.037 −13.176 11.294 1.176 −2.209 47.291 0.037 −1.882 2.756 0.518 −0.078 3.468 0.037 −13.176 11.294 1.399 −1.984 34.982
Chile −0.024 −15.216 7.759 1.446 −2.073 24.587 −0.021 −4.716 7.759 0.892 1.404 20.488 −0.025 −15.216 7.594 1.660 −2.181 19.995
China 0.032 −8.039 5.554 1.009 −0.651 8.607 0.024 −5.745 5.449 1.041 −0.107 6.124 0.036 −8.039 5.554 0.993 −0.968 10.076
Czechia 0.023 −8.160 7.369 0.963 −1.400 18.938 0.001 −2.079 1.618 0.572 −0.666 1.699 0.035 −8.160 7.369 1.112 −1.353 15.575
Egypt −0.022 −9.808 5.753 1.132 −1.467 13.316 0.020 −5.464 3.256 0.978 −0.699 5.146 −0.043 −9.808 5.753 1.203 −1.635 14.402
France 0.031 −13.098 8.056 1.255 −1.561 20.467 0.054 −3.635 2.688 0.818 −0.737 3.074 0.020 −13.098 8.056 1.428 −1.515 17.773
Germany 0.035 −13.055 10.414 1.278 −1.142 20.381 0.050 −3.537 3.314 0.860 −0.437 2.689 0.027 −13.055 10.414 1.446 −1.134 18.154
India 0.059 −14.102 8.595 1.252 −1.872 27.227 0.041 −2.084 5.186 0.795 1.120 6.709 0.068 −14.102 8.595 1.431 −2.006 23.355
Indonesia 0.011 −6.805 9.704 1.036 0.068 14.200 0.006 −2.628 1.916 0.639 −0.163 1.214 0.013 −6.805 9.704 1.190 0.077 11.788
Iraq 0.016 −3.844 6.885 0.742 1.991 19.870 −0.014 −2.254 2.095 0.541 0.030 3.036 0.032 −3.844 6.885 0.825 2.147 18.789
Israel 0.030 −6.857 7.228 1.070 −0.774 10.114 0.022 −4.839 2.008 0.750 −1.438 6.891 0.033 −6.857 7.228 1.202 −0.652 8.694
Italy 0.038 −18.541 8.549 1.383 −3.275 43.571 0.071 −3.608 3.311 0.912 −0.383 2.078 0.021 −18.541 8.549 1.570 −3.321 38.892
Mexico 0.022 −6.638 4.744 1.045 −0.502 4.994 0.008 −4.263 2.927 0.798 −0.202 3.406 0.029 −6.638 4.744 1.151 −0.543 4.448
Morocco 0.019 −9.232 5.305 0.751 −2.983 41.774 0.014 −1.642 1.955 0.439 0.214 3.263 0.022 −9.232 5.305 0.869 −2.936 34.640
Nepal 0.086 −6.226 5.885 1.222 0.005 6.843 −0.019 −2.130 2.725 0.703 0.803 2.127 0.140 −6.226 5.885 1.413 −0.131 5.178
Netherlands 0.048 −11.376 8.591 1.125 −1.391 18.903 0.044 −3.374 2.386 0.737 −0.889 3.356 0.050 −11.376 8.591 1.279 −1.346 16.453
Pakistan 0.009 −7.102 4.684 1.101 −0.794 6.750 −0.033 −3.353 3.511 1.021 0.160 1.289 0.031 −7.102 4.684 1.141 −1.151 8.495
Philippines 0.002 −14.322 7.172 1.329 −1.962 22.834 0.036 −2.995 2.785 0.838 0.164 1.537 −0.016 −14.322 7.172 1.520 −1.971 19.496
Poland 0.031 −13.579 5.705 1.195 −1.867 22.300 0.020 −2.515 2.651 0.783 0.051 1.415 0.037 −13.579 5.705 1.359 −1.933 19.653
Portugal 0.017 −10.267 7.532 1.099 −1.295 16.636 0.022 −2.215 2.783 0.734 −0.181 0.976 0.014 −10.267 7.532 1.245 −1.322 14.740
Romania 0.044 −11.892 6.817 1.107 −2.486 29.536 0.039 −11.892 6.817 1.149 −3.217 41.461 0.046 −10.075 5.973 1.087 −2.032 21.637
Russia 0.063 −8.646 7.435 1.039 −0.971 16.504 0.068 −2.018 2.395 0.681 0.158 0.782 0.061 −8.646 7.435 1.181 −1.010 14.422
Saudi Arabia 0.048 −8.685 6.831 0.961 −2.021 21.565 0.011 −3.615 2.123 0.796 −0.463 1.552 0.067 −8.685 6.831 1.035 −2.358 23.910
South Africa 0.030 −10.450 9.057 1.253 −0.738 14.588 0.026 −3.078 3.077 0.840 −0.408 1.827 0.032 −10.450 9.057 1.419 −0.727 12.859
Spain −0.002 −15.151 8.225 1.309 −1.781 25.910 0.007 −2.807 2.485 0.757 −0.413 1.558 −0.006 −15.151 8.225 1.516 −1.700 21.110
Sweden 0.048 −11.173 6.849 1.158 −1.191 13.114 0.051 −2.902 2.953 0.864 −0.432 1.260 0.046 −11.173 6.849 1.283 −1.253 12.694
Switzerland 0.033 −10.134 6.780 0.951 −1.509 20.914 0.047 −3.181 2.811 0.702 −0.474 3.118 0.026 −10.134 6.780 1.057 −1.582 20.089
Turkey 0.051 −10.307 5.810 1.284 −1.387 9.866 0.038 −5.840 4.043 1.190 −0.411 3.420 0.057 −10.307 5.810 1.331 −1.736 11.795
UK 0.023 −9.820 8.039 1.152 −0.889 15.644 0.030 −2.875 4.105 0.695 0.220 4.811 0.019 −9.820 8.039 1.326 −0.890 12.709
USA 0.056 −12.765 8.968 1.308 −1.135 22.054 0.042 −3.290 4.840 0.867 −0.215 5.228 0.062 −12.765 8.968 1.484 −1.161 19.364

Average 0.031 −11.968 7.764 1.210 −1.406 22.305 0.023 −4.762 3.437 0.884 −0.449 7.068 0.036 −11.000 7.736 1.334 −1.308 17.709

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are, respectively, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of log-returns.

Fig. 1.

Fig. 1

Historical evolution of the market indexes prices for November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. The dotted grey line indicates November 17, 2019, and the dotted red line indicates March 9, 2020. Note: This figure illustrates the historical evolution of the closing prices of market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

The standard deviation of log-returns increased from sub-sample 1 to sub-sample 2 for all countries except Argentina, China, and Romania. This increase is illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows that the variability peaked during March 2020 and kept at high levels until the end of the sample. As mentioned above, March 2020 also presents the largest drop for most indexes. In this way, we can observe that despite the pandemic having reached countries at different periods,11Fig. 1 shows that the reaction of stock markets to COVID-19 took place in a similar or very close period. We also note a delay between the first COVID case diagnosed on November 17, 2020, and the market reaction. Ashraf (2020) points out that the decline in market returns occurred mainly as the number of confirmed cases of the disease increased, which happened around March 2020. In this period, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially declared the COVID-19 outbreak to be a global pandemic (WHO, World Health Organization, 2020), which may also justify the market’s reaction to the virus. Vasileiou et al. (2021) identify a period of a sharp decline in the stock market when COVID-19 was declared a pandemic.

Fig. 2.

Fig. 2

Historical evolution of log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. The dotted grey line indicates November 17, 2019, and the dotted red line indicates March 9, 2020. Note: This figure illustrates the historical evolution of the log-returns of the market indexes (in %) of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. We obtain log-returns considering the closing prices of each market index.(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

The descriptive statistics of minimum returns of the indexes also reflect the adverse shock around March 2020. Except for Argentina, Iraq, Romania, and Turkey, all countries had their minimum returns in March 2020. More specifically, the week of March 9, 2020, concentrates on the minimum returns of 21 countries. The strong recovery that took place after the shock caused the maximum returns of the countries to be registered within sub-sample 2, except for Chile and Romania.12 In Section 4.1, we mention some particularities of these countries that might account for some of their descriptive statistics’ dissonance with the other countries. Also, comparing the range between the minimum and maximum returns during the sub-samples helps characterize the increased variability during the pandemic. The average (across countries) of the minimum and maximum returns during sub-sample 1 was −4.76% and 3.44%, respectively. In sub-sample 2, this gap became more expansive, the average minimum return was −11.00%, and the average maximum return was 7.74%.

The skewness is negative for most countries in both sub-samples, being more predominantly negative in sub-sample 2. The negative asymmetry indicates values concentrated in the left tail of the density. By its definition, the skewness is non-linearly affected by the observations. This finding explains why the effect of the extreme losses around March 9, 2020, was stronger than the effect of the trend of high positive returns that followed the shock. Notwithstanding, the recovery after the shock presumably caused the right tail in sub-sample 2 to become heavier than in sub-sample 1. In addition to that, the kurtosis also increased from sub-sample 1 to sub-sample 2. This increase indicates that the distribution tails become heavier than sub-sample 1.

3.2. Aggregate indexes

We use the returns of the market indexes to generate three aggregate indexes. These aggregate indexes are constructed through three different aggregation functions, which provide concise pictures of how the financial markets were exposed to the COVID-19 pandemic. Our three aggregation functions differ in how they assign weights to the individual indexes. For the definition of the aggregate indexes, we adopt the following notation: the return of the market index iI at tT is denoted as Xt,i and Xt=(Xt,1,Xt,2,,Xt,n); the elements in C{c1,,cn} and D{d1,,dn} represent the absolute values of COVID-19 cases and deaths, respectively, recorded in each country until November 11, 2020 (these values are reported in Table 1). The first aggregate index, which we use as a benchmark, is the naive portfolio, which weights the market indexes equally:

ΛN(Xt)i=1nXt,i×1n,

where n refers to the number of countries, i.e., 35 countries.

The second and third procedures use information about the COVID-19 cases and deaths toll in each country. The second procedure weighs the individual markets by the percentage of coronavirus cases in the respective country:

ΛC(Xt)i=1nXt,i×ci,

where ci=cii=1nci, ciC, is the country i’s percentage of the total COVID-19 cases until November 11, 2020 (among the countries in our sample). The following function weights the return of each country iI with i’s percentage of the total deaths by COVID-19 until November 11, 2020 (among the countries in our sample).

ΛD(Xt)i=1nXt,i×di,

where di=dii=1ndi, diD, is the percentage of COVID-19 deaths for each iI. As can be seen in Table 1, the values of di and ci differ, which justifies considering both weightings instead of one.13 As mentioned in the introduction, we consider both aggregation functions because of the evidence that the market reacted negatively to the number of cases and deaths caused by COVID-1914 . See, for instance,  Al-Awadhi et al., 2020, Andrieś et al., 2021, Ashraf, 2020 and Xu (2021). We do not include financial variables for weighting, such as trading volume, so we do not give more weight to countries with high volume and low risk.

The aggregated indexes were also divided into two sub-samples, one containing data before the first coronavirus case and the other with data during the pandemic. For the full sample and sub-samples, we quantify descriptive statistics in Table 3. We should emphasize that the descriptive statistics of the aggregated indexes provide information that could not be extracted by analyzing the descriptive statistics of the individual indexes. For instance, looking at Table 2, one could conclude nothing about what the system looked like in its worst period. In particular, one would not obtain a realistic image of the system’s worst period by averaging the countries’ minimum returns (last line, second column of Table 2). This follows because of the fact that

minΛθ(Xt):tT=mini=1nθiXi,t:tTi=1nθiminXi,t:tT, (1)

where θN,C,D represents the aggregation function and θin1,ci,di is the country, i’s weight. The left-hand side of Eq. (1) stands for the worst return of the system, as represented by an aggregation function Λθ(). The right-hand side stands for the average of the countries’ worst returns. The above equation is an example of how aggregation functions can be useful in assessing the performance of a system composed of several financial entities. The next equation further illustrates this argument, this time considering the best period of the system, as represented by the naive aggregation function.

maxΛN(Xt):tT=max1ni=1nXi,t:tT1ni=1nmaxXi,t:tT (2)

To illustrate how large the gap in the previous inequality can be, we note that maxΛN(Xt):tT=4.788% in sub-sample 2, which is lower than maxXi,t:tT for almost all countries, whose average in sub-sample 2 equals 7.736% (see Table 2).

Table 3.

Descriptive statistics of the aggregated indexes. The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Full sample
Indexes Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt

ΛC 0.042 −10.343 6.156 0.952 −2.984 34.305
ΛD 0.038 −10.493 6.449 0.974 −2.776 32.518
ΛN 0.031 −8.744 4.788 0.759 −3.277 35.511

Average 0.037 −9.860 5.798 0.895 −3.012 34.111

Sub-sample 1

Indexes Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt

ΛC 0.037 −2.063 1.739 0.524 −0.675 1.914
ΛD 0.036 −2.364 1.800 0.547 −0.762 2.317
ΛN 0.023 −1.702 1.546 0.432 −0.656 2.269

Average 0.032 −2.043 1.695 0.501 −0.698 2.167

Sub-sample 2

Indexes Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt

ΛC 0.045 −10.343 6.156 1.110 −2.819 27.487
ΛD 0.040 −10.493 6.449 1.132 −2.630 26.269
ΛN 0.036 −8.744 4.788 0.881 −3.141 28.998

Average 0.040 −9.860 5.798 1.041 −2.863 27.585

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are, respectively, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the aggregated indexes. ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns from 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of aggregated indexes.

The point of inequalities (1), (2) is to establish the notion that the aggregated indexes are diversified portfolios and, as such, their minimum and maximum returns are “moderate”. Moreover, since the aggregated indexes are diversified portfolios, their standard deviations are also expected to be smaller than those of the individual markets. Formally, for any weights θin1,ci,di we have

SDi=1nθiXii=1nθiSD(Xi), (3)

where SD() stands for the standard deviation and Xi represents the theoretical counter-part of the return of the country i’s market index (see Section 2 for details). The difference between the left and right-hand sides of inequality (3) can be very substantial. For instance, the standard deviation of the naive portfolio in sub-sample 1, which equals 0.432, is smaller than the standard deviation of all the individual markets in the same sub-sample, whose average equals 0.884 (see Table 2). Last, we have the following equality between the mean return of the aggregate indexes and the weighted mean returns of the individual indexes

1Tt=1TΛθ(Xt)=1Tt=1Ti=1nθiXi,t=i=1nθi1Tt=1TXi,t (4)

which holds for θ{N,C,D} and θin1,ci,di. Notice that Eq. (4) provides an opportunity to check the consistency of our data by comparing the mean of ΛN in each sample (Table 3) with the average of the mean returns of the individual indexes (last line of Table 2).

The above inequalities and equality establish a guide to compare the descriptive statistics of the aggregated indexes with the mean of the respective statistics among the individual indexes. Let us now focus on how the aggregated indexes changed between the sub-samples. Some patterns found for the individual indexes also hold for the aggregated indexes. For instance, the mean of the aggregated indexes is close to zero in all samples. This result is a consequence of the mean of the individual indexes being close to zero15 and of Eq. (4). We applied the bilateral (and right one-tailed) Mann–Whitney test to check whether the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is different than (higher than, respectively) that of sub-sample 1. The p-values of the tests are in Appendix. As expected (given the results for the market indexes), the tests do not generally reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the median returns did not change significantly between the sub-samples. This result reflects the characteristics observed in daily returns (close to zero) and a reversal of returns, both individual and aggregated indexes, to a period of greater stability. However, it is worth highlighting, as seen in Figs. 2 (log-returns of the market indexes) and 3 (aggregated indexes) that the reduction in variability was not immediate after the shock.

Fig. 3.

Fig. 3

Historical evolution of the aggregated indexes for November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. The aggregated indexes were obtained from market index returns. The dotted grey line indicates November 17, 2019, and the dotted red line indicates March 9, 2020. Note: ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths. Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

A portion of the market’s recovery after the shock can be explained by the expansionary policies carried by central banks of global economies. The countries have expanded the monetary base through different mechanisms and at different levels. In this respect, Cantú et al. (2021) provides a comprehensive dataset on the monetary measures adopted around the world. As a consequence of the inherent heterogeneity across countries and the monetary policies they adopted, the effectiveness of these measures also varied. Several works report a significant positive effect of the monetary expansions in softening the drop of economic activity and stock prices, as well as in decreasing the risk in the financial markets (Aguilar et al., 2020, Cortes et al., 2021, Feldkircher et al., 2021). However, other authors have pointed out that expansionary policies had very limited effects in some cases (Apergis, 2021, Pinshi et al., 2020, Rubbaniy et al., 2021, Wei and Han, 2021). In this regard, an agenda for future research is to quantify the influence of these policies on the recovery of the financial system as a whole, which can be measured, for instance, by the aggregated indexes we proposed. As argued in Khalfaoui, Nammouri, Labidi, and Jabeur (2021), sentiments also affect the performance of the markets. In particular, market optimism regarding the development and approval of vaccines – which would stimulate economic growth and the return to normality – might also have played a role in the market’s recovery. In this line, Khalfaoui et al. (2021) showed that the COVID-19 vaccination had a strong and significant positive influence on S&P 500 returns.16

As a consequence of this dynamic of abrupt shock and posterior recovery, the standard deviation of the aggregated indexes increased substantially between the sub-samples, which is illustrated in Fig. 3. The average standard deviation of all aggregated indexes increased more than 100% between the sub-samples. Fig. 3 suggests that this happened because of the shock in the week of March 9 and the fact that the variability did not immediately return to the levels before the shock. The greater variability during sub-sample 2 is also indicated by the fact that all aggregated indexes’ minimum and maximum values are registered in sub-sample 2. All aggregated indexes attained their minimum on March 12, 2020 (the day after WHO updated the classification of the coronavirus crisis as a pandemic (Zhang et al., 2020)) and their maximum on March 24, 2020.17 This consistency indicates that the methodology of aggregating indexes is robust to the weights used.

