Abstract
The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus—organism—response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective—objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.
Keywords: radical behaviorism, subjective, objective, dispositions, first- and third-person sentences, private events
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Selected References
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