A U.S. Organ Allocation Revolution
In the United States, organ allocation policy is undergoing major revision to reduce geographic disparity that previously disadvantaged candidates living in some parts of the country1. Fixed geographic donor service areas (DSAs) have been replaced with circles that offer organs first to candidates within a certain distance of the donor hospital. Further changes are mandated to eliminate all boundaries, even circles, in favor of continuously varying geographic allocation priority (continuous allocation). The change to circles has been disruptive, increasing the number of transplant centers and candidates required to place a kidney and increasing the logistical burden on transplant centers and local organ procurement organizations (OPOs) that handle deceased donors. Further, circles increased cold ischemia time (CIT) and distribution time. We believe these burdens should be accounted for as the U.S. moves toward continuous allocation.
On March 15th 2021, deceased donor kidney allocation transitioned to an allocation system which uses a 250 NM circle around the donor hospital2. Previously, each OPO worked primarily with the small set of transplant centers in one DSA. Replacing DSAs with circles was predicted to increase the complexity of the allocation system by increasing the number of necessary relationships between transplant centers and OPOs3.
Circles were implemented to align kidney allocation with the Final Rule, by reducing geographic variation in time on dialysis for transplanted patients2. The Final Rule requires that allocation “shall not be based on the candidate’s place of residence or listing”, except to the extent required by other competing interests, among which is to “promote the efficient management of organ placement”4. Our findings suggest circles have decreased the efficiency of organ placement.
Increased Burden Analysis Methods
Using Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipient (SRTR) match run and transplant data for deceased donor kidneys from 10/05/2020 to 10/05/2021, we quantified the change in logistical burden due to circle-based kidney allocation. We compared the median number of transplant centers and candidates required to place a kidney pre- and post-circles. We further stratified this analysis by donor Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) region to determine how the change in logistical burden varied geographically. Finally, we compared mean CIT and mean distribution time pre- and post-circles both nationally and by donor OPTN region.
We defined center number at offer as the number of unique transplant centers that had at least one candidate on the match run with offer number . We defined distribution time as the duration from the match run submission to organ reperfusion, where organ reperfusion was estimated as the time at cross clamp plus ischemia time. Ischemia time was defined as cold ischemia time, plus warm ischemia time when reported.
Results: increased logistical burden of circles
Compared to the pre-circles era, kidneys were offered to more candidates (5 vs 10, p<0.0001) and centers (3 vs 5, p<0.0001) before being accepted; more centers were involved in the match run by offer number 50 (5 vs 11, p<0.0001); CIT increased by 1.7 hours (18.0 hours vs 19.7 hours, p<0.0001); and distribution time increased by 2.2 hours (42.0 hours vs 44.2 hours, p<0.0001) (Table 1).
Table 1.
Increased burden associated with circle-based kidney allocation.
| Pre-Circles | Post-Circles | P | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Median Offer Number at Acceptance* | 5 | 10 | <0.0001 |
| Median Center Number at Acceptance* | 3 | 5 | <0.0001 |
| Median Center Number at Offer 50* | 5 | 11 | <0.0001 |
| Mean Cold Ischemia Time (Hrs) | 18.0 | 19.7 | <0.0001 |
| Mean Distribution Time (Hrs)** | 42.0 | 44.2 | <0.0001 |
Increased logistical burden is geographically heterogeneous, with a higher burden on OPOs and transplant centers in the Northeast and lesser burden for kidneys recovered in the less densely populated West (Figures 1 and 2). Kidneys recovered in densely populated Region 9, which includes New York State and New York City, were offered to many more candidates (10 vs 25, p=0.0006) and centers (5 vs 12, p<0.0001) before being accepted. Median center number at offer number 50 on the match run increased in every region, with the greatest increases being in Region 2 containing Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia (6 vs 20, p < 0.0001), and Region 10 containing Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio (5 vs 17, p < 0.0001).
Figure 1. Geographic Variation of Changes in Logistical Complexity by Donor Region After Circle-Based Kidney Allocation*.

(a) Median offer number at acceptance; (b) Median center number at acceptance; (c) Median center number at offer number 50 on the match run.
* For each match run with at least one bypassed offer, we removed all bypassed offers and renumbered the offer and center number throughout the match run, unless all offers were bypassed until an accepted offer, in which case that match run was removed. When considering offer and center number at acceptance, we only considered accepted offers that ultimately resulted in transplant
Figure 2. Geographic Variation of Changes in Allocation Efficiency by Donor Region After Circle-Based Kidney Allocation.

(a) Mean cold ischemia time; (b) Mean distribution time**.
** Distribution time is defined as the duration from the match run submit date to reperfusion, where reperfusion was estimated as the time at cross clamp plus ischemia time. Ischemia time was defined as cold ischemia time, plus warm ischemia time when reported.
Continuous allocation
Circle-based allocation, like DSA-based allocation, uses hard geographic boundaries that determine which transplant centers will initially receive offers. Continuous allocation, which assigns a numerical score to each candidate according to their medical priority and proximity to the donor hospital, uses no hard geographic boundaries5. Under continuous allocation, a candidate at any transplant center could, in principle, be ranked highly on a match run regardless of location of listing or donor recovery. Consequently, continuous allocation might further disrupt the relationships between OPOs and transplant centers.
Circle sizes, like previous OPTN policies, were chosen ad hoc from a set of plausibly reasonable policies. In contrast, an optimization approach6–8 would apply computational tools to design circles or continuous allocation scores that maximize transplant benefits while enforcing constraints, say, that limit logistical complexity while distributing organs equitably. Since increased burden varies greatly by geography, we could design a geographically heterogeneous continuous allocation score9,10. Before implementation of any continuous allocation system, policymakers could examine the median center number by offer number 50, as we have done, to estimate the potential increase in logistical burden. We recommend approaches like these to carefully design continuous allocation scores to avoid further increased logistical burden in kidney allocation.
Conclusion
Circle-based kidney allocation increased logistical burden by increasing the number of transplant centers and candidates responding to offers before acceptance. Increased burden is likely greater than we estimated, because some transplant centers regularly evaluate offers before becoming primary, and would have evaluated offers beyond those accounted for here. Circle-based kidney allocation is additionally associated with an increase of 1.7 hours in mean CIT and an increase of 2.2 hours in mean distribution time. These delays are plausibly caused by the increased number of centers required to place an organ. We encourage the OPTN to attend to the logistical complexity of match runs in moving toward continuous allocation systems, perhaps by using optimization and design approaches to limit complexity while simultaneously reducing geographic disparity.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The data reported here have been supplied by the Hennepin Healthcare Research Institute as the contractor for the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). The interpretation and reporting of these data are the responsibility of the author(s) and in no way should be seen as an official policy of or interpretation by the SRTR or the U.S. Government.
This study used data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). The SRTR data system includes data on all donor, wait-listed candidates, and transplant recipients in the U.S., submitted by the members of the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN). The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provides oversight to the activities of the OPTN and SRTR contractors.
Funding
This work was supported by grant numbers R01DK111233 (PI: Dorry Segev) and K24DK101828 (PI: Dorry Segev) from the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Disease (NIDDK). The analyses described here are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of Health and Human Services, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government.
Abbreviations:
- CIT
Cold Ischemia Time
- DSA
Donor Service Area
- HRSA
Health Resources and Services Administration
- OPO
Organ Procurement Organization
- OPTN
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
- SRTR
Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients
Footnotes
Disclosure
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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