The descriptive statistics of the aggregated indexes also vary substantially between sub-samples 1 and 2. For instance, the minimum returns of ΛN,ΛC, and ΛD in sub-sample 1 range from approximately -2.36% to −1.7%, depending on the index considered, while in sub-sample 2 they range between −10.5% to −8.7%. The maximum returns of the aggregate indexes range from 1.54% to 1.80% in sub-sample 1 and from 4.79% to 6.45% in sub-sample 2. The skewness is negative for all aggregated indexes and samples and becomes even more negative in sub-sample 2. In sub-sample 1, the skewness ranges from −0.76 to −0.65, while in sub-sample 2, it goes from −3.14 to −2.63. The kurtosis of the indexes also increased considerably between the sub-samples. It ranges from 1.9 to 2.3 in sub-sample 1 and 26.3 to 29 in sub-sample 2. Since the aggregated indexes are weighted means, such an increase in the prevalence of extreme values indicates that the individual indexes’ returns moved in synchronicity during sub-sample 2. This is an indication that the aggregation functions we considered were able to reflect the strong dependence structure between the returns in sub-sample 2 (which can be deduced by Fig. 1).18

3.3. Models and risk estimation procedures

After the descriptive analysis of the data, we proceed to risk estimation. For both single-index and systemic risk, we consider VaR, EL, MSD, ES, EVaR, and ML as functional bases to quantify the risk estimates considering data from the in-sample period. We consider these functionals because they are common in risk forecasting literature and fit the general approach for measuring systemic risk used in this study. For risk estimation, we consider a semi-parametric approach known as Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) (Barone-Adesi et al., 1998, Barone-Adesi et al., 1999). Our study considered the FHS because empirical evidence points to good results from using this approach in predicting risk measures (Christoffersen and Gonçalves, 2005, Giannopoulos and Tunaru, 2005). Besides that, this approach is quite flexible in the sense that it can handle individual stocks and portfolios (Giannopoulos & Tunaru, 2005). Consider that Y has a fully parametric location-scale specification based on the expectation, dispersion, and random component, which is represented by Yt=μt+σtzt, where μt and σt are the conditional mean and the conditional standard deviation, respectively, and zt is a white noise process, which can assume many probability distributions (F). The main idea of this method is to construct the returns series through the filtered residuals ZT{zt}t=1T using the conditional mean and volatility predicted for the period t for which risk measures are estimated.

In the first step, we extract from historical data the mean and conditional deviation using an Autoregressive (AR)-Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH),19 which can be described as:

Yt=ϕ0+i=1pϕiYti+ϵt=μt+ϵt,
ϵt=σtzt,zti.i.d.F(θ),
σt2=a0+j=1qajϵtj2+k=1sbkσtk2, (5)

where p is the order of the autoregressive component, ϕi (for i=0,1,,p) are the parameters of the autoregressive model, ϵt is the error term, zt is a white noise process with distribution F(θ), where θ is a vector of parameters of the distribution, including zero mean and unit variance in addition to additional parameters that vary as the distribution. μt and σt2 are the mean and variance conditional on past information, q and s are the orders of the GARCH model, and aj and bk, for j=0,1,,q and k=0,1,,s are the parameters of the GARCH model (a0>0, aj0, bk0).

Additionally to the AR-GARCH model, we consider asymmetric GARCH specifications to account for the leverage effect, which is a common characteristic in financial time series (Rodríguez & Ruiz, 2012), such as AR-Exponential GARCH (AR-EGARCH) and AR-Glosten–Jagannathan–Runkle GARCH (GJR-GARCH) model. The AR(p)-EGARCH(q, s) model can be described in this manner:

Yt=ϕ0+i=1pϕiYti+ϵt=μt+ϵt,
ϵt=σtzt,zti.i.d.F(θ),ln(σt2)=a0+j=1qajg(ϵtj)+k=1sbkln(σtk2), (6)

where ln is the natural logarithm, and g() is the impact curve given by:

g(ϵt)=γϵt+λ(|ϵt|E[|ϵt|]),

where γ and λ are real constants, and ϵt and |ϵt|E[|ϵt|] are zero-mean independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequences with continuous distributions. The volatility specification in terms of logarithmic transformation implies that there are no restrictions on the values of the parameters to guarantee the positivity of the variance. For more details, see Nelson (1991).

Further, AR(p)-GJR(q, s) model can be written in the following way:

Yt=ϕ0+i=1pϕiYti+ϵt=μt+ϵt,
ϵt=σtzt,zti.i.d.F(θ),
σt2=a0+j=1q(aj+λjItj)ϵtj+k=1sbkσtk2, (7)

where Itj is an indicator function that assumes 1 if ϵtj<0 and takes zero otherwise. We have that aj0,bk0,λj0 and a0>0. More details can be seen at Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993).

For F, we assume normal, skewed normal, Student-t, skewed Student-t, generalized error, skewed generalized error, normal inverse Gaussian, and Johnson SU distributions. Besides the normal distribution, we select distributions that can capture asymmetry and heavy tail, which are common stylized facts in financial series (Cont, 2001). The parameters of the models were estimated through Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML). We choose the best specifications based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The Appendix presents the specifications for the individual market and aggregated indexes. The AR-EGARCH had the best fit for 28 out of 35 countries for the individual market indexes, while the student-t distribution was selected for 31 countries. The AR-EGARCH presents lower AIC for all aggregated indexes, with the generalized error distribution providing the best fit. To estimate the conditional mean, we use an AR(1). As stated by Garcia-Jorcano and Novales (2021), this specification is sufficient to produce serially uncorrelated innovations. We extract the standardized residuals (ZT) independently and identically distributed for each estimated model. This step is necessary to form the returns series. We perform usual diagnostics under standardized residuals to assess if the information is appropriately filtered. The estimates from the AR-GARCH fits and diagnostics tests are available under request.

After model estimation, we use a non-parametric method, known as Historical Simulation (HS),20 to represent the distribution of the market log-returns and aggregated index. Therefore, the risk measures are quantified as follows:

VaRtα=μt+σtVaRα(ZT),
ELt=μt+σtEL(ZT),
MSDt=μt+σtMSD(ZT),
EStα=μt+σtESα(ZT),
EVaRtα=μt+σtEVaRα(ZT),
MLt=μt+σtML(ZT) (8)

where μt and σt are, respectively, the mean and conditional standard deviation for the in-sample period obtained by the GARCH models (see the models’ specification in Appendix). VaRα, EL, MSD, ESα, EVaRα, and ML are risk measures, which are quantified using HS approach. For MSD, we use β=1 to incorporate all the deviation. The values of α are 0.01, 0.025, and 0.00145 for VaR, ES, and EVaR, respectively. For VaR and ES, these levels are recommended by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013). Regarding EVaR, Bellini and Di Bernardino (2017) show that α=0.00145 makes the EVaR measurements closely comparable to the levels suggested by the Basel Committee for ES and VaR. We conduct all computational implementations using R programming language (R. Core Team, 2020), and the package for estimating the model parameters is rugarch (Ghalanos, 2019).

We compute mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis for descriptive analysis of the single-index and systemic risk. These statistics are provided for the full sample and sub-samples. Additionally, for both single-index and systemic risk, we applied the bilateral and right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test to assess whether there is a significant difference between the results of sub-sample 1 and 2. The description and discussion of these results are presented in the next section.

4. Empirical results

In this section, we describe the single-index and systemic risk estimation results.

4.1. Single-index risk results

The descriptive statistics of single-index risks, as measured by the risk measures in Eq. (8), are presented in Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9. Each table presents the average, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, asymmetry, and kurtosis for the single-index risk computed by one of the following measures VaR, EL, MSD, ES, EVaR, and ML for the thirty-five countries analyzed.

Table 4.

Descriptive statistics of the Value at Risk (VaR) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 6.509 4.867 15.699 1.788 2.331 5.946 6.887 4.867 15.699 2.670 1.584 1.174 6.316 5.175 10.062 1.040 1.060 0.266
Austria 3.297 1.265 14.003 1.839 2.837 9.982 2.878 1.666 5.770 0.768 1.289 1.689 3.511 1.265 14.003 2.162 2.350 6.239
Bangladesh 1.875 0.162 8.240 0.868 2.672 13.235 1.720 0.162 3.097 0.482 −0.214 0.498 1.954 0.457 8.240 1.001 2.463 9.928
Belgium 3.431 1.438 14.633 2.013 2.540 7.930 3.005 1.606 5.172 0.851 0.574 −0.523 3.649 1.438 14.633 2.370 2.101 4.748
Brazil 4.184 1.762 23.067 2.420 4.536 25.677 3.532 2.114 5.740 0.803 0.500 −0.452 4.517 1.762 23.067 2.864 3.816 17.241
Canada 2.171 0.570 19.958 2.298 4.735 26.098 1.648 0.669 4.395 0.771 1.397 1.373 2.438 0.570 19.958 2.733 3.971 17.352
Chile 3.507 1.243 15.867 1.832 2.525 10.102 2.216 1.243 5.058 0.709 2.146 5.143 4.167 1.473 15.867 1.878 2.702 10.129
China 2.813 1.612 4.832 0.555 1.122 0.812 2.852 1.612 4.388 0.518 0.797 0.248 2.794 2.024 4.832 0.572 1.262 1.052
Czechia 2.486 1.214 14.266 1.419 3.387 15.533 1.958 1.214 3.717 0.424 1.186 1.869 2.756 1.229 14.266 1.655 2.775 10.160
Egypt 3.240 1.226 13.997 1.409 3.248 16.257 3.049 1.226 7.770 1.024 1.203 1.710 3.337 1.649 13.997 1.562 3.326 15.052
France 3.851 0.763 20.894 2.767 2.911 10.819 3.166 0.957 6.251 1.259 0.466 −0.660 4.202 0.763 20.894 3.226 2.491 7.117
Germany 3.691 1.714 14.790 1.947 2.801 9.240 3.127 1.887 4.888 0.688 0.389 −0.636 3.979 1.714 14.790 2.291 2.258 5.407
India 2.932 0.978 14.245 1.656 3.536 15.405 2.598 1.393 3.646 0.506 −0.330 −0.724 3.102 0.978 14.245 1.982 2.878 9.494
Indonesia 2.653 1.311 11.522 1.260 3.413 14.638 2.183 1.311 4.275 0.502 1.219 2.083 2.894 1.531 11.522 1.450 2.938 10.057
Iraq 1.527 1.065 6.418 0.436 3.926 28.404 1.481 1.102 2.497 0.255 1.133 1.471 1.551 1.065 6.418 0.502 3.696 23.067
Israel 3.345 1.359 12.039 1.874 2.396 6.326 2.706 1.586 5.862 0.818 1.279 1.353 3.671 1.359 12.039 2.157 1.960 3.657
Italy 3.753 0.781 14.366 2.046 1.959 4.697 2.814 0.781 5.134 0.925 −0.257 −0.238 4.233 1.532 14.366 2.283 1.640 2.708
Mexico 2.731 1.714 8.514 1.069 3.101 11.162 2.347 1.721 4.519 0.495 1.780 4.078 2.928 1.714 8.514 1.220 2.700 7.638
Morocco 1.773 0.911 9.720 1.044 4.698 26.653 1.497 0.948 2.426 0.298 0.589 −0.215 1.914 0.911 9.720 1.242 3.891 17.479
Nepal 3.095 1.004 9.568 1.180 1.370 3.058 2.570 1.004 4.401 0.534 0.870 0.921 3.364 1.248 9.568 1.322 0.958 1.692
Netherlands 3.225 1.281 16.414 1.915 3.150 13.687 2.685 1.281 5.542 0.993 0.888 −0.053 3.501 1.311 16.414 2.195 2.826 10.039
Pakistan 2.761 1.740 9.374 1.014 3.109 12.684 2.736 1.928 4.689 0.541 1.202 1.453 2.773 1.740 9.374 1.185 2.858 9.476
Philippines 3.324 2.314 9.435 1.050 2.876 9.516 2.739 2.314 3.335 0.209 0.285 −0.552 3.624 2.515 9.435 1.175 2.412 6.171
Poland 2.890 1.520 12.578 1.350 3.687 17.594 2.443 1.640 3.555 0.438 0.388 −0.670 3.119 1.520 12.578 1.583 3.066 11.575
Portugal 2.556 1.145 10.245 1.159 3.455 16.592 2.184 1.283 3.544 0.507 0.355 −0.776 2.746 1.145 10.245 1.339 3.019 11.729
Romania 2.711 1.404 16.817 1.531 3.421 16.229 2.783 1.539 16.817 1.570 3.844 23.028 2.674 1.404 13.012 1.511 3.170 12.005
Russia 2.498 1.614 9.611 1.137 3.891 16.865 2.093 1.620 2.891 0.268 0.682 0.042 2.706 1.614 9.611 1.338 3.169 10.519
Saudi Arabia 2.295 0.744 13.579 1.323 3.925 22.913 2.355 1.250 4.852 0.748 0.698 −0.156 2.264 0.744 13.579 1.536 3.796 18.778
South Africa 3.112 1.694 10.255 1.183 3.213 13.011 2.690 1.694 3.816 0.480 0.096 −0.722 3.328 1.828 10.255 1.364 2.762 8.734
Spain 3.470 1.638 15.503 1.958 3.148 12.458 2.678 1.638 4.390 0.649 0.814 −0.202 3.876 1.694 15.503 2.258 2.617 8.112
Sweden 3.052 2.001 9.493 1.231 2.890 9.029 2.684 2.003 3.835 0.382 0.539 −0.272 3.241 2.001 9.493 1.454 2.294 5.052
Switzerland 2.557 1.122 21.354 1.713 4.487 29.299 2.220 1.327 6.695 0.835 2.058 5.340 2.730 1.122 21.354 1.999 3.983 21.845
Turkey 4.091 2.502 9.849 0.842 2.173 8.691 4.104 2.638 7.510 0.695 0.842 2.082 4.084 2.502 9.849 0.909 2.429 9.195
UK 2.670 0.843 14.637 1.788 3.353 12.940 2.070 1.140 3.933 0.579 1.060 0.920 2.976 0.843 14.637 2.094 2.746 8.045
USA 3.059 1.011 20.052 2.359 3.590 17.146 2.671 1.091 7.357 1.230 1.132 0.983 3.257 1.011 20.052 2.743 3.226 12.619

Average 3.061 1.415 13.309 1.522 3.155 14.018 2.668 1.527 5.356 0.726 0.928 1.446 3.262 1.510 13.040 1.720 2.732 9.839

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk, respectively. We estimate the VaR from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. We obtain VaR estimates using α=1%, i.e., VaR1% and for estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS). Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of VaR risk estimates.

Table 5.

Descriptive statistics of the Expected Loss (EL) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina −0.094 −2.318 0.426 0.139 −4.558 71.681 −0.096 −2.318 0.426 0.173 −6.683 85.851 −0.093 −0.828 0.399 0.119 −0.564 6.403
Austria −0.027 −0.044 0.059 0.013 2.951 11.432 −0.030 −0.040 −0.010 0.005 1.155 1.554 −0.026 −0.044 0.059 0.015 2.465 7.367
Bangladesh −0.046 −0.201 −0.004 0.021 −2.672 13.235 −0.042 −0.076 −0.004 0.012 0.214 0.498 −0.048 −0.201 −0.011 0.024 −2.463 9.928
Belgium −0.001 −0.052 0.245 0.038 2.604 9.116 −0.008 −0.051 0.051 0.017 0.523 0.228 0.003 −0.052 0.245 0.044 2.206 5.827
Brazil −0.034 −1.186 1.213 0.140 −0.255 21.191 −0.038 −0.360 0.229 0.085 −0.255 1.614 −0.032 −1.186 1.213 0.161 −0.263 17.722
Canada −0.028 −0.051 0.227 0.033 4.683 25.556 −0.036 −0.050 0.003 0.011 1.350 1.150 −0.024 −0.051 0.227 0.039 3.917 16.922
Chile 0.025 −0.392 0.839 0.077 2.177 25.097 0.024 −0.105 0.272 0.042 1.025 5.443 0.025 −0.392 0.839 0.090 2.002 19.581
China −0.028 −0.245 0.126 0.028 −0.432 8.129 −0.028 −0.183 0.123 0.029 0.059 5.998 −0.028 −0.245 0.126 0.027 −0.723 9.380
Czechia −0.026 −0.060 0.126 0.015 4.146 29.189 −0.030 −0.045 0.001 0.007 1.399 2.722 −0.024 −0.060 0.126 0.017 3.678 21.927
Egypt 0.017 −0.557 1.097 0.122 1.767 14.392 0.012 −0.318 0.607 0.105 0.851 5.387 0.020 −0.557 1.097 0.130 1.961 15.503
France −0.007 −0.057 0.288 0.047 2.928 11.018 −0.019 −0.055 0.035 0.022 0.439 −0.705 −0.001 −0.057 0.288 0.055 2.505 7.264
Germany −0.012 −0.549 0.332 0.050 −2.100 22.261 −0.008 −0.141 0.109 0.033 −0.516 2.669 −0.014 −0.549 0.332 0.056 −2.053 19.402
India −0.063 −0.185 0.213 0.023 3.224 31.155 −0.064 −0.152 −0.026 0.014 −1.085 6.194 −0.062 −0.185 0.213 0.026 3.236 25.839
Indonesia −0.014 −0.150 0.255 0.025 1.569 18.822 −0.017 −0.074 0.029 0.015 0.204 1.113 −0.013 −0.150 0.255 0.029 1.477 15.749
Iraq −0.009 −0.358 0.318 0.049 0.517 10.646 −0.009 −0.139 0.165 0.039 0.880 3.151 −0.009 −0.358 0.318 0.053 0.436 10.604
Israel −0.038 −0.135 −0.015 0.021 −2.396 6.326 −0.030 −0.066 −0.018 0.009 −1.279 1.353 −0.041 −0.135 −0.015 0.024 −1.960 3.657
Italy −0.021 −0.274 0.206 0.032 0.927 11.608 −0.030 −0.097 0.040 0.019 0.114 0.862 −0.017 −0.274 0.206 0.036 0.707 10.143
Mexico −0.017 −0.217 0.220 0.039 0.091 4.474 −0.015 −0.134 0.141 0.030 0.033 3.241 −0.018 −0.217 0.220 0.043 0.138 3.991
Morocco −0.043 −0.257 0.203 0.024 −0.168 29.725 −0.040 −0.110 0.009 0.015 −0.703 3.684 −0.044 −0.257 0.203 0.028 −0.029 24.874
Nepal −0.075 −0.231 −0.024 0.028 −1.370 3.058 −0.062 −0.106 −0.024 0.013 −0.870 0.921 −0.081 −0.231 −0.030 0.032 −0.958 1.692
Netherlands −0.029 −0.235 0.344 0.040 2.164 14.409 −0.036 −0.124 0.055 0.024 0.223 1.663 −0.025 −0.235 0.344 0.045 2.019 11.708
Pakistan −0.006 −0.101 0.192 0.027 1.695 10.362 −0.005 −0.082 0.077 0.024 0.158 1.176 −0.006 −0.101 0.192 0.028 2.178 12.629
Philippines −0.001 −0.574 0.274 0.052 −2.115 23.820 0.001 −0.119 0.110 0.033 0.156 1.548 −0.002 −0.574 0.274 0.060 −2.111 20.306
Poland −0.025 −0.623 0.204 0.051 −2.115 23.996 −0.025 −0.135 0.088 0.034 0.014 1.430 −0.025 −0.623 0.204 0.058 −2.168 21.078
Portugal −0.017 −0.104 0.110 0.015 1.255 12.010 −0.019 −0.045 0.015 0.009 0.158 0.918 −0.016 −0.104 0.110 0.016 1.138 10.076
Romania −0.049 −0.058 0.063 0.009 4.809 37.179 −0.048 −0.057 0.063 0.010 5.911 54.966 −0.049 −0.058 0.038 0.009 4.051 23.690
Russia −0.064 −0.214 0.123 0.022 1.132 15.887 −0.067 −0.109 −0.021 0.013 0.215 0.847 −0.062 −0.214 0.123 0.025 0.997 13.236
Saudi Arabia −0.062 −0.307 0.262 0.036 2.144 21.889 −0.061 −0.139 0.075 0.029 0.493 1.594 −0.063 −0.307 0.262 0.038 2.495 24.197
South Africa −0.014 −0.419 0.447 0.056 0.728 14.523 −0.019 −0.147 0.125 0.037 −0.182 1.693 −0.011 −0.419 0.447 0.063 0.693 12.593
Spain 0.012 −0.330 0.377 0.046 1.649 14.475 0.002 −0.083 0.092 0.025 0.164 1.222 0.017 −0.330 0.377 0.053 1.391 11.203
Sweden −0.038 −0.643 0.458 0.072 0.037 10.277 −0.043 −0.211 0.141 0.052 −0.269 1.205 −0.035 −0.643 0.458 0.080 0.020 9.646
Switzerland −0.025 −0.067 0.272 0.032 3.735 23.531 −0.029 −0.065 0.063 0.020 1.369 3.065 −0.022 −0.067 0.272 0.036 3.591 19.815
Turkey −0.059 −0.108 0.086 0.017 2.212 13.174 −0.059 −0.104 0.025 0.015 0.873 4.437 −0.059 −0.108 0.086 0.018 2.604 15.039
UK −0.014 −0.042 0.086 0.015 3.330 13.639 −0.019 −0.039 −0.002 0.005 0.711 1.091 −0.012 −0.042 0.086 0.018 2.759 8.724
USA −0.032 −0.525 0.713 0.082 2.740 23.579 −0.039 −0.210 0.313 0.052 1.158 7.500 −0.028 −0.525 0.713 0.093 2.620 19.974

Average −0.027 −0.339 0.296 0.044 1.058 18.596 −0.029 −0.180 0.096 0.031 0.229 6.208 −0.026 −0.297 0.294 0.048 1.085 13.934

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk, respectively. We estimate the EL from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For EL estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS). Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of EL risk estimates.

Table 6.

Descriptive statistics of the Mean plus Semi-Deviation (MSD) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 2.344 1.606 5.663 0.672 2.239 5.424 2.482 1.606 5.663 0.994 1.550 1.068 2.274 1.773 3.967 0.405 1.128 0.670
Austria 0.820 0.297 3.599 0.477 2.838 9.991 0.711 0.400 1.462 0.199 1.292 1.693 0.875 0.297 3.599 0.562 2.351 6.243
Bangladesh 0.470 0.041 2.065 0.217 2.672 13.235 0.431 0.041 0.776 0.121 −0.214 0.498 0.490 0.115 2.065 0.251 2.463 9.928
Belgium 0.841 0.325 3.733 0.519 2.536 7.887 0.731 0.369 1.276 0.219 0.569 −0.534 0.897 0.325 3.733 0.611 2.095 4.709
Brazil 0.989 0.393 5.952 0.606 4.580 26.880 0.828 0.408 1.544 0.208 0.544 −0.164 1.072 0.393 5.952 0.716 3.873 18.249
Canada 0.546 0.113 5.344 0.623 4.723 25.906 0.404 0.138 1.143 0.209 1.393 1.345 0.619 0.113 5.344 0.742 3.959 17.209
Chile 0.959 0.308 4.293 0.500 2.456 9.803 0.612 0.308 1.459 0.199 2.076 5.040 1.136 0.311 4.293 0.514 2.588 9.754
China 0.729 0.405 1.315 0.151 1.140 0.914 0.740 0.405 1.214 0.142 0.864 0.464 0.724 0.510 1.315 0.155 1.264 1.119
Czechia 0.577 0.262 3.519 0.350 3.414 15.951 0.447 0.265 0.892 0.106 1.231 1.996 0.643 0.262 3.519 0.408 2.804 10.496
Egypt 0.767 0.065 3.907 0.376 3.414 19.297 0.719 0.130 2.188 0.279 1.423 3.605 0.792 0.065 3.907 0.415 3.517 18.220
France 0.864 0.131 4.902 0.661 2.910 10.785 0.700 0.178 1.438 0.300 0.460 −0.672 0.948 0.131 4.902 0.770 2.489 7.085
Germany 0.823 0.389 3.296 0.429 2.793 9.169 0.699 0.420 1.067 0.152 0.378 −0.672 0.887 0.389 3.296 0.505 2.252 5.359
India 0.658 0.167 3.387 0.407 3.525 15.368 0.577 0.275 0.833 0.126 −0.342 −0.693 0.700 0.167 3.387 0.487 2.876 9.498
Indonesia 0.643 0.307 2.756 0.310 3.390 14.271 0.525 0.307 1.025 0.122 1.201 2.014 0.703 0.362 2.756 0.357 2.915 9.760
Iraq 0.431 0.288 1.614 0.130 2.930 14.778 0.418 0.298 0.812 0.084 1.289 2.206 0.437 0.288 1.614 0.147 2.814 12.422
Israel 0.696 0.283 2.504 0.390 2.396 6.326 0.563 0.330 1.219 0.170 1.279 1.353 0.764 0.283 2.504 0.449 1.960 3.657
Italy 0.858 0.150 3.149 0.490 1.940 4.538 0.632 0.150 1.190 0.222 −0.275 −0.236 0.974 0.328 3.149 0.547 1.621 2.571
Mexico 0.685 0.408 2.183 0.274 3.124 11.381 0.589 0.408 1.111 0.125 1.651 3.276 0.735 0.411 2.183 0.313 2.713 7.757
Morocco 0.362 0.175 2.322 0.230 4.777 27.753 0.302 0.183 0.506 0.065 0.596 −0.173 0.392 0.175 2.322 0.274 3.956 18.233
Nepal 0.681 0.221 2.105 0.260 1.370 3.058 0.565 0.221 0.969 0.117 0.870 0.921 0.740 0.275 2.105 0.291 0.958 1.692
Netherlands 0.728 0.260 3.721 0.458 3.125 13.287 0.596 0.260 1.236 0.236 0.852 −0.175 0.795 0.310 3.721 0.525 2.799 9.678
Pakistan 0.727 0.452 2.621 0.275 3.186 13.573 0.721 0.495 1.290 0.145 1.190 1.444 0.730 0.452 2.621 0.321 2.928 10.166
Philippines 0.837 0.576 2.467 0.264 2.886 9.858 0.691 0.576 0.896 0.058 0.454 −0.094 0.911 0.618 2.467 0.296 2.429 6.500
Poland 0.735 0.375 3.368 0.350 3.651 17.453 0.618 0.407 0.940 0.116 0.407 −0.575 0.794 0.375 3.368 0.409 3.044 11.543
Portugal 0.692 0.296 2.853 0.323 3.449 16.496 0.588 0.351 0.962 0.140 0.350 −0.794 0.745 0.296 2.853 0.373 3.010 11.638
Romania 0.682 0.331 4.502 0.412 3.438 16.452 0.702 0.368 4.502 0.423 3.875 23.466 0.673 0.331 3.475 0.406 3.177 12.078
Russia 0.594 0.355 2.482 0.299 3.908 17.122 0.488 0.355 0.707 0.072 0.652 0.096 0.649 0.361 2.482 0.352 3.187 10.722
Saudi Arabia 0.531 0.110 3.463 0.342 3.985 24.032 0.547 0.239 1.276 0.195 0.723 0.038 0.522 0.110 3.463 0.396 3.871 19.858
South Africa 0.796 0.412 2.855 0.318 3.259 13.575 0.683 0.412 1.041 0.129 0.132 −0.594 0.854 0.450 2.855 0.366 2.806 9.187
Spain 0.851 0.389 3.938 0.492 3.139 12.411 0.651 0.389 1.089 0.163 0.799 −0.246 0.954 0.403 3.938 0.566 2.611 8.086
Sweden 0.748 0.411 2.672 0.333 2.904 9.583 0.650 0.422 1.040 0.112 0.567 0.160 0.798 0.411 2.672 0.393 2.333 5.567
Switzerland 0.600 0.255 5.115 0.427 4.407 27.654 0.515 0.287 1.570 0.205 1.954 4.685 0.643 0.255 5.115 0.498 3.898 20.433
Turkey 0.866 0.481 2.249 0.198 2.207 9.115 0.869 0.521 1.694 0.164 0.868 2.286 0.864 0.481 2.249 0.214 2.469 9.666
UK 0.686 0.191 3.882 0.477 3.352 12.947 0.526 0.275 1.023 0.155 1.059 0.919 0.768 0.191 3.882 0.559 2.746 8.051
USA 0.813 0.227 5.609 0.667 3.564 16.823 0.702 0.253 2.040 0.347 1.125 1.033 0.870 0.227 5.609 0.775 3.198 12.342

Average 0.761 0.327 3.412 0.392 3.132 13.803 0.663 0.356 1.403 0.195 0.938 1.542 0.811 0.350 3.334 0.439 2.717 9.719

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk, respectively. We estimate the MSD from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For MSD estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) and β=1. Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of MSD estimates.

Table 7.

Descriptive statistics of the Expected Shortfall (ES) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 8.844 6.627 22.069 2.417 2.352 6.120 9.357 6.627 22.069 3.614 1.597 1.247 8.582 7.082 13.478 1.400 1.055 0.240
Austria 3.391 1.302 14.397 1.890 2.837 9.982 2.960 1.714 5.933 0.790 1.289 1.689 3.611 1.302 14.397 2.223 2.350 6.239
Bangladesh 1.960 0.170 8.615 0.907 2.672 13.235 1.798 0.170 3.238 0.504 −0.214 0.498 2.043 0.478 8.615 1.046 2.463 9.928
Belgium 3.538 1.484 15.082 2.074 2.540 7.931 3.099 1.657 5.333 0.877 0.574 −0.523 3.763 1.484 15.082 2.442 2.101 4.748
Brazil 4.217 1.776 23.248 2.440 4.536 25.676 3.560 2.131 5.784 0.810 0.500 −0.452 4.553 1.776 23.248 2.886 3.816 17.241
Canada 2.288 0.603 21.010 2.418 4.736 26.102 1.738 0.707 4.629 0.812 1.397 1.373 2.569 0.603 21.010 2.876 3.971 17.355
Chile 3.931 1.399 17.796 2.054 2.527 10.114 2.483 1.399 5.672 0.794 2.147 5.147 4.672 1.667 17.796 2.106 2.706 10.142
China 3.148 1.806 5.397 0.620 1.122 0.814 3.191 1.806 4.898 0.579 0.796 0.246 3.127 2.267 5.397 0.639 1.263 1.055
Czechia 2.517 1.230 14.440 1.436 3.387 15.531 1.982 1.230 3.763 0.429 1.186 1.869 2.790 1.245 14.440 1.675 2.775 10.159
Egypt 3.207 1.212 13.866 1.396 3.248 16.266 3.018 1.212 7.698 1.014 1.204 1.715 3.304 1.632 13.866 1.547 3.326 15.061
France 3.862 0.766 20.951 2.775 2.911 10.819 3.175 0.960 6.269 1.263 0.466 −0.660 4.214 0.766 20.951 3.235 2.491 7.117
Germany 3.583 1.664 14.349 1.890 2.801 9.238 3.036 1.834 4.744 0.668 0.389 −0.637 3.862 1.664 14.349 2.223 2.258 5.406
India 2.864 0.954 13.922 1.619 3.536 15.404 2.538 1.360 3.563 0.494 −0.330 −0.723 3.031 0.954 13.922 1.938 2.878 9.493
Indonesia 2.663 1.316 11.565 1.265 3.413 14.638 2.191 1.316 4.291 0.504 1.219 2.083 2.905 1.537 11.565 1.455 2.938 10.058
Iraq 1.808 1.264 7.647 0.515 4.003 29.467 1.753 1.307 2.967 0.300 1.140 1.495 1.836 1.264 7.647 0.594 3.764 23.884
Israel 3.198 1.300 11.512 1.792 2.396 6.326 2.588 1.517 5.606 0.782 1.279 1.353 3.511 1.300 11.512 2.063 1.960 3.657
Italy 3.737 0.777 14.304 2.037 1.959 4.697 2.802 0.777 5.112 0.921 −0.257 −0.238 4.215 1.525 14.304 2.273 1.640 2.708
Mexico 2.728 1.712 8.504 1.068 3.101 11.162 2.344 1.719 4.514 0.494 1.780 4.078 2.925 1.712 8.504 1.219 2.700 7.638
Morocco 1.711 0.879 9.400 1.008 4.699 26.658 1.445 0.915 2.340 0.288 0.588 −0.217 1.848 0.879 9.400 1.200 3.892 17.483
Nepal 3.174 1.029 9.811 1.210 1.370 3.058 2.635 1.029 4.513 0.547 0.870 0.921 3.450 1.279 9.811 1.356 0.958 1.692
Netherlands 3.155 1.253 16.057 1.875 3.150 13.683 2.626 1.253 5.422 0.972 0.887 −0.054 3.426 1.283 16.057 2.149 2.826 10.036
Pakistan 2.907 1.833 9.859 1.067 3.108 12.668 2.881 2.031 4.933 0.569 1.203 1.454 2.920 1.833 9.859 1.248 2.857 9.464
Philippines 3.555 2.474 10.081 1.123 2.876 9.517 2.929 2.474 3.561 0.223 0.283 −0.557 3.875 2.688 10.081 1.257 2.412 6.171
Poland 3.126 1.645 13.586 1.460 3.688 17.606 2.643 1.775 3.848 0.473 0.389 −0.667 3.373 1.645 13.586 1.711 3.067 11.583
Portugal 2.711 1.215 10.858 1.228 3.455 16.594 2.317 1.360 3.758 0.537 0.356 −0.775 2.912 1.215 10.858 1.419 3.019 11.731
Romania 3.094 1.606 19.142 1.742 3.421 16.219 3.176 1.760 19.142 1.787 3.842 23.008 3.052 1.606 14.812 1.719 3.170 12.002
Russia 2.611 1.688 10.032 1.186 3.891 16.861 2.188 1.695 3.020 0.280 0.682 0.042 2.827 1.688 10.032 1.396 3.169 10.517
Saudi Arabia 2.456 0.801 14.503 1.413 3.923 22.887 2.520 1.342 5.179 0.798 0.698 −0.160 2.423 0.801 14.503 1.640 3.795 18.754
South Africa 3.262 1.775 10.746 1.239 3.213 13.008 2.820 1.775 4.001 0.503 0.097 −0.722 3.488 1.915 10.746 1.429 2.761 8.733
Spain 3.507 1.655 15.667 1.979 3.148 12.459 2.706 1.655 4.436 0.656 0.814 −0.202 3.916 1.712 15.667 2.281 2.617 8.113
Sweden 3.241 2.127 10.052 1.305 2.890 9.021 2.850 2.132 4.063 0.405 0.539 −0.277 3.441 2.127 10.052 1.541 2.294 5.044
Switzerland 2.601 1.141 21.716 1.742 4.487 29.309 2.258 1.351 6.809 0.849 2.058 5.344 2.777 1.141 21.716 2.032 3.984 21.853
Turkey 4.068 2.488 9.794 0.838 2.173 8.691 4.081 2.623 7.469 0.691 0.842 2.082 4.061 2.488 9.794 0.904 2.429 9.196
UK 2.824 0.894 15.473 1.890 3.353 12.940 2.190 1.208 4.159 0.612 1.060 0.920 3.148 0.894 15.473 2.213 2.746 8.045
USA 3.513 1.170 23.081 2.702 3.592 17.181 3.070 1.260 8.459 1.410 1.133 0.988 3.740 1.170 23.081 3.142 3.228 12.648

Average 3.229 1.515 13.958 1.589 3.157 14.054 2.827 1.631 5.748 0.779 0.929 1.448 3.434 1.618 13.589 1.785 2.734 9.863

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are, respectively, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk. We estimate the ES from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For ES estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) and α=2.5%, i.e., ES2.5%. Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of ES estimates.

Table 8.

Descriptive statistics of the Expectile Value at Risk (EVaR) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 23.056 17.345 60.844 6.252 2.395 6.514 24.387 17.345 60.844 9.364 1.626 1.428 22.375 18.615 34.580 3.600 1.050 0.229
Austria 3.658 1.406 15.519 2.037 2.837 9.982 3.194 1.850 6.397 0.851 1.289 1.689 3.895 1.406 15.519 2.396 2.350 6.239
Bangladesh 2.305 0.199 10.130 1.067 2.672 13.235 2.114 0.199 3.807 0.592 −0.214 0.498 2.402 0.562 10.130 1.230 2.463 9.928
Belgium 4.063 1.710 17.297 2.377 2.540 7.934 3.559 1.908 6.121 1.005 0.574 −0.522 4.320 1.710 17.297 2.799 2.101 4.751
Brazil 4.790 2.011 26.331 2.766 4.535 25.669 4.045 2.417 6.536 0.918 0.496 −0.458 5.170 2.011 26.331 3.273 3.816 17.235
Canada 2.690 0.717 24.627 2.833 4.736 26.112 2.046 0.839 5.433 0.951 1.397 1.375 3.020 0.717 24.627 3.369 3.971 17.363
Chile 5.119 1.834 23.191 2.677 2.532 10.137 3.230 1.834 7.395 1.033 2.149 5.153 6.085 2.208 23.191 2.744 2.713 10.166
China 4.815 2.770 8.210 0.944 1.124 0.823 4.880 2.770 7.435 0.881 0.792 0.241 4.782 3.477 8.210 0.974 1.266 1.068
Czechia 2.705 1.323 15.498 1.542 3.386 15.522 2.131 1.323 4.041 0.460 1.185 1.866 2.998 1.340 15.498 1.798 2.774 10.152
Egypt 4.103 1.593 17.556 1.774 3.237 16.083 3.862 1.593 9.719 1.288 1.194 1.629 4.226 2.102 17.556 1.966 3.314 14.879
France 4.403 0.880 23.845 3.156 2.912 10.820 3.621 1.100 7.140 1.436 0.466 −0.660 4.803 0.880 23.845 3.679 2.491 7.118
Germany 3.846 1.785 15.420 2.029 2.801 9.242 3.258 1.963 5.094 0.717 0.390 −0.635 4.146 1.785 15.420 2.387 2.258 5.409
India 3.299 1.108 15.997 1.857 3.536 15.407 2.924 1.573 4.100 0.567 −0.330 −0.724 3.490 1.108 15.997 2.224 2.878 9.494
Indonesia 3.216 1.591 13.974 1.526 3.415 14.664 2.647 1.591 5.183 0.609 1.221 2.088 3.507 1.858 13.974 1.756 2.940 10.079
Iraq 2.562 1.799 10.951 0.730 4.128 31.190 2.484 1.859 4.232 0.422 1.157 1.557 2.602 1.799 10.951 0.843 3.873 25.207
Israel 3.544 1.440 12.755 1.985 2.396 6.326 2.867 1.681 6.211 0.866 1.279 1.353 3.890 1.440 12.755 2.285 1.960 3.657
Italy 4.201 0.877 16.102 2.286 1.959 4.704 3.152 0.877 5.743 1.033 −0.256 −0.238 4.737 1.717 16.102 2.551 1.640 2.714
Mexico 2.842 1.784 8.860 1.112 3.101 11.159 2.442 1.792 4.704 0.515 1.782 4.089 3.047 1.784 8.860 1.270 2.699 7.637
Morocco 2.064 1.064 11.260 1.212 4.696 26.630 1.744 1.106 2.833 0.346 0.591 −0.205 2.228 1.064 11.260 1.442 3.890 17.465
Nepal 3.906 1.267 12.075 1.490 1.370 3.058 3.243 1.267 5.555 0.674 0.870 0.921 4.246 1.575 12.075 1.668 0.958 1.692
Netherlands 3.451 1.374 17.569 2.047 3.150 13.697 2.873 1.374 5.931 1.061 0.888 −0.050 3.746 1.401 17.569 2.346 2.827 10.048
Pakistan 3.077 1.940 10.421 1.129 3.106 12.652 3.049 2.150 5.216 0.602 1.203 1.456 3.091 1.940 10.421 1.320 2.855 9.452
Philippines 4.394 3.057 12.430 1.389 2.877 9.522 3.619 3.057 4.383 0.276 0.277 −0.568 4.790 3.317 12.430 1.554 2.412 6.176
Poland 3.669 1.933 15.905 1.713 3.690 17.628 3.102 2.085 4.520 0.555 0.391 −0.663 3.959 1.933 15.905 2.007 3.068 11.598
Portugal 3.048 1.368 12.194 1.379 3.455 16.598 2.605 1.528 4.224 0.603 0.356 −0.775 3.274 1.368 12.194 1.594 3.019 11.735
Romania 4.971 2.599 30.541 2.778 3.419 16.192 5.103 2.844 30.541 2.849 3.838 22.956 4.904 2.599 23.639 2.741 3.169 11.993
Russia 2.978 1.928 11.406 1.348 3.890 16.851 2.497 1.939 3.441 0.317 0.683 0.040 3.224 1.928 11.406 1.586 3.168 10.509
Saudi Arabia 3.093 1.026 18.154 1.768 3.919 22.812 3.173 1.707 6.487 0.998 0.697 −0.169 3.052 1.026 18.154 2.052 3.789 18.684
South Africa 3.683 2.004 12.126 1.397 3.212 13.002 3.185 2.004 4.524 0.568 0.098 −0.721 3.938 2.160 12.126 1.611 2.760 8.730
Spain 3.956 1.870 17.691 2.230 3.148 12.465 3.053 1.870 5.004 0.739 0.814 −0.199 4.417 1.933 17.691 2.571 2.618 8.118
Sweden 3.677 2.417 11.347 1.476 2.889 9.005 3.235 2.432 4.592 0.457 0.540 −0.286 3.903 2.417 11.347 1.742 2.293 5.031
Switzerland 2.891 1.269 24.118 1.933 4.490 29.364 2.510 1.505 7.567 0.943 2.062 5.365 3.085 1.269 24.118 2.254 3.987 21.901
Turkey 4.535 2.781 10.895 0.931 2.172 8.678 4.549 2.930 8.311 0.768 0.841 2.076 4.527 2.781 10.895 1.005 2.428 9.182
UK 3.113 0.989 17.038 2.081 3.353 12.940 2.415 1.334 4.583 0.673 1.060 0.920 3.469 0.989 17.038 2.437 2.746 8.045
USA 5.648 1.916 37.290 4.313 3.599 17.279 4.942 2.056 13.629 2.252 1.138 1.002 6.009 1.916 37.290 5.016 3.236 12.732

Average 4.210 2.085 17.702 1.988 3.162 14.111 3.764 2.220 8.042 1.091 0.930 1.452 4.439 2.232 16.754 2.174 2.737 9.898

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are, respectively, minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk. We estimate the EVaR from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For EVaR estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) and α=0.145%, i.e., EVaR0.145%. Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of EVaR estimates.

Table 9.

Descriptive statistics of the Maximum Loss (ML) forecasting computed from log-returns of the market indexes (in %). The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Argentina 54.095 40.752 145.530 14.633 2.413 6.688 57.215 40.752 145.530 21.926 1.638 1.512 52.499 43.716 82.056 8.411 1.050 0.238
Austria 5.669 2.192 23.966 3.142 2.836 9.981 4.954 2.878 9.894 1.313 1.289 1.688 6.034 2.192 23.966 3.695 2.350 6.239
Bangladesh 3.677 0.318 16.163 1.702 2.672 13.235 3.373 0.318 6.075 0.945 −0.214 0.498 3.833 0.897 16.163 1.963 2.463 9.928
Belgium 5.814 2.462 24.710 3.387 2.541 7.939 5.097 2.744 8.755 1.432 0.575 −0.521 6.181 2.462 24.710 3.988 2.101 4.755
Brazil 7.325 3.052 39.987 4.215 4.534 25.665 6.192 3.686 9.868 1.400 0.486 −0.470 7.905 3.052 39.987 4.988 3.816 17.234
Canada 4.765 1.301 43.288 4.971 4.738 26.138 3.635 1.517 9.585 1.669 1.398 1.378 5.343 1.301 43.288 5.912 3.973 17.382
Chile 8.383 3.032 38.019 4.388 2.538 10.166 5.285 3.032 12.130 1.690 2.150 5.161 9.968 3.697 38.019 4.498 2.722 10.194
China 10.133 5.849 17.184 1.980 1.126 0.835 10.269 5.849 15.534 1.846 0.790 0.240 10.063 7.333 17.184 2.043 1.270 1.084
Czechia 3.889 1.912 22.162 2.205 3.384 15.485 3.068 1.912 5.793 0.657 1.181 1.854 4.309 1.939 22.162 2.570 2.771 10.122
Egypt 6.607 2.659 27.951 2.832 3.222 15.849 6.222 2.659 15.372 2.056 1.183 1.531 6.803 3.418 27.951 3.140 3.298 14.648
France 8.362 1.718 45.041 5.948 2.912 10.825 6.889 2.132 13.519 2.707 0.467 −0.658 9.115 1.718 45.041 6.934 2.491 7.123
Germany 5.624 2.605 22.662 2.972 2.802 9.259 4.765 2.838 7.464 1.051 0.391 −0.627 6.064 2.605 22.662 3.496 2.260 5.423
India 5.348 1.839 25.782 2.983 3.537 15.416 4.745 2.581 6.635 0.909 −0.329 −0.726 5.656 1.839 25.782 3.572 2.879 9.497
Indonesia 4.608 2.286 20.043 2.185 3.417 14.702 3.795 2.286 7.433 0.872 1.223 2.097 5.024 2.668 20.043 2.514 2.942 10.110
Iraq 4.676 3.297 20.210 1.332 4.264 33.072 4.533 3.405 7.774 0.762 1.183 1.660 4.749 3.297 20.210 1.539 3.993 26.649
Israel 4.785 1.945 17.223 2.681 2.396 6.326 3.872 2.269 8.387 1.170 1.279 1.353 5.252 1.945 17.223 3.086 1.960 3.657
Italy 6.240 1.316 24.014 3.382 1.962 4.725 4.689 1.316 8.522 1.529 −0.254 −0.238 7.034 2.560 24.014 3.774 1.643 2.732
Mexico 4.740 2.993 14.765 1.852 3.096 11.133 4.073 2.998 7.879 0.860 1.797 4.201 5.081 2.993 14.765 2.113 2.696 7.628
Morocco 3.229 1.672 17.600 1.884 4.691 26.585 2.730 1.737 4.461 0.539 0.598 −0.179 3.485 1.672 17.600 2.242 3.886 17.439
Nepal 6.303 2.044 19.484 2.404 1.370 3.058 5.233 2.044 8.963 1.087 0.870 0.921 6.851 2.541 19.484 2.692 0.958 1.692
Netherlands 5.128 2.060 26.151 3.026 3.153 13.744 4.275 2.060 8.823 1.570 0.892 −0.036 5.564 2.073 26.151 3.468 2.830 10.091
Pakistan 4.746 2.997 15.961 1.736 3.098 12.557 4.703 3.326 8.004 0.927 1.207 1.468 4.767 2.997 15.961 2.029 2.848 9.382
Philippines 6.757 4.702 19.051 2.139 2.878 9.537 5.565 4.702 6.701 0.426 0.271 −0.577 7.367 5.092 19.051 2.393 2.414 6.188
Poland 5.510 2.908 24.012 2.569 3.694 17.675 4.660 3.135 6.802 0.833 0.396 −0.652 5.945 2.908 24.012 3.012 3.072 11.631
Portugal 5.335 2.409 21.263 2.405 3.456 16.614 4.564 2.671 7.392 1.053 0.357 −0.771 5.729 2.409 21.263 2.779 3.021 11.750
Romania 11.703 6.157 71.405 6.492 3.417 16.167 12.009 6.729 71.405 6.657 3.835 22.906 11.546 6.157 55.284 6.406 3.169 11.985
Russia 4.692 3.044 17.825 2.102 3.888 16.824 3.942 3.078 5.408 0.495 0.685 0.035 5.076 3.044 17.825 2.474 3.166 10.489
Saudi Arabia 4.576 1.550 26.660 2.594 3.913 22.717 4.693 2.557 9.537 1.464 0.696 −0.181 4.516 1.550 26.660 3.012 3.783 18.596
South Africa 5.602 3.048 18.416 2.117 3.209 12.993 4.847 3.048 6.905 0.861 0.102 −0.717 5.987 3.277 18.416 2.440 2.759 8.727
Spain 6.121 2.902 27.455 3.444 3.150 12.485 4.728 2.902 7.747 1.142 0.817 −0.189 6.833 3.000 27.455 3.971 2.619 8.133
Sweden 6.231 4.118 18.930 2.477 2.886 8.960 5.490 4.161 7.690 0.766 0.542 −0.308 6.611 4.118 18.930 2.924 2.289 4.995
Switzerland 4.534 1.994 37.752 3.014 4.499 29.547 3.942 2.378 11.869 1.472 2.072 5.433 4.837 1.994 37.752 3.515 3.996 22.060
Turkey 9.693 6.014 23.051 1.961 2.167 8.618 9.724 6.316 17.615 1.617 0.837 2.048 9.678 6.014 23.051 2.117 2.422 9.115
UK 4.264 1.367 23.279 2.841 3.353 12.939 3.311 1.836 6.271 0.919 1.060 0.920 4.751 1.367 23.279 3.328 2.746 8.044
USA 10.417 3.576 69.042 7.914 3.605 17.362 9.124 3.834 25.183 4.135 1.142 1.015 11.078 3.576 69.042 9.203 3.242 12.802

Average 7.417 3.831 30.458 3.369 3.166 14.166 6.749 4.048 15.055 2.022 0.932 1.459 7.758 4.098 28.184 3.607 2.740 9.936

Note: Min, Max, SD, Skew, and Kurt are minimum, maximum, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the single-index risk, respectively. We estimate the ML from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For ML estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS). Average refers to the average value of descriptive statistics of ML estimates.

The mean risk in sub-sample 2 is higher than in sub-sample 1 for almost all countries and risk measures. For example, the mean VaR for Brazil and the USA are 3.532% and 2.671% for sub-sample 1, while for sub-sample 2, the mean values are equal to 4.517% and 3.257%, respectively. It is valid to mention that both countries were, at some point, at the epicenter of COVID-19’s dissemination. Also, the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies adopted in both countries might have contributed to the recovery of the markets and, consequently, ameliorated the rise of tail risk during sub-sample 2 (Feldkircher et al., 2021). Cantú et al. (2021) mentioned that in previous crisis episodes, emerging markets have reacted by raising interest rates, not by cutting them. The rationale was that low-interest policies could lead to massive capital outflows and generate a balance of payments deficits and currency depreciation. In the recession of 2020–2021, on the other hand, the international scenario, particularly regarding advanced economies like the USA, was that of lower interest rate policies, which would decrease the risk of capital outflows from emerging economies that chose to cut interest rates.

The Mann–Whitney test described in Appendix confirms the risk increase between the sub-samples. The test indicates that the risk in sub-sample 2 is significantly higher than in sub-sample 1 for almost all countries and risk measures considered except for EL. The exception of the EL is expected. EL evaluates the risk in terms of the central trend of the losses, which are close to zero. Besides, it ignores the variability and less likely losses, known as tail risk. The increase of single-index risk during the pandemic period is in line with the findings of investigations of Baek et al., 2020, Baker et al., 2020, Breugem et al., 2020, and Zhang et al. (2020).

We realize that there is a positive association between average risk in sub-sample 2 and death and case rates caused by COVID-19.21 This result indicates that countries with higher death and case rates tend to have a higher single-index risk. On the other hand, in countries with lower death and case rates, the risk tends to be lower.22 That are, however, exceptions to this pattern. The United States, for instance, has the highest percentage of cases and deaths in our sample. However, it has the seventeenth and eleventh highest average values for VaR and ES in sub-sample 2, respectively. The increase in average risk in the USA – which is the median of the increases among the countries – did not closely follow its high exposure to COVID. Plausible explanations for this exception are the high capitalization of the USA’s financial market and the expansionary policies adopted by its government, which might have contributed to softening the risk increase.

We emphasize that the risk measures considered present conceptual differences and, for this reason, they vary in absolute value. However, when analyzing the relative variation in single-index risk between sub-sample 1 and 2, we find that the values are similar regardless of the measure. This variation is not valid for EL for the reasons previously mentioned. We also realized, as well as verified by Rout et al. (2020), that the pandemic shocks affected the countries differently. We observe that only Argentina, China, Romania, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey have the highest mean risk registered in sub-sample 1 (for all risk measures considered). For example, China, for sub-samples 1 and 2, has a mean value of ES equal to 3.191% and 3.127%, respectively.23 Despite the lower average risk in sub-sample 2, China presents the maximum risk estimate in this sub-sample. (Rout et al., 2020) studied the tail risk of the G20 countries and also found that China was less affected by the pandemic compared to other countries. This finding explains that China has managed to contain the virus quickly and restarted its economic activities. The country injected trillions of RMB into the banking sector through open market operations, reduced interest rates, and decreased the 1-year medium-term lending facility rate (Rizwan et al., 2020). Although Turkey suffered losses and high volatility around March 9, 2020, we found that its risk was similar in both sub-samples. Considering the countries of Asia and Europe, Turkey presented the highest average risk in sub-sample 1. This finding reflects Turkey’s financial and economic crisis in 2018, which has unleashed excessive current account deficit and foreign currency debt (Arbaa & Varon, 2019). With the arrival of the pandemic, Turkish companies that were already facing difficulties in accessing financing had their situation aggravated. The challenges facing Turkey’s economy have led the World Bank, in 2021, to support the country in limiting the damage of COVID-19 and also to advance the country’s long-term needs (Celasin, 2021). Romania’s market underwent a volatility clustering at the beginning of the log-returns series, which may have contributed to the average risk of sub-sample 1 being higher than that of sub-sample 2. Romania’s greatest risk may be associated with the perceived level of corruption in the country’s public and private sector (Transparency International, 2021). For Europe, Turkey and Romania have the highest average risk values. Regarding Saudi Arabia, we also noticed a small cluster of volatility before the peak in March 2020 (see Fig. 2). This increase in volatility was accompanied by a drop in prices in mid-2019 (see Fig. 1).

As far as Argentina is concerned, the country experienced a high risk period in the full sample. In sub-sample 1, we see that the average ES for the country is 9.357%, whereas the overall average single-index risk for all countries is 2.827%. During the pandemic period, we noticed that the country’s ES reduced to 8.582%. However, it remains high compared to the overall average ES in the same sub-sample, 3.434%. This happened because, during the period analyzed, the financial market in Argentina reacted to several adverse macroeconomic and political shocks, thereby presenting remarkably high volatility compared to the other countries (see Fig. 2, for instance). The high risk presented by Argentina contributed to the higher average risk of countries that belong to America compared to countries that belong to other continents.24 For instance, the average ES in sub-sample 2 of the countries that belong to America (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Mexico, and the USA) is equal to 4.823%. If we exclude Argentina, this figure drops to 3.883%. As a similar exercise, we noted that if we exclude Argentina from the group of G20 countries,25 the average ES of these countries in sub-sample 2 drops from 3.677% to 3.370%. For the sake of comparison, the average ES during sub-sample 2 for European countries equals 3.462%, and for countries that do not belong to G20, we have an average ES of 3.204% during sub-sample 2.

Chile and Italy, followed by Canada, Spain, and the UK, were the countries with the most percentage increase in their risks. The increase in Chilean risk may be explained by the severity and extension of the containment measures applied by the Chilean government. Also, the fall of copper prices exacerbated the impact of COVID-19 on the Chilean economy and, presumably, on its financial markets (Osterhuber, 2020). For Canada, this is a presumable consequence of a relatively stable financial performance during sub-sample 1 and the record decline of the FSX index during the week of March 9, 2020 (Smith, 2020). Regarding Italy, in March 2020, the country surpassed China as the country with the highest death toll, becoming the epicenter of the pandemic during that period. In a short period, the country closed its factories and all non-essential production to contain what the prime minister called the country’s most difficult crisis since World War II (Horowitz, Bubola, & Povoledo, 2020). In addition to these measures, the authorities carried out a nationwide lockdown, closed parks, and banned outdoor activities. We can highlight that these restrictive measures are not exclusive to Italy and were present in many countries to reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. While measures of mandatory social distancing and business closures were imposed for public health reasons, some authors, such as Baker et al. (2020), present evidence indicating that they had a severe adverse effect on the stock markets. The lockdown drastically affected the real economy, decreasing companies’ cash flow and, as a consequence, their trading price. The extreme character of the lockdown measures and uncertainty regarding the duration and effects of the measures may have also led investors to desperately flee from risky assets towards “safe-heavens” like gold and Treasury securities (Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, Lucey, & Sensoy, 2021).

In addition to the mechanisms mentioned above, evidence shows that the number of cases and deaths caused by COVID-19 have a direct partial effect on the market’s risk and volatility (Al-Awadhi et al., 2020, Andrieś et al., 2021, Li et al., 2021, Xu, 2021). A major mechanism linking cases and deaths to market volatility and risk, as indicated in Baek et al. (2020), might be the negative news about pandemics (a surge of cases and deaths, for instance). This case is strengthened by Baker et al. (2020), which showed that the media’s coverage of the pandemic developments (cases and deaths) was gigantic. Chundakkadan and Nedumparambil (2021) indicate that the media’s focus on the pandemic has generated a pessimistic attitude among investors and weakened stock exchanges around the world. In periods of the outbreak, social media alter market sentiment, which then stimulates trading activities and can cause extreme price movements (Broadstock & Zhang, 2019). Besides that, the uncertainty about the future of the economic and financial environment might have influenced stock valuation negatively. In light of this evidence, we infer that, as investors received a continuous flow of (mainly) bad news regarding the COVID-19 cases and death tolls, as well as regarding the collapse of the health system of developed economies like Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, for example, the market sentiment changed, which contributed to the movements observed in the financial markets (see, for instance, Huynh, Foglia, Nasir, & Angelini, 2021, and Lehrer, Xie, & Zhang, 2021).

In Fig. 4 we present the graphical evolution of VaR results for the group of countries investigated.26 For the sake of brevity, we do not provide illustrations of the other risk measures; however, they are available upon request. For most countries, the Value at Risk was stable at low levels during sub-sample 1 and at the beginning of sub-sample 2 (November 17, 2019). The VaR of most countries peaked near the red-dotted line, which indicates March 9, 2020. This characteristic is also valid for the single-index risk obtained by the other risk measures. Thus, similar to Breugem et al. (2020) and Jackwerth (2020), we identify that the single-index risk did not react timely to the burst of the pandemic. As we mentioned for the descriptive statistics of the returns, essential explanations for the synchronicity of the peak of the risks are the Saudi-Russian oil price war,27 which escalated on March 8, 2020, and the WHO’s classification, on March 11, 2020, of the COVID-19 surge as a pandemic. Corroborating, Chundakkadan and Nedumparambil (2021) find that the negative effect of the pandemic on daily returns was strong in the week that the World Health Organization declared it a pandemic.

Fig. 4.

Fig. 4

Historical evolution of the VaR estimates for market indexes from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. The dotted grey line indicates November 17, 2019, and the dotted red line indicates March 9, 2020. We estimate the VaR from log-returns of the market indexes of countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020. For VaR estimation, we consider Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) and α=1%. The VaR estimates are with its signal converted. We make this transformation to compare VaR estimates with the indexes’ negative returns (losses).(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

As we can see in Fig. 4 in the second half to the end of 2020, there is a reduction in single-index risk in most countries. Among the reasons for the recovery of the financial markets, it is possible to point out the help of central banks offered around the world to mitigate the impacts on the capital markets. Rouatbi, Demir, Kizys, and Zaremba (2021) also show that COVID-19 vaccination helped to stabilize global equity markets. Furthermore, the authors point out that the impact of vaccination was greater in developed markets than in emerging ones. Corroborating, Yu, Xiao, and Liu (2021) find that the correlations between pandemic anxiety indexes and stock market returns are smaller and vary less after the COVID-19 vaccine results were announced. For these reasons, the emergence of new variants in 2021, such as the delta variant, did not imply an increase in individual market risk.

In general, we verified that, as for losses, there is a synchronism in the increase and reduction of the single-index risk of the different analyzed markets. Although we observe that all countries felt the impacts of the pandemic, it is worth noting that it affected all economies differently, and not all reacted in the same way. This is clear from the individual analysis of each market. To corroborate this, we performed a correlation matrix28 between the VaR estimates for the 35 countries that make up our sample. See Appendix. Higher positive values indicate a greater similarity in the evolution of risk in these countries. For example, for Argentina and Brazil, the correlation is 0.998 (in sub-sample 2). The relationship between the risk of the two countries can be explained by both being neighbors in Latin America and by the commercial relationship performed by both countries. Although several countries with high positive correlations were found, there are situations such as Germany, in which we observed negative values in most cases, showing that the dynamics of single-index risk in this country did not evolve in a similar way to the others. The analysis of the correlation between country risk can also be used as a way to assess the contagion29 of market risk between countries. It is noted that there is an increase in the relationship during the pandemic period. The increase in correlation indicates a possible risk contagion among the countries. However, a more in-depth analysis of the contagion between markets during the pandemic is beyond the scope of our work. For excellent references on contagion, we refer (Kenourgios, Dimitriou, & Samitas, 2018) and Samitas et al. (2020)Akhtaruzzaman, Boubaker, and Sensoy (2021) and Baumöhl et al. (2020) are good examples regarding investigations about financial contagion during COVID-19 crisis.

We also note that the standard deviation of the risk increased from sub-sample 1 to sub-sample 2 for all risk measures considered and in almost all countries. The standard deviation of the VaR of the United States and Germany, for instance, rose from 1.230 to 2.743 and 0.688 to 2.291, respectively, between sub-samples 1 and 2. The variation of the standard deviation of the risk between the sub-samples, in absolute values, depends on the risk measure being used. However, we note that the percentage variation in the standard deviation of each country’s risk, from sub-sample 1 to 2, is similar across the different risk measures, except for EL. The increase in the dispersion of the risk estimates during the pandemic is also confirmed when we verify the amplitude between the maximum and minimum values. For instance, the gap between the minimum and maximum VaR for Germany is approximately 3% for sub-sample 1 and 13% for sub-sample 2.

Following the losses, around thirty countries registered their maximum risk in March 2020, considering all risk measures.30 The notable exceptions are Argentina and Romania, for which the maximum risks were registered in sub-sample 1 for all risk measures considered. This result may be associated with the internal problems of both countries, which were previously discussed. Moreover, these countries are the only ones for which the maximum VaR in sub-sample 1 was above 15%. Remarkably, all risk measures peaked on the same day for most countries, except the EL (and the MSD in a few cases). Also, four countries had their maximum risk during the week of March 9, 2020, and all of these countries registered their minimum returns during this same week. Interestingly, the week of March 9, 2020, concentrated more on maximum losses than maximum risks, the former occurring before. This time ordering of the maximum loss and the maximum risk was also observed for the countries that did not attain their maximum risks during the week of March 9, 2020. This time delay was also observed in Breugem et al. (2020) and Jackwerth (2020). According to Ramelli and Wagner (2020), in March 2020, COVID-19 began to attract the attention of financial market participants because it was during this period that the Federal Reserve Board announced major interventions in the corporate bond market. The authors also comment that the virus also spread to Europe and the United States31 during this period, leading to the lockdown of many economies. As a result of the lockdowns, investors were concerned about the high corporate indebtedness and the chances of survival of companies with little cash flow. The dates of the minimum risk of most countries were also invariant concerning the risk measure being used, except for the EL (see Table 17).

The skewness and kurtosis are also systematically higher in sub-sample 2 than in sub-sample 1. This is illustrated by the increase of the average skewness and the average kurtosis of the market risks between sub-sample 1 and 2. These figures are presented in the last line of Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9. The higher (positive) skewness of the risk in sub-sample 2 is compatible with the more negative skewness of the returns in sub-sample 2. Also, it reflects the more prominent right-sided asymmetry of the risk. The higher kurtosis in sub-sample 2 is explained by more extreme realizations of the risks in sub-sample 2. Exceptions to these patterns are, for instance: Argentina, for which the standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the risk, as measured by all risk measures considered, except the EL, are higher in sub-sample 1 than in the sub-sample 2, and Romania, for which the kurtosis of the risk, as measured by all risk measures considered, is higher in sub-sample 1 than in sub-sample 2. A remarkable fact is that these averages for both sub-samples are very similar across the different risk measures (except EL). Similarities of this sort (across different risk measures) were described throughout this sub-section, and most of them will be confirmed for systemic risk. In particular, for VaR, ES and EVaR, these observations are positive evidence that the levels of significance provided in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013) for VaR and ES and in Bellini and Di Bernardino (2017) for the EVaR do make the historical evolution of the measures very similar.

Table 10.

Descriptive statistics of systemic risk. The full sample period refers from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Indexes VaR
ES
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt
Full Sample

ΛC 2.191 0.867 14.728 1.702 4.283 21.676 2.305 0.912 15.483 1.789 4.283 21.669
ΛD 2.351 0.710 18.251 1.866 4.509 26.614 2.377 0.718 18.450 1.887 4.509 26.613
ΛN 1.754 0.695 11.933 1.332 4.366 23.176 1.868 0.743 12.662 1.415 4.364 23.137

Average 2.099 0.757 14.971 1.633 4.386 23.822 2.183 0.791 15.532 1.697 4.385 23.806

Sub-Sample 1

ΛC 1.843 0.982 3.477 0.591 0.840 −0.296 1.939 1.034 3.656 0.621 0.839 −0.298
ΛD 1.934 0.879 4.190 0.701 0.772 0.059 1.955 0.889 4.236 0.708 0.772 0.059
ΛN 1.463 0.779 2.841 0.494 0.863 −0.358 1.559 0.832 3.018 0.525 0.861 −0.365

Average 1.747 0.880 3.503 0.595 0.825 −0.198 1.818 0.918 3.637 0.618 0.824 −0.201

Sub-Sample 2

ΛC 2.394 0.871 14.803 2.051 3.554 13.970 2.500 0.909 15.450 2.141 3.554 13.967
ΛD 2.585 0.711 18.285 2.225 3.806 17.903 2.596 0.714 18.360 2.234 3.806 17.903
ΛN 1.913 0.689 11.911 1.599 3.618 14.895 2.044 0.739 12.689 1.705 3.616 14.865

Average 2.278 0.757 14.971 1.939 3.705 16.010 2.370 0.791 15.532 2.014 3.705 15.998

Indexes EL
EVaR
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt

Full Sample

ΛC −0.049 −0.349 −0.002 0.033 −4.418 27.091 2.551 1.010 17.118 1.979 4.282 21.655
ΛD −0.046 −0.333 −0.003 0.033 −4.659 29.663 2.583 0.780 20.035 2.050 4.509 26.611
ΛN −0.031 −0.312 0.673 0.058 4.468 43.859 2.075 0.831 13.989 1.567 4.360 23.077

Average −0.042 −0.331 0.223 0.041 −1.536 33.538 2.403 0.874 17.047 1.865 4.384 23.781

Sub-Sample 1

ΛC −0.043 −0.090 −0.010 0.014 −0.754 0.376 2.146 1.146 4.043 0.687 0.839 −0.301
ΛD −0.039 −0.076 −0.003 0.013 −0.608 0.034 2.125 0.967 4.603 0.770 0.772 0.059
ΛN −0.032 −0.139 0.100 0.032 0.875 2.573 1.733 0.927 3.342 0.581 0.857 −0.378

Average −0.038 −0.102 0.029 0.020 −0.162 0.994 2.001 1.013 3.996 0.679 0.823 −0.207

Sub-Sample 2

ΛC −0.052 −0.349 −0.002 0.038 −3.827 19.081 2.758 1.010 17.118 2.357 3.582 14.209
ΛD −0.050 −0.333 −0.009 0.039 −4.021 20.835 2.818 0.780 20.035 2.427 3.837 18.225
ΛN −0.030 −0.312 0.673 0.067 4.202 35.203 2.251 0.831 13.989 1.858 3.690 15.502

Average −0.044 −0.331 0.221 0.048 −1.215 25.040 2.609 0.874 17.047 2.214 3.703 15.979

Indexes MSD
ML
Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt Mean Min Max SD Skew Kurt

Full Sample

ΛC 0.504 0.195 3.528 0.401 4.320 22.262 3.411 1.353 22.828 2.643 4.280 21.623
ΛD 0.527 0.156 4.228 0.424 4.513 26.739 4.211 1.275 32.554 3.338 4.509 26.601
ΛN 0.419 0.121 3.395 0.357 4.510 25.644 2.805 1.139 18.673 2.102 4.351 22.942

Average 0.483 0.157 3.717 0.394 4.448 24.882 3.476 1.256 24.685 2.694 4.380 23.722

Sub-Sample 1

ΛC 0.423 0.213 0.821 0.140 0.872 −0.176 2.870 1.538 5.398 0.918 0.837 −0.308
ΛD 0.433 0.190 0.945 0.159 0.779 0.066 3.464 1.582 7.500 1.253 0.772 0.059
ΛN 0.344 0.149 0.760 0.136 0.975 0.117 2.344 1.264 4.479 0.778 0.850 −0.405

Average 0.400 0.184 0.842 0.145 0.875 0.002 2.893 1.461 5.792 0.983 0.820 −0.218

Sub-Sample 2

ΛC 0.545 0.195 3.528 0.477 3.619 14.666 3.688 1.353 22.828 3.147 3.580 14.185
ΛD 0.575 0.156 4.228 0.501 3.841 18.328 4.593 1.275 32.554 3.952 3.837 18.217
ΛN 0.457 0.121 3.395 0.423 3.838 17.499 3.040 1.139 18.673 2.491 3.682 15.398

Average 0.526 0.157 3.717 0.467 3.766 16.831 3.774 1.256 24.685 3.197 3.700 15.933

Note: Min refers to the minimum, Max is the maximum, StD is the standard deviation, Skew is the Skewness, and Kurt is the kurtosis. VaR, EL, MSD, ES, EVaR, and ML, are, respectively, Value at Risk, Expected Loss, Mean plus Semi-Deviation, Expected Shortfall, Expectile Value at Risk, and Maximum Loss. ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.

4.2. Systemic risk results

In this subsection, we present the systemic risk estimates obtained by applying single component risk measures to the aggregate indexes. In comparison to the results, we described in Section 3.2 – where the focus was the aggregated indexes’ returns – the figures we provide in the present section reflect the tails of the aggregate indexes’ distribution. The descriptive statistics of the systemic risk estimates are introduced in Table 10.

Our results show that, regardless of the aggregate index, the mean systemic risk increases from sub-sample 1 to 2, except when EL is used. For an illustration, see ΛD and ES; the mean value is equal to 1.955% in sub-sample 1 and increases to 2.596% in sub-sample 2. The estimates are similar for VaR, and those for EVaR are slightly higher. Notice that, as most risk measures we use are not linear (but convex), results of this sort could not be inferred from the risk estimates of the individual indexes.

Moreover, except for EL, the risk estimates in both sub-samples are smaller when ΛN is used. For instance, when ES is combined with ΛN, the average systemic risk is 1.559% in sub-sample 1 and 2.044% in sub-sample 2, which are smaller figures than when ΛD is used. The fact that the systemic risk increased less when ΛN was used (in comparison to that of ΛC and ΛD) is explained by the findings of Al-Awadhi et al., 2020, Andrieś et al., 2021, Ashraf, 2020 and Xu (2021), that show that the market’s performance was affected by the number of cases and deaths by COVID-19. Also, these results suit the observation of Li et al. (2021) that investors take the number of cases and deaths by COVID-19 as concerning factors of risk. As previously mentioned, we also observed a positive correlation between the death and confirmed coronavirus case rates and the mean risk of the individual countries. In a similar spirit, Andrieś et al. (2021) found that, for European countries, the number of cases and deaths by COVID-19 is directly related to the countries’ sovereign CDS spreads, which is an indication of high uncertainty. Therefore, it was expected that the risk would increase when the countries with more cases and deaths by COVID-19 receive higher weights. Furthermore, we see that ΛD generates the highest systemic risks among all other aggregation functions. This result can be justified because we observed a greater correlation between the death rates and the average single-index risk.32

We applied the right one-tailed (bilateral, respectively) Mann–Whitney test to analyze whether the median of the systemic risk in sub-sample 2 is higher (different, respectively) than in sub-sample 1. The tests are reported in Appendix. For both tests, the null hypothesis that the medians of the systemic risk are equal was rejected at a significance level of 1% for all aggregated index and risk measures except the EL. This result was expected, given the increased single-index risk observed. According to Fang, Chen, Yu, and Qian (2018), when individual markets are in distress, the risk to the entire system increases significantly at the start of the crisis. The significant median tests that we report sustain this argument, keeping in mind that we are adopting the “portfolio like” view on the financial system, as explained in Section 2. Our findings corroborate previous studies indicating a significant increase in systemic risk due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Abuzayed et al., 2021, Baumöhl et al., 2020, and Rizwan et al. (2020) reached conclusions similar to ours, although they employed a view on systemic risk more focused on the dissemination of financial shocks. For the banking system, the systemic risk vulnerabilities are mainly due to: (i) liquidity risk associated with economic downturns and reduced access to financing sources; (ii) loss of intermediation income that is a reflection of policy and regulatory responses, which suspended loan payments and made more loans available,33 for example; and (iii) reduction in intermediation business, which may affect the ability to finance operations and financing costs of financial institutions (Rizwan et al., 2020). Given these risks, the interconnection among financial institutions can spread individual issues to the network of institutions, resulting in a general heating-up of the financial system. In addition to adverse events generating chain reactions, they also facilitate the spread of pessimistic expectations, which contributes to an increase in systemic risk (Abuzayed et al., 2021).

Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the dynamics of the systemic risk were not V-shaped, even if abnormal positive returns dominated the period following the shock of March 2020. As illustrated in Fig. 5, the systemic risk remained above pre-pandemic levels until the end 2020. A possible reason for this is that several issues related to the pandemic – the availability of vaccines, for instance – were not settled right after March 2020. Yet, several novel sources of uncertainty have appeared since then. These considerations and our estimates indicate that the financial system was not as stable after March 2020 as before. The reduction in systemic risk observed at the end of 2020, in the first place, attests to the positive systemic risk response to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. For a description of policy responses, see section 2 of Aguilar et al. (2020) and Rizwan et al. (2020). Furthermore, as the positive results of the vaccines were released, agents and investors are pricing in the recovery of economies, which contributes to the stock’s valuation and reduction of systemic and single-index risks.

Fig. 5.

Fig. 5

Historical evolution of systemic risk estimates that we computed from aggregated indexes from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. The dotted grey line indicates November 17, 2019, and the dotted red line indicates March 9, 2020. Note: ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Fig. 5 shows that, for a given aggregation function, the historical evolution of the systemic risk follows remarkably similar patterns whenever we consider the VaR, ES, or EVAR as a single component risk measure. On the other hand, the plot changes abruptly when the EL is used as the single component risk measure. This follows, as mentioned earlier because the EL is a measure of the central tendency of the losses, not tail risk. This also explains why MSD also generates low systemic risk estimates. The ML, by its definition, generates the highest systemic risk among all other risk measures. Also, although the absolute values of ML and MSD differ from those of VaR, ES and EVaR, notice that they all generate the same pattern for the historical evolution of the systemic risk. This can be seen by looking at the red dotted line in Fig. 5, where these five measures indicate a sharp increase in systemic risk. As reported in Appendix (Table 19), for all risk measures, the systemic risk peaked in March 2020. For this period, Hanif, Mensi, and Vo (2021), in a study that investigates the spillover between the US and Chinese equity sectors also find significant abrupt changes in risk spillovers for all sectors analyzed. For Hanif et al. (2021), this change is explained by the investors’ sentiment, which affects investment decisions and, consequently, stock pricing. Baumöhl et al. (2020) points out that the systemic risk and the density of the spillover network were not so high even during the Subprime crisis. In 2008, the global financial crisis started in the United States and progressively spread to other nations. On the contrary, the coronavirus disease quickly brought the world economy to a standstill by instantly shutting down demand and supply lines around the globe due to extensive lockdowns (Ozkan, 2021).

Similarly to the single-index risks, we verify that the standard deviation of the systemic risk was higher during sub-sample 2 than in sub-sample 1 for all indexes and risk measures considered. The increase of the variability and the average value of systemic risk was also observed by Borri and Di Giorgio (2021), which investigated the systemic risk contribution of large European banks during the Great Financial Crisis, the European sovereign debt crisis, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The increase in systemic risk variability reflects the risk’s movement of abrupt increase near March 9, 2020, and the posterior retraction, as seen in Fig. 5. These downward and upward dynamics are the most distinctive characteristic of the historical evolution of the risks during sub-sample 2. Therefore, these are natural candidates for the leading causes of the increase in the standard deviation of the risk between sub-samples. Nonetheless, it is valid to stress that the systemic risk after March 2020 did not return to the pre-pandemic levels until almost the end of 2020. For ΛC, ΛD, and ΛN, we note an increase in the variability of systemic risk by approximately 245%, 215%, and 225%, respectively, from sub-sample 1 to sub-sample 2 (except when EL is used). By illustration, the standard deviation for systemic risk estimates of ΛC using ES is equal to 0.621 in sub-sample 1 and equal to 2.141 in sub-sample 2. The increased variability in systemic risk estimates is also noticed when the maximum and minimum systemic risks are compared. For instance, for both sub-samples, the minimum systemic VaR varies between 0.69% and 0.98% (depending on the aggregation function considered). On the other hand, the maximum VaR ranges from 2.85% to 4.19% in sub-sample 1, while in sub-sample 2 it ranges from 12% to 18.3%. This means that the maximum systemic risk during sub-sample 2 was far above the minimum and that this gap is approximately 3 to 4 times wider in sub-sample 2 than in sub-sample 1. Similar figures hold for ES and EVaR. This also shows that the maximum systemic risk increased substantially between the sub-samples. This increase was even more remarkable for ML. The maximum systemic ML was similar to the others during sub-sample 1. However, the ML detaches from the general trend during March 2020, which caused the systemic ML to present the largest gap between the maximum systemic risk sub-sample 1 (near 4.5% to 7.5%) and in sub-sample 2 (18.7% to 32.5%). As expected, the maximum systemic risk is the lowest for the EL, ranging from -0.009% to 0.673% during sub-sample 2. It is valid to mention that although the variation of the maximum systemic EL is small in absolute terms, it is remarkably large in percentage terms. For instance, when ΛN is used with EL, the maximum risk in sub-sample 2 is more than six times the maximum risk in sub-sample 1. This happens mainly due to the low values of the systemic EL in sub-sample 1. For all risk measures, we found that the maximum systemic risk occurred in March 2020, corroborating with single-index risk findings.

The skewness and kurtosis were also higher in sub-sample 2. The higher skewness indicates a strong right-sided asymmetry of the distribution of the systemic risk, while the higher kurtosis indicates more realizations of extreme values. In addition, we found that these descriptive statistics of the systemic risk are similar for MSD, VaR, ES, EVaR, or ML. As mentioned for the single-index risks, this observation is explained by the similarity of these risk measures’ historical evolution over the period considered. The similarity between the descriptive statistics is greater for ES, EVaR, ML, and VaR. These are tail risk measures, and the significance levels were chosen to make them similar. We have also considered other weighted averages as aggregation functions as a robustness check. In particular, we observed that the systemic risk behavior remains qualitatively equal when the weights are given by the number of deaths and cases per 1 million inhabitants. Because of this similarity, these results are omitted from the study.

Furthermore, to confirm whether the evolution of systemic and single-index risks from different markets moved in similar directions during the sample period, we describe in Table 16 a correlation of the VaR risks of each market with the systemic risk computed by VaR.34 We note that during sub-sample 1, the correlation tends to be negative. Thus, each market’s risk does not follow the behavior of systemic risk. This result indicates no spread of financial disturbances from one market to another in the period before the pandemic. However, we observed that this correlation was positive for most markets during the pandemic. Corroborating with our descriptive statistics, we can conclude that as the single-index risk of the markets increased, the risk of the system followed the same direction. It is also noted that the correlations between single-index risk from countries and systemic risk differ. This finding indicates that the contribution of each market to the risk of the system tends to be different. Future analysis can investigate the markets that most contributed to political uncertainty and panic in the economy of each of the markets analyzed during the pandemic. Investigations along these lines, for the spread of the Subprime Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, are found in Samitas et al. (2020). However, this point deserves future investigations into the current crisis.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we describe how COVID-19 affected the risk of individual market indexes and the risk of the system composed of these indexes. We considered market indexes from the thirty-five countries with the higher number of cases and deaths by COVID-19. Our results confirm that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was felt beyond the health sector and led to severe consequences in stock markets and the financial system composed of these markets.

We assessed the single-index risk with VaR, ES, EL, EVaR, MSD, and ML using a semi-parametric approach known as Filtered Historical Simulation. Our single-index risk estimates corroborate known facts and unveil new ones. For instance, we observed that the initial financial shock of March 2020, which was already documented in the literature, occurred with a remarkable simultaneity across a large sample of countries. Moreover, this synchronicity involved a time delay between the maximum loss and the peak of their risks. Also, we could identify that some European and American countries, particularly those which were, at some point, epicenters of the COVID-19 pandemic, had their financial markets among the most affected in our sample.

We quantified the systemic risk using the approach developed by Chen et al. (2013). This approach considers a single component risk measure and an aggregation function. As single component risk measures, we used those employed for the single-index risk analysis. We considered three aggregation functions, which are averages with different weights. As the benchmark, we used the naive average, and we further considered aggregation functions based on the number of confirmed cases and deaths due to COVID-19 in each country. Regardless of the combination of risk measure and aggregation functions being employed, the systemic risk followed the single-index risks, in that both spiked during March 2020. The systemic risk remained above pre-pandemic levels until the end of 2020.

The estimates we obtained for the systemic risk were consistent across several “robustness checks”. Our estimates are similar for the various aggregation functions and most single component risk measures considered. This result indicates that the systemic risk measures we employed are reliable tools for measuring systemic risk. We present a detailed description of the dynamics of systemic risk, illustrating Chen’s approach’s potential to serve as a tool for regulatory authorities and policymakers to assess, monitor, and manage systemic risk.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Fernanda Maria Müller: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Software, Supervision, Validation, Visualization, Roles/Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Samuel Solgon Santos: Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Resources, Software, Validation, Visualization, Roles/Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Marcelo Brutti Righi: Conceptualization, Data curation, Formal analysis, Funding acquisition, Investigation, Methodology, Project administration, Resources, Supervision, Validation, Roles/Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing.

Declaration of Competing Interest

The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

Footnotes

We thank the editor, associate editor, and reviewer for the constructive comments and suggestions. These were very useful in improving the manuscript’s quality. We are grateful for the financial support of the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) projects number 302369/2018-0 and 407556/2018-4 and for financial support from the Brazilian Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel (CAPES) under grant number 88882.439088/2019-01.

1

We name the risk of each market index as single-index risk.

2

We use the term “single component” to distinguish these from the systemic risk measures.

3

Eighteen systemic risk measures because there are three aggregation functions combined with six single component risk measures.

4

Chen et al. (2013) originally proposed the term “single firm risk measures”, which was later also adopted by Kromer et al. (2016). The term “firm” suits well the framework of Chen et al. (2013) because their central motivation was to measure the risk of an economy. The term “firm” does not fit as neatly with our application, so we change the term by component.

5

We have opted to analyze 40 countries in each group for the sake of computational tractability and convenience and the availability of information for the period. The year 2020, especially from March onwards, concentrates on the peak of the rate of new cases and deaths by COVID-19, as well as the greatest losses and variability in the financial markets. Therefore, our choice of considering the number of cases and deaths until November 2020 is aligned with our goal of studying the financial markets of the countries that suffered the most during the peak of the pandemic. We also selected the 40 countries with the most deaths and/or cases of COVID-19 until October 25, 2021. The overall sample remained the same. However, China dropped out of the sample. This country had great relevance in the pandemic, as it was the first epicenter of COVID-19. Thus, we consider the 40 countries with the most cases and/or deaths from COVID-19 until November 11, 2020. However, additional results are available under request..

6

Quandl and quantmod are R packages (R. Core Team, 2020).

7

Countries that belong to the G20 represent more than 80% of world GDP, 75% of global trade, and 60% of the population of the planet (Zhang et al., 2020).

8

For the registration of the first case of COVID-19, we follow newspaper sources, such as South China Morning Post (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coronavirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back). We use the pre-pandemic period to compare risk outcomes with the pandemic period. As robustness tests, we consider a longer pre-pandemic period with data starting in January 2016 and January 2018. The results were qualitatively equal to the study sample. For this reason, they have been omitted but are available under request.

9

We use daily prices observed for trading days that have occurred simultaneously in all stock markets considered.

10

In fact, we report the excess kurtosis, which is defined as the kurtosis of the distribution minus 3, which is the kurtosis of a normal distribution.

11

In the Coronavirus timeline available at the following link https://www.thinkglobalhealth.org/article/updated-timeline-coronavirus it is possible to verify the periods in which there is an increase in cases and/or deaths from COVID-19 in different countries. This link also highlights the epicenters of the pandemic.

12

The table with the dates of maximum and minimum returns is available under request. We omit it here for the sake of brevity.

13

Notice that, since no case nor death by COVID-19 happened during sub-sample 1, we use the same weights for both sub-samples.

14

As a robustness test, we performed the weighting of the aggregate indexes based on the weights obtained by the absolute number of deaths and cases per 1 million inhabitants. The results were qualitatively similar. For this reason, they are omitted but are available on request.

15

The average daily log-returns of the market indexes is close to zero. This characteristic is known in the literature and encompasses a set of stylized facts observed in daily log-returns of stock indexes, for example. See McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts (2015).

16

It is noteworthy that the reasons presented here for recovering aggregate indexes and not rejecting the null hypothesis are also valid for not rejecting the null hypothesis when referring to individual indexes (Table 2 describes the statistics for these series).

17

The table with the minimum and maximum dates is available on request.

18

Several works have studied systemic risk by analyzing the degree of interconnectivity and dependence in the financial systemic. On the other hand, our focus is on measuring systemic risk through tail-risk measures. Both approaches are connected. However, they use different methodological procedures and, therefore, it would be out of our scope to pursue a detailed analysis of the dependence structure between the markets.

19

We select the AR-GARCH model because it is common in risk forecasting literature (see Hartz, Mittnik, & Paolella, 2006 and Righi & Ceretta, 2015, for instance).

20

The HS approach is commonly used in academia and the financial industry. The approach considers the empirical distribution of the data, making no assumptions about the data distribution. See Pérignon and Smith (2010).

21

We omit the correlation values, but they are available under request.

22

The positive correlation between cases and deaths by COVID-19 with average risk corroborates the decision to use both variables to generate the aggregated indexes in the analysis of systemic risk.

23

China and India are the countries with the largest populations in the world. VaR Fig. 4 illustrates a certain stability of China’s risk. Based on descriptive statistics, we note that the average risk value for the complete sample is similar to that for the sub-samples, despite the average being higher in sub-sample 1. In addition to China’s rapid recovery from the impact of the coronavirus, it is worth noting that the country experienced, together with the United States, a crisis in 2019. Thus, in sub-sample 1, China and Turkey had the highest average risk value in Europe and Asia. On the other hand, India had lower mean risk estimates in sub-sample 1, and thus the increase in its mean risk across sub-samples was greater. It is noteworthy that, because of the conceptual differences between the risk measures, the countries may figure in different positions when comparing their risks through different risk measures. For example, in sub-sample 2, the mean ES of China is greater than that of India, whereas the mean VaR of India is greater than that of China in the same sub-sample. Unlike China, India’s response to COVID-19 has not been as successful. For more details, see Lancet (2021).

24

To separate countries into continents, we consider that Turkey and Russia belong to Europe and Asia.

25

We have included Spain, which is an invited member, to the G20.

26

The value at risk plotted in Fig. 4 had its signal converted so that the plot of VaR can be compared to the negative returns of the indexes.

27

Jia, Wen, and Lin (2021) analyzed the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and international oil price on China. According to the results, COVID-19 had a much more significant impact on China’s environment and economy than international oil prices. At first, the drop in oil prices will affect crude oil extraction companies, and given that the price remains low for a long time, it can cause fluctuations in the financial market and the economy. On the other hand, the pandemic triggered the closure of business activity, stoppage of non-essential service factories, increase in unemployment, and reduction of purchasing power, which can be considered as a massive blow against the economies (Jia et al., 2021). In line with the fact that our main purpose is to analyze the effects of the pandemic on the single-index and systemic risk of the countries most affected by the coronavirus, these findings prevent us from entering the fierce oil price war on March 8, 2020. We also emphasize that although the oil trade war may have aggravated losses, it is not our goal to isolate nor compare the effect of the two events.

28

The correlation matrix was performed considering Kendall’s correlation since it is a non-parametric measure. The results obtained via the Spearman and Pearson correlation are consistent with those found. Furthermore, we present the correlation matrix only for VaR estimates, but other risk measures are available on request. It is noteworthy that the results of the other measures, except for EL, are similar. The results are shown for sub-sample 1 and 2 only, and full sample results are also available on request.

29

According to Samitas, Kampouris, and Umar (2020), contagion refers to the propagation of financial disturbances from one country to others or from a specific channel to everyone.

30

The table with the date of the maximum and minimum value for each risk measure and the country is available in the Appendix (Table 17).

31

Abuzayed et al. (2021) found that the United States can be considered as the main stock market in transmitting (or receiving) the marginal tail risk of global markets during the pandemic. As highlighted by Samitas et al. (2020), the United States is the core of the global financial system. If that system collapses, there is a possibility that the entire world financial environment will go into crisis.

32

For the sake of brevity, these results are omitted, but they are available on request..

33

These measures, more immediately, contributed to reducing the default risk. However, they were responsible for the significant increase in non-performing loans (Ari, Chen, & Ratnovski, 2020)..

34

The correlation was obtained using the Kendall measure. Correlation of the results of each country with the systemic risk, considering the estimates obtained via ML, EL, ES, EVaR, and MSD, are available on request. These results are not presented for brevity. However, it is worth noting that the results were similar to VaR. This is not only valid for EL.

Appendix. Appendix - results of empirical analysis

See Table 11, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14, Table 15, Table 16, Table 17, Table 18, Table 19, Table 20.

Table 16.

Correlation (Kendall correlation) matrix between VaR estimates for market indexes from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Correlations were performed only for the sub-samples. Sub-sample 1 comprehends risk forecasting from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends risk forecasting from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Sub-sample 1

Argentina 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.126 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
Austria 0.999 1.000 0.150 0.999 0.998 0.820 0.999 −0.003 0.999 0.052 0.595 0.031 0.587 0.037 −0.264 −0.517 0.672 0.999 0.215 −0.127 0.261 0.409 0.290 0.728 0.337 −0.278 0.999 0.454 0.098 0.999 0.893 0.830 0.388 0.438 0.999
Bangladesh 0.151 0.150 1.000 0.151 0.151 0.103 0.151 0.063 0.151 0.036 0.026 0.106 0.121 0.083 −0.007 −0.196 0.051 0.151 0.001 0.176 0.038 0.132 −0.046 0.095 −0.080 −0.085 0.151 0.101 −0.019 0.151 0.128 0.121 0.187 −0.008 0.151
Belgium 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.127 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
Brazil 0.999 0.998 0.151 0.999 1.000 0.820 0.999 −0.002 0.998 0.052 0.595 0.031 0.587 0.037 −0.265 −0.516 0.672 0.999 0.215 −0.126 0.262 0.409 0.290 0.729 0.338 −0.278 0.999 0.455 0.098 0.999 0.893 0.830 0.388 0.439 0.999
Canada 0.821 0.820 0.103 0.821 0.820 1.000 0.821 0.109 0.820 0.127 0.710 −0.002 0.632 0.014 −0.234 −0.374 0.782 0.821 0.269 −0.118 0.327 0.456 0.353 0.839 0.454 −0.222 0.821 0.473 0.131 0.821 0.892 0.860 0.380 0.506 0.821
Chile 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.126 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
China −0.002 −0.003 0.063 −0.002 −0.002 0.109 −0.002 1.000 −0.003 −0.064 0.202 0.067 0.215 0.008 0.241 −0.170 0.204 −0.002 0.078 0.205 0.088 0.450 0.333 0.179 0.240 0.050 −0.002 0.173 −0.294 −0.002 0.044 0.082 0.438 0.294 −0.002
Czechia 0.999 0.999 0.151 0.999 0.998 0.820 0.999 −0.003 1.000 0.053 0.595 0.031 0.587 0.037 −0.264 −0.517 0.672 0.999 0.215 −0.127 0.261 0.409 0.290 0.729 0.337 −0.278 0.999 0.454 0.099 0.999 0.893 0.830 0.388 0.438 0.999
Egypt 0.053 0.052 0.036 0.053 0.052 0.127 0.053 −0.064 0.053 1.000 0.242 −0.112 0.023 0.003 −0.141 0.161 0.137 0.053 0.275 0.169 0.314 −0.022 0.197 0.214 0.277 0.152 0.053 0.215 0.414 0.053 0.108 0.144 0.035 0.221 0.053
France 0.596 0.595 0.026 0.596 0.595 0.710 0.596 0.202 0.595 0.242 1.000 −0.085 0.617 0.015 −0.102 −0.225 0.814 0.596 0.319 −0.146 0.441 0.494 0.486 0.763 0.598 −0.077 0.596 0.541 0.255 0.596 0.690 0.740 0.478 0.725 0.596
Germany 0.031 0.031 0.106 0.031 0.031 −0.002 0.031 0.067 0.031 −0.112 −0.085 1.000 0.000 −0.022 −0.021 −0.157 −0.029 0.031 −0.094 0.163 −0.090 0.037 −0.142 −0.048 −0.188 0.048 0.031 −0.036 −0.140 0.031 −0.010 −0.039 0.006 −0.040 0.031
India 0.588 0.587 0.121 0.588 0.587 0.632 0.588 0.215 0.587 0.023 0.617 0.000 1.000 0.061 −0.066 −0.322 0.695 0.588 0.233 −0.034 0.219 0.622 0.348 0.646 0.432 −0.101 0.588 0.447 0.097 0.588 0.662 0.616 0.397 0.478 0.588
Indonesia 0.037 0.037 0.083 0.037 0.037 0.014 0.037 0.008 0.037 0.003 0.015 −0.022 0.061 1.000 0.031 −0.013 0.034 0.037 −0.017 −0.002 −0.055 0.025 0.002 0.052 0.018 −0.038 0.037 0.066 0.037 0.037 0.034 0.029 0.031 0.048 0.037
Iraq −0.265 −0.264 −0.007 −0.265 −0.265 −0.234 −0.265 0.241 −0.264 −0.141 −0.102 −0.021 −0.066 0.031 1.000 0.046 −0.098 −0.265 −0.178 0.039 −0.022 0.052 0.127 −0.191 −0.096 0.114 −0.265 −0.073 −0.156 −0.265 −0.232 −0.204 0.090 0.058 −0.265
Israel −0.517 −0.517 −0.196 −0.517 −0.516 −0.374 −0.517 −0.170 −0.517 0.161 −0.225 −0.157 −0.322 −0.013 0.046 1.000 −0.282 −0.517 −0.011 −0.001 −0.022 −0.225 −0.055 −0.300 −0.056 0.144 −0.517 −0.199 0.110 −0.517 −0.431 −0.383 −0.362 −0.239 −0.517
Italy 0.673 0.672 0.051 0.673 0.672 0.782 0.673 0.204 0.672 0.137 0.814 −0.029 0.695 0.034 −0.098 −0.282 1.000 0.673 0.273 −0.077 0.323 0.591 0.429 0.799 0.519 −0.121 0.673 0.505 0.173 0.673 0.768 0.749 0.474 0.638 0.673
Morocco 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.126 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
Mexico 0.215 0.215 0.001 0.215 0.215 0.269 0.215 0.078 0.215 0.275 0.319 −0.094 0.233 −0.017 −0.178 −0.011 0.273 0.215 1.000 0.042 0.278 0.191 0.376 0.268 0.326 0.131 0.215 0.182 0.222 0.215 0.279 0.306 0.152 0.267 0.215
Nepal −0.126 −0.127 0.176 −0.127 −0.126 −0.118 −0.126 0.205 −0.127 0.169 −0.146 0.163 −0.034 −0.002 0.039 −0.001 −0.077 −0.126 0.042 1.000 −0.148 0.058 −0.032 −0.062 −0.128 0.030 −0.126 −0.030 −0.024 −0.127 −0.130 −0.125 0.047 −0.084 −0.127
Netherlands 0.261 0.261 0.038 0.261 0.262 0.327 0.261 0.088 0.261 0.314 0.441 −0.090 0.219 −0.055 −0.022 −0.022 0.323 0.261 0.278 −0.148 1.000 0.147 0.421 0.349 0.460 0.157 0.261 0.303 0.285 0.261 0.307 0.349 0.172 0.363 0.261
Pakistan 0.410 0.409 0.132 0.410 0.409 0.456 0.410 0.450 0.409 −0.022 0.494 0.037 0.622 0.025 0.052 −0.225 0.591 0.410 0.191 0.058 0.147 1.000 0.337 0.505 0.371 −0.091 0.410 0.341 −0.134 0.410 0.481 0.442 0.538 0.460 0.410
Philippines 0.291 0.290 −0.046 0.291 0.290 0.353 0.291 0.333 0.290 0.197 0.486 −0.142 0.348 0.002 0.127 −0.055 0.429 0.291 0.376 −0.032 0.421 0.337 1.000 0.419 0.440 0.086 0.291 0.316 0.163 0.291 0.352 0.410 0.288 0.462 0.291
Poland 0.729 0.728 0.095 0.729 0.729 0.839 0.729 0.179 0.729 0.214 0.763 −0.048 0.646 0.052 −0.191 −0.300 0.799 0.729 0.268 −0.062 0.349 0.505 0.419 1.000 0.504 −0.232 0.729 0.542 0.194 0.729 0.808 0.807 0.449 0.583 0.729
Portugal 0.338 0.337 −0.080 0.338 0.338 0.454 0.338 0.240 0.337 0.277 0.598 −0.188 0.432 0.018 −0.096 −0.056 0.519 0.338 0.326 −0.128 0.460 0.371 0.440 0.504 1.000 0.132 0.338 0.346 0.255 0.338 0.419 0.443 0.263 0.536 0.338
Romania −0.278 −0.278 −0.085 −0.278 −0.278 −0.222 −0.278 0.050 −0.278 0.152 −0.077 0.048 −0.101 −0.038 0.114 0.144 −0.121 −0.278 0.131 0.030 0.157 −0.091 0.086 −0.232 0.132 1.000 −0.278 0.015 0.193 −0.278 −0.235 −0.215 −0.135 0.038 −0.278
Russia 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.126 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
Saudi Arabia 0.455 0.454 0.101 0.455 0.455 0.473 0.455 0.173 0.454 0.215 0.541 −0.036 0.447 0.066 −0.073 −0.199 0.505 0.455 0.182 −0.030 0.303 0.341 0.316 0.542 0.346 0.015 0.455 1.000 0.166 0.455 0.455 0.491 0.350 0.416 0.455
South Africa 0.099 0.098 −0.019 0.099 0.098 0.131 0.099 −0.294 0.099 0.414 0.255 −0.140 0.097 0.037 −0.156 0.110 0.173 0.099 0.222 −0.024 0.285 −0.134 0.163 0.194 0.255 0.193 0.099 0.166 1.000 0.099 0.141 0.193 −0.085 0.189 0.099
Spain 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.127 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000
Sweden 0.894 0.893 0.128 0.894 0.893 0.892 0.894 0.044 0.893 0.108 0.690 −0.010 0.662 0.034 −0.232 −0.431 0.768 0.894 0.279 −0.130 0.307 0.481 0.352 0.808 0.419 −0.235 0.894 0.455 0.141 0.894 1.000 0.892 0.389 0.505 0.894
Switzerland 0.830 0.830 0.121 0.830 0.830 0.860 0.830 0.082 0.830 0.144 0.740 −0.039 0.616 0.029 −0.204 −0.383 0.749 0.830 0.306 −0.125 0.349 0.442 0.410 0.807 0.443 −0.215 0.830 0.491 0.193 0.830 0.892 1.000 0.437 0.541 0.830
Turkey 0.389 0.388 0.187 0.389 0.388 0.380 0.389 0.438 0.388 0.035 0.478 0.006 0.397 0.031 0.090 −0.362 0.474 0.389 0.152 0.047 0.172 0.538 0.288 0.449 0.263 −0.135 0.389 0.350 −0.085 0.389 0.389 0.437 1.000 0.514 0.389
UK 0.439 0.438 −0.008 0.439 0.439 0.506 0.439 0.294 0.438 0.221 0.725 −0.040 0.478 0.048 0.058 −0.239 0.638 0.439 0.267 −0.084 0.363 0.460 0.462 0.583 0.536 0.038 0.439 0.416 0.189 0.439 0.505 0.541 0.514 1.000 0.439
USA 1.000 0.999 0.151 1.000 0.999 0.821 1.000 −0.002 0.999 0.053 0.596 0.031 0.588 0.037 −0.265 −0.517 0.673 1.000 0.215 −0.127 0.261 0.410 0.291 0.729 0.338 −0.278 1.000 0.455 0.099 1.000 0.894 0.830 0.389 0.439 1.000

Sub-sample 2

Argentina 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
Austria 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
Bangladesh −0.108 −0.108 1.000 −0.114 −0.107 −0.363 −0.108 0.025 −0.108 −0.096 −0.275 0.138 −0.037 0.022 0.043 −0.264 −0.200 −0.108 −0.147 0.426 −0.228 0.002 −0.189 −0.269 −0.228 −0.191 −0.108 0.006 −0.302 −0.108 −0.382 −0.353 0.035 −0.173 −0.108
Belgium 0.983 0.983 −0.114 1.000 0.983 0.052 0.983 0.171 0.983 −0.122 0.050 −0.084 −0.098 −0.001 0.192 0.013 0.120 0.983 0.080 −0.048 0.079 −0.058 −0.057 0.111 0.166 0.083 0.983 −0.248 0.064 0.983 0.013 0.008 0.048 0.017 0.983
Brazil 0.998 0.998 −0.107 0.983 1.000 0.067 0.998 0.181 0.998 −0.108 0.065 −0.098 −0.083 0.002 0.195 0.027 0.136 0.998 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.044 −0.042 0.127 0.182 0.098 0.998 −0.238 0.079 0.998 0.028 0.023 0.064 0.034 0.998
Canada 0.068 0.068 −0.363 0.052 0.067 1.000 0.068 0.349 0.068 0.450 0.780 −0.406 0.350 0.085 0.156 0.773 0.590 0.068 0.477 −0.150 0.671 0.276 0.610 0.730 0.680 0.632 0.068 0.122 0.763 0.068 0.840 0.876 0.354 0.579 0.068
Chile 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
China 0.180 0.180 0.025 0.171 0.181 0.349 0.180 1.000 0.180 0.266 0.352 −0.197 0.177 0.110 0.327 0.377 0.331 0.180 0.142 0.300 0.325 0.109 0.372 0.281 0.264 0.305 0.180 −0.051 0.291 0.180 0.368 0.387 0.430 0.348 0.180
Czechia 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
Egypt −0.107 −0.107 −0.096 −0.122 −0.108 0.450 −0.107 0.266 −0.107 1.000 0.482 −0.318 0.238 0.086 0.027 0.502 0.331 −0.107 0.382 0.001 0.451 0.310 0.561 0.424 0.405 0.409 −0.107 0.273 0.455 −0.107 0.434 0.484 0.241 0.424 −0.107
France 0.066 0.066 −0.275 0.050 0.065 0.780 0.066 0.352 0.066 0.482 1.000 −0.408 0.481 0.101 0.119 0.769 0.747 0.066 0.550 −0.087 0.705 0.386 0.669 0.798 0.761 0.731 0.066 0.215 0.816 0.066 0.736 0.798 0.417 0.732 0.066
Germany −0.099 −0.099 0.138 −0.084 −0.098 −0.406 −0.099 −0.197 −0.099 −0.318 −0.408 1.000 −0.291 −0.169 −0.042 −0.440 −0.342 −0.099 −0.423 0.084 −0.389 −0.258 −0.402 −0.454 −0.465 −0.421 −0.099 −0.242 −0.462 −0.099 −0.406 −0.437 −0.266 −0.349 −0.099
India −0.082 −0.082 −0.037 −0.098 −0.083 0.350 −0.082 0.177 −0.082 0.238 0.481 −0.291 1.000 0.109 0.033 0.466 0.595 −0.082 0.442 −0.070 0.406 0.492 0.397 0.451 0.424 0.497 −0.082 0.379 0.463 −0.082 0.325 0.352 0.355 0.578 −0.082
Indonesia 0.001 0.001 0.022 −0.001 0.002 0.085 0.001 0.110 0.001 0.086 0.101 −0.169 0.109 1.000 −0.037 0.137 0.123 0.001 0.138 0.026 0.100 0.101 0.114 0.137 0.138 0.159 0.001 0.104 0.130 0.001 0.083 0.090 0.115 0.129 0.001
Iraq 0.193 0.193 0.043 0.192 0.195 0.156 0.193 0.327 0.193 0.027 0.119 −0.042 0.033 −0.037 1.000 0.167 0.140 0.193 −0.011 0.253 0.122 −0.134 0.155 0.053 0.004 0.036 0.193 −0.171 0.069 0.193 0.202 0.155 0.162 0.140 0.193
Israel 0.027 0.027 −0.264 0.013 0.027 0.773 0.027 0.377 0.027 0.502 0.769 −0.440 0.466 0.137 0.167 1.000 0.632 0.027 0.562 −0.022 0.685 0.382 0.667 0.733 0.695 0.678 0.027 0.243 0.783 0.027 0.698 0.746 0.373 0.643 0.027
Italy 0.135 0.135 −0.200 0.120 0.136 0.590 0.135 0.331 0.135 0.331 0.747 −0.342 0.595 0.123 0.140 0.632 1.000 0.135 0.504 −0.061 0.581 0.381 0.521 0.721 0.669 0.659 0.135 0.211 0.690 0.135 0.584 0.618 0.479 0.750 0.135
Morocco 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
Mexico 0.095 0.095 −0.147 0.080 0.095 0.477 0.095 0.142 0.095 0.382 0.550 −0.423 0.442 0.138 −0.011 0.562 0.504 0.095 1.000 −0.187 0.537 0.432 0.484 0.573 0.620 0.624 0.095 0.287 0.611 0.095 0.428 0.477 0.250 0.473 0.095
Nepal −0.051 −0.051 0.426 −0.048 −0.051 −0.150 −0.051 0.300 −0.051 0.001 −0.087 0.084 −0.070 0.026 0.253 −0.022 −0.061 −0.051 −0.187 1.000 −0.132 −0.088 −0.007 −0.135 −0.146 −0.108 −0.051 −0.035 −0.140 −0.051 −0.140 −0.113 0.111 0.021 −0.051
Netherlands 0.094 0.094 −0.228 0.079 0.094 0.671 0.094 0.325 0.094 0.451 0.705 −0.389 0.406 0.100 0.122 0.685 0.581 0.094 0.537 −0.132 1.000 0.355 0.612 0.657 0.648 0.638 0.094 0.166 0.709 0.094 0.633 0.687 0.369 0.557 0.094
Pakistan −0.043 −0.043 0.002 −0.058 −0.044 0.276 −0.043 0.109 −0.043 0.310 0.386 −0.258 0.492 0.101 −0.134 0.382 0.381 −0.043 0.432 −0.088 0.355 1.000 0.324 0.421 0.447 0.459 −0.043 0.506 0.402 −0.043 0.184 0.244 0.210 0.386 −0.043
Philippines −0.041 −0.041 −0.189 −0.057 −0.042 0.610 −0.041 0.372 −0.041 0.561 0.669 −0.402 0.397 0.114 0.155 0.667 0.521 −0.041 0.484 −0.007 0.612 0.324 1.000 0.582 0.544 0.592 −0.041 0.221 0.630 −0.041 0.597 0.667 0.352 0.567 −0.041
Poland 0.127 0.127 −0.269 0.111 0.127 0.730 0.127 0.281 0.127 0.424 0.798 −0.454 0.451 0.137 0.053 0.733 0.721 0.127 0.573 −0.135 0.657 0.421 0.582 1.000 0.835 0.755 0.127 0.276 0.819 0.127 0.670 0.732 0.447 0.649 0.127
Portugal 0.182 0.182 −0.228 0.166 0.182 0.680 0.182 0.264 0.182 0.405 0.761 −0.465 0.424 0.138 0.004 0.695 0.669 0.182 0.620 −0.146 0.648 0.447 0.544 0.835 1.000 0.730 0.182 0.262 0.773 0.182 0.609 0.676 0.415 0.607 0.182
Romania 0.098 0.098 −0.191 0.083 0.098 0.632 0.098 0.305 0.098 0.409 0.731 −0.421 0.497 0.159 0.036 0.678 0.659 0.098 0.624 −0.108 0.638 0.459 0.592 0.755 0.730 1.000 0.098 0.283 0.718 0.098 0.555 0.622 0.390 0.653 0.098
Russia 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
SaudiArabia −0.239 −0.239 0.006 −0.248 −0.238 0.122 −0.239 −0.051 −0.239 0.273 0.215 −0.242 0.379 0.104 −0.171 0.243 0.211 −0.239 0.287 −0.035 0.166 0.506 0.221 0.276 0.262 0.283 −0.239 1.000 0.251 −0.239 0.052 0.111 0.213 0.271 −0.239
SouthAfrica 0.080 0.080 −0.302 0.064 0.079 0.763 0.080 0.291 0.080 0.455 0.816 −0.462 0.463 0.130 0.069 0.783 0.690 0.080 0.611 −0.140 0.709 0.402 0.630 0.819 0.773 0.718 0.080 0.251 1.000 0.080 0.706 0.769 0.415 0.654 0.080
Spain 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000
Sweden 0.029 0.029 −0.382 0.013 0.028 0.840 0.029 0.368 0.029 0.434 0.736 −0.406 0.325 0.083 0.202 0.698 0.584 0.029 0.428 −0.140 0.633 0.184 0.597 0.670 0.609 0.555 0.029 0.052 0.706 0.029 1.000 0.875 0.381 0.570 0.029
Switzerland 0.024 0.024 −0.353 0.008 0.023 0.876 0.024 0.387 0.024 0.484 0.798 −0.437 0.352 0.090 0.155 0.746 0.618 0.024 0.477 −0.113 0.687 0.244 0.667 0.732 0.676 0.622 0.024 0.111 0.769 0.024 0.875 1.000 0.409 0.596 0.024
Turkey 0.065 0.065 0.035 0.048 0.064 0.354 0.065 0.430 0.065 0.241 0.417 −0.266 0.355 0.115 0.162 0.373 0.479 0.065 0.250 0.111 0.369 0.210 0.352 0.447 0.415 0.390 0.065 0.213 0.415 0.065 0.381 0.409 1.000 0.408 0.065
UK 0.034 0.034 −0.173 0.017 0.034 0.579 0.034 0.348 0.034 0.424 0.732 −0.349 0.578 0.129 0.140 0.643 0.750 0.034 0.473 0.021 0.557 0.386 0.567 0.649 0.607 0.653 0.034 0.271 0.654 0.034 0.570 0.596 0.408 1.000 0.034
USA 1.000 1.000 −0.108 0.983 0.998 0.068 1.000 0.180 1.000 −0.107 0.066 −0.099 −0.082 0.001 0.193 0.027 0.135 1.000 0.095 −0.051 0.094 −0.043 −0.041 0.127 0.182 0.098 1.000 −0.239 0.080 1.000 0.029 0.024 0.065 0.034 1.000

Note: In the line that labels each column, i.e., the country names, we use numbers to represent each country. We did this to organize the table on the same page. 1 is Argentina, 2 is Austria, 3 is Bangladesh, 4 is Belgium, 5 is Brazil, 6 is Canada, 7 is Chile, 8 is China, 9 is Czechia, 10 is Egypt, 11 is France, 12 is Germany, 13 is India, 14 is Indonesia, 15 is Iraq, 16 is Israel, 17 is Italy, 18 is Morocco, 19 is Mexico, 20 is Nepal, 21 is Netherlands, 22 is Pakistan, 23 is Philippines, 24 is Poland, 25 is Portugal, 26 is Romania, 27 is Russia, 28 is Saudi Arabia, 29 is South Africa, 30 is Spain, 31 is Sweden, 32 is Switzerland, 33 is Turkey, 34 is UK, and 35 is USA. Results for the full sample are omitted for brevity but are available on request.

Table 17.

Dates of maximum risk values and minimum values for the countries and risk measures considered. The date at the top is for the maximum, and the bottom is the minimum.

Countries VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML
Argentina 08/13/2019 08/14/2019 08/15/2019 08/13/2019 08/13/2019 08/13/2019
11/20/2018 08/13/2019 11/21/2018 11/20/2018 11/20/2018 11/20/2018
Austria 03/18/2020 03/22/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020
01/08/2021 04/21/2021 01/08/2021 01/08/2021 01/08/2021 01/08/2021
Bangladesh 03/20/2020 11/18/2018 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
11/19/2018 03/20/2020 11/19/2018 11/19/2018 11/19/2018 11/19/2018
Belgium 03/18/2020 03/25/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
12/30/2019 02/25/2020 12/30/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019
Brazil 03/20/2020 03/15/2020 03/18/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
12/27/2019 03/13/2020 12/29/2019 12/27/2019 12/27/2019 12/27/2019
Canada 03/19/2020 03/15/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020
01/19/2020 01/22/2020 01/19/2020 01/19/2020 01/19/2020 01/19/2020
Chile 03/22/2020 03/17/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020
01/13/2019 11/17/2019 01/13/2019 01/13/2019 01/13/2019 01/13/2019
China 03/26/2020 07/07/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020
11/19/2018 02/04/2020 11/19/2018 11/19/2018 11/19/2018 11/19/2018
Czechia 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
11/18/2018 07/16/2021 01/23/2020 11/18/2018 11/18/2018 11/18/2018
Egypt 03/17/2020 03/16/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020
02/18/2019 03/23/2020 06/08/2020 02/18/2019 02/18/2019 02/18/2019
France 03/19/2020 03/20/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020
04/18/2021 04/21/2021 04/18/2021 04/18/2021 04/18/2021 04/18/2021
Germany 03/19/2020 03/25/2020 03/20/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020
08/15/2021 03/13/2020 08/16/2021 08/15/2021 08/15/2021 08/15/2021
India 03/25/2020 03/24/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020
09/01/2021 04/08/2020 09/01/2021 09/01/2021 09/01/2021 09/01/2021
Indonesia 03/20/2020 03/27/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
01/28/2019 03/10/2020 01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019 01/28/2019
Iraq 08/26/2021 08/19/2021 08/26/2021 08/26/2021 08/26/2021 08/26/2021
04/26/2020 05/07/2020 04/26/2020 04/26/2020 04/26/2020 04/26/2020
Israel 03/26/2020 01/15/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020
01/15/2020 03/26/2020 01/15/2020 01/15/2020 01/15/2020 01/15/2020
Italy 03/13/2020 03/25/2020 03/19/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020
04/04/2019 03/13/2020 04/07/2019 04/04/2019 04/04/2019 04/04/2019
Morocco 03/30/2020 03/10/2020 03/29/2020 03/30/2020 03/30/2020 03/30/2020
07/06/2021 03/25/2020 02/01/2019 07/06/2021 07/06/2021 07/06/2021
Mexico 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
05/03/2021 03/11/2020 05/03/2021 05/03/2021 05/03/2021 05/03/2021
Nepal 07/03/2020 11/18/2018 07/03/2020 07/03/2020 07/03/2020 07/03/2020
11/18/2018 07/03/2020 11/18/2018 11/18/2018 11/18/2018 11/18/2018
Netherlands 03/13/2020 03/25/2020 03/19/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020
04/24/2019 03/13/2020 04/24/2019 04/24/2019 04/24/2019 04/24/2019
Pakistan 03/18/2020 03/24/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020 03/18/2020
07/27/2021 04/17/2020 07/27/2021 07/27/2021 07/27/2021 07/27/2021
Philippines 03/22/2020 03/27/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020 03/22/2020
07/15/2019 03/20/2020 07/17/2019 07/15/2019 07/15/2019 07/15/2019
Poland 03/15/2020 03/18/2020 03/15/2020 03/15/2020 03/15/2020 03/13/2020
06/07/2021 03/13/2020 06/08/2021 06/07/2021 06/07/2021 06/07/2021
Portugal 03/15/2020 03/25/2020 03/15/2020 03/15/2020 03/15/2020 03/15/2020
01/21/2020 03/13/2020 01/21/2020 01/21/2020 01/21/2020 01/21/2020
Romania 12/20/2018 12/20/2018 12/20/2018 12/20/2018 12/20/2018 12/20/2018
01/27/2020 01/10/2021 01/27/2020 01/27/2020 01/27/2020 01/27/2020
Russia 03/26/2020 03/20/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020
01/03/2020 03/11/2020 05/08/2019 01/03/2020 01/05/2020 01/05/2020
Saudi Arabia 03/12/2020 03/09/2020 03/12/2020 03/12/2020 03/12/2020 03/12/2020
08/24/2020 03/11/2020 08/19/2020 08/24/2020 08/24/2020 08/24/2020
South Africa 03/20/2020 03/27/2020 03/25/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
04/24/2019 03/13/2020 04/25/2019 04/24/2019 04/24/2019 04/24/2019
Spain 03/17/2020 03/25/2020 03/18/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
04/23/2019 03/13/2020 04/23/2019 04/23/2019 04/23/2019 04/23/2019
Sweden 03/26/2020 03/25/2020 03/25/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020 03/26/2020
12/30/2019 03/13/2020 12/31/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019
Switzerland 03/13/2020 03/25/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020
12/23/2020 03/13/2020 02/01/2021 12/23/2020 12/23/2020 12/23/2020
Turkey 03/17/2020 03/23/2021 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
11/12/2020 01/10/2020 11/12/2020 11/12/2020 11/12/2020 11/12/2020
UK 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020 03/20/2020
12/15/2019 11/10/2020 12/15/2019 12/15/2019 12/15/2019 12/15/2019
USA 03/17/2020 03/15/2020 03/18/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020
12/29/2019 03/17/2020 12/30/2019 12/29/2019 12/29/2019 09/03/2020

Table 18.

Bilateral and right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test applied on systemic risk estimates from Sub-sample 1 and Sub-sample 2. This table presents the p-value of the test. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Bilateral
Aggregated indexes VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML

ΛC 0.031 0.015 0.039 0.031 0.031 0.030
ΛD <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ΛN <0.001 0.334 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001

Right-tailed

Aggregated indexes VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML

ΛC 0.016 0.993 0.020 0.015 0.015 0.015
ΛD <0.001 1.000 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
ΛN <0.001 0.833 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001

Note: This table presents the p-value of the bilateral and one-tailed Mann–Whitney test. The bilateral test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1, and the alternative hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is different from sub-sample 1. The right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1. The alternative hypothesis is that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is higher than sub-sample 1. , , and indicate that the test is significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. VaR, EL, MSD, ES, EVaR, and ML, are, respectively, Value at Risk, Expected Loss, Mean plus Semi-Deviation, Expected Shortfall, Expectile Value at Risk, and Maximum Loss. ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.

Table 19.

Dates of maximum systemic risk values and minimum values for aggregated indexes and risk measures considered. The date at the top is for the maximum, and the bottom is the minimum.

Aggregated indexes VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML
ΛC 03/19/2020 03/10/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020 03/19/2020
12/30/2019 03/25/2020 12/30/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019 12/30/2019
ΛD 03/13/2020 03/24/2019 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020 03/13/2020
12/29/2019 03/18/2020 12/29/2019 12/29/2019 12/29/2019 12/29/2019
ΛN 03/17/2020 03/13/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/17/2020 03/19/2020
06/15/2021 03/25/2020 01/03/2020 06/15/2021 06/15/2021 06/15/2021

Note: ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.

Table 20.

Kendall’s correlation between VaR estimates for individual countries and the systemic risk of aggregate indexes. Systemic risk is computed using VaR and the three aggregation functions. Risk estimates comprise November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021. Sub-sample 1 comprehends risk estimates from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends risk forecasting from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Full sample
Sub-sample 1
Sub-sample 2
ΛC ΛD ΛN ΛC ΛD ΛN ΛC ΛD ΛN
Argentina 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Austria 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.170 −0.175 −0.126 0.101 0.095 0.059
Bangladesh −0.205 −0.210 −0.226 −0.181 −0.188 −0.208 −0.183 −0.188 −0.222
Belgium 0.145 0.151 0.184 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.085 0.079 0.044
Brazil 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Canada 0.340 0.340 0.385 −0.065 −0.072 −0.031 0.562 0.567 0.608
Chile 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
China 0.022 0.038 0.047 −0.306 −0.275 −0.259 0.261 0.267 0.270
Czechia 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.170 −0.175 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Egypt 0.335 0.339 0.312 0.283 0.285 0.240 0.394 0.397 0.399
France 0.466 0.468 0.519 0.119 0.109 0.157 0.695 0.697 0.748
Germany −0.297 −0.298 −0.260 −0.175 −0.177 −0.125 −0.343 −0.339 −0.308
India 0.295 0.275 0.298 −0.049 −0.078 −0.017 0.552 0.536 0.526
Indonesia 0.053 0.054 0.037 −0.037 −0.036 −0.035 0.115 0.116 0.086
Iraq −0.043 −0.027 0.001 −0.135 −0.112 −0.103 0.000 0.010 0.052
Israel 0.585 0.578 0.568 0.451 0.443 0.384 0.643 0.646 0.657
Italy 0.413 0.415 0.460 0.018 0.007 0.057 0.659 0.658 0.681
Morocco 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Mexico 0.420 0.422 0.386 0.163 0.170 0.111 0.555 0.549 0.527
Nepal −0.039 −0.028 −0.025 −0.067 −0.065 −0.057 −0.066 −0.053 −0.066
Netherlands 0.458 0.469 0.477 0.152 0.172 0.118 0.624 0.626 0.660
Pakistan 0.183 0.173 0.161 −0.131 −0.130 −0.111 0.522 0.502 0.465
Philippines 0.350 0.369 0.396 0.055 0.080 0.072 0.539 0.547 0.574
Poland 0.407 0.411 0.452 0.014 0.011 0.051 0.686 0.684 0.693
Portugal 0.455 0.451 0.441 0.109 0.105 0.074 0.671 0.666 0.666
Romania 0.348 0.336 0.294 −0.041 −0.056 −0.094 0.729 0.728 0.714
Russia 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Saudi Arabia 0.173 0.167 0.167 0.024 0.022 0.080 0.344 0.337 0.309
South Africa 0.516 0.512 0.535 0.292 0.263 0.281 0.693 0.691 0.704
Spain 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059
Sweden 0.305 0.312 0.362 −0.087 −0.094 −0.049 0.486 0.494 0.540
Switzerland 0.339 0.343 0.392 −0.044 −0.052 −0.014 0.550 0.556 0.599
Turkey 0.110 0.123 0.130 −0.192 −0.166 −0.170 0.368 0.373 0.377
UK 0.428 0.443 0.480 0.046 0.059 0.092 0.685 0.694 0.717
USA 0.149 0.155 0.188 −0.169 −0.174 −0.125 0.101 0.095 0.059

Note: ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.

Table 11.

Bilateral and right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test applied under log-returns of the market indexes from Sub-sample 1 and Sub-sample 2. This table presents the p-value of the test. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Bilateral Right tailed
Argentina 0.888 0.444
Austria 0.306 0.153
Bangladesh 0.008 0.004
Belgium 0.992 0.496
Brazil 0.998 0.501
Canada 0.365 0.183
Chile 0.556 0.278
China 0.542 0.271
Czechia 0.461 0.231
Egypt 0.668 0.666
France 0.702 0.649
Germany 0.657 0.672
India 0.112 0.056
Indonesia 0.766 0.383
Iraq 0.991 0.495
Israel 0.966 0.483
Italy 0.966 0.517
Mexico 0.321 0.160
Morocco 0.418 0.209
Nepal 0.001 0.001
Netherlands 0.931 0.465
Pakistan 0.119 0.060
Philippines 0.689 0.656
Poland 0.602 0.301
Portugal 0.783 0.391
Romania 0.597 0.299
Russia 0.440 0.220
Saudi Arabia 0.141 0.070
South Africa 0.686 0.343
Spain 0.776 0.388
Sweden 0.962 0.519
Switzerland 0.998 0.501
Turkey 0.292 0.146
UK 0.793 0.396
USA 0.579 0.289

Note: This table presents the p-value of the bilateral and one-tailed Mann–Whitney test. The bilateral test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1, and the alternative hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is different from sub-sample 1. The right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1. The alternative hypothesis is that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is higher than sub-sample 1. , , and indicate that the test is significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.

Table 12.

Bilateral and right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test applied under aggregated indexes from Sub-sample 1 and Sub-sample 2. This table presents the p-value of the test. Sub-sample 1 comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends data from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Aggregated indexes Bilateral Right tailed
ΛC 0.246 0.123
ΛD 0.367 0.184
ΛN 0.139 0.069

Note: This table presents the p-value of the bilateral and one-tailed Mann–Whitney test. The bilateral test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1, and the alternative hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is different from sub-sample 1. The right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1. The alternative hypothesis is that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is higher than sub-sample 1. ΛN, ΛC and ΛD are the aggregated indexes. ΛN is the naive aggregation (equally weighted); ΛC is based on the number of cases (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 cases); and ΛD is based on the number of deaths (weights returns by the percentage of COVID-19 deaths). Aggregate indexes are built using log-returns (in %) from market indexes of 35 countries with the highest total confirmed cases and/or deaths caused by COVID-19 until November 2020.

Table 13.

Specification of the parametric models used to filter the log-returns of the market indexes, i.e., to compute the mean and the conditional standard deviation of log-returns. The sample period comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Specification Distribution
Argentina AR(1)-GARCH(2, 2) Student-t
Austria AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Bangladesh AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Generalized error
Belgium AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Brazil AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Canada AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Chile AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
China AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 2) Student-t
Czechia AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Egypt AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
France AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Germany AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 2) Student-t
India AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Indonesia AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 2) Student-t
Iraq AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Skewed Student-t
Israel AR(1)-GJR(1, 1) Generalized error
Italy AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Morocco AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Mexico AR(1)-GJR(2, 1) Student-t
Nepal AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 1) Generalized error
Netherlands AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
Pakistan AR(1)-GARCH(1,2) Student-t
Philippines AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 1) Student-t
Poland AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
Portugal AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Romania AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
Russia AR(1)-GARCH(2, 1) Student-t
Saudi Arabia AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
South Africa AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 1) Student-t
Spain AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 1) Student-t
Sweden AR(1)-GARCH(2, 2) Student-t
Switzerland AR(1)-GJR(2, 2) Student-t
Turkey AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 2) Student-t
UK AR(1)-EGARCH(2, 2) Student-t
USA AR(1)-EGARCH(1, 1) Student-t

Note: We choose the best specifications and the model based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).

Table 14.

Specification of the parametric models used to filter aggregated indexes, i.e., compute the mean and the conditional standard deviation of indexes. The sample period comprehends data from November 17, 2018, to October 25, 2021.

Aggregated indexes Specification Distribution
ΛC AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) generalized error
ΛD AR(1)-EGARCH(2,2) generalized error
ΛN AR(1)-EGARCH(1,1) generalized error

Note: ΛN is the naive aggregation; ΛC is based on the number of cases; and ΛD is based on the number of deaths. We choose the best specifications based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).

Table 15.

Bilateral and right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test applied under risk forecasting from Sub-sample 1 and Sub-sample 2. This table presents the p-value of the test. Sub-sample 1 comprehends risk forecasting from November 17, 2018, to November 16, 2019; Sub-sample 2 comprehends risk forecasting from November 17, 2019, to October 25, 2021.

Countries Bilateral
Right-tailed
VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML VaR EL MSD ES EVaR ML
Argentina <0.001 0.805 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.403 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Austria 0.624 0.240 0.618 0.624 0.624 0.628 0.312 0.120 0.309 0.312 0.312 0.314
Bangladesh 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.021 0.979 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
Belgium 0.727 0.849 0.716 0.726 0.727 0.724 0.363 0.424 0.358 0.363 0.364 0.362
Brazil <0.001 0.375 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.187 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Canada <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Chile <0.001 0.294 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.147 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
China 0.002 0.820 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.999 0.410 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999
Czechia <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Egypt 0.013 0.443 0.026 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.222 0.013 0.007 0.006 0.006
France 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Germany <0.001 0.148 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.926 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
India 0.829 0.285 0.881 0.828 0.827 0.824 0.415 0.857 0.440 0.414 0.413 0.412
Indonesia <0.001 0.013 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.006 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Iraq 0.869 0.753 0.867 0.872 0.871 0.868 0.566 0.624 0.566 0.564 0.564 0.566
Israel <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.000 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Italy <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Mexico <0.001 0.036 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.982 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Morocco <0.001 0.011 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.994 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Nepal <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.000 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Netherlands <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Pakistan <0.001 0.039 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.000 0.980 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Philippines <0.001 0.074 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.963 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Poland <0.001 0.915 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.458 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Portugal <0.001 0.003 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Romania 0.030 0.052 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.985 0.974 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985
Russia <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Saudi Arabia <0.001 0.070 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1.000 0.965 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
South Africa <0.001 0.019 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.009 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Spain <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Sweden 0.001 0.243 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.121 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Switzerland 0.001 0.073 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.037 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Turkey 0.015 0.093 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.992 0.954 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.993
UK <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
USA 0.143 0.285 0.133 0.142 0.142 0.145 0.071 0.142 0.066 0.071 0.071 0.072

Note: This table presents the p-value of the bilateral and one-tailed Mann–Whitney test. The bilateral test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1, and the alternative hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is different from sub-sample 1. The right one-tailed Mann–Whitney test has the null hypothesis that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is equal to sub-sample 1. The alternative hypothesis is that the location parameter of sub-sample 2 is higher than sub-sample 1. , and indicate that the test is significant at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively. VaR, EL, MSD, ES, EVaR, and ML, are, respectively, Value at Risk, Expected Loss, Mean plus Semi-Deviation, Expected Shortfall, Expectile Value at Risk, and Maximum Loss.

Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

